incident of the "Ostend Manifesto." At that time, James Buchanan was
Minister to England. John Y. Mason was Minister to France, and Pierre Soule
was Minister to Spain. Secretary of State Marcy suggested a conference
between these three officials. They met at Ostend, but afterward
transferred their deliberations to Aix la Chapelle. The meeting attracted
general attention in Europe. The result of what they reported as "a full
and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments," was a recommendation
that an earnest effort be made immediately to purchase Cuba. They were of
opinion that the sum of one hundred and twenty million dollars be offered.
The report proceeded thus: "After we shall have offered Spain a price for
Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it
will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba in the possession
of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our
cherished Union? Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then,
by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from
Spain if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that
would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his
neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flame from
destroying his own home." It is evident that Soule dominated the meeting,
and only less evident that he, in some way, cajoled his associates
into signing the report. No action was taken on the matter by the
Administration, and the incident has passed into history somewhat, perhaps,
as one of the curiosities of diplomacy. At all events, all historians note
it, and some give it considerable attention.
The next serious complication arose out of the Ten Years' War, in Cuba,
in 1868, to which reference is made in a chapter on Cuba's revolutions.
Spain's leaders seemed quite incapable of grasping the Cuban situation, of
seeing it in its proper light. It is more than probable that, even then,
the Cubans would have remained loyal if the Spanish authorities had paid
attention to their just and reasonable demands. As stated by Mr. Pepper,
in his _Tomorrow in Cuba_, "The machete and the torch then gained what
peaceful agitation had not been able to achieve." The demands of the
Cubans are thus stated by Señor Cabrera, in his _Cuba and the Cubans_: "A
constitutional system in place of the autocracy of the Captain-General,
freedom of the press, the right of petition, cessation of the exclusion of
Cubans from public office, unrestricted industrial liberty, abolition of
restrictions on the transfer of landed property, the right of assembly and
of association, representation in the Cortes, and local self-government,"
all reasonable and just demands from every point of view of modern
civilization. Spain refused all, and on October 10, 1868, an actual
revolution began, the first in the history of the island to be properly
classed as a revolution. The United States soon became concerned and
involved. In his message to Congress on December 6, 1869, President Grant
said: "For more than a year, a valuable province of Spain, and a near
neighbor of ours, in whom all our people cannot but feel a deep interest,
has been struggling for independence and freedom. The people and the
Government of the United States entertain the same warm feelings and
sympathies for the people of Cuba in their pending struggle that they have
manifested throughout the previous struggles between Spain and her former
colonies (Mexico, Central America and South America) in behalf of the
latter. But the contest has at no time assumed the conditions which amount
to a war in the sense of international law, or which would show the
existence of a _de facto_ political organization of the insurgents
sufficient to justify a recognition of belligerency." On June 13, 1870,
President Grant sent a special message to Congress, in which he reviewed
the Cuban situation. Another reference appears in his message of December
5, 1870. In his message of December 4, 1871, he stated that "it is to be
regretted that the disturbed condition of the island of Cuba continues
to be a source of annoyance and anxiety. The existence of a protracted
struggle in such close proximity to our own territory, without apparent
prospect of an early termination, cannot be other than an object of concern
to a people who, while abstaining from interference in the affairs of other
powers, naturally desire to see every other country in the undisturbed
enjoyment of peace, liberty, and the blessings of free institutions." In
the message of December 2, 1872, he said: "It is with regret that I have
again to announce a continuance of the disturbed condition in the island of
Cuba. The contest has now lasted for more than four years. Were its scene
at a distance from our neighborhood, we might be indifferent to its result,
although humanity could not be unmoved by many of its incidents wherever
they might occur. It is, however, at out door." Reference was made to it in
all following annual messages, until President Hayes, in 1878, announced
its termination, ten years after its beginning. The contest had become
practically a deadlock, and a compromise was arranged by General Maximo
Gomez, for the Cubans, and General Martinez Campos, for Spain.
[Illustration: HOISTING THE CUBAN FLAG OVER THE PALACE, MAY 20, 1902
_Senate building on the right_]
The entanglements that grew out of the experiences of this period are too
long and too complicated for detailed review here. This country had no
desire for war with Spain, but approval of the Spanish policy in Cuba was
impossible. The sympathies of the American people were with the Cubans, as
they had been for fifty years, and as they continued to be until the end of
Spanish occupation in the West Indies. Rumors of all kinds were afloat, and
again and again the situation seemed to have reached a crisis that could be
ended only by war. A particularly aggravating incident appeared in what is
known as the _Virginius_ case. This was described as follows, in President
Grant's message to Congress on December 1, 1873.
"The steamer _Virginius_ was on the 26th day of September, 1870, duly
registered at the port of New York as a part of the commercial marine
of the United States. On the 4th of October, 1870, having received the
certificate of her register in the usual legal form, she sailed from
the port of New York, and has not since been within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. On the 31st day of October last (1873),
while sailing under the flag of the United States on the high seas, she was
forcibly seized by the Spanish gunboat _Tornado_, and was carried into the
port of Santiago de Cuba, where fifty-three of her passengers and crew were
inhumanly, and, so far at least as related to those who were citizens of
the United States, without due process of law, put to death."
Only for the timely arrival of the British man-of-war _Niobe_, and the
prompt and decisive action of her commander, there is no doubt that
ninety-three others would have shared the fate of their companions. Some
were Americans and some were British. The excitement in this country was
intense, and war with Spain was widely demanded. Further investigation
revealed the fact that the American registry was dishonest, that the ship
really belonged to or was chartered by Cubans, that it was engaged in
carrying supplies and munitions of war to the insurgents, and that its
right to fly the American flag was more than doubtful. The ship was seized
by the American authorities under a charge of violation of the maritime
laws of the United States, and was ordered to New York, for a trial of the
case. American naval officers were placed in command, but she was in bad
condition, and foundered in a gale near Cape Fear. As far as the vessel
was concerned, the incident was closed. There remained the question of
indemnity for what Caleb Cushing, then the American Minister to Spain, in
his communication to the Spanish authorities, denounced as "a dreadful,
a savage act, the inhuman slaughter in cold blood, of fifty-three human
beings, a large number of them citizens of the United States, shot without
lawful trial, without any valid pretension of authority, and to the horror
of the whole civilized world." England also filed its claim for the loss
of British subjects, and payment was soon after made "for the purpose of
relief of the families or persons of the ship's company and passengers." In
his _Cuba and International Relations_, Mr. Callahan says: "The catalogue
of irritating affairs in relation to Cuba, of which the _Virginius_ was
only the culmination, might have been urged as sufficient to justify a
policy of intervention to stop the stubborn war of extermination which had
been tolerated by peaceful neighbors for five years. Some would have been
ready to advocate intervention as a duty. The relations of Cuba to the
United States, the Spanish commercial restrictions which placed Cuba at
the mercy of Spanish monopolists, and the character of the Spanish rule,
pointed to the conclusion that if Spain should not voluntarily grant
reforms and guarantee pacification of the island, the United States might
be compelled, especially for future security, temporarily to occupy it and
assist in the organization of a liberal government based upon modern views.
Such action might have led to annexation, but not necessarily; it might
have led to a restoration of Spanish possession under restrictions as to
the character of Spanish rule, and as to the size of the Spanish army and
naval force in the vicinity; more likely it would have resulted in the
independence of Cuba under American protection."
These are only some of the more prominent features in fifty years of
American interest in Cuba. Throughout the entire period, the sympathies
of the American people were strongly pro-Cuban. Money and supplies were
contributed from time to time to assist the Cubans in their efforts to
effect a change in their conditions, either through modification of Spanish
laws, or by the road of independence. Only a minority of the Cubans sought
to follow that road at that time. The movement for independence was not
national until it was made so in 1895. What would have happened had we,
at the time of the Ten Years' War, granted to the Cubans the rights of
belligerents, is altogether a matter of speculation. Such a course was then
deemed politically inexpedient.
IX
_CUBA'S REVOLUTIONS_
Only by magnifying protests into revolts, and riots into revolutions, is it
possible to show Cuba as the "land of revolutions" that many have declared
it to be. The truth is that from the settlement of the island in 1512 until
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1898, there were only two experiences
that can, by any proper use of the term, be called revolutions. This
statement, of course, disputes a widely accepted notion, but many notions
become widely accepted because of assertions that are not contradicted.
That a strong undercurrent of discontent runs through all Cuba's history
from 1820 to 1895, is true. That there were numerous manifestations of that
discontent, and occasional attempts at revolution, is also true. But none
of these experiences, prior to 1868, reached a stage that would properly
warrant its description as a revolution. The term is very loosely applied
to a wide range of experiences. It is customary to class as revolution all
disorders from riots to rebellions. This is particularly the case where
the disorder occurs in some country other than our own. The _Standard
Dictionary_ defines the essential idea of revolution as "a change in the
form of government, or the constitution, or rulers, otherwise than
as provided by the laws of succession, election, etc." The _Century
Dictionary_ defines such proceedings as "a radical change in social or
governmental conditions; the overthrow of an established political system."
Many exceedingly interesting parallels may be drawn between the experience
of the American colonies prior to their revolution, in 1775, and the
experience of Cuba during the 19th Century. In fact, it may perhaps be
said that there is no experience in Cuba's history that cannot be fairly
paralleled in our own. In his _History of the United States_, Mr. Edward
Channing says: "The governing classes of the old country wished to exploit
the American colonists for their own use and behoof." Change the word
"American" to "Spanish," and the Cuban situation is exactly defined. The
situation in America in the 18th Century was almost identical with the
situation in Cuba in the 19th Century. Both, in those respective periods,
suffered from oppressive and restrictive trade laws and from burdensome
taxation, from subordination of their interests to the interests of the
people of a mother-country three thousand miles away. Unfortunately for the
Cubans, Spain was better able to enforce its exactions than England
was. Cuba's area was limited, its available harbors few in number, its
population small.
Not until the years immediately preceding the revolutions by which the
United States and Cuba secured their independence, was there any general
demand for definite separation from the mother-country. The desire in both
was a fuller measure of economic and commercial opportunity. One striking
parallel may be noted. The Tories, or "loyalists," in this country have
their counterpart in the Cuban _Autonomistas_. Referring to conditions in
1763, Mr. Channing states that "never had the colonists felt a greater
pride in their connection with the British empire." Among the great figures
of the pre-revolutionary period in this country, none stands out more
clearly than James Otis, of Boston, and Patrick Henry, of Virginia. In an
impassioned address, in 1763, Otis declared that "every British subject in
America is of common right, by acts of Parliament, and by the laws of God
and nature, entitled to all the essential privileges of Britons. What God
in his Providence has united let no man dare attempt to pull asunder."
Thirteen years later, the sundering blow was struck. Patrick Henry's
resolutions submitted to the Virginia House of Burgesses, in 1765, set
that colony afire, but at that time neither he nor his associates desired
separation and independence if their natural rights were recognized. It was
not until the revolution of 1895 that the independence of Cuba became a
national demand, a movement based on realization of the hopelessness of
further dependence upon Spain for the desired economic and fiscal relief.
As in the American colonies there appeared, from time to time, individuals
or isolated groups who demanded drastic action on the part of the
colonists, so were there Cubans who, from time to time, appeared with
similar demands. Nathaniel Bacon headed a formidable revolution in Virginia
in 1676. Massachusetts rebelled against Andros and Dudley in 1689. From the
passage of the Navigation Acts, in the middle of the 17th Century, until
the culmination in 1775, there was an undercurrent of friction and a
succession of protests. The Cuban condition was quite the same excepting
the fact of burdens more grievous and more frequent open outbreaks.
The records of many of the disorders are fragmentary. Spain had no desire
to give them publicity, and the Cubans had few means for doing so. The
_Report on the Census of Cuba_, prepared by the War Department of the
United States, in 1899, contains a summary of the various disorders in
the island. The first is the rioting in 1717, when Captain-General Roja
enforced the decree establishing a government monopoly in tobacco. The
disturbances in Haiti and Santo Domingo (1791-1800) resulting in the
establishment of independence in Haiti, under Toussaint, excited
unimportant uprisings on the part of negroes in Cuba, but they were quickly
suppressed. The first movement worthy of note came in 1823. It was
a consequence of the general movement that extended throughout
Spanish-America and resulted in the independence of all Spain's former
colonies, excepting Cuba and Porto Rico. That the influence of so vast a
movement should have been felt in Cuba was almost inevitable. As disorder
continued throughout much of the time, the period 1820-1830 is best
considered collectively. The same influences were active, and the same
forces were operative for the greater part of the term. The accounts of
it all are greatly confused, and several nations were involved, including
Spain, the United States, France, England, Mexico, and Colombia. The
slavery question was involved, as was the question of the transfer of the
island to some Power other than Spain. Independence was the aim of some,
though probably no very great number. Practically all of Cuba's later
experiences have their roots in this period. During these ten years, the
issue between Cubans who sought a larger national and economic life,
and the Spanish element that insisted upon the continuance of Spanish
absolutism, had its definite beginning, to remain a cause of almost
constant friction for three-quarters of a century. The Spanish Constitution
of 1812, abrogated in 1814, was again proclaimed in 1820, and again
abrogated in 1823. The effort of Captain-General Vives, acting under
orders from Ferdinand VII, to restore absolutism encountered both vigorous
opposition and strong support. Secret societies were organized, whose exact
purposes do not appear to be well known. Some have asserted that it was a
Masonic movement, while others have held that the organizations were
more in the nature of the _Carbonari_. One of them, called the _Soles de
Bolivar_, in some way gave its name to the immediate activities. It was
charged with having planned a rebellion against the government, but the
plans were discovered and the leaders were arrested. The movement appears
to have been widespread, with its headquarters in Matanzas. An uprising was
planned to take place on August 16, 1823, but on that day Jose Francisco
Lemus, the leader, and a number of his associates were arrested and
imprisoned. Among them was José Maria Heredia, the Cuban poet, who was,
for this offence, condemned, in 1824, to perpetual exile for the crime of
treason.
Others engaged in the conspiracy fled the country. Some were officially
deported. But the punishments imposed on these people served to excite
the animosity of many more, and a period of agitation followed, marked by
occasional outbreaks and rioting. To meet the situation, an army intended
to be employed in reconquering some of the colonies that had already
declared and established their independence, was retained on the island.
In 1825, a royal decree conferred on the Spanish Governor in Cuba a power
practically absolute. This excited still further the anger of the Cuban
element and led to other manifestations of discontent. There was a
combination of political agitation with revolutionary demonstrations.
In 1826, there was a local uprising in Puerto Principe, directed more
particularly against the Spanish garrison, whose conduct was regarded as
highly offensive. A year or two later, Cuban exiles in Mexico and Colombia,
with support from the people of those countries, organized a secret society
known as the "Black Eagle," having for its purpose a Cuban revolution. Its
headquarters were in Mexico, and its activities were fruitless. Many
were arrested and tried and sentenced to death or deportation. But Vives
realized the folly of adding more fuel to the flames, and the sentences
were in all cases either mitigated or revoked. This seems to have brought
that particular series of conspiracies to an end. It was a time of active
political agitation and conspiracy, with occasional local riots that were
quickly suppressed. While much of it was revolutionary in its aims and
purposes, none of it may with any fitness be called a revolution, unless
a prevalence of a lively spirit of opposition and rebellion is to be so
classed. The agitation settled down for a number of years, but broke out in
local spasms occasionally. There were riots and disorders, but that is not
revolution. It is to be remembered that the cause of all this disturbance
was, in the main, an entirely creditable sentiment, quite as creditable
as that which led the American colonists to resist the Stamp taxes and to
destroy tea. It was a natural and righteous protest against oppression, a
movement lasting for seventy-five years, for which Americans, particularly,
should award praise rather than blame or carping criticism. Having done, in
our own way, very much what the Cubans have done, in their way, we are not
free to condemn them. The only real difference is that their methods were,
on the whole, a little more strenuous than ours. Cuban blood was stirred
by the successful revolutions in Mexico and in Spanish South America, and
conditions in the island were contrasted with those in the then somewhat
new United States. Something of the part played by this country in the
experiences of the time is presented in another chapter, on the relations
of the two countries.
The next movement worthy of note came in 1849, if we omit the quarrel, in
1837, between General Tacon and his subordinate, General Lorenzo, and the
alleged proposal of the slaves in the neighborhood of Matanzas to rise
and slaughter all the whites. Neither of these quite belongs in the
revolutionary class. In 1847, a conspiracy was organized in the vicinity
of Cienfuegos. Its leader was General Narciso Lopez. The movement was
discovered, and some of the participants were imprisoned. Lopez escaped to
the United States where he associated himself with a group of Cuban exiles,
and opened correspondence with sympathizers in the island. They were joined
by a considerable number of adventurous Americans, inspired by a variety
of motives. The declared purpose of the enterprise was independence as the
alternative of reform in Spanish laws. An expedition was organized, but
the plans became known and President Taylor, on August 11, 1849, issued
a proclamation in which he declared that "an enterprise to invade the
territories of a friendly nation, set on foot and prosecuted within the
limits of the United States, is in the highest degree criminal." He
therefore warned all citizens of the United States who might participate in
such an enterprise that they would be subject to heavy penalties, and would
forfeit the protection of their country. He also called on "every officer
of this Government, civil or military, to use all efforts in his power to
arrest for trial and punishment every such offender against the laws." The
party was captured as it was leaving New York. The best evidence of the
time is to the effect that there was in Cuba neither demand for nor support
of such a movement, but Lopez and his associates, many of them Americans,
persisted. A second expedition was arranged, and a party of more than six
hundred men, many of them American citizens, assembled on the island of
Contoy, off the Yucatan coast, and on May 19, 1850, landed at Cardenas. But
there was no uprising on the part of the people. The Spanish authorities,
informed of the expedition, sent ships by sea and troops by land. After
a sharp skirmish, the invaders fled for their lives. Lopez and those who
escaped with him succeeded in reaching Key West. He went to Savannah, where
he was arrested but promptly liberated in response to public clamor. But
even this did not satisfy the enthusiastic liberator of a people who did
not want to be liberated in that way. He tried again in the following
year. On August 3, 1851, he sailed from near New Orleans, on the steamer
_Pampero_, in command of a force of about four hundred, largely composed
of young Americans who had been lured into the enterprise by assurance of
thrilling adventure and large pay. They landed near Bahia Honda, about
fifty miles west of Havana. Here, again, the Cubans refused to rise and
join the invaders. Here, again, they encountered the Spanish forces by whom
they were beaten and routed. Many were killed, some were captured, and
others escaped into the surrounding country and were captured afterward.
Lopez was among the captured. He was taken to Havana, and died by _garrote_
in the little fortress La Punta. His first officer, Colonel Crittenden, and
some fifty Americans were captured and taken to Atares, the fortress at the
head of Havana harbor, where they were shot. For that somewhat brutal act,
the United States could ask no indemnity. In violation of the laws of the
United States, they had invaded the territory of a nation with which the
country was at peace. In the initial issue of the _New York Times_, on
October 18, 1851, there appeared a review of the incident, presenting a
contemporaneous opinion of the experience. It was, in part, as follows: