CHAPTER IX.

THE REVOLUTION BREAKS INTO SEPARATE PARTS. APRIL TO OCTOBER, 1848.

Attitude of the other races to the Italian struggle.--Inconsistency

of Kossuth.--Attitude of the Provisional Government of

Lombardy.--Hesitation of Charles Albert.--His two declarations

about the Lombard war.--The war adopted by Leopold of Tuscany.--By

Ferdinand of Naples.--Confusions of the Pope.--General

Durando.--Radetzky at Mantua.--The first battle of Goito.--Mazzini

in Milan.--Casati, Charles Albert, and the Italian Volunteers.--The

Southern Tyrol.--Venice.--Manin's error.--Durando and

Manin.--Charles Albert's attitude towards Venetia.--The Pope's

difficulty.--The Encyclical of April 29.--Its effect.--The Mamiani

Ministry.--Effect of the Pope's attitude on Charles Albert's

position.--The fall of Udine, and its consequences.--Charles Albert

and Venetia.--Casati and Mazzini.--The question of the Fusion.--Its

effect on opinion.--The Neapolitan Coup d'Etat of May 15.--The

recall of the Neapolitan troops from Lombardy.--Pepe and

Manin.--Battle of Curtatone.--"The handful of boys."--Second battle

of Goito.--Capture of Peschiera.--The vote of fusion.--The emeute

of May 29 and its effects.--The struggle and fall of Vicenza.--The

Austrian conquest of Venetia.--The vote of fusion in Venice.--The

attack on Trieste.--German feeling in Frankfort.--The various

difficulties of the Frankfort Parliament.--Effect of Archduke

John's election.--Anti-Italian decisions.--The struggle in Italy

grows fiercer.--Charles Albert's new blunders.--Mazzini's advice to

the Lombard Government.--Charles Albert at Milan.--The final

treason.--The Austrian reconquest of Lombardy.--The 8th of August

in Bologna.--Repulse of Welden.--The struggle between Frankfort and

Berlin.--The question of Posen.--The Schleswig-Holstein war.--The

Assembly and the King.--The truce of Malmo.--The fatal vote.--The

riots at Frankfort.--The "state of siege."--The

Struve-Putsch.--The Vienna Parliament.--The race struggle.--Change

of feeling towards the Magyars.--Intrigues of Latour.--Character

and policy of Ferdinand.--Jellacic.--The conference at Vienna.--"We

meet on the Danube."--Stratimirovic and Rajacic.--Colonel

Mayerhoffer.--The Magyar deputation.--The mission and death of

Lamberg.--Latour and Pulszky.--Murder of Latour.--Jellacic and

Auersperg.--Blum and Bem.--The battle of Schwechat.--Fall of

Vienna.--Death of Blum.--General remarks.

The struggle of races described in the last chapter had not been

without its effect on the progress of affairs in Italy. Those

Austrians, whose one desire was for the unity of the Empire, spoke of

Radetzky's camp as the only place where Austria was truly represented;

while, on the other hand, the leaders of the different race movements

were divided in their feelings about the Italian war. The Germans, both

at Frankfort and Vienna, saw with chagrin that Lombardy and Venetia

were slipping away from German rule; but they felt, nevertheless,

that they could not entirely condemn a struggle for freedom and

independence. The Bohemians, especially in the first part of the

struggle, would gladly have let the Italian provinces go, if they could

thereby have facilitated the federal arrangement of the rest of the

Austrian Empire. Among the Croats there seems to have been some

division of feeling on the subject. Gaj and the purely national party

had some sympathies with Italian liberty; but Jellacic, and that large

body of his followers who mingled military feelings with the desire for

Croatian independence, were eager to show their loyalty to the House of

Austria by supporting the war in Italy; and they were, moreover, not

unmindful of the rivalry between Slavs and Italians in Dalmatia and

Istria. The Magyars, in the early days of the March movement, had been

more disposed than any race in the Empire to show friendliness to

Italy; and Kossuth's Italian sympathies had been specially well known.

But circumstances changed the attitude of the Croats and Hungarians to

Italy, as the struggle went on; for, while the former desired to recall

the Croat forces from Italy to the defence of their home, the latter

became more and more desirous of conciliating the sympathies of the

Emperor. The wish to preserve a strictly legal position led some of the

members of the Hungarian Ministry to dwell upon the claims due to the

Austrian Government under the Pragmatic Sanction; and Kossuth, without

sympathising with this feeling, was easily induced to give way to his

colleagues, by his fear of the encouragement which the recall of

Croatian regiments would give to the desire for Croatian independence;

and therefore, in spite of his belief in the justice of the Italian

cause, he strongly supported the use of Hungarian troops in crushing

out the freedom of Italy.

But, interesting as the Italian struggle was to all the different races

of the Austrian Empire, it was yet working itself out in a way so

distinct from either the Austrian or the German movements, that we are

compelled to ignore the exact chronological order of European events in

order to understand its full significance; and we must therefore now go

back to the events which followed the March risings and the flight of

Radetzky and Palffy. The centre of interest was still in Milan,

where Casati and the Town Council had been changed by the force of

circumstances into the Provisional Government of Lombardy. These men

had shown, during the siege, a continual uncertainty of purpose and

readiness to compromise; and, when Radetzky had been driven from

Milan, they showed an equal unreadiness to follow up their advantages.

In the people, however, there was no want of willingness to carry on

the struggle; and at least one general rose to the occasion. Augusto

Anfossi had died of his wounds during the siege; but Luciano Manara,

the youth who had captured Porta Tosa, was following up the retreat of

Radetzky, placing guards in the villages, and cutting roads. Manara

found it very difficult to carry out his plans; partly owing to the

distrust shown to him by the General whom the Provisional Government

had placed over him, partly to the insubordination of Torres, one of

the leaders of the Genoese Volunteers, who was nominally acting under

him, and whose defiance of Manara seems to have been at least tolerated

by the Provisional Government.

For Casati and his friends put their trust not so much in any Lombards

as in the help derived from Charles Albert. That Prince, indeed, had

hesitated as usual till the last moment. When the news of the Milanese

rising had reached Genoa, the Genoese had risen and sent volunteers to

assist the insurgents; but Charles Albert had not only forbidden their

march, but had sent troops to drive them back from the frontier. So

indignant were the students of Turin at this action that they rose

against Charles Albert, and would not submit until they were allowed

to volunteer. Several officers even threatened to leave the Army if

war was not declared on Austria; Parma and Modena were rising at the

same time against the Austrian forces, and demanding annexation to

Piedmont; while Mazzini and his friends were issuing appeals from

Paris to urge their followers to support Charles Albert, if he would

venture on war with Austria. At last Pareto, the most democratic of

Charles Albert's Ministers, assured him that, if he did not act, a

rebellion would break out in Piedmont; and so, on March 23, having

demanded of the Austrians the evacuation of Parma and Modena, and

having been refused, Charles Albert ordered the Austrian Ambassador to

leave Turin, and straightway declared war. Yet even now he left

doubtful the exact object of the war; for, while he declared to the

Provisional Government that he came "to lend to the Peoples of

Lombardy and Venetia that assistance which brother may expect

from brother, and friend from friend," he announced to the other

Governments of Europe that he had only intervened to prevent a

Republican rising. He then despatched General Passalacqua to Milan,

announcing that he himself would not arrive there until he had won a

victory over the Austrians.

But, however ungraciously Charles Albert had done his part, he had

succeeded in quickening the enthusiasm of the Italians for a war

against Austria. Leopold of Tuscany had announced, two days before,

that the hour of the resurrection of Italy had struck, and that his

troops should march to the frontier of Tuscany; and, on April 5, he

frankly declared the purpose of this march, and ordered his troops to

help their Lombard brothers. Riots broke out both in Naples and Rome,

and the Austrian arms were torn down. Guglielmo Pepe hastened back to

Naples, after twenty seven years of exile, and demanded the immediate

departure of the troops for Lombardy. Ferdinand yielded to the popular

cry, and consented to make Pepe general of the expedition. Pius IX. was

less easy to move. He had become thoroughly scared at the progress of

events; and though he had consented to grant a Constitution, much

like that of other Princes, he could not reconcile in his mind the

contradictions between his position as Head of the Catholic Church and

as a Constitutional Italian Prince. The former position seemed to

require of him a claim to absolute authority in home affairs, and a

perfectly impartial attitude towards the various members of the

Catholic Church, whatever might be their differences of race or

government. The latter position seemed, on the contrary, to demand that

he should adapt himself to the freer life which was growing up in the

different Italian States, and that he should become the champion of

Italian unity and liberty against the Emperor of Austria. His own

inclinations and sympathies would have led him to sacrifice the new

office to the old one. He was, as already explained, much more a priest

than a prince, much more a Conservative than a Reformer. His priestly

training combined with his weak health to make new ideas distasteful to

him; and his sense of his duties as Head of the Catholic Church worked

in with that very kindliness of disposition which had betrayed him into

the position of a reformer, to make him oppose a fierce and dangerous

war. Under these circumstances, he looked with alarm on the new impulse

which Charles Albert had given to the anti-Austrian feeling throughout

Italy.

But he was, for the moment, in the hands of stronger men, who were

determined on driving him forward. Massimo d'Azeglio was in Rome

seconding the efforts of Ciceruacchio for the war; and Giovanni

Durando (a brother of the Giacomo Durando who had written on Italian

Nationality) was appointed general of the forces which were to march

to Lombardy. Even now the Pope refused to recognize the object of

their expedition; and as the troops filed past him, on March 24, he

blessed them, but only as the defenders of the Roman territories

against assailants; and when a young man cried from the ranks, "Holy

Father, we are going to fight for Italy and for you," he answered,

"Not for me; I wish for peace, not war." Durando, however, issued a

proclamation to his troops in which he declared that, since Pius IX.'s

approval of the war, "Radetzky must be considered as fighting against

the Cross of Christ." Pius IX. angrily repudiated this speech in the

Government Gazette, declaring that he would soon utter his own

opinions, and that he did not require to express them through the

mouth of a subordinate. But nobody took any notice of this protest,

and the troops marched to Lombardy.

In the meantime Charles Albert was beginning the war in an unfortunate

manner. Eager to distinguish himself by an engagement with Radetzky,

he was resolved to march after him to Lodi instead of seizing on the

important fortress of Mantua. Mantua had attempted to shake off the

Austrian yoke at the time when other cities of Lombardy were rising;

but a desire to act through the Municipal Council led the citizens to

hesitate in their movement. The want of communication with other towns

prevented them from being aware of the position of the Austrian

troops; and, on the evening of March 22, Benedek, one of the Austrian

generals, was able to crush out the incipient rising. But the news of

the Piedmontese advance once more stirred the Mantuans to action; on

the 29th they rose again, threw up barricades, organized a Civic

Guard, and eagerly hoped that Charles Albert would come to support

them. When Radetzky found that Charles Albert did not seize on this

important fortress, he availed himself of the blunder to march at once

to Mantua; and, on March 31, that city fell again into the hands of

the Austrians. This victory at once alarmed the Piedmontese, who,

under the command of General Bava, set out, on April 8, to Goito, a

village a few miles from Mantua. The Austrians occupied the little

bridge across the Mincio at the entrance to the village, and the

Tyrolese sharpshooters sheltered themselves behind an inn which stands

near the bridge on the Mantuan side. The Piedmontese, mistaking the

stone ornaments on the inn for sentinels, fired at them; shots were

returned by the Austrians, and a fierce encounter followed, during

which several of the troops from the Italian Tyrol deserted the

Austrian ranks and joined the Piedmontese. The Austrians, finding

themselves beaten, attempted to blow up the bridge; but had only

succeeded in destroying one arch before they were driven back. By this

victory the Piedmontese obtained the command of the whole line of the

Mincio from Mantua to Peschiera, and cut off all communication between

the two wings of the Austrian army, one of which was in Mantua and one

in Verona.

The battle of Goito roused the greatest enthusiasm for Charles Albert;

and it unfortunately strengthened the Provisional Government of Milan

in their determination to rely rather on him than on their own people.

How much popular force they might at this time have gained was shown

by an event which took place on the very day after the battle of

Goito. On that day, April 9, Mazzini arrived in Milan. About eight

o'clock in the evening he appeared on the balcony of the Albergo della

Venezia, which stands directly opposite the place occupied by the

Provisional Government. He addressed a few words to the people, waving

the tricolour banner. He spoke in terms of warm approval of the

Provisional Government, and praised them for rejecting a truce which

Radetzky had proposed, and for endeavouring to secure a complete

representation of the Lombard provinces in the Assembly which met at

Milan; and when Casati appeared he greeted him warmly. But Mazzini

soon found that, neither in the camp of Charles Albert, nor in Milan,

were the leaders disposed to welcome the help of the Republican

forces. When Mazzini applied to the Provisional Government to grant

employment to those who had already had experience in revolutionary

wars, he was told that no one knew where they were; and when he

answered this objection by producing the men, their services were

refused. The Swiss, who flocked in from the Canton Ticino, were in the

same way repelled; and even a more illustrious volunteer than any of

these found cold reception in Charles Albert's camp; for it was at

this period of the war that Garibaldi arrived in Lombardy in the full

splendour of the reputation he had won as a champion of liberty in

Monte Video. But, when he offered his services to Charles Albert, he

was told that he might go to Turin, to see _if_ and _how_ he could be

employed.

One of the great points of difference between the policy of the

Republicans and that of Charles Albert was that the former desired to

press forward to the Alps and excite an insurrection against Austria

amongst the population of the Southern Tyrol. That population, in

spite of its Italian blood and language, had been loyal to Francis of

Austria in the time of Andrew Hofer; but the ungrateful policy of the

Austrian Emperor had gradually alienated the sympathies of the Italian

Tyrolese; and, while even in Frankfort the representatives of the

Southern Tyrol were asking for local self-government in their own

country, the population were ready to rise on behalf of Garibaldi and

Manara. But the dislike of many of the Piedmontese officers to the

war, and the hesitation of Charles Albert between war, diplomacy, and

complete abandonment of the cause, led the official leaders of the

Lombard movement to repel any proposal for so extending the area of

the war as to drive the Austrians to extremities, and to make them

unwilling to accept a diplomatic settlement of the contest.

Many of those who were repelled by Casati and Charles Albert went to

find a more generous welcome at Venice. The extremely democratic

character of the Venetian insurrection had impressed all observers;

and it was specially noted that an artizan, named Toffoli, had been

admitted into the Provisional Government of Venice. But, hearty as

Manin was in his desire to enlist the sympathies of all classes, he

could not help being a Venetian, and not a Milanese. However narrow

and aristocratic Casati and his friends might be in their personal

feelings, they were the official representatives of a city whose

glories were connected with the memories of a time when it was the

head of a league of free cities;[14] while Venice, even in its long

struggle against the Turks or in its resistance to the papacy in the

seventeenth century, could never be taken as the champion of free

civic government. Manin and Casati seem alike to have been influenced

by these traditions; and while the future Council of Lombardy had been

fully constituted by April 13th, it was not till the 14th of that

month that the Provisional Government of Venice consented to allow the

towns of Venetia to choose representatives, who should take a real

share in the government of the province. The consequences of this

hesitation were most unfortunate. Treviso, Padua, Rovigo, Vicenza, and

Udine had formed Provisional Governments even before they knew that

Venice was free; and they would then readily have joined the Venetian

Republic; but observing some hesitation on the part of Venice to

answer to their appeal, Vicenza offered herself to Charles Albert.

This decision excited some indignation in Venice; for Manin had hoped

that the old towns of Venetia would be willing, under whatever form of

government, to act with the chief city; and whatever errors Manin may

have committed in the delay, he was more zealous than either the

Milanese or Piedmontese Governments for the protection of the Venetian

towns from the Austrian forces.

Nor, indeed, was it wholly the result of the above-named hesitation

that Manin was not able to secure that co-operation which he desired

between Venice and the other Venetian cities. There seems to have been

a tendency in the civic governments, and still more in those officers

who came to help the Lombards and Venetians, to look rather for

orders to Casati and Charles Albert than to the rulers of Venice; and

this tendency was still further increased by the anomalous position of

the officers of the Papal troops. Durando, the chief of these

officers, was vividly conscious that he had come to Lombardy in an

independent manner, and in spite of the discouragement of the Pope;

and, though he was willing to fight for Venice, he wished to do so in

his own manner, and refused to listen to Manin's directions about the

plan of operations. He felt no doubt that it was safer to take orders

from an established sovereign, like Charles Albert, than from the head

of an un-"recognised" revolutionary Government; and while he wished to

march to the aid of Padua, he desired to do so as an officer of

Charles Albert. But the same motives which led Charles Albert to

abandon the Southern Tyrol were making him hesitate, at any rate,

about extending his campaign to Venetia. So he forbad Durando to enter

Venetia, and sent him instead to protect the Duchies of Modena and

Parma.

While these conflicting interests were weakening the efforts of the

defenders of Lombardy and Venetia, another apple of discord was thrown

into the camp by an Encyclical from the Pope. As already mentioned,

Pius had discouraged the march to Lombardy, and had promised to state

his own opinions instead of accepting those of Durando. His Ministers,

feeling the uncertainty of the position in which the Papal troops were

placed, urged him to come to a more definite decision on this point.

At no time was such strong pressure brought to bear from opposite

sides on the feeble mind of Pius IX. On the one hand, disturbances

were breaking out in the provinces; and the indignation at the Pope's

hesitation was stirred to greater bitterness by the want both of food

and of work which was being felt in Rome. On the other hand, two

powerful influences were being exerted to induce Pius to abandon the

Italian cause. In Germany great bitterness had arisen against the

Italian war; and the German Catholics were threatening to break loose

from the Papal authority. At the same time, Ferdinand of Naples, who

had never heartily sympathised with the struggle for Italian freedom,

was trying to inspire the Pope with jealousy of the designs of Charles

Albert. To say the truth, Ferdinand was not without excuse in this

matter; for, while he was being driven to declare war on Austria, the

Sicilian Assembly were deposing him from the throne of Sicily, and

discussing a proposal to offer their island to a son of Charles

Albert. Therefore the Neapolitan Ambassador was directed to use his

influence with Pius IX. for the promotion of a league between Rome,

Naples, and Tuscany, which was to counteract the power of Piedmont.

Thus, then, those rival instincts, of the Head of the Church and the

Italian Prince, were both appealed to, to secure the opposition of the

Pope to the war; and however much he may have been terrified by the

disturbances in the provinces, those disturbances did not tend to

increase his sympathy with the popular movement. Such was his state of

feeling, when on April 28th, his Ministers, headed by Cardinal

Antonelli, entreated him to give his open sanction to the war. The

result of this petition was directly contrary to the desire expressed

by the signers of it; for, on April 29th there appeared a Papal

Encyclical absolutely repudiating the Italian war.

In this document, the Pope complained of the desire of the agitators

to draw away from him the sympathy of the Catholics of Germany; and he

proceeded to justify and explain the course that he had hitherto

followed. He alluded to the demand for reform which had been made in

the time of Pius VII., and to the encouragement which that demand had

received from the programme presented to Gregory XVI. by the Great

Powers. That programme had included a Central Council, improvement in

the Municipal Councils, and above all the admission of the laity to

all offices, whether administrative or judicial. Gregory had not been

able to carry out these ideas completely; and therefore Pius had been

compelled to develope them further. In this he had been guided, not by

the advice of others, but by charitable feeling towards his subjects.

But his concessions had not produced the result which he had hoped;

and he had been compelled to warn the people against riots. These

warnings had been in vain; and he had been forced to send troops to

guard his frontier, and to "protect the integrity and security of the

Papal State." He protested against the suspicion that he sympathised

with those "who wished the Roman Pontiff to preside over some new kind

of Republic to be constituted out of all the Peoples of Italy." He

exhorted the Italians to abandon all such theories, and to obey the

Princes of whose benevolence they had had experience; and he, for his

part, did not desire any further extension of his temporal power, but

would use all his efforts for the restoration of peace.

The greatest indignation was aroused by this Encyclical; but it was

still possible for the Pope to find protection in that superstition

which Ciceruacchio had so industriously encouraged. The cry was again

raised that the Cardinals were misleading the Pope, and special

charges of treason were made against Antonelli. Some of the more

zealous patriots even talked of carrying off the Pope to Milan, that

he might see for himself the real condition of the war. At the same

time appeals were made to the humanity of Pius; it was pointed out to

him that, if he disowned his soldiers, they would be liable to be

treated as brigands; and instances were quoted of the cruelty of

Austrian soldiers to those whom they had captured. Partly moved by

humanity, and partly by fear, the Pope at last yielded; and on May 3

he summoned to office Terenzio Mamiani, so lately under suspicion as a

half-amnestied rebel; and Mamiani speedily avowed his zeal for the

war, declaring it a holy cause.

But, in spite of this change of front, the Encyclical produced a

dangerous effect on the Lombard war; and its first result was to

strengthen the power of Charles Albert, by compelling Durando to place

himself more definitely than before under his orders, and by leading

the Italians in general to look to the King of Sardinia as their only

trustworthy leader. Fortunately, this accession of strength came to

Charles Albert at a moment when he was rousing himself from that

state of hesitation which had followed the victory at Goito. That

hesitation, however, had given time for Radetzky to fortify Mantua

more strongly; while Nugent, at the head of another Austrian force,

had marched into Venetia. The Venetians, ill-supported, were little

able to stand against the invader; and the important town of Udine

fell into the hands of the Austrians. This startled both Charles

Albert and Casati; and, while the Provisional Government of Lombardy

turned to Mazzini for advice, Charles Albert at last consented to

allow Durando to advance into Venetia. Durando sent his subordinate

officer Ferrari before him; and on May 8, Ferrari encountered the

Austrians at Cornuta, and drove them back. He then continued the

struggle in hopes of new reinforcements from Durando; but, when

Durando had not arrived at four o'clock in the afternoon, the soldiers

were compelled to retreat. Then they were seized by a sudden panic,

and they cried out that either Ferrari or Durando had betrayed

them. The consciousness of the illegal position in which the Papal

Encyclical had placed them, still further increased the panic of the

soldiers; Ferrari was forced to retreat to Mestre, and Durando to

Vicenza. In Vicenza, indeed, the latter defended himself gallantly

enough; and the people seconded his efforts. Women, old men, and

children, rushed to put out the lighted balls which the enemy threw

into the city; and, after a struggle of about twelve hours, the

Austrian forces were compelled to retreat.

But by this time Charles Albert had again repented of his invasion of

Venetia; and, refusing to come to the help of Durando, he turned his

attention to the fortress of Peschiera. The zeal of the Milanese

Government had been even more short-lived than that of Charles Albert.

Mazzini had proposed the formation of a Council of War, to be composed

of three men, and to be accompanied by a levee en masse of what were

called "the five classes." The Government consented to summon only the

first three classes, alleging as their excuse, the distrust which they

felt for many of the peasantry. Mazzini also proposed to issue an

appeal for volunteers, and to place his own name first on the list.

