Korea’s people and resources by the 38° North parallel, was the
evacuation of all Japanese personnel, except 500 retained in North
Korea, after VJ-Day. The 700,000 Japanese formerly resident in Korea
dominated all elements of the economy and supplied management and
technical personnel even to the mechanic class. Koreans were denied
opportunities or positions of consequence in all phases of political
and economic life. It is no reflection on the individuals concerned
to note that a former Korean stationmaster at Pusan is now head of
the railways, or that a vocational school graduate is in responsible
charge of a large hydroelectric plant not far from Seoul. It is
however, an indication of an almost fatal deficiency in South Korean
economy. The ultimate solution is not readily apparent.
_Disinvestment_
The process of disinvestment probably began in South Korea during the
late thirties when the Japanese decided to put all new capital into
war production and permit nonwar facilities to depreciate. Capital
goods provided by the Japanese for maintenance and development in
South Korea went with few exceptions to war plants such as the
submarine shop at Pusan, and to the strategic transport services
linking Japan with the Manchuria-North Korea industrial complex.
This meant that facilities such as the north-south railroad from
Pusan to Antung on the Manchurian border received the main portion
of construction materials available. Other industrial establishments
in South Korea were converted to war production or allowed to
deteriorate. The supply of fertilizer, essential to rice culture in
the exhausted paddies of South Korea, was drastically reduced in the
early forties as a result of the conversion of North Korean nitrogen
fixation plants to the manufacture of explosives. Exploitation of
South Korea’s meager forest resources resulted in severe erosion and
the destruction of crops and utilities through flooding The Japanese
also depleted Korean stock-piles and withdrew skilled labor for Army
service, or for the mines and factories of Manchuria and the Japanese
islands. During two years of military government, the process of
disinvestment has continued.
The possibility of South Korea financing a program of investment
and rehabilitation out of the proceeds of exports is not worth
considering in detail. Although South Korea is primarily
agricultural, it is unlikely that it will be able to export
foodstuff, even under the most favorable circumstances. Deterioration
of agriculture, due to accumulated soil deficiencies and erosion,
and an increase of population from 15 to 20 million since 1940
indicate that no export surplus of food can be expected in the next
several years. The only exports which may be derived from South Korea
are small amounts of such minerals as tungsten, gold and copper,
some ginseng root, and marine products such as agar-agar. The most
optimistic estimate is $10 million worth of exports by 1950. Much
more than $10 million earned by Korean exports will be needed to
finance essential raw material imports, and there is no prospect of
any capital development out of current production.
_Inflation_
The Korean inflation is not as serious as the Chinese inflation
in rate of price increase, but its causes are less susceptible to
control by measures taken within Korea. Price increases have been
due to physical inability to produce goods, and not to unrestrained
issuance of paper currency. Prices of consumers’ goods in various
categories have risen 200 to 700 times over the 1937 level. The
official rise price, however, has risen only 70 times, and about
80 per cent of the calorie requirement for the urban population
is available at the official price. A runaway inflation has not
yet occurred in South Korea, because (_a_) the Military Government
has restrained the issuance of currency by keeping governmental
expenditures and local occupation costs at reasonable levels, and
(_b_) because cannibalization and the use of Japanese stocks have
kept some industry going, and (_c_) the forcible collection of rice
at harvest time has brought in sufficient food to maintain, with
“disease an unrest” imports, an adequate official ration in the
cities without the use of large inflationary payments to the farmers.
Highly inflationary factors such as the exhaustion of raw material
stocks, cumulative breakdowns in public services and transportation,
and the cutting of power supply from the North, might occur
simultaneously. The Korean economic outlook is, therefore, more grave
than in China or Japan, where governmental fiscal policies as well as
low production, are the main causes of inflation. Korea, lacking raw
materials and skilled labor, is not in a position to be saved from
a disastrous and chaotic hyper-inflation by the efforts of its own
people combined with correct policy decisions. A breakdown could be
forestalled only by external provision of large amounts of consumers’
goods and transportation equipment.
_Agriculture and Fisheries_
_Agriculture_—Over three-quarters of the total population of South
Korea are farmers. The total area of land under cultivation in
1946 was 6,033,000 acres, or about 2½ acres per farm household.
Approximately 15 per cent of agricultural land was formerly owned by
Japanese, but title thereto remains with the Military Government and
will eventually pass to Koreans. In the projected land reforms an
additional 60 per cent of land, which is tenant-operated, would be
involved. The Military Government has not proceeded with land reform
even with regard to Japanese-held land, in the view that such reform
should not precede establishment of an interim Korean Government.
After VJ-Day the influx of over two and a half million Koreans from
Japan, China, and North Korea into South Korea, coupled with almost
complete lack of commercial fertilizers as well as severe floods,
resulted in a severe food shortage. Farmers have been reluctant to
double-crop soils already depleted because of a lack of fertilizer,
and have preferred to conserve land for rice, the best money crop. In
1946 the average planted acreage was only 79 per cent of the 1935-39
average, and production of grains and pulses was only 71 per cent.
In the past, about 36 per cent of the population and 36 per cent
of the food production of Korea were located north of the 38°
North parallel. However, postwar population movements, plus the
availability of more commercial fertilizers in North Korea (where
almost all of Korea’s large chemical plants are located), has changed
this situation. Only about 30 per cent of Korea’s population is now
north of the 38° North parallel, but that area accounts for around 38
per cent of food production.
Rice is the principal Korean crop, and it has consistently
represented more than half the total value of agricultural
production. During the 1930’s the rice crop averaged about
100,000,000 bushels annually. Forty per cent or more was exported
each year to Japan accounting generally for about one-third of the
total gross value of exports. This was by no means voluntary on
the part of the Korean people. In line with Japanese policy, farm
tenancy increased from less than 40 per cent in 1910 to more than 75
per cent in 1945. This facilitated grain collections, for landlords
usually received their rentals in rice, and these averaged about 60
per cent of the crop. Consequently, although Koreans preferred rice
to other grains, their per capita consumption was forced down from
3.62 bushels in 1915-19 to 2.0 bushels in 1939-45, a decline of 44
per cent. This deficiency was partly made up by imports of Manchurian
millet and soya beans, but underconsumption was nevertheless chronic.
To meet the food crisis in South Korea and to rehabilitate
agriculture the Military Government developed program to import
foodstuffs to prevent starvation and to assure Korean urban residents
at least a subsistence diet until indigenous production could be
increased to meet minimum food needs; and a fertilizer import
program designed to restore depleted soils and increase agricultural
production to levels at least as high as had been reached in the past.
In 1945 the Military Government’s attempt to institute a compulsory
system of rice collection for rationing to non-self-suppliers was
largely unsuccessful. In 1946, a poor crop year due to floods, the
Military Government collected 87,428 tons of rice, or about one-sixth
of the total production. In order to supplement indigenous production
to meet the minimum needs of non-self-suppliers in South Korea,
180,848 metric tons of wheat, corn, and flour were imported into
South Korea by the Military Government from May through December,
1946.
A program for the collection of the rice in 1946 was given highest
priority by the Military Government, as one of the most important
ways to ease the food situation, stabilize the economy, and check
the inflationary spiral. This program was fully supported by all
agencies, and it succeeded in collecting a total of 548,000 metric
tons of polished rice, or its equivalent, about 30 per cent of the
total 1946 production.
This successful collection program, coupled with the importation of
275,962 metric tons of cereals purchased with U. S. funds during the
first seven months of 1947, has enabled the Military Government to
stabilize the food situation in South Korea through the issuance to
non-self-suppliers of minimum staple rations averaging slightly over
300 grams (1,050 calories) per person per day.
_Fisheries_—Fishing was one of the important prewar Korean
industries, ranking sixth in the world. It is second in importance,
only to agriculture in the economic structure of the country. The
industry was, however, largely dependent upon Japan for imports of
fisheries supplies and, has deteriorated seriously since this source
has been cut off. Consumption of fish products has decreased from
a prewar average of 47 pounds per capita per year to 32 pounds.
Korea needs additional fisheries supplies, boats, manila line, nets,
trawls, ammonia for refrigeration, tin plate for canning, salt and
sugar for canning. Fears are expressed that if such supplies are
not forthcoming and fishing operations considerably expanded, the
Japanese will enter claims for fishing grounds now reserved for the
Koreans.
_Foreign Trade_
The total volume of Korea’s external trade grew from 660,000,000 yen
in 1910 to more than 2,400,000,000 yen in 1939. With respect to the
principal categories of its trade, i. e., foodstuffs, textiles and
fibres, minerals, manufactures, and miscellaneous items. Korea was
consistently a net importer; of all, except for foodstuffs. Food
exports however, were seldom so large that they did more than offset
imports of textiles and fibers.
From 1910 to 1945, Korea’s external trade was almost wholly absorbed
by the Japanese Empire and the prime factor during the entire
period was the export of rice to Japan. In 1936, of the value of 41
Korean products showing a net export balance, rice accounted for
approximately 64 per cent. Although by 1939 the relative importance
of rice exports had declined in favor of minerals and manufactures,
of the 55 net export products in that year, rice still made up
one-third of the total money value. Until the years immediately
preceding the war, fish and marine products ranked second to
rice, averaging from 7.5 per cent to 9 per cent of all net export
commodities. Other exports individually were of minor significance.
Korea’s principal imports historically have reflected its dependence
on the outside world for fuels, heavy manufacturers, machinery,
automotive equipment, textiles, and fibers, and specialized products.
Under current conditions, foreign trade in the ordinary sense of
the term is small in amount. During the period August 15, 1945,
through June 30, 1947, the value of goods entering or leaving the
area was approximately $168,000,000. Of this sum, however, only about
$25,000,000 represents the value of goods exchanged between Korea
and the mainland of Asia as a result of the operations of private
traders. The remaining $143,000,000 represents mainly commodities
imported by agencies of the United State Government as a part of the
Civilian Supply Program and financed with appropriated funds of the
War Department, or as shipments made under the $25,000,000 UNRRA
supplies. Exports which enter into this figure are surplus Foreign
Liquidation Commission credit, plus small amounts of government-owned
minerals and marine products, to the value of some $5,000,000.
The Military Government is endeavoring to encourage such trade as
will reduce the area’s dependence upon American funds. Credits
realized from South Korea exports, unless balanced in kind by imports
approved as essential, are to be used to purchase commodities similar
to those making up the Civilian Supply list and certified for import
by the Military Government. On July 15, 1947, Korea was declared open
to small numbers of foreign businessmen, who might desire to develop
trade possibilities within the framework established by the military
authorities. Meanwhile, trade has been undertaken with Hong Kong and
Macao, and some critically needed materials have been obtained by
barter in exchange for Korean surpluses. Recent negotiations with the
Egyptian government have led to an agreement to exchange 730 tons of
tungsten concentrates for 3,000 bales of long-staple Egyptian cotton.
All dealings with Japan are restricted to a governmental level, and
China has imposed conditions which make legitimate trade virtually
out of the question. Actually, a growing smuggling trade is going
on both with Japan and China, and via Hong Kong and Macao. An
essential step for promoting Korea’s trade on a sound basis would be
development of an efficient customs service.
_United States Investment in Rehabilitation_
There is one basic policy question which overhangs all financial and
economic programs for Korea: How long will the occupation of South
Korea continue on a unilateral basis? Until this question is answered
in terms of months or years, no satisfactory decision can be made on
United States financial or developmental programs for the area. The
characteristics of the South Korean economy are such that there is
no compromise which provides effective utilization of dollars, and
at the same time leaves open the decision concerning the duration
of the occupation. If a serious decline in the living standard, and
possibly economic disintegration are to be avoided, South Korea must
have (_a_) unification with North Korea, or (_b_) substantial relief
supplies, or (_c_) relief and rehabilitation supplies of $200 to $300
million a year for several years. The third alternative would provide
a possible basis for an indefinite continuance of occupation. The
capital investment in a permanently separate South Korea would be
wasteful, and the likelihood of a stable economy resulting therefrom
would be in doubt for some years. South Korea is a depleted and
eroded country with no minerals worth mentioning; an agriculture
dependent on nitrate input, and a backward people. In terms of the
needs of the East Asia area, an investment in rehabilitation and
industrialization, which would permit South Korea to subsist on its
own industrial output at its standards of the past 10 years with a
minimum of relief, could be justified only by political and strategic
consideration of the highest order.
A consideration affecting the duration of the occupation of Korea,
and hence the type of economic program, is the estimated length of
the occupation in Japan. General MacArthur has indicated his desire
for a United Nations, or other international administration to take
responsibility in Japan soon after the peace treaty is signed.
There would be obvious difficulties in any long-term occupation and
rehabilitation program for South Korea, initiated at a time when
the occupation of Japan was about to be relinquished by the United
States. Apart from the problem of tactical forces in Japan to back
up the Korean occupation, there would be communication and supply
problems. There might he political objection to the occupation of
liberated Korea after the termination of occupation in defeated Japan.
The United States Military Government in Korea has recommended
a five-year rehabilitation program starting in July, 1948, and
requiring U. S. financing for a deficit of $647 million. The
estimates indicate that the proposed rehabilitation of the Korean
economy would cost more per year for the first three years, than the
relief program of $137 million which was tentatively approved for
fiscal 1948, but reduced in July, 1947, to $92.7 million.
A feature of the proposed rehabilitation program is an expenditure
of $35 million to provide a chemical fertilizer industry and the
supporting power installations, roughly duplicating the installations
in North Korea which formerly supplied the fertilizer needs of
South Korea. An additional amount of approximately $85 million
is included in the five-year rehabilitation program to cover the
cost of fertilizer imports, pending the completion of the plants.
Other items in the program are investment in coal mining to provide
low-grade anthracite for briquetting, and to provide for the
development and reconstruction of the transportation, textile and
fisheries industries. There is no assurance, however, that (_a_) $35
million fertilizer industry would meet the estimated requirements,
or reach capacity production in the time allotted. The suitability
of low-grade anthracite dust as the basic energy source for a
considerable industrial establishment in South Korea has not been
tested, and (_b_) there are no reliable estimates of the reserves of
this fuel, and no evidence of this fuel, and no evidence that the
mines and railroads could be developed to fit the prescribed time
schedule.
