_Discovered during a trip to Peleliu in 1994 was this 1,000-man cave,
littered with empty sake bottles, deep in the tunnels in the Amiangal
Mountain in north Peleliu._]
On orders from Colonel Hanneken, the 7th Marines’ commanding officer,
3/7 then captured the high ground which 2/321 had abandoned, but at
a cost which did little for inter-service relations. Thereafter, 3/7
was gradually further committed along the ridge within the 321st zone
of action. This of course stretched 3/7, which still had to maintain
contact on its right in the 7th Marines’ zone, generally facing the
southern shoulders of the Umurbrogol Pocket. Further north, as the
321st pressed on, it was able to regain some of the heights above its
axis of advance, and thereafter held onto them.
Abreast the northern end of Umurbrogol Pocket, where the sinkhole
terrain blended into more regular ridgelines, the 321st captured
parts of a key feature, Hill 100. Together with an adjacent hill just
east of East Road, and designated Hill B, that position constituted
the northern cap of the Umurbrogol Pocket. Seizing Hill B, and
consolidating the partial hold on Hill 100 would occupy the 321st for
the next three days.
As the regiment probed this eastern path across the north end of
Umurbrogol, it also pushed patrols north up the West Road. In the
vicinity of the buildings designated “Radio Station,” it reached a
promising road junction. It was in fact the junction of West and
East Roads. Colonel Robert F. Dark, commanding officer of RCT 321,
determined to exploit that route, back south, to add a new direction
to his attack upon Hill 100/Hill B. He organized a mobile task force
heavy in armor and flamethrowers, designated Task Force Neal, named
for Captain George C. Neal. He sent it circling southeast and south to
join 2/321’s efforts at the Hill 100/Hill B scene. Below that battle,
the 7th Marines continued pressure on the south and east fronts of the
Pocket, but still attacking south to north.
As those efforts were underway, the 5th Marines was ordered into the
developing campaign for northern Peleliu. Now relieved by the 1st
Marines of its passive security mission on the eastern peninsula and
its nearby three small islands, the 5th moved over the West Road to
side-step the 321st action and seize northern Peleliu. Having received
the division order at 1100, the 5th motored, marched, and waded (off
the northeastern islets) to and along the West Road. By 1300, its 1st
Battalion was passing through the 321st lines at Garekoru, moving to
attack the radio station installations discovered by 321st patrols the
previous afternoon.
In this area, the 5th Marines found flat ground, some open and some
covered with palm trees. The ground was broken by the familiar
limestone ridges, but with the critical tactical difference that
most of the ridges stood alone. Attackers were not always exposed to
flanking fires from mutually supporting defenses in adjacent and/or
parallel ridges, as in the Umurbrogol. The Japanese had prepared
the northern ridges for defense as thoroughly as they had done in
the Umurbrogol, with extensive tunnels and concealed gun positions.
However, the positions could be attacked individually with deliberate
tank, flamethrower, and demolition tactics. Further, it developed that
the defenders were not all trained infantrymen; many were from naval
construction units.
On the U.S. side of the fight, a weighty command factor shaped the
campaign into northern Peleliu. Colonel Harold D. “Bucky” Harris was
determined to develop all available firepower fully before sending his
infantry into assault. His aerial reconnaissance earlier had acquainted
him with an understanding of the terrain. This knowledge strengthened
his resolve to continue using all available firepower and employing
deliberate tactics as he pursued his regiment’s assigned missions.
On the afternoon of 25 September, 1/5 seized the Radio Station complex,
and the near portion of a hill commanding it. When 3/5 arrived, it was
directed to seize the next high ground to the east of 1/5’s position.
Then when 2/5 closed, it tied in to the right of 3/5’s position, and
extended the regimental line back to the beach. This effectively
broke contact with the 321st operations to the south, but fulfilled
Colonel Harris’ plans to advance north as rapidly as possible, without
over-extending his lines. By suddenly establishing this regimental
“beachhead,” the 5th Marines had surprised the defenders with strong
forces challenging the cave defenses, and in position to engage them
fully on the next day.
[Illustration: NORTH PELELIU & NGESEBUS