DESPOTISM RETIRING BEFORE CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1844-DECEMBER, 1847.
The Bandiera insurrection. Its results.--Career of Cesare Balbo,
"Le Speranze d'Italia."--Vincenzo Gioberti. "Il Primato degli
Italiani."--The insurrection of Rimini. "Ultimi casi di
Romagna."--The risings in Galicia.--History of Cracow since
1815.--Causes of the failure of the Galician movement.--The seizure
of Cracow. Palmerston's utterances thereon.--Change in Charles
Albert's position.--The Ticino treaties.--Mistake of Solaro della
Margherita.--"Long live the King of Italy!"--D'Azeglio's
policy.--Aurelio Saffi.--Death of Gregory XVI.--State of Roman
Government.--Parties in the Conclave.--Election of Pius IX.--His
character and career.--The amnesty. Its effect.--Ciceruacchio. His
work.--The Congress at Genoa.--Charles Lucien Bonaparte.--Death of
Confalonieri.--State of Milan.--Pio Nono's reforms.--The clerical
conspiracy.--The occupation of Ferrara. Its effect on Italian
feeling.--State of Tuscany.--The Duke of Lucca.--Absorption of
Lucca in Tuscany.--The struggle with Modena.--The massacre of
Fivizzano.--Occupation of Parma and Modena by Austria.--State of
Switzerland.--Position of Bern and Zurich.--The Concordat of
Seven.--The refugee question in 1838.--The Aargau monasteries.--The
Sonderbund.--The Jesuit question.--Metternich's feelings, real and
pretended.--Palmerston's attitude.--Relations between Metternich
and Guizot.--The decision of the Swiss Diet.--The Sonderbund
war.--Effect of the Federal victory.--The Schleswig-Holstein
question.--The official view and the popular view.--Metternich's
way out of the difficulty.--Effect of the movement on Germany and
Prussia.--State of Europe at outbreak of Sicilian insurrection.
The divisions of opinion, which had been hindering progress in
Hungary, had, in the meantime, been growing less prominent in Italy;
so that the more active political leaders in the latter country were,
for a time at least, aiming at a common programme. Yet this point had
only been reached after much suffering and failure. Conspiracies with
various objects had been rife in Italy, especially in the Papal
States; but, though some passing attention was attracted by the
cruelties exercised in their suppression, these risings had left
apparently little mark on the country. But an insurrection took place
in 1844 which proved a turning-point in Italian politics. The
character and circumstances of the leaders excited a sympathy which
impressed their memories on the hearts of their countrymen; while the
failure of the rising led to a change in the general tactics of the
Italian Liberals.
The rising in question was that organized by the brothers Emilio and
Attilio Bandiera. These youths were the sons of a Venetian nobleman
who was an admiral in the Austrian service, and who had attracted
attention in 1831 by violating the terms of the capitulation of
Ancona, and attempting to seize the exiles who, under protection of
that treaty, were on their way to France. Emilio and Attilio had been
compelled, while still boys, to enter the service of Austria; but they
soon began to feel a loathing for the foreign rulers of their country;
and, while in this state of mind, they came into contact with some of
those who were already acting with the Giovine Italia. At last, in
1842, Attilio Bandiera wrote to Mazzini expressing the esteem and love
he had learned to feel for him, his desire to co-operate with him, and
his belief that the Italian cause was but a part of the cause of
humanity.
This correspondence with Mazzini was maintained by means of another
naval officer in the Austrian service, Domenico Moro; in the following
year a passing struggle in Southern and Central Italy gave new hopes
to the brothers. They fled from their ships and met Domenico Moro at
Corfu. But a stronger influence than the fear of Austrian tyranny was
put forward to hinder the brothers Bandiera from their attempts. Their
mother wrote from Venice calling on them to return, and denouncing
them as unnatural for their refusal. Even this pressure, however, they
resisted, and they prepared to make their first rising in March, 1844.
The desire to free the Neapolitans, already distracted by so many
insurrections, gave rise to this attempt, of which Cosenza was the
head-quarters. Unfortunately, the plan of the rising had not been
understood by some of the insurgents, and a preliminary effort was
easily suppressed by the Neapolitan troops. Nothing daunted by this,
the Bandiere planned a new march on Calabria. It was, unfortunately,
on this occasion that the correspondence of the Bandiere with Mazzini
was opened by the British Postmaster-General, and communicated by him
to the Austrians. When, then, the brothers, accompanied by many
recruits from various parts of Italy, marched upon Cosenza to deliver
the prisoners who had been taken in the former unsuccessful attempt,
they found guides prepared to deceive them; and in a wood near Cosenza
they were met by a large body of gensdarmes, who had been warned of
their coming. They repelled the attack, however, and retreated to
Corfu to gather new forces; but the authorities had filled the minds
of the inhabitants with the belief that the Bandiere and their
followers were Turks. The people rose against them; and when they
again marched on Cosenza they were easily overpowered and imprisoned,
and soon after condemned to death. The brothers received the news of
their condemnation with cries of "Long live Italy! Long live Liberty!
Long live our country!" And, to the priests who tried to exhort them
to repentance, they answered that they had acted in the spirit of
Christ in trying to free their brethren.
The effect of their death, and of all the circumstances of their
rising, was deep and wide; and their memory seems to have lived longer
than that of any previous martyrs for Italian freedom. The bullets
with which they were shot were collected as sacred relics; and it was
felt that a new impulse had been given to the struggle against
Austrian tyranny. But with the indignation at the treachery by which
the Bandiera brothers had suffered, and with the reverence for their
memories, there arose in Italy a passing wave of suspicion against
Mazzini and the leaders of the Giovine Italia, as people who wasted
the lives of the heroic youth of Italy in useless and ill-organized
attempts.
It was at this period that two books, written in 1843, began to
attract attention. These were the "Speranze d'Italia" of Cesare Balbo
and the "Primato" of Vincenzo Gioberti.
Cesare Balbo was the son of that Count Prospero Balbo who was
supposed, in the reign of Victor Emmanuel I., to have supplied a
Liberal element to the Government. There had been, however, little in
Count Prospero's career to inspire any reasonable confidence in him.
He served under Victor Amadeus till the fall of Piedmont before the
French; but after the establishment of Napoleon's power he had
returned to Piedmont and become head of the University of Turin. After
the restoration of the House of Savoy he had taken office again under
Victor Emmanuel, and had played the somewhat doubtful part, described
above, in the movement of 1821. Cesare had been presented by his
father, when a boy, to Napoleon; and though Count Prospero had
considered it a dangerous step, the young man had accepted office in
Napoleon's Council of State in Turin, and subsequently had served
under the same ruler in Tuscany. Although shocked at the kidnapping of
Pius VII., he did not abandon the service of Napoleon until the fall
of the French Empire in 1814. Yet, after the restoration of the House
of Savoy, he entered the army of the King of Sardinia, and fought,
first against Napoleon, and then against Murat. In 1821 he managed to
remain on friendly terms with Santa Rosa, while he was at the same
time advising Charles Albert to break with the Revolutionists, and was
also trying to hinder the proclamation of the Spanish Constitution at
Alessandria. Such was the man who now tried to tell Italy of her
hopes.
While appealing to Gioberti as his master, and declaring his preference
for a moderate party, Balbo dwelt on the want of national independence
as the chief source of the evils of Italy, and particularly on the
control exercised by the Austrians over the Pope. He urged his
countrymen to put aside the old ideas of Dante, and not to go back
further than 1814 for their conception of Italian Unity. He then
proceeded to examine the different schemes for attaining this unity,
and, rejecting alike the schemes of Monarchists and Federalists, as
well as the plan for a closer unity put forward by the Republicans of
the Giovine Italia, he pointed out as the only real hope for Italy the
possibility of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent chance
that Italy might be freed in the scramble which would follow.
It is well to dismiss this book of Balbo's first, because its only
worth is that it shows what scraps of comfort were caught at eagerly
by Italians at this period; but, as a matter of fact, its publication
was slightly later than that of the "Primato" of Vincenzo Gioberti, to
which Balbo alludes in the preface to his book.
Gioberti has already been mentioned as having been a contributor to
the journal of the Giovine Italia. Previously to that time, he had
chiefly been known as a writer on ecclesiastical or theological
subjects. Before the age of twenty, he had written a philosophical
treatise on Man, God, and Natural Religion; and early in life he had
also written on the "Wickedness of the Popes," and had tried to
prove that that wickedness was due to their temporal power. At the
University of Turin, the Professor to whom he looked up with the
greatest reverence was driven from his post by the Jesuits, and this
event awakened in Gioberti his bitter hostility to that Order.
Gioberti's connection with the Giovine Italia brought him under the
suspicion of the Piedmontese Government; and he was banished from the
country shortly before Mazzini's expedition to Savoy.
In that expedition, however, Gioberti had refused to join; and he
remained at Paris, where many of the Italian exiles were gathered.
Among these, two of the most prominent were Pellegrino Rossi and
Terenzio Mamiani. Both of these writers may have confirmed him in his
dislike of the Jesuits; though they may also have exercised some
influence in alienating him from the Republicans. He returned, indeed,
at this period to those philosophical writings for which he was much
better fitted than for the active life of politics; and, in 1842,
he was offered a Chair of Philosophy at Pisa. But Solaro della
Margherita, the Minister of Charles Albert, succeeded in persuading
the Grand Duke of Tuscany to withdraw this appointment. Such had been
Gioberti's career up to the time when he brought out the book which,
by a curious combination of circumstances, was to make his name
famous.
This book, "Il Primato Morale e Civile degli Italiani," professes to
show why, and how, the Italians should take the lead in the affairs of
Europe. The writer begins with a glorification of Italy, though, at
the same time, he complains that she has too often neglected her
mission; and he maintains, in this connection, the necessity of
combining philosophy with political discussion. Very early in
the argument he goes back to Romulus; but, not content with the
comparative antiquity of that allusion, he thinks it necessary to
deduce the origin of civilization from Noah. He then considers the
relation between the Papacy and the Empire after the time of Charles
the Great, and the attitude of various Italian writers and patriots
towards the Papacy. He incidentally notices the fascination of Abelard
for Arnold of Brescia as one of the causes of that reformer's
hostility to the Papacy, and as a warning to Italians not to yield to
the influence of French ideas. It is to the Guelphs that Gioberti
looks for the embodiment of the political wisdom of the Italians
of the Middle Ages. Without the Papacy, there could be no real
political unity for Italy, since through its influence alone could
there be produced a union of morality, religion, and civilization. He
deprecates all revolution, all encouragement of invasion, all
imitations of foreign ideas. Unity, in the complete sense in which it
was known in England and France, was, says Gioberti, an impossibility,
because of differences in Government and dialect between the different
States of Italy. He expresses a belief that Alfieri would have
repented of his attacks on Popes and Kings if he had lived to see the
dignified resistance of Pius VII. to Napoleon. The Pope would be
obliged to act by peaceful means; and while forming an Italian Navy,
and developing Italian colonies, he should carry on his work through a
Federal Union, of which he would be the President. But, as the Pope
must act by pacific means, there would be need of a military leader
also for Italy; and he must be found in Piedmont. Literature had been
slower in growth in Piedmont than in other parts of Italy; but in
proportion to its backwardness in this respect was its superiority in
military matters. Further, the House of Savoy had been softened by
religion, and had never produced a tyrant. But moderate reforms were
necessary in order to make the leadership palatable; especially a
modification of the censorship of the Press, and greater encouragement
to science and literature. In urging that Italy must take the lead of
Europe, not merely in matters of civilization, but in thought, he
dwells emphatically on the connection between philosophy and politics.
But, above all, Italy should hold this position because she has never
fallen into the errors of Protestantism. Passing from the independent
States of Italy, he dwells on the necessity of a union between
Lombardy and Piedmont; and then, after discussing what qualities the
different parts of Italy will contribute to the general character of
the whole, and dwelling on the possible union among the literary men
of Italy, he concludes by insisting that religion can be the only
uniting force; and therefore that the Head of the Christian World must
be the Head of the Italian League.
This curious book attracted considerable attention; but although many
expressed admiration for the author, few committed themselves
definitely to its doctrines. The idea of a Pope as a liberator and
uniter of Italy clashed with all the experiences which Italy had had of
the Government of Gregory XVI., and Gioberti was forced to modify his
words, and to deny that he looked to the Pope then on the throne to
carry out his programme. This explanation led him into a controversy
with the Jesuits, which must considerably have increased his
popularity.
A third writer, who attracted some attention, though far less than
Balbo and Gioberti, was Giacomo Durando, already mentioned as one of
the conspirators of 1831. He demanded a league between Peoples and
Princes, but utterly denied that any initiative of Italian independence
could come from the Pope. His idea was a Kingdom of Italy divided into
three parts--Northern, and presumably Central, Italy to be under the
House of Savoy; the city of Rome and some islands to be left to the
Pope; and Southern Italy to the King of Naples. He did not, however,
desire that the League should make war upon Austria, but that it
should wait, and be ready to resist attacks from that Power.
But while these writers were trying to formulate, in a literary
manner, the programme of the Constitutional Liberals, the more fiery
members of that party were anxious to show that they too could do
something in the way of a political movement of a more determined
kind; and it was in the Papal States, again, as the centre of the
worst government of Italy, that this new programme of insurrection was
put forward. A man named Pietro Renzi undertook to formulate the
demands of this section of the party. The petition drawn up by Renzi
went back to the time of Pius VII., to show that hopes of reform had
once been held out, even in the Papal States. It dwelt on the fact
that, from the time of the insurrections of 1821 to the death of Pius
VIII. in 1831, there had been a steady growth of tyranny; that in 1831
the Papal Government would have fallen but for the intervention of
Austria; that, when Gregory XVI. had been restored to his power,
demands had been made for reform in the Papal Government which had
been steadily opposed; that the Pope and Cardinal Albani were now
encouraging robbers and murderers on the ground of the support which
such men gave to the faith. "For eight or ten years past," Renzi
declared, "it had not been the Pope or Rome or the Cardinals who had
been governing the people of the Legations; but a sanguinary faction
of the brutalized populace has been wearing the dress, and performing
the functions of government." Many young men had been driven from the
universities, or shut out from liberal professions, by the influence
of the Jesuits; and the clergy had usurped the control of all
education. The leaders of the new party, therefore, demanded twelve
concessions.--1. A general amnesty for all political offences from
1821 to that time. 2. Publicity of Debate; trial by jury, and
abolition of confiscations and capital punishment for political
offences. 3. That laymen should not be subjected either to the
Inquisition nor any other ecclesiastical tribunal. 4. That political
offences should be tried by the ordinary tribunals. 5. That municipal
councils should be freely elected subject to the approval of the
Sovereign; that these municipal councils should elect the provincial
councils, and the provincial councils the Supreme Council of State. 6.
That the Supreme Council should reside in Rome, superintending the
public funds, and should have a deliberative power in some matters, a
consultative in others. 7. That all offices, civil, military, and
judicial, should be held by laymen. 8. That public instruction, other
than religious, should be taken away from the clergy. 9. That the
censorship of the Press should be only employed in the case of
offences against God, the Catholic Religion, and the Sovereign, and
the private life of citizens. 10. That foreign troops should be
dismissed. 11. That the Civic Guard should be instituted, and
entrusted with the maintenance of the laws and of public order. 12.
That the Government should enter on all those social reforms which are
required by the spirit of the age, and of which all the _civil_
governments of Europe have given an example.
Renzi resolved to enforce this programme by a sudden attack on Rimini,
in which he was completely successful; but an ally of his, who had
raised a revolt simultaneously in the lower Romagna, was compelled to
retire before the Swiss troops of the Pope; and Renzi, apparently
panic struck, retreated into Tuscany. Unfortunately, a reaction was
then taking place there. Fossombroni had died in 1844, Corsini, the
Minister who was most in sympathy with Fossombroni's policy, resigned
in 1845; and the chief of the Jesuit party took his place. The Grand
Duke Leopold himself was at first disposed to be friendly to Renzi;
but, as the best protection to him, he advised his escape to France.
Renzi soon returned, and Metternich, alarmed at the intensity of
Italian feeling, denounced the Duke for protecting rebels, and, under
the influence of Austrians, Jesuits, and of the Pope, Leopold
consented to surrender Renzi to Gregory XVI.
The attention of the country was still further directed to this
attempt by a pamphlet which came out immediately after, and which was
written by a young Piedmontese nobleman, Count Massimo Tapparelli
D'Azeglio. In this pamphlet D'Azeglio complained that the Rimini
movement had been much misrepresented; but that the action of the
insurgents had no doubt been a blunder, because the movement had been
purely local, and they had not considered how to use the forces of the
whole of Italy. He then proceeded to denounce the corruptions of the
Papal Government, and the cruelties which had followed the suppression
of this rising; particularly the gross injustice of imprisoning a
lawyer because he had defended some of the prisoners. After a
denunciation in detail of the evils of the Papal Government, he goes
on to repudiate the use of secret societies, as having failed in their
purpose; calls on the Italians to unite in peaceable protest against
abuses, rather than in insurrection; and points to the Tugendbund of
Germany as a model for Italian combinations. The pamphlet had little
that was new in it, but attention was fixed upon the author, by the
fact that he was immediately banished from Tuscany by the Grand Duke,
and was, shortly after, welcomed in Piedmont.
Metternich's protest against this welcome might have been more decided
had he not been hampered by the events which were occurring in
Galicia. Ever since the insurrection of 1830, there had been a steady
feeling of sympathy towards the Poles, not merely as an oppressed
nation, but as _the_ nation whose restoration was the chief duty and
necessity of the champions of liberty. Kossuth declared, at a somewhat
later time, that there was a close connection between the liberties of
Hungary and those of Poland. Mazzini had been eager to co-operate,
where it was possible, with the exiled Poles. Robert Blum had shown a
special enthusiasm for their cause, and was ready to help in a rising
in Posen. Every Slavonic race looked on the wrongs of the Poles as the
typical instance of the oppression of the Slavs by the Great Powers of
Europe; while, at the same time, they honoured them as the most famous
fighters in the cause of Slavonic freedom. But it was in France that
the greatest enthusiasm was felt for the Poles, and the most complete
organization of the exiles existed. There a special military school
was founded for them in 1843; and in 1846, after a preparation of
three years, the democratic section among the Poles resolved to strike
a decisive blow against Austria.
The city of Cracow, on the borders of Galicia, was the one part of
Poland which still maintained a nominal freedom. The political
independence of Cracow had been secured by the Treaty of Vienna. The
Austrian Government even then wished to absorb it into their own
dominions; but, under pressure from Russia, Francis consented that
Cracow should be a free town, governed by its own elected Chamber of
Representatives, and surrounded by a district which was not to be
occupied by Austrian troops; and it was also to exercise complete
control over its army and police. The usual Austrian interpretation of
liberty, however, was soon to be applied to the Republic of Cracow.
Although free trade between Cracow and Warsaw had been secured by a
regular treaty, the protecting Powers, as they were called (Austria,
Russia, and Prussia), began soon to insist on prohibitive duties being
introduced on the frontiers of Cracow. Its University, dating from the
fourteenth century, had been secured in its properties and liberties
by the Treaty of Vienna; but, unfortunately, a large portion of the
lands from which the University drew its income lay within the
dominions of the three protecting Powers, each of whom refused, under
various pretexts, to give up its share of the land. As to the
liberties of the University, the Austrian Government, in 1817, had
declared that it would inflict a fine of 100 ducats on any parent who
sent his sons to the University of Cracow; in 1822, the Russian
Government followed this example by a decree forbidding Polish youths
to study in any foreign country, under which title they specially
included Cracow. In the meantime, the organizing Commission, which
had been appointed by the Powers, was gradually destroying the
Constitution which had been established by the Treaty of Vienna. The
right to modify laws sent from the Senate was first taken from the
Chamber of Representatives; while, as to the control of the finances,
which had been specially mentioned in the Treaty, the House of
Representatives was informed that the accounts were only to be shown
to the Chamber in order to convince them that the Senate had spent the
money, and that the Treasury was empty; though the Commission
graciously allowed the Chamber to examine and make observations on the
accounts, and assured them that these observations should be sent to
the Senate. The self-government of the University was, in a similar
manner, gradually taken from it; and, under the excuse of a riot in
1820, the great Powers, six years later, sent a Russian colonel to act
as supreme ruler of the University. The insurrection of 1830 in Warsaw
had, of course, given excuse for further interference with the
liberties of Cracow; and, in 1831, Russian soldiers, for a time,
occupied the city. It is hardly necessary to add that the liberty of
the Press, which had been specially guaranteed by the Treaty of
Vienna, had been gradually crushed out; and a new Commission,
appointed by the three Powers in 1833, revised the Constitution of
Cracow, thereby setting aside the claims of England and France to have
their opinions considered in any revision of the Treaty. Torture was
revived for the purpose of extorting revelations of crimes which had
never been committed. The judges had, indeed, retained, for a time,
the independence secured them by the Treaty; but in March, 1837, the
Conference, as it was called, of the three Powers abolished the
offices of Mayors of the Commune and Judges of First Instance, and
transferred their duties to officers of police. In December of the
same year, the protecting Powers decided that the question of the
amount to be expended on the police and militia should not be
submitted to the Chamber. Then the Chamber, at last, attempted an
appeal to the two Powers whose opinions had been wholly ignored by the
other signatories to the Treaty of Vienna; but the appeal was,
apparently, in vain, and there seemed no remedy left but insurrection.
The centralizing principles of the Austrian Government, on this as on
later occasions, paralyzing their power of action in emergencies,
Cracow was seized and occupied by the democratic leader Tyssowski. The
Government Boards in Galicia were little able to make head against the
movement; and, if Tyssowski had known how to appeal to the popular
sympathies, he might have been completely successful. Unfortunately,
however, the leaders of the insurrection had not yet been able to
establish that sympathy with the peasantry of Galicia which alone
would have enabled them to carry out a really popular insurrection;
and, instead of trying to enlist the sympathies and interest of the
peasants on behalf of the movement, Tyssowski's only idea was to
terrorize them into obedience. He issued a proclamation, announcing
that the whole Empire, during the time of revolution, is one and
common property in the hands of the revolutionary Government. Every
priest who opposed the rising was to be deprived of his office; anyone
who refused to subscribe to the national cause was to be seized and
brought before a Governor chosen by the insurgents; every inhabitant,
on pain of death, was to go to the place appointed him, as soon as he
knew of the outbreak of the insurrection. The peasantry, alarmed at
hearing that many of them had been condemned to death for their
unreadiness to assist the revolution, appealed to the officials to
defend them; nor could they be conciliated by hearing that the
insurgents were about to abolish all feudal dues and titles of rank,
and to secure a certain amount of land to every peasant. These offers
from unknown people could not induce the peasants to make friends
with those who were threatening them with death. From more than
seventy districts representatives came from the peasants to the
official authorities at Tarnow to ask for military help against the
revolutionary leaders; and they were advised to defend themselves and
to arrest the agitators. On February 18th, 1846, the insurrection
broke out, and one of the first actions of the conspirators was to
fire on the peasants who had refused to join them. Then the peasants,
stirred to desperation, rose; and a general massacre of the nobles
began. The dark and underground methods of the Austrian Government,
and the centralizing principle which had drained out the strength of
the different local governments, had brought a double Nemesis on its
founders. For while on the one hand the powerlessness of the local
boards caused the early successes of the insurgents, on the other hand
the world at large thought that the massacre of the nobles of Galicia
must have been organized from Vienna, as a part of the regular
Austrian policy.[7] This belief was likely to be further strengthened
by the events which followed. While Mieroslawski and some of the
leaders of the insurrection surrendered to the Prussian troops, which
had been despatched to prevent a rising in Silesia and Posen,
Metternich struck the final blow at the independence of Cracow. The
account given above shows that there was little independence left to
be destroyed in that unfortunate city; but somehow the actual
destruction of liberties never excites so general a horror, especially
in the diplomatic world, as the final removal of the _forms_ of
liberty. And Lord Palmerston, who does not seem to have responded to
the previous appeal from the Assembly of Cracow, now addressed
indignant remonstrances to Metternich, and uttered the remarkable
words, "If the treaties of 1815 are null on the Vistula, they may be
null on the Rhine and the Po."
Thus the occupation of Cracow seemed to many to be an abandonment by
Metternich of the semi-legal position which till then he had, in the
eyes of diplomatists, maintained; while his supposed complicity in
the massacre in Galicia roused against him the feelings of those
humanitarians who do not understand the wickedness of choking out the
moral and intellectual life of a nation, but who shrink with horror
from any physical cruelty. It is, therefore, no unnatural inference
that the delay which Metternich showed in making any stern protest
against Charles Albert's new position in Italy may have been due to
the paralysis caused by the storm of indignation roused against
Austria by the Galician massacres and the annexation of Cracow. Charles
Albert profited by this weakness. He had been shifting as usual in his
policy, encouraged on the one side in moderate reforms by the Liberal
minister, Villamarina, and dragged, on the other side, into extreme
clericalism by Solaro della Margherita. But, just about the time when
D'Azeglio arrived in Piedmont, events were occurring which riveted on
Charles Albert the hopes of many who had not hitherto believed in the
sincerity of his desire for reform; and the same circumstances gave him
that position of champion of Italian independence which, in the eyes of
perhaps a majority of Italians, he continued to maintain till the fall
of Milan in 1848. The chief cause of this change of feeling is to be
found in the following circumstance.
In the year 1751 a treaty had been made between Austria and Piedmont
by which the former granted to the latter the right of sending through
Lombardy the salt which they were selling to the Republic of Venice.
In consideration of this boon the King of Sardinia renounced his trade
with the Swiss cantons; and the treaty was renewed in 1815, after
Venice had passed under the Austrian rule. In 1846 Ticino, desiring to
open a trade in salt with Marseilles, asked the Piedmontese Government
to allow them to transmit their salt through Piedmont, and Charles
Albert consented.
The Austrian Government had for some time past looked with suspicion
on Charles Albert. Metternich had never forgotten his passing outburst
of Liberalism in 1821; and the continual search of the Italian
Liberals for some leader in the War of Independence was naturally
drawing people's eyes to Piedmont. Few, and comparatively unimportant,
as were the reforms that he introduced, they were enough to increase
the suspicions of Metternich; and, reformer or not, the King of
Sardinia was necessarily an enemy to the House of Austria. Moreover,
Charles Albert had recently given a tolerably clear hint of his
own feelings; for he had struck a medal representing a lion (the
well-known badge of the House of Savoy) trampling on an eagle; and on
the reverse side of the medal appeared, "_J'attends mon astre_."
The concession to the Canton Ticino lighted the spark which had been
smouldering in the breasts of the Austrian rulers. For of all the
States of Europe, this little canton had become specially obnoxious to
Austria in the last few years; and not long before this Metternich and
Charles Albert had worked together to stamp out its freedom, and
deprive it of the right of sheltering those Italian exiles who were
dear to the Italian-Swiss from similarity in race and language.
Metternich had failed in that effort, and the Liberals had risen in
the canton and overthrown the Conservative Government and Austrian
influence together. Any sign, therefore, of friendliness shown by
Charles Albert to the Ticinese was a special cause of alarm to the
Austrians. They declared at once that the treaty of 1751 had been
violated; in April, 1846, they increased the custom duties on the wine
sent from Piedmont to Lombardy; and in order to mark the hostility of
the Act more plainly the same decree declared that there would be no
change with regard to the wines coming from several of the other
Italian States.
Solaro della Margherita, though his Conservatism naturally inclined
him to sympathize with the Austrian Government, was a man who valued
the independence and dignity of Piedmont; and he therefore consented
to Charles Albert's proposal at once to lower the duties between
Piedmont and France, in order to facilitate the commerce between those
countries. The meaning of this act could not be misunderstood; and the
Austrian ambassador, alarmed at the sudden defiance, made a proposal
to recall the duty on Piedmontese wines, on condition that Charles
Albert would consent to withdraw his concession to Ticino. Solaro
della Margherita, in his anxiety for a friendly understanding with
Austria, did not perceive that such a concession would give up the
whole principle at stake, since it would admit the right of Austria to
forbid Charles Albert to make what terms he pleased with the canton;
so Solaro actually urged the King to agree to the proposal. But
Charles Albert stood firm, and, greatly to Margherita's horror,
D'Azeglio succeeded in persuading the people to get up a demonstration
in Turin, at which cries were heard of "Long live the King of Italy!"
Charles Albert, however, though showing some signs of his usual
irresolution, did not draw back from his policy of hostility to
Austria; and he set himself to promote a railway which should connect
Lombardy and Venetia more closely with Piedmont. The Austrians made
some difficulty with regard to this railway, and it was on this
occasion apparently that the point was carried against the rulers of
Lombardy, to a great extent, by the energies of a Venetian lawyer,
Daniele Manin, a name afterwards memorable in the records of Venice.
In the meantime D'Azeglio had been working hard to convince the rest
of Italy that Charles Albert was preparing to put himself at the head
of an Italian movement and to attack Lombardy. In Tuscany Professor
Montanelli had already formed a Society for promoting the unity of
Italy. Demonstrations were being made against the Jesuits, and
petitions for changes in taxation and education were drawn up.
But it was in the Papal States that D'Azeglio most hoped to gain
ground; and in Forli he came in contact with Aurelio Saffi, who, with
D'Azeglio's encouragement, prepared an address from the people of
Forli to one of the clerical rulers, calling attention to the growth
of Italian feeling and the desire for action against the foreigner.
The authorities became alarmed and Saffi's arrest and imprisonment
were determined on, when the death of Gregory XVI. suddenly changed
the whole position of affairs; and Charles Albert's newly-won fame was
for a time dimmed by that of another hero of the popular imagination;
while Gioberti's teaching, hitherto admired only in a small circle,
and laughed at by many, was suddenly accepted as the utterance of an
inspired prophet, and as embodying the conception of a profound
statesman.
The state of Roman government at the death of Gregory XVI. was as
follows:--The management of affairs was entirely in the hands of
cardinals, or of laymen appointed by the Pope. The nobles and the rich
were indeed conciliated to some extent by appointments which seemed a
concession to lay feeling. The provincial councils, nominated by the
Pope, laid taxes partly on property and partly on articles of
consumption. The study of political economy was prohibited in
the schools; and the study of law and medicine was but little
provided for. The press was under a triple censorship, that of the
Inquisition, of the Bishop, and of the Governor of the province. The
police, though vigorous in repressing political conspirators, were
utterly unable to check highway robbery. In the tribunals which were
administered by the clergy, the grossest corruptions prevailed. As a
natural result of all this, the ablest and best men of the States were
to be found, not in Rome, but some in France, some in Tuscany,
and some in Piedmont. The government of Rome and its immediate
neighbourhood was corrupt; and the government of the Legations in some
cases became so cruel as to excite shame even in the Pope himself. And
Monsignore Savelli, one of the worst of these tyrants, had been guilty
of such a combination of corruption and cruelty that Gregory had been
compelled to remove him from office.
Such was the state of affairs when Gregory XVI. died. Tremendous
expectation was roused in the different provinces of the Papal
States; an insurrection broke out in Ancona; and a colonel, who had
distinguished himself for cruelty in that town, was killed. The
cardinals at once despatched Savelli to suppress the rising. In the
meantime the Conclave met, and the ambassadors of the different
Powers began to intrigue for their respective candidates. Cardinal
Lambruschini was one of the most powerful members of the sacred
college; but he was hated for his injustice and partisan distribution
of offices; and no sooner had the Conclave opened than attacks were
made on him by Cardinal Micara, on this very ground. Lambruschini had
been appointed by the influence of the Austrian Court, and might have
been supposed to be their candidate. But whether it were that even the
Austrians desired certain concessions to the policy of reform, which
they had themselves supported after the rising of 1831, or whether it
were that their influence was weakened by the events which had recently
occurred in Galicia, they do not seem to have used very great pressure
on behalf of Lambruschini.
On the other hand, there had recently arrived in Rome, as French
ambassador, that same Pellegrino Rossi who had formerly been driven
into exile by the success of the Austrians in 1815, who had contributed
to the Conciliatore of Confalonieri, and who had played so important
and influential a part among the Italian exiles in Paris. Rossi
declared in favour of reform in the church, and demanded the election
of someone who both wished and knew how to reform prudently and
efficiently. The person naturally marked out as the candidate of the
Liberals was Cardinal Gizzi, who had been known for milder government
than that of any of the other Cardinals, and who had been singled out
for exceptional praise by Massimo D'Azeglio. But where a bitter
conflict of interests arises between the leading candidates, it is only
natural that some unknown man should slip in; and, as the reformers
were probably more in earnest and more united than the majority of the
opponents of reform, other Liberal candidates were withdrawn; Giovanni
Mastai Ferretti was elected Pope on June 16th, 1846, and, out of
respect for Pius VII., took the name of Pius IX.
He was then fifty-four years old and had been originally intended for
the Papal guard; but, being liable to epileptic fits, he had been
refused admission. He had thereupon become a priest, and had, as
already mentioned, distinguished himself in 1831 by the honesty with
which he had carried out the terms of the surrender of Imola. He was
so little known, however, to the general public that a rumour arose,
after his election, that it was really Cardinal Gizzi who had been
chosen. Nor were his future opponents startled at the choice. Princess
Metternich wrote of him in her diary that he was a man of exemplary
piety, "_toute fois sans etre exalte_." Nor was it till a month later
that Pio Nono took the step which was the foundation of his future
popularity. It was then that he issued a general amnesty in favour of
all those who had been condemned for political offences. The amnesty,
indeed, was carefully guarded; for only those were admitted to it who
would sign a declaration confessing their previous offences, and
promising future improvement. Mamiani and others refused to sign this
declaration, and it would have been obvious to anyone who had thought
over the question that this was a demand which could not be accepted
by any men of spirit and consistency. But men's minds had been excited
by previous events; and the teaching of Gioberti led, not only the
Romans, but Italians in all parts of the peninsula, to place a meaning
upon this amnesty which was certainly not intended by the Pope
himself. This belief in the reforming intentions of the Pope was
further increased by the bitter hostility that he excited in that
extreme party which had thriven under Gregory XVI., and which was
urged on by Lambruschini, who, in his disappointed ambition, began to
throw discredit on the election of his rival and to plot against his
authority.
The appointment of Cardinal Gizzi as Secretary of State roused the
hopes of the Liberals still further, and commissions were appointed to
examine into the question of reforms. Yet Gizzi, who was the only
cardinal with the most remote claims to the confidence of the
Liberals, does not seem to have desired anything more than some slight
administrative reforms. And it may be doubted whether the enthusiasm
for Pius IX. would long have been sustained, had it not been fostered
and directed by a man of a very different type from any of the
philosophical writers on the politics of Italy.