In the event that it is decided to continue a one-nation occupation
of South Korea for some years, the least costly program would be
one designed to provide, not capital goods, but raw materials and
fertilizer in sufficient quantity to stabilize the economy at a
satisfactory standard of living as measured by a prewar Japanese and
potential North Korean living standards. In this way, the risk of an
experiment in industrialization without resources would be avoided.
A relief program of the type envisaged might cost the United States
about $150 million a year, in addition to the present military
occupation costs which are in the neighborhood of $200 million a
year. It would be necessary frankly to recognize this as a relief
program which held no prospect of financial return, and no prospect
of making South Korea a self sufficient economy.
_Industrial Survey_
A comprehensive industrial survey of South Korea would not be
warranted. The industrial elements and capabilities as well as
weaknesses of that area are all too evident. Should Korea be
reunited, and the United States bear a responsibility in the economic
rehabilitation of the country, an industrial survey wholly or in
part by qualified United States Government personnel is indicated.
If, however, it be made by private consultants, they should clearly
understand that the survey must be realistic and reflect the economic
needs and capabilities of the country. Foreign consultants and
construction firms do themselves and their own country as well as the
country concerned, a disservice in recommending projects for which
there is not complete economic justification.
APPENDIX G TO PART III—KOREA
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
Because Japan had administered and developed Korea uniformly for
Japanese and not Korean purposes, and in particular had persistently
suppressed the people’s historic culture, once the region was freed
of the Japanese, its people undertook a re-Koreanization program
with feverish activity. Since VJ-Day, their own labors in behalf of
education, for example, apart from the contributions of American
authorities have been determined and surprisingly effective. In that
short time it is estimated that total illiteracy has been cut from 75
to 44 per cent (to 25 per cent in a most favored area), a commendable
record even when one notes warningly that the degree of literacy thus
attained is necessarily a modest one permitting little more in some
cases than ability to read a ballot. Although there are today more
children in school in South Korea than were in school in all Korea
during the Japanese rule, popular education is but begun, whether
one considers primary or secondary schooling. Its advancement calls
for buildings, texts and other equipment, teachers and advisors, and
these requirements call for money.
The program of the educational group in our own Military Government
is well designed but promoted within tight financial limits The same
can be said for adult educational work of the United States Office
of Civil Information. It operates through local libraries whose
pictures, posters, periodicals, and other exhibits reach a great many
urban visitors, and through a special train which moves periodically
among the villages, presenting well-attended educational picture
shows and distributing eagerly read farm weeklies and newspapers. Of
many lacks the worst is of picture films.
Korean newspapers are numerous but for the most part are primarily
political organs. Only by hastening education in the Korean language,
long suppressed by Japan, can there be prompt development of adult
education; there is present need for increased educational and
cultural activities to occupy the attention of young people who
presently have insufficient employment.
American health advisers report good progress in prevention of such
serious diseases as smallpox and typhus, scant progress in the fight
on chronic maladies. Institutional welfare work is insufficient but
no more so than under Japan.
In general, one notes abundant energy among Korean leaders and a
great desire for mass improvement socially and culturally as well as
in other fields; it merits greater financial encouragement than thus
far has been available.
APPENDIX H TO PART III—KOREA
THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA AND PROPOSED MILITARY AID
_Military Situation_
In September, 1945, United States Army Forces, pursuant to
instructions contained in General Order Number 1 of the Supreme
Commander Allied Powers, occupied Korea south of the 38° North
parallel and accepted the surrender of Japanese troops south of that
line. This arbitrary line of demarcation between the United States
and Soviet Union occupation areas rapidly became a complete barrier
to free movement between agricultural South Korea and the more
industrialized North Korea. Numerous disputes and incidents, mostly
political or economic, continue to take place even after two years of
occupation.
The Commander in Chief, Far East, has delegated military
responsibility and authority for occupation of South Korea to
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the XXIV
Corps. This Corps of two divisions totals 41,000 United States troops
and constitutes the American Occupational Force in Korea.
There are no South Korean Armed Forces to augment these American
occupational troops. There are, however, three authorized Korean
uniformed elements or quasi-military forces: the National Police with
a strength of 28,000, the Constabulary with 16,000, and the Korean
Coast Guard with 3,000. These forces may be expected to remain loyal
to the United States Military Government in the event of emergency.
The National Police Force is the agency for enforcing law and order
in Korea and is organized into district and subdistrict headquarters
with police stations in principal towns and villages.
* * * * *
The Constabulary is similar in purpose to the National Guard of the
United States in that it is used to back up the police in event of
major disorders. At present, the Constabulary is also being utilized
to augment American guards on United States Army installations.
It is armed with captured Japanese rifles and small arms, and its
efficiency is low by American standards.
North of the 38° North parallel, the estimated Soviet troop strength
in Korea is approximately 45,000. These forces are organized into
two major units, the 40th Rifle Division and the 19th Mechanized
Division, plus complementary air, naval, and service support. There
is evidence of further Soviet withdrawal now underway. An accurate
figure denoting the Soviet-trained and equipped North Korean People’s
(Communist) Army in its overall structure has not yet been obtained
but the figure of 125,000 troops has been generally accepted. These
forces assist Soviets in control of the border, maintain liaison with
Chinese Communists in Manchuria, and constitute a potential military
threat to South Korea.
Current political and economic unrest in Southern Korea is aggravated
by Communistic terrorism, and by Communist-inspired riots and
revolutionary activities in the occupied area. Such disorders impose
additional military burdens on the police, the constabulary, and the
American Occupation Forces. In addition, there is a possibility,
however remote, of a Soviet-inspired invasion of South Korea by
troops of the North Korean People’s (Communist) Army. Recent reports
from Manchuria indicate that sizable elements of Korean troops
are operating with Chinese Communists, possibly to acquire battle
conditioning. Furthermore there is evidence that Soviet officers and
equipment are being used to groom the Korean Army.
Although it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets or their North
Korean satellites would invade South Korea in the near future,
infiltration of Communists and of large numbers of the North Korean
Army, in connection with large-scale Communist-inspired or abetted
riots or revolts in the South, is always a dangerous threat. Should
this occur, the forces available should be adequate for maintaining
order under any circumstances except for an outright Soviet directed
or controlled invasion.
_Strategic Importance_
The political, social, economic, and military situations in South
Korea are inextricably mingled. A Soviet-dominated Korea would
constitute a serious political and psychological threat to Manchuria,
North China, the Ryukyus, and Japan, and hence to United States
strategic interests in the Far East. It is therefore in the best
interest of the United States to ensure the permanent military
neutralization of Korea. Neutralization can only be assured by its
occupation until its future independence as a buffer state is assured.
So long as Soviet troops remain in occupation of North Korea, the
United States must maintain troops in South Korea or admit before the
world an “ideological retreat.” The military standing of the United
States would decline accordingly; not only throughout the Far East,
but throughout the world. Withdrawal of United States Occupation
Forces from Korea would result in a growing unrest among the Japanese
people because of their uncertainty regarding future United States
policy in the Far East, and their consequent fears of expanding
Soviet influence. This might well increase occupational requirements
for Japan.
Except as indicated above, and the fact that its occupation denies
a potential enemy the use of warm-water ports and the opportunity
to establish strong air and naval bases in the peninsula, the
United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or
bases in Korea. In the event of major hostilities in the Far East,
present forces in Korea would most likely be a military liability
as they could not be maintained there within our present military
capabilities.
There are three possible courses of action with reference to United
States Occupation Forces in Korea:
They may be withdrawn immediately, which would abandon South Korea
to the Soviet Union through pressures which could be exerted by
the North Korea People’s (Communist) Army and is therefore an
unacceptable course from the strategic viewpoint.
They may remain in occupation indefinitely, which course would be
unacceptable to the American public after Soviet withdrawal, and
would subject United States to international censure.
They may be withdrawn concurrently with Soviet occupation forces.
Soviet forces in Northern Korea will not be withdrawn until the North
Korean puppet government and armed forces which they have created
are strong enough and sufficiently well indoctrinated to be relied
upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of
Soviet troops. One of these Soviet objectives will undoubtedly be
to obtain control of South Korea by utilization of Communist Korean
armed forces as a means of pressure after withdrawal of United
States forces, as was done in the cases of Poland, Outer Mongolia,
Yugoslavia, and Albania.
There appears to be a strong possibility that Soviet Russia will
withdraw its occupational forces when such conditions are favorable
and thus induce our own withdrawal.
_Military Aid to Korea_
The Military Government in Korea, which is currently being turned
over to American and Korean civilians, is the only government in
South Korea. The immediate and primary objectives of the American
Military Commander in Korea are to maintain law and order in the
face of subversive uprisings in the American zone, to care for
and safeguard American noncombatants and property, and to operate
a military government which looks toward the future political
independence of Korea together with its economic and social
rehabilitation. In view of these objectives, the immediate purpose
of any American military aid to Korea should be to facilitate their
realization.
The long-term purpose of military aid to Korea should be to enable
South Korea, and later all Korea, to engage in a holding operation
against the progressive expansion of militaristic Communism. Minimum
military aid to Southern Korea therefore should envisage the support
of the uniformed elements of Korean military and quasi-military
forces through the furnishing of United States equipment including
carbines and some light machine guns as well as furnishing vehicles,
telephone and radio communications, etc., and training advice.
Consideration was given by the Mission to the organization, training,
and equipping of a strong Korean military force along the lines
of the former Philippine Scouts. This force should be under the
control of the United States Military Commander, initially should be
officered throughout by Americans, but with a program for replacement
and understudy by Korean officers, and should be of sufficient
strength to cope with the threat from the north. Such a force will
become truly effective only if the United States Commander in Korea
is given clear-cut authority to establish and control it.
Because of its occupation by two nations of radically differing
ideologies and policies, and the corresponding separation into two
parts economically, there is little that Korea, even as a liberated
nation, can do to improve its situation. South Korea lacks the
experience and industrial potential to create or support its own
armed forces.
An American organized and equipped Korean military force would serve
to counteract in large measure the North Korean People’s (Communist)
Army when the American and the Soviet forces are withdrawn from
Korea. It might possibly preclude the forceful establishment of a
Communist Government, and thus contribute to a situation favorable
for the establishment of a free and independent Korea.
_Conclusions_
United States-Soviet Union troop strengths in South and North
Korea are approximately equal but the Soviets, assisted by a
Soviet-controlled, equipped, and trained North Korean People’s
(Communist) Army of 125,000 men, and geographically supported by a
contiguous Soviet Siberia, are in an infinitely stronger military
position.
There is considerable unrest in South Korea but forces available to
General Hodge are adequate to cope with it and to maintain order,
though completely inadequate, even with maximum assistance from
General MacArthur, to meet Soviet-controlled invasion of North Korean
forces.
A United States withdrawal which permitted the Soviet Union to
dominate Korea would result in a serious political and psychological
threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.
The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring
permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base
to the Soviet Union.
The Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces just as soon as
they can be sure that the North Korean puppet government and armed
forces which they have created will be strong enough and sufficiently
well indoctrinated to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives
without the actual presence of Soviet troops.
_Recommendations_
It is recommended that:
United States withdrawal from Korea be based upon agreements with
the Soviet Union to effect proportional withdrawals, with as many
guarantees as possible to safeguard Korean freedom and independence.
Military aid be furnished to South Korea which would support the
achievement of such adequate safeguards and which would envisage:
Continuing to furnish arms and equipment to Korean National
Police and Korean Coast Guard.
The creation of an American-officered Korean Scout Force to replace
the present Constabulary of sufficient strength to cope with the
threat from the North.
Continued interim occupation by United States Army forces in Korea.
Advice in training of technical specialists and tactical units.
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Beaulieu, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, N. Y., 1893.
F
_Fight for the Republic of China, The_, by B. L. Putnam Weale, Dodd,
Mead and Co., N. Y., 1917.
G
_Genghis Khan_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and Co., N. Y.,
1927.
_Great Globe Itself, The_, by William C. Bullitt, Charles Scribner’s
Sons, N. Y., 1946.
H
_History of Civilization_, by James Henry Breasted, Ginn & Co., N.
Y. and Boston, 1937.
_History of Russia, A_, by Bernard Pares, Alfred A. Knopf, N. Y.,
1926.
_History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great_, by Voltaire,
Vol. XVIII, St. Hubert Guild, N. Y., 1901.
_History of the Russian Revolution_, by Leon Trotsky, Vols. I, II,
III, Simon and Schuster, N. Y., 1932.
I
_Inside Asia_, by John Gunther, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London,
1942.
_Intelligence Digest_—A Review of World Affairs.
_International Relations of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea
Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., Vols. I, II, III, 1918.
_I Speak for the Chinese_, by Carl Crow, Harper and Bros., N. Y. and
London, 1937.
_Ivan the Terrible, Czar of Russia_, by George Backer, Random House,
N. Y., 1950.
J
_Journey to China, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, London, Constable and
Co., Ltd., 1931.
L
_Life Magazine_, The June 14, issue.
_Lost Peace in China_, by George Moorad, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., 1949.
M
_Man of Independence, The_, by Jonathan Daniels, Lippincott & Co.,
N. Y., 1940.
_March of the Barbarians_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday, Doran and Co.,
Inc., N. Y., 1940.
_March of Muscovy, The_, by Harold Lamb, Doubleday and Co., Inc.,
Garden City, N. Y., 1948.
_Marco Polo, the Venetian_, Everyman’s Library, Edited by Ernest
Rhys, 1907.
O
_Old Civilizations of the New World_, by Hyatt Verrill,
Bobbs-Merrill Co., N. Y., 1929.
P
_Pageant of Chinese History, The_, by Elizabeth Seeger, Longmans,
Green and Co., N. Y., 1934.
Pamphlets, Foundation for Economic Education, Irvington-on-Hudson,
N. Y.
_Practical Program for America, A_, Edited by Henry Hazlett,
Harcourt Brace and Co., N. Y., 1932.
R
_Resistance and Reconstruction_, by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Harper and Bros., N. Y. and London, 1943.
_Riding the Tiger_, by Harry Carr, Houghton Mifflin Co., N. Y., and
Boston, 1934.
_Russia and the Peace_, by Bernard Pares, The MacMillan Co., N. Y.,
1944.
_Russian Enigma, The_, by William Henry Chamberlin, Charles
Scribner’s Sons, N. Y., 1943.
_Russia and the Russians_, by Edward Crankshaw, Viking Press, N. Y.,
1948.
S
_Siberia_, by Emil Lengyel, Random House, N. Y., 1942.
_Soong Sisters, The_, by Emily Hahn, Doubleday, Doran and Co.,
Garden City, N. Y., 1942.
_Speaking Frankly_, by James F. Byrnes, Harper Bros., N. Y., 1947.
_Stalin, A Critical Survey of Bolshevism_, by Boris Souvarine,
Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1939.
_Stalin’s Russia and the Crisis in Socialism_, by Max Eastman, W. W.
Norton and Co., N. Y., 1940.
_Study in History, A_, by Arnold J. Toynbee, Abridgement of Vols.
I-VI, by D. C. Somervell, N. Y., G. Cumberlege, Oxford University
Press, 1946.
T
_Tamerlane, the Earth Shaker_, by Harold Lamb, Robert M. McBride and
Co., N. Y., 1928.
_Tinder Box of Asia, The_, by George E. Sokolsky, Doubleday, Doran
and Co., Inc., N. Y., 1932.
_Together_, by Katherine Tupper Marshall, Tupper & Love, Inc., N.
Y., Atlanta, 1946.
_Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire, The_, by Hosea
Ballou Morse, Longmans, Green and Co., N. Y., 1908.
W
_War in the East_, by Charles A’Court Repington, John Murray,
London, 1905.
_We’re in This with Russia_, by Wallace Carroll, Houghton Mifflin
Co., Boston, 1942.
_Index_
A
Acheson, 19, 26, 118.
_American Mercury_, 23.
Atwood, Harry E., 134.
Anti-Imperialist League, 67
Aristotle, 144.
Attila, the Hun, 73, 74.
Attlee, Prime Minister, 146.
B
“Ballentine Beer Patches,” 16.
“Big Noses,” 117.
Bleucher, General, 59.
Borodin, Michael, 59.
Bourtai, 76.
(See _also_ Genghis Khan, favorite wife of)
Browder, Earl, 50, 53, 59, 60.
Byrnes, Secretary of State, 19, 24.
C
Cairo Conference, 108.
Canton, Russians in, 113, 120, 121.
Chang Kuo Sin, 117, 119.
Checfoo, 9.
Cheng Tien-shi, Dr., 129, 130.
Chennault, Claire L., 119.
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106;
building of model village by, 106, (See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Chiang Kai-shek, 7, 8, 27, 59, 62, 67, 85, 92, 93, 103-116,
contributions of, to the U. S., 103;
“Golden Decade” of, 104;
mistakes of, 10;
tragedy of, 103-116.
Chinese Communist Party, 45;
Central Committee of, 32;
Central People’s Government, 45;
Personalities, 45-68;
young intelligentsia of, 57.
Chinese New Year, 87.
Chingwangtao, 7.
Chou En-lai, 8, 13, 28, 42, 56-61, 125;
family of, 59;
wife of, 60, 126;
“Executioner,” 59.
Chungking, 45, 105, 106;
destruction of, by Japanese, 106;
model village in, 106.
Churchill, 26, 33, 108.
Chu Teh, 13, 38, 40, 50-56;
as a movie “fan,” 40;
family of, 51;
hunting prowess of, 40;
wives of, 51, 54.
Comintern, 49.
Communism, the “lure” of, 1;
forebears of, 70-81.
Communist, flag; propaganda, 82-93;
(See _also_ Propaganda, Communist)
Confucius, 50, 115.
Courcy, Kenneth de, 145.
“Cumshaw,” 36.
D
Dairen, 9.
Daniels, Jonathan, 25.
Drugs, “actedon,” 90;
“mescaline,” 90;
use of, 90, 91;
on Joseph Cardinal Mindszenty, 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of)
on Michael Shipkov, 91;
on Robert A. Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Democracy, as a principle, 133.
E
England, 139.
Estabrooks, Dr. G. H., 91;
(See _also_ Hypnotism, use of).
Eurasia, 7.
F
Fifth Column, conception of, 72.
Finland, 132.
Foundation for Economic Education, 136.
Formosa, 112, 115, 118;
invasion of, 118-120.
France, 132.
Free love, 125.
G
Gallen, 59.
Genghis Khan, 17, 22, 53, 68, 70, 74-78, 79, 81, 96, 99, 100, 105,
106, 108, 109;
favorite wife of, 76;
“Scourge of God,” 74;
superstitions of, 77;
Yassa of, 1, 78.
Generalissimo, 7, 10, 17, 28, 33, 45.
H
Hankow, 115.
Hatem, Dr., 63, 64;
family of, 63, 64. (See _also_ Ma Hia-teh).
Hiss, 26.
Hirohito, 131.
Hitler, 46, 131, 136.
Hong Kong, 108, 124, 128, 129;
treatment of British in, 129.
Hoover administration, 135, 136.
Hoover, J. Edgar, 137.
Huns, 70, 73.
Hutton, Betty, 40.
Hurley, Ambassador, 10, 41, 45, 109.
Hypnotism, use of, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Estabrooks, Dr. G. H.);
on Cardinal Mindszenty, 91, 92;
on Robert Vogeler, 91, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of);
on Van der Lubbe, 92;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
I
International News Service, 18.
International Hospital, 30, 37.
(See _also_ Yenan).
J
Japanese, peace terms offered, 108, 115.
Jefferson, Thomas, 142.
Jenner, William E., 20, 22.
Jessup, 26.
Joffe, Adolph, 104.
Judd, Walter H., 17.
K
Kalgan Pass, 9.
Kung, H. H., Madame, 64.
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Kung, H. H., Dr., 104.
Kwangsi Province, 113.
L
Lamb, Harold, 22.
Lattimore, 26.
Lehey, William D., 25.
Lesser concessions, theory of, 135.
Li Li San, 61, 96;
wife of, 61.
_Life Magazine_, 115.
Lin Piao, 62.
Li Tsun-jen, General, 113.
“Long March,” the, 47, 48, 54, 121.
Lu Hsun Art Academy, 34, 64.
M
MacArthur, General Douglas, 22, 23, 25, 107.
Madison, James, 134.
Ma Hai-teh, 63, 64.
(See _also_ Hatem, Dr.).
Malinovsky, Marshall, 61.
Mao Tse-tung, 13, 14, 15, 29, 33, 45-50, 54, 57, 61, 62, 63, 68, 76,
92, 102, 121, 125;
daughter of, 30;
son of, 46;
wives of, 48;
heroine of “Long March,” 48, 49;
Lang Ping, 48, 49;
Myth, 49;
propaganda speech by, 92, 93.
Manchuria, 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 61, 94-102;
as granary of Asia, 94;
occupation of, by Japanese, 94;
stripping of, by Communists, 96.
Manchus, 94, 104.
Marriage, New Democracy, 125-126.
Marshall, General George C., 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 24,
28, 56;
at a Chinese opera, 14;
at a Communist banquet, 14;
in conference with Mao, 15;
preference for Mao, 16;
visit of, to Yenan, 12, 14, 15.
McNeil, Hector, 130.
Michener, James, 115.
Mindszenty, Joseph Cardinal, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use; Hypnotism, use of).
Ming Bing, 13.
Min Yuan Park, 87.
Missionaries, Catholic, 34;
Protestants, 35.
Mongol, 38, 70, 72, 73, 74, 81, 100, 101.
Mongolia, 9.
Mossadegh, Mohammed, 146.
Moses, 70, 133.
Mud caves, of Yenan, 29, 44.
Mukden, 95, 99.
N
Nanking, 16, 56, 58.
Nan Yuan, 8.
Nationalist, 9, 11;
(See _also_ Chiang Kai-shek, tragedy of).
“New Democracy,” 82;
marriage under the, 125-126.
New Life Movement, 61, 106.
Nimitz, Admiral Chester, 107.
O
Open Door Policy, 9.
Opera, Chinese, 14;
Shanghai, 68.
P
Peace terms, Japanese, 108.
Pei Yuan, 8.
Peking, 7, 8, 57, 87, 122;
capture of, 87, 122;
famine in, 122.
Personalities, Communist, 45-69.
Plato, 50
Politburo, 15.
Port Arthur, 9.
“Prisoners of War School,” 32;
(See _also_ Yenan).
Propaganda, Communist, 82-93;
against Americans, 85;
basic purpose of, 82;
distortion of terms in, 82, 83;
Democracy, 82;
Freedom, 82, 83;
Security, 83;
Truth, 83;
for children, 84, 85;
newspapers as, 86;
opera as, 89;
posters as, 84;
slogans as, 84;
speeches as, 86;
by Mao Tse-tung, 12, 93;
titles as reward, 87;
types of, two, 83.
Q
Quislings, 100.
Quo Vadis, 131-148.
R
Red Curtain, Behind the, 117-130.
Republic, discussion of, 133, 134.
Rosenberg, Anna, 27.
Roosevelt, 21, 26, 33, 108, 135.
“Rosamond,” 65.
Russell, Dean, 143.
Russia, war potential, 138, 139.
Russian advisors, 117.
S
Samarkand, Battle of, 100.
Sanzo Nosako, 33.
Shanghai, fall of, 119, 120, 124;
Mayor of, 119;
Russians in, 120;
treatment of Americans in, 127.
Shensi Province, 29.
Shipkov, Michael, 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of).
Soong, Charlie, 65;
family, 65, 104;
Sisters, 64, 104.
“Stakhanovitism,” 80.
Stalin, 3, 28, 49, 50, 131.
State Department, 7, 9, 27, 42.
Stuart, J. Leighton, Ambassador, 24, 56.
Sun Fo, 66.
Sun Yat-sen, Madame, 31, 45, 64-69;
(See _also_ Soong, Sisters).
Sun Yat-sen, 47, 103;
revolution of, 51.
T
Tamerlane, 53, 78.
Tang Shan, 8.
Tartars, 63, 70, 78.
Tientsin, 7, 87, 88.
Tipping, prohibition against, 36;
“cumshaw,” 36.
Trans-Siberian Railway, 97.
Trohan, Walter, 23, 25.
Trotsky, 2.
Truce teams, 16.
Truman, President, 7, 10, 15, 19, 22, 108, 111.
U
United States, 7, 8, 16, 117.
Urals, 96, 97.
V
Vogeler, Robert A., 91;
(See _also_ Drugs, use of; Hypnotism, use of).
V-J Day, 95, 97.
_Voice of America_, 118.
W
Wallace, Henry, 131.
Wedemeyer, Lieutenant General Albert C., 9, 24, 111, 114, 118, 142.
Wei Tao-ming, Madame, 68, 69.
Wesleyan College, 65.
Wife swapping, 125.
Worton, Major General William Arthur, 7, 8.
Y
Yalta, 10, 12, 13, 22.
Yangtse River, 60, 105.
“Yassa,” 1, 78.
Yeaton, Colonel Ivan D., 31.
Yenan, 12, 15, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 48, 57, 64;
International Hospital in, 30;
Market place in, 35;
“Prisoner of War School,” 32.
Yenching University, 24, 56, 57.
Z
Zukov, 62.
About the Author...
Mary Lamar Knight, famed foreign correspondent and lecturer,
graduated into the ranks of foreign correspondents while she was on
a two-month “tour” of Europe in 1930. The tour lasted for five full
years with only brief vacations and assignments at home. At that
time Miss Knight was the only woman employed on a full-time basis in
the Paris Bureau of the United Press Associations. In this capacity
she covered the European continent as a feature writer in the varied
fields of women’s fashions, crime and politics.
She reported on the outstanding fashions of the Parisian designers
as they paraded their creations into pages of history; she was the
first woman since the days of the French Revolution to witness the
guillotining of a famous convict in Paris; she interviewed royalty
of many nationalities; and, most important of all, she saw and
studied the beginnings of World War II: the propaganda build-up, the
international deceit and intrigue, the in-human characters of the men
who promoted the war and prepared the nations of Europe for their own
destruction.
During her varied career, Miss Knight, who is the daughter of the
late Dr. Lucian Lamar and Edith Nelson Knight, of Atlanta, Georgia,
has worked as a nurse at Bellevue Hospital, New York, to report on
a bitter campaign to regulate working conditions for doctors and
nurses; she was assigned to the New York Women’s House of Detention
to pose as a prostitute, going to jail with Lucky Luciano’s “girls”
and latter covered his vice trial in the courtroom; at one time she
was assigned the role of a taxi-dance girl, and at another time to
join the chorus line of the world-famous “Rockettes” at the lavish
Music Hall theater; she was the first woman reporter allowed to
invade the training camps of Joe Louis and Max Schmeling prior to
their title fight which she covered at ringside. In 1935, the author
embarked for China on a Norwegian freighter.
Remaining in China for two years she travelled to most of the
principal cities in China, Korea and Manchuria. At the borders of
Mongolia she witnessed the beginnings of her RED BLIGHT of today.
The Communists were then in the process of developing the tactics,
the brutality, the deceit and the methods which they have so far so
successfully employed against their homeland and the neighboring
countries of Tibet and Korea. In China, 1935-36, Mary Lamar Knight
had a 15-year advance in preview of the tragic days that are now
immediately ahead for all civilized nations. She returned to China
again in 1946, independently covering the Pauley and the Marshall
Missions. She met and became personally acquainted with most of the
men who dominate today’s great human conflict—Marshall, Wedemeyer,
Ambassador Hurley, Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, Chou En-lai
and many others. Herein she was able to objectively view the entire
American-Chinese crisis, make a personal analysis of the appalling
international situation and draw the conclusions which she presents
in RED BLIGHT.
In recent months Miss Knight has spent her time in bringing this
vitally enlightening book up-to-the-minute and appearing before many
outstanding political, civic and patriotic clubs and organizations as
a featured speaker on Communism and its avowed principles of ruling
or ruining the earth.
Among Miss Knight’s published works are: _On My Own_, an
autobiography, (MacMillan, 1938); _Spies versus Censors_ (Reader’s
Digest, May, 1946) and _Red Realm in China_ (Reader’s Digest,
February, 1947). The author was the only woman contributor to _We
Cover the World_, the first symposium of foreign correspondents
(Prentice-Hall).
The author is available for personal appearances and speaking
engagements. (Fees are variable.)
A Note on KOREA ...
_By Mary Lamar Knight_
Books already have been written about the Korean situation. Although
it is one spoke in the great Asiatic wheel, Korea is very important,
but China still remains in the hub of the wheel. One of the greatest
tragedies of this whole chain of events is that General Douglas
MacArthur had the difficult—the impossible—task of trying to rescue
the Korean chestnut from the fire—a fire which might not have ignited
had his counsel and advice, along with that of Lieutenant General
Albert C. Wedemeyer and others, been heeded in the first place.
The Communist-inspired invasion of South Korea by the North Korean
Communists was a trial balloon let loose by the Soviet and Chinese
Communists to determine how far the United States and the United
Nations would go before buying an all-out Asiatic war. It was a trick
from the start, to draw U. S. and UN forces foremost into the area
from which the U. S. had withdrawn in 1949. Once committed, and once
having dispatched American—and a trickle of UN soldiers into South
Korea, the chances were that they could be kept there indefinitely.
We were permitted, early in the conflict, to cross the arbitrary 38th
parallel, and to proceed at great difficulty and even greater loss
of life, to the borders of Manchuria. Then, in typical Communist
fashion, they struck back in the evening, almost, of our declaration
of all but total victory. One need only to glance at a map of Korea
to realize that the Communists, Soviet and Chinese, are in a position
to pour millions of men into North Korea, dressed as Koreans or
otherwise, at their will. How could we hope to do anything of a
permanent nature in unifying Korea against the Communists? The Korean
patriot Kim Koo, shortly before his assassination and replying to a
question put to him by Representative Walter Judd said: “It doesn’t
make any difference what you (the U. S.) do now. There just isn’t
any way to get Korea so that she can be independent and secure and
self-sustaining, until you solve the Communist problem across the
border in Manchuria.” We solved that problem by giving that prize to
the Soviets. It was Russia’s price for entering the war, the last six
days of it, as an ally, even though it was rather generally known
that Japan was ready to surrender.
For every life that may have been spared by the signing of the
questionable Yalta agreement, thousands of American and Korean GI’s,
and Korean civilians are now dead, dying and maimed. This little
Florida-shaped country of Korea, cut up by outsiders, is a tragic
example of failure to think beyond military objectives. We cannot
defend Korea from Russian attack without an all-out war. We can only
prolong the agony. If it was right for us to leave Korea in 1949, can
we, honestly, justify our re-entry there in 1950—at the price we have
paid?
There yet remain other fates to be decided—Formosa, the Philippines
and numerous islands of the Pacific, whether we occupy them or not.
Have we not already proven that, “It is fantastic to imagine that we
can convert our enemies into our friends by treating our friends as
if they were our enemies”?
But to understand the overall picture, one must begin with a
knowledge of the background that has made China and the United States
the estranged bed-fellow nations which they have become. The historic
removal of Douglas MacArthur from all of his commands in the Far
East, by President Truman at 1 a. m. on April 11, 1951, will have
far-reaching effects. Due to this move, disaster looms before us
larger than ever, especially for the United States and Great Britain.
Nearly a month before the news of the impending MacArthur dismissal
by the President “leaked” to the American press, headlines had
appeared in Danish newspapers saying: “British Say ‘MacArthur Must
go’.”
The average reader, in all probability, sees only a difference of
opinion in the policies of the political and military leadership on
the conduct of World War III, but the facts go deeper than this.
There appears to be a determination on the part of those who are
playing international politics, to obtain and control world power.
MacArthur, definitely, was the greatest single stumbling block in
their path. To be in a position, militarily, to bomb enemy supply
sources, and yet forbidden, by political directives from Washington,
to do this, put greater handicaps on MacArthur than he was willing
to take. With the MacArthur removal, Truman will bend every effort
toward silencing all who remain opposed to his Acheson-approved
manifesto.
On April 1, 1951, correspondent Kenneth de Courcy (_Intelligence
Digest_—A Review of World Affairs) cabled from London:
“There is no longer even a definite objective in the Korean war.
Each nation or organization concerned in it seems to have a
different objective; while each high commander seems to have a
private idea of what would represent success or victory. If the
powers that be cannot agree even in Korea, it is hardly surprising
that they cannot devise an agreed strategy for the entire world.
Mr. Truman, who is becoming very tired, seems determined to await
decisive trends of public opinion. His private views and conclusions
are not likely to be pressed unless he is convinced that public
opinion is more than ready for them. In fact, American public
opinion is far ahead of its leadership. Mr. Truman however, has not
yet been convinced of this....
“The Kremlin reckons on a steadily progressive weakening of the
Atlantic group of powers. Meanwhile, it is intended to increase the
flow of warlike supplies and indirect help to Asiatic Communist
forces, rather than to the European satellites. Major developments
are timed to take place in Asia before the end of this year, which
by the middle of 1952, will give the USSR access to certain valuable
and essential raw materials which now have to be purchased from
outside the Soviet system.... The Kremlin thinks war with the West
will become inevitable ... but hopes to be able to postpone this war
until Burma and India have been brought within the Soviet sphere of
influence.”
To follow the MacArthur program has been called a “colossal gamble,”
but what greater gamble can there be than sitting back and waiting
for the enemy to come and destroy us? Was England able to stop
Hitler by appeasement? Nor will the present British Labor Government
be able to silence the Chinese Communists by promising them Formosa
and a hand in the Japanese peace treaty if, indeed, the Japanese
accept such a treaty.
Those who still believe that a “deal” can be made with Stalin or
Communists anywhere, just do not know the history of Communism or of
Communism’s forbears. MacArthur’s removal from the scene at this time
is cause for jubilation among the radically inclined the world over,
for this particular American hero was Stalin’s Enemy Number One.
Another great boon to the Chinese and Korean Reds is that Truman
has virtually promised them that their Manchurian bases will not be
bombed by us, unless of course, they step out of line and bomb us
first. Thus, they can continue to kill and maim our boys without fear
of too much retaliation on our part. We won two great victories on
the battlefields of World Wars I and II, but we lost them both at
conference tables. Political double-talk always gives the enemy a far
greater victory than could be won on the battlefield.
The political moves made by the powers that be in Washington serve
only to cancel out our military victories. On November 16, 1950,
when Russia vetoed the Security Council’s resolution demanding
that China clear out of Korea, she put the blame for the Korean
war squarely in her own lap. But as long as Stalin and the Kremlin
remain within the United Nations, this international body politic
will remain hamstrung, for it will be used as an instrument to give
aid and comfort to Communists everywhere in achieving military
aggression against the Western Hemisphere. For Russia, as a member
of the United Nations, with veto power, has sent no troops to Korea
to fight the aggression. But why should she be exempt when others
are not? A United Nations operating in opposite directions cannot be
very united. With one side of the UN fighting aggression and another
faction pushing it, defeat can be the only outcome. When the Korean
war first burst into actual flame, and we discovered that Russia was
openly, as well as secretly, supporting the North Koreans, why did
we not then expel her from the UN and declare her an enemy of the
peace? Had we had the courage to do so, the story would be different
today. Now, with our hands tied behind our backs, we wait for the
enemy to make the next move in the most tragic game of chess ever
played with flesh and blood pawns.
It is difficult to understand why General MacArthur was prevented
from arming some 400,000 unarmed South Koreans. On April 6, 1951, he
stated that political decisions beyond his authority prevented him
from doing this, but why were they deprived of fighting for their
own land? And why were American fathers and sons to be butchered
in battle to free those who would gladly fight for themselves, but
for political interference? No short term good ever derived from a
long term evil, nor can any amount of political expediency replace
military emergency.
Terrible sabotage in this country is not unlikely. On April 7, 1951,
J. Edgar Hoover stood before the Senate Committee and said: “A hard
core of Communists trained in sabotage is ready to strike at vital
industries ...” and he added that this would be one of the most
effective weapons that Stalin could use against the United States.
Despite denials from the White House and State Department, we know
that Russia has a solid network of spies and undercover agents
operating in every department of our national life, operating to
destroy us from within, circumventing the need for any long-range
attack.
To those who stubbornly maintain that the blood of more than sixty
thousand American boys killed or wounded in Korea, in addition to an
almost equal number of what are called non-battle casualties, still
constitutes merely a “police action,” I say in all reverence, may God
forgive you. We are at war now. No amount of waiting or appeasement
will put off World War III. We are in it up to our necks.
Your First Step....
“The journey of a thousand miles begins with just one step ...” says
a Chinese proverb.
Millions of Americans today know that we have to take that “one step”
individually, if order is to be restored to the national house in
which we live.
You have read in this volume of the many wrong steps in the wrong
direction that have been taken by our national planners. These have
resulted in the human turmoil, the domestic unrest, and in undeclared
war against Communism. Our battlefield casualties have already passed
the seventy thousand mark.
Every American must act NOW to preserve our Constitutional Way of
Life. But before concerted political action can be taken the facts
must be known. RED BLIGHT tells these facts!
Now _you_ can take _your_ first step in the right direction by
helping to disseminate the truth about the RED BLIGHT that is
engulfing the earth. You can do this by placing RED BLIGHT into the
hands of as many people as possible.
RED BLIGHT is bound in two editions: Paper bound, $1.50 per copy;
Cloth Bound, $2.50 per copy. Please use the coupon below for placing
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Transcriber’s Notes
pg 10 Changed at no time had be to: he
pg 13 Changed spelling of Moa Tse-tung to: Mao
pg 15 Changed swayed to its ryhthmic to: rhythmic
pg 22 Changed methods of Genghis Kahn to: Khan
pg 23 Changed that these are dissillusioning to: disillusioning
pg 25 Changed Eighth Regiment at Fort Screvan to: Screven
pg 26 Added quote after: finest regiments in the Army.
pg 27 Changed May God forebid to: forbid
pg 31 Changed this last shipemnt to: shipment
pg 32 Changed proved to be a diobolical to: diabolical
pg 46 Changed Moa’s childhood was to: Mao’s
pg 50 Changed devotion to Confuscius to: Confucius
pg 52 Changed fire of vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 56 Replaced comma with period at: foreign dignitaries with ease
pg 56 Changed did such a consumate to: consummate
pg 58 Changed more violent and vitrolic to: vitriolic
pg 58 Added double quote to end of sentence: return to China
from Europe?
pg 66 Changed publicity she so abhored to: abhorred
pg 67 Changed capitalization of world Anti-Imperialist to: World
pg 67 Changed capitalization of a cable to the anti-Imperialist
to: Anti
pg 67 Changed mind and persuasive personalitly to: personality
pg 72 Changed horsemen in the earily to: early
pg 73 Changed dirty and disheaveled to: disheveled
pg 86 Changed effort is wasted on superflous to: superfluous
pg 91 Changed warrant a demontration to: demonstration
pg 105 Changed capitalization of it had become obvious to: It
pg 135 Changed established in this county to: country
pg 138 Changed humiliation and degredation to: degradation
pg 141 Changed economically and phychologically to: psychologically
pg 142 Changed use our almost unprecendented to: unprecedented
pg 146 Changed dispatch datelined Teheran to: Tehran
pg 152 Changed Russian reentry to: re-entry
pg 153 Changed facilitate China’s post-war to: postwar
pg 154 Added comma after: Korea, the political
pg 155 Changed bound ideolologically to: ideologically
pg 163 Changed developments as portentious to: portentous
pg 164 Changed program of assistant to: assistance
pg 164 Changed eight years of war. to: war,
pg 166 Changed to preserve Korea to: Korea’s
pg 167 Removed comma from: first meeting March 8, 1946
pg 169 Changed continue as long is to: as
pg 169 Changed In the over-all administration to: overall
pg 174 Added space between words eastern and half
pg 177 Changed land for rise to: rice
pg 177 Changed chaotic hyperinflation to: hyper-inflation
pg 178 Removed period after: 1915-19 to 2.0
pg 178 Changed diet until indigeous to: indigenous
pg 179 Changed over 300 gram to: grams
pg 179 Changed salt an sugar to: and
pg 180 Changed long-staple Egyption to: Egyptian
pg 181 Changed in the time alloted to: allotted
pg 182 Removed duplicate word and their own own country
pg 184 Changed Army in its over-all to: overall
pg 186 Changed expansion of miltaristic to: militaristic
pg 189 Changed Charles Schribner’s to: Scribner’s
pg 191 Changed Education, Irrington-on Hudson to: Irvington
pg 193 Changed spelling of Aristole to Aristotle and changed page
number from 143 to 144
pg 193 Changed spelling of Centrol People’s Government to: Central
pg 193 Changed spelling of Crinese New Year to: Chinese
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after: Drugs, use of, 90, 91
pg 193 Changed period to semicolon after:
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 64, 104, 106
pg 194 Fixed page references under Hypnotism
pg 194 Replaced semi-colon with period after: International News
Service
pg 195 Changed spelling under Mindszenty of Hynotism to: Hypnotism
pg 196 Changed Sun Yet-sen to: Yat-sen
pg 196 Changed spelling of: Hynotism under Vogeler to: Hypnotism