Caption by the artist, Tom Lea

“=The Beach ... My First View as I Came Around From the Ramp of our

LVT= _We ground to a stop, after a thousand years, on the coarse

coral.... And we ran down the ramp and came around the end of the LVT,

splashing ankle-deep up the surf to the white beach. Suddenly I was

completely alone. Each man drew into himself when he ran down that

ramp, into that flame. Those Marines flattened in the sand on that

beach were dark and huddled like wet rats in death as I threw my body

down among them._”]

In these underground installations, the admiral’s personnel had well

survived the Task Force 58 March attacks. Above ground, planes and

installations were demolished. As Task Force 58 departed, the Japanese

emerged, repaired what they could, but continued to focus upon

underground installations. Together with a few Korean labor troops,

their numbers totaled about 7,000, most of them lacking training and

leadership for infantry action.

Leadership arrived in the person of Colonel Nakagawa, with his

6,500-man _2d Infantry Regiment (Reinforced)_. They had long

battle experience in China. They were armed with 24 75mm artillery

pieces, some 13-15 light tanks, about 100 .50-cal. machine guns, 15

81mm heavy mortars, and about 30 dual-purpose antiaircraft guns.

Already on the island were a large number of very heavy (141mm)

mortars, naval antiaircraft guns, and rudimentary rocket launchers

for sending up large, unguided naval shells. Most significant, the

regiment had Colonel Nakagawa and his battle-disciplined officers and

noncommissioned officers. Nakagawa had already been awarded nine medals

for leadership against the Chinese and was viewed as a “comer” within

his officer corps.

Immediately upon arrival, Nakagawa reconnoitered his prospective

battle area from the ground and from the air. He identified the

western beaches, the Marines’ White and Orange Beaches, as the most

probable landing sites. He immediately ordered his troops to dig in and

construct beach defenses. At this time, a bureaucratic conflict arose.

Vice Admiral Seiichi Itou, who was the senior officer and the senior

naval officer on Peleliu, resented being subordinate to an Army officer

much junior to him.

From Koror, Lieutenant General Inoue dispatched Major General Kenjiro

Murai to Peleliu, to assume island command and to maintain “liaison”

with Colonel Nakagawa. Murai was young, highly regarded, and, as the

personal representative of Lieutenant General Inoue, was considered

senior to the admiral. He left Nakagawa’s operational mission firmly in

Nakagawa’s hands, as Inoue intended. Throughout the campaign, Nakagawa

exercised operational control, and was assisted and counseled, but not

commanded, by General Murai.

Nakagawa had a sound appreciation of his mission, of the situation,

and of American firepower. He turned his attention to the fullest use

of his principal advantage, the terrain. He so deployed and installed

his forces to inflict all possible damage and casualties during the

anticipated landing, and then to defend in depth for as long as

possible. On Peleliu, that offered a vertical as well as a horizontal

dimension to the defense.

He surveyed and registered artillery and mortar weapons over the

width and depth of the reef off both eastern and western beaches, with

planned heavy concentrations along the fringe of the western reef. In

this he anticipated the American need to transfer follow-on waves from

landing craft to the reef-crossing amphibian vehicles. He registered

weapons on, and immediately inland from, the water’s edge, to subject

landing troops to a hail of fire. Off-shore he laid 500 wire-controlled

“mines.”

[Illustration:

Bloody Beaches: The Marines at Peleliu · 第 9 / 34 题