_Cpl Peter P. Zacharko stands by a captured Japanese 141mm mortar,
which rained shells down on the landing beaches and on the Marines as
they proceeded inland._]
Nevertheless, it was by now apparent that the D-Day phase-line
objectives were not going to be met in either the south or the north.
Alarmed at the loss of the desired momentum, General Rupertus began
committing his reserve. First, he ordered the division reconnaissance
company ashore, then, pressing commanders already on the island, he
ordered his one remaining uncommitted infantry battalion, Lieutenant
Colonel Spencer S. Berger’s 2/7, to land. No commander ashore felt a
need for 2/7, but Colonel Hanneken said he could find an assembly area
where it would not be in the way. General Rupertus ordered it to land,
remarking to his staff that he had now “shot his bolt!” Ashore, it was
apparent that what was needed on this hectic beachhead was not more
troops, but more room in which to maneuver and more artillery.
General Rupertus began to make plans to land himself and the main
elements of his command group. Advice from the ADC ashore, and his
chief of staff, Colonel John T. Selden, convinced Rupertus to stay on
the flagship. He compromised that decision by ordering Colonel Selden
ashore. By now, the shortage of LVTs was frustrating the timely landing
of following waves. In consequence, neither Selden’s small CP group,
nor Berger’s 2/7, could get past the transfer line in their landing
craft, and had to return to their ships despite their orders to land.
Into this division posture, at about 1650, Colonel Nakagawa launched
his planned tank-infantry counterattack. All Marine commanders had
been alerted to the Japanese capability to make an armored attack on
D-Day, and were well prepared. The attack emerged from the area north
of the airfield and headed south, generally across the front of the 1st
Marines’ lines on the eastern edge of the airfield clearing. The attack
moved directly into the 5th Marines’ sector where Boyd’s 1/5 was set
in, and stretched across the southern area of the airfield. Marines in
2/1 and 1/5 took the attackers under fire, infantry and tanks alike.
A bazooka gunner in 2/1’s front hit two of the tanks. The commanding
officer of 1/5 had his tanks in defilade, just behind his front lines.
They opened up on the Japanese armor, which ran through the front lines
and virtually into his forward command group. Boyd’s lines held fast,
taking the attackers, infantry and tanks alike, under fire with all
available weapons.
Major John H. Gustafson, in 2/5’s forward command post mid-way across
the airfield, had his tank platoon close at hand. Although the enemy
had not yet come into his zone of action, he launched the platoon of
tanks into the melee. Accounts vary as to just who shot what, but
in a very few minutes it was all over. The attacking tanks were all
destroyed, and the Japanese infantry literally blown away.
Colonel Nakagawa’s attack was courageous, but proved to be a total
failure. Even where the tanks broke through the Marine lines, they
induced no Marine retreat. Instead, the Japanese armor became the focus
of antitank fire of every sort and caliber. The light Japanese tanks
were literally blown apart. More than 100 were reported destroyed.
That figure, of course, reflected the amount of fire directed their
way; each Marine grenadier, antitank gunner, and tanker thought he had
killed the tank at which he shot, and so reported.
[Illustration: PELELIU