With the counterattack over and the Japanese in apparent disarray, 2/5
immediately resumed its attack, moving north along the eastern half
of the airfield. The battalion advanced halfway up the length of the
airfield clearing before it stopped to organize for the night. It was
the maximum advance of the day, over the most favorable terrain in the
division front. It provided needed space for artillery and logistic
deployment to support the continuation of the attack the next day.
However, that relatively advanced position had an open right, south,
flank which corresponded to a hole in the regimental command structure.
At that stage, 3/5 was supposed to maintain the contact between
north-facing 2/5 and south-oriented 3/7. But 3/5’s battalion command
and control had been completely knocked out by 1700. The battalion
executive officer, Major Robert M. Ash, had been killed earlier in
the day by a direct hit upon his landing LVT. About the time of
the Japanese tank attack, a mortar barrage hit the 3/5 CP in the
antitank ditch near the beach, killing several staff and prompting the
evacuation of the battalion commander. As of 1700, the three companies
of 3/5 were not in contact with each other, nor with the battalions
to their right and left.
[Illustration: _The antitank ditch dug by the Japanese along the center
and right of Orange Beaches 1 and 2 soon after the landing became the
locations of command posts of various units. Both the 5th Marines’ and
3/5’s CPs were located there, as was the 7th Marines’, shown here. BGen
Oliver P. Smith with the advance element of the division CP set up in
the ditch also._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 94939
]
The 5th Marines commanding officer ordered his executive officer,
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis W. Walt, to take command of 3/5 and to
redeploy so as to close the gap between 5th and 7th Marines. Major
Gayle moved 2/5’s reserve company to his right flank and to provide a
tie-in position. Walt located and tied in his 3/5 companies to build a
more continuous regimental line. By 2230, he had effected the tie-in,
just in time. Beginning then, the salient which the 5th Marines had
carved between Peleliu’s central and southern defenders came under a
series of sharp counterattacks that continued throughout the night.
The attacks came from both north and south. None of them enjoyed any
notable success, but they were persistent enough to require resupply
of ammunition to forward companies. Dawn revealed scores of Japanese
bodies north of the Marine lines.
Elsewhere across the 1st Division’s front there were more potentially
threatening night counterattacks. None of them succeeded in driving
Marines back or in penetrating the lines in significant strength. The
most serious attack came against the Company K, 3/1, position on the
Point, at the 1st Marines’ left.
In the south, the 7th Marines experienced significant night attacks
from the Japanese battalion opposing it. But the Marines there were
in comfortable strength, had communications to bring in fire support,
including naval gunfire illumination. They turned back all attacks
without a crisis developing.
At the end of the first 12 hours ashore, the 1st Marine Division held
its beachhead across the intended front. Only in the center did the
depth approximate that which had been planned. The position was strong
everywhere except on the extreme left flank. General Smith, from his
forward command post was in communication with all three regimental
commanders. The report he received from Colonel Puller, on the left,
did not afford an adequate perception of 1st Marines’ tenuous hold on
the Point. That reflected Colonel Puller’s own limited information. The
other two regimental reports reflected the situations adequately.
In addition to the three infantry regiments, the 1st Division had
almost three battalions of light artillery ashore and emplaced. All 30
tanks were ashore. The shore party was functioning on the beach, albeit
under full daylight observation by the enemy and under intermittent
enemy fire. The division necessarily had to continue at full press on D
plus 1. The objective was to capture the commanding crests on the left,
to gain maneuver opportunities in the center, and to finish off the
isolated defenders in the south.
[Illustration: