THE PEACE CONFERENCE--A MONARCHY OR A REPUBLIC?
The Peace Conference met at Shanghai on December 18th.
Dr. Wu Ting Fang, who was the Chief Commissioner on the Revolutionist
side, is well known. He was educated in Hongkong, and afterwards
qualified for the Bar in England. He practised in Hongkong for a
little time, and also acted as Police Magistrate. Later on he joined
the Chinese Government service under the late Marquis Li Hung-chang.
He became Minister to the United States, Spain, and Peru in 1896, and
was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Commerce and then of the
Waiwupu in Peking. In 1906 he became Vice-President of the Board of
Punishments, and was engaged in revising the Chinese code of laws.
He retired in that year, and in 1907 went to the United States a
second time to represent China as Envoy. He is a firm believer in
rational diet. He originated and was made President of the Rational
Diet Society and anti-Tobacco Movement in Shanghai, which became very
popular.
Of the Revolutionary delegates, Wen Tsung-yao also hailed from
Hongkong, and was educated in the Government Central School in that
colony over twenty years ago. After that he was engaged in the
Peiyang University in Tientsin. From 1905 to 1908 he went to Canton
as Secretary to ex-Viceroy Tsen Chuan-hsuan, and in June, 1908, he
was appointed to Lhassa as {186} Assistant-Amban, and was removed
from office after the ex-Dalai Lama was deposed by Edict. Wang
Chung-hui is a Cantonese student who graduated from college in
America. He also studied in Europe, and is versed in law. Wang
Chao-ming is celebrated for his attempt to assassinate the ex-Prince
Regent, for which offence he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He
was released when the recent pardon was granted to all reformers and
political offenders. Wang Cheng-ting, who is a returned student from
the United States, and Hu Ying are delegates appointed by General Li
Yuan Hung.
#Tang Wu
Shao-yi Ting-Fang*
+------------------------------+
#Er Kuan | o o | Wen
Chan. | o o | Tseng Yao.*
| |
#Hsu | | Wang
Ting Lin. | o o | Chou Wei.*
| |
#Chao | | Wang
Chun Ni. | o o | Chow Ning*
| |
#Feng | | New
Ih Tung. | o o | Yung Kee.*
| o |
+------------------------------+
Wang Chen Ting.*
* Republicans. #Imperialists.
Up to the time my manuscript went forward to the publishers I was
unable to get any special information regarding the Imperial
delegates. Of Tang Shao-yi, however, much is known. He had played
many an important part on the political platform of his country, and
was, undoubtedly, a man calculated safely to direct the affairs of
the Imperial side into safe channels. At the time he was appointed
to represent Yuan Shih K'ai he occupied an important position, and,
because he had {187} had a career most successful as a diplomat, was
chosen as the man of all the men the Imperial body were able to
secure as most likely to commit no political errors. Tang Shao-yi is
one of the ablest statesmen in China to-day.
The table at the Conference was arranged as on opposite page.
For more than four hours these two Cantonese--Wu and Tang--with their
colleagues, held secret conference in the Town Hall of Shanghai, with
the object of deciding on terms of peace which were expected to
involve a decision as to the future form of government in China. At
the end of the session the following statement, initialed by both
commissioners, was handed out as a memorandum of the happenings of
the day:--
"1. Exchange of credentials.
"2. Commissioner Tang agrees to wire Yuan Shih K'ai conveying the
demand of the Republicans that the order to stop fighting and
capturing of places by the Manchu Army should be carried out
effectively in Hupei, Shansi, Shensi, Shantung, Anhui, Kiangsu,
and Fengtien, and that no further conference should be held until
a satisfactory reply from Yuan Shih K'ai has been received.
"3. Commissioner Wu agrees to wire to General Li Yuan Hung of
Hupei and the Republican Generals of Shansi and Shensi ordering
them to discontinue fighting and further attacks upon the Manchu
troops."
At the opening of the Conference Mr. Tang made a short address. He
told of his appointment to come to Shanghai for the Conference, and
expressed the hope that it would be successful. He then presented
his credentials to Dr. Wu. The latter examined them, and then
expressed a similar hope that the Conference would result in great
good for China. His credentials were then given to Mr. Tang, and the
Conference was begun. Although these assistants were admitted to the
meeting they had no voice in its affairs, the two commissioners alone
carrying on the discussion. No one of Dr. Wu's assistants was
allowed to address Mr. Tang directly, nor were any of Mr. Tang's
assistants allowed to {188} address Dr. Wu. Instead they could offer
suggestions to their leaders, either by written note or by whispers.
Tang Shao-yi expressed his personal readiness to accept Dr. Wu's
demands for a Republic, but deferred a definite answer until he had
communicated with Yuan Shih K'ai. With the exception of an agreement
that the armistice should be extended for a week, ending December
31st, this was the result of the Conference, as told in the official
statement given out at the end. The statement, headed "Authentic
Account of To-day's Peace Conference," was as follows:--
"1. It is mutually agreed that the armistice should be extended
for a period of seven days, i.e., from December 24, 8 a.m., to
December 31, 8 a.m.
"2. Dr. Wu Ting Fang advocated the necessity of establishing a
Republican form of government for China. He believed that China
is fully prepared to welcome a new Republic. He said, in
substance, as follows:
"The people of China will accept no other form of government than
a Republic founded upon the will of the people. Since we can
appoint delegates to represent us both in the various provincial
assemblies and in the National Assembly at Peking, why are we not
qualified to elect a President as the Chief Executive of the
nation?
"The Manchus have shown their utter impossibility to govern the
people for 267 years. They must go out. A government may be
well likened to a trading company: if the manager through
incapacity or dishonesty causes the failure of the concern, he
has no business to continue in office. A new manager must be
elected by the shareholders. The Republican Party does not
intend to drive the Manchus out, nor to ill-treat them. On the
contrary, they want to place them on perfect equality with the
Chinese, enjoying together the blessings of liberty, equality,
and fraternity."
The official statement of the day's proceedings, as handed out to the
Chinese newspapers, was practically the same as that given to the
foreign papers, except that it contained the following additional
statement as being made by his Excellency Tang Shao-yi:--
"Personally, I am in favour of a Republic, which is the only
solution of the present crisis. But we must not in the
Conference overlook the integrity of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet,
and other dependencies."
{189}
To which Dr. Wu replied:--
"The Republic does not denote the integrity and union of the
eighteen provinces only."
Tang Shao-yi replied to this:--
"I will have to telegraph to Yuan Shih K'ai as regards the Republican
question."
This Conference between the plenipotentiaries of the Peking
Government and the Revolutionary groups was looked upon as a meeting
of tremendous importance to the nation of China. Indeed, it was not
too much to say that the fate of the Empire was to turn on the issue.
The whole world would observe the proceedings and criticise the
outcome with intense interest. Tang Shao-yi and Wuting-Fang, chief
plenipotentiaries of the opposing parties, were to either earn the
applause of civilisation or be condemned for having failed to rise to
the opportunity of setting China firmly in the path of progress,
which was to be presented by this extraordinary collocation of
circumstances.
First may be considered what the situation probably would be if
hostilities were resumed. At present the Yangtze River approximated
a dividing line between territories controlled by the Government and
Revolutionaries. Some localities north of the river had been in
revolt, but a majority of these had returned to Imperial allegiance,
being apparently satisfied with the concessions granted, and others
showed a disposition to do the same. It seemed reasonable to assume
that if the nation were to have civil war the country would divide
north against the south, with the Yangtze River as a general line of
demarcation.
The Peking Government had the advantage of being recognised by
foreign nations, a condition which would continue while it remained
in possession of the capital and any considerable region surrounding
it. It had almost all of the modern drilled army, and a great {190}
majority of the trained officers. It had better military equipment.
The Government still controlled the Imperial railways of North China,
the Peking-Hankow Railway, and the Tientsin-Pukou Railway over the
greater part. Thus it would be able to concentrate troops at any
given point along or north of the Yangtze more easily than the
Revolutionists. Moreover, the Imperial troops were accustomed to and
equipped to endure a cold climate, and winter had the northern part
of the country in its grip. What forces the Revolutionaries could
put in the field north of the Yangtze River was not definitely known.
Except a few thousand trained troops, any army assembled for the
purpose of advancing upon Peking or resisting an advance of the
Imperial Army would be composed of raw recruits officered in the main
by inexperienced men. Such an army would be ill provided to
undertake a winter campaign in the north. Without further analysis
the mooted march of a Revolutionary Army to Peking could be dismissed
as visionary, unless it was assumed that the Imperial Army was
disloyal and would desert the Government. There was now no very
tangible basis for such an expectation. Yuan Shih K'ai, the creator
of the new army which had always been loyal to him, still held the
respect of the soldiers. It was one thing for the new army and its
leaders to be dissatisfied with the old order of things at Peking: it
was quite another to assume that it was dissatisfied with the form of
government proposed by Yuan Shih K'ai, its former and present
commander. The army knew Yuan, and what to expect from him. It did
not know the Revolutionary leaders, except one here and there, and it
did not know what treatment it would receive from a Revolutionary
Government after what had happened. If it were assumed that the
Northern Army would remain loyal to Yuan Shih K'ai, an early
occupation of Peking by the Revolutionists was practically
impossible. This was a task which would require a campaign of a year
{191} or perhaps more--if it could ever be accomplished. The
Imperialists might not have been able to penetrate south of the
Yangtze, but they would have had no great difficulty in holding the
territory under their control. And in the event of schisms and
disintegration of the Republicans, the Government should have been
able in time to recover its dominion in all the provinces. This was
a phase which the Revolutionists had to consider. Hitherto the
processes of disintegration and discontent had worked almost
altogether in their favour.
Prolongation of hostilities, therefore, would seem to presage a
temporary, perhaps a permanent, division of the Empire into two
parts, and the subjection of the country and the people to the
horrors and disasters which inevitably attend such internecine
struggles. The calamities which would befall under these
circumstances were obvious. Six months of such conditions would
probably create a counter-revolution in the southern provinces.
Conditions in the north would have been somewhat similar, but
probably not so bad, as the Government had a firmer grip on affairs
and would be able to keep outlawry within bounds. In this discussion
it is assumed, of course, that Chinese would be left to fight it out
among themselves, without foreign intervention. Foreign
intervention, which it would be difficult to avoid if hostilities
were to be prolonged indefinitely, would bring its own problems and
dangers. Such aspects were presented by the alternative of war.
These were some of the chief considerations which were to weigh upon
the plenipotentiaries. There seemed only one point of serious
divergence--whether the new Government would follow the Monarchical
or the Republican form. If the former were elected, it probably
would mean that the present Dynasty would be retained, although
perhaps reigning under a different name, for neither Revolutionists
nor Monarchists had another emperor to propose. If a Republic were
to be decided {192} upon, the Government which would be instituted
would differ only in title from a Constitutional Monarchy; therefore,
the argument was more about mere terms than about realities.
Objections to the retention of the monarchy were based upon two
principal theories. One was that with the Manchu Dynasty on the
throne the liberty of the Chinese would not be secure--that the
Dynasty must be overthrown and the capital removed from Peking in
order to shake off for ever the atmosphere and associations of the
old regime. Another objection was that, under the monarchical form,
Yuan Shih K'ai would be virtual dictator, and then he would use his
power to place himself on the throne. In certain quarters Yuan was
certainly credited with having this ambition--as one Chinese put it,
he wanted to be China's Napoleon, not her George Washington. But it
seemed that if Yuan had this ambition, a Republic such as would of
necessity exist in China would be exactly what he would want.
Napoleon began his rise to power as a Republican. If Yuan desired to
make himself emperor, he could adopt no more favourable course than
to accept the presidency of a Republic now, biding his time, as
Napoleon did, until the inevitable reaction set in, and the
transition back to an Empire would be comparatively easy. On the
other hand, continuation of the Dynasty and Imperial forms
constituted a check on such ambition, if it existed, for it provided
a focus for loyalty of the people without in any practical way
hampering administration of the Government on constitutional lines.
Should Yuan Shih K'ai concede the point at issue and assent to a
Republic, what then? A Republic would have the same difficulties as
a Constitutional Monarchy, difficulties which well might baffle the
ablest statesmanship. If peace should be established, there still
would remain all the great problems which make China an invalid among
nations, accentuated by famine, and the strain of the Revolution.
Could a Republic solve these offhand? Or would {193} a republic have
a better prospect? If there were any difference in favour of either
of the two forms of government a Constitutional Monarchy would have
less difficulty. A Republic would be handicapped in its attempts to
restore order, and put the administration of the Government back on a
normal basis by expectations of the people which it could not fulfil.
To do this it would be compelled to have money. It would be
compelled, almost immediately, to make a foreign loan, a policy which
Revolutionists had been denouncing in the Peking Government. It
would be compelled to continue many forms, conditions, and processes
which Revolutionists had criticised in the Manchu Government, and had
led the people to expect would be abolished immediately. It would
have to resume collection of taxes in localities where the
Revolutionary Press had led the people to believe they would be
reduced or abrogated altogether. It would, until a new code be
devised and put into operation, have to administer the existing laws.
In short, a Republican Government would be absolutely compelled to do
many of the things which its leaders had been criticising the Manchu
Government for permitting. It would have to reckon with a large
number of upstart leaders and their henchmen brought forth by the
Revolution, and who one and all looked forward to securing good
positions in the new Government. What the immediate future of China
would be under a Republic none could at the time of the Conference
foresee.
And although the issue of the Revolution remains still in doubt, one
was at the start of the Conference in a better position to realise
the nature and strength of its motive forces. Clearly this
Revolutionary movement in China was not inspired solely or even
mainly by the desire to press through a reform, too long delayed, of
the corrupt Chinese Government. Nor was the general cry that the
Manchus must be eliminated due solely or even mainly to a
well-grounded disbelief in {194} the will or the power of the Tartar
Dynasty to break with its tradition of misrule. The movement, which
had spread like wildfire throughout the length of China, from the
province of Chihli in the extreme north to that of Kwangtung in the
extreme south, was clearly a national uprising of the Chinese against
what was regarded as a degrading foreign domination. It had borrowed
the political cries of the Liberal West; it had clothed itself, in
those centres where it was victoriously established, with the forms
of republican government; but its dynamic force was derived, at least
among the ignorant masses, for whom constitutional government was a
meaningless phrase, from the traditional feelings of a people which
had for three hundred years past been restive under the Tartar yoke.
Nothing could show this more clearly than what had everywhere been
the first act of emancipation--the cutting of the queue, for the
shaven head and queue were imposed in the seventeenth century upon
the Chinese as a symbol of subjection by the conquering Manchus.
Everywhere people had, from the start of the Revolution, been taking
off their queues, and, although an Imperial edict had made it
optional for the people to discard or retain them, the Imperialists
had killed hundreds of peaceable folk merely because they were found
without their queues. The rebellion thus took its place in a series
of national uprisings against the Tartar rulers, and it was, as will
be seen in the later portion of this volume, not without significance
that it gained its most conspicuous initial successes precisely in
those maritime provinces in which the appearance of the dispossessed
Chinese Ming Dynasty held out longest against the Manchu usurpers.
If the movement had taken on fresh forms, said a writer in a London
journal, this was due to the exigencies of changed conditions. The
Kwangsi rebels in 1850 set up as Emperor, with the name of Tien-te
("heavenly virtue") a youth said to be the representative of the
{195} last Ming Dynasty. The movement languished until the
redoubtable Hung Siu-tsuan swept the Pretender aside, courted foreign
favours by declaring himself a Christian, and, after capturing
Wuchang and Nanking, proclaimed himself the first Emperor of the
Taiping Dynasty as Tien Wang ("heavenly king"). His hideous
atrocities, continued the writer quoted, and a too fantastic
description of the physical attributes of the deity--the outcome of a
"vision" intended to impress the missionaries--alienated all foreign
sympathy, and on the eve of his complete success his power was
shattered by the Government troops, organised and led by "Chinese
Gordon." The secret of his power lay in the absence of the
legitimate "Son of Heaven" of the old Dynasty, in his claim to a new
commission from Heaven itself.
[Illustration: YIN CHANG. Minister of War of the Manchu Government
at the beginning of the Revolution, and Commander-in-Chief of the
Imperial Troops in Hupeh Province.
TANG SHAO-YI. Peace Commissioner for the Manchu Government and
Premier of the Provisional Military Government of the United Republic
of China.
FENG KUO-CHANG. Commander-in-chief of the First Expedition of the
Imperial Troops for the Relief of Hupeh.]
Now, General Li Yuan Hung and those associated closely with him made
no such claim. The younger Revolutionists were, for the most part,
trained in the schools of the West, and their appeal for Western
sympathy took a new form. At the time it was impossible to foresee
how, in the long run, the idea of a democratic Republic would appeal
to a people steeped in the political philosophies of Confucius, with
its conception of parental rights and filial duties as the
fundamental basis of government.
So far, indeed, the claim that from Chihli to Kwang-tung, and from
Shantung to Szechuen, the provinces had approved the Republic seems
to have been justified. It would seem, then, that, no scion of the
old Imperial house being available, the Chinese would have been able
to reconcile themselves to the creation of a United States of China,
under an elected President, in which case it was at the time
interesting to speculate whether a too patent breach with the past
might be avoided by retaining a ceremonial "Son of Heaven," who, like
the King Archon at Athens or the Rex Sacrificulus of Rome, would
continue to offer the traditional sacrifices to the Fountain of
Authority.
{196}
It was to decide this and much more that the Peace Conference of last
December was convened, but nothing but disappointment followed.
The plenipotentiaries, themselves actually agreeable to the main
issue at stake, were overruled by Yuan Shih K'ai. Day after day
wires were passing frequently between Yuan and Tang, and all looked
anxiously towards Shanghai for the final word of the war. The
Republic seemed already to have been born, and the five-coloured flag
in Shanghai's streets heralded its dawn. But Yuan was obstinate,
obdurate as a mule. In the end, after endless discussions on the
situation, he repudiated Tang Shao-yi's power, declared that Tang
could not finally negotiate upon any question, although his
credentials showed that in him full power had been invested, and in
the end the Conference merely "fizzled out."
The next scene presents Dr. Sun Yat Sen on the Republican platform.
The civilised world then looked to him to solve this political
conundrum--and he was voting plump for the Republic. He had now
arrived in Shanghai, and his presence totally altered the
situation.[1]
[1] The following article, from the pen of Charles Spurgeon Medhurst,
setting forth the claims of a Republic and a Monarchy, and printed in
the _China Press_ of Shanghai, on December 13, 1911, will be of
interest to the reader at this juncture:--
"Representative government with a scion of the Dynasty, not
necessarily the infant Emperor, as its head, or representative
government without any link with the past, is the problem on which
hangs the issue of peace or war in China, and yet, so far as the
freedom of the country is concerned, the difference between these two
ideals is as the distinction between the good old English russet
grown in the West of England, and a bellflower cultivated on the
western slopes of the Pacific. Both are good eating apples. The
preference for one before the other is a matter of taste. One may,
indeed, almost say that the Imperialists are Republicans, and that
the Republicans are Imperialists, for the Republican insists as
strongly as his brother Imperialist that there must be a strong
central authority, and the Imperialist {197} clasps hands with his
Republican comrade in his anxiety that the control of national
affairs shall be in the hands of the people. To borrow an expressive
simile recently used by Dr. Wu in reference to something else, the
bottle is different but the brand is the same. Each side is pledged
to give the nation freedom from all authority, excepting such as the
nation itself imposes upon itself. Between Imperialist and
Republican the difference is, in reality, one of form and not of
substance. A general recognition of this fact will clear the
atmosphere, and make it easier to perceive the imperative needs of
the moment. There is the more urgent demand that this should be
brought about because in their enthusiasm over the prospects of the
new dawning day many of our Chinese friends have mistakenly persuaded
themselves that Democracy is the greatest gift the Occident has for
the Orient. But the last mail brought us a message from Dr. Inge,
the Dean of St. Paul's in London, that Democracy is perhaps one of
the silliest of modern fetishes. It is incumbent, therefore, on
those of us in China who agree with the Dean to speak out plainly at
this critical juncture, lest our Chinese hosts blindly step on to a
devious and a dangerous path. The duty becomes still plainer when we
recall a recent speech by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in which he hinted that
universal suffrage for men and women would be the note to which the
tune of the new Republic would be keyed.
"For any good result to come from a universal suffrage there must
have been many previous years of universal education, but even with
this advantage Democracy becomes for the most part little more than a
dream, a good catchword but impossible politics. Constitutional
government has nowhere as yet been perfected. The best we have is an
adaptation of realities still unrealised. Like everything else at
this stage of our progress, it is a compromise. Its methods give no
sign of finality; in all countries it is what must take place in
China, an adaptation to existing circumstances. None know better
than the Chinese that co-operative compromise with the ideas of
others is the foundation of all order. What else are the mutations
of the Yin and the Yang? If these do not harmonise disorder ensues.
In the same way there can be no peace in China until Republicans and
Imperialists work together. That autocracy has been abused is no
reason why Republicans should seek to replace it by a system which
many residents of democratic countries, as witness the observations
of the London dean, are beginning to regard as false in its premise.
Because a revolution has shown it to be the will of the country that
there should be a change in the administration of Chinese affairs
there is no reason why Imperialists should not unite with Republicans
in friendly conference, and see if between them it be not possible to
evolve an administration better than any now existing, and thus
magnify their proud position of being the oldest nation in the world.
Both sides are Chinese. Why not meet and set younger civilisations
an example in civics?
"If democracy be a dream, self-government is an illusion. There
never has been and never will be any society, or any body, which is
self-governed. We are not even free to wear the clothes our
inclination suggests. Madame Fashion cuts the cloth and purchases
the material. Government (to quote a French expression) is always an
'affair of two.' Like love-making, it is a matter of one yielding to
the other. In the same way self-respect is not self-respect but the
approbation of my lower to my Higher, the God within me.
Self-control is not self-control, but the obedience of my passional
nature to the Divine enshrined within. Self-government is not
self-government, but the government of one part by another part, of
the unfit by the fit, of the masses by the classes, of the uneducated
by the educated. Anything else would be incompetence, injustice, not
liberty. There cannot be equality and fraternity in government.
There is much truth in Lao Tzu's paradox, 'When the people are
difficult to control it is because they possess too much worldly
wisdom.' Democracy is an idol many of its worshippers are ceasing to
respect, and facts should be known before a temple to its honour is
erected in China. What is wanted is an Autocracy in its proper
place, not an autocracy of birth, of money, or of clamour, but an
autocracy of character, of self-sacrifice, and ability. This is
China's hour, a challenge to her strong men to devise something
characteristic of herself, and not merely to imitate Western
Constitutions.
"If this is to be successfully accomplished, preconceived ideas must
be kept fluid when the peacemakers meet in the coming Conference.
Republicans must remember that to imagine a Democracy without an
oppression is idle. Imperialists must consider that to interfere
with the rights of another is wrong. Republicans must not forget
that every democratic government rules by majorities, and that when
the wishes of the minority are overridden an Autocracy in its wrong
place has been substituted for Democracy. Imperialists must not lose
sight of the truth that the yoke laid on the defeated party is no
easier to bear because the coercion comes from an opposing political
body and not from one or two accredited officials, and that coercion
of any sort invites rebellion. Let both sides consider that wisdom
does not always dwell with majorities. History supplies many
instances where the minority of one was right and all the rest wrong.
Being right, he might perhaps efface himself and yield to the general
wish, but he cannot properly be coerced. If Democracy be right, then
coercion is necessarily wrong, whether the pressure be exercised by
individuals or majorities.
"The proper basis for an orderly arrangement of men's common
interests is that all concerned shall discuss in a friendly way with a
{199} Vacant page?
view to agreement. If this prove impossible, then as a general rule
(subject to the elastic dictates of common sense) the question
should, if possible, be shelved as being unripe for decision. If
government by party, such as exists under all Constitutional
Governments be right, if it be right for one party because stronger
to compel the other party because weaker to submit to its ruling,
then might becomes right. In that case Imperialists and Republicans
should continue their fight until one has crushed the other; in that
case the Powers whose interests are jeopardised by the continuance of
the conflict should step in and apply their might also, that right
may be enthroned. If, however, Force be always evil, if the
universal practice of Constitutional Governments in regard to
minorities be wrong, it follows that whichever side refuses to
compromise in the present struggle is also wrong, because by such
refusal reliance is placed on the strength of the arm, instead of on
the might of TRUTH.
"In any event it is ironical inconsistency to employ the harsh
arbitrament of war to decide such a question as the supremacy of the
will of the people until, at least, a vote has been taken and the
consent of those who have lived within the area of the fight has been
obtained to the unavoidable destruction of their property. As there
is no conscription in China the position of the soldier need not be
taken into account. At present the few have spoken for the many, the
leaders on both sides have imposed their will on their followers, and
the masses are afraid to speak. I cannot guess what the verdict on
the Revolution would be were every one heard from individually, nor
does it affect the point at issue. The simple fact remains that
grave wrongs have been inflicted on thousands who have had no chance
to assent or to protest, and that for the rest of their lives they
will be worse off than they would have been under the most tyrannical
government. If it be argued that this 'evil' was unavoidable, that
the Revolution was a cruel necessity, the answer is that it should be
concluded as speedily as possible and recompense given to those who
have suffered. Every unrequited wrong committed in its name, or on
its account, will be a weak spot in the new Government's armour.
"If these paragraphs are felt to be mere counsels of perfection, they
at least emphasise the terrible hurt that will be inflicted on
Righteousness should the fighting be resumed. Conciliation,
submission, compromise are the foundations of Truth and of Liberty,
the binding forces of society everywhere. It is not strength but
weakness which refuses to swerve from an assumed position. The
bravest men are not afraid of inconsistency. As Michael Wood says:
'Humility is the strength of God: the power of everything worth
having. It does not grovel: it is strong. It is seeing true: it is
having your values right. It is knowing what matters and what is
rubbish to be flung away.' Or as Jacob Boehme put it: 'He to whom
Eternity is as Time and Time as Eternity is free from all strife.'
In a word, Democracy can only succeed where all the people are
aristocrats, and now is the time for the leaders on both sides to
prove their aristocracy and their fitness to rule, by gracefully
yielding each to the other. China has always set the world an
example in this particular. She will surely not fail on the eve of
what will doubtless be the most glorious chapter of her memorable
history."
{198}
[Transcriber's note: this page was entirely taken up by part of
footnote 1, which is now on page 196 in its entirety.]
{200}
[Illustration: HWANG HSING. Generalissimo of the Nanking Provisional
Military Government and Chief of the General Staff of the Republic of
China.
DR. SUN YAT-SEN. First Provisional President of the Republic of
China]
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