ALLIES WITHDRAW INTO GREECE--ATTITUDE OF GREEK GOVERNMENT
A general withdrawal into Greece, with Saloniki as base, had been
decided on by General Sarrail, in accordance with instructions from
Paris and London.
This now brought up a very peculiar and delicate situation between the
Allies and Greece. As a neutral, Greece was strongly disposed to take
up the same attitude toward the belligerents as Holland, who during
the early part of the war had been interning great numbers of the
English and Belgian soldiers who had sought refuge inside her
boundaries when the Germans had taken Belgium. The Allies, on the
other hand, were not inclined to accept this point of view, as Greece
was bound to Serbia by a defensive treaty and therefore could not
assume full neutrality without repudiating this treaty. To this Greece
opposed the contention, based on a technicality, that the treaty with
Serbia had in view only a defensive alliance against Bulgaria, whereas
now the Austrians and Germans were attacking, as well as the
Bulgarians. The successes of the Austro-German forces had stiffened
the determination of the Greek King and his Government to stand by
this policy.
However, there was ample room for a diversity of opinion among the
Greeks themselves; on which side Greece's political interests lay was
largely a matter of individual opinion. The chief, and probably the
only, reason why there was any popular feeling in favor of the Allies
was because they were opposed to the Bulgarians, whom the Greeks hate
in season and out.
But on the other hand, Greek ambitions and Italian ambitions clash in
Albania, in the islands of the Archipelago and in Asia Minor. Both
nations hope to acquire territory in those countries. And Italy was
one of the Allies. Had Italy not entered the war it is very probable
that Greece would have aligned herself with the Serbians, French, and
British in the early stages of their operations. But when Italy
declared war on the side of the Allies, there was no doubt in the
minds of the Greek politicians that she had been promised much, if not
all, of the territories on which they had their own eyes. Added to
this, the King of Greece was related to the German Emperor through
marriage, his queen being a sister of Emperor William.
All through November, 1915, and during the early part of December,
1915, the ambiguous, doubtful attitude of Greece was causing the
French and the British much anxiety. It was a curious and, for the
Allies, a very dangerous situation. Faced as they were by an enemy
much their superior in numbers, there was danger of finding that
disadvantage considerably intensified by the inclusion of Greece among
their enemies.
The unrestricted command of the base at Saloniki was now indispensable
for the safety of the allied forces. They had landed under the terms
of a "benevolent neutrality," even at the request of the Greek
Government, while Venizelos was at its head. With the change in
premiers had come a complete change in attitude. The Greeks had begun
hampering the Allies at every turn. Prices were raised; they were
called upon to pay in advance, and in gold, for the use of the
railroads in transporting the troops. Further, the Greek troops were
actually occupying the defensive positions around Saloniki; positions
which the Allies should occupy and strengthen, if they were to make
their base secure. The Greeks stretched barbed-wire entanglements
between themselves and the allied troops. Submarine mines, stored as
if ready to be launched, were discovered at the mouth of the Vardar
River, and the fort at the entrance to the upper Gulf of Saloniki had
been secretly strengthened and heavy guns mounted. The port swarmed
with German and Austrian and Bulgarian spies; its atmosphere was heavy
with hostility to the Allies. Prince Andrew of Greece, in an interview
with a neutral journalist, said that as long as 80,000 French soldiers
were hostages to the Greek army for the Allies' good behavior, the
Allies would never dare to bombard Athens or any other Greek port. So
critical did the situation become that one Sunday the British ships
cleared for action.
And now, after the failure of the French troops to join up with the
Serbians in Babuna Pass, arose the probability of withdrawing their
forces in Serbian and Bulgarian territory across the frontier to
Saloniki. Thus arose the question: How would Greece comport herself on
their retirement? Would she give them complete freedom of
communication south of the frontier to Saloniki? Or would she seek to
disarm and intern them and such Serbians as crossed the border?
A brief review of the political events that had been happening in
Athens since the situation of the Serbians had become acute will show
how divided Greece herself was on these questions.
When France and Great Britain decided to assist Serbia by sending
forces to her support, Venizelos was premier of Greece and it was with
his consent that the first contingents began disembarking in Saloniki
on October 5, 1915. His policy of thus aiding the operations was
thoroughly discussed in the Greek Chamber of Deputies and approved by
a majority of 45 in a house of 257.
The following day King Constantine summoned the premier and told him
that he could not support his policy and demanded his resignation,
which was given. In his place the king installed M. Zaimis. In a
meeting of the Chamber a day or two later, on October 11, 1915, the
new premier defined the policy of his Government as one of armed
neutrality, adding that "our attitude in the future will be adapted to
events, the course of which will be followed with the closest of
attention." Whereupon Venizelos arose, protesting, and made a speech
that clearly defined the attitude that he thought Greece should
follow, and which he felt was supported by a majority of the people.