The Government consented; but, before the appeal had been prepared,

they had changed their mind and withdrawn their approval from the

proposal. The Council of War was changed into a Committee of Defence

for Venetia, then into a Committee of aid for Venetia, and finally

disappeared altogether. Charles Albert's secretary announced that the

King did not choose to have an army of enemies in his rear, and

inscriptions on the walls of Milan threatened Mazzini with death. The

leaders of the volunteers, who had been pressing forward to the Alps,

were discouraged; and General Allemandi, their commander, was so ill

supported that he resigned his office.

The war seemed to be rapidly changing its character; and the desires

of Charles Albert appeared to be more exclusively concentrated on the

aggrandisement of his own Kingdom. When he had first entered Lombardy,

both he and the Milanese leaders had announced that the form of

Government would be left undecided till the victory was won; but they

now changed their tone, and prepared for a union between Piedmont and

Lombardy. On May 12, the Milanese Government issued a decree that the

population of Lombardy should decide by a plebiscite the question

whether Lombardy should be immediately incorporated with Piedmont

under the rule of Charles Albert. The Republicans, held in check to a

great extent by Mazzini, had hitherto refrained from giving prominence

to their political opinions. But Mazzini now felt it necessary to

protest against this proposal; and all the more strongly because

Charles Albert's secretary had hoped, by the offer of the premiership

in the future Kingdom of North Italy, to induce him to assist in

promoting the fusion between Lombardy and Piedmont. He therefore now

issued a protest against the taking of any political vote of this kind

while the war was going on; both because it was absurd and unnatural in

itself; because it was a violation of the promises of the Government;

and because it gave a pretext for foreign intervention, by changing the

war of liberation into one of conquest. The champions of Charles Albert

were infuriated at this opposition; Mazzini's protest was publicly

burnt in Genoa; and the Provisional Government of Lombardy resolved to

go on with the Plebiscite. This decision tended undoubtedly to bring

great confusion into Lombardy. It weakened the sympathies of those

Germans, Austrians, and Hungarians who had been well disposed towards

the Italian struggle for independence; while it gave an excuse for the

opposition of that larger body of politicians, who had hesitated

between Liberal principles and national prejudice, and who were now

eager to declare that the war had ceased to be a struggle for Italian

liberty, and was merely designed for the aggrandisement of Charles

Albert.

But, however much Charles Albert's interests might suffer from his

changeable policy, he always was helped out of his difficulties by the

contrast between his questionable acts, and the unquestionable badness

of some other prince. As the Papal Encyclical had come at the right

moment to redeem the credit which he had lost by his slackness after

the Battle of Goito, so the treachery of the King of Naples served, at

this crisis, to throw, by force of contrast, a more favourable light

on the ambitious proposals for the fusion of Lombardy with Piedmont.

Ferdinand of Naples had reluctantly consented to join in the Italian

war. The hearty dislike of Liberty, which he shared with the majority

of the Bourbon family, combined with his special jealousy of Charles

Albert to increase his desire to abandon this expedition. He feared

that a Kingdom of North Italy would be the natural result of the war,

even if the popular enthusiasm did not carry Charles Albert into

schemes of greater aggrandizement; and he had a not unreasonable

grievance against the King of Sardinia in the recent choice by the

Sicilians of the Duke of Genoa as their King. The priests in Naples,

unlike those in Lombardy and Venetia, were intriguing on behalf of

Austria, and had circulated the rumour that St. Januarius was a friend

to the Austrian Emperor. In spite of these intrigues, a Liberal

majority had been returned to the Neapolitan Parliament; and the King,

therefore, resolved to put still further limits on the power of that

Parliament, by demanding of the members an oath which would have

admitted Ferdinand's right to suppress the Sicilian movement, would

have enforced the complete acceptance of the Roman Catholic faith,

and would have prohibited any attempt to enlarge or reform the

Constitution.

This oath the deputies refused; but in spite of the advice of his

Ministers, the King resolved to insist upon it. Tumults arose in the

city, and barricades were thrown up; but the deputies, while thanking

the people for their zeal, urged them to remain quiet, and to pull

down the barricades. Some of those who had taken part in the rising

withdrew from the streets in consequence of this appeal; but others

demanded that the royal troops, drawn up in the piazza of the palace,

and near the church of San Francesco, should be withdrawn at the same

time. The deputies went to wait upon the King; but whilst they were in

conversation with him, they heard the first shots fired by the

soldiers upon the crowd. Ferdinand then scornfully told the deputation

to go home and consider themselves; "for the Day of Judgment is not

far from you." He had one great advantage on his side. That degraded

class, the Lazzaroni of Naples, had always been fanatical supporters

of the King and St. Januarius; and it is even said, that, while the

troops were firing on the people, Ferdinand was exclaiming to the

Lazzaroni, "Go forward!" "Naples is yours!" While massacre and outrage

were raging in the streets, the deputies sent a message to the French

admiral, whose fleet was anchored in the Bay of Naples, to entreat him

to intervene in the name of France. But he answered that he had been

ordered not to interfere in the affairs of another people.

The deputies then passed a resolution, declaring that they would not

suspend their sittings, unless compelled by brute force. An officer

soon after came to disperse them; and, after a written protest, they

yielded to this violence. Every liberty was shortly after crushed out;

and, though, for about a month longer, a kind of spasmodic struggle

went on and though, after a time, the Sicilians consented to send some

help to the insurgents, the movements were too ill-organized to have

any permanent strength; and the Government were able to suppress them

by repeated massacres.

Ferdinand's _coup d'etat_ had taken place on May 15. In the meantime,

the Neapolitan forces under Pepe had been slowly advancing through

the Papal territory collecting volunteers as they went. The slowness

of their march had been due in part to the suspicious attitude of the

Pope, who feared that the King of Naples might seize on those

territories, which had always been a bone of contention between Naples

and Rome. Pepe therefore had not yet left the Papal territory, when he

received orders to abandon the war, and to return to Naples. At the

same time he was told that, if he did not wish to return, he might

resign his command to General Statella. Pepe was resolved to advance;

but it seemed doubtful how far his authority would outweigh that of

the King, and of the subordinate officers who were on the King's side.

The Bolognese, who had risen in March to drive out those Austrian

troops which had lingered in Ferrara, and to expel the Duke from

Modena, now rose to insist that Pepe should lead on his forces to

Lombardy. Statella was compelled to fly from the city; and those

soldiers who returned to Naples were followed by the curses of the

Romagnoli. Several of the officers were willing to act with Pepe; and

he passed the Po with two battalions of volunteers, one company of the

regular forces, and some Lombards and Bolognese. But many of these

deserted him even after he had crossed the Po; and by the time he

reached Venice, there remained with him only one battalion of

riflemen, whose officer had served under him in 1815. But, however

poorly attended, Pepe was heartily welcomed by Manin, and was soon

after made Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces of Venice. These

were composed not only of Venetians and Neapolitans, but also of

Lombards, Romans, and even Swiss. The Neapolitan admiral, too, at

first refused to obey the orders of the King, and continued for a time

to defend Venice on his own authority.

In the meantime, while the resources of the Lombard towns were being

drained to support the designs of Charles Albert, he was devoting his

energies to the siege of Peschiera. Radetzky, seeing that the weakest

part of the Italian army was stationed near Mantua, resolved to march

from Verona, which was the headquarters of the Austrians, attack the

right wing of the Italian army near Mantua, drive it across the

Mincio, and so march to the relief of Peschiera. At a comparatively

short distance from Mantua he reached the small collection of

scattered houses which formed the village of Curtatone. A band of

6,000 Tuscans, chiefly composed of University students, and commanded

by their professors, were marching along the road which lies between

Curtatone and Montanara, on their way to join the Piedmontese army at

Goito. There were, at that time, open fields on both sides of the road

stretching along in an unbroken plain; and no defences had been made;

for when Radetzky, at the head of 20,000 men, came upon the Tuscan

band, the latter were far from expecting any attack. General de

Laugier, who was in command of the Tuscans, resolved to resist; and

for six hours this gallant little troop held its own against the

overwhelming forces of the Austrians. But superiority in numbers and

training at last prevailed; and, fighting inch by inch, the Tuscans

were driven back to Montanara, and were either killed or captured. The

same "fanaticism" which Radetzky had observed in Milan, seemed to show

itself here also; and as his officers marched the young prisoners

before him after the battle, he exclaimed in scorn, "Did you take six

hours to beat a handful of boys?"

But the "handful of boys" had done their work; for, when Radetzky once

more marched across the bridge at Goito, with his prisoners, he found

Charles Albert at the head of his forces ready to receive him. The

fight was fierce; the King and his eldest son, Victor Emmanuel, were

both wounded; but at the close of the day, a new battalion dashed

forward and compelled the Austrians to retreat. The day before this

battle, while the Tuscans were still fighting between Curtatone and

Montanara, the fortress of Peschiera had surrendered to Charles

Albert; and while he was still exulting over his triumph, there had

come to him the news that the Lombard plebiscite had been decided in

favour of the fusion with Piedmont.

But it was not without much bitterness that it had been so decided.

Mazzini's protest against the proposal of the fusion had been

temperate and reasonable; but it had been sufficient to attract the

attention of the enemies of Italy; and, while Gioberti had come to

Milan to arouse sympathy with the movement for the fusion, a Jew named

Urbino (who was unknown to the Republican leaders in Milan) was taking

advantage of the differences of opinion to stir up riots against the

Provisional Government. On May 28 (the day before the actual closing

of the poll) an anonymous placard appeared, calling on the National

Guard and the people to meet in the Piazza San Fedele, in front of the

office of the Provisional Government. A deputation of the National

Guard was about to demand the deposition of its captain; and the

crowd which gathered in the Piazza San Fedele mixed itself up

with the deputation. One of the agitators named Romani, demanded the

convocation of a Constituent Assembly and denounced the proposed vote

of fusion. Many even in the crowd opposed Romani; and the President,

by promises of further security for personal freedom, was able to

disperse them. The next day, however, they gathered again, with cries

against the Piedmontese, and broke into the civic palace. The students

heard of the disturbance, and rushed to the rescue of the Provisional

Government. Casati had at first been panic struck; but he now gathered

courage, and tried to address the people. Urbino attempted to drown

his voice by shouting that the Government had resigned; and he

exhibited a list of a new Government, composed of some of the leading

Republicans in Milan. Casati snatched the list from his hand, and tore

it in pieces. Many voices in the crowd denounced Urbino, and the

rioters were speedily arrested or dispersed.

The unreality of this demonstration, as an exhibition of any popular

feeling, was clear from every circumstance connected with it. The

innocence of the Republican leaders might be gathered from a stern

protest against the proceedings issued by Mazzini directly after; and

the real source of the agitation might not unfairly be inferred from

the cries of "Viva Radetzky," which broke out from some of the less

cautious agitators. But the Provisional Government either was, or

seemed to be, alarmed about the possible consequences of the riot

of May 29; and Cernuschi, who had been the first to propose the

deputation to O'Donnell which had preceded the struggle of the Five

Days, and who had fought gallantly during that struggle, was arrested

at midnight on the very night of the riot, and sent to prison. He was

soon after set free, from want of any evidence against him; but the

bitterness which his arrest had caused against the Provisional

Government did not so soon come to an end.

This quarrel between the two sections of the national party in

Milan tended to strengthen the power of Charles Albert. Casati had

originally felt little sympathy for the Piedmontese aristocracy; but

his growing distrust of Milanese feeling strengthened the effect

produced by the victory at Goito, and the capture of Peschiera, and

induced him to rest his hopes for the success of the struggle against

Austria solely on Charles Albert, and the Sardinian army. And while

the divisions in Milan strengthened Charles Albert's power in

Lombardy, the weakness of the cities of Venetia, though due to a large

extent to the previous vacillation of Charles Albert, was yet

compelling them more and more to appeal to him as the recognised

leader of the most important Italian force in the North of Italy. This

tendency had been resisted by Daniel Manin, who was strongly opposed

to the fusion of Venetia with Piedmont; and when he found that Charles

Albert was unwilling to help the Venetians on any other terms, he had

been disposed to turn for help rather to France than to Piedmont. But

the prestige of Charles Albert's victories in Lombardy were attracting

Vicenza and Padua to the scheme of fusion; and nothing but the proof

that Venice could save Vicenza could counteract this tendency. Manin

and Tommaseo felt so much the importance of this point, that they even

left Venice for a few days to go to the help of Vicenza; and the

coldness of Charles Albert towards the defence might, if Vicenza had

held out, have worked in favour of Manin's views. But Radetzky also

saw the importance of this siege, and resolved to lead the attack in

person. He appeared before the city on June 9, and on the following

day succeeded, after a fierce struggle, in occupying the heights which

surrounded it. The defence speedily became hopeless; and, though

Durando was afterwards blamed for the surrender, and even suspected of

treason, there seems little reason to suppose that the town could have

obtained better terms than those which were now granted it, if it had

attempted a longer resistance. The garrison was allowed to go out with

arms and baggage; the lives and property of the inhabitants were to be

safe; and a full amnesty was to be granted for the past; the garrison

only binding themselves not to bear arms for three months. The fall of

Vicenza seemed to mark the crisis of the struggle in Venetia. Padua,

Treviso, and Palmanuova rapidly fell into the hands of the Austrians;

and the citizens of Venice now began to believe that, so far from

being able to defend the freedom of their countrymen, they could only

hope to secure their own freedom by surrendering themselves to Charles

Albert.

It was while this feeling was at its height, that the Venetian Assembly

met on the 3rd of July. Manin recapitulated the circumstances of the

war. He had failed to obtain even recognition for his Government from

the French Republic. He admitted the growth of the feeling in favour of

the fusion; and he advised his Republican friends to suppress for a

time the assertion of their special political creed, and to accept the

fusion as their only hope of safety. Tommaseo, indeed, protested

against the proposal; but Manin's influence, assisted by the growing

sense of weakness, prevailed; and on July 4, the representatives of

Venetia by 127 votes against six declared their province united to

Piedmont. Manin, however, resigned his office, as being unable to act

as Minister under a Monarchical Government.

But while Charles Albert seemed to be gaining partizans in Lombardy

and Venetia by the growing necessities of those provinces, he was

exciting against him the opposition of those who might at one time

have been favourable to the Italian cause. On June 16, the Sardinian

and Venetian fleets had attacked Trieste. As a military incident in

the Italian war, this attack was probably of little importance; but

its effect on the relations between the German and Italian movements

for freedom and unity was of far greater importance than could be

estimated by merely military results. For, in Germany more than in

almost any other country of Europe, the movement for national freedom

and unity was necessitating an amount of self-assertion on the part of

the body which represented those ideas, which unavoidably brought it

into collision with many whom it ought to have hailed as allies. Both

the necessity and desire for this German self-assertion had been

evident from the first opening of the Frankfort Constituent Assembly on

the 18th of May. Even a small but picturesque incident which took place

on the first day of its meeting indicated the strength of the exclusive

and defiant German feeling. An old man of seventy-nine had attempted,

during the first stormy sitting, to address the Parliament, but his

voice had been drowned in the general hubbub. On the following day,

the member for Cologne called the attention of the Parliament to the

fact that the deputy so unceremoniously treated was the poet Arndt; and

thereupon the whole Assembly rose, and expressed to him their thanks

for his song on the German Fatherland.

This desire to assert its position as the representative of German

feeling had been quickened in the Parliament by two signs of resistance

to its authority. The fiery Republicans of Baden had returned in

indignation to their State, when they found that the Preparatory

Parliament would neither establish a Republic, nor declare itself

permanent; and, provoked by the arrest of one of their members, they

had rushed into open insurrection, which only the influence of Robert

Blum had prevented from spreading to the Rhine Province. And, while

they were preparing to suppress the Republican opposition, the

Frankfort Parliament were startled to hear that an Assembly had met in

Berlin, which claimed, like them, to be a National Constituent

Assembly; and this rivalry was made the more alarming by the assistance

which Prussian soldiers were at that time giving to the Grand Duke of

Hesse-Darmstadt in suppressing a popular movement in Mainz. The

Frankfort Parliament indignantly resolved that, "This Assembly of the

Empire has alone the power, as the one legal organ of the will of the

German people, to settle the Constitution of Germany, and to decide

about the future position of the Princes in the State." And they

further resolved that every Prince who would not submit to their

decisions "should be deprived, with his family, of the princely rank,

and should descend into the class of citizens, and that his crown and

family property should become the property of the State." While they

thus boldly claimed to rule the internal affairs of Germany, they were

equally zealous in asserting her rights against those who desired to

infringe them. They had resented the resistance of the Bohemians to the

proposed absorption of Bohemia in Germany; and, while they were

disposed to make some concessions to the Poles of Posen, they made them

in a somewhat grudging spirit, and were eager to retain in Germany all

of that province which they could prove, to their own satisfaction, to

be Germanized.

It was obvious that, while such was their state of mind, the Frankfort

Parliament would watch with jealous eyes the movement for Italian

liberty. They could not, indeed, deny that the Italians had some claim

to freedom; or that the authority exercised by Austria in Lombardy

was, both in its origin and character, exactly of the kind most

opposed to the ideas embodied in the Frankfort Parliament. But the

extreme desire to claim Austria as a part of united Germany naturally

led the Frankfort Parliament to look at least with tolerance on the

special prejudices of the Viennese. While they were thus divided in

their minds between principle and prejudice, the news of the attack on

Trieste came like a God-send to those who were looking for an excuse

to sacrifice their Liberal principles to the desire for German

aggrandizement. The Parliament, therefore, resolved unanimously that

any attack on the German haven of Trieste was a declaration of war

against Germany. A resolution of this kind naturally prepared the way

for more decided hostility to the Italian cause; and another decision

at which they soon after arrived gave new force to the anti-Italian

feeling. Even if some Viennese Democrats might desire, or at all

events approve, the separation of Lombardy and Venetia from the

Empire, there could be no doubt that this feeling was not shared by

the members of the House of Hapsburg. When, therefore, on June 29,

Archduke John was chosen Administrator of the German Empire, the

Frankfort Parliament almost unavoidably identified itself with the

domineering policy of the Austrian Germans. While, then, they claimed

security for German freedom, the Parliament triumphed savagely over

the fall of the liberties of Bohemia, refused even provincial

independence to the Southern Tyrol, and demanded that Northern Italy

should be retained in the Austrian Empire.

How far the support of the German Parliament gave any encouragement to

Radetzky it may be difficult to say; but it is certain that, during

the month of July, his efforts to recover his ground in Italy became

more daring in character. No longer confining himself to Lombardy and

Venetia, he now marched his troops into Modena, and attempted to

restore the Austrian authority in that Duchy. Charles Albert was

roused in his turn by this new invasion. His chief general, Bava,

rallied his forces, and drove the Austrians first across the Po and

then across the Mincio. Charles Albert's whole feeling seems to have

been suddenly changed by these successes; abandoning the hesitating

policy which he had pursued in the beginning of the war, he now became

desperate even to rashness; and, rejecting the advice of General Bava,

he tried to push forward to Mantua. Radetzky, during Charles Albert's

delays and hesitations, had had time to reinforce his strength, to

revive the discipline and vigour of the army, which had been utterly

broken during the retreat from Milan, and to choose the best positions

for defence and attack. Therefore, on July 24, he was more than ready

for Charles Albert's rash attack; and at the battle of Somma Campagna

he speedily routed the Piedmontese, and drove them back across the

Mincio. But Charles Albert's zeal for action was not yet exhausted,

and he marched against Valleggio, in the hope of cutting off Radetzky

from Verona. In this march the King seems again to have acted contrary

to the advice of his generals; and part of the march was conducted in

such tremendously hot weather, and with such bad arrangements for the

provision of food, that many of the soldiers died on the road from

heat and hunger. A victory gained by General Bava, near Custozza,

strengthened the delusions of Charles Albert; but Radetzky soon

recovered his ground; the hasty march and the want of food weakened

the forces at Custozza, and the Piedmontese were shortly after

defeated on the very ground on which they had just been victorious.

Charles Albert's assumption of military authority and his defiance of

his generals, led to continual confusions and misunderstandings. The

result of one of these confusions was that General Sonnaz suddenly

left an important fortified position, under orders for which both

Charles Albert and General Bava denied their responsibility. On

discovering his mistake he hastened back to his position, to find that

it had been in the meantime occupied by the Austrians; and when he

then attempted to recover it he received one of the most severe

defeats of the campaign.

In the meantime the Provisional Government of Lombardy were exciting

the greatest irritation by their want of vigour in the conduct of the

war, and by the discouragement which they gave to the volunteers. As

an extreme instance of this latter fault, may be mentioned their

treatment of Francesco Anfossi. He was a brother of Augusta, the

leader of the Five Days' Rising, and had served with distinction at

Brescia; yet, on his arrival at Milan, he was suddenly arrested

without any reason being given. When the news of Charles Albert's

defeat arrived in Milan, the Provisional Government once more became

alarmed, and again called Mazzini to their help. He had had much

difficulty in preventing some of his more fiery followers from

imitating the example of Urbino, and organizing an insurrection

against the Provisional Government. Therefore Casati and his friends

knew that they could depend upon his help whenever they should ask for

it. His former proposal for a Council of War was now accepted, and he

was asked to name the citizens of which it should be composed. Of the

three whom he named, there was only one who had been a steady

Republican; while one of them had laboured to promote that fusion of

Venetia with Piedmont to which Mazzini had been opposed. The duties of

this Committee were to fortify the town, and to provision the army.

They proclaimed a _levee en masse_, and prepared to fortify the lines

of the Adda. They also made special requisitions for corn and rice,

and arranged for the bringing in of considerable provisions from the

country; though some of these were lost by the refusal of the

Piedmontese officers to provide guards for the protection of the

convoy. They then despatched Garibaldi to raise volunteers; and in

three days he had under arms 3,000 men, and was marching to Brescia.

In the midst of these arrangements, the Committee suddenly heard that

the Austrians had crossed the Adda, and that Charles Albert was

retreating before them. They sent messengers to the Piedmontese camp

to learn the intentions of the King; and were dismayed at receiving

the answer that he intended to come himself to defend Milan. They then

sent messengers to recall Zucchi and Garibaldi from the line of the

Adda to the actual defence of Milan. But the management of the defence

was now taken out of their hands; and on August 2 the Committee were

obliged to resign their authority to the Piedmontese General Olivieri.

Olivieri, while urging the Committee of Defence to remain in office,

refused their proposal to summon the people to the barricades. But

when Charles Albert was attacked by the Austrians under the walls of

Milan, the barricades were thrown up in spite of Olivieri. It was,

however, then too late to save the Piedmontese from defeat, and, on

August 4, the King sent for the Municipal Council, to tell them that

he had resolved to come to terms with Radetzky. Restelli, one of the

Committee of Defence, denied the failure of food and money which

Charles Albert had pleaded as one of his grounds of surrender; and

when the Town Council assented to the proposal, Maestri, another of

the Committee, denied their claim to speak on behalf of the citizens.

The news that the King was intending to desert them, roused the

Milanese to fury; and on August 5 Charles Albert promised in writing

to stay to defend the city; and General Olivieri even promised to go

to Radetzky to obtain good terms. But he did not go; and Charles

Albert, after a secret agreement with Radetzky to put the Porta Romana

into his hands, fled secretly from Milan on August 6. Many of the

Piedmontese officers were so indignant at this desertion, that they

offered to remain in the city and share in its defence; and the cry

was raised of "Long live Piedmont!" and "Shame to Charles Albert!" But

resistance was in vain; and on August 7 Radetzky entered Milan.

Garibaldi, who was already on his march to Milan, attempted, with the

help of General Medici, to carry on the struggle on the banks of the

Lago Maggiore; and Mazzini joined this little band, encouraged them to

persevere in their defence, and attempted, though in vain, to form a

connection with the defenders of Venice. But the struggle was

hopeless. The Lombard cities rapidly fell into the hands of Radetzky;

and on August 11, Venice, left alone in her defence, disowned her

connection with Charles Albert, and recalled Manin to power.

After this defeat thousands of Lombards left their country; and

the following extracts from a litany composed at this period

express, better than any mere description, their feelings about this

catastrophe:--"All Italy is our country; and we are not exiles, because

we remain on Italian soil. Yet we are pilgrims, because a vow binds us

to go on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, that is to say to Lombardy when

it is freed. For the heart of our country is the house of our fathers,

the place where we were born, where we have learned to pray, and where

love was revealed to us, where we have left our dead at rest, our

mothers, our sons, and our brothers in tears. Kyrie Eleison," &c....

They then call on Christ, the Virgin, and the Saints to deliver

Lombardy from the Austrians, and invoke them to their aid, by the

memory of the special sufferers in the cause of Liberty, among whom

they particularly specify the Brothers Bandiera, and the defenders of

Milan and Pavia; and they end with a prayer that they may not die until

they have saluted Italy "one, redeemed, free, and independent."

Radetzky, however, had another enemy to punish besides the Lombards

and the Piedmontese. The action of the Pope, however uncertain, and

one may even say unwilling, had given a force to the anti-Austrian

movement which no other Prince could have given; and, as long as the

Liberals ruled in the Papal States, Radetzky considered his work

unfinished. About three weeks, therefore, before the surrender of

Milan, a body of 6,500 Austrians had crossed the Po, and had once more

entered Ferrara. The Bolognese, always the most politically energetic

of any of the subjects of the Pope, desired at once to march to

Ferrara; but the Pro-Legate, who ruled in Bologna, tried to check the

popular movement; and refused to take any more energetic step than the

issue of proclamations. He even appealed to the Bolognese to remember

the fate of Vicenza as a warning against useless defences. But the

people would not listen to him; and a declaration of the Pope that he

would defend the frontiers of his State, increased their desire for

action. Encouraged by the peaceable action of the Pro-Legate, and by

no means alarmed at his proclamations, General Welden entered the

Porta Maggiore of Bologna at the head of his forces on the 7th of

August. Near that gate a path leads up to a raised piece of ground

called the Montagnola, which is covered with grass and trees. To this

the Austrian forces made their way; but, in spite of the warnings of

the Pro-Legate, Welden's demand for hostages was flatly refused. The

people rang their bells, and rushed to the barricades; an old cannon

was brought out and carried up to the Montagnola, and by six o'clock

in the evening of the 8th of August, barricades had been thrown up

near every gate of the city. The Austrians were driven out; and

Monsignore Opizzoni, who was in a country house outside the town, was

rescued by the citizens, and brought into Bologna.

The dreamy, old-world city at once became full of new life; neighbours

flocked in from the surrounding districts; and soldiers who had left

the city, in the belief that it was indefensible, now returned to its

help. The Pro-Legate issued an encouraging address to the citizens;

and Welden complained that the rulers of Bologna were unable to

control the excited spirits of the city. The Ambassadors of England,

France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, and even Naples, who were resident

at Florence, protested against the renewal of the Austrian attack;

the enthusiasm for the Bolognese spread to Venice, where a large

subscription was raised for the families of those who had fallen on

August 8; and finally on August 15 a meeting took place between Welden

and the representatives of the Pope, which resulted in an order to the

Austrian forces to recross the Po.

In the meantime, whatever help the Austrian generals might have

received from the approval of the Frankfort Parliament, that assistance

must have lost its value, as the position of the Parliament became

weaker and weaker. One great difficulty, as already mentioned, was the

growing rivalry of Berlin; and this became the more dangerous to German

liberty, as the supporters of the original struggle for freedom

continued to lose their influence in the Prussian Court. Camphausen,

the new Prime Minister, repudiated the March Revolution as decidedly as

Schmaltz had repudiated the popular element in the struggles of 1813.

Prince William of Prussia, the brother of the King, who was considered

the leader of the reactionary party, had returned to Berlin; and,

though he now professed to accept the Constitution, he was believed to

mean mischief. The actual liberties, indeed, of the citizens of Berlin

had not yet been attacked; but a warning of their future fate was given

by the treatment inflicted on Posen. Mieroslawski, the leader of the

Polish movement in Posen, had been received with enthusiasm in Berlin

during the March rising; and the King had then given permission to the

different provinces of Prussia to decide whether or not they should be

absorbed in the new Germany. The Posen Assembly had decided by

twenty-six votes to seventeen against the proposed absorption; and as a

means of carrying out this decision, they had removed certain Prussian

officials from office in their province. The King of Prussia had at

first seemed to approve this change, and had despatched General von

Willisen to secure the Poles in their national rights. But when the

German party in Posen offered resistance to this policy, the King

yielded to them, withdrew General von Willisen, and sent in his stead

General von Pfuel, who placed Posen in a state of siege, and punished

all who had taken part in the Polish movement.

But, however alarming these signs might be to the more Liberal members

of the Frankfort Parliament, the attitude of the majority of that

Parliament towards the Poles had not been so generous as to justify

them in passing severe condemnation on the Prussian Ministry. It was

in another part of Europe, and in a very different struggle, that the

power of the Frankfort Parliament over the King of Prussia was to be

finally tested. The March rising in Denmark had, unfortunately, like

the risings in Pesth and Frankfort, been accompanied with a desire to

strengthen their own country at the expense of its neighbours; and an

Assembly in Copenhagen had, on March 11, denounced the claims of

Schleswig to a separate Constitution as eagerly as the Liberals of

Pesth had demanded the suppression of the Transylvanian Diet, and the

Liberals of Frankfort the absorption of Bohemia in Germany. The

Schleswig-Holstein Estates, however, thought that the time had come

for a more definite demand for independence: and, on March 18, they

put forward five proposals which they embodied in a petition to the

King. These were to the effect that the members of the Estates of both

Duchies should be united in one Assembly for the purpose of discussing

an Assembly for Schleswig-Holstein; that measures should be taken

to enable Schleswig to enter the German Confederation; that in

consideration of dangers both from within and without, measures should

be taken for a general arming of the people; that liberty of the Press

and freedom of public meeting should be granted; and that the Prime

Minister of Denmark should be dismissed. The arrival of the bearers of

this petition in Copenhagen caused great indignation among the Danes;

and, on March 20, a meeting was held to pass five counter-resolutions

in favour of the claims of Denmark over Schleswig; and the temper of

the meeting was sufficiently shown by the fact that, while the four

resolutions which asserted the power of Denmark were easily carried, a

resolution proposing a Provincial Assembly for Schleswig was rejected by

an enormous majority. War was declared on the Duchies of Schleswig and

Holstein; and, in order to prevent those Duchies from having due notice

of the war, the members of the deputation were detained in Copenhagen

until the expedition had actually sailed. On March 27 the Danish forces

appeared before Hadersleben; and thereupon the Schleswig-Holstein

Estates declared that the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein was no longer free,

and formed a Provisional Government.

The meeting of the Preparatory Parliament at Frankfort had naturally

increased the hopes of the people of Schleswig-Holstein; and they

elected seven representatives to take part in the deliberations of

that Parliament. But the Schleswig-Holstein question seemed doomed to

bring into prominence all the difficulties which hindered the

establishment of the freedom and unity of Germany. The old Bundestag

had, even before the meeting of the Frankfort Parliament, declared its

sympathy with the Estates of Schleswig-Holstein; and, though it

expressed its approval of the election of the Schleswig-Holstein

representatives to the Frankfort Parliament, it claimed, as against

that body, the sole right of directing the Federal forces of Germany.

The King of Prussia was, no doubt, glad enough to pit the older body

against the representatives of the newer Germany; and it was avowedly

under the authority of the Bundestag that, in the month of April, he

marched his forces into Schleswig-Holstein. But it soon became clear

that neither the representatives of the old League of Princes, nor the

Assembly which embodied the aspirations for German freedom and unity,

would be able to control the King of Prussia. Early in June he showed

an inclination to come to an understanding with the King of Denmark

and to evacuate North Schleswig. The leaders of the Frankfort

Parliament felt that, in order to control this dangerous rival to

their authority, they must create some central Power which should be

able entirely to supersede the Bundestag; and it was, to a large

extent, under the influence of this feeling, that the Archduke John

was chosen Administrator of the Empire.

But, however much strength the Frankfort Parliament might gain in

Germany by this election, it was hardly to be expected that the choice

of an Austrian Prince would lead to more friendly relations between

Frankfort and Berlin; and, in July, it began to be rumoured that a

truce of a more permanent kind was about to be made between the King

of Prussia and the King of Denmark, while the King of Hanover seemed

disposed to second the former in his defiance of the Constituent

Assembly at Frankfort. At last, in September, the crisis of the

struggle came. It then became clearly known that a truce of seven

months had been agreed to at Malmo between Prussia and Denmark. During

that period both the Duchies were to be governed in the name of the

King of Denmark as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein; and the man who was

chosen to act in the King's name was Count Moltke, who had been

previously protested against by the people of Schleswig-Holstein on

account of his tyrannical acts. He was to exercise all power except

that of legislation, which, indeed, was to cease altogether during the

truce; and he was to be assisted by four Notables, two of them to be

nominated by the King of Denmark and two by the King of Prussia.

The Frankfort Parliament felt that this truce would sacrifice the

whole object of the war; and, on the motion of Dahlmann, they

resolved, on September 5, by 238 votes against 221, to stop the

execution of the truce. The Ministry, who had been appointed by

Archduke John, thereupon resigned, and Dahlmann was empowered by the

Archduke to form a new Ministry. At the same time the Estates of

Schleswig-Holstein met, and denied that any one had the power to

dissolve them against their will, or to pass laws or lay on taxes

without their consent. A public meeting of the Schleswig-Holstein

citizens declared that they would not submit to the new Government;

every one of the four Notables refused to act with Moltke; and, when

he applied to the Provisional Government for protection, they sent him

a passport to enable him to leave the country. But the Frankfort

Parliament very soon began to shudder at its own audacity; and, when

Robert Blum urged upon it the desirability of speedily putting in

force its decree about Schleswig-Holstein, the Parliament decided that

there was no urgency for this motion; and some of the more timid

members began to plead the danger of a quarrel with Prussia. Arndt,

who had voted for the condemnation of the truce, now changed sides,

and urged that the Parliament should accept it, in order to convince

the Danes "that they are a brother People;" while even those who still

condemned the action of Prussia began to propose all sorts of

compromises. At last, on September 16, the Assembly rescinded its

former vote, declaring, by 257 against 236, that it was unadvisable to

hinder the execution of the truce.

The leaders of the German Left had felt that concession to the King of

Prussia in this dispute implied the sacrifice of the whole object of

the Parliament's existence; and Robert Blum had declared, shortly

before the final vote, that it must now be decided whether Prussia was

to be absorbed in Germany or Germany to become Prussian. But the

decision of the Frankfort Parliament so roused the fierce Democratic

feeling in the city that the movement of resistance to Prussia passed

out of the control of Robert Blum, and fell under the leadership of

far fiercer and more intolerant spirits. Several thousand Democrats

belonging to the Frankfort clubs held a meeting, on September 18, at

which they called upon the members of the Left to leave the Frankfort

Parliament and form a separate Assembly. Zitz, a representative of

Mainz, and nineteen other members, accepted this proposal; and, in the

meantime, the Frankfort mob, headed by a man who bore the ominous name

of Metternich, threw up barricades in the streets, and prepared for a

regular insurrection. The Ministry, in great alarm, sent for troops;

and Bavarian, Prussian, and Austrian generals alike responded to the

appeal. Robert Blum and Simon, the member for Breslau, in vain tried

to make peace; entreating the Ministry to withdraw the troops, and the

insurgents to pull down the barricades. But the Ministry would not

listen to any advice, and the insurgents threatened Blum and Simon

with death. Auerswald and Lichnowsky, two members of the Right, were

killed in the riot. Many fled from the city; and it is said that, when

Archduke John wished, at last, to make a truce, no member of the

Ministry could be found to countersign the order for the withdrawal of

the troops. The struggle went on fiercely during the 19th; but there

was no organization capable of offering permanent resistance to the

soldiers; and, by ten o'clock at night, all the barricades had been

swept away; and the Ministry soon after declared Frankfort in a state

of siege.

These events gave a shock to the hopes for combining German freedom

with German unity which they never after recovered; and the alternative

which Blum had propounded, whether Prussia should be absorbed in

Germany or Germany in Prussia, was, from that day, to be exchanged for

the question whether Austria or Prussia should absorb Germany. There

were some, however, who did not at once give up their hope for a

solution more favourable to freedom than either of those alternatives.

In several parts of Germany Republican feeling seemed to have been

growing for some time past, and the fiercest and most daring of the

Republican leaders were still to be found in Baden. The rising which

had followed the dissolution of the Preparatory Parliament had, indeed,

discredited Hecker and his friends with many of the more moderate

Democrats; and this feeling, by alienating the party of Hecker from

Robert Blum, had deprived that able and temperate statesman of the

power which he might have gained as the head of a united Democratic

party. That rising had also, unfortunately, brought about a collision

between Baden and Bavaria, and, at least, a feeling of suspicion

between Baden and Wuertemberg. But, though the Democratic party, as a

whole, had been weakened by the Baden rising, and though even the

special South German movement, which had seemed, in March, to have

gained so strong an influence, had been disunited, yet, on the other

hand, a certain form of popular enthusiasm had undoubtedly been roused

by Hecker, of a kind which the wiser Democrats had failed to excite;

and the attempt of the members of the Right in the Frankfort Parliament

to annul Hecker's election, on account of his insurrection, had marked

him out as a martyr for liberty.

But when the Baden Republicans gathered for action after the Frankfort

riots, it was, for some unknown reason, to Struve, rather than to

Hecker, that they offered the leadership of the movement. Struve seems

to have had fewer gifts for the work of a leader of insurrection than

his colleague had possessed. He had been, as was proved by his

programme in the Preparatory Parliament, interested rather in the

redress of material grievances than in the assertion of Constitutional

Liberties; and, though he now proclaimed the Republic from the Town

Council House in Loerrach, he rested his appeal to the people mainly on

the ground of the burdens still pressing on the cultivators of the

land; and he did not allude to the Schleswig-Holstein question, nor

did he allege any Constitutional reason for proclaiming the Republic.

Blum had seen that Republicanism was not popular in Germany; and,

though he looked forward to a Republic as the ultimate goal of his

political aspirations, he felt, during the sitting of the Frankfort

Parliament, as Mazzini had felt during the war in Lombardy, that any

violent attempt to enforce Republican opinions would be dangerous to

liberty. Indeed, it was clear that the only possibility for even a

temporary success in an insurrection at that time would have lain in

an appeal to the national feeling about the Schleswig-Holstein war.

The movement, therefore, failed, and failed ignominiously. The Federal

troops were sent against the insurgents; at the first collision the

latter were easily defeated; and the insurrection was only remembered

as the Struve-Putsch.

Since, then, the Frankfort Parliament no more embodied the hopes of the

Liberals; since Republican risings seemed hopeless; and since it was

hardly to be expected from human nature that those who had desired to

establish German unity at Frankfort should consent at once to rally

round that Prussian Parliament which had helped to defeat their

efforts; the eyes of all who would not give up the cause for lost

turned instinctively to Vienna. There, ever since July 10, a Parliament

had been sitting, which seemed to enjoy securer freedom than could be

found in other parts of Germany. This security was partly due to the

influence of the same prince who had so much increased the dignity of

the Frankfort Parliament; for the Archduke John was the one member

of the Royal House who had a genuine respect for liberty. He had

consented, not only to open the Viennese Assembly, but, a little later,

to get Pillersdorf dismissed from office, on the ground of his having

lost the confidence of the people; and, in August, Ferdinand himself

was induced to return to Vienna, and thus to give a still further

sense of security to the supporters of parliamentary government. Nor

was this Parliament without more solid results; for it abolished in

Austria that system of feudalism which had already been swept away in

Hungary.

But, in spite of this apparent success, the seeds of division and

bitterness were too deeply sown to allow of lasting liberty in Vienna.

The workmen's movements, so often leading to riot, had been one cause

of weakness; but the most lasting and fatal cause was that terrible

race hatred, which, more than anything else, ruined the Austrian

movement for freedom in 1848. The opposition of the Bohemians to the

May rising in Vienna had intensified against them the indignation

which had already been roused by their attitude towards the Frankfort

Parliament; and the June insurrection in Prague had been exaggerated

by German panic-mongers into an anti-German "St. Bartholomew." When

Dr. Rieger, Palacky's son-in-law, pleaded for delay in the election of

the President of the Assembly, on the ground that the Bohemian members

had not had time to arrive, he was hooted in the streets, and only

saved from actual violence by the intervention of Dr. Goldmark; and,

when Rieger protested against the illegal arrest and secret trial of

one of the Bohemian leaders in Prague, Bach, who had now become the

most popular of the Ministers with the German party, evaded the

appeal. Indeed the utterances of the German party in Vienna were

marked by a combination of a somewhat arrogant assertion of popular

authority, as represented by the Assembly, with contempt for the

aspirations of other countries. This combination of feeling was

perhaps best illustrated by the meeting of July 29, when a majority of

the Assembly, in calling upon the Emperor to return to Vienna,

indignantly rejected the word "bitten" (entreat) from the address, and

substituted the word "fordern" (demand). On the day of this important

assertion of popular rights, the news of Radetzky's victories in Italy

was received with loud applause in the Chamber, and a solemn Te Deum

was shortly afterwards decreed in honour of these victories.[15]

But, offensive as this contrast between the more vulgar side of

democratic feeling, and the indifference to the liberties of Italy and

Bohemia must seem to the student of this period, there was one

direction in which the more generous instincts of the Viennese

Democrats were shown; although, even in this matter, the generosity of

principle was to be sadly clouded by the savagery of act. The

political question which called out this better feeling was the

relation of Vienna to Hungary. It will be remembered that the

enthusiasm for Hungary, which had been awakened by Kossuth's speech of

the 3rd of March, had been considerably damped by the attitude which

the Magyar leaders had taken up towards the May rising in Vienna; and

the more democratic tone of Jellacic on that occasion had led the

Viennese, for a time, to turn for sympathy to Agram rather than to

Buda-Pesth. But no concessions to monarchical feeling which Kossuth

might be disposed to make, could reconcile the most influential of

Ferdinand's advisers to the independent position which the Magyar

Ministers had obtained. The courtiers, indeed, who helped to form the

Camarilla, might shrink at first from any sympathy with the daring and

independent attitude of the Serbs and Croats. But the party in Vienna

which was opposed to Hungarian liberty had been swelled, since March,

by the accession of men who were not theoretic opponents of rebellion,

but who simply desired that the new free Government should be as

thoroughly centred in Vienna as the old system of Metternich had been.

The most important representative of this phase of opinion was the War

Minister Latour. Ever since he had taken office, in the latter part of

April, he had been trying to make use of the discontented races in

Hungary to weaken the power of the Magyars and to strengthen the

authority in Vienna. Although he could not at once bring round his

colleagues in the Ministry to these intrigues, nor persuade the

courtiers to sympathize with the national leaders at Agram and

Carlowitz, yet there were points in the position of affairs of which

Latour was able to make skilful use for the accomplishment of his

ends. Of these circumstances one of the most striking was the

character of the Emperor. Ferdinand had shown himself, ever since his

accession, most desirous of doing justice between the rival races of

his Empire. The great difficulty of balancing the claims of German and

Bohemian, Magyar, Croat, and Serb, might well have perplexed a

stronger brain and weakened a steadier will than that of Ferdinand the

Good-natured (der Guetige); and when the painful disease, with which he

was always afflicted, is taken into account, it will seem more

wonderful that he ever maintained a steady political purpose for

however short a period, than that he was constantly hesitating and

changing his course, as new aspects of the question pressed themselves

on his attention.

This confusion and its natural results are well illustrated by a story

which, though obviously incapable of proof, yet, none the less, may be

supposed to embody the popular feeling about this weak but well-meaning

monarch. The story is, that during one of his conferences with a Serb

deputation, Ferdinand had listened with tears to the descriptions of

the cruelties inflicted by the Magyars; but that, just when he seemed

about to give them a favourable answer, he happened to glance at a note

from Metternich which was lying beside him on the table, and, taking it

up, he read these words: "Die Serben sind und bleiben Rebellen" (the

Serbs are and remain rebels). This sentence checked Ferdinand's

sympathy, and he at once dismissed the deputation with vague words.

Upon this desire to do justice to both sides, and this weakness under

the pressure of a stronger will, Latour found it easy to act. A

Conference at Vienna between representatives of the rival races was

obviously an expedient, which it was easy to recommend to Ferdinand,

while it gave admirable opportunities for secret intrigues. Moreover,

whatever objections might be entertained by the courtiers to other

leaders of the Slavonic races, there was one, at least, who stood on a

somewhat different footing. Jellacic was a personal favourite of the

Archduchess Sophia, the wife of Archduke Francis Charles, the next

heir to the throne. He had been a colonel in the Austrian army, and

his appointment had been looked on at Buda-Pesth as quite as much an

assertion of Imperial authority, as of Croatian independence. On the

other hand, the fact that he had been entrusted by the Croatian

Assembly, on June 29, with almost dictatorial powers, only ten days

after he had been declared a traitor by the Emperor, made him a

trustworthy representative of the independent nationalists of Croatia;

and while, therefore, Latour saw in him a fit tool for his purpose,

Ferdinand naturally hoped that a meeting between Jellacic and

Batthyanyi in Vienna might lead to a satisfactory settlement of the

quarrels between Hungary and Croatia.

In this hope the Emperor was encouraged by Archduke John, who

offered himself as a mediator between the contending parties. But,

unfortunately, the double responsibility which Archduke John had taken

upon himself interfered with the execution of his good intentions; for

while he was urging compromises on Magyars and Croats, the burden of

his duties as Administrator of the German Empire compelled him to

hasten away to Frankfort. And thus Batthyanyi and Jellacic were left

face to face in a city where there were few who desired to reconcile

them, and where the most influential people desired to aggravate their

divisions. It must be said, however, in justice to Jellacic, that some

of the points on which he insisted in the controversy have been

somewhat misunderstood in respect of their spirit and intention. It

has been urged, for instance, that in demanding the centralization at

Vienna of financial and military administration, he was contending

solely for the interests of the Court, and not at all for Croatian

independence. This, however, is scarcely just; for Jellacic had good

reason to believe that Slavonic liberty needed protection from the

Magyar Ministers of Finance and War, since, in July, Kossuth, as

Minister of Finance, had refused supplies for the Croatian army; and

even the Serbs, who were still in partially hostile relations with the

Court, had discussed the question of placing themselves under the

Ministry at Vienna, as a protection against the Magyars. There were,

however, other proposals made by Jellacic, which could scarcely be

covered by this explanation, such as the demand that Hungary should

take over a share of the Viennese debt, and that more troops should be

sent to Italy; and it was natural, therefore, that Batthyanyi should

construe the proposal about the War and Finance Ministry, rather as a

blow at the liberties of the Magyars, than as an assertion of Croatian

independence. It was obvious that for purposes of conciliation the

Conference was a hopeless failure; and Batthyanyi, after in vain

urging Jellacic to abandon these proposals, rose in indignation

exclaiming, "Then we meet on the Drave."[16] "No," said Jellacic, "on

the Danube." And so they parted with the consciousness that war was no

longer avoidable.

But though the Conference had failed, so far as regarded its apparent

purpose, it had served to complete the change in the policy of the

Court, and in the position of Jellacic. From this time forward he

ceased to be the complete champion of Croatian liberty, and became the

soldier of the Emperor; and from this time forward, therefore, the

German Democrats of Vienna resumed their old faith in Kossuth, and

considered his enemies as their enemies. The policy of Latour had been

accepted at Court, and Ferdinand was whirled away in the vortex of

aristocratic opinion, and official intrigue. On August 4 Ferdinand

officially declared his confidence in Jellacic; about September 1, the

Viennese Ministry announced to the Hungarians that the March laws

which had secured a responsible Ministry to Hungary were null and

void, as having been passed without the sanction of Ministers at

Vienna; and Ferdinand endorsed this opinion.

In the meantime, even the Serb movement which the Viennese courtiers

had looked upon with special suspicion, was passing into hands more

favourable to the authority of the Emperor. In the latter part of

July, Stratimirovic had gained great successes in the Banat; and his

alliance with Knicsanin, the Servian General, had led him to hope that

he might be able to throw off the authority both of Vienna and of

Buda-Pesth. But the Patriarch Rajacic, who had entered with such

hesitation into the insurrection, saw his only possibility of safety

in placing the movement under the authority of the Emperor. He

therefore set himself against the influence of Stratimirovic; and on

his return from Agram to Carlowitz, he was able to use his authority

as Patriarch, backed by the influence of Jellacic, to recover the

reins of government, and to limit the authority of Stratimirovic to

military affairs. At the time of the return of Rajacic, the war

had begun to languish; but in the middle of August the Magyars

renewed their attacks, and besieged the Serb town of Szent-Tomas.

Stratimirovic marched to the defence, and gained such successes that

some of the Magyars raised the cry of treason against their Generals.

General Kiss was therefore sent down to take the place of those who

had forfeited the public confidence. At first the result of the war

was doubtful; for victories were alternately gained by the Serbs and

the Magyars; but at last Kiss, by a dexterous movement, succeeded in

preventing Stratimirovic from joining his forces with those of

Knicsanin, and thus turned the whole tide of the war against the

Serbs. This change of affairs naturally favoured the designs of

Rajacic; Stratimirovic, finding that much of the popular feeling was

turning against him, resigned his authority, and Colonel Mayerhoffer,

an Austrian officer, was sent down to take his place. Some of the

soldiers of Stratimirovic were, indeed, indignant at this change; and

Rajacic was obliged to make some advances to reconciliation; but

Suplikac, the Voyvode, backed Rajacic in his general plans; and by the

help of their joint influence, Latour was able to turn the Serb cause

into a new prop for the rule of the Emperor.

It is pathetic to see how, in spite of irresistible evidence,

Ferdinand still clung to the hope that he might succeed in reconciling

the leaders of the different races in his Empire, and yet more strange

to see how he still believed that Latour would co-operate with him for

this object. He now chose as his mediator, a Hungarian named Lamberg,

to whom he gave a commission to settle matters between the contending

parties, and to restore order in Hungary. Lamberg was known to

Batthyanyi, and seems, to some extent, to have enjoyed his confidence;

for Batthyanyi declared that he would himself have counter-signed

Lamberg's commission, if Latour would only have submitted it to him in

time. But Latour, whose object was very different from that of his

good-natured master, despatched Lamberg to Buda-Pesth without that

sanction which could alone secure him legal authority in the eyes of

the Hungarian Ministers.

Some days before the arrival of Lamberg in Pesth, a striking proof had

been given of the growing sympathy between the German Democrats of

Vienna and the Magyars, and also of that fierce race-hatred between

Germans and Bohemians which had been stirred up by the circumstances of

the June rising in Prague. The Magyars had despatched a deputation to

the Viennese Parliament, in the hopes of reviving the old alliance

between Buda-Pesth and Vienna. The more generous side of the Democratic

spirit had been reawakened in the Germans of Vienna by many of the

recent events. Even those who had sympathized with the reconquest of

Lombardy had been alarmed at the kind of government which the Austrian

generals were trying to introduce into that province; and one of the

members of the Assembly asked what should they think if the army which

was now in Italy were to stand before the gates of Vienna? This feeling

of alarm at the growth of a military power independent of Parliament

had naturally been increased by the suspicions of Latour's intrigues

with the Serbs and the Croats. When, then, on September 19, the Magyar

deputation, among whom were Eoetvoes and Wesselenyi, asked for an

audience from the Assembly, that they might explain their position, the

leading German Democrats urged their admission, but the Bohemian

leaders protested against it, denouncing the Magyars both for

separating from Austria and for oppressing the Slavs. Schuselka

attempted to mediate between the two parties, maintaining that though

the Magyars had done many indefensible things, yet, as a matter of

justice, the Parliament ought to hear their petition; but the

Ministerialists, combined with the Bohemians, were too strong for

opposition; and, by a majority of eighty, it was decided not to admit

the deputation.

This refusal of the Viennese Parliament brought to an end the last hope

of a peaceable settlement of the Hungarian difficulties. On September

27, Lamberg entered Buda-Pesth, to which the Hungarian Diet had now

been transferred. It must be remembered that the Magyars had just been

irritated at Ferdinand's denunciations of the March laws of Hungary,

and alarmed at his expression of confidence in Jellacic, who had just

crossed the Drave and invaded Hungary. When, then, Lamberg arrived in

Pesth, with a commission unsigned by any Hungarian Minister, his

arrival was naturally looked upon as a further indication of an attempt

of the Austrian Ministry to crush out the liberties of Hungary. A

slight thing was sufficient to cause these suspicions to swell into a

panic; and the news that Lamberg had at once crossed the Danube, to

visit the fortress of Buda, seemed, to the excited Magyars, a

sufficient proof of his dangerous intentions. The cry was raised that

the fortress was going to be seized and military law established. The

fiery students of Pesth hastened out into the streets; and as Lamberg

returned across the suspension bridge into Pesth, he was attacked and

murdered. Batthyanyi, terrified at this act, resigned his premiership

and fled to Vienna; and the Diet of Hungary passed a resolution

condemning the murder. Ferdinand was now more easily urged to violent

action. On October 3 he declared the Hungarian Diet dissolved,

proclaimed Jellacic Dictator of Hungary, and appointed Recsey Prime

Minister in place of Batthyanyi. Jellacic, however, did not find it

easy to assert the authority which was now given him. He had hoped

that, in the confusion which followed the death of Lamberg, he would be

able to carry Pesth by storm; but he was driven back, and before the

end of October the Croats had been expelled from Hungary.

In the meantime the suspicions of the Viennese had been increasing, and

on the 29th of September Dr. Loehner, one of the original leaders of the

March movement, publicly denounced Latour for his intrigues with

Jellacic. These intrigues had now been placed beyond a doubt by certain

letters which had fallen into the hands of the Hungarian Ministry.

Pulszky, who was at this time in Vienna, took the opportunity to

publish these letters in the form of a placard, while he complained to

Latour of the permission given to Jellacic to raise recruits in Vienna,

and threatened, if these proceedings continued, to excite a revolution

in which the Viennese Ministers would be hung from lamp-posts. There

were, indeed, revolutionary elements enough in Vienna at this time. The

friendship between the workmen and the students had led to the

formation of a special workman's Sub-Committee under the Committee of

Safety. This body actually undertook to find employment for all who

were out of work, and even to pay them wages while they were out of

work. This offer naturally caused a rush of workmen to Vienna, from all

parts of the Empire. The attempt to sift and regulate the claims for

employment led to new bitterness; and demands for impossibly high wages

provoked rebuffs, which were answered by threats of violence. The

Ministry tried to induce the workmen to leave the city, by urging them

to join the army in Italy; but the students defeated this attempt by

reminding the workmen that the war in Italy was a war against liberty.

The suspicions of the Ministers were now excited, not only against the

workmen, but against the students; and, after a riot in the latter part

of August, the Committee of Safety had been dissolved, and the

lecture-rooms of the University closed. But this repression, far from

weakening the bitterness in Vienna, only drew closer the links between

the poorer students and the workmen; for, while the richer students

left the city, the poorer ones, finding it difficult to support

themselves after the closing of the lecture-rooms, were subscribed for

by the workmen. Thus then the suspicions roused by the intrigues of

Latour were strengthened considerably by the general condition of

Vienna at this period.

Latour, however, was resolved not to yield. The defeats which Jellacic

was experiencing in Hungary only made it the more necessary that those

who sympathized with him should send him help; and on the 5th of

October the news spread through Vienna that an Austrian regiment was

about to march to Hungary to the assistance of Jellacic. The students

went to the head-quarters of one of the grenadier regiments, and urged

them not to join in the march. An officer, who arrested one of the

students, was attacked and wounded; and when one of the grenadiers,

who had been wounded in a quarrel, was sent to his barrack, his

comrades seemed to consider it as a kind of arrest, and demanded his

surrender. The National Guard joined in this demand; and thus a state

of confusion arose which made it easy for the students and the workmen

to hinder the march of the regiments which were starting for Hungary.

An Italian battalion refused to proceed further, and the march was

hindered for that day. But General Auersperg, who commanded the forces

in Vienna, was resolved to continue the attempt; and so, on the

following day, the soldiers were despatched to the station which lies

beyond the Tabor bridge. But, when they arrived on the bridge, they

found that the students and the National Guard were before them, and

that the barriers had been closed against them. Auersperg was alarmed

at this resistance, and recalled the troops; but collisions had by

this time taken place between the soldiers and the people in other

parts of the town; and a fierce fight was raging in the Stephansplatz,

and even in the church itself.

Then suddenly there rose the cry "Latour is sending us the murderers

of the 13th of March;" and a rush was made towards the office of the

Ministry of War. Fears had already been entertained by several members

of the Assembly, that a personal attack would be made on Latour;

and Borrosch, one of the German Bohemian members, Smolka, the

Vice-President of the Assembly, Dr. Goldmark, and others, hastened to

protect Latour from the vengeance of the crowd. Borrosch, with the

same humane ingenuity which Lafayette had shown on a similar occasion,

promised that Latour should have a formal trial, if the crowd would

spare him. The crowd cheered Borrosch and his friends; and many of

them promised that they would protect Latour's life. Borrosch rode

off, supposing Latour to be safe; but Dr. Fischhof, feeling that

matters were not yet secure, persuaded several members of the National

Guard to act as special protectors to Latour; and as the best means of

effecting this object, some thirty or forty of them undertook to

arrest him. But the excitement of the crowd had been roused anew, and

they burst into the War Office. Smolka then entreated Latour to

resign. The Minister consented; but the passions of the crowd would

not be appeased. The unfortunate man attempted to hide from their

pursuit: but they dragged him from his hiding-place, and thrust aside

his defenders. Fischhof warded off the first blow that was aimed at

him. A student, named Rauch, attempted also to protect him; but all

was in vain; and he was dragged down the staircase and into the square

in front of the War Office. With his white hair floating about him, he

was lifted on to the lamp-post which then stood in the square. He

struggled against his enemies, and compelled them to drop him once;

but again he was lifted on to the post, and this time the hanging was

completed, the crowd tearing his clothes from his body and dipping

their handkerchiefs in his blood. This outburst of savagery, instead

of satisfying the fury of the people, had quickened their thirst for

blood; and their desire for vengeance was now turned against the

Bohemian Deputies. Strobach, who had been chosen President of the

Assembly, had objected to hold a sitting at all on that day, declaring

that executive rather than legislative functions were needed just

then. For this refusal some of the members wished to prosecute him;

and armed men appeared in the gallery of the Assembly threatening

violence to the Bohemian deputies. Those deputies, finding that they

could no longer deliberate freely, soon after fled from the city, and

issued from Prague a protest against the Reign of Terror, which they

declared to be dominating Vienna. In the meantime Ferdinand, having

consented, on the day of Latour's death, to the formation of a

Democratic Ministry, fled, on the next day, from Vienna to Schoenbrunn,

and shortly afterwards to Innspruck; and he soon notified his feelings

to the Viennese by a proclamation in which he too denounced the reign

of violence in Vienna.

Hardly had the Viennese recovered from the surprise caused by the

flight of their Emperor, than they heard that Jellacic, having

abandoned his hope of conquering Hungary, was marching against Vienna.

General Auersperg, who had withdrawn his troops to the Belvedere after

the collision between the soldiers and the people, was still assumed

by the Viennese to be in some degree favourable to their cause; and

they entreated him to repel the attack of Jellacic, and to call for

help from the Hungarians. Auersperg, however, rejected this proposal,

withdrew his troops secretly from the city, and, on October 11, openly

joined Jellacic.

The Assembly were now anxious to appeal to the Frankfort Parliament

for help, and entreated them to send representatives to Vienna. Robert

Blum, who had grown weary of the state of affairs in Frankfort, and

who believed that the only remaining hope for Germany was in Vienna,

consented, in company with four others, to accept this embassy. The

Parliament in Vienna still imagined that they could keep within legal

forms; but this desire irritated those fiery politicians who felt that

the struggle was now on a revolutionary footing; and they therefore

desired to overthrow the Assembly, and to establish a more determined

body in its place. But Blum, who had been accustomed to hold in check

the violent members of his own party in Frankfort, supposed that, in

Vienna also, he was bound to resist revolutionary methods; and, though

he was ready to encourage the Viennese in the defence of their city,

he objected to the proposal for the violent dissolution of the

Assembly, on the ground that such a proceeding would give an excuse to

the tyrants for a dissolution of the Frankfort Parliament.

A man of much more importance in such a siege than Robert Blum could

be, arrived about the same time in Vienna. This was Joseph Bem, a

Galician of about fifty-three years of age, who had served in

Napoleon's expedition to Russia, and had greatly distinguished himself

as colonel of the Polish artillery at the battle of Ostrolenka. He had

also commanded the Polish artillery in the insurrection of 1830, and

had attempted to organize a Polish legion, for the help of the

Portuguese, during their struggle against the Absolutist party. He had

been wounded in one of these wars, was obliged to use a staff in

walking, and was small and delicate in his appearance. He had gained

both friends and enemies in Poland, and was known for his strong

democratic sympathies. Although he was not appointed to the official

headship of the National Guard, he soon became the centre and life of

the defence. But he found that the men with whom he had to act did not

understand the position in which they were placed; for, when he

attempted to urge the National Guard to march out against the army of

Jellacic, they twice refused to follow him, on the ground that they

were only intended for the defence of the city.

And, if the rulers of Vienna were feeble in their attitude towards

their enemies, they were not less feeble in their treatment of the

one people, from whom they might have expected help in this emergency.

The advance of Jellacic against Vienna had naturally increased the

sympathy of the Magyars for the Viennese, and Pulszky urged the latter

to summon the Hungarian army to their rescue. This formal invitation

was the more necessary because the Hungarian officers were in many

cases confused in their minds as to their strict legal duty in

this war. Archduke Stephen, the Count Palatine of Hungary, after

professedly assuming the command of the army, had suddenly fled from

the country, and thus weakened the legal position, both of his

subordinate officers, and of the Hungarian Diet, of which he was the

nominal head. Ferdinand had repeated his former dissolution of the

Diet in a proclamation of the 20th October; Prince Windischgraetz,

professing to act in the name of the Emperor, issued a declaration

from Prague forbidding the Hungarian officers to fight against

Jellacic; and soon after, followed up this proclamation by marching

against Vienna. General Moga, the Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian

forces, hesitated to resist the Imperial orders; but, whilst the

generals were debating among themselves, Kossuth arrived in the

Hungarian camp to urge them to advance. After some delay his influence

prevailed; and on October 28 began the march of the Hungarian army for

the relief of Vienna.

In the meantime, all those in Vienna, who really cared to save it,

were trying to rouse their fellow-townsmen to action. Robert Blum made

an address to the students in favour of making "no half-revolution,

but a complete change of the system;" and on the 25th October, three

days before the Hungarians had begun their march, Bem had succeeded

in persuading the National Guard to make their sortie. But confusion

followed this attempt; some of the Guard fled; others were mistaken in

the darkness for enemies, and fired on by their comrades. Bem's horse

was killed under him, and he was compelled to retreat. Windischgraetz,

who had now been appointed to the complete command of the besieging

force, demanded the surrender of "the Polish emissary Bem, who in a

quite uncalled-for manner, had mixed himself up in the affairs of

Vienna." This recognition of the independence of the Polish provinces

of the Austrian Empire was not accepted by the Viennese; nor did they

consent to surrender any of the other people who were demanded by

Windischgraetz. Bem roused the soldiers again to the defence, and drove

them to their work with abuse. The Students' Legion distinguished

itself by its courage; and some of the workmen seconded them bravely.

But Messenhauser, the official leader of the National Guard, declared

that the struggle was hopeless, and urged the people to yield.

Many were now disposed to abandon the defence; when suddenly, on

October 30, there arose a cry that the Hungarians were approaching.

Messengers went up the high tower of St. Stephen's Church, and looked

out towards the plain of Schwechat, where the Hungarians and Austrians

had at last joined battle. The Viennese had been advised by their

Hungarian friends to tear up the railway lines; but they neglected

this precaution; and thus Windischgraetz had been able to send more

troops to Schwechat. But the great weakness of the Hungarians was due

to the hesitation of General Moga, and to the want of confidence felt

in him by his subordinate officers. Troops were ordered to advance,

and then suddenly to halt, without any apparent reason; several of the

new recruits ran away; and at last a general panic seized the army,

and they fled before the Austrians, continuing to retreat, even after

the enemy had ceased to pursue them.

The rumours of Hungarian help had encouraged some of the Viennese to

oppose the surrender of their city; and this opposition was continued

even after the defeat of the Hungarians had been officially announced.

This division of opinion between the leaders and a great part of the

people, led to riots in various parts of the town. Under these

circumstances, Windischgraetz refused to accept the peaceable surrender

offered by the leaders, and, instead, bombarded the town, and then

entered it, while it was still on fire. Bem managed to escape; and so

did three of the representatives of the Frankfort Parliament; but Blum

and Froebel were arrested. The latter was discovered to have written a

pamphlet, which implied a desire to maintain the unity of the Austrian

Empire; and, on this ground, he was set free. But Blum was proved to

have acted as a captain of one of the corps of the National Guard,

during the defence; his speech to the students, about the complete

change of system, was supposed to imply a desire for a Republican

movement; and so on the 8th November he was condemned to death, and on

the 9th he was shot.

Great indignation was excited in Germany by this execution; and the

unpopularity which the Frankfort Parliament had incurred by their

assent to the truce of Malmo, was increased by their having refused to

interfere to protect Blum from arrest. Yet it seems as if the

remarks, made above in the case of Confalonieri, may be applied again

to Blum. That Blum should die, and Windischgraetz triumph, was no doubt

sad; but Blum's execution was rather the result of a system of

Government, than a specially illegal or tyrannical act. Blum had

staked his life on the issue of the struggle, by coming to Vienna

during the siege. If there were any alternative to his death, it was

the one proposed by Socrates to his judges; and in the case of Blum,

as in that of Socrates, the actual result was the best for his honour.

But, as for the capture of Vienna itself, it is difficult to

over-estimate its importance in the history of the Revolution. As the

fall of Milan had broken the connection of the Italian struggle with

the European Revolution, so the fall of Vienna destroyed the link which

bound all the other parts of the Revolution together. Race hatred, and

a narrow perception of their own interests, might hinder the Viennese

from understanding their true position; but the March rising in Vienna

had given to the various Revolutions a European importance, which they

would scarcely have attained without it; and the attention of each of

the struggling races in turn had been riveted on the city which

Metternich had made the centre of the European system. In a still more

evident manner was the link broken between Germany and the rest of

Europe, and apparently between the most vigorous champions of liberty

in the different parts of Germany.

This last aspect of the fall of Vienna has been embodied, by a poet

named Schauffer, in verses, which appeared a year after the event, and

which contain also a worthy tribute to those fiery youths whose

determination and enthusiasm were to so large an extent the cause of

all that was best in the Vienna insurrections; though their national

prejudices, and their want of self-control, contributed largely to the

ruin of the movement which they had inaugurated.[17]

THE VIENNA LEGION.

Their hearts beat high and hopeful,

In the bright October days;

Not March's glorious breezes

Could bolder daring raise.

No more with idle drum beats,

But with cannons' thundering tone,

Marched forth to guard the ramparts,

Vienna's Legion.

Once more they come to guard it,--

The freedom won by fight;

Once more 'tis force must conquer,

When blood is shed for right.

A steely forest threatens,

Ere yet the day be won;

But the Fatherland, they'll save it,

Vienna's Legion.

And, as the Spartans hurled them

On the Persian's mighty horde,

They burst on the barbarian,

To smite with German sword.

Their lives into the balance

In careless scorn they've thrown;

And victory crowns their daring,

Vienna's Legion.

Thus did they struggle boldly,

For many a day and night;

Thus were they crushed, o'er wearied

By the tyrant's conquering might;

Grey warriors wept in anguish

O'er many a gallant son;

E'en in defeat 'twas victor,

Vienna's Legion.

Their deeds will well be honoured

In the victor's glorious lay;

Our youth lay dead in battle,

But they would not yield the day.

Let others crouch and tremble!

No pardon will they own;

They dare not live in bondage,--

Vienna's Legion.

In the days of bright October

They shouted in their pride;

Their blows fell thick and boldly,

They struck their strokes--and died.

The gallant lads have fallen;

In blood the Legion lie;

But in the grave that hides them

Is buried--Germany.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] To avoid needless controversy, I may add that I am perfectly

aware of the tyranny exercised by Milan over Lodi and other small

towns; but the fact remains that the real force of the Lombard League,

in its struggle against Barbarossa, lay in the _equal_ union of the

greater towns of Lombardy.

[15] It must be admitted that a protest was made by some of the

members against Radetzky's restoration of the Duke of Modena; but then

the Duke of Modena was not subject to the Viennese Parliament, and

Radetzky, in restoring him, had acted without their authority.

[16] The boundary river between Croatia and Hungary.

[17] It is also worth noting that the first production of the freed

Press of Vienna in March, 1848, was a poem by L. A. von Frankl, in

praise of the services of the students to the cause of liberty; but,

though this poem gained some celebrity at the time, it does not as

easily lend itself to translation as the one translated above.