CHAPTER XI.

THE DEATH STRUGGLE OF FREEDOM.--OCTOBER 1848-AUGUST 1849.

Division of Feeling among the Magyar Leaders.--Arthur

Goergei.--Ground of his quarrels with Kossuth.--Bem.--The

Volunteers.--The Plan of Defence.--The Flight to Debreczin--The

Proclamation at Waitzen.--Effect of Hungarian Conscription Law in

Transylvania. Puchner and the Roumanians.--Puchner finally adopts

their Cause.--Avraham Jancu.--The Saxons and Roumanians.--Bem in

Transylvania.--His Character and Work.--The Appeal to General

Lueders.--The Russians in Transylvania.--The Capture of

Hermannstadt.--Bem and Csanyi.--The Reign of Terror.--The Death of

Roth.--Goergei and Dembinski.--Effect of Francis Joseph's coup

d'etat.--Why it did not produce greater results.--The Race

Feuds.--The Constitutional Difficulty.--The Declaration of

Independence.--Kossuth's Power and its Causes.--The Struggle in

Rome.--The Triumvirate and their Difficulties.--Order and

Liberty.--The Danger from France.--A Pacific Candidate.--The

Collapse of the Tuscan Movement.--The Final Struggle and Fall of

Sicily.--The French Expedition.--The Landing at Civita

Vecchia.--Oudinot and Manara.--The Occupation of Civita

Vecchia.--The March to Rome.--Guerra! Guerra!--The Repulse of the

French.--The Debates in France.--The Defence of Bologna.--Lesseps

in Rome.--Lesseps and Oudinot.--French Treachery.--Garibaldi and

Roselli.--Further Treachery.--The Fight by the Vascello.--Ledru

Rollin's Insurrection.--The Final Struggle for German Liberty and

its Failure.--The Final Struggle in Rome.--Mazzini's

Proposals.--Decision of the Assembly.--Garibaldi's last

Effort.--"Cardinal" Oudinot in Rome.--The Struggle in

Venice.--Manin and Kossuth.--Kossuth's Blunder.--Goergei's

Policy.--The Russian Invasion of Transylvania.--The Struggle at the

Temos Pass.--Bem and Kossuth.--Kossuth's Resignation.--The

Surrender at Vilagos.--The Cholera in Venice.--The Final

Surrender.--Manin's Stone.--General Estimate of the Struggle and

its Results.

The battle of Schwechat had brought into prominence the great

difficulties with which the Hungarian Government had now to contend.

The flight of the Count Palatine, and the resignation of Batthyanyi,

had thrown the government into the hands of the Committee of Defence,

over which Kossuth's power was nearly supreme. But, however much this

concentration of authority in the hands of the most popular leader may

have given strength to the civil part of the Executive, yet the

revolutionary character which it gave to the movement called out

scruples in many military men, who had hitherto been willing to work

with tolerable heartiness for the Hungarian cause. The flight of

Archduke Stephen deprived the Government of that Constitutional

sanction which would have been derived from the presence of an

official directly representing the Emperor; while at the same time,

Ferdinand's approval of Jellacic and the dissolution of the Hungarian

Diet, placed the Emperor and the Magyars in that condition of direct

opposition to each other, which most of the Magyar statesmen had

desired to avoid. This change of position considerably affected the

feelings of the officers, especially of those who had previously

served in the Austrian Army, and in whom the military preference for

Monarchical Government was strongly developed. This feeling had shown

itself even during the struggle against Jellacic's invasion; and it

was this which had led those Magyar officers, who were friendly to the

Viennese cause, to ask for a direct summons from the Viennese

Parliament before they would cross the frontier. Finally, it was this

feeling which had led to those orders and counter orders, and to that

general uncertainty of plan which had ruined the Hungarian cause at

the Battle of Schwechat. Kossuth, and all who wished to carry on the

war vigorously, felt that a change of generals was necessary, if the

freedom of Hungary was not to be destroyed by the internal divisions

of the country. General Moga had therefore to be removed; and

the question was, who was to take his place? It was under these

circumstances that Kossuth called to the front a man whose character

and actions have ever since been the favourite debating ground of the

students of the Hungarian war.[20]

Arthur Goergei had been a lieutenant in the Austrian Army, and, by his

own account, had lived away from Hungary until April, 1848, and was

"nearly ignorant of his country's customs, and above all, wholly

deficient in even a superficial and general acquaintance with civil

administration." He had, however, been made a captain in the newly

raised regiments of Honveds or Home troops of Hungary, in the summer

of 1848. He very soon began to complain of the men who had been

placed over his head; and specially at being superseded on one

occasion by Moritz Perczel. To Perczel he soon began to show the same

insubordinate demeanour which remained ever his characteristic

attitude towards his superior officers; and he was only saved by the

intercession of friends from being shot for disobeying orders. He had,

however, gained credit with some of the fiercer patriots among the

Magyars, by his summary execution of Count Eugene Zichy, who had been

suspected of treason; and this act, though condemned by the more

temperate champions of the cause, was considered to have committed

Goergei so strongly to an anti-Austrian policy, that there could be no

fear of his lack of zeal in the coming struggle. When then General

Moga had shown that, either from military incapacity, or from want of

sympathy with the cause, he was not to be trusted with the command of

the army, Kossuth turned to Goergei, and offered him the post of which

Moga had been deprived. Goergei accepted it; and then there almost

immediately began that long series of differences and difficulties

which was to ruin the cause of Hungarian liberty.

The quarrel between Kossuth and Goergei will always be judged

differently by military and non-military critics; for, setting aside

those unfortunate peculiarities of character which marked both these

leaders, the struggle was one between the ideas of a statesman and the

ideas of a soldier. Kossuth had already had experience of the

difficulties which arose from putting confidence in officers who are

out of sympathy with the cause for which they are fighting; and he was

therefore specially alive to any sign of this want of sympathy in the

successor of General Moga. Goergei, on the other hand, had that

belief, so common in men of his profession, that all political

questions were mainly to be judged from the military point of view;

and that his admitted ignorance in matters of civil administration did

not disqualify him from laying down the law on the most important

affairs of Government. Although he shared Kossuth's distrust for

General Moga, he sympathised with Moga's preference for Monarchical

Government; and although he had fought bravely against the forces of

Windischgraetz at the battle of Schwechat, he had previously declared

that he did not see the solidarity between the cause of Hungary and

that of Vienna; and he held that the oath which the officers had taken

to the March Constitution implied their duty to preserve that

Constitution in the exact form in which it had been originally

granted.

But if Goergei went beyond his province in his interference with

affairs of civil government, Kossuth no doubt, in turn, hampered

Goergei in matters in which he was bound to trust him, so long as he

retained him in his command. But in periods of revolution there always

arise a large number of questions which, in ordinary times, would be

decided on purely military grounds, but which, in that abnormal

state of affairs, become necessarily complicated with political

considerations. It is this peculiarity of circumstances, for which

both statesmen and soldiers find it so hard to make allowance, and

which makes it so difficult to judge justly in such a controversy as

that which we are considering.

The first point of difference between Kossuth and Goergei related to

exactly one of those matters in which military and political feeling

seem most necessarily and reasonably to come into collision. This was

the choice of Bem as a general in the Hungarian army. Bem had

succeeded in escaping secretly from Vienna and coming to Hungary. He

had, indeed, offered his services to the Hungarians at an earlier

period, but Pulszky had persuaded him that he could best serve the

cause of Hungary in Vienna; and now that that city had fallen, he

hastened back to Kossuth. Kossuth and Bem seem always to have

recognized in each other that common faith in the people, and power of

calling out popular enthusiasm, which, in different ways, was the

great strength of both of them. Bem's conduct in the defence of Vienna

had given sufficient pledge of his zeal against the power of Austria,

a zeal which had produced such effect on the imagination of his

enemies that it was said by the Vienna wits that Francis Joseph

ordered the bells of Vienna to be muffled because they would ring out

"Bem, Bem!" But Goergei disliked Bem for the very reason for which

Kossuth approved of him. He considered him a knight errant who

followed revolutionary methods of warfare which were quite unknown to

correct military tacticians; and he soon found that his own estimates

of the different officers under him were quite opposed to those formed

by Bem. Kossuth therefore wisely decided that Goergei and Bem could

not work together, and he despatched Bem to take the command in

Transylvania.

On the next question at issue the balance of opinion will probably be

in favour of Goergei. The volunteers who had been raised by the

national Government were naturally objects of special favour to them;

but they had in some cases shown themselves disorderly; and this

disorder was, no doubt, considerably increased by the return to their

country of Hungarian soldiers who had been stationed in Galicia and

other parts of the Empire. These soldiers had, in many cases, thrown

off the authority of their officers, and asserted their national

rights at the expense of military discipline. Goergei tried to make

special arrangements for so redistributing these recruits as to

utilize their services while preventing the growth of any such

feelings of insubordination as might be likely to spring from their

previous mutiny. In these methods of re-organization the Committee of

Defence saw a tendency to discourage patriotic feeling; and Goergei

found himself opposed in matters where he justly felt that he should

have been allowed some freedom of action.

But an even more important question of controversy was the general

plan of the campaign. Kossuth and the Committee of Defence were

extremely anxious to defend the Western frontier of Hungary, partly in

order to weaken the fears produced by the battle of Schwechat; partly,

as Goergei believed, to make it easier to draw the line between Hungary

and Austria, and so break off political connection between them.

Goergei, on the other hand, held that, since Hungary was now threatened

on north, south, and west, and, since Windischgraetz's army was better

disciplined than the Hungarian soldiers, a defence of the frontier was

impossible, and that it would be better to retreat to Raab and defend

the principal passes across the White Mountains, while removing the

seat of Government beyond the Theiss. In this plan he was at first

over-ruled. But his ideas received apparent justification in the

defeats which he suffered from Windischgraetz; and, on December 19 he

was actually compelled to retreat to Raab.

Then followed an episode which has brought much discredit on Kossuth.

He issued a sensational address, declaring that the Committee of

Defence would be buried under the ruins of Buda rather than desert the

capital. Goergei ridiculed the idea of the defensibility of Buda-Pesth;

but the Committee of Defence insisted; and Goergei was preparing for

battle, when, early in January, 1849, the news suddenly arrived in his

camp that the Committee of Defence had left Pesth without waiting for

the siege, and had retired to Debreczin. But, if Kossuth had been to

blame in these earlier matters of controversy, Goergei now took a step

which certainly seems to justify all Kossuth's subsequent suspicions.

Goergei was, at this time, stationed at Waitzen, a little north of

Pesth; and he there issued a declaration to the army condemning the

policy of the Committee of Defence, and calling upon the officers to

declare that the army was fighting for the maintenance of the

Constitution of Hungary as sanctioned by King Ferdinand V.;[21]

that it will oppose all those who may attempt to overthrow the

Constitutional Monarchy by untimely Republican intrigues; and that it

will only obey orders received from the responsible Minister of War,

appointed by the King.

A few weeks later Goergei was again defeated by Windischgraetz, who,

after the battle, offered him an amnesty, and free life out of Austria.

In answer to this offer, Goergei sent a copy of the proclamation drawn

up at Waitzen, declaring that this was the ultimatum, both of his army

and of himself. By this act it is evident that he called the attention

of the General against whom he was nominally fighting to the internal

party divisions of Hungary. However brilliant Goergei's military

abilities might be, and however unfairly he had been interfered with by

the Committee of Defence, it cannot be wondered at that, after this act

of treachery, they looked upon him with distrust. In the following

month Goergei was deprived of his command and superseded by the Polish

General Dembinski.

In the meantime a struggle of far greater moral importance, though

possibly of less value to military science, was being carried on in

Transylvania. The Roumanian movement had been undergoing the same

change, which had already passed over the national movements of the

Serbs and Croats. As early as June, 1848, the Croatian Assembly had

expressed their sympathy with the struggle of the Roumanians; and even

from the Italians some utterances of sympathy had been heard, in

favour of their kinsmen in Transylvania. The rejection of their

petition by the Emperor, and the consequent persecution by the Magyars

had led the Roumanians to rely upon themselves; and had induced some

of their leaders to look for help rather to the new State which was

trying to struggle into existence in Wallachia and Moldavia, than to

the Austrian Government. In September, however, a new element was

introduced into the struggle by the passing of a Conscription law by

the Hungarian Diet. While the Roumanians resented this, as an attempt

to make them serve under the military leadership of their persecutors,

they also saw that an attempt to enforce a law, passed without the

sanction of the Emperor, was a direct defiance of his authority; and

at a meeting in the town of Orlat, they protested against this

conscription, and declared their preference for the Austrian army, as

against the Hungarian. They now openly announced their separation from

Hungary, and demanded to be formed into an independent nation.

The Hungarians met this demand by authorizing their Commissioner

Berczenczei to summon the Szekler to a public meeting, nominally to

plan the defence of their country, but really as a counterblast to the

demands of the Roumanians.

But the Roumanians felt that it was necessary to strengthen themselves

by an appeal to a recognized authority; and they saw that the

desultory and barbarous warfare, which they had hitherto carried on,

would never suffice to win them the rights which they had now resolved

to claim; they therefore made advances to Field-Marshal Puchner, the

General of the Austrian forces in Transylvania. Latour had for some

time past been trying to stir up Puchner to action; but Puchner had

hesitated to listen either to the Austrian Minister, or to the

Roumanian leaders. He seems to have been a man of much higher type

than most of the Austrian generals who were engaged in the struggles

of this period; and he shrank alike from the underhand intrigues of

Latour, and from the dreadful cruelties of Roumanian warfare. The

latter feeling would have had special force with him at this period;

because the most urgent appeals for his help came from Urban, a former

officer in the Austrian army, who had been the most notorious for his

brutalities of all the leaders of the Roumanians. But, while Puchner

was unwilling to commit himself definitely to the Roumanian cause,

he opposed himself to the reckless persecution which the Magyar

Commissioner Vay had carried on against all who had helped in

organizing the petition of the Roumanians; and Puchner had even gone

to Karlsburg, and successfully petitioned for the release of some of

the Roumanian prisoners. He had hoped, however, to combine this

merciful and moderate policy with the recognition of Vay's authority,

and even with a kind of co-operation with him. But the fiercely

revolutionary character, which the Hungarian Diet began to assume

after the death of Latour, compelled Puchner into more decided

opposition to their proceedings.

On the 8th of October, Kossuth issued an order to the towns of

Hungary, in which he told them that anyone who did not hang out the

Hungarian flag, and express in writing his devotion to the Hungarian

cause, and his willingness to obey the committee appointed by the

Government, should be shot as a traitor; and this savage proclamation

was followed the next day by a command from Commissioner Vay, to the

tax collectors of Transylvania, that they should no longer send the

taxes to the central office at Hermannstadt, but to the office in

Klausenburg, which had hitherto been considered subordinate. As

Hermannstadt was at once the military head-quarters of the Austrian

army and the chief town of the Saxon settlement in Transylvania, this

was a direct attack both on the Imperial power, and on the influence

of the Saxons. A few days later the Szekler, in the meeting which had

recently been summoned, denounced Puchner for his attempt to hinder

that meeting, and formally repudiated his authority.

Puchner now felt that the time had come for action; and, on the

18th of October, he issued from Hermannstadt an appeal to all the

inhabitants of Transylvania, and especially to the official boards. In

this he declared that, since the Count Palatine and his Ministers had

resigned their offices, there had been no legal Government in Hungary.

The Government of Kossuth, which wrongfully claimed to act for the

Emperor, was substituting terror for equality, and had falsely spread

the rumour that the Government desired to use the Roumanians to

oppress the Magyar and Szekler. In order, then, to put an end to

anarchy, and to protect the country from terrorism, he, Puchner, had

resolved to take advantage of the Imperial Manifesto of October 3,

which had placed Hungary under military Government; and he called upon

all boards to act with him in restoring order, and upon the volunteers

and national guards to place themselves under his command.

Nor were the Roumanians content with this official appeal; for their

own national committee issued about the same time, on their own

responsibility, an address to the Szeklers and Magyars. In this

address they declared that they, like the Szeklers and Magyars, had

sympathized with the March movement in Hungary; but that a faction had

now usurped the Government of the country, and was aiming, at once, at

depriving the King of his crown, and the Hungarian Peoples of their

nationality. They hoped that the better part of the Magyars and

Szeklers would unite against this faction; but, if they would not,

then the Roumanians must declare war on them. They promised, however,

to carry on the war in a humane manner, and to spare women, old men,

and prisoners. At the same time, they issued an appeal to their

countrymen, urging them to abstain from cruelties in warfare, as such

practices were unworthy of a free people. The Saxons had, at first,

been somewhat unwilling to act with the Roumanians; but the new

movement seemed to give an opening for better co-operation. Joint

committees of the two races were formed, and Puchner undertook to

organize the soldiers of both races.

Of the Roumanian leaders who now came to the front, the most remarkable

was Avraham Jancu.[22] He had been originally trained as a lawyer;

but, after the meeting in September, he went off to organize the

National Guard in his own mountains; and, when Puchner had issued his

proclamation, Jancu received orders to give his assistance in disarming

the Magyars. This process had been begun by the Roumanians, without

waiting for orders; and it had, in consequence, been accompanied with

many acts of cruelty. Jancu therefore sent down three tribunes with

forces to protect the Magyar families from violence; and he also

persuaded one or two of the towns to surrender to him, that he might

then protect them from ill-treatment. Jancu also won several victories,

and became so formidable to his opponents that he gained the name of

the "Mountain King." But the humane exertions of Jancu and other

tribunes, seconded with all his influence by Puchner, were not

sufficient to keep in check the wildness of some of the Roumanian

leaders. The cruelties which both the Magyars and Szeklers had

committed in the struggle; the summary execution at Klausenburg of

three leaders of the Roumanians, before the actual rising had taken

place, and the reputed crucifixion of another at Maros Vasarhely,

roused the fury of the Roumanians to its highest pitch.

The fiercest hatred of the Roumanians was directed against the

Szeklers who had been their most determined enemies; and General

Gedeon marched against Maros Vasarhely. Its specially isolated

position, and the bad roads in its neighbourhood made it an easy prey

for a General who had some skill in guerilla warfare. The city fell

into the hands of Gedeon, who revenged the wrongs of the Roumanians by

inflicting every species of brutality on the Szekler inhabitants.

Horrified as Puchner was at these cruelties, he did not wholly

understand the character of the men with whom he was working; for, in

one of the orders which he issued, he gave a distinct sanction to the

practice of burning villages. He seems, indeed, to have intended this

form of violence merely to be used as an extreme measure in case of

retreat; but the Roumanians did not so understand it; and when, on one

occasion, Puchner was sternly rebuking some of the Roumanian leaders

for not better preventing the cruelties of their followers, one of

them retorted by appealing to this order.

Besides the difficulties arising from these cruelties, Puchner had

to contend against the continual rivalry between the Saxons and

Roumanians. The former were contemptuous towards their allies; and,

according to the Roumanian theory, were disposed to take unfair

advantage of the Roumanians in the election of the members of the

Committee of Management. Nevertheless, the help of the Saxons probably

enabled Puchner to secure a more orderly Government than he could

have achieved without it; and, amongst others from whom he received

this kind of help, was the Saxon clergyman, Stephan Ludwig Roth, who

had already been known for his efforts to secure German emigrants to

Transylvania. He was appointed by Puchner to govern the district of

Mediasch, in the valley of Kokelburg, where he distinguished himself

by his humanity to the Magyar families who came under his protection,

and showed his large-hearted sympathy by adopting a Magyar child who

had been deserted by its parents. Moreover, Bishop Schaguna, who,

it will be remembered, had discouraged the first risings of the

Roumanians, now joined in with Puchner's plans, and exerted himself to

restrain the violence of his countrymen.

But while Puchner, aided by men like Schaguna, Jancu and Roth, was

endeavouring to check the cruelties which his new followers were too

ready to inflict, there was needed on the other hand an equally strong

influence to restrain the savagery of the Magyar and Szekler. This was

the more necessary, because, whatever injustice these races had

committed towards the weaker races of Hungary, in the state in which

things then stood, the Magyar cause had become identified with the

cause of European freedom. Only in the success of the armies which

Kossuth was trying to organize, did there seem even the least remaining

chance for the overthrow of that Government which was crushing out the

life of Vienna, which had trampled on the freedom of Lombardy, and

which threatened to be the complete inheritor of the old system of

Metternich. But if the Magyar armies in North Hungary were to achieve

either the military or moral success which such a cause required, it

was necessary that, in Transylvania also, the same race should deserve

and obtain a similar success. For that purpose, they would need a man

who would be the equal of Puchner both in generalship and humanity. For

under Puchner's leadership, the Saxons and Roumanians were gaining in

military prowess, even more than in self-restraint, and Klausenburg had

fallen into the hands of the Imperial forces.

Such was the state of things, when, on December 15, it was announced

that Bem had been appointed by Kossuth Commander-in-Chief of the

Transylvanian Army. He at once assembled the officers of the Army

which he was to command, and informed them that he required from them

unconditional obedience. Those who did not obey, he said, would be

shot. Those who did obey he would know how to reward. With these few

stern words, he dismissed them. This address was evidently one which

might either be delivered by a mere overweening tyrant, or by a man of

real genius and strong will, who understood the work that was before

him. A few months served to show in which class Bem was to be

reckoned. Ignoring the Commissioner, who had been sent down, he armed

and reclad his troops; punished disorder with a stern hand, but showed

such personal sympathy with his followers, that he became known as

"Father Bem;" while his enemies soon learned to distinguish him from

the other leaders by his generosity and humanity to the conquered. He

seems to have been one of those born leaders of men, who understand

when to be stern, and when to be indulgent. On one occasion an officer

doubted if he could hold a position. Bem told him that he must either

hold it, or be shot; and it was held. On another occasion his troops,

seized by the panic natural to undisciplined levies, fled before the

enemy, leaving Bem in great danger. He announced afterwards that he

might have had to shoot or flog many of them; but he would not do the

first, because he thought they might still serve their country; nor

the second, because he would not treat them as beasts; and, therefore,

he must forgive them. With regard to his military capacity, although

the conventional military critics were disposed to discredit it, yet

it could not be denied that he taught an undisciplined mob to stand

fire before a regular army, to obey discipline, and even to develope a

courage and capacity which won special applause and honours for the

Szekler nation; that he succeeded in about three months in completely

turning the fortunes of the war in Transylvania; and at a later period

in holding his own for another two months against the powerful armies

of two nations. His personal daring was more like that of a knight

errant than of a modern general. On one occasion, after a battle in

which he had been worsted, he saw some Austrians carrying off one of

his cannon. He darted forward alone, exclaiming, "That is my cannon";

and so cowed his enemies, that they surrendered it at once. On another

occasion he sent an aide-de-camp to call up the rear-guard of his

Army, and found that they had all disappeared, and that he was

continuing the struggle with hardly any followers.

As if to mark the cause for which Bem was fighting as more distinctly

than ever the cause of liberty, Puchner began, in January, 1849, those

negotiations with the Russians which were finally to stamp the

Austrian invasion of Transylvania with the anti-national character

which other circumstances of the struggle might have made doubtful. In

this matter, as in his original adoption of the Roumanian cause,

Puchner seems not so much to have taken the lead as to have been

driven into his position by unavoidable circumstances. Schaguna, whose

prominence among the Roumanians had specially marked him out as an

object of hostility to the Magyar Government, fled from Hermannstadt

on the first news of Bem's arrival in Transylvania, and is believed to

have made the first appeal for Russian help. The Roumanians, whose

kinsmen of the Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia) were in some

alarm about the intentions of Russia, do not seem to have sympathized

warmly with this action of their bishop; but the Saxons were less

scrupulous; and the towns of Kronstadt and Hermannstadt sent a formal

address to General Lueders, the Russian Commander in Bucharest, asking

him to come to their assistance. Lueders answered that the Czar

sympathized with the brave defenders of the Austrian throne, and

wished to respond to their appeal; but that he was unable to do so

without a direct request from the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. Under

these circumstances, Puchner felt himself bound to yield to the wishes

of the Saxons; some of the Roumanian leaders joined in the appeal; and

so, on February 1, formal application was made for Russian help. The

Russians do not seem to have come in great numbers, nor with that

formal announcement of war which accompanied their later invasion, in

June. Bem, at any rate, did not lose courage. Although he had recently

been repulsed by Puchner, he rallied his forces; and, on March 11, he

defeated the Russians before Hermannstadt, and followed up his victory

by the capture of the town. This signal victory secured, for a time,

the reconquest of Transylvania by the Magyars; and, if Bem had

remained in that province, it is possible that he would not only have

retained the territory under Magyar rule, but that he might have made

that rule acceptable to the Saxons, and, in time, even to the

Roumanians.

But behind Bem stood the dark figure of one who had already brought

disgrace and injury on the Magyar cause, and who was still further to

degrade it on this occasion. This was Ladislaus Csanyi, the intriguer

who had introduced into the election of Zala County those elements

of bribery and intimidation which had compelled Deak to refuse

election. Csanyi now desired to put Hermannstadt to the sword; but Bem

interfered, and the Saxons still honour his memory as that of the man

who saved their countrymen from massacre and their chief city from

destruction. Determined to counteract, so far as he could, the brutal

policy of Csanyi, Bem issued a general amnesty to those who had opposed

the Magyar Government; but, unfortunately, that Government believed

that they needed Bem's military talents more than his civil wisdom; and

they despatched him into the Banat, to clear that province also of the

enemies of Magyar rule. So, while Bem was succeeding in battle in the

Banat, Csanyi was undoing his work in Transylvania. With the approval,

apparently, of Kossuth, Csanyi repudiated Bem's amnesty altogether, and

established tribunals in Transylvania for the summary execution of his

enemies and the confiscation of their goods.

There was one victim of this reign of terror whose character and

sufferings stand out in a manner which throws a halo over the Saxon

cause. Stephan Ludwig Roth had, as above mentioned, distinguished

himself by his humanity in the administration of the government of

Mediasch under Puchner's rule; and the Magyar officials of the town of

Elizabethstadt had sent him an address of thanks for his protection of

their town from plunder. But he was hated by the strong partizans of

Magyar rule, as the most illustrious embodiment of the feeling in

favour of Saxon independence; and his attempts to promote the

immigration of Germans into Transylvania had been remembered against

him by those who wished to crush out, in Hungary, all national feeling

except that of the Magyars. Bem had been so well aware of the hatred

which Roth had excited, that he had thought it necessary to give him,

in addition to the general amnesty, a special guarantee for his

safety. In reliance on this security, Roth had retired to his parish

of Meschen, and was living without any apparent fear, when he was

suddenly arrested there by the soldiers of Csanyi, and brought, after

some delay, to Klausenburg. There he was kept in prison, and, though

at first leniently treated, he was, after a time, prevented from

holding any communications with his friends. In the meantime, the

tribunal which was to decide his fate was not allowed to come to a

free decision. The Magyar mob of Klausenburg gathered round the court

and demanded his death; and even those of the judges who were

convinced of his innocence were terrified into voting for his

condemnation. His friends appealed for mercy to Csanyi, but he

indignantly rejected all petitions, declaring that Roth had deserved

ten deaths.

After his condemnation Roth sent the following letter to his

children:--

"Dear Children,--I have just been condemned to death, and in three

hours more the sentence will be put into execution. If anything

gives me pain, it is the thought of you, who are without a mother,

and who now are losing your father. But there are good men who will

advise and help you for your father's sake. The Hungarian foundling

whom I adopted, I entreat you to continue to take care of; only if

its parents should wish for it, they have a nearer claim. Except

for this, I have nothing more in this world. The children of my

church at Meschen, and my Nimisch people I think of in love. May

God make these communities become rich in the fruits of godliness,

like fruit-trees whose loaded boughs hang down to the ground! In my

writing-table are the prospectuses of the school and church

newspaper which is to be published. The body of the nation is

broken to pieces. I do not believe in any binding together of its

limbs any more. So much the more do I desire the keeping alive of

the spirit which once lived in these forms. For that purpose I

entreat my brother clergy whom I leave behind to take care to carry

on this newspaper, in order to keep alive the character, pure

manners, and honesty of will of our people. But, if it is decreed

in the Counsels of History that it must perish, may it perish in a

manner that shall not bring shame on its ancestors! Time flies. I

know not if my sick body can honourably support my willing spirit.

All whom I have insulted I heartily entreat for pardon. For my

part, I leave the world without hate, and pray God to forgive my

enemies. So let the end come in God's name!

"Klausenburg, 11th May, 1849.

"I must add that neither in life nor death have I been an enemy of

the Hungarian nation. May they believe this, on the word of a dying

man, in the moment when all hypocrisy falls away!"

He was shortly after led out to execution. When his sentence was read

out to him, in which he was accused of having taken the sword instead

of the Bible, and of having led on the Saxon and Wallack hordes, he

cried out indignantly, "It is not true. I never carried a sword." He

refused to have his hands bound; and, with his face to the soldiers,

he fell, after the third shot. The captain in command of the soldiers

was so much impressed by the spectacle, that he exclaimed, "Soldiers,

learn from this man how to die for one's people."

But long before Csanyi's reign of terror had reached this climax, the

aspect of affairs in other parts of Hungary had gone through important

changes. The removal of Goergei and the appointment of Dembinski had

caused great irritation among the friends of the former. This

irritation might be somewhat excused by the fact that nearly a month

had elapsed between the time when Goergei had sent his proclamation to

Windischgraetz and his deposition from command; and the deposition even

received an appearance of injustice and hardship from its announcement

at the moment when Goergei had just obtained a victory. But the

opposition to this change of command would have been almost as

certain if the removal had taken place earlier, and under different

circumstances. It was looked upon as a blow struck by the politicians

of Buda-Pesth at the politicians of the army; and the appointment of a

foreigner added an element of national prejudice to the outburst of

professional irritation. Moreover, Dembinski seems to have been exactly

the kind of officer whom Goergei most disliked. His reputation rested on

certain brilliant feats of guerilla warfare in the Polish insurrection

of 1830; and of course Goergei and his friends may have been right in

thinking that such a man was ill fitted to carry on the more regular

warfare which was needed for the defeat of Windischgraetz. But, whatever

excuse they may have had for opposition to the appointment, they

clearly put themselves in the wrong by their evident determination not

to allow Dembinski a fair chance. Goergei, indeed, at first affected to

discourage the protests against Dembinski's appointment; but the

language in which he did so was so evidently defiant in intention as to

call forth a censure from his personal friend, the War Minister

Meszaros; nor was it long before Goergei threw off even this slender

mask, and openly defied Dembinski's authority.

Goergei's faction among the officers was so strong, and the dislike to

Dembinski so general, that the commanders of divisions at last agreed

to demand the deposition of their chief. Kossuth came down to the camp

to inquire into the circumstances; and he found the feeling against

Dembinski so violent that he consented to his removal. Goergei seems to

have used this opportunity for once more discussing the political

situation with Kossuth; and, strange to say, he made to him the very

proposal which Batthyanyi had rejected when it was put forward by

Jellacic; namely, that the War and Finance Ministries should be

removed to Vienna. If this proposal had been unsatisfactory when

Vienna was free, and Ferdinand on the throne, it could have sounded

little short of treason to the cause of Hungary, when Vienna was

under the absolute rule of Windischgraetz; and it is not wonderful,

therefore, that, though Kossuth was willing to remove Dembinski, he

preferred appointing General Vetter as Commander-in-Chief to trusting

Goergei with the leadership.

It was at this crisis that the event occurred which was mentioned in

the last chapter, and which hastened on the final phase of the

movement. Encouraged, as Goergei believed, by the victories of

Windischgraetz, Francis Joseph and his advisers suddenly dismissed the

Parliament at Kremsier, and proclaimed a Constitution "octroye" for

the occasion. Hungarians of all parties condemned this act as a

violation of their old laws and customs, and an assertion of the

arbitrary will of the sovereign. For, indeed, the discontent now

aroused was far from being confined to the Magyars; and it would have

been strange had it been otherwise. The dissolution of the Kremsier

Parliament was, even irrespective of all that followed it, the most

barefaced act of despotism that had been committed since the March

risings of the previous year. Even Ferdinand of Naples could plead

that barricades had been thrown up in the streets before his _coup

d'etat_ of May 15. The unfortunate June insurrection at Prague had

given a plausible excuse for preventing the meeting of the Bohemian

Parliament; the murder of Lamberg had, no doubt, seemed to Ferdinand

of Austria to supply at least a palliation for his dissolution of the

Hungarian Diet; the murder of Latour and the persecution of the

Bohemian deputies supplied Windischgraetz with sufficient argument for

depriving Vienna of its liberties; and even the violent dispersal of

the deputies of Berlin could be defended by the King of Prussia by

reference to the previous riots of August. But not a single excuse of

this kind could, with the least show of plausibility, be urged in

defence of the dissolution of the Kremsier Parliament. Indeed, Francis

Joseph betrayed the weakness of his case by pleading in his defence

the nature of the subjects that had been discussed in the Parliament;

and he could not even pretend that it had either exceeded its powers

or exercised them in a disorderly manner.

Nor was the Constitution, which was offered as a sequel to this

dissolution, any more acceptable than the dissolution itself; and a

general protest went up from nearly every race in the Empire. However

much the Viennese might, under other circumstances, have liked a

Constitution which was centralised at Vienna, they none of them would

welcome it when it was combined with the rule of Windischgraetz. The

Bohemian leaders felt themselves doubly offended; first by the

dissolution of a Parliament to which they had specially trusted

for justice; and secondly by the refusal of any real provincial

independence to Bohemia. The Croats indignantly denounced the

restoration of the military rule on the frontier, and the consequent

separation from Croatia of the Slavs who inhabited the frontier

district. The Serbs, ever since January, had been complaining of the

advance of military rule in the Serb districts, and the gradual

diminution of the power of the Voyvode; and they now felt that all

their local institutions were still further endangered by the

centralisation of the new Constitution. Some of the bitterest protests

came from the Roumanians. They had been treated from the first with

the greatest contempt by most of the Imperialist officers; and

directly after the capture of Hermannstadt by Bem, they found

themselves suddenly deserted by the Austrian forces, which were

withdrawn into Wallachia. While they were still smarting under this

treachery, the news of the new Constitution reached them; and they

found that they were as far off as ever from obtaining that separate

national organization for which they had so long been pleading; while

a part of the Banat, which they considered specially Roumanian, was to

be placed, by the new arrangement, under the Serbs.

In this state of general discontent, it might have seemed that Kossuth

would have had a fair chance of rallying round him all the races of the

Empire, in a common desire for local independence, and a common

hostility to the rule of Francis Joseph. But the divisions and mutual

suspicions between the various races of the Empire had gone too deep to

allow of this change. As for co-operation between the Bohemians and

Germans, even if such a combination had been possible after the various

causes of bitterness mentioned in the preceding chapters, little good

could be effected by it at this crisis, when both Prague and Vienna

were at the mercy of the conqueror. The important question, therefore,

was the attitude to be taken up towards the new Constitution, by the

various races in the Kingdom of Hungary; and here it must be owned that

it was not wholly the fault of Kossuth, that he did not succeed in

combining them in this emergency.

Many both of the Croats and Serbs expressed plainly their discontent

with the treatment which they had received from the House of Austria,

but both Croats and Serbs were paralysed by the leaders whom they had

accepted. The Banal Council[23] of Croatia protested against the

publication of the new Constitution; but Jellacic declared that he

was bound to see that it was published, and that the Council were

only to carry out his orders. In a similar manner, many of the

leading Serbs remonstrated with Rajacic on his acceptance of the

vague promises, which were the substitute in the new Constitution, for

those ancient liberties which the Serbs claimed as their due. But

Rajacic maintained his authority over his countrymen, and accepted a

place of completer subordination to the Austrian General than that

which he had hitherto held. On the other hand, Kossuth seems to have

neglected the opportunity offered by the general feeling of discontent,

which prevailed at this time among the Serbs and Croats; and it was not

till months later, when driven to desperation, that he proposed to make

those concessions, which had by that time lost all grace. Towards the

Roumanians, indeed, Kossuth seemed disposed to make concessions, by

which he hoped to draw them away from the Saxons; and he chose a

negotiator, whom he thought well fitted for this purpose. But Jancu

distrusted Kossuth's emissary, and perhaps also Kossuth himself; and so

the negotiation broke down.

And if Kossuth failed to draw round him, at this crisis, the different

races who were discontented with the new Constitution, it was a much

stranger fact that he was unable to maintain the union between the

different parties in the Magyar nation itself. This was all the

stranger, because just at this time both the personal and political

grounds for difference between Kossuth and Goergei seemed to be

suddenly removed. Deep as had been Goergei's irritation at the

appointment of Vetter, it had naturally been brought to a close by the

sudden illness which removed Vetter from the command, and which was

followed on March 31 by the appointment of Goergei as provisional

Commander-in-Chief; while, as to political opinions, Goergei and

Kossuth were both agreed in denouncing the circumstances under which

Francis Joseph had been thrust on to the throne of Hungary, and the

character and origin of the Constitution which he had just issued.

Under these circumstances, it seemed as if there could be no further

ground for division between the military party who followed Goergei,

and the larger body of Magyars, who accepted Kossuth as their leader.

But it soon appeared that this was not the case.

Kossuth and his friends naturally argued that as the only member of

the House of Hapsburg who claimed the throne of Hungary was admittedly

in an illegal position, the only logical course was to depose the

House of Hapsburg from the throne of Hungary; and that as the only

Constitution by which the rulers of Austria would consent to link

themselves to Hungary was admittedly an illegal Constitution, the only

logical course was to separate Hungary from Austria. Goergei and his

friends, on the other hand, shrank with horror from the idea of

fighting without the authority of a King. They had sworn to obey

Ferdinand, and to accept the Constitution of March 1848; they

therefore insisted on ignoring the abdication of Ferdinand, and the

abolition of that Constitution, and continued to fight, in the name of

a King who did not wish to reign, and on behalf of a Constitution

which had ceased to exist. Kossuth and his friends, however, were

resolved to assert their principles; and on April 14 they issued the

celebrated "Declaration of Independence."

The strongly legal and historical character which had marked the whole

Hungarian movement since the time of the meeting of the Diet in 1825,

still shows itself even in this semi-revolutionary document. The

Declaration goes back to the first connection of the House of Hapsburg

with the throne of Hungary, and declares that no House had ever had so

good a chance of governing successfully, and had so misused it. After

mentioning some of the tyrannies of the earlier Kings of this House,

the Declaration dwells on the fact that while Hungary had often had to

fight for its freedom, it had always been so moderate in its demands

that it had laid down its arms as soon as the King gave a new oath to

preserve its freedom; but these oaths had never been kept, and for

three hundred years this policy had never been changed. The people,

after each promise, had forgotten the wounds of past years, in

exaggerated magnanimity; but now the time had come to break the union.

The House of Hapsburg had united itself with the enemies of the

people, and with robbers and agitators, in order to oppress the

people. It had attacked those of its subjects who would not combine

against the Constitution which it had sworn to protect, or against the

independent life of the nation. It had attacked with violence the

integrity of the country, though it had sworn to preserve it. It had

used a foreign Power to murder its own subjects and suppress their

lawful freedom. Any one of these crimes was sufficient reason for

depriving the Dynasty of its throne. The Declaration then goes on to

consider the excuses which the Dynasty offered for its conduct. As for

the independence secured by Hungary in March, 1848, that was only the

confirmation of an old tradition; for the Pragmatic Sanction showed

that neither Hungary nor any of the provinces connected with it had

ever been absorbed in Austria. Joseph II. alone had ignored this fact,

and his name, therefore, never appeared in the list of the kings of

Hungary. As for the laws which the Diet had passed in March, Ferdinand

had sanctioned them; but he now wished to suppress them. Yet the

Hungarians had taken no advantage of the disturbances in different

parts of the Austrian Empire to secure greater independence for

themselves, but had remained content with what had been granted in

March. They had supported the monarchy; but Ferdinand had tried to

break his oath as soon as it was made. The Government at Vienna had

at first tried to act through the Count Palatine; but, as this

combination had weakened their power, they had gradually withdrawn

more and more power from him. They had tried to impose customs duties

which would have cut off Hungary from the rest of the world; and when

this method failed they tried to stir up the different nationalities

against the Hungarian Ministry. The proclamation proceeds to say that

dates and documents prove that the Archduke Louis, the Archduke

Francis Charles, and the Archduchess Sophia had stirred up the

movements in Croatia and Slavonia. They attribute Ferdinand's first

denunciation of Jellacic as a traitor to the difficulties caused by

the war in Italy; but they accuse him of having played a double

part, both in Croatia and Slavonia, and of having helped the Croats

and Serbs with money and ammunition at the very time when he was

denouncing them as rebels. They charge the Serbs with having committed

great cruelties in their rising. They denounce, as illegal, the

scattering of Hungarian troops in different provinces of the Austrian

Empire, and they declare that it was in consequence of this arrangement

that they were unable to save Fiume from Jellacic. They complain of the

order given to the soldiers and commanders of fortresses not to obey

the Hungarian Ministry, and to take orders only from Vienna. They

complain that the Emperor had made a general of the Slavonic priest who

had headed the rising of the Slovaks in North Hungary. They complain of

their desertion by the Archduke Stephen, after his promises of support,

and of the intrigues of Latour with Jellacic and with other generals

against the liberties of Hungary. Lastly, they complain of the

abdication of Ferdinand in favour of Francis Joseph. Yet even Francis

Joseph they would have accepted had he claimed his rights in a legal

manner; but he had threatened to conquer Hungary by force, and had, for

the conquest of Transylvania, called in those Russians who had crushed

out the liberties of Roumania. They further stated that, although at

first the Hungarians had been driven back, they had now recovered their

ground in Transylvania, cleared North Hungary of foes, suppressed the

Serb rising, and defeated the Austrians in five battles. Under these

circumstances they now declared Hungary independent of the House of

Hapsburg, and appointed Kossuth as their President.

Kossuth's supremacy in Hungary had been an important fact for a

considerable time past, and had been due, not only to his personal

qualities, but to the gradual retirement from public life of most of

the leading statesmen who had played a part in the earlier phases of

the struggle against the ruling powers in Vienna. Batthyanyi had

abandoned all direct initiative in Hungarian politics ever since his

resignation of the Premiership, and had only attempted to mediate

between the contending armies, a mediation which had been scornfully

rejected by Windischgraetz. Deak had, from the first, announced that he

was unfit for revolutionary propaganda; and, after devoting himself,

in the early days of the March Ministry, to the compilation of a code

of laws and the administrative work of his office, he had gradually

assumed the same position of mediator which Batthyanyi had desired,

and with equal want of success. Wesselenyi was now old and blind; and,

though he had consented to go with Eoetvoes on that deputation to the

Vienna Assembly which had been repulsed by the Bohemian Deputies,

neither he nor Eoetvoes now took any regular part in public affairs.

Szechenyi, horrified at the results which, as he considered, had

flowed from his early encouragement of Magyar feeling, lost his

reason, and was at this time under restraint. Thus, of the statesmen

who had been prominent in Hungary during the struggle against

Metternich, Kossuth was the only one who could still be said to be

before the public.

Kossuth's unrivalled eloquence, and his keen sympathy, both with the

intensity and the narrowness of Magyar feeling, had given him a force

which none of the other leaders of the movement had ever possessed;

and his discovery of the military genius of Bem had secured him an

influence in Transylvania which considerably increased the strength of

his position. On the other hand, his intolerant attitude towards the

subject races of Hungary had marked him out in a special manner as the

object of their hatred; while his contempt for ordinary military

arrangements, his growing distrust of Goergei, and last, but perhaps

not least, the belief among many military men that he was deficient in

physical courage, tended to strengthen against him a formidable party

in the army which was eventually to prove too strong for him. But, if

the divided state of Hungarian feeling threw formidable difficulties

in the way of Kossuth, he could find compensations in the condition of

the forces opposed to him. Windischgraetz does not seem to have been

reckoned, by military critics, a considerable general. Stratimirovic,

whatever military qualities he may have possessed, was continually

held in check by the cautious policy of Rajacic. Puchner, who had

succeeded in giving such force to the Roumanian rising, was becoming

an object of suspicion to the more conventional Austrian generals, and

was shortly to be removed from Transylvania; while a cause of

weakness, which was perhaps still more important, was to be found

in the withdrawal from the country of a large body of Austrian

and Croatian soldiers, who were being despatched against the new

Government of the Roman States.

For in Italy, too, the champions of liberty were preparing for their

final struggle, though under rather different auspices from those

under which it was being fought out in Hungary. On the very day when

the Declaration of Independence was published in Hungary, Mazzini,

Saffi, and Armellini, who had been elected Triumvirs of the Roman

Republic, after the failure of Charles Albert's final war, appeared in

the Assembly for the first time in their new capacity. They had no

light task before them. Apart from the enemies who were threatening

the Republic from outside, there were dangers arising from the

feelings of the different parties within the Roman State. The

deposition of the Pope had undoubtedly given a shock to the feelings

of many strong Liberals, of a much keener, and if one may say so, more

intelligible kind, than the deposition of the House of Hapsburg could

possibly give to any Hungarian leader. Even Castellani, the Ambassador

of the Venetian Republic, hesitated to identify the cause of his city

with that of the opponents of the Pope; while the feeling among the

priests of the Roman States had been shown by a formidable conspiracy

in Imola and Ascoli. General Zucchi, who had taken part in this

conspiracy, had even attempted to force his way into the Neapolitan

territory, in order to put himself under the authority of the Pope.

Garibaldi had defeated this attempt, and Zucchi had been sent as a

prisoner to Rome; but the conspiracy was not forgotten; and, when the

Triumvirs came into power, they found that these outbursts of priestly

opposition were provoking savage reprisals on the part of the

Republicans.

While Saffi had been only Minister of the Interior, and Mazzini only a

private member of the Assembly, they had both warned the Government of

the probability of this danger; and they now found that a Society had

been formed at Ancona which threatened death to the enemies of

Liberalism. The Triumvirs first sent down two officers, who tried to

organize the local leaders into a committee for preserving public

order; but, though their emissaries were satisfied with their own

action, the Triumvirs were less easily contented. Felice Orsini was

sent down with full powers to put down the insurrection; and, if

necessary, to declare Ancona in a state of siege. He at once arrested

twenty men, called out the National Guard, put down opposition by

force, and carried off his prisoners to Rome, where they were shut up

in the Castle of St. Angelo. From Ancona Orsini went on to Ascoli,

where he condemned three of the most dangerous persons to be shot, and

sequestrated the goods of a cardinal, who had stirred up the clerical

insurrection. But the Austrian forces were now advancing into the

Roman territory; and Orsini was compelled to retire to Rome.

Even in the capital the Triumvirs had to use strong measures to check

the fierce feeling against the priests. This feeling had just been

roused to an unusual height by special discoveries of priestly

cruelty. In sweeping away the various irregular tribunals, which had

grown up under the papal tyranny, the Triumvirs had to deal with the

question of the Inquisition. They appropriated the former offices of

that celebrated institution, as dwellings for the poor; but, in making

the buildings available for this purpose, they threw open the secret

dungeons, and discovered prisoners who were slowly dying of their

imprisonment. One bishop, who had remained there since the time of

Leo XII., had absolutely lost the power of walking. The horrible

instruments of torture, which were found in the same place, excited

still further the indignation of the people; and that feeling found

yet a new cause for its expression, when a book was discovered in the

library of the Inquisition, containing the secrets of the principal

families of Italy, which had been obtained through the revelations of

confessors. Several of the fiercer spirits in Rome at once made an

attack on the pulpits and confessionals, and burnt some of them in

the Piazza del Popolo. These tumults were sternly checked by the

Triumvirs; and they succeeded in protecting from the popular vengeance

the convent in which the chief Inquisitor lived. But while they

protected the persons and private property of the priests, they

appropriated the greater part of the ecclesiastical lands to the

support of the poor, arranging that every family of three persons

should have as much land as could be managed by a pair of oxen. At the

same time the jurisdiction of the clergy over the universities and

schools was taken away.

While the attention of the Government was thus devoted to the

restoration of internal order, and the carrying out of necessary

reforms, they did not neglect the vigorous measures which were needed

for the resistance to foreign enemies. The forces which had been

rather carelessly scattered in the outlying provinces of the Roman

State, were concentrated by the Triumvirs near Bologna. That gallant

little city had been in a state of alarm ever since the early part of

February, when the Austrian forces had again attacked Ferrara; and the

difficulties of communication between these two cities had increased

the alarm of the Bolognese, though it had also strengthened their

eagerness for resistance. But even before this Austrian invasion, the

Roman Republicans had been alarmed at the threats issued by another

Power. Three days after the flight of the Pope, General Cavaignac

announced in the French Assembly that he had sent three frigates to

Civita Vecchia to secure the safety of His Holiness. This expedition

had excited much opposition in France; and, during the subsequent

contest for the Presidency, the following letter was addressed by one

of the candidates to the editor of a French newspaper:--

"MR. EDITOR,

"Knowing that my agreement to the vote for the Expedition to Civita

Vecchia has been remarked upon, I think myself bound to declare

that, whatever may have been decided about the arrangements

suitable for guaranteeing the liberty and authority of the chief

Pontiff, nevertheless I cannot approve by my vote a military

demonstration that appears dangerous both to the sacred interests

that they pretend to protect, and that has a tendency to compromise

European peace.

"Yours respectfully,

"LOUIS NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

"December 2, 1848."

As this pacific candidate had been shortly after elected President of

the French Republic, there seemed little fear that an expedition

"tending to compromise European peace," would again be entered upon by

France; and the Mountain of the French Assembly had lately sent

greetings to the Roman Republic.

Since then the immediate danger to Rome seemed to come rather from the

North than from the West, the Triumvirs watched with much anxiety the

hesitating attitude of Guerrazzi and the Tuscan Government. So eager

had the leaders of the Roman Assembly been for a union between

Tuscany and the Roman States that they had even offered to Montanelli

and Guerrazzi places in the first Triumvirate, which had been formed

before Mazzini and Saffi had been called to power. Guerrazzi, however,

had refused to accept this offer; and, while declaring his desire for

union with Rome, he professed his inability to find a means for

effecting that union. Indeed, Guerrazzi held an almost impossible

position. Though unable to make up his mind to accept a Republican

Government, he was yet determined to resist any interference, either

by Piedmontese or Austrians, in favour of the former Government of

Tuscany. And while he still seemed to cherish Italian ideas, he felt

that the defeat of Charles Albert had taken away the hopes for any

satisfactory continuance of the War of Independence. Under these

circumstances the champions of the restoration of the Grand Duke

naturally gained ground in Tuscany. Guerrazzi, distrusted alike by

Republicans and Royalists, was unable either to resist this movement,

or to guide it according to his own theories; and on April 12 the

Municipality of Florence took the matter out of the hands both of

Guerrazzi and the Assembly, and decreed the recall of the Grand Duke.

This catastrophe, though a subject of regret, could scarcely have

caused much surprise to the leaders of the Roman Republic. A feeling

of far deeper pain must have been roused by the final failure of the

earliest of all the struggles for liberty of this period. The _coup

d'etat_ at Naples of May 15, 1848, though it had shattered the hopes

of the Neapolitans, had only intensified the zeal of the Sicilians in

their struggle against Ferdinand. As they had just deposed him from

the throne, and proclaimed the Duke of Genoa as their King, they

thought themselves safe against the restoration of Neapolitan rule;

and the Ambassadors of France and England tried to persuade the King

of Naples not to send an expedition to Sicily. He refused, however, to

listen to these remonstrances; the expedition sailed; and, by his

bombardment of Palermo, Ferdinand won for himself throughout Sicily the

title of Il Re Bombardatore, which was quickly shortened into Bomba.

Ruggiero Settimo, who had taken part in the struggles of 1812 and 1821,

was placed at the head of the Sicilian Government, and Garibaldi was

invited to come to defend the island. Garibaldi, however, did not

arrive; and the chief defence of the island was entrusted to the Polish

General Mieroslawski, who, having failed to save Posen from the hands

of the Prussians, had become a kind of knight errant of liberty in

other parts of Europe. He brought, however, but little good to the

causes which he defended. He quarrelled with the Italian General

Antonini, and was so often defeated, that the Sicilians began to fear

treachery, and at last compelled him to resign his command. The

struggle had, in fact, now become hopeless; and on April 17, 1849, the

Sicilian Parliament decided to meet no longer. Then Ruggiero Settimo

called his friends together, and declared that he was ready to undergo

all his troubles again, if they decided to continue the contest. But

they believed that the case was now desperate, and voted for peace.

Then Settimo consulted the National Guard, but also in vain; and

finding that any further efforts were useless, he resigned his

Presidency, and left the island. The separateness of the Sicilian

movement lessened, no doubt, in some degree the importance of this

defeat; but the gallantry of their struggle had excited much sympathy

in Rome; and their fall set free the Neapolitan forces for action

against the Roman Republic.

This addition to the dangers which were harassing the Republic would

not perhaps have been so formidable had not a new and more important

enemy begun to show signs of hostility at the same period. The

election of Louis Napoleon as President of the French Republic had

been hailed with some satisfaction both in Venice and Rome; and, after

the Roman Republic had been established, two envoys were sent to

Paris, who reminded the President of the share he had taken in one of

the insurrections against Gregory XVI. Louis Napoleon replied that the

time of Gregory XVI. had gone by in Rome, and that his youth was also

gone by. Both remarks were undoubtedly true, nor were they in

themselves very alarming; but Ledru Rollin, one of the few Frenchmen

who really sympathized with Italy, warned Mazzini that danger was

coming; and the nature of the danger soon became apparent. On April 16

Odillon Barrot moved in the French Assembly a proposal for a vote of

twelve hundred thousand francs for an expedition to Italy; an

expedition, he said, which was not to restore the Pope; but to protect

liberty and humanity. On April 20 General Oudinot took the command of

the expedition, and told his followers that his object was to maintain

the old legitimate French influence, and to protect the destinies of

Italy from the predominance of the stranger, and of a party who were

really in a minority. So kindly was the tone of the French Ministry

towards the Romans, that Colonel Frapolli, one of the envoys of the

Roman Republic, obtained the leave of the French President to organize

a French Legion, which was to fight for the defence of Rome, and to be

commanded by Pierre Buonaparte. But Pierre Buonaparte suddenly resigned

his command; the prefect was ordered to hinder the embarkation of the

Legion; and a large supply of muskets, which had been bought by the

Roman Republic, were confiscated by the French Government. In the

meantime Oudinot had set sail, and on April 24 he appeared before

Civita Vecchia.

About the time when the French troops were landing, there arrived at

the same place a very different force. The leader of this force was

Luciano Manara, who had fought so gallantly in the "Five Days" of

Milan, and who had afterwards been so hampered by Casati and Charles

Albert in his attempt to rescue the Southern Tyrol from Austrian rule.

He, like others, had been disappointed by the failure of Charles

Albert's final war; but he had refused to join in the Genoese

insurrection, which followed the defeat at Novara, and had preferred

to set out with 8,000 men to help the Roman Republic. The difficulties

thrown in the way of their march were, however, so great that only 600

remained with Manara by the time that he reached Civita Vecchia.

Oudinot, with extraordinary impudence, disputed the right of the

Lombards to interfere on behalf of Rome; and he even tried to persuade

them that the cause of Rome was so distinct from that of Lombardy,

that the Lombards could consistently join their forces with the French

against Rome. Manara indignantly repelled the suggestion; and then

Oudinot in vain attempted to exact a promise that the Lombard forces

should not act against him until the 4th of May. Manara, having

refused this further demand, Oudinot was forced to allow the Lombards

to pass; and Manara marched to Rome to tell the Romans how the French

Republic was preparing to defend the cause of "liberty and humanity."

In spite of this plain evidence of his intentions, Oudinot still

attempted to play his double part; and, since his utterance about the

government of a party in a minority had alarmed the inhabitants of

Civita Vecchia, he authorised the Secretary of the Legation to declare

the sympathy of the French for the Romans, and to assure the citizens

of Civita Vecchia that the French Army had only come to defend them

against the Austrians. Mannucci, the Governor of Civita Vecchia, had

wished to oppose the first landing of the French; but he was overborne

by the Chamber of Commerce and the Municipal Council, who were

convinced that the French could not really intend to destroy the

freedom which they so much professed to cherish. No sooner, however,

had Oudinot effected a landing, than he announced that he would not

protect the Anarchical Government of Rome, which had never been

officially recognised. The Municipality became alarmed; and Oudinot

again altered his tone, and declared that the French would respect the

vote of the majority of the population, and did not desire to impose

any special form of Government upon them. In spite of the warnings

given by Oudinot's previous proclamation, the Municipal Council

consented to admit him into the town; and, no sooner was he there,

than he disarmed the battalion which was to have defended the town;

and still further showed his zeal for the interests of "Liberty and

humanity," by suppressing a printing office in Civita Vecchia,

because it had recently printed an address in which the Papacy was

condemned.

In the meantime the news had spread to Rome; and the Assembly were

debating how they should receive Oudinot. So deep was the conviction

of the reality of the French zeal for freedom, that Armellini actually

suggested that Oudinot should be received as a friend. But, while the

Assembly were debating, Mazzini entered the hall, and announced that

Colonel le Blanc had confessed that the expedition was sent to restore

the Papacy. Thereupon the Assembly voted that the Triumvirs should

have power to resist force with force. But another difficulty arose;

the officers of the National Guard declared that they did not believe

their soldiers would fight. Thereupon Mazzini ordered that the

battalions of the Guards should defile next morning in front of the

Quirinal, where the Assembly were meeting; and, as the Guards passed,

he put to them the question whether they were for peace or war. A loud

shout of "Guerra, guerra!" answered his appeal; and the defence was at

once resolved on.

In every district the heads of the people and the representatives of

the Assembly were to organize the defence of every inch of the

country. Barricades were thrown up; arms were to be given to all the

people; while the municipality undertook to provide them with corn,

meat, and other eatables. At the same time all foreigners, and

particularly all Frenchmen living in Rome, were to be placed under the

protection of the nation. Anyone who injured them was to be punished

as having violated the honour of Rome. With regard to the actual

soldiers to be used in the first defence of the city, they were

arranged as follows:--the 1st brigade, commanded by Garibaldi,

guarded the line outside the walls, which extends from the Porta

Portese to the Porta San Pancrazio. The 2nd brigade, commanded by

Colonel Masi, was drawn up before the Porta Cavalleggieri, the

Vatican, and the Porta Angelica. The 3rd, under Colonel Savini, stood

in reserve in the Piazza Navona. Colonel Galletti commanded the 4th,

which was stationed in the Piazza Cesarini; while a reserve force

under General Galletti, in which Manara and his Lombard volunteers

were included, was held back for the present, to come up when needed.

The whole of the forces were supervised by General Avezzana, who had

organized the insurrection in Genoa after the defeat at Novara, and who

now acted apparently both as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief.

On April 29 Avezzana took his staff up to Monte Mario, from which point

he could see the French army advancing from Civita Vecchia. As they

marched along the road, the French saw everywhere a singular inscription

painted upon the walls and posts. It ran as follows:--"Article

5 of the preamble of the French Constitution. The French Republic

respects foreign nationalities as it intends to make its own respected.

It does not undertake any war of conquest. It will never use its own

forces against the liberty of any people." Whether as a kind of answer

to this challenge, or in contempt of it, Oudinot announced to his troops

that they came to liberate Rome from the factious party which had

expelled the Pope, and which had answered his words of conciliation with

ill-considered provocations.

It was at 11.30 a.m. on April 30 that the French and Roman armies first

came into collision. Garibaldi advanced from Porta San Pancrazio to

meet the French, who were entering the grounds of the Villa Pamfili,

and who, hearing the bells of the city ring for the attack, supposed

that an insurrection had broken out in favour of the Pope, and that

they would have an easy victory. Garibaldi, however, repelled them,

after a sharp fight, and made 300 prisoners. But the main attack of the

French was in the meantime directed against the Porta Angelica. There

one of the French captains had hoped to lead a column into Rome by a

secret way near the Vatican. But a fire was poured on the advancing

column from the Papal gardens, while the troops from Monte Mario

attacked them in the rear. The battle lasted for four hours. The French

captain Picarde managed at first to drive back the University

battalion; but as he advanced, Colonel Arcioni at the head of a

regiment of the Lombard exiles attacked him on one flank, and Galletti

at the head of the National Guard on the other; finally Garibaldi,

having disposed of his original opponents at the Villa Pamfili, charged

the French force, and compelled them to lay down their arms.

Several acts of special valour marked this battle. One officer, named

Montaldi, having been surrounded by the French, was beaten to his

knees, and fought on with only a piece of his sword left. He had

fought under Garibaldi at Monte Video, and was a Genoese by birth. Ugo

Bassi[24] distinguished himself by riding about the field urging the

Romans to battle. His horse was killed under him, and, as he was

embracing it with tears, the French came up and took him prisoner.

Garibaldi himself was wounded; but would not allow it to be known

until the battle was over, when he sent privately for the doctor.

On the following day the battle was renewed; the people flocking to

the defence of the walls, and the French sharp-shooters being finally

driven out from the Pamfili gardens. Garibaldi would now have been

able to cut off the French retreat and destroy their army; but the

Triumvirs, though they had no faith in Oudinot's promises, believed

that, if the French were generously treated, the Republican feeling

would awake again in France and overthrow the Government, or defeat

their plans; but that, if they were driven to extremities, the French

vanity would hinder even the most consistent Republicans from opposing

the war. On these grounds, they allowed the French to retreat, granted

them a short truce, and set free the prisoners who had been captured.

But the hope of any change of feeling in the French was soon found to

be utterly vain. A debate, indeed, had been begun in the French

Assembly soon after the sailing of the expedition, and a Committee had

been appointed to enquire into the object of the expedition; but Jules

Favre, the chairman of that Committee, reported that the Government

had no intention of making France a party to the overthrow of the

Roman Republic; and that it only interfered in order that, under the

French flag, humanity might be respected; and that a limit might be

placed on the pretensions of Austria. In spite, therefore, of the

opposition of Ledru Rollin, the money for the expedition had been

voted by 325 against 283. But even Jules Favre could not be entirely

blinded by such phrases as these, when considered in the light of

Oudinot's actions; and on May 8 the National Assembly invited the

Government to take, without delay, the necessary measures for

preventing the expedition to Italy from being diverted from the scope

assigned to it; and they therefore decided to send Ferdinand Lesseps

to negotiate with the Triumvirs for terms of peace.

In the meantime, the Roman Republic realized that it had to guard

itself against two other enemies. On May 2, a Neapolitan army was

found to be on its way to Rome. On the 4th, Garibaldi marched to

Palestrina, and, with the help of Manara and his Lombard battalion,

utterly defeated the Neapolitan forces. Just at the same time, the

Bolognese became aware that the threatened attack of the Austrians was

about to become a reality. Ferrara was occupied on May 7; but, even

with the Austrian troops present in the city, the Municipal Council of

Ferrara voted, by thirty-seven to three, in favour of the Roman

Republic. Such a protest was undoubtedly of use in proving the

earnestness of the Roman provinces on behalf of the new Government.

But something more was expected, from a city so heroic in its

traditions as Bologna. On May 6 it had been announced by the President

of the Municipality that medals were about to be distributed in memory

of August 8, 1848. On May 8 it was announced that the Austrians were

advancing upon Bologna. In that city, as in Rome, the internal defence

was organized in special districts under special leaders, while the

National Guard and the University battalion were to fight side by side

with the regular troops. By nine o'clock in the morning of the 8th the

Austrians were at the gates of Bologna, and before eleven o'clock

fierce struggles had taken place at the Porta Galliera, the Porta San

Felice, and the Porta Saragozza. The people indignantly refused every

proposal for capitulation, and at about four o'clock the Austrians

began to bombard the city. Before the end of the day, the President

had resigned his office, believing that resistance was useless; but

the Municipality having in vain endeavoured to obtain the terms which

they had hoped for, the assault was renewed, and the Austrians

discharged rockets into the city from the bell-tower of the Franciscan

convent. A special Commission was appointed to carry on the struggle,

and the band of one of the regiments, standing under the tree of

Liberty in the Piazza San Petronio, encouraged the combatants with

music and songs. The struggle, however, was a desperate one, and, on

May 10, it was again necessary to send a deputation to ask for a truce.

But the combat was soon renewed, and the Bolognese troops were so eager

in the attack that the general had to warn them against firing off

their pieces needlessly. The pastry cooks were ordered to suspend the

making of mere confectionary, in order that there might be more bread

for the defenders of the city, and reinforcements were expected from

the country districts of the Romagna. General Wimpffen, who was leading

the Austrian troops, denounced the defence as "the stupid work of a

blind faction;" but the Provisional Government answered that the

proclamation signed by Marshal Wimpffen, and forwarded by him to the

magistrates, having come without any accompanying evidence, could not

be received by them. Weary of acting merely on the defensive, the

Bolognese made a sortie from the Porta Maggiore, repelled an attack of

the Austrians, and succeeded in joining a body of the Romagnoli, who

were coming to the relief of the city. But the chances of uniting with

the outside world became less and less; for the Austrian troops drew

ever more closely round the city, and, on the 15th, the bombardment was

renewed. Then a number of the citizens requested leave to go to Rome,

to find out how things were going on there, in order that they might

know what was still required of them at headquarters. But this proposal

seems to have been a mere utterance of despair; for, on the 16th, it

became necessary to abandon the defence and arrange for terms of

surrender.

While the Bolognese were engaged in this desperate struggle, Ferdinand

Lesseps had arrived in Rome, and was rapidly becoming converted to the

belief that the Republican Government was the free choice of the

people, and that it was better able to maintain order than the Papacy

had been; while a conversation with Mamiani had shown him that even

the so-called Moderate Liberals were unwilling to act against the

Republic. But, though Lesseps was honest enough to confess these

facts, his vanity, both personal and national, prevented him from

making the natural inference that neither he nor Oudinot were needed

in Rome. He, therefore, proposed that the Roman States should request

the paternal protection of the French Republic; that the Roman

populations should pronounce freely on their form of government; that

Rome should receive the French as their friends; and that Roman and

French troops should act together in defence of the city. The Assembly

rejected these proposals, on the ground that Rome had no need of

protection, and that the name of the Roman Republic was not mentioned

in the negotiation; and they further complained that, on May 19, while

the truce was still in force, the French soldiers had crossed the

Tiber. Then the Triumvirs proposed, in their turn, that the Roman

Republic should acknowledge the help offered by the French nation

against foreign intervention; that the Constitution which had been

adopted by the General Assembly should be sanctioned by a popular

vote; that Rome should welcome the French soldiers as brothers; but

that they should stay outside the city till the Roman Republic called

for them. These proposals were accepted, with some modifications, by

Lesseps, within the time of the truce; and he left Rome, well

satisfied with Mazzini, still better with himself.

Great, however, was the indignation of this unfortunate diplomatist,

when, on reaching the camp of Oudinot, he found that the general,

without waiting for the expiration of the truce, had suddenly occupied

Monte Mario! Lesseps was divided between his feelings as a man of

honour and his unwillingness to oppose his countrymen. He threatened at

first that if the order for assault were not withdrawn, he would

himself go back to Rome and give the alarm; but when, on his return to

the city, the Triumvirs questioned him about the breach of the truce,

he assured them that Monte Mario had only been occupied in order to

prevent its falling into the hands of the French reinforcements,

which were on their way to Rome. The fact was that, from first to

last, Lesseps had been the dupe of the unscrupulous men who were

ruling France. While he had been entrusted with apparently peaceful

negotiations, secret instructions had been sent to Oudinot to the

following effect:--"Tell the Romans that we do not wish to join with

the Neapolitans against them. Continue your negotiations in the sense

of your declaration. We are sending you reinforcements. Wait for them.

Manage to enter Rome by agreement with the inhabitants; and if you

should be compelled to assault it, do it in the manner that shall

be most likely to secure success." Oudinot fully understood his

instructions. On May 31 he scornfully rejected the convention which had

been accepted by Lesseps; and on the same day Lesseps received his

recall to Paris, and Oudinot received orders to take Rome by force.

In the meantime an unfortunate occurrence had called attention to

another danger which was threatening the Roman Republic. General

Roselli had now been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Roman army;

but he found it very difficult to control Garibaldi. After the defeat

of the Neapolitan forces, Garibaldi had desired to push on to Velletri.

Roselli forbad him to do so; but Garibaldi disobeyed the orders of his

chief, and marched forward. Part of the troops who followed him had not

learned to stand fire, and fled at the first attack. Garibaldi was in

such danger that he was obliged to send to Roselli for fresh troops.

With the help of these reinforcements, Garibaldi drove back the

Neapolitans; but he then disobeyed Roselli's orders for the second

time, marched forward to Velletri, and entered it on May 20. Fierce

recriminations followed between the friends of Garibaldi and those of

Roselli; Garibaldi and his friends maintaining that, but for Roselli's

delay, the victory would have been more complete; the supporters of

Roselli declaring that, if it had not been for Garibaldi's rashness,

Ferdinand himself, and a great part of his army, would have fallen into

the hands of the Romans. Roselli further demanded that Garibaldi should

be summoned before a Court-Martial for his disobedience to orders. But

the Triumvirs felt that there would be a certain incongruity in such a

trial, which could only lead to mischief, and they persuaded Roselli to

abandon his proposal. Garibaldi's influence, indeed, was strong, not

only among his soldiers, but also among the members of the Assembly;

and Sterbini, who seems generally to have suspected all existing

Governments, demanded that Garibaldi should be made Dictator, and that

Roselli's command should be taken from him. This proposal, however, the

Assembly rejected, and, on June 3, declared itself in permanence.

On that very day Oudinot gave another proof of his peculiar ideas of

French honour. The day before, he had promised to defer the attack

until June 4. The grounds of the Villa Pamfili lie at a short distance

from the Porta San Pancrazio, and were then more thickly wooded than

they are now. On the night of June 2 they were occupied by three

companies of Bolognese. These soldiers, trusting to the honour of

Oudinot, were sleeping peacefully, when suddenly two French divisions

entered the wood. They surrounded and captured 200 of the soldiers;

but the remaining 200 retreated fighting, before a body of 8,000

French. Garibaldi hastened up with reinforcements, and the fight

lasted from 2 a.m. till 6 p.m. on June 3. Four times were the houses

in the grounds of the Villa Pamfili lost and won. The walls shook with

the thunder of the French and Roman artillery; and the houses were

filled with the dead and wounded of both armies. But the treachery of

Oudinot had been successful in securing him so good a position, that

the houses at last remained in the hands of the French, although they

were so ruined that they afforded them very little protection.

[Illustration: IL VASCELLO, ROME (_taken since the siege_).]

This struggle seemed only to rouse the energies of the Romans to new

efforts. Between the Villa Pamfili and the Porta San Pancrazio, stood

an old house which, from its shape, was known as the Vascello or

little ship; and it was by the walls of this house that, for nearly a

month from this time, General Medici and Garibaldi held their own

against the numbers, the training, and the treachery of the French.

Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the Romans in the defence of

their city. The walls were crowded with people during the fight;

youths, not able yet to bear arms, rushed into the crash of battle.

And girls went, while the cannon was still firing, to search for the

dead, to encourage the combatants, and to heal the wounded. But

treachery steadily gained ground upon valour. Enrico Dandolo, a young

captain in Manara's regiment, was about to attack a company of

Frenchmen, when the French captain cried out, "We are friends!"

Dandolo ordered the attack to be suspended, and advanced to the

Frenchman, holding out his hand. The French at once fired, and Dandolo

and more than a third of his company fell dead. Oudinot, however,

over-estimated the credulity of the Romans; for on June 12 he demanded

to be admitted into Rome, on the ground that his intentions had been

misunderstood, and that he wished to secure Roman liberty. When,

however, he was reminded of his violation of Lesseps's agreement, he

showed his zeal for Roman liberty by proceeding to bombard the city.

But there were still some Frenchmen who held different views from

Oudinot's on the subject of their country's honour. On the very day when

the bombardment of Rome began, Ledru Rollin and his friends, having in

vain tried to secure a condemnation of the Roman expedition from the

French Assembly, took up arms for a final effort to vindicate the honour

of France against its faithless rulers. But the revolutionary force of

France had been wasted in the Socialist insurrection of the previous

year; and, after a gallant struggle, the champions of French honour and

liberty were suppressed by General Changarnier. The failure of this

effort must, no doubt, have been terribly disappointing to those Romans

who had hoped to the last that France would vindicate herself against

those who were dishonouring her. And, as if to bring home to the Romans

how isolated their position was becoming as defenders of liberty, there

came to them, shortly after, the news of the final downfall of German

liberty.

Ever since April 24, when the King of Prussia refused the crown of

Germany, he had been following a steady course of opposition to the

Liberal movements in favour of German unity; and on May 24 he had

recalled the Prussian Deputies from the Frankfort Assembly. This had

encouraged the other Princes of Germany to dissolve their local

parliaments and recall their subjects from the Frankfort Parliament;

while the strengthening of the troops near Frankfort seemed to limit

the freedom of debate among the few deputies who remained. At last, on

June 6, the few remaining representatives of German unity decided to

transfer their place of meeting from Frankfort to Stuttgart. The Baden

Republicans had in the meantime taken the stronger course of appealing

for the last time to insurrection; but both the constitutional and the

revolutionary attempt to save the liberties of Germany proved

hopeless. On June 18 the remnant of the German Parliament was

dispersed by the Wuertemberg soldiers; the Baden rising failed, to a

great extent from the quarrels between the Polish general Mieroslawski

and the Baden general Sigel; and the Prussian soldiers trampled out

the last remains of German liberty.

In the meantime the Austrians were capturing city after city in the

Roman provinces; and the French were pressing nearer to the city. But

the enthusiasm of the Romans did not slacken. As Garibaldi went

through the hospitals to visit the wounded, several of the sufferers

sprang from their beds to embrace his knees, with cries of "Papa,

papa"; and the women exerted themselves gallantly to relieve the

sufferings of the wounded. The French did not even now seem absolutely

certain of victory; for when a sortie, planned by Garibaldi on June

22, had ended in a fiasco, a certain M. Corcelles attempted to reopen

diplomatic negotiations. But Mazzini, warned by his experience of

Lesseps, sternly repelled all proposals for negotiation; and the

struggle was renewed. The state of the Roman Republic was, however,

really desperate. On June 24 came the news that, after twenty-five

days' struggle, Ancona had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, who

had almost immediately violated the understanding on which it had been

surrendered.

In the meantime the French slowly advanced in the struggle by the

Vascello, Medici continually driving them back. Many of the houses

were battered down, but the inhabitants were provided by the Triumvirs

with fresh lodgings in the deserted houses of the Cardinals. When the

French knocked down part of the walls, the citizens picked up the

stones to repair them. At last, however, on June 29, Oudinot resolved

to make a final effort, and directed his forces against Garibaldi's

house, which was known as the Villa Spada. Twice the invaders attacked

this house, and twice they were repelled. Then they succeeded in

capturing a barricade which had been raised in front of the house; but

again the Romans recaptured it. Garibaldi fought in the midst of his

followers, singing a war-song; and more than a hundred of his soldiers

fell round him. Seven times the barricade was taken and retaken; the

gallant Manara was killed; and at last, after twelve hours' fighting,

it was discovered that the Porta San Pancrazio was no longer tenable.

On June 30 the Roman Assembly met, and Mazzini propounded to them three

alternatives. Either they should continue the defence, which now seemed

impossible; or they should yield altogether; or, thirdly, they should

cut their way out into the provinces, and continue the struggle there.

Mazzini strongly urged the third course. While the debate was still

proceeding, Garibaldi in his red shirt, covered with mud, sprang into

the Assembly. He declared that further defence was impossible,

unless they were prepared to abandon the Trastevere, and break down

the bridges. Under these circumstances, he supported Mazzini's

recommendation, that they should cut their way out into the provinces,

and carry on the struggle there. Cernuschi, however, proposed the

following resolution:--"The Roman Constituent Assembly abandons a

defence which has become impossible, and remains at its post."

This motion was carried; the Triumvirs resigned their post to the

Municipality, and a new Triumvirate was elected to carry out the terms

of peace.

Then Garibaldi called round him his followers in the Piazza San

Pietro, and addressed them as follows:--"I have nothing to give you

but hunger, sufferings, and battles; the bare earth for your bed, and

the burning sun for your refreshment. Yet let him who does not yet

disbelieve in the fortune of Italy follow me." He then marched out

from the Porta San Giovanni, followed by 4,000 men. They made their

way to the northern part of the Roman States; but after much suffering

and privation, they were forced to abandon the struggle. Ugo Bassi and

others fell into the hands of the Austrians, and were shot. Garibaldi

and a small remnant of his followers succeeded in escaping from the

country.

In the meantime the Roman Municipal Council attempted to make

terms with Oudinot; but finding it impossible to secure honourable

conditions, they declared that they yielded only to force. On July 3

the French troops entered Rome; and while they marched through the city

they found all the shops closed, and heard from every side the cries of

"Death to Cardinal Oudinot! Death to the soldiers of the Pope! Death to

the Croats of France!" On the same day the Roman Assembly proclaimed

from the Capitol the Constitution of the Republic. On the next day a

regiment of French infantry dissolved the Assembly by force; and soon

after a Commission of three Cardinals was appointed to govern Rome.

The hopes of Italy now centred in Venice, where, ever since the

abandonment of Milan by Charles Albert in the previous August, the

Republican Government had struggled alone against Austria. So fierce

had been the feeling caused by Charles Albert's treatment of Venice,

that it had required all Manin's influence to hinder a violent attack

on the Sardinian Commissioner. The Sardinian Admiral, indeed,

attempted at first to disregard the orders of Charles Albert, and to

continue the defence of Venice, but he was compelled after a time to

withdraw. Manin, however, was anxious to secure foreign allies for

Venice; and, shortly after his abandonment by Charles Albert, he

appealed to France for help. The French Government answered by those

vague and cheap promises which meant nothing; while the English Consul

at Venice tried to form an Austrian party in the city; and Lord

Palmerston worried Manin with all sorts of useless proposals for

diplomatic compromises. But if Manin found little help from foreign

Governments, he received much encouragement from those Italians who had

not yet despaired of their country. In September, 1848, 1,200 soldiers

who had served under Durando arrived in Venice; and on October 3 a

vessel brought 6,000 guns from Genoa. The Austrian blockade, indeed,

pressed ever closer, and on October 10 it had become so close that food

could not be brought into the town. But so little did Manin lose heart

that on October 11 he declared to the Assembly that Venice was

in a better state for defence than when the Dictatorship had been

established in August; and the Assembly in turn voted that Manin and

the two colleagues who had been appointed to assist him should be

entrusted with all political negotiations, saving the ratification by

the Assembly of the final treaty. So great was the mutual confidence

between Manin and the poorer classes of Venice, that in January, 1849,

two Gondoliers were chosen to assist him in the Government.

The proclamation of the Republic in Rome had excited both the

sympathies and the fears of Manin; for while he saw in it a step

towards an Italian Republic, in which Venice might take a part, he

also saw that it might hasten an Austrian intervention in the Roman

States. The failure of Charles Albert's final effort in April, 1849,

so alarmed the Venetians that Manin began to speculate on the

desirability of accepting an Austrian Prince as Constitutional

Sovereign of Lombardo-Venetia. But the Hungarian Declaration of

Independence once more revived his hopes, and from that time his one

aim in foreign policy was to secure and strengthen an alliance between

Venice and Hungary. Yet the month of May, in which this alliance was

concluded, seemed one of the most desperate periods in the fortunes of

Venice. The fortress of Malghera, which lies on an island in the

lagunes, about two hours' gondola journey west of Venice, was the

scene of one of the fiercest struggles between the Austrians and

Venetians. General Haynau had effected a landing on this island, and

attempted to seize the fortress; but the Venetians on their side let

loose the waters to swamp the Austrian trenches, sent boats under the

fire of the Austrians to bring food to the defenders, and made

expeditions to carry off oxen, even from the country already occupied

by the Austrians. So desperate was the resistance that Radetzky

treated Haynau's attempt as a failure, and sent General Thurn to take

his place. But, partly by breaking a truce, partly by force of

superior numbers, the Austrians succeeded in carrying the day; and on

May 26, when the fortress had been reduced to ruins, the Venetians

were compelled to abandon Malghera, and to retreat to some islands

nearer the city. In the following month Manin again tried to enter

into negotiations with Radetzky; but a letter from Kossuth encouraged

him to stand firm; and he made such demands for independence that the

Austrians scornfully rejected them.

In spite, however, of the encouragement which he had sent to Manin,

Kossuth's own position was one of increasing danger. The Declaration

of Independence of April 14 had been followed by the resignation of

several Hungarian officers; and Goergei, though unwillingly retaining

his command, became more and more antagonistic in his attitude towards

Kossuth. This mutual distrust was one of the main causes of a step not

very creditable to either party, and which is reckoned by military

critics one of the most unfortunate in the war. On April 26, Goergei

and General Klapka had, by a desperate march, rescued the fortress of

Komorn from the Austrians; and Klapka and others believed that, if

Goergei had followed up this success by marching to Raab, he might have

been able to reopen communications with Vienna. Kossuth, however, was

anxious that Buda-Pesth should not be allowed to remain in the hands

of the Austrians, and he therefore desired Goergei to turn his forces

to the deliverance of the capital. Goergei, in common with all the

military leaders, believed this proposal to be a mistake; but he has

frankly recorded his reasons for readily obeying Kossuth's orders. If

he had followed up his advantages and marched into Austria, a

Republic, he believed, would have been proclaimed in Hungary; and a

compromise with the Austrian Government would have become impossible;

whereas, by occupying Buda-Pesth, he thought that he should gain a

vantage ground which would enable him to persuade both parties to

accept the modified Constitution for Hungary which he desired. Hence

it came to pass that the greater part of May was taken up by the siege

of the fortress of Buda, while Goergei was intriguing with Kossuth's

opponents in the Diet, and the Austrians were gaining ground in

Hungary. And while he was with difficulty holding his own against

Goergei's intrigues, Kossuth was alarmed by the news that a more

formidable enemy had once more appeared on the scene.

On May 1 the Emperor of Austria had formally appealed to the Russians

to assist him against his Hungarian subjects; and in June the Russian

forces began to gather near the passes of the Carpathians. On the 17,

Colonel Szabo encountered the Russians near the Temos Pass. When he

first advanced to meet them, he believed that he had only to do with

some skirmishing troops, such as those with whom he had previously

dealt. But more and more soldiers pressed in to the attack, and Szabo

was compelled to retreat. Two days later Colonel Kiss, at the head of

a band of Szeklers, came up to resist the invaders; and, while those

who were on the hills above hurled down stones and wood on the

Russians, the soldiers below, though only 400 in number, resisted so

gallantly that the Russians at first fled before them. At last,

however, Kiss was laid senseless by a shot, and his soldiers were

seized with a panic and fled in disorder.

Bem, who had returned to Transylvania about the end of May, now

attempted to rally the Szekler by inspiriting appeals to the memories

of their former struggles. On June 25 he recaptured the Saxon town of

Bistritz, and then encountered in the open field a combined corps of

Russians and Austrians. For seven hours he held out against them; but

new reinforcements came up, and he was compelled to retreat. The

enormous numbers of the Russians seem to have impressed Bem's

followers, and to have increased their original panic. The country was

overrun by the enemy; Hermannstadt was captured and recaptured, and

when, on August 5, it at last fell into the hands of the Russians, Bem

narrowly escaped with his life. Even then he wished to continue the

struggle; but on August 7 he was summoned to North Hungary by Kossuth,

to advise him in his difficulties with Goergei.

After an attempt to supersede Goergei by Meszaros, Kossuth had been

compelled to allow the former to resume the command; but he had by no

means recovered confidence in him, and he felt ready to clutch at any

proposal which would extricate himself and his country from their

difficulties. Amongst other suggestions he proposed to offer to Jancu

and the Roumanian leaders independent commands in the Hungarian Army,

and to concede to them most of the points about which they had been

fighting. He had even opened negotiations with Jancu for this

purpose; but Bem steadily opposed the scheme, and the negotiations

came to nothing. But Kossuth's great hope was to supersede Goergei by

Bem. This proposal, however, was opposed, not only by Goergei himself,

but also by Csanyi, who seems throughout to have sympathised with

Goergei, as against Kossuth. Bem, therefore, returned to the war.

Kossuth, left unsupported, became more and more alarmed. Csanyi and

Goergei pressed for his resignation; and, while he was doubting, he

received the news that Bem had been dangerously wounded in battle. The

report, indeed, was exaggerated; and Bem wrote a letter to assure

Kossuth of the slightness of his wound, and to encourage him to stand

firm. But this letter never arrived, and the next news which Bem

received was that Kossuth had abdicated, and Goergei been declared

Dictator of Hungary. Bem wrote a letter of remonstrance to Kossuth,

and, at the same time, marched towards Lugos, in the Banat, to meet

the Russians. Dembinski, who was now in Bem's army, disobeyed his

orders, and Bem was defeated. On that very day, August 13, Goergei

surrendered at Vilagos with all his forces to the Russian general.

This surrender is now believed to have been necessary on military

grounds. The advances made by the Austrians during the siege of Buda,

and the Russian conquest of Transylvania had placed Hungary at the

mercy of the conqueror. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the

quarrel between Goergei and Kossuth, and the factions which the former

had stirred up in the army, had tended considerably to bring about

this result; while, with regard to the terms of surrender, General

Goergei has never been able to explain how it was that, while the

amnesty was so scrupulously observed towards himself both by the

Austrians and Russians, the generals, whose only fault was that they

had served under him, were ruthlessly put to death by Haynau. Anyhow,

whatever may have been the excuses for the act, the surrender of

Vilagos produced a startling close to the Hungarian War. Bem, indeed,

hastened back to Transylvania, and attempted to rouse his former

followers; and General Klapka held out for a month longer at Komorn.

But Bem's efforts were of no avail; Klapka's defence only served to

secure rather better terms; and both these generals, as well as

Kossuth, were forced to take refuge in Turkey.

The news of the surrender of Vilagos did not reach Venice till August

20. There Manin had had much difficulty in still retaining the

control which had been necessary for the guidance of affairs; and on

August 6 a minority of 28 in the Assembly had protested against his

reappointment as Dictator. The cholera had now been added to the other

horrors of the siege; provisions were growing scarce; and thus the

news of Goergei's surrender came as the last straw to break down the

hopes of the defenders of Venice. On the 22nd, therefore, the

Government agreed to yield. Manin succeeded in preventing the riots

which seemed likely to break out on the news of the capitulation; and

on August 30 the final surrender of Venice to the Austrians brought to

a close the long struggle for liberty which had begun with the

Sicilian rising of 1848.

On December 20, 1849, there appeared the following statement in a

Swiss paper: "In front of Manin's door was a stone on which his name

was engraved. The Austrians broke it to pieces; but the smallest

fragments of it have been collected by the Venetians as sacred

relics."

So ended the revolutionary period of 1848 and 1849. Those Revolutions

had displayed, in a way unknown before, the strength and the weakness

of the national principle. The enthusiasm for liberty, and the power

of generous self-sacrifice, which was kindled by the feeling for a

common language and common traditions, had been shown in each of the

Revolutions; and they had struck a blow at the merely diplomatic and

military settlements of States which produced a lasting effect. But,

on the other hand, with the love for men of the same race and language

there awoke in all these nations, with terrible force, the hatred and

scorn for men of other races and languages; and thus, while the

leaders of the movement taught tyrants their danger, they supplied

them at the same time with a defence against that danger,--with

another justification of the old maxim of tyrants, "Divide et impera."

And so the work of the Revolutionists did not fail; but yet it could

not achieve all the noble ends for which it was intended.

The time which followed the defeat of the Revolutionists was to show

both their failure and their success. The dreary period of reaction

from 1849 to 1859 could not have been expected by any sane man to be of

long duration. But the time of reawakening was not like the time of the

first dawn of hope. The work which had been ennobled by the thought of

Mazzini, by the sword of Garibaldi, by the statesmanship of Manin,

and the eloquent enthusiasm of Ciceruacchio, was to be carried to

completion by the intrigues of Cavour, and the interested speculation

of Louis Napoleon. In the place of the wisdom of Robert Blum, and the

wild popular energy of Hecker, was to arise the stern hard policy of

"blood and iron"; and, as Germany had failed to absorb Prussia, Prussia

was finally to absorb Germany. The blunders and prejudices of the

leaders of the Vienna Revolution were to be reproduced by Schmerling,

without their self-sacrifice or generosity. But at the same time

Francis Deak, the wise statesman, who had stood aside in dislike of the

fiercer and more unscrupulous policy of other Magyar leaders, was to

re-establish gradually for his country the freedom which she had lost

for a time during the Revolutionary struggle. The race struggles of the

Austro-Hungarian Empire were to be renewed in a milder form, and the

solution of their difficulties postponed to a distant future; while the

yet more dangerous problems of Socialism, which had forced themselves

in so untimely a manner on the citizens of Vienna and Berlin, were

gradually to assume ever greater prominence in the affairs of Europe.

Thus it will be seen that the Revolutions of 1848 to '49 were but the

climax of movements of which we have not yet seen the end; but, for

good and for evil, they left a mark on Europe, which is never likely to

be entirely effaced.

THE END.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] I must admit that my estimate of Goergei is, in many respects,

lower than that of men whose opportunities of observing the facts, and

whose general candour of judgment entitles their opinion to great

respect. I can only plead that the severest judgments which I have

passed upon him are founded upon his own memoirs; that is, partly upon

the facts narrated in them, and partly upon the tone in which they are

written.

[21] This was the title of the Emperor Ferdinand in his capacity of

King of Hungary.

[22] It will observed that the Roumanians used, wherever possible, the

old Roman titles, in order to assert their connection with ancient

Rome.

[23] The Council which advised the Ban.

[24] A Bolognese priest, who followed Garibaldi partly in the character

of a chaplain and partly as aide-de-camp. See "The Disciples," by Mrs.

E. H. King.

INDEX.

A.

Aargau, 152, 155, 160.

Agram, Bishop of in Gaj's time, 99;

Assembly at, 144-5;

May Meeting at, 318-19;

contrasted with Prague, 333.

Albrecht (Professor), 92. _See_ also Arch Dukes.

Alessandria, occupation of, 3;

in 1821, 39-40, 43;

threatened by Radetzky, 182.

Alexander I. of Russia, character of, 3-4;

relations with Mme de Kruedener, 7;

plan of Holy Alliance, 8;

supports Sardinia, 27;

attitude in 1820, 32;

treatment of Greece, 46-7;

death, 49.

Alfieri, Vittorio, influence of, 23;

Manzoni's feeling to, 25, 54;

influence in Piedmont, 35.

Allemandi, 350.

Alliance, Holy. _See_ Holy Alliance.

Altieri, Cardinal, 417.

Ancona, in 1831, 61, 118;

treatment of by French, 159;

by Triumvirs, 464-5;

fall of, 485.

Andrian, 208.

Anfossi, Augusto, conspiracy against Charles Felix, 61;

early career, 263;

in Milan, 263, 265, 267, 269;

death, 337.

---- Francesco, 365.

Antologia, of Florence, 54-5.

Antonelli, Cardinal, supports Italian war, 346;

suspected of treachery, 348.

Antonini, General, 469.

Apponyi, Chancellor of Hungary, 201.

Arch Duchess Sophia, opposed to Metternich, 207;

favours Jellacic, 288;

denounced by Hungarians, 460.

Arch Duke Albert, in March insurrection, 239, 241.

---- Francis Charles, in Imperial Council, 207;

appealed to by merchants, 231;

attitude to Metternich, 241;

denounced by Hungarians, 460.

---- John, promises to Italy, 21;

his toast at Cologne, 209-10;

his liberalism, 241;

pressure on Metternich, 243;

made administrator, 363, 373;

forms new ministry, 374;

opens Viennese Parliament, 378;

intervenes in Croatian question, 383.

---- Louis, helps to govern Vienna, 206;

opposes removal of Hye, 207;

warns Metternich, 232;

his proposal about Windischgraetz, 240;

denounced by Hungarians, 460.

---- Maximilian, in March rising, 242-3.

---- Sigismund, 268.

---- Stephen, deserts Hungary, 395, 432;

denounced by Hungarians, 461.

Arcioni, at defence of Rome, 475.

Armellini, in provisional government, 423;

Triumvir, 464; feelings to French, 473.

Arndt, relations with Stein, 10;

professor, 12;

in 1816, 12;

restored by Frederick William IV., 94;

thanked at Frankfort, 361; vote on truce of Malmo, 374-5.

Arthaber, 245.

Ascoli, Duke of, 34-5.

---- conspiracy in, 464-5.

Auersperg, General, in October rising, 391, 393.

Auerswald, death of, 376.

Austria, Arch Duchy of, relations with Bohemia and Hungary, 250-3.

---- Emperors of. _See_ Francis, Ferdinand, Francis Joseph.

---- Empire of, special evils of in Italy, 20-22;

German language in, 89-90;

policy of, 132-3;

in Switzerland, 151, 159;

political character of, 209;

Moering's view of, _see_ Moering;

Kossuth's view of, 227-8;

attitude of Bohemians towards, 298-300;

of Viennese towards, 304;

proposed federation of, 333;

Radetzky's position in, 335.

---- Estates of. _See_ Estates.

---- House of, policy towards Serbs, 281-2;

feeling to Italy, 363;

deposed in Hungary, 458-61.

Avezzana, 474.

B.

Bach, his soup kitchen, 212;

his treatment of Rieger, 379.

Baden, from 1815-47, 219-20;

movement in in 1847-8, 220-1;

programme of leaders of, 232-3;

insurrections in, 361, 377-8, 485. _See_ also Struve, Hecker, and

Republicans, South German.

Balbo, Prospero, supposed liberalism of, 35;

in 1821, 38-9;

inconsistencies, 120-1.

---- Cesare, early career, 121;

Speranze d'Italia, 121-2.

Banat, 449, 456.

Bandiera Brothers, 118-20, 368.

Bassermann, 221.

Bassi, Ugo, 475, 487.

Batthyanyi, Louis, in 1839, 86;

in 1857, 202;

Prime Minister, 246;

his difficulties, 279-80;

his appeal to Szeklers, 316;

his interview with Jellacic, 383-4;

feeling about Lamberg, 386;

his resignation, 388;

attempted mediation, 462

Battles, of White Hill, 250-1;

of Goito first, 341;

second, 356;

of Cornuta, 349;

of Curtatone, 355;

of Somma Campagna, 364;

of Custozza, 364;

of Schwechat, 396-7, 432;

of Novara, 429.

Bava, General, 341, 363-4.

Bavaria, treatment of by Metternich, 13;

protest against concluding act of Vienna, 18;

resistance of to Metternich, 218;

revolution of 1848 in, 222;

quarrel of with Baden, 377.

Beauharnais, 21, 25.

Bem, early career, 394;

defence of Vienna, 396;

relations with Kossuth and Goergei, 436;

first campaign in Transylvania, 446-7;

contrasted with Csanyi, 449-50;

final struggle of, 492-3;

flies to Turkey, 494.

Bentinck, Lord William, 21, 44.

Berczenczei, 440.

Bergamo, 197, 268.

Berlin, March rising in, 247-9;

discontents in, 402-3;

riots in, 405-6;

struggle of Assembly in, 409-14.

Bern, 152, 154, 156.

Bible, Metternich's view of, 6.

Bini, Carlo, 55.

Blasendorf, 312-14.

Blum, Robert, first appearance, 92;

sympathy with Ronge, 95;

victory of, 96;

sympathy with Poland, 192;

in March rising, 223-5;

influence in Preparatory Parliament, 293, 295;

hinders May rising, 361;

view of Truce of Malmo, 374-5;

action in Frankfort riot, 375-6;

difference with Hecker, 376-7;

his republicanism, 377-8;

in Vienna, 393-7;

his death and its effects, 397-8.

Blumenthal, Major von, 412-13.

Bohemia, division of classes in, 204;

national feeling in, 206;

history of in 17th and 18th centuries, 250-3;

revival of language in, 253-4;

March rising in, 254-60;

race difficulties in, 289-92;

relations of to Frankfort Parliament, 295-302;

effect on of May rising, 308, 310;

peculiarity of its position, 333;

feeling towards Italy, 335;

triumphed over by Frankfort Parliament, 363;

Deputies of in Viennese Parliament, 387, 392;

Deputies at Olmuetz, 415-16;

at Kremsier, 416;

treatment of in Constitution of 1849, 455. _See_ also Slavs,

Prague, Rieger.

Bologna, in 1830, 60;

attitude to Corsica, 60;

sympathy with Lombards, 354;

in August, 1848, 368-9;

struggle of in 1849, 466, 477-9.

Bolza, 144, 183, 267.

Bonn, 412.

Borrosch, tries to save Latour, 391;

at Kremsier, 416.

Bozzelli, 177.

Brandenburg, General, 408, 409-10.

---- City, 409, 413-14.

Brescia, 189, 261;

March rising in, 268-9;

Anfossi's service at, 365;

Garibaldi's march to, 356;

rising in 1849, 428-9.

Breslau, 406, 412.

Brunetti. _See_ Ciceruacchio.

Buda-Pesth, March movement in, 278-9;

contrasted with Presburg, 279-80;

death of Lamberg in, 388;

question of its defence, 438;

besieged by Goergei, 491.

Bund, constitution of in 1815, 8;

effect on of Carlsbad Decrees, 17;

strengthened in 1834, 90;

proposed reform of, 223.

Bundestag, duty of, 9;

decrees of in 1830, 50;

in Schleswig-Holstein question, 165;

action of in March, 1848, 224;

relations of with Frankfort Parliament, 295, 372-3.

Buonaparte, Charles Lucien, at Genoa, 143;

in Venice, 192-3;

advocates Italian Assembly, 419.

---- Napoleon I., 1, 2, 20-1.

---- Louis Napoleon, expulsion of from Switzerland, 154;

letter on Cavaignac's expedition, 467;

elected President, 467, 470;

answer to Roman deputation, 470.

Buonaparte, Pierre, 471.

Buonarotti, 70-1.

Burschenschaft, 14-15.

C.

Camarilla, 244, 381.

Camphausen, his policy, 370;

his fall, 405.

Campo Formio, Treaty of, 20, 23.

Canino, Prince of. _See_ Buonaparte, Charles Lucien.

Canning, George, his foreign policy, 48;

Metternich's opinion of him, 48;

treatment of Greece, 49;

his death, 50.

Capo d'Istria, 47.

Carbonari, 4;

rise and work of, 29-30;

in 1820, 31-2, 33;

Mazzini's relations with, 56-8.

Carlowitz, importance of to Serbs, 283, 284;

May meeting at, 311-12;

June attack on, 319-20;

contrasted with Prague, 333.

---- General von, 225.

Carlsbad Decrees, 17, 221.

Carlsruhe, 221.

Carpathians, 108, 109.

Casati, honours Confalonieri, 144;

character and position, 185;

behaviour in smoking riots, 197;

in March rising, 264-6, 267;

in Lombard war, 336;

policy of, 337;

Mazzini's relations with, 342, 349, 365;

action in May rising, 357;

feeling to Charles Albert, 358.

Castellani, 464.

Castlereagh, in 1815, 2;

in 1821, 44;

suicide, 48.

Cavaignac, 467.

Cavour, 181.

Cernuschi, conduct in March rising, 264;

arrested in May, 357-8;

his proposal in Rome, 487.