This was Angelo Brunetti, better known by his nick-name of
Ciceruacchio. He was a man of poor birth, and simple habits, who by
hard work had made a certain amount of money, while, by personal
beauty, a peculiar kind of eloquence, and a thorough honesty of
character, he had gained a special influence among the poorer classes
in Rome. A kind of imaginative enthusiasm had evidently possessed his
whole mind; and this was kindled to the highest degree by the idea of a
reforming Pope. It was to Ciceruacchio, then, rather than to any
utterance of the Pope himself, that the popular conception of Pius IX.
was due. A kindly priest, wishing to do more justice than his
predecessors, was reflected in Ciceruacchio's mirror as the liberator
and reformer of Italy. The myth quickly grew. Demonstrations in honour
of the Pope were organized by Ciceruacchio; and, as each new difficulty
or hindrance arose in the path of progress, he was ready to assure his
countrymen that these hindrances were all due to the wicked cardinals,
and that Pius IX. was eager to remove them. And so, while the other
princes of Italy were being asked to concede various limitations on
their power, in Rome was heard continually the cry of "Viva Pio Nono
Solo."
Thus it came about that this quiet and unpretending priest found
himself magnified in the popular imagination into a leader of heroic
proportions, half saint, half crusader. It was impossible for him to
resist altogether the fervour of popular enthusiasm, and it soon
spread far beyond the limits of the Roman State. In December, 1846, a
Congress, nominally intended for scientific discussion, met at Genoa.
These congresses had already begun to give opportunity for the
expression of political opinion, and two circumstances tended to
increase the importance of this particular meeting. One was, that 1846
was the centenary of the expulsion of the Austrians from Genoa, at the
close of their temporary occupation during the Austrian War of
Succession. The other was the presence in this Congress of Charles
Lucien Buonaparte, Prince of Canino. He had already gained some
reputation as a student of physical science, but his interest in
politics was even greater than his zeal for learning; and he now came
to the Congress to invite the men of science to carry on their
discussions in the Papal States. From this he naturally passed to the
praise of Pius IX. and of Charles Albert, and to the denunciation of
Austria and Metternich.
Such an oration, especially when delivered on a non-political
occasion, naturally excited the alarm of the Austrian Government; and
that alarm was still further increased by the reappearance in Lombardy
of the old feeling of irritation against Austrian rule. An attempt on
the part of the Austrian Government to seize upon the funds of the
Benevolent Societies of Lombardy, in order to appropriate them for
their own purposes, had caused such a storm of indignation in the
provincial Lombard Councils, that the Government had been compelled to
withdraw the proposal. And as if this awakening of life had not been
sufficiently significant, it was followed in December, 1846, by a
still more alarming sign of popular feeling.
Count Confalonieri had been released from the prison at Spielberg by
Ferdinand on his accession to the throne in 1835, but had been
deprived of his civil rights, and sent to America. The news now
reached Milan that, hearing of the new hopes aroused by the accession
of Pius IX., Confalonieri had set sail for Italy, but had died on the
way. Instantly a demonstration was organized in his honour, and Count
Gabrio Casati, Podesta of Milan, took part in the funeral procession.
Bolza, one of the group of Austrian officials who ruled Milan, took
note of all who attended the ceremony; and when it was followed by a
proposal to form a committee for erecting a statue to Confalonieri,
Bolza threatened to prohibit the committee altogether. He was not,
however, able to hinder the growing popular feeling in Milan, and
early in the following year, 1847, the bitterness was increased by a
famine. Grain riots followed; and the Governor of Milan, as the only
method for relieving the distress, prohibited the export of grain to
foreign parts, except to the German provinces of Austria. Again that
terrible canton of the Ticino protested against this infringement of a
commercial treaty, made between herself and Austria; and again the
Austrian Government was compelled to yield, and to re-open the grain
trade with the Ticinese. Hymns to Pio Nono were answered with cheers
in the Milanese theatre; while the Viceroy and his family were
received, in the same theatre, in dead silence.
In the meantime, Pio Nono's reforms, if not important, were numerous.
On March 12th, 1847, came out a modification of the censorship of the
press, of which the most important point was that the censorship was
to be administered in future by four laymen and one ecclesiastic. On
April 14th, a Council of State was formed, to be chosen by the Pope
from delegates elected by the provinces; and this Council was to be
allowed to propound opinions on certain questions of State. Finally,
on July 5th, the Pope granted a civic guard to Rome, and promised one
to the provinces.
Metternich had now become thoroughly alarmed, and, whether he
sanctioned or not the attempt which was now made in Rome, there seems
to be little doubt that the friends of Lambruschini did actually
organize a conspiracy against the Pope. The anniversary of the amnesty
of 1846 was the occasion of the discovery of this conspiracy. A
popular demonstration had been prepared in honour of the day; but when
the organizers of this demonstration appeared, their first act was to
call out the civic guard to arrest the conspirators. Ciceruacchio
paraded the streets, attended by a great number of people. Several of
the conspirators were seized and imprisoned, others fled, and none
attempted any resistance.
How far Metternich had sympathized with this conspiracy can never be
known; but its failure seemed to decide him to strike the blow which
he had been meditating. It has already been mentioned that the
Austrians had succeeded in introducing into the Treaty of Vienna a
clause, permitting them to occupy some part of Ferrara. Pius VII. had
protested against this, as an injury to the Holy See. Cardinal
Consalvi had expressed this protest in the following words:--"This
clause," he said, "is an unprovoked aggression, deprived of all that
could make a war legitimate under the rights of nations; an aggression
against a weak and innocent State, which had solemnly proclaimed its
neutrality in the war that agitates other States; an act outside every
human right; and a treaty that is the consequence of an aggression of
such a kind is essentially null and void."
Such a protest, and the fact that it was disregarded, emphasized the
important truth that treaty rights, as understood in Europe, are
simply the rights of the strong to divide the territories of the weak.
Pius IX. had committed no act of aggression against Austria; and
nothing new had arisen to justify the enforcement of a clause which
had been allowed to remain in abeyance so long. When the Powers of
Europe had desired to compel Gregory XVI. to reform his dominions
after the insurrection of 1831, Metternich had shrunk, with holy
horror, from the idea of putting pressure on an independent Prince;
but now that Pius IX. had introduced reforms far short of those
recommended by the Powers in 1833, Metternich seized the opportunity
to despatch Austrian forces to Ferrara.
A cry of indignation arose from all parts of Italy. The Milanese
seized the opportunity of the appointment of an Italian Archbishop of
Milan to organize an Italian demonstration. A league was formed for
commercial purposes between Rome, Sardinia, and Tuscany; and it was
supposed that Pius IX. and Charles Albert would declare war upon
Austria. Neither of those Princes, however, were ready for the
emergency. Pius IX. hardly knew yet what attitude he should take up
towards the Italian movement. Charles Albert was as usual hesitating
between different policies. But fortunately, besides the moral
objections to the occupation of Ferrara, it appeared that there were
diplomatic doubts about the interpretation of the clause which excused
it. And, while the mere cowardice and injustice of an insult to a weak
State might have passed unavenged, the wrong interpretation of the
word "_place_" in the clause of a treaty could not be permitted
without a protest.
Lord Palmerston, however, had shown on more than one occasion his
loathing of the policy of Metternich; and he was doubtless glad enough
of this diplomatic excuse for forwarding the cause of Constitutional
Liberty. Lord Minto was despatched to Italy to encourage the various
princes to stand firm in the cause of reform; and in December, 1847,
the Austrian troops consented to withdraw from Ferrara, after having
succeeded, by their occupation of it, in consolidating against them an
amount of Italian feeling such as they had hardly aroused till then.
The first and most startling expression of this feeling, and of the
consequent determination of the Italians to break loose from Austrian
influence, came from a prince whom Metternich had probably hardly
recognized as an opponent. Leopold of Tuscany, however much disposed
to avoid collision with his kinsman, the Emperor of Austria, could not
altogether free himself from the rush of reforming zeal which was
spreading through Italy. That triumph of Austrian and Papal policy in
Tuscany, which had been signalized by the surrender of Renzi and the
expulsion of Massimo d'Azeglio, had lasted a comparatively short
period, and even during that period the reaction had not been
complete. The influence of the Jesuits had increased in Tuscany after
the fall of Corsini, and that influence has always excited an
hostility which no other form of tyranny has produced; and the
University of Pisa, under the influence of Cosimo Ridolfi, was
specially zealous in protesting against their influence. As Ridolfi
gained ground in Leopold's Council, Metternich had become alarmed, and
tried to counteract his influence and to drive him from office.
Leopold, however, refused to yield to this pressure, and, as the
reforming movement spread, he advanced further and further in his
sympathies with Italian freedom. Freedom of the press was granted;
many new journals were started; and when the civic guard was conceded,
great demonstrations were held in Florence, and an attempt was made to
revive the memories of Francesco Ferruccio and other heroes of the
past. Professor Montanelli, already known as a writer, now took a
prominent part in the political movement, organized a deputation to
Pius IX. to entreat him to grant liberty of the press, to expel the
Jesuits, and to declare war upon Austria. Domenico Guerrazzi, who had
assisted at the foundation of Young Italy, seconded the efforts of
Montanelli, and Leopold became, almost against his will, marked out as
a reforming sovereign.
The movement now spread beyond Tuscany and affected the dominions of
the Duke of Lucca. This Duke was one of those eccentric princes who
combined despotism and a reliance on Austria with a certain love of
playing at Liberalism with foreign exiles. This game was not carried
on with any of those ambitious objects which had led Francis of Modena
to play with rebellion in 1831; but it rather arose from a love of
clever literary lions, coupled with those tendencies to eccentricity
which might be natural to a prince with no great responsibilities and
a certain amount of cleverness. When, however, the Liberal movement
spread to Lucca, he dropped his dilettantism and proposed to suppress
Liberalism by force. Finding that the people rose against him, he
consented to yield all which Leopold of Tuscany had granted; but his
subjects were unwilling to trust a prince who was the ruler of so
small a State under the influence of Austria, and who had only yielded
to reform under sudden pressure; so they continued to make further
demands. The Duke, weary of the struggle, and very likely desirous to
avoid bloodshed, took advantage of a clause in the Treaty of Vienna
which constituted the Grand Duke of Tuscany his heir, and resigned his
dominions forthwith to Leopold. At the same time, he desired to exempt
from this surrender the two towns of Pontremoli and Bagnone and to
hand them over to the Duke of Modena. Leopold accepted the territory
of Lucca; but, by the same clause which had constituted him the heir
to the Duke of Lucca, he was bound, on acquiring the territory, to
surrender to the Duke of Modena the district of Fivizzano. Now, of all
the princes of Italy, none had been more utterly subservient to
Austria than the Duke of Modena, and the people of Fivizzano therefore
resented the proposal to annex them to Modena. The Duke of Modena
thereupon called on the Austrian Marshal Radetzky to help him to
enforce his demands; and, while Leopold of Tuscany was preparing to
fix a day for the surrender of Fivizzano, the Duke of Modena marched
his troops into the town and massacred the unarmed inhabitants.
Both the Pope and the Grand Duke protested against this cruelty; and
Leopold, wishing to keep Fivizzano in consequence of the people's
preference for his rule, offered to make Charles Albert and the Pope
arbiters between him and the Duke of Modena. In the meantime the
citizens of Pontremoli and Bagnone sprang to arms in order to resist
the entrance of the Duke of Modena. The Austrians had by this time
sent forces to assist the Duke; but though they were able to secure
the submission of Fivizzano, the Duke of Modena was forced to
surrender Pontremoli and Bagnone. Less than a fortnight after this
treaty the Duchess of Parma died, and the Duke of Lucca succeeded to
her territory. Here he immediately found himself confronted by a new
insurrection; but, unwilling to trouble himself further, he fled to
Milan, leaving the Austrian troops to occupy Parma. This occupation
and the despatch of forces to Modena tended to strengthen the
bitterness which had already been roused by the occupation of Ferrara,
so that, when the Austrians consented to the evacuation of that town,
they merely incurred the shame of a diplomatic defeat without
lessening the causes of Italian bitterness against them.
But the evacuation of Ferrara was not the only diplomatic defeat
which the year 1847 brought to Metternich. The blow which was to be
recognized by all Europe as one of the most fatal which the cause of
despotism had yet sustained was to come from a little State which
seemed to stand outside the ordinary politics of Europe.
The territory of the Swiss Confederation had been increased by the
Treaty of 1815; but this had by no means led to such a complete
strengthening of Switzerland as the most patriotic Swiss would have
desired. The aristocratic party had been restored in several of the
cantons, and the customs duties on the frontiers of the separate
cantons had been renewed. But what specially alarmed the Liberals of
Switzerland was a clause, which the Papal Nuncio had introduced into
the Treaty of Vienna, giving the monasteries of Switzerland an
independent position. It must be remembered that the early struggles of
the Swiss cantons against the House of Austria had been connected with
the throwing off of the influence of the monks, who had been patronized
by the Hapsburgs; and in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries the combination of the Roman Catholic cantons had tended to
strengthen the influence of foreign Powers in Switzerland, and in some
cases had even endangered the unity of the Confederation. The extreme
Roman Catholic party in Switzerland were, therefore, naturally inclined
to oppose reform, and to weaken the Confederation. And after the July
Monarchy of France had begun to show its Conservative tendencies, the
Liberals of Switzerland began to fear that their reforms might be
checked by outside influence. As early as the year 1831, Metternich,
already alarmed at the Polish and Belgian risings, as well as at the
movements in Italy and Germany, remarked that there was still another
question to which the Cabinets must devote their attention, "the moral
anarchy which reigns in Switzerland." And the expedition of Mazzini in
1833-4 increased the alarm of the Austrian Government. In the
steady-going canton of Bern there was always an element of moderate
Conservatism, which led the Government to shrink from sympathy with the
insurrectionary plans of other parts of Europe; and they even called
upon the other cantons to assist them in suppressing the revolutionary
movement. But the sturdier Liberals of Zurich protested against this
circular, and led the way in internal democratic changes, in which they
were followed by several other cantons. Utterances like those of
Metternich tended to draw the reformers together; and in March, 1832,
while Metternich was no doubt meditating the Frankfort Decrees, which
he carried out a few months later, the seven Liberal cantons formed a
league in which they bound themselves to stand by each other in case of
an attack on their freedom.
The cantons which entered into this concordat were Bern, Zurich,
Luzern, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau, and Thurgau. This league
was considered by its opponents to be a violation of the Swiss
Confederation, though the champions of it would probably have pleaded
its purely defensive character. But the Roman Catholic party felt
themselves justified in retaliation; and they formed, in November,
1832, an opposition league called the Sarnerbund. This Bund steadily
set itself to oppose reform; but the men of Schwytz, who were at that
time its leading spirits, did not confine themselves to argument, but
invaded Luzern in 1833. Thereupon the Diet interfered, occupied
Schwytz, and dissolved the Sarnerbund. The reforming party now began
to spread their ideas, and the new University of Zurich, which was
founded at this time, became a fresh centre of intellectual life. The
fugitives from other countries gathered more and more to Switzerland,
and the excitement roused in that country by Mazzini's expedition to
Savoy led to the foundation of a society called Young Europe.
The great object to which the reforming party in Switzerland now
devoted its attention was the breaking down of the authority of the
clergy, and the placing education and marriage under the State instead
of under the Church. Their scheme was embodied in fourteen articles
which excited the indignation of the Roman Catholic cantons; on the
appeal of the Roman Catholics to Gregory XVI., he declared these
articles heretical; and a little later Louis Philippe intervened to
prevent the canton of Bern from enforcing them in the Roman Catholic
district of the Jura.
The struggle had now risen to great bitterness; and, at this period,
the bitterness was much intensified by the domestic character of the
quarrel. The Radical party and the Roman Catholic party struggled
fiercely against each other in several of the cantons; and there were
changes in the government, backwards and forwards, which temporarily
affected the contest. The two changes, however, which were of a
permanent character, and which had a vital effect on the destinies of
Switzerland, were that which took place in 1838 in Bern and that in
Luzern in 1841. Bern, though reckoned, on the whole, among the
Liberal cantons, in consequence of its undoubted Protestantism, was
yet under the control of a timid and moderate party. This may have
arisen from the fact of its important position in the Confederation;
for though Bern divided at this time with Luzern and Zurich the honour
of being the meeting-place of the Diet, yet it seems to have assumed,
even at this period, a certain superior and initiative tone.
Whether it was due to the sense of responsibility inspired by this
position, or to some other cause, certain it is that the tone adopted
by the Government of Bern in matters of foreign policy by no means
satisfied the sterner Radicals of Switzerland. The proposal of Bern for
an anti-revolutionary proclamation in 1830 had been defeated by the
protest of Zurich; but when in 1838 Bern considered, not unfavourably,
the demand for the expulsion of a refugee, the Radicals became furious.
This was one among many instances of that curious irony of history by
which great principles have to be asserted in defence of persons who
are in themselves unworthy of protection; for the exile, whose
surrender was now demanded by Louis Philippe, was Louis Napoleon
Buonaparte, who had recently made his attempt on Strasburg. But the
Radicals of Bern rightly felt that the principle of asylum was more
important than the character of any particular refugee; and when Louis
Napoleon left Switzerland to avoid being surrendered, the reforming
party rose in indignation, and Bern became the centre of determined
Radicalism from that time. The change in Luzern seems to have been due
to an extension of the suffrage which threw the power more distinctly
into the hands of the Roman Catholics, who were a majority in the
canton; and thus Luzern became the centre of the Roman Catholic
movement.
But before that change had taken place, new elements of bitterness had
been introduced into the discussion. Neuhaus, the new leader of the
Bern Government, had been chosen president of the Confederation; and he
had used the troops of the Confederation to help the Aargau Protestants
in suppressing the monasteries in that canton. The majority of the
Swiss Diet had, however, been unwilling to support Neuhaus in this
action, and had even condemned the suppression of the Aargau
monasteries. The Aargau Protestants, however, had refused to yield,
except as to the restoration of two very small monasteries. The feeling
on both sides had now risen to its highest point, and on September
13th, 1843, the six cantons of Luzern, Uri, Schwytz, Unterwalden, Zug,
and Freyburg formed the alliance known as the Sonderbund. They appealed
to the old treaties on which the Confederation was founded, and
maintained that even the terms of the Confederation fixed by the Treaty
of Vienna had not been observed in the matter of the protection of the
rights of the Roman Catholics.
The compromise to which the Diet had assented in the Aargau question,
and their non-interference on behalf of some monasteries at Thurgau,
excited a special protest from the Sonderbund, and they demanded that
the Diet should set these things to rights. So far the Sonderbund
could scarcely be logically condemned by those who had joined the
Protestant Concordat of Seven in 1832. But the Roman Catholic cantons
went on to say that, if their demands were rejected, they would
consider that the principles of the Confederation were so completely
violated that they would secede from it.
The formation of the Sonderbund excited their opponents; and it was
declared that France, Austria, and the Pope were intriguing against
Switzerland. The Jesuits, as usual, were supposed to be the centre of
the intrigues; and the cry was raised that they ought to be expelled
from the Confederation. Hitherto they had chiefly settled in Schwytz
and Freyburg; but it was believed that if a cry rose against them they
would become less safe in those cantons; and Luzern, as one of the
three chief towns of the Confederation, was supposed to be a safer
resting-place; therefore, on September 12th, 1844, the Assembly of
Luzern passed a resolution inviting the Jesuits to settle in Luzern.
Strange to say, Bern and Zurich had somewhat changed places during
this period; for while the indignation against the former Government
of Bern, caused by their abandonment of the right of asylum, had
produced a strong and permanent Radical feeling in that canton, the
bitter hostility to Christianity shown by some of the leading Radicals
of Zurich had, on the other hand, scandalized the more moderate
Liberals, and produced a Government less keenly Radical than that
which now ruled in Bern. At this crisis, unfortunately, the Government
of Bern took a step which could scarcely have tended to the order and
unity of Switzerland. They appointed a committee to attack the
Jesuits, and organized volunteer regiments, which they despatched
against Luzern. And the want of confidence in the central power, which
had been proclaimed by the Sonderbund, seemed to be almost justified
by the action of the Diet at their next meeting; for that body, while
condemning the Bernese volunteers, refused to take any steps to hinder
their march. The attack of the volunteers was, however, successfully
repelled by Luzern; and the Sonderbund soon after proceeded to form a
council of war for its own protection.
In the meantime, Metternich had become more and more alarmed at the
progress of affairs in Switzerland. The defeat of the efforts of
Austria and Sardinia to defend the Conservative cause in the Ticino,
and the subsequent alliance between the Ticinese and Charles Albert,
had strengthened the fears which had been previously aroused in the
Austrian Government by the shelter given by the Swiss to the European
Revolutionists. Even in 1845 Metternich had despatched troops to the
frontier of Switzerland; he looked upon the struggle of the Catholic
cantons as a means for carrying out his policy of weakening the union
of Switzerland; and, through the help of Solaro della Margherita, he
succeeded in rousing Charles Albert's sympathies for the cause of the
Sonderbund. But to others he frankly said that he was not fighting in
the least for the Jesuits--"They do not make us hot or cold;" and
instead of resting his appeal to the Diet on so doubtful a ground, he
earnestly entreated Louis Philippe to prevent the violent substitution
of a unitary and propagandist government "for the cantonal government
of Switzerland."
To say the truth, it was for the stability of Austrian government in
Italy that Metternich was now alarmed; and Mentz had warned him that a
strong and united government in Switzerland would be dangerous to
Austria in Lombardy. When, then, the election of a Radical government
by the canton of St. Gallen made the character of the coming Swiss Diet
tolerably certain, Metternich thought that the time had come for
decided action; and he desired that before the meeting of the Diet,
Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia should declare that they would not
suffer cantonal authority to be violated. England, however, Metternich
well knew would be opposed to him. Ever since the recognition of Greek
independence in 1830 Metternich had become aware that a statesman had
arisen in England who, though inferior to Canning in width of sympathy
and capacity for sudden and ready action, yet was Canning's equal in
strength of will, and in the thorough grasp of the two convictions that
Constitutionalism was better than Despotism, and that Metternich was a
dangerous politician who should always be opposed.
Palmerston, indeed, had not accomplished any such brilliant stroke of
foreign policy as the breaking up of the Holy Alliance, or the defeat
of Absolutism in Portugal, and had only played a late and subordinate
part in the Greek question. But he had helped to save Belgium from the
clutches both of France and Holland. He had uttered as decided a
protest as was, perhaps, possible to him, against the Frankfort
Decrees. And he had recently intimated plainly his opinion about the
annexation of Cracow. The occupation of Ferrara had not at that time
taken place; but Palmerston's utterance about the Treaty of Vienna on
the Po had sufficiently indicated to Metternich the line which English
feeling was taking with regard to Italian policy. But, though
certain of the hostility of Palmerston, Metternich fully hoped to
counterbalance that danger by securing France to his side. With
Guizot he had long been on terms of cordial friendship; and each had
sympathized with the other in various points of their political
career. But, unfortunately for Metternich, in the Italian question
Guizot had not seemed entirely sympathetic with Austria; for the
Lombard exile, Pellegrino Rossi, who was now French ambassador at
Rome, was the special friend and _protege_ of Guizot; and as it was
primarily for the sake of Austrian rule in Italy that Metternich cared
about the Swiss question, he might find that here, too, French opinion
did not coincide with Austrian.
It soon appeared that Louis Philippe shrank from an alliance with
Austria. He declared that any declaration by the four Powers, instead
of hindering any outburst in Switzerland might hasten it; and Guizot
was directed to propose that, instead of a common action by the four
Powers, Austria should undertake alone the defence of the Sonderbund,
France merely occupying some position in the territory of the
Confederation. Metternich, however, remembered that during the
intervention in the Papal States, in 1831-2, a French general had
seized on Ancona, and had attempted a demonstration there, at first of
a Republican character, and throughout entirely anti-Austrian. And he
feared that, if he consented to Guizot's proposal, the French Radicals
might turn the occupation of Swiss territory to their advantage.
While France and Austria were thus wasting their time in wrangling,
the Swiss Diet met. Ochsenbein, an even more energetic man than
Neuhaus, had been chosen President of the Confederation; and on the
20th July, 1847, the Diet had declared that the Sonderbund was
incompatible with the Treaty of Confederation. This was speedily
followed by the dismissal from the service of the Confederation of all
those who held office in the cantons of the Sonderbund; and finally,
in September, the Diet decreed that the Assemblies of Luzern, Schwytz,
Freyburg, and Valais should be invited to expel the Jesuits from their
territory. The Sonderbund probably felt that a direct military
resistance to the whole forces of the Diet would be hopeless, and
therefore they resolved to make a separate attack on some of the
smaller cantons. With this view they prepared to march their troops
from Luzern against Aargau, which they considered one of the centres
of Protestant tyranny; and about the same time the canton of Uri
resolved to invade the Ticino. In both these cases the Sonderbund
hoped to rouse a popular insurrection on their side, but in this they
were singularly mistaken.
Previously to 1815 Uri had exercised a special authority over Ticino,
and had used it to thrust in German officials in place of Italian. The
Treaty of Vienna had secured Ticino from these tyrannies; but the
Ticinese remembered them, and resented this new invasion. The troops of
Uri were indeed able to gain one or two successes; but the people of
Ticino rose against them, and, after a short, sharp struggle, succeeded
in driving them out of the canton. The expedition to Aargau proved
equally unsuccessful, and, in the meantime, the Federal Diet was
organizing its forces under the command of General Dufour, a Genevese.
They resolved that Freyburg, as the nearest of the Sonderbund cantons
to Bern, and as geographically separated off from its allies, should
be the first object of attack; and on November 7, Rilliet, the
commander of the first division of the Federal forces, issued the
following order of the day to his troops:--
"You are the first Federal troops who have entered the Freyburg
territory. Your bearing at this moment will give the tone to the whole
division. Consider that you are entering on a Federal territory, that
you are marching against members of the Federation, who for centuries
have been your friends, and will be so again. Consider that they are
rather misled than guilty. Consider that they are neighbours, and that
you ought to be fighting under the same flag. Therefore be moderate;
refute the slanders of those who are driving them on. Listen not to
false rumours, nor to foolish provocations to violence. Listen only to
your leaders, and leave to your opponents the responsibility of having
fired the first shot against the Federal flag. Soldiers! I rely on you
as on myself; and do you trust in God, who marches before the flag of
good, right, and honour."
To the Freyburger Rilliet appealed to receive the Federal troops as
brothers and friends, and as obeying the God whom Protestants and
Catholics alike worship. "Lay down your arms," he said, "not before
us, but before our flag, which is yours also."
These appeals were not without result. At one of the first towns at
which the Federal troops arrived in the canton of Freyburg, the
townsfolk threw off the authority of the Cantonal Boards, raised the
Federal flag, and admitted the Federal troops. Two slight skirmishes
took place after this between the Federal forces and those of the
canton; but the former were easily victorious. On November 12 the
Federal troops appeared before the town of Freyburg; and on the 14th
it was surrendered to them. Large numbers of the citizens received
them with cries of "Long live the Confederates! Down with the
Sonderbund! Down with the Jesuits!"
The leaders of the Sonderbund at Luzern were startled at this sudden
collapse, and resolved to apply for foreign help; and it was on
November 15, 1847, that the descendants of Reding and Winkelried
appealed to the descendants of Leopold of Hapsburg for help against
their fellow-confederates.
Metternich would gladly have intervened; and he hastened to assure the
Sonderbund that the Emperor of Austria considered their cause a just
one. Still, however, he desired the co-operation of France; but Guizot
hesitated, and when Palmerston announced that any demonstration in
favour of the Sonderbund would be met by a counter-demonstration by
England on the side of the Federal Diet, the French Government
distinctly refused to have any share in intervention.
In the meantime the Sonderbund was rapidly breaking down. The
Protestant party had gained the upper hand in the little canton of
Zug, and persuaded the Government to surrender to the Diet even before
the Federal troops had appeared in the canton. The occupation of Zug
was speedily followed by a march to Luzern. On November 23 the Federal
troops encountered the forces of Luzern and drove them back after a
sharp fight. On the following day the War Council of the Sonderbund
fled from Luzern and the Federal troops entered it. After this defeat
there was no further serious resistance; by November 29 the last
canton of the Sonderbund had surrendered to the Diet, and on December
7 the Diet passed a formal resolution refusing to admit any mediation
from the Great Powers. So ended the Sonderbund war; and whatever
harshness the Diet and the Protestant cantons may have shown in the
earlier part of the struggle towards their Catholic neighbours,
they had at least consistently upheld the principle of national
independence, and by their vigour and determination they had saved the
unity of Switzerland and defeated Metternich.
Nor were these the only defeats which the ruler of Europe sustained in
the year 1847. In Germany, too, there were signs that the old system
was giving way. Metternich, indeed, had hoped that the King of Prussia
had been about to abandon the policy which he had followed from 1840
to 1843; for in 1846 a meeting had taken place between Metternich and
the King in which Frederick William had shown signs of alarm at the
popular movement. But this change of feeling had been only temporary,
for an event had occurred soon after which had given a new impulse
to German national feeling, and re-awakened thereby the popular
sympathies of the King of Prussia.
On July 8, 1846, the King of Denmark, Christian VIII., issued a
proclamation in which he declared that he should consider the provinces
of his Crown as forming one sole and same State. This was felt
to be undoubtedly aimed at the independence of Schleswig-Holstein.
That Duchy had, since the middle of the fifteenth century, been
recognized as a separate province, of which the King of Denmark was duke
(till that time Schleswig had been a fief of Denmark and Holstein of
Germany). In the seventeenth century a practically absolute Government
had been established in Denmark; but in 1830 the liberties of that
country had been restored, and soon after a cry had arisen from some of
the Radical party at Copenhagen in favour of the conquest of Schleswig.
But the object of the popular party and that of the King were entirely
unlike; the Democratic party desiring to assert what they considered a
national principle by the separation of Schleswig from Holstein and its
absorption in Denmark; the King wishing to absorb Schleswig-Holstein
whole into the Danish dominions, without consideration for anything but
selfish aggrandizement. As a compromise between his own aims and those
of the people of Copenhagen, Christian, in 1831, conceded separate
assemblies to Holstein and Schleswig; but he had followed this up by
steadily trying to Danize the Duchies. Danish officers were introduced
into their army and navy, even into their private ships; Danish teachers
were appointed in the University of Kiel; the liberty of the Press was
continually interfered with, and arms were removed from the forts of
Schleswig-Holstein to Copenhagen. Thus it became evident that the
proclamation of July, 1846, was merely another step towards the complete
denationalization of the Duchies.
Metternich was in a difficult position. On the one hand he was bound
by the Treaty of Vienna to assert the rights of Austria to protect
Holstein as a member of the German Confederation; on the other hand he
knew that by so doing he was strengthening that German national
feeling which he so much dreaded. "In the University of Heidelberg,"
wrote Metternich, "in the municipal councils of German towns, in the
gatherings of professors and of choral societies, the cry is being
raised for the Fatherland." The professors of Heidelberg had sent a
special address to the Holsteiners, and it was clear on every side
that German sentiment was rising to boiling point. Under these
circumstances Metternich tried to steer between the dangers of
encouraging popular feeling and that of neglecting to assert the legal
influence of Austria. Finally, he persuaded the Federal Diet, on
September 17, 1846, to pass two resolutions--First, that, apart from
his letter of July 8, the King of Denmark should respect all the
rights which he had promised to respect in a private letter of August
22; but, secondly, that, "while the Confederation pays just honour to
the patriotic sentiments shown on this occasion by the Confederated
German States, it regrets the passionate accusations and irritations
which were produced by this circumstance."
So for the moment Metternich hoped to stave off the natural results of
this outburst of popular feeling. But he could not prevent the effect
which that outburst would produce on the more impressionable character
of the King of Prussia. One of those who had had much opportunity of
observing that king remarked that whoever was a favourite with him for
the time and managed to indulge his fancies had the game in his own
hands; and the Ministers who then enjoyed the confidence of Frederick
William were eager to encourage him in complying with the popular
feeling. So, in spite of Metternich's warnings, the King of Prussia,
in January, 1847, had summoned to Berlin the representatives of all
the Provincial Estates to discuss affairs. "The King," said Princess
Metternich, "has promulgated this Constitution without force and
without virtue, which is nothing to-day, but which to-morrow may
change into thunder and destroy the Kingdom."
But the concessions which the King of Prussia was making only embodied
a feeling which was stirring in various parts of Germany. A terrible
famine in Silesia was quickening the desire of the poorer classes for
some change in their condition; the booksellers and literary men were
uttering various demands for freedom of the Press; and when a meeting
of the Baden Liberals at Offenburg tried to formulate these demands,
the organizers of the meeting were threatened with a prosecution which
never took place.
Such, then, was Metternich's position towards the close of 1847;
discredited as a champion of legality by the annexation of Cracow,
looked on with suspicion by many orthodox Catholics in consequence of
his attempt on Ferrara, his power as a ruler and his reputation as a
diplomatist alike weakened by the result of the Sonderbund war. The
result of these various failures was seen in the attitude both of
kings and peoples. The King of Prussia was breaking loose from
Metternich's control; France was suspicious and England hostile;
Charles Albert was assuming more and more an attitude of defiance to
Austria; the Pope was drifting gradually into the position of a
champion of Italian Liberty; German national feeling, which Metternich
had hoped to stamp out in 1834, was bubbling up into new life under
the triple influence of the Schleswig-Holstein question, the King of
Prussia's reforms, and the growing Liberalism of Saxony and Baden;
while Hungary, which had seemed hopelessly divided, was gradually
solidifying into opposition to Austrian rule. Such were the chief
points in the spectacle which presented itself to Metternich as he
looked upon Europe. Yet he was far indeed from thinking of yielding in
the struggle, or of abandoning in the slightest degree his faith in
his great system. He was still prepared to crush Switzerland and
Charles Albert, to lead back the Pope and the King of Prussia into
wiser courses, to quench the spirit of German enthusiasm, to wear out
Hungarian opposition, to recover the friendship of France, and to defy
the enmity of England. Such results seemed still possible when, in an
Italian island to which Metternich had not recently given much
attention, there first broke out that revolutionary fire which, under
judicious guidance, was to spread over Europe and overthrow the system
of Metternich.
FOOTNOTE:
[7] I feel that some explanation is needed for the rejection of what
was once one of the most deeply-rooted traditions among all Liberals
who interested themselves in the politics of this period. I must,
therefore, state that my chief authority for my account of the
paralysis of the Austrian Government in the Galician insurrection, and
their consequent innocence of any organized massacre, is Dr. Herbst,
the well-known leader of the German Liberals in the Austrian Reichstag,
who was in Galicia at the time of the insurrection.