THE END OF RUSSIA’S SEA POWER
BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U. S. N., RETIRED
The Battle of the Japan Sea resulted from the wish of Russia to
overthrow the naval control which has enabled the island Empire of Japan
to sustain her land warfare upon the continent of Asia. Preliminary to
this struggle, it was desirable that the fleet despatched for the
purpose, under Admiral Rojestvensky, should reach Vladivostok. There it
could refit after its long voyage, and there leave in security the train
of supply ships which had been the necessary accompaniment of so distant
an expedition.
After the junction of a second division under Admiral Nebogatoff, the
whole Russian fleet moved northward, passing between the Philippine
Islands and Formosa. Rojestvensky thus left open to doubt, and retained
in his hands the decision, whether he would seek his port by the Straits
of Korea, or, circumnavigating the main island of Japan, pass through
the Straits of Tsugaru, opposite Vladivostok. It may be presumed he was
as ignorant as the rest of the world just where Togo was; but he knew
that, whether in the Straits of Korea or of Tsugaru, he would have to
fight, if Togo chose, as he probably would. He decided to take the most
direct and shortest route through the Korean Channel.
Toga awaited him there; at what particular point is immaterial, for the
Straits are but sixty miles wide, which space is halved by the Island of
Tsushima, whence the Straits have the alternate name—Tsushima. In such
narrow waters, wherever the Japanese Admiral might be, he was certain,
by an extensive scouting system, to receive notice timely enough to
ensure intercepting his enemy. The notice came by wireless telegraphy
early on Saturday, May 27, from cruisers off Quelpaert Island, 150 miles
southwest of Tsushima; and as the Russian fleet, heading for
Vladivostok, drew up with Tsushima, the Japanese battleships were seen
rounding its northern point. As regards the position of the Russian
ships, it seems certain, that, upon sighting the enemy, they formed in
two columns of vessels. One contained the armored ships, a very
heterogeneous assembly in size and qualities, composed of battleships of
the first and second class, armored cruisers, and coast-defence
ironclads. The second column was of lighter cruisers. This took the left
hand, toward Tsushima, while the battleships were on the right, toward
Japan. At the head of the battle column were three battleships; two of
the first order of strength, 13,516 tons, the third of 10,000 tons,
between them.
Admiral Togo divided his principal force of fighting ships into two
squadrons. One, of four battleships and two armored cruisers, he kept
under his own immediate direction. The other, of six armored cruisers,
which are battleships of superior swiftness, but somewhat lighter armor
and armament, was intrusted to Admiral Kamimura. The first of these
approached from the north of Tsushima; the second, and faster, followed
a little later from round its southern end. The head of the Russian
battle column received the weight of the Japanese fire, and the superior
speed of the latter enabled them so to choose their positions as to keep
their fire concentrated on these leading ships. Kamimura’s attack was on
the rear, and after that the battle soon became general. There was also
a third Japanese squadron, of vessels not belonging to the armored
fleet. These alone had been shown by Togo, until the Russian was
committed to the passage of the Straits. They are said now to have
attacked the other side of the Russian column. In brief, while Togo
threw the weight of his force upon the head of the enemy’s order, he
provided that the remainder should be so occupied as not to render
serious assistance.
There was a strong breeze from southwest with a heavy sea. This favored
the Japanese, because of their longer experience and better training in
the use of their guns when the ships were in violent motion. This
disadvantage of the Russians was increased by the rolling of their
vessels, exposing the underwater body, giving the Japanese a target more
easily pierced, and the holes from which are more dangerous. Through the
five hours of daylight the contest was purely one of gunnery under the
conditions named: concentration upon the head of the Russian columns,
and heavy sea. The result was twofold. The head of the column, beaten
down by superior gunfire, was disordered; and individual ships, pierced
below water, filled and sank. As described, the Japanese, keeping ahead
of their enemy, forced them to change direction; but this by no means
need follow, were the Russians holding their own in the gunnery contest.
Had they given as good as they got, there was no reason why they should
forsake their course. The disorder, thus occasioned in the front, was
transmitted to the ships which followed; and there ensued the confusion
which is the sure precursor of defeat.
Upon this scene night fell. Of the Russians, three battleships and two
others had already been sunk. Then came the time and opportunity for the
torpedo vessels; darkness, and an enemy both crippled and broken. By a
singular coincidence, the wind which in its strength favored the
Japanese gunners—an advantage which they had earned and deserved—now
fell somewhat; and with it fell the sea, rendering easier the work of
the torpedo craft. This is one of the chances of war. Of the scenes of
that night we as yet have little description, and from the fearful loss
of life we possibly may never know enough justly to estimate the
difficulties of the defence of the routed ships, or the degree of
resistance experienced by the assailants. From Japanese sources we have
heard that, under all the disadvantages of the Russians, some attacks
were successfully repelled; and three torpedo destroyers were sunk. That
pursuit continued to the Liancourt Rocks, 200 miles from the scene of
the battle, indicates that, had not superior gunnery already won a
decisive victory, the torpedo alone would scarcely so have reduced the
Russian fleet as to leave the Japanese the secure mastery they now
possess of the waters which constitute their vital line of
communications.
The captured ships were the battleships “Orel” and “Emperor Nicholas I,”
the coast-defence vessels “General Admiral Apraxine” and “Admiral
Seniavin,” and the destroyer “Bedovy.” Six battleships, five cruisers,
one coast-defence ship, three destroyers, and a repair ship were sunk.
[Illustration:
THE SECOND SQUADRON OF THE BALTIC FLEET JUST BEFORE IT SAILED FROM
KRONSTADT
]
[Illustration:
THE LITTLE ARMORED GUNBOAT “KHRABRY”
Built in 1890; of 1492 tons, has one 9-inch, one 6-inch, eight Q. F.
guns, and two torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
THE FAST ARMORED CRUISER “SVIETLANA”
Built in 1896; has six 5.9 Q. F. Canets, ten 1.8-inch guns, four
torpedo tubes, and a speed of 20.2 knots
]
FIGHTING SHIPS OF VARIOUS CLASSES IN RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET
[Illustration:
THE BATTLESHIP “EMPEROR ALEXANDER II”
An old boat, built in 1887; armed with two 12-inch, four 9-inch, eight
6-inch, twenty-four smaller guns, and five torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
THE BATTLESHIP “SISSOI VELIKY”
Built in 1894; of 8,800 tons, has four 12-inch, six 6-inch Q. F.,
eighteen smaller Q. F., and six torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
THE POWERFUL BATTLESHIP “OSLABYA”
Built in 1898; of 12,674 tons, has four 10-inch, eleven 6-inch Q. F.,
sixteen 3-inch, twenty-seven smaller guns, and six torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
THE FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP “BORODINO”
Built in 1901; of 13,400 tons, has four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch Q. F.,
twenty 3-inch, many smaller guns, and six torpedo tubes
]
FORMIDABLE FIGHTING SHIPS OF RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET
[Illustration:
THE FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP “OREL”
Built in 1903; of 13,400 tons, has four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch Q. F.,
twenty 3-inch Q. F., and many smaller guns, and six torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
THE BATTLESHIP “NAVARIN”
Built in 1891; of 10,000 tons, has four 12-inch, eight 6-inch, and
twenty-two smaller rapid fire guns, and six torpedo tubes
]
[Illustration:
FIRST-CLASS BATTLESHIP “ALEXANDER III”
Built in 1901; of 13,600 tons, has four 12-inch, twelve 6-inch Q. F.,
and forty six smaller guns. The speed is 18 knots
]
[Illustration:
THE COAST BATTLESHIP “GENERAL ADMIRAL APRAXIN”
Battleship of the fifth class, built in 1893; of 4,126 tons, has three
10-inch, four 4.7-inch, and thirty-six small quick-fire guns
]
FOUR OF THE BATTLESHIPS OF RUSSIA’S BALTIC FLEET
[Illustration:
THE BATTLEGROUND OF THE WAR AND THE VICTORIOUS PROGRESS OF THE
JAPANESE
]
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TRANSCRIBER’S NOTES
● Typos fixed; non-standard spelling and dialect retained.
● Enclosed italics font in _underscores_.