IV. THE RIDDLE OF THE BRITISH

All the French people I met in France seemed to be thinking and talking

about the English. The English bring their own atmosphere with them;

to begin with they are not so talkative, and I did not find among

them anything like the same vigour of examination, the same resolve to

understand the Anglo-French reaction, that I found among the French.

In intellectual processes I will confess that my sympathies are

undisguisedly with the French; the English will never think nor talk

clearly until the get clerical “Greek” and sham “humanities” out of

their public schools and sincere study and genuine humanities in; our

disingenuous Anglican compromise is like a cold in the English head,

and the higher education in England is a training in evasion. This is

an always lamentable state of affairs, but just now it is particularly

lamentable because quite tremendous opportunities for the good of

mankind turn on the possibility of a thorough and entirely frank mutual

understanding between French, Italians, and English. For years there

has been a considerable amount of systematic study in France of English

thought and English developments. Upon almost any question of current

English opinion and upon most current English social questions, the

best studies are in French. But there has been little or no reciprocal

activity. The English in France seem to confine their French studies to

_La Vie Parisienne._ It is what they have been led to expect of French

literature.

There can be no doubt in any reasonable mind that this war is binding

France and England very closely together. They dare not quarrel for the

next fifty years. They are bound to play a central part in the World

League for the Preservation of Peace that must follow this struggle.

There is no question of their practical union. It is a thing that must

be. But it is remarkable that while the French mind is agog to apprehend

every fact and detail it can about the British, to make the wisest

and fullest use of our binding necessities, that strange English

“incuria”--to use the new slang--attains to its most monumental in this

matter.

So there is not much to say about how the British think about the

French. They do not think. They feel. At the outbreak of the war, when

the performance of France seemed doubtful, there was an enormous feeling

for France in Great Britain; it was like the formless feeling one has

for a brother. It was as if Britain had discovered a new instinct. If

France had crumpled up like paper, the English would have fought on

passionately to restore her. That is ancient history now. Now the

English still feel fraternal and fraternally proud; but in a mute way

they are dazzled. Since the German attack on Verdun began, the French

have achieved a crescendo. None of us could have imagined it. It did not

seem possible to very many of us at the end of 1915 that either France

or Germany could hold on for another year. There was much secret

anxiety for France. It has given place now to unstinted confidence and

admiration. In their astonishment the British are apt to forget the

impressive magnitude of their own effort, the millions of soldiers, the

innumerable guns, the endless torrent of supplies that pour into France

to avenge the little army of Mons. It seems natural to us that we should

so exert ourselves under the circumstances. I suppose it is wonderful,

but, as a sample Englishman, I do not feel that it is at all wonderful.

I did not feel it wonderful even when I saw the British aeroplanes

lording it in the air over Martinpuich, and not a German to be seen.

Since Michael would have it so, there, at last, they were.

There was a good deal of doubt in France about the vigour of the British

effort, until the Somme offensive. All that had been dispelled in August

when I reached Paris. There was not the shadow of a doubt remaining

anywhere of the power and loyalty of the British. These preliminary

assurances have to be made, because it is in the nature of the French

mind to criticise, and it must not be supposed that criticisms of detail

and method affect the fraternity and complete mutual confidence which is

the stuff of the Anglo-French relationship.

2

Now first the French have been enormously astonished by the quality of

the ordinary British soldiers in our new armies. One Colonial colonel

said something almost incredible to me--almost incredible as coming

as from a Frenchman; it was a matter to solemn for any compliments or

polite exaggerations; he said in tones of wonder and conviction, “_They

are as good as ours._” It was his acme of all possible praise.

That means any sort of British soldier. Unless he is assisted by a kilt

the ordinary Frenchman is unable to distinguish between one sort of

British soldier and another. He cannot tell--let the ardent nationalist

mark the fact!--a Cockney from an Irishman or the Cardiff from the Essex

note. He finds them all extravagantly and unquenchably cheerful and with

a generosity--“like good children.” There his praise is a little tinged

by doubt. The British are reckless--recklessness in battle a Frenchman

can understand, but they are also reckless about to-morrow's bread and

whether the tent is safe against a hurricane in the night. He is struck

too by the fact that they are much more vocal than the French troops,

and that they seem to have a passion for bad lugubrious songs. There he

smiles and shrugs his shoulders, and indeed what else can any of us

do in the presence of that mystery? At any rate the legend of the

“phlegmatic” Englishman has been scattered to the four winds of heaven

by the guns of the western front. The men are cool in action, it is

true; but for the rest they are, by the French standards, quicksilver.

But I will not expand further upon the general impression made by the

English in France. Philippe Millet's _En Liaison avec les Anglais_ gives

in a series of delightful pictures portraits of British types from the

French angle. There can be little doubt that the British quality, genial

naive, plucky and generous, has won for itself a real affection in

France wherever it has had a chance to display itself....

But when it comes to British methods then the polite Frenchman's

difficulties begin. Translating hints into statements and guessing at

reservations, I would say that the French fall very short of admiration

of the way in which our higher officers set about their work, they

are disagreeably impressed by a general want of sedulousness and close

method in our leading. They think we economise brains and waste

blood. They are shocked at the way in which obviously incompetent or

inefficient men of the old army class are retained in their positions

even after serious failures, and they were profoundly moved by the bad

staff work and needlessly heavy losses of our opening attacks in July.

They were ready to condone the blunderings and flounderings of the 1915

offensive as the necessary penalties of an “amateur” army, they had had

to learn their own lesson in Champagne, but they were surprised to

find how much the British had still to learn in July, 1916. The British

officers excuse themselves because, they plead, they are still

amateurs. “That is no reason,” says the Frenchman, “why they should be

amateurish.”

No Frenchman said as much as this to me, but their meaning was as plain

as daylight. I tackled one of my guides on this matter; I said that it

was the plain duty of the French military people to criticise British

military methods sharply if they thought they were wrong. “It is not

easy,” he said. “Many British officers do not think they have anything

to learn. And English people do not like being told things. What could

we do? We could hardly send a French officer or so to your headquarters

in a tutorial capacity. You have to do things in your own way.” When

I tried to draw General Castelnau into this dangerous question by

suggesting that we might borrow a French general or so, he would say

only, “There is only one way to learn war, and that is to make war.”

When it was too late, in the lift, I thought of the answer to that.

There is only one way to make war, and that is by the sacrifice of

incapables and the rapid promotion of able men. If old and tried types

fail now, new types must be sought. But to do that we want a standard of

efficiency. We want a conception of intellectual quality in performance

that is still lacking....

M. Joseph Reinach, in whose company I visited the French part of the

Somme front, was full of a scheme, which he has since published, for the

breaking up and recomposition of the French and British armies into a

series of composite armies which would blend the magnificent British

manhood and material with French science and military experience. He

pointed out the endless advantages of such an arrangement; the stimulus

of emulation, the promotion of intimate fraternal feeling between the

peoples of the two countries. “At present,” he said, “no Frenchman ever

sees an Englishman except at Amiens or on the Somme. Many of them still

have no idea of what the English are doing....”

“Have I ever told you the story of compulsory Greek at Oxford and

Cambridge?” I asked abruptly.

“What has that to do with it?”

“Or how two undistinguished civil service commissioners can hold up the

scientific education of our entire administrative class?”

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