of supplies that we must deprive the enemy of--shall be considered as
traitors to their country_.
ARTICLE III. _All who are caught in the act, or whose violation of Article
II shall be proven, shall be shot. Let all chiefs of operations of the army
of liberty comply with this order, determined to furl triumphantly, even
over ruin and ashes, the flag of the Republic of Cuba_.
_In regard to the manner of waging the war, follow the private instructions
that I have already given_.
_For the sake of the honor of our arms and your well-known courage and
patriotism, it is expected that you will strictly comply with the above
orders_.
_(Signed)_ MAXIMO GOMEZ,
General-in-Chief.
To peace-loving souls, all this sounds very brutal, but all war is brutal
and barbarous. In our strife in the Philippines, from 1899 to 1902, many of
us were proud to be told that we were conducting a "humane war." There is
no such thing. The very terms are contradictory. Gomez had declared that
if Spain would not give up Cuba to the Cubans, the Cubans would themselves
render the island so worthless and desolate a possession that Spain could
not afford to hold it. Short of further submission to a rule that was, very
rightly, regarded as no longer endurable, no other course was open to them.
Another proclamation appeared a few days later.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY OF
LIBERATION
Sancti Spiritus, November 11 1895.
To HONEST MEN, VICTIMS OF THE TORCH:
_The painful measure made necessary by the revolution of redemption
drenched in innocent blood from Hatuey to our own times by cruel and
merciless Spain will plunge you in misery. As general-in-chief of the army
of liberation, it is my duty to lead it to victory, without permitting
myself to be restrained or terrified, by any means necessary to place Cuba
in the shortest time in possession of her dearest ideal. I therefore place
the responsibility for so great a ruin on those who look on impassively and
force us to those extreme measures which they then condemn like dolts and
hypocrites as they are. After so many years of supplication, humiliation,
contumely, banishment, and death, when this people, of its own will, has
arisen in arms, there remains no solution but to triumph, it matters not
what means are employed to accomplish it_.
_This people cannot hesitate between the wealth of Spain and the liberty
of Cuba. Its greatest crime would be to stain the land with blood without
effecting its purposes because of puerile scruples and fears which do not
concur with the character of the men who are in the field, challenging the
fury of an army which is one of the bravest in the world, but which in this
war is without enthusiasm or faith, ill-fed and unpaid. The war did not
begin February 24; it is about to begin now_.
_The war had to be organized; it was necessary to calm and lead into
the proper channels the revolutionary spirit always exaggerated in the
beginning by wild enthusiasm. The struggle ought to begin in obedience to a
plan and method more or less studied, as the result of the peculiarities of
this war. This has already been done. Let Spain now send her soldiers to
rivet the chains on her slaves; the children of this land are in the field,
armed with the weapons of liberty. The struggle will be terrible, but
success will crown the revolution and the efforts of the oppressed_.
(_Signed_) MAXIMO GOMEZ,
General-in-Chief.
Such an address doubtless savors of bombast to many Americans, but in the
history of political and military oratory in their own land they can find
an endless number of speeches that, in that particular quality, rival if
they do not surpass it. The Cuban situation was desperate, and the Cuban
attitude was one of fixed determination. Productive industry was generally
suppressed, and much property was destroyed, by both Cubans and Spaniards.
This necessarily threw many out of employment, and drove them into the
insurgent ranks. The Cubans are a peaceful people. All desired relief from
oppressive conditions, but many did not want war. While many entered the
army from patriotic motives, many others were brought into it only as a
consequence of conditions created by the conflict. The measures adopted
were severe, but decision of the contest by pitched battles was quite
impossible. The quoted figures are somewhat unreliable, but the Spanish
forces outnumbered the Cubans by at least five to one, and they could
obtain freely the supplies and ammunition that the Cubans could obtain only
by filibustering expeditions. The Cubans, therefore, adopted a policy, the
only policy that afforded promise of success. Spain poured in fresh troops
until, by the close of 1895, its army is reported as numbering 200,000 men.
The Cubans carried the contest westward from Oriente and Camaguey, through
Santa Clara, and into the provinces of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio.
[Illustration: ALONG THE HARBOR WALL _Havana_]
The _trocha_ across the island, from Jucaro on the south to Moron on the
north, originally constructed during the Ten Years' War, was a line of
blockhouses, connected by barbed wire tangles, along a railway. This
obstructed but did not stop the Cuban advance. The authorities declared
martial law in the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio on January 2,
1896. Gomez advanced to Marianao, at Havana's very door, and that city was
terrified. Maceo was operating immediately beyond him in Pinar del Rio,
through the most important part of which he swept with torch and machete.
The Spaniards built a _trocha_ there from Mariel southward. Maceo crossed
it and continued his work of destruction, in which large numbers of the
people of the region joined. He burned and destroyed Spanish property;
the Spaniards, in retaliation, burned and destroyed property belonging to
Cubans. Along the highway from Marianao to Guanajay, out of many stately
country residences, only one was left standing. Villages were destroyed and
hamlets were wrecked. On one of his expeditions in December, 1896, Maceo
was killed near Punta Brava, within fifteen miles of Havana. Gomez planned
this westward sweep, from Oriente, six hundred miles away, but to Antonio
Maceo belongs a large part of the credit for its execution. The weakness of
the Ten Years' War was that it did not extend beyond the thinly populated
region of the east; Gomez and Maceo carried their war to the very gates of
the Spanish strongholds. There were occasional conflicts that might well be
called battles, but much of it was carried on by the Cubans by sudden and
unexpected dashes into Spanish camps or moving columns, brief but sometimes
bloody encounters from which the attacking force melted away after
inflicting such damage as it could. Guerrilla warfare is not perhaps a
respectable method of fighting. It involves much of what is commonly
regarded as outlawry, of pillage and of plunder, of destruction and
devastation. These results become respectable only when attained through
conventional processes, and are in some way supposed to be ennobled by
those processes. But they sometimes become the only means by which the weak
can meet the strong. Such they seemed to be in the Cuban revolt against
the Spaniards, when Maximo Gomez and Antonio Maceo made guerrilla warfare
almost a military science. Gomez formulated his plan of campaign, but, with
the means at his disposal, its successful execution was possible only by
the methods adopted. At all events, it succeeded. The Cubans were not
strong enough to drive Spain out of the island by force of arms, but they
showed themselves unconquerable by the Spanish troops. They had once
carried on a war for ten years in a limited area; by the methods adopted,
they could repeat that experience practically throughout the island. They
could at least keep insurrection alive until Spain should yield to their
terms, or until the United States should be compelled to intervene. No
great movements, but constant irritation, and the suspension of all
industry, was the policy adopted and pursued for the year 1897.
But there was another side to it all, a different line of activity.
Immediately after his arrival on the island, on April 11, 1895, Marti
had issued a call for the selection of representatives to form a civil
government. He was killed before this was effected. An assembly met, at
Jimaguayu, in Camaguey, on September 13, 1895. It consisted of twenty
members, representing nearly all parts of the island. Its purpose was the
organization of a Cuban Republic. On the 16th, it adopted a Constitution
and, on the 18th, elected, as President, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, and
as Vice-President, Bartolomé Maso. Secretaries and sub-secretaries were
duly chosen, and all were formally installed. Maximo Gomez was officially
appointed as General-in-Chief of the army, with Antonio Maceo as Lieutenant
General. Tomas Estrada y Palma was chosen as delegate plenipotentiary
and general agent abroad, with headquarters in New York. Both civil and
military organizations were, for a time, crude and somewhat incoherent. It
could not be otherwise. They were engaged in a movement that could only
succeed by success. Arms and money were lacking. The civil government was
desirable in a field that the military arm could not cover. Action lay with
the military and with the Cuban Junta in the United States. The latter
organization immediately became active. Calls were made for financial
assistance and liberal responses were made, chiefly by Cubans. In 1896
and 1897, bonds were issued and sold, or were exchanged for supplies and
munitions of war. For a number of years scandalous stories were afloat
declaring that these bonds were printed by the acre, and issued, purely for
speculative purposes, to the extent of millions upon millions of dollars.
The truth is that every bond printed, whether issued or unissued, has been
fully accounted for, the actual issue being about $2,200,000. Provision was
made in Cuba's Constitution for the recognition of this indebtedness, and
it has since been discharged, while the plates and the unused bonds have
been destroyed. There may have been speculation in the bonds, as there was
in the bonds issued by the United States during the Civil War, but Cuba's
conduct in the whole matter has been honest and most honorable. In that
matter certainly, its detractors have been confounded. The principal
difficulty encountered by the _junta_ was the despatch to Cuba of the men
and the munitions so greatly needed by those in the field. That, however,
is a story that I shall endeavor to tell, in part, in another chapter. It
cannot now, if ever, be told in full.
Meanwhile, a complicated political situation developed. The story is too
long and too complicated for review in detail. It may be given in general
outline. The Peace of 1878 was followed by the organization of political
parties, the Liberal and the Union Constitutional. At first, there was
comparatively little difference in the essence of their respective
platforms, but the lines diverged as the situation developed. The Liberal
party became, and remained, the Cuban party, and the Union Constitutional
became the Spanish party. Later on, the Liberals became the Autonomists.
Their object, for twenty years, was reform in conditions under the rule of
Spain. There was no independence party. That was organized, in 1895, by
Marti, Gomez, Maceo, Maso, and their associates. It had only one plank in
its platform--_Cuba Libre y Independiente_--whatever the cost to the island
and its people. "The Autonomist group," says Mr. Pepper, in his _Tomorrow
in Cuba_, "became as much a political party as it could become under
Spanish institutions." It grew in strength and influence, and continued its
agitation persistently and stubbornly. The Spanish Cortes busied itself
with discussion of Cuban affairs, but reached no conclusions, produced no
results. In 1893, there came the definite organization of the Reformist
party, with aims not differing greatly from those of the _Autonomistas_.
But Spain delayed until Marti and his followers struck their blow. Official
efforts to placate them failed utterly, as did efforts to intimidate them
or to conquer them. The Autonomists declared their support of the existing
Government, and rebuked the insurgents in a _manifesto_ issued on April 4,
1895, six weeks after the outbreak. They only succeeded in antagonizing
both sides, the Spanish authorities and the revolutionists. Spain, greatly
alarmed, recalled Martinez Campos and sent out Weyler to succeed him.
Had Spain followed the advice of Martinez Campos, the failure of the
insurrection would have been little short of certain. It sent out Weyler,
on whom the Cubans, twenty years earlier, had conferred the title of
"Butcher." This step threw to the side of the insurgents the great mass
of the middle class Cubans who had previously wavered in uncertainty,
questioning the success of revolution while adhering to its general
object. Weyler instituted the brutal policy that came to be known as
reconcentration. It may be said, in a way, that the Cuban forces themselves
instituted this policy. To clear the country in which they were operating,
they had ordered all Spaniards and Spanish sympathizers to betake
themselves to the cities and towns occupied by Spanish garrisons. This was
inconvenient for its victims, but its purpose was humane. Gomez also sought
to concentrate the Cubans, particularly the women and children, in the
recesses of the hills where they would be less exposed to danger than they
would be in their homes. This also was a humane purpose.
Weyler's application of this policy was utterly brutal. The people of the
country were herded in prison camps, in settlements surrounded by stockades
or trenches beyond which they might not pass. No provision was made for
their food or maintenance. The victims were non-combatants, women, and
children. In his message of December, 1897, President McKinley said of
this system, as applied by Weyler, "It was not civilized warfare; it was
extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness
and the grave." In my experience as a campaign correspondent in several
conflicts, I have necessarily seen more or less of gruesome sights,
the result of disease and wounds, but I have seen nothing in any way
comparable, in horror and pitifulness, to the victims of this abominable
system. To describe their condition in detail would be little short of
offensive, those groups of hopeless, helpless sufferers who lingered only
until death came and kindly put them out of their misery and pain. But by
this time, two forces had come into active operation, dire alarm in Spain
and wrath and indignation in the United States. Weyler had failed as
Martinez Campos, when leaving the island, predicted. He was recalled, and
was succeeded, on October 31, 1897, by General Blanco. The new incumbent
tried conciliation, but it failed. The work had gone too far. The party in
the field had become the dominant party, not to be suppressed either by
force of arms or by promises of political and economic reform. At last,
Spain yielded. Outside pressure on Madrid, chiefly from the United States,
prevailed. A scheme for Cuban autonomy was devised and, on January 1,
1898, was put into effect. But it came too late. It was welcomed by many
non-participants in the war, and a form of government was organized under
it. But the party then dominant, the army in the field, distrusted the
arrangement and would have none of it. All overtures were rejected and
the struggle continued. On February 15, 1898, came the disaster to the
battleship _Maine_, in the harbor of Havana. On April 11th, President
McKinley's historic message went to Congress, declaring that "the only hope
of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the
enforced pacification of Cuba," and asking for power and authority to use
the military and naval forces of the United States to effect a termination
of the strife in Cuba. Such, in the briefest possible outline, is the
record of this eventful period, eventful alike for Cuba and for the United
States.
During this struggle, the people of the United States became deeply
interested in the affairs of the island, and the Administration in
Washington became gravely concerned by them. A preceding chapter, on the
United States and Cuba, dropped the matter of the relations of this country
to the island at the end of the Ten Years' War, but the relations were by
no means dropped, nor were they even suspended. The affairs of the island
appear again and again in diplomatic correspondence and in presidential
messages. The platform of the Republican party, adopted at the national
convention in St. Louis, on June 18, 1896, contained the following: "From
the hour of achieving their own independence, the people of the United
States have regarded with sympathy the struggles of other American peoples
to free themselves from European domination. We watch with deep and abiding
interest the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and
oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their
determined contest for liberty. The Government of Spain having lost control
of Cuba and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident
American citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations, we believe
that the Government of the United States should actively use its influence
and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island."
The Democratic party platform of the same year stated that "we extend our
sympathy to the people of Cuba in their heroic struggle for liberty and
independence." The platform of the People's party likewise expressed
sympathy, and declared the belief that the time had come when "the United
States should recognize that Cuba is and of right ought to be a free and
independent State." This may be regarded as the almost unanimous opinion of
the people of this country at that time. In 1896 and 1897 many resolutions
were introduced in the Congress urging action for the recognition of Cuban
independence. There was frequent and prolonged debate on the question, but
no final action was taken. In his message of December, 1897, President
McKinley said: "Of the untried measures (regarding Cuba) there remain
only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the
independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a
rational compromise between the contestants; and intervention in favor of
one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that
cannot be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal
aggression."
[Illustration: COUNTRY ROAD _Havana Province_]
Recognition of the Cubans as belligerents would have effected a radical
change in the situation. It would have given the Cubans the right to buy in
the American market the arms and supplies that they could then only obtain
surreptitiously, that they could only ship by "filibustering expeditions,"
by blockade-runners. In law, the propriety of granting belligerent rights
depends upon the establishment of certain facts, upon the proof of the
existence of certain conditions. Those conditions did then exist in Cuba.
An unanswerable argument was submitted by Horatio S. Rubens, Esq., the
able counsel of the Cuban _junta_ in New York. The Cubans never asked for
intervention by the United States; they did, with full justification, ask
for recognition as belligerents. The consent of this country was deemed
inexpedient on political rather than on moral grounds. Had it suited the
purposes of this country to grant that right, very much the same arguments
would have been made in support of the course as those that were used to
support the denial of Cuba's requests. Recognition of Cuban independence,
or intervention in favor of the Cubans, would have been the equivalent of
the grant of belligerent rights. But the policy adopted, and the course
pursued, did not serve to avert war with Spain. The story of that war has
been written by many, and is not for inclusion here. The treaty of peace
was signed, in Paris, on December 10, 1898, duly ratified by both parties
in the following months, and was finally proclaimed on April 11, 1899. The
war was over, but its definite termination was officially declared on the
anniversary of the issuance of President McKinley's war message. On January
1, 1899, the American flag was hoisted throughout the island, as a signal
of full authority, but subject to the provisions of the Teller Amendment to
the Joint Resolution of Congress, of April 20, 1898, thus:
"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to
exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except
for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is
accomplished, to leave the government and control of the Island to its
people."
At twelve o'clock, noon, on the 20th of May, 1902, there was gathered
in the State Apartment of the Palace occupied by many Spanish
Governors-General, the officials of the United States, the elected
officials of the new Cuban Republic, and a limited number of guests. In
that same apartment, General Castellanos signed the abdication of Spanish
authority. In its turn, pursuant to its pledges, the United States
transferred authority to the President of the Cuban Republic. Four
centuries of subjection, and a century of protest and struggle, were there
and then ended, and Cuba joined the sisterhood of independent nations.
XI
_FILIBUSTERING_
The term "filibuster" affords an interesting example of the way in which
words and their uses become twisted into something altogether different
from their original meaning. It comes from a Dutch word, several centuries
old, _vrijbuiter_, or free vessel or boat. It got somehow into English as
"freebooter," and into Spanish as _filibustero_. The original referred
to piracy. Two or three centuries later, it meant an engagement in
unauthorized and illegal warfare against foreign States, in effect,
piratical invasions. In time, it came into use to describe the supply
of military material to revolutionists, and finally to obstruction in
legislative proceedings. In his message of June 13, 1870, President Grant
said that "the duty of opposition to filibustering has been admitted by
every President. Washington encountered the efforts of Genet and the French
revolutionists; John Adams, the projects of Miranda; Jefferson, the schemes
of Aaron Burr. Madison and subsequent Presidents had to deal with the
question of foreign enlistment and equipment in the United States, and
since the days of John Quincy Adams it has been one of the constant cares
of the Government in the United States to prevent piratical expeditions
against the feeble Spanish American Republics from leaving our shores."