"Even if there did not exist the treaty with Serbia," he said, "our
interests oblige us to depart from neutrality, as another state wishes
to aggrandize itself at our expense. The question is not whether we
ought to make war or not, but when we ought to make war. In any case
we ought not to allow Bulgaria to crush Serbia. The national soul will
say that it is to the interest of Greece that Bulgaria should be
crushed. If Bulgaria should conquer, Hellenism will be completely
vanquished."
That Venizelos spoke for the majority of the deputies was soon to
manifest itself. On November 4, 1915, in the course of a debate in the
Chamber, a Venizeloist deputy, M. Vlachos, made some criticism of the
minister of war, which caused the latter to leave the Chamber in
violent anger. The scene provoked a tumult, in which cheers and
protests mingled. The deputy finally apologized and order was
reestablished, the minister of war returning to his seat. It was then
that Venizelos arose and expressed the opinion that an apology was
also due from the war minister because of his disrespectful behavior
in leaving the House. The premier, M. Zaimis, thereupon declared that,
in the opinion of the Government, the war minister's conduct had been
perfectly correct and he demanded a vote of confidence from the
assembled deputies.
M. Venizelos replied by delivering a strong attack on the Government's
war policy, which, he said, was not supported by a majority, deploring
that Bulgaria was being allowed to crush Serbia, that she might fall
on Greece later.
As a result of the vote that followed this discussion, the Chamber
refused to express confidence in the present Government by a vote of
147 against 114, in consequence of which the premier, Zaimis, was
compelled to resign. The king, however, still persisted in his
opposition to the policy of the Venizelos party and immediately called
upon M. Skouloudis, one of his own partisans, to form a new cabinet.
To avoid any more expressions of disagreement with the king's policy
on the part of the Chamber, the new premier, only a week later,
ordered the dissolution of that body, his pretext being that the
country at large should have an opportunity of expressing itself
through a general election. This was a move which Venizelos had always
opposed; for, he pointed out, so long as the Greek army was mobilized
and Greek soldiers were excluded from casting their votes, the true
opinion of the people could never be determined. And even if the
soldiers were allowed to vote, they would be under the influence of
their officers, who always supported the king's policy.
This high-handed procedure on the part of the Government created a bad
impression in France and Great Britain. What added to that was the
dispatch which announced, only a few days before, the arrival in
Saloniki in a special train from Sofia of four German officers: Baron
Falkenhausen, Colonel von Erbstner, General von der Goltz's A. D. C.,
Prince von Buelow's son, and another. After a short stay in Saloniki
they departed for Athens in a Greek torpedo boat, accompanied by Greek
officers of high rank. It was just after the arrival of such a mission
in Sofia that Bulgaria had made her agreement with Germany, promising
her support in driving out the Serbians. And meanwhile Premier
Skouloudis, doing as Radislavov, the Premier of Bulgaria, had done,
was protesting daily that Greece had no intention of going against the
Allies.
But incidentally he also expressed the opinion publicly that Greece's
"benevolent neutrality" did not extend to protecting the allied
troops, whether French, British, or Serbian, from the operation of
international law, and that, therefore, these troops would be disarmed
and interned on their passing over into Greek territory.
His words created some alarm in the allied countries, which was
deepened when it became known that Greece was concentrating 200,000
men in and around Saloniki. The question now arose, Should the Allies
submit quietly while Greece carried out this publicly declared
intention, or should they persuade her to a change of opinion by the
application of armed force?
Ordinary arguments had proved unavailing and much time was lost in
talk. Opinion and feeling began growing heated in France and Great
Britain over the delay, as well as over the question itself. France in
particular called for immediate and energetic action, urging that it
was necessary to show the iron hand under the velvet glove. The iron
hand was not a mere figure of speech, for the British and French
fleets could not only bombard the coast cities of Greece, but
institute a blockade which would cut off all her supplies.
On November 19, 1915, the British Legation in Athens, communicated a
statement to the press, beginning with the following passage:
"In view of the attitude adopted by the Hellenic Government toward
certain questions closely affecting the security of the allied troops
and their freedom of action (two privileges to which they are entitled
in the circumstances in which they landed on Greek territory), the
allied powers have deemed it necessary to take certain measures, the
effect of which is to suspend the economic and commercial facilities
which Greece has hitherto enjoyed at their hands."
At the same time came a dispatch from Athens announcing that the
French and British ships had begun to institute a severe search on
board all steamers flying the Greek flag in the Aegean and in the
Mediterranean.
Thus a partial embargo was placed on Greek shipping, only severe
enough to make the Greek Government realize what might happen should a
thorough blockade be established. At the same time two visits that
were paid to King Constantine while this crisis was acute had a
favorable influence on it. One was from M. Denys Cochin, a member of
the French Cabinet and a man held in the highest esteem in Greece; the
other was from Lord Kitchener, who was on his way back from an
inspection of the British forces in Gallipoli, whither he had been
dispatched by his colleagues in the British Cabinet to report on the
advisability or the reverse of abandoning that peninsula.
Still the negotiations were spun out and it was not till November 23,
1915, that matters were brought to a head by the presentation of a
combined note to Greece.
This note demanded formal assurances that the allied troops should
under no circumstances be disarmed and interned, but should be granted
full freedom of movement, together with such facilities as had already
been promised. Greece was only required to live up to her previous
promises; she need not abandon her attitude of neutrality. On the
other hand, the note categorically stated that the Allies would make
restitution for all territory occupied and pay suitable indemnities.
Two days later the Greek Government replied in friendly but somewhat
vague terms, which were not considered satisfactory, and on the 26th
the Entente sent a second note asking for a precise assurance
regarding the liberty of movement of the allied troops. The Greek
answer was liked so little that it was decided to tighten somewhat the
grip of the iron hand.
Thus what is known to international law as a "measure of constraint
short of war" was instituted. The pressure was at once felt. At
Saloniki particularly the people were obliged to live from hand to
mouth, the supply boats being able to bring in only enough flour to
last two days. So great was the need of grain in Greece itself that a
cargo of flour which had been condemned at Piraeus was baked into
bread. The Bulgarians attempted to relieve the situation by sending
in 15,000 tons of wheat by rail from Sofia, but as the line over which
it passed through Drama was presently occupied by the British, this
source of supply could not be maintained, nor would it have been
sufficient to have relieved the situation.
The Greek public and their Government were strongly impressed. One
dispatch stated that Greek troops were patrolling the streets of
Athens and that a heavy guard had been placed around the royal palace
in fear of revolutionary attempts. Meanwhile the Cabinet Council was
sitting in permanent conference with the chiefs of the General Staff
trying to come to a decision.
"You are wicked," said M. Rallis, Greek Minister of Justice, to a
British newspaper correspondent; "the only thing we want is peace and
you force us to make war. You are starving us; two wheat vessels were
stopped to-day. You want us to save you when no English soldiers shed
their blood for Serbia, when scarcely an English rifle has been fired.
We do not wish to be another Serbia."
The newspapers which supported Venizelos, on the other hand, accused
the Government of having precipitated the country to the verge of a
conflict with the Entente Powers by want of foresight and a policy of
deception.
Finally, however, the Greek Government came to terms, accepting
practically all that the Allies demanded and withdrawing most of the
Greek soldiers from Saloniki, while the Gevgheli-Saloniki and the
Doiran-Saloniki railroads were handed over to the Allies with their
adjacent roads and land. King Constantine complained that he was
between the devil and the deep sea, or words to that effect, and
protested that Greek neutrality was violated, though he did not deny
that he had at first acceded to the invitation Venizelos had extended
to the Allies to send troops to Saloniki. The king, anxious to be rid
of his unwelcome guests, let it be understood that if the Allies would
only retire from Greece altogether, he and his army would protect
their retreat and see that they were not molested on embarking. But
this was a proposition which the Entente Powers were not inclined to
consider at all by this time.
Meanwhile, before Greece was finally compelled to come to a complete
understanding with the Allies regarding her attitude in the event of a
general retirement on Saloniki, General Sarrail's position was
becoming decidedly dangerous. The Bulgarian armies were, for the time
being, busy pursuing the last remnants of the Serbians out of the
country beyond Monastir, but presently they would be able to give
their full attention and strength to an attack on the Allies. Thanks
to the difficulties occasioned by the concentration of Greek troops in
that section of the country, the British forces had not been afforded
ample means of transportation and they were arriving but very slowly,
though gradually they had established a line along the rugged hills to
the north of Doiran. They had not, at the end of November, 1915,
fought a general action as yet.
General Sarrail's position was a remarkably insecure one. The taking
of Prilep, and subsequently the occupation of Monastir by the
Bulgarians, practically turned his line and exposed him to a perilous
flanking movement against his extreme left on the Tcherna. His troops
were bunched up in a very acute salient, the head of which was just
south of Gradsko, and his front very largely conformed to the
convolutions of this and the Vardar River. On his right, from before
Strumitza Station, the British continued the line to the north of Lake
Doiran.
It will seem somewhat strange that, though the British were the first
to disembark in Saloniki in the first week in October, 1915, two
months should elapse before they took any prominent part in the
fighting. The British commander, General Mahon, reached Greece on
October 12, 1915, to be followed a month later by General Munro, but
the British made no move of any importance. There were some trifling
encounters with outposts, and these had been magnified into battles by
the dispatches from Greece, but the truth was that the French had
borne the brunt of the struggle on the Tcherna, perhaps because they
were then more numerous than the British, who were not actively
engaged in force until the first week of December. Their trenches,
north and West of Lake Doiran, among bleak hills covered with snow,
spread out fanwise in the direction of Strumitza, which they had taken
over from the French when the latter had gone up the Vardar to
Krivolak.