Oglethorpe addresses a letter to Lieutenant-Governor Bull, suggesting
an expedition against St. Angustine--Follows this, by application
in person--Promised assistance, and coöperation--Returns to
Frederica--Collects his forces--Passes over to Florida--Takes several
Spanish forts--Is joined by the Carolinean troops--The enemy receive
supplies--Oglethorpe changes the siege into a blockade--Takes
possession of Anastasia Island--Colonel Palmer and his men surprised
and cut to pieces--Spanish cruelties--English fleet quit the
station--Siege raised, and Oglethorpe returns to Frederica.
By the information which Oglethorpe was able to obtain from the
prisoners, which confirmed the accounts received from other sources,
he learned that the garrison at St. Augustine was in want of
provisions; and that, the half-galleys having been sent to the Havana
for troops and supplies, the river and sea-board were destitute of
defence. Such being the case, he conceived that a fitting opportunity
now offered for the reduction of the place, taking the enemy by
surprise, before the reinforcements arrived; and thereby dispossessing
the Spaniards of Florida. He, therefore, sent an express to
Lieutenant-Governor Bull, urging an immediate compliance with his
application for assistance. The consideration was accordingly renewed
in the Assembly on the 4th of February. At length Oglethorpe,
impatient of delays occasioned by their continued demurring about the
feasibility of the project, presented himself before them, that they
might be made acquainted more fully with his intentions, and with
every thing relative to their being carried into execution. After
many conferences, a scheme of action was agreed upon, and an Act of
Assembly passed, April 5th, 1740, for the raising of a regiment of
four hundred men, to be commanded by Colonel Vanderdussen; a troop of
rangers;[1] presents for the Indians; and supply of provisions for
three months.[2] They also furnished a large schooner, with ten
carriage and sixteen swivel guns, in which they put fifty men under
the command of Captain Tyrrell.
[Footnote 1: As the Rangers could not be procured, the Assembly
afterwards voted an addition of two hundred men.]
[Footnote 2: The term of service, and, of course, the amount of
supply, were afterwards extended to four months.]
With this encouragement, and the promise of coöperation by Commodore
Vincent Price, who commanded the small fleet on that station, the
place of rendezvous was appointed at the mouth of St. John's river.
The General then published his manifesto,[1] and immediately hastened
back to Georgia to prepare his forces for the Expedition.
[Footnote 1: Appendix, No. XXII.]
On the beginning of April he went to the Uchee town to engage runners
to his Indian allies to inform them of his intended assault of St.
Augustine; to bespeak their assistance, and request their chiefs and
warriors to join his forces at Frederica, whither he immediately
repaired. There he completed the equipment of his forces; selected the
field-pieces and their carriages, balls and powder; and attended to
the military accoutrements, stores and provisions.
On the 9th of May he passed over to Florida with four hundred selected
men of his regiment, and a considerable party of Indians, headed by
Molochi, son of Prim the late chief of the Creeks; Raven, war-chief of
the Cherokees; and Toonahowi, nephew of Tomo Chichi. On the evening of
the 10th, part of the Carolina forces arrived.
[Illustration]
As the first thing to be done was to take the forts that kept open
the communication of the Spaniards with the country, and thus cut off
their supplies, the General, impatient of losing time, invested the
small fort called Francis de Pupa, seventeen miles north of St.
Augustine, commanded by a sergeant and twelve men, who surrendered
without a contest. Thence he proceeded to Fort Diego, situated on the
plains, twenty-five miles from St. Augustine, defended by eleven guns,
and fifty regulars, besides Indians and negroes. In his sortie upon
this, he made use of a little stratagem, as well as force; which
was by appointing three or four drums to beat, at the same time, in
different places in the woods, and a few men now and then to appear
suddenly, and withdraw out of sight again. At this, the enemy in
the fort were so confounded, with the apprehension that they were
surrounded by a great number of troops, that they made only a feint of
opposition; and, being summoned to surrender, did so, on condition
of being treated as prisoners of war, and, (what they principally
insisted on) not to be delivered into the hands of the Indians, from
whom they were conscious that they had incurred the most condign
reprisals for former aggressions.[1] The other articles were that they
should deliver up the guns and stores, which consisted of nine swivel
and two carriage guns, with the powder and shot, &c.; that they should
have liberty to keep their baggage; that Seignior Diego Spinosa, to
whom the fort belonged, it having been built at his expense, and
on his land, should hold his plantation and slaves, and such other
effects as were not already plundered in the field; and, finally, that
no deserters or runaways from Charlestown should have the benefit of
this capitulation. Here he left a garrison of sixty men, under the
command of Lieutenant Dunbar, to secure the retreat of the army, in
case of accidents, and to preserve a safe communication with the
settlements in Georgia. He then returned to the place of rendezvous,
where he was joined on the 19th of May by Captain M'Intosh, with a
company of Highlanders, and Colonel Vanderdussen, with the rest of the
Carolina troops, but without any horse, pioneers, or negroes.
[Footnote 1: Stephens, II. 389.]
By this time six Spanish half-galleys, with a number of long brass
nine pounders, manned with two hundred regulars, and attended by two
sloops loaded with ammunition and provisions, had entered the harbor
of St. Augustine, so that the forces in the town and castle were very
nearly equal in numbers to the land forces brought against them, and
their artillery much superior.
Notwithstanding all the reinforcement which Oglethorpe had received,
it was judged impracticable to take the place by assault from the land
side, unless an attack could be made at the same time by the boats of
the men of war, and other small craft, on the sea side, on which the
town had no intrenchments; and to begin a regular siege on the land
side was impossible, as he had neither force enough for investing the
place, nor any pioneers for breaking the ground, and carrying on the
approaches. For this reason it was concerted between him and the sea
commanders, that as soon as they arrived off the bar of the north
channel, he should march up with his whole force, consisting of about
two thousand men, to St. Augustine, and give notice by a signal agreed
on, that he was ready to begin the attack by land; which should be
answered by a counter signal from the fleet of their readiness to
attack it by sea. Accordingly the General marched, and arrived near
the intrenchments of St. Augustine, June 4th, at night, having in his
way taken Fort Moosa, about three miles from St. Augustine, which the
garrison had abandoned upon his approach. He ordered the gates of the
fort to be burnt, and three breaches to be made in the walls.
As soon as it was proper to begin the attack, he made the signal
agreed on, but had no countersign from the men of war. This was to his
utter surprise and disappointment. The reason which was afterwards
assigned, was, that the fleet had ascertained that their promised
cooperation had been rendered impracticable; as the galleys had been
drawn up abreast in the channel between the castle and the island, so
that any boats which they should send in must have been exposed to the
cannon and musketry of the galleys, as well as the batteries of the
castle; and, as no ships of force could get in to protect them, they
must have been defeated, if not wholly destroyed; and that it was
impossible to make an attack by sea, while the galleys were in that
position. It being presumptuous to make an attack without the aid of
the fleet, the General was under the necessity of marching back to
Fort Diego, where he had left all his provisions, camp furniture, and
tools; because he had neither horses nor carriages for taking them
along with him by land, nor had then any place for landing them near
St. Augustine, had he sent them by water.[1]
[Footnote 1: _London Magazine_, Vol. XXVII. p. 22.]
Disappointed in the project of taking the place by storm, he changed
his plan of operations, and resolved, with the assistance of the ships
of war, which were lying at anchor off the bar, to turn the siege into
a blockade, and to shut up every channel by which provisions could
be conveyed to the garrison. For this purpose, he stationed Colonel
Palmer, with his company, at Fort Moosa, to scour the woods, and
intercept all supplies from the country, and "enjoined it upon him,
for greater safety, to encamp every night in a different place, and,
by all means to avoid coming into action." He also charged him, if he
should perceive any superior party sallying forth from St. Augustine,
to make a quick retreat towards Fort Diego, where it was certain the
enemy would not follow him, for fear of having their retreat cut off
by a detachment from the army. He sent Colonel Vanderdussen, with his
regiment, to take possession of Point Quartell, at a creek which makes
the mouth of the harbor opposite Anastasia; and this he did "because
they would be safe there, being divided from St. Augustine, and
covered from any sally that would be made by the garrison."[1]
[Footnote 1: _History of the British Settlements in North America_.
Lond. 1773, 4to, page 163.]
As there was a battery on Anastasia, which defended the entry to St.
Augustine, the Commodore suggested that, if a body of troops should
be sent to land upon that island, under favor of the men of war, and
dispossess it, he would then send the small vessels into the harbor,
which was too shallow to admit the ships. Upon this, the General
marched to the coast, and embarked in the boats of the men of war,
with a party of two hundred men, and most of the Indians. Captain
Warren, with two hundred seamen, attached themselves to this
expedition.
Perceiving that the Spaniards were advantageously posted behind the
sand-hills, covered by the battery upon the island, and the fire from
the half-galleys which lay in shoal water where the men of war could
not come, he ordered the heavy boats to remain and seem as though they
intended to land near them, while he, with Captain Warren and the
pinnaces, rowed, with all the speed they could, to the southward about
two miles. The Spaniards behind the sand-hills strove to prevent their
landing, but before they could come up in any order, the boats had got
so near to the shore that the General and Captain Warren, with the
seamen and Indians, leaped into the water breast high, landed, and
took possession of the sand-hills. The Spaniards retreated in the
utmost confusion to the battery; but were pursued so vigorously,
that they were driven into the water, and took shelter in the
half-galleys.[1]
[Footnote 1: _London Magazine_, Vol. XXVII. p. 22.]
All hands were now set to work to erect the batteries, whence a
cannonade was made upon the town. This, however, was to little effect;
partly from the distance, and partly from the condition of some of the
field pieces which were employed. The enemy returned a brisk fire
from the castle and from the half-galleys in the harbor. The latter,
chiefly annoying the camp, it was agreed to attack them; but though
Commodore Price had proposed that measure to Colonel Vanderdussen
first, he altered his opinion and would not consent to it.
"Thirty-six pieces of cannon, together with planks for batteries, and
all other necessaries, with four hundred pioneers were to have come
from Carolina; but only twelve pieces of cannon arrived. Of course,
for want of planks for batteries, they were obliged to fire upon the
ground, the consequence of which was, that their carriages were soon
broken, and could not be repaired."[1]
[Footnote 1: _History of British Settlements in North America_, p.
165.]
The Spaniards, on the other hand, had surprised and cut to pieces
the detachment under Colonel Palmer. Of this disastrous event, the
particulars are given by one who could say,--"Quos ego miserrimus
vidi, et quorum pars magna fui." [Which I had the misfortune to see,
and greatly to share.] I refer to a letter from Ensign Hugh Mackay
to his brother in Scotland, dated at Fort St. Andrews, on Cumberland
Island, August 10th, 1740.
After some introductory remarks, he gives the following account of the
action:
"On the 9th of June the General sent out a flying party of militia,
Indians, and thirteen soldiers, in all making one hundred and
thirty-seven men, under the command of Colonel Palmer, a Carolina
gentleman, an old Indian warrior, of great personal resolution, but
little conduct. Under him I commanded the party, and had orders to
march from St. Diego, the head-quarters, to Moosa, three miles from
St. Augustine, a small fort which the Spaniards had held, but
was demolished a few days before; there to show ourselves to the
Spaniards, and thereafter to keep moving from one place to another
to divert their attention, while the General took another route, and
intended to come to Moosa in five days. The orders were just, and
might with safety be executed, had a regular officer commanded; but
poor Colonel Palmer, whose misfortune it was to have a very mean
opinion of his enemies, would by no means be prevailed upon to leave
the old fort, but staid there, thinking the Spaniards durst not attack
him. He was mistaken, as will appear presently.
"Upon the 15th day of June, about four in the morning, we were
attacked by a detachment of five hundred, from the garrison of St.
Augustine, composed of Spaniards, negroes, and Indians, besides a
party of horse to line the paths, that none of us might escape.
Apprehending that this would happen, I obtained leave of Colonel
Palmer, and therefore ordered our drum to beat to arms at three
o'clock every morning, and to have our men in readiness till it was
clear day. Thus it was upon the fatal 15th of June, as I have said,
when the Spaniards attacked us with a very smart fire from their small
arms; in which Colonel Palmer fell the first. We returned the fire
with the greatest briskness that can be imagined; and so the firing
continued for some time; but, unluckily, we were penned up in a
demolished fort; there was no room to extend. The Spaniards endeavored
to get in at the ruinous gate; and our party defended the same with
the utmost bravery. Here was a terrible slaughter on both sides; but
the Spaniards, who were five times our number, got at last, by dint
of strength, the better; which, when I saw, that some prisoners were
made, I ordered as many of my party then as were alive to draw off. We
had great difficulty to get clear, for the Spaniards surrounded the
fort on all sides. However, by the assistance of God, we got our way
made good; drew up in sight of the enemy, and retired, without being
pursued, till we were in safety. I had no more than twenty-five men,
and some of them very ill wounded, of which number I was, for I
received three wounds at the fort gate, but they were slight ones.
Several of the poor Highlanders, who were in the engagement, and
fought like lions, lost their lives,--some of them your acquaintance.
"I commanded, next Colonel Palmer, as captain of the horse, on the
militia establishment. My lieutenant was killed. My cornet and
quartermaster were made prisoners of war, with four more of the
Highlanders. Charles Mackay, nephew to Captain Hugh Mackay, who was
ensign of militia, received five wounds in the action, and lost one of
his fingers; and, thereafter, rather than fall into the hands of the
Spaniards, ventured to swim an inlet of the sea, about a mile broad,
and had the good fortune to get to the side he intended, and so to the
General's camp.
"As the Indians fled several different ways, no more account is yet
heard of them, only that some of them were killed in the action, and
others wounded and taken prisoners. I believe there were sixty killed,
and twenty taken prisoners of our whole party. To some of our Creek
Indians who were taken by the enemy, leave was given (to curry favor
with their nation) to return home. They told me that we killed a great
number of the Spaniards at Moosa, and that they were dying by fives
and sixes a day after getting into the town; so miserably were they
cut by our broad swords; yet by their great numbers they got the day;
but were sadly mauled, otherwise they would have pursued me."
The fate of Colonel Palmer was the more affecting, from the
consideration that he had raised one hundred and fifty good men, who
had come with him as volunteers; that he was in a fort in which a
breach had been made, and of course was no adequate protection; and
that he was beyond the reach of any assistance. It has, indeed, been
said that he was not enough mindful of the directions that had been
given him, and presumptuously exposed himself to danger.[1]
[Footnote 1: Appendix, No. XXIII.]
Mr. Stephens remarks that "the most bloody part of all fell to the
unhappy share of our good people of Darien, who, almost to a man
engaged, under the command of their leader, John Moore McIntosh; a
worthy man, careful director among his people at home, and who now
showed himself as valiant in the field of battle; where, calling on
his countrymen and soldiers to follow his example, they made such
havoc with their broadswords, as the Spaniards cannot easily
forget."[1] This brave champion was taken prisoner, and suffered
severe and cruel treatment.[2]
[Footnote 1: _Journal_, II. 436.]
[Footnote 2: He was sent to Old Spain, where he remained a prisoner,
at Madrid, for several months; and was finally exchanged, and returned
home to Darien.]
The principal commander of the Spaniards fell at the first onset.
The Spanish took several prisoners; basely insulted the bodies of the
dead; and would have inflicted vengeful cruelties on their captives,
one of whom was an Indian named Nicholausa, whom they delivered over
to the Yamasees to burn, but General Oglethorpe sent a drum with
a message to the Governor from the Indian chief of the Cherokees,
acquainting him that if he permitted Nicholausa to be burnt, a Spanish
horseman who had been taken prisoner should suffer the same fate. He
also mentioned that, as the Governor was a gentleman and a man of
honor, he was persuaded that he would put an end to the barbarous
usage of that country; and expected from the humanity of a Spanish
cavalier that he would prohibit insults to the bodies of the dead, and
indignities to the prisoners; and he rather wished it, as he should be
forced, against his inclination, to resort to retaliation, which
his Excellency must know that he was very able to make, since his
prisoners greatly exceeded those made by the Spaniards. Upon this the
Governor submitted to the rescue of Nicholausa from the fate to which
he had been destined. It was, also, agreed that the Indians, on both
sides, should be treated as prisoners of war; so that an end was put
to their barbarous custom of burning the unhappy wretches who fell
into their hands.
Oglethorpe continued bombarding the castle and town until the regular
troops came over from the land side, and the Carolina militia were
removed from Point Quartel to Anastasia. He then summoned the Governor
to surrender, but received an indignant refusal.
Soon after some sloops, with a reinforcement of men, and a further
supply of military stores and provisions from Havana, found means to
enter the harbor through the narrow channel of the Matanzas.
Upon this, all prospect of starving the enemy Was lost; and there
remained only the chance of a forcible assault and battery.
As the dernier resort, it was agreed, on the 23d of June, that Captain
Warren, with the boats from the men of war, the two sloops hired by
General Oglethorpe, and the Carolina vessels, with their militia,
should attack the half-galleys; and, at a given signal, the General
should attack the trenches.
This was a desperate measure; for the whole of the troops belonging to
the besiegers, including even the seamen, were much inferior in number
to the garrison. The town was also covered on one side by a castle,
with four bastions, and fifty pieces of cannon; from whence was run an
intrenchment, flanked with several salient angles to Fort Coovo, on
the river Sebastian. This intrenchment consisted of the neck of land
from the river Anastasia to that of St. Sebastian, and entirely
covered the town from the island.
Upon this the General drew in all the strength that he possibly could,
and sent for the garrison that he had left at Diego. Being joined by
them and by the Creek Indians, and having made a sufficient number
of fascines and short ladders, provided all other necessaries for
attacking the intrenchments, and brought up thirty-six cohorns, he
received notice that the Commodore had resolved to forego the attack;
declaring, that, as the season of hurricanes was approaching, he
judged it imprudent to hazard his Majesty's ships any longer on the
coast.[1]
[Footnote 1: Appendix, No. XXIV.]
On the departure of the fleet, the place was no longer blockaded on
the sea side; of course the army began to despair of forcing the place
to surrender. The provincials, under Colonel Vanderdussen, enfeebled
by the heat of the climate, dispirited by fruitless efforts, and
visited by sickness, marched away in large bodies.[1] The General
himself, laboring under a fever, and finding his men as well
as himself worn out by fatigue, and rendered unfit for action,
reluctantly abandoned the enterprise. On the fourth of July everything
which he had on the island was reëmbarked, the troops transported to
the continent, and the whole army began their march for Georgia; the
Carolina regiment first, and the General with his troops in the
rear. On this occasion a very notable answer of the Indian Chief is
reported; for, being asked by some of the garrison to march off with
them, "No!" said he, "I will not stir a foot till I see every man
belonging to me marched off before me; for I have always been the
first in advancing towards an enemy, and the last in retreating."[2]
[Footnote 1: Dr. RAMSAY, the historian of South Carolina, with his
usual frankness and impartiality, closes his narrative of this siege
with the following remark. "On the 13th of August the Carolina
regiment had reached Charlestown. Though not one of them had been
killed by the enemy, their number was reduced, fourteen, by disease
and accidents."]
[Footnote 2: _London Magazine_, Vol. XXVII. p. 23.]
"Thus ended the expedition against St. Augustine, to the great
disappointment of both Georgia and Carolina. Many reflections were
afterwards thrown out against General Oglethorpe for his conduct
during the whole enterprise. He, on the other hand, declared that he
had no confidence in the Provincials, for that they refused to obey
his orders, and abandoned the camp, and returned home in large
numbers, and that the assistance from the fleet failed him in the
utmost emergency. To which we may add, the place was so strongly
fortified both by nature and art, that probably the attempt must
have failed though it had been conducted by the ablest officer, and
executed by the best disciplined troops."[1]
[Footnote 1: HARRIS's Voyage, II. 340.]
The difficulties which opposed his success, showed the courage that
could meet, and the zeal that strove to surmount them; and, while
we lament the failure, we perceive that it was owing to untoward
circumstances which he could not have foreseen; and disappointments
from a quarter whence he most confidently expected and depended upon
continued cooperation and ultimate accomplishment. Referring to this,
in a speech in the British house of Peers, the Duke of Argyle made
these remarks: "One man there is, my Lords, whose natural generosity,
contempt of danger, and regard for the public, prompted him to
obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own
territories; a man, whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm
to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of
war by a regular education, who yet miscarried in the design only for
want of supplies necessary to a possibility of success."[1]
[Footnote 1: "Laudari viris laudatis"--to be praised by men themselves
renowned, is certainly the most valuable species of commendation.]
A writer, who had good authority for his opinion, declares, that,"
though this expedition was not attended with the success some
expected from it, the taking the fortress of St. Augustine, it was,
nevertheless, of no little consequence, inasmuch as it kept the
Spaniards for a long time on the defensive, and the war at a distance;
so that the inhabitants of Carolina felt none of its effects as a
Colony, excepting the loss suffered by their privateers, till the
Spaniards executed their long projected invasion in 1742, in which
they employed their whole strength, and from which they expected to
have changed the whole face of the Continent of North America; and,
even then, the people of Carolina suffered only by their fears."[1]
[Footnote 1: HARRIS's Voyages, Vol. II. page 340.]
In a letter to Lord Egmont, by Governor Belcher, dated Boston, May
24th, 1741, is this remark; "I was heartily sorry for the miscarriage
of General Oglethorpe's attempt on Augustine, in which I could not
learn where the mistake was, or to what it was owing, unless to a
wrong judgment of the strength of the place, to which the force that
attacked it, they say, was by no means equal. I wish that a part of
Admiral Vernon's fleet and General Wentworth's forces may give it a
visit, before the Spaniards sue for peace. It seems to me absolutely
necessary for the quieting of the English possessions of Carolina
and Georgia, that we should reduce Augustine to the obedience of the
British crown, and keep it, as Gibraltar and Mahon."[1]
[Footnote 1: Letter-book of his Excellency JONATHAN BELCHER, in the
archives of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Vol. V. p. 254.]