_Maj Gordon D. Gayle, commander of 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, outlines
in the sand proposed enemy targets in the north for LtCol Joslyn R.
Bailey, Marine Aircraft Group 11. Looking on are Col Harold D. Harris,
5th Marines commander, center, and LtCol Lewis W. Walt, behind Gayle,
5th Marines executive officer._]
A week of such siege-like activity pushed the northern boundary of the
Pocket another 500 yards south. On 12 October, the 3d Battalion, 5th
Marines was called in to relieve 2d Battalion, 5th Marines. The relief
was seriously marred, primarily because the forward positions being
relieved were so close to the opposing enemy. The incoming troops,
including a company commander, were picked off by snipers during this
exchange, and a small group of enemy reoccupied a position earlier
subdued by frequent interdiction fires. Despite these losses and
interruptions, the relief was completed on schedule, and on 13 October,
3/5 continued the slow and deliberate wedging forward.
Directly south of Hill 140, there seemed no feasible axis for advance,
so 3/5’s axis was shifted southwest, approximately paralleling the
West Road, and into the coral badlands in front of the containing
lines manned by the composite groups guarding West Road. While the
composite groups held in place, 3/5 operated across their front, north
to south. By this means the coral badlands were cleared out for an
average (east-west) depth of 75-150 yards, along some 500 yards of the
north-south front. This terrain, earlier judged unsuitable for any
but the costliest and most difficult advance, was now traversed with
the aid of preparatory fire-scouring by napalm bombs. Major “Cowboy”
Stout’s VMF-114 pilots’ bombs fell breathtakingly close to both the
advancing 3/5 front and to the stationary composite units holding just
east of West Road.
A similar effort was then launched from the south by what was left of
Lieutenant Colonel John Gormley’s 1/7. Together, these two advances
seized and emptied about one-half of the depth of the coral badlands,
between West road and the China Wall. This clearing action allowed the
composite “infantillery” unit to advance its lines eastward and then
hold, as far as the infantry had cleared, toward the back of China Wall.
Overall, the actions of the 5th and 7th Marines in October had reduced
the Pocket to an oval some 800 yards, north to south, and 400-500
yards, east to west. According to Colonel Nakagawa’s contemporaneous
radio report back to Koror, he still had some 700 defenders within the
Pocket, of which only 80 percent were effective. In early October, some
wag had suggested that the Pocket situation be clarified by enclosing
it with barbed wire and designating it as a prisoner of war enclosure.
Spoken in bitter jest, the concept did recognize that the Pocket
no longer counted in the strategic balance, nor in completing the
effective seizure of Peleliu.
But it still weighed significantly in the mind of Major General
Rupertus, who wanted to subdue the Pocket before turning over to Major
General Mueller the 81st Division’s previously specified mopping-up
task. In point of fact, Rupertus’ successful seizure of Ngesebus and
northern Peleliu had terminated the enemy’s capability to reinforce the
now-isolated Japanese on Peleliu. Creation of that tactical situation
had effectively secured Peleliu.
Without pressing for a declaration that Peleliu had been effectively
secured, which would have formalized the completion of the 1st Marine
Division’s mission, General Geiger had for some days suggested that
in continuing his attacks into the Pocket, Rupertus relieve first
the 5th, then the 7th Marines with his largest and freshest infantry
regiment, the 321st RCT, still attached to 1st Marine Division. To all
such suggestions, General Rupertus replied that his Marines would “very
shortly” subdue the Pocket.
Two events now overtook General Rupertus’ confidence. First, the 81st
Division was made whole by the return of its 323d RCT, fresh from its
critically important seizure of Ulithi. Second, the perception that
Peleliu was effectively secured was validated by a message which so
stated from Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific
Fleet/Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas. Major General Geiger
was directed to turn over command to Major General Mueller, whose 81st
Division was now directed to relieve the 1st Marine Division, to mop
up, and to garrison Peleliu, as long planned. Rear Admiral George E.
Fort, Rear Admiral Theodore S. Wilkinson’s successor as commander of
operations in the Palaus, was directed to turn over that responsibility
to Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, a sub-area commander. When relieved by
the 81st Division, the 1st Marine Division would embark for return to
Pavuvu.
[Illustration: DRIVE FROM THE NORTH]
During the movement and turnover, tactical operations ashore
necessarily remained under 1st Marine Division control until the 81st
Division could move its command post from Angaur. General Mueller
established his CP near Peleliu’s Purple Beach on 20 October. The
Wildcat Division thereupon acquired “custody” of the Pocket, and
responsibility for final reduction of its determined, able, battered
defenders.
Meanwhile, the relief of the 5th Marines by the 321st RCT took place
on 15 and 16 October. While that relief was in progress, Lieutenant
Colonel Gormley’s 1/7 was still engaged in the earlier-described
coral badlands action, to make possible the eastward movement of
the containing lines protecting West Road. The relief of 1/7 was
accordingly delayed until the next day. On 17 October, a full-strength
Company B, 1/323, newly arrived from Ulithi, relieved Gormley’s
surviving battalion, approximately man for man.
_Post-assault Operations in the Palaus_
When on 20 October Major General Mueller became responsible for mopping
up on Peleliu, he addressed the tactical problem as a siege situation,
and directed his troops to proceed accordingly. Over a period of nearly
six weeks, his two regiments, the 322d and 323d Infantry, plus 2/321,
did just that. They used sandbags as an assault device, carrying sand
up from the beaches and inching the filled sandbags forward to press
ever nearer to positions from which to attack by fire the Japanese
caves and dug-in strong points. They made liberal use of tanks and
flamethrowers, even improving upon the vehicle-mounted flamethrower.
They thrust a gasoline pipeline forward from a roadbound gasoline
truck, thereby enabling them, with booster pumps, to throw napalm
hundreds of feet ahead into Japanese defensive areas. Noting the
effectiveness of the 75mm pack howitzer which the Marines had wrestled
up to Hill 140, they sought and found other sites to which they moved
pack howitzers, and from which they fired point-blank into defending
caves. To support their growing need for sandbags on ridge-top
“foxholes,” their engineers strung highlines to transport sand (and
ammo and rations) up to such peaks and ridgetops.
[Illustration: