But the sea has refused to be trained. It is the same old sea that it

was in Columbus’ time, without any loss of trickiness in bumping small

craft against towering sides. The way that this destroyer slid up to

the flagship without any fuss and the way her bluejackets held off from

the paint as she rose on the crests and slipped back into the trough,

did not tell the whole story. A part of it was how, at the right

interval, they assisted the landlubber to step from gunwale to gangway,

making him feel perfectly safe when he would have been perfectly

helpless but for them.

I had often watched our own bluejackets at the same thing. They did

not grin--not when you were looking at them. Nor did the British.

Bluejackets are noted for their official politeness. I should like

to have heard their remarks--they have a gift for remarks--about

those invaders of their uniformed world in Scotch caps and other kinds

of caps and the different kind of clothes which tailors make for

civilians. Without any intention of eavesdropping, I did overhear one

asking another whence came these strange birds.

One knew the flagship by the admirals’ barges astern, as you know the

location of an army headquarters by its automobiles. It seemed in the

centre of the fleet at anchor, if that is a nautical expression. Where

its place would be in action is one of those secrets as important

to the enemy as the location of a general’s shell-proof shelter in

Flanders. Perhaps Sir John Jellicoe may be on some other ship in

battle. If there is any one foolish question which one should not ask

it is this.

As one mounted the gangway of this mighty super-Dreadnought one was

bound to think of another flagship in Portsmouth harbour, Nelson’s

_Victory_--at least, an American was. Probably an Englishman would

not indulge in such a commonplace. One would like to know how many

Englishmen had ever seen the old _Victory_. But, then, how many

Americans have been to Mount Vernon and Gettysburg?

It was a hundred years, one repeats, since the British had fought a

first-class naval war. Nelson did his part so well that he did not

leave any fighting to be done by his successors. Maintaining herself

as mistress of the seas by the threat of superior strength--except in

the late fifties, when the French innovation of iron ships gave France

a temporary lead on paper--ship after ship, through all the grades

of progress in naval construction, has gone to the scrap heap without

firing a shot in anger.

The _Victory_ was one landmark, or seamark, if you please, and this

flagship was another. Between the two were generations of officers and

men working through the change from stagecoach to motors and aeroplanes

and seaplanes, who had kept up to a standard of efficiency in view of

a test that never came. A year of war and still the test had not come,

for the old reason that England had superior strength. Her outnumbering

guns which had kept the peace of the seas still kept it.

All second nature to the Englishman this, as the defence of the immense

distances of the steppes to the Russian or the Rocky Mountain wall

and the Mississippi’s flow to the man in Kansas. But the American

kept thinking about it; and he wanted the Kansans to think about it,

too. A sentimentalist envisaged the tall column in Trafalgar Square,

with the one-armed figure turned toward the wireless skein on top of

the Admiralty Building when he went on board the flagship of Sir John

Jellicoe.

One first heard of Jellicoe fifteen years ago on the China coast, when

he was Chief of Staff to Sir Edward Seymour, then Commander-in-Chief of

the Asiatic Squadron. Indeed, one was always hearing about Jellicoe.

He was the kind of man whom people talk about after they have met

him, which means personality. It was in China seas, you may remember,

that when a few British seamen were hard pressed in a fight that was

not ours that the phrase, “Blood is thicker than water,” sprang from

the lips of an American commander, who waited not on international

etiquette but went to the assistance of the British.

Nor will any one who was present in the summer of ’98 forget how Sir

Edward Chichester stood loyally by Admiral George Dewey, when the

German squadron was empire-fishing in the waters of Manila Bay, until

our Atlantic Fleet had won the battle of Santiago and Admiral Dewey

had received reinforcements and, east and west, we were able to look

after the Germans. The British bluejackets said that the rations of

frozen mutton from Australia which we sent alongside were excellent;

but the Germans were in no position to judge, as none was sent to them,

doubtless through an oversight in the detail of hospitality by one of

Admiral Dewey’s staff. No. Let us be officially correct. We happened to

run out of spare mutton after serving the British.

In the gallant effort of the Allied force of sailors to relieve the

legations against some hundreds of thousands of Boxers, Captain Bowman

McCalla and his Americans worked with Admiral Seymour and his Britons

in the most trying and picturesque thing of its kind in modern history.

McCalla, too, was always talking of Jellicoe, who was wounded on the

expedition; and Sir John’s face lighted at mention of McCalla’s name.

He recalled how McCalla had painted on the superstructure of the little

_Newark_ that saying of Farragut’s, “The best protection against an

enemy’s fire is a well-directed fire of your own”; which has been said

in other ways and cannot be said too often.

“We called McCalla Mr. Lead,” said Sir John; “he had been wounded so

many times and yet was able to hobble along and keep on fighting. I

corresponded regularly with him until his death.”

Beatty, too, was on that expedition; and he, too, was another

personality one kept hearing about. It seemed odd that two men, who

had played a part in work which was a soldier’s far from home, should

have become so conspicuous in the Great War. If on that day when,

with ammunition exhausted, all members of the expedition had given up

hope of ever returning alive, they had not accidentally come upon the

Shi-kou arsenal, one would not be commanding the Great Fleet and the

other its battle-cruiser squadron.

Before the war, I am told, when Admiralty lords and others who had the

decision to make were discussing who should command in case of war,

opinion ran something like this:

“Jellicoe! He has the brains!”

“Jellicoe! He has the health to endure the strain, with years enough

and not too many!”

“Jellicoe! He has the confidence of the service!”

The choice literally made itself. When any one is undertaking the

gravest responsibility which has been an Englishman’s for a hundred

years, that kind of a recommendation helps. He had the guns; he had

supreme command; he must deliver victory--such was England’s message

to him.

When I mentioned in a despatch that all that differentiated him from

the officers around him was the broader band of gold lace on his arm,

an English naval critic wanted to know if I expected to find him in

cloth of gold. No; nor in full dress with all his medals on, as I saw

him appear on the screen at a theatre in London.

Any general of high command must be surrounded by more pomp than an

admiral in time of action. A headquarters cannot have the simplicity

of the quarter-deck. The force which the general commands is not in

sight; the admiral’s is. You saw the commander and you saw what it was

that he commanded. Within the sweep of vision from the quarter-deck was

the terrific power which the man with the broad gold band on his arm

directed. At a signal from him it would move or it would stand still.

That command of Joshua’s if given by Sir John one thought might have

been obeyed.

One hundred, two hundred, three hundred, four hundred twelve-inch guns

and larger, which could carry a hundred tons and more of metal in a

single broadside for a distance of eighteen thousand yards! But do not

forget the little guns, bristling under the big guns like needles from

a cushion, which would keep off the torpedo assassins; or the light

cruisers, or the colliers, or the destroyers, or the 2,300 trawlers and

mine-layers, and what not, all under his direction. He had submarines,

too, double the number of the German. But with all the German

men-of-war in harbour, they had no targets. Where were they? One did

not ask questions that could not be answered. Waiting, as the whole

British fleet was waiting, for the Germans to show their heads, while

cruisers were abroad scouting the North Sea.

At the outset of the war the German fleet might have had one chance in

ten of getting a turn of fortune of its favour by an unexpected stroke

of strategy. This was the danger which Admiral Jellicoe had to guard

against. For in one sense, the Germans had the tactical offensive by

sea as well as by land; theirs the outward thrust from the centre. They

could choose when to come out of their harbour; when to strike. The

British had to keep watch all the time and be ready whenever the enemy

should come.

Thus, the British Grand Fleet was at sea in the early part of the war,

cruising here and there, begging for battle. Then it was that they

learned how to avoid the submarines and the mine-fields. Submarines

had played a greater part than expected, because Germany had chosen a

guerrilla naval warfare: to harass, to wound, to wear down. Doubtless

she hoped to reduce the number of British fighting units by attrition.

Weak England might be in plants for making arms for an army, but not

in ship-building. Here was her true genius. She was a maritime power;

Germany a land-power. Her part as an ally of France and Russia being to

command the sea, all demands of the Admiralty for material must take

precedence over demands of the War Office. At the end of the first year

she had increased her fighting power by sea to a still higher ratio of

preponderance over the Germans; in another year she would increase it

further.

Admiral von Tirpitz wanted nothing so much as to draw the British

fleet under the guns of Heligoland or into a mine-field and submarine

trap. But Sir John Jellicoe refused the bait. When he had completed his

precautions and his organisation to meet all new conditions, his fleet

need not go into the open. His Dreadnoughts could rest at anchor at a

base while his scouts kept in touch with all that was passing and his

auxiliaries and destroyers fought the submarines. Without a British

Dreadnought having fired a shot at a German Dreadnought, nowhere on the

face of the seas might a single vessel show the German flag except by

thrusting it above the water for a few minutes.

If von Tirpitz sent his fleet out he, too, might find himself in a

trap of mines and submarines. He was losing submarines and England was

building more. His naval force rather than Sir John’s was suffering

from attrition. The blockade was complete from Iceland to the North

Sea. While the world knew of the work of the armies, the care that

this task required, the hardships endured, the enormous expenditure of

energy, were all hidden behind that veil of secrecy which obviously

must be more closely drawn over naval than over army operations.

From this flagship the campaign was directed. One would think that many

offices and many clerks would be required. But the offices and the

clerks were at the Admiralty. Here was the execution. In a room perhaps

four feet by six was the wireless focus which received all the reports

and sent all the orders, with trim bluejackets at the keys. “Go!” and

“Come!” the messages were saying; they wasted no words. Officers of

the staff did their work in narrow space, yet seemed to have plenty of

room. Red tape is inflammable. There is no more place for it on board

a flagship prepared for action than for unnecessary woodwork.

At every turn the compression and the concentration of power were

like the guns and the decks cleared for action in their significant

directness of purpose. The system was planetary in its impressive

simplicity, the more striking as nothing that man has ever made is more

complicated or includes more kinds of machinery than a battleship. One

battleship was one unit, one chessman on the naval board.

Not all famous leaders are likeable, as every world traveller knows.

They all have the magnetism of force, which is quite another thing from

the magnetism of charm. What the public demands is that they shall win

victories, whether personally likeable or not. But if they are likeable

and simple and human in the bargain and a sailor besides--well, we

know what that means.

Perhaps Sir John Jellicoe is not a great man. It is not for a civilian

even to presume to judge. We have the word of those who ought to know,

however, that he is. I hope that he is, because I like to think that

great commanders need not necessarily appear formidable. Nelson refused

to be cast for the heavy part, and so did Farragut. It may be a sailor

characteristic. I predict that after this war is over, whatever honours

or titles they may bestow on him, the English are going to like Sir

John Jellicoe not alone for his service to the nation, but for himself.

Admiral Jellicoe is one with Captain Jellicoe, whose cheeriness even

when wounded kept up the spirits of the others on the Relief Expedition

of Boxer days. “He could do it, too!” one thought, having in mind

Sir David Beatty’s leap to the deck of a destroyer. Spare, of medium

height, ruddy, and fifty-seven. So much for the health qualification

which the Admiralty lords dwelt upon as important. After he had been

at sea for a year he seemed a human machine, much of the type of that

destroyer as a steel machine--a thirty-knot human machine, capable of

three hundred or five hundred revolutions, engines running smoothly,

with no waste energy, slipping over the waves and cutting through them;

a quick man, quick of movement, quick of comprehension and observation,

of speech and of thought, with a delightful self-possession--for there

are many kinds--which is instantly responsive with decision.

A telescope under his arm, too, as he received his guests. One

liked that. He keeps watch over the fleet himself when he is on the

quarter-deck. One had a feeling that nothing could happen in all his

range of vision, stretching down the “avenues of Dreadnoughts” to the

light-cruiser squadron, and escape his attention. It hardly seems

possible that he was ever bored. Everything around him interests him.

Energy he has, electric energy in this electric age, this man chosen to

command the greatest war product of modern energy.

Fastened to the superstructure near the ladder to his quarters was a

new broom which South Africa had sent him. He was highly pleased with

that present; only the broom was von Tromp’s emblem, while Blake’s had

been the whip. Possibly the South African Dutchmen, now fighting on

England’s side, knew that he already had the whip and they wanted him

to have the Dutch broom, too.

He had been using both, and many other devices in his campaign against

von Tirpitz’ “_unter see_ boots,” which was illustrated by one of the

maps hung in his cabin. Quite different this from maps in a general’s

headquarters, with the front trenches and support and reserve trenches

and gun-positions marked in vari-coloured pencillings. Instantly a

submarine was sighted anywhere, Sir John had word of it, and another

dot went down on the spot where it had been seen. In places the sea

looked like a pepper-box cover. Dots were plentiful outside the harbour

where we were; but well outside, like flies around sugar which they

could not reach.

Seeing Sir John among his admirals and guests one had a glimpse of the

life of a sort of mysterious, busy brotherhood. I was still searching

for an admiral with white hair. If there were none among these seniors,

then all must be on shore. Spirit, I think, that is the word; the

spirit of youth, of corps, of service, of the sea, of a ready, buoyant

definiteness--yes, spirit was the word to characterise them. Sir

John moved from one to another in his quick way, asking a question,

listening, giving a direction, his face smiling and expressive with a

sort of infectious confidence.

“He is the man!” said an admiral. I mean, several admirals and

captains said so. They seemed to like to say it. Whenever he

approached one noted an eagerness, a tightening of nerves. Natural

leadership expresses itself in many ways; Sir John gave it a sailor’s

attractiveness. But I learned that there was steel under his happy

smile; and they liked him for that, too. Watch out when he is not

smiling, and sometimes when he is smiling, they say.

For failure is never excused in that fleet, as more than one commander

knows. It is a luxury of consideration which the British nation cannot

afford by sea in time of war. The scene which one witnessed in the

cabin of the Dreadnought flagship could not have been unlike that of

Nelson and his young captains on the _Victory_, in the animation of

youth governed with only one thought under the one rule that you must

make good.

Splendid as the sight of the power which Sir John directed from his

quarter-deck while the ships lay still in their plotted moorings, it

paled beside that when the anchor chains began to rumble and, column

by column, they took on life slowly and majestically gaining speed one

after another turned toward the harbour’s entrance.

XXXI

SIMPLY HARD WORK

England’s navy, the culmination of her brains and application--A

perpetual war-footing--Pride of craft--The personnel behind

the guns--Physique, health, conduct--Fate’s favourites in the

trenches!--Gun practice--A miniature German Navy--The acme of

efficiency--The British nation lives or dies with its navy--The

prototype of our own Atlantic fleet.

Besides the simple word spirit, there is the simple word work. Take the

two together, mixing with them the proper quantity of intelligence, and

you have something finer than Dreadnoughts; for it builds Dreadnoughts,

or tunnels mountains, or wins victories.

In no organisation would it be so easy as in the navy to become slack.

If the public sees a naval review it knows that its ships can steam and

keep their formations; if it goes on board it knows that the ships are

clean--at least, the limited part of them which it sees. And it knows

that there are turrets and guns.

But how does it know that the armour of the turrets is good, or that

the guns will fire accurately? Indeed, all that it sees is the shell.

The rest must be taken on trust. A navy may look all right and be quite

bad. The nation gives a certain amount of money to build ships which

are taken in charge by officers and men who, shut off from public

observation, may do about as they please.

The result rests with their industry and responsibility. If they are

true to the character of the nation by and large that is all the

nation may expect; if they are better, then the nation has reason to be

grateful, Englishmen take more interest in their navy than Americans in

theirs. They give it the best that is in them and they expect the best

from it in return. Every youngster who hopes to be an officer knows

that the navy is no place for idling; every man who enlists knows that

he is in for no junket on a pleasure yacht. The British navy, I judged,

had a relatively large percentage of the brains and application of

Britain.

“It is not so different from what it was for ten years before the war,”

said one of the officers. “We did all the work we could stand then;

and whether cruising or lying in harbour, life is almost normal for us

to-day.”

The British fleet was always on a war footing. It must be. Lack of

naval preparation is more dangerous than lack of land preparation. It

is fatal. I know of officers who had had only a week’s leave in a year

in time of peace; their pay is less than our officers’. Patriotism kept

them up to the mark.

And another thing: Once a sailor, always a sailor, is an old saying;

but it has a new application in modern navies. They become fascinated

with the very drudgery of ship’s existence. They like their world,

which is their house and their shop. It has the attraction of a world

of priestcraft, with them alone understanding the ritual. Their drill

at the guns becomes the preparation for the great sport of target

practice, which beats any big game shooting when guns compete with

guns, with battle practice greater sport than target practice. Bringing

a ship into harbour well, holding her to her place in the formation,

roaming over the seas in a destroyer--all means eternal effort at the

mastery of material with the results positively demonstrated.

On one of the Dreadnoughts I saw a gun’s crew drilling with a dummy

six-inch, weight one hundred pounds.

“Isn’t that boy pretty young to handle that big shell?” an admiral

asked a junior officer.

“He doesn’t think so,” the officer replied. “We haven’t any one who

could handle it better. It would break his heart if we changed his

position.”

Not one of fifty German prisoners whom I had seen filing by over in

France was as sturdy as this youngster. In the ranks of an infantry

company of any army he would have been above the average of physique;

but among the rest of the gun’s crew he did appear slight. Need more be

said about the physical standard of the crews of the fighting ships of

the Grand Fleet?

One had an eye to more than guns and machinery and to more than the

character of the officers. He wanted to become better acquainted with

the personnel of the men behind the guns. They formed patches of blue

on the decks, as one looked around the fleet, against the background

of the dull, painted bulwarks of steel--the human element whose skill

gave the ships life--deep-chested, vigorous men in their prime, who

had the air of men grounded in their work by long experience. One noted

when an order was given out that it was obeyed quickly by one who knew

what he had to do because he had done it thousands of times.

There are all kinds of bluejackets, as there are all kinds of other

men. Before the war some took more than was good for them when on

shore; some took nothing stronger than tea; some enjoyed the sailor’s

privilege of growling; some had to be kept up to the mark sharply; an

occasional one might get rebellious against the merciless repetition of

drills.

The war imparted eagerness to all, the officers said. Infractions

of discipline ceased. Days pass without any one of the crew of a

Dreadnought having to be called up in default, I am told. And their

health? At first thought, one would say that life in the steel caves

of a Dreadnought would mean pasty complexions and flabby muscles. For

a year the crews had been the prisoners of that readiness which must

not lose a minute in putting to sea if von Tirpitz should ever try the

desperate gamble of battle.

After a turn in the trenches the soldiers can at least stretch their

legs in billets. A certain number of a ship’s company now and then get

a tramp on shore; not real leave, but a personally conducted outing

not far from the boats which will hurry them back to their stations

on signal. However, all that one needs to keep well is fresh air and

exercise. The blowers carry fresh air to every part of the ship; the

breezes which sweep the deck from the North Sea are fresh enough in

summer and a little too fresh in winter. There is exercise in the

regular drills, supplemented by setting-up exercises. The food is good

and no man drinks or eats what he ought not to, as he may on shore. So

there is the fact and the reason for the fact: the health of the men,

as well as their conduct, had never been so good.

“Perhaps we are not quite so clean as we were before the war,” said an

officer. “We wash decks only twice a week instead of every day. This

means that quarters are not so moist and the men have more freedom of

movement. We want them to have as much freedom as possible.”

My Year of the Great War · 第 26 / 30 段