_At a conference held in the 1st Marine Division command post, Col
Harold D. “Bucky” Harris, 5th Marines commander, center, explains to
MajGen Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, III Amphibious Corps, left,
and MajGen William H. Rupertus, commander of the division, his plan of
operations in northern Peleliu._]
Furthermore, the Marine front lines in the Umurbrogol had by now
reached close to what proved to be the final Japanese defensive
positions. Intelligence then available didn’t tell that, but the
terrain and situation suggested that the assault requirements had
been met, and that in the Umurbrogol it was time for siege tactics.
The Japanese defenders also learned that when aerial observers were
overhead, they were no longer free to run their weapons out of their
caves and fire barrages toward the beach or toward the airfield.
When they tried to get off more than a round or two, they could
count on quick counter-battery, or a much-dreaded aerial attack from
carrier-based planes, or--after 24 September--from Marine attack planes
operating from the field on Peleliu.
[Sidebar (page 20): A Paucity of Reserves
Planning for the seizure of the southern Palaus (Angaur and
Peleliu-Ngesebus) had been the responsibility of III Amphibious Corps
(Major General Roy S. Geiger). But General Geiger and his staff had
been fully occupied during the critical planning weeks, up to and
including the capture of Guam, from 21 July to 10 August. The Guam
operation ended more than a month later than originally contemplated.
Meanwhile, someone else had to fill the corps planning function for the
Palau undertaking. A temporary headquarters, X-Ray Corps, under Major
General Julian C. Smith was established. The two major tactical tasks
of the southern Palau operation were assigned to the Army 81st Infantry
Division (Angaur) and 1st Marine Division (Peleliu-Ngesebus). The 81st
Division was also tasked to set aside one RCT as corps reserve.
This partition of division level-planning effort was convenient, but it
slipped into a gross imbalance in force allocation which was neither
recognized nor corrected as plans progressed toward operations. The
1st Marine Division had nine infantry battalions with which to attack
more than 10,000 defending Japanese on Peleliu. Major General Paul
J. Mueller’s 81st Infantry Division had six infantry battalions with
which to attack 1,500 (earlier reported as 2,500) Japanese defenders
on Angaur. Terrain and circumstances on the two objective islands were
similarly imbalanced. Peleliu was considerably larger and had far
more complex terrain. Its defensive fortifications were obviously far
more developed, and it offered fewer predictable landing beaches than
Angaur. Only the subsequent rapid shifting of plans and higher-level
responsibilities can account for such force allocation imbalance not
having been corrected at Corps or Expeditionary Troops level. The
effect of all these imbalances was still further magnified between 13
and 17 September. Higher level changes in plans and naval decisions
stripped III Corps of all its reserves.
]
_The Early Battle in the Division Center_
On D plus 1, when the 1st Marines had launched their costly Umurbrogol
assault, the 5th Marines on its right also faced an assault situation,
but one of substantially less opposition and easier terrain. Lieutenant
Colonel Boyd’s 1/5 had to fight across the airfield, from southwest to
northeast, and through the built-up area similar to that which faced
Honsowetz’s 2/1. The battalion was subjected to observed fire from
the Umurbrogol and to small arms fire from Japanese defenders in the
rubble-filled built-up area. Boyd’s coordinated tank-infantry attack
quickly carried the day. He soon had control of that area, and the
east-west, cross-island road, which could lead the 5th toward its next
objective, the eastern peninsula of Peleliu.
On the 5th Marines’ right, 2/5 had a more difficult time. Its progress
was stubbornly opposed by infantry from the woods on its right, and
by artillery from Umurbrogol, which took a particular interest in the
tanks 2/5 was using to support its attack along the edge of the woods.
Whether the Japanese infantry in those woods had been posted to defend
that position, or whether they were just surviving Japanese infantry
from the D-Day counterattack, was never established. The fight took
all day and inflicted heavier casualties on Gayle’s battalion than had
D-Day. By dusk, 2/5 had battled beyond the north end of the airfield,
and halted for the night near the woods concealing the approaches to
the eastern peninsula.
As the two-battalion attack of the 5th Marines (D plus 1) was heavily
engaged on its front and right, the regimental headquarters near the
beach was hit by an artillery barrage which, coupled with D-Day’s
loss of 3/5’s commanding officer and executive officer, engendered a
significant rearrangement in command assignments. The early D plus
1 barrage hit the regimental CP, took out numbers of the staff, and
buried the regimental commander in the crumbling Japanese antitank
trench in which the CP was “sheltered.” Fortunately, the burial was
temporary, and Colonel Harris emerged with a twisted and battered leg,
but still able to hobble. Two of his principal staff officers were
casualties, and his sergeant major killed. Harris elected not to be
evacuated, but he needed help in the regimental CP. Ordering Lieutenant
Colonel Walt back from the 3d Battalion to the regimental CP, Harris
directed the commanding officer of 2/5 to send his executive officer,
Major John H. Gustafson, to take command of 3/5. Then Harris directed
Boyd to send his 1/5 operations officer, Major Hierome Opie, to join
3/5 as Gustafson’s executive officer.
Fortunately, 3/5 was having a relatively quiet day, unlike its
hair-raising regrouping on the night of D-Day. After daylight, as 2/5
attacked north, 3/5 stretched along the east edge of the mangrove
lagoon which separated Peleliu from the eastern peninsula. In that
position, 3/5 also tied into 3/7 as that battalion attacked south.
Thus 3/5 protected each regiment’s flank against any Japanese movement
across the intervening water, and into the rear of the attacking
battalions. No such threat developed, and as the afternoon grew on,
there emerged a more pressing employment for 3/5.
As Walt returned to his post beside the now only semi-mobile Harris,
Major Gustafson was told to get 3/5 into position to bolster and then
relieve 1/5, as it closed in on its O-2 objectives.
Throughout the next day (D plus 2), the 5th Marines kept tied in with
the 1st Marines on its left and captured some control of the foot of
the East Road. On the right, 2/5 hacked and combed its way through the
jungle and mangrove north of the airfield, alongside the road leading
toward the eastern peninsula. The thick scrub, nearly impenetrable,
reduced progress to a crawl. It compensated by concealing most of the
advancing Marines from enemy observation from high ground to 2/5’s
north and northwest.
That 5th Marines’ forward position generally coincided with the
northeast sector of the airfield earlier mentioned. Possession of that
visual boundary meant that in most places on the regimental right,
frontline Marines were spared the hostile observation and directed
fire from Umurbrogol. As with the 7th Marines, largely hidden in the
jungle of the south, this lessened the need for headlong assault. There
would now be freedom to maneuver more deliberately and to coordinate
supporting fire more carefully.
_The 7th Marines’ Complete Destruction of Enemy in the South_
In the south, from D plus 1 through D plus 3, the 7th Marines was in
vigorous assault against extensive fortifications in the rear of the
Scarlet Beaches. These were defended by a full battalion, the elite
_2d Battalion, 15th Regiment_. Although isolated and surrounded by the
Marines, this battalion demonstrated its skill and its understanding of
Colonel Nakagawa’s orders and mission: to sell Peleliu at the highest
possible price. The 7th Marines attacked with 3/7 on the left and 1/7
on the right. They enjoyed the advantage of attacking the extensive
and well-prepared defenses from the rear, and they had both heavy fire
support and the terrain for limited maneuver in their favor. Both sides
fought bitterly, but by 1530 on 18 September (D plus 3), the battle
was substantially over. The Marines had destroyed an elite Japanese
reinforced infantry battalion well positioned in a heavily fortified
stronghold. Colonel Hanneken reported to General Rupertus that the 7th
Marines’ objectives he had set for D-Day were all in hand. The naval
gunfire preparation had been significantly less than planned. The
difference had been made up by time, and by the courage, skill, and
additional casualties of the infantry companies of 1/7 and 3/7.
Now the 7th Marines, whose 2d Battalion was already in the thick of
the fight for Umurbrogol, was about to move out of its own successful
battle area and into a costly assault which, by this time, might have
been more economically conducted as a siege.
_Maneuver and Opportunity_
As the 7th Marines moved to its mission, the 5th Marines was again
successfully opening up opportunities on Peleliu’s eastern, “lobster
claw” peninsula. Most of those opportunities, unfortunately were never
exploited.
By the end of D plus 2, the 5th Marines stood at the approach to the
eastern peninsula, and astride the East Road just east of the 1st
Marines’ terrible struggle in Umurbrogol. It had fought somewhat clear
of the galling fires from Umurbrogol, and planned an assault on the
eastern peninsula across a narrow causeway, which the Japanese should
certainly defend. Then a D plus 3 reconnaissance of the causeway
revealed that the causeway was not defended. The 2d Battalion hastened
to seize the opportunity and moved across in strength. The attack was
hit by its own supporting fires. The forward battalion CP group was
strafed by Navy planes and then hit by artillery airburst, causing the
loss of 18 battalion headquarters personnel to “friendly fire.”
Nevertheless, a bridgehead across the causeway was well established
on D plus 3, and the 5th Marines’ Colonel Harris moved to exploit it.
During the afternoon, he thinned his forces holding the East Road
sector, gave the former 3/5 mission to Company L, 3/5, and gave the
remainder of 3/5 a new mission. He ordered Gustafson into a position
within the bridgehead established by 2/5, and further ordered both
battalions then to capture and clear the eastern peninsula. Earlier he
had expected such an attack to be against the strong defending forces
originally reported on the eastern peninsula. However, the apparent
reduction of defending forces now appeared to offer an opportunity to
seize Purple Beach quickly, a logistic prize of some significance.
Harris knew that the division would need to shift its logistical axis
to Purple Beach, away from the fire from Umurbrogol, and away from the
threat of westerly storms.
Before dark, Gustafson moved two of his 3/5 companies across the
causeway, and moved his own CP group in with the 2/5 CP, where the two
commanders jointly planned the next day’s advance. Hoping for little
resistance, they directed rapid movement, but armed their point units
with war dog sections to guard against ambush. Their lead companies
moved out just after dawn. In the 3/5 sector, there was an ambush,
but the war dogs warned of, and effectively thwarted, the attempted
surprise.
[Illustration: