+Source.+--Swift: _The Conduct of the Allies_. Vol. v., pp. 66-72.
Swift's Works, Bohn edition.
At the Revolution, a general war broke out in Europe, wherein many
princes joined in an alliance against France, to check the ambitious
designs of that monarch; and here the emperor, the Dutch, and England
were principals. About this time the custom first began among us of
borrowing millions upon funds of interest: It was pretended, that the
war could not possibly last above one or two campaigns; and that the
debts contracted might be easily paid in a few years, by a gentle tax,
without burthening the subject. But the true reason for embracing this
expedient, was the security of a new prince, not firmly settled on the
throne: People were tempted to lend, by great premiums and large
interest, and it concerned them nearly to preserve that government,
which they trusted with their money. The person[30] said to have been
author of so detestable a project, is still living, and lives to see
some of its fatal consequences, whereof his grandchildren will not see
an end. And this pernicious counsel closed very well with the posture of
affairs at that time: For, a set of upstarts, who had little or no part
in the Revolution, but valued themselves by their noise and pretended
zeal when the work was over, were got into credit at court, by the merit
of becoming undertakers and projectors of loans and funds: These,
finding that the gentlemen of estates were not willing to come into
their measures, fell upon those new schemes of raising money, in order
to create a monied interest, that might in time vie with the landed, and
of which they hoped to be at the head.
The ground of the first war, for ten years after the Revolution, as to
the part we had in it, was, to make France acknowledge the late king,
and to recover Hudson's Bay. But during that whole war, the sea was
almost entirely neglected, and the greatest part of six millions
annually employed to enlarge the frontier of the Dutch. For the king was
a general, but not an admiral; and although King of England, was a
native of Holland.
After ten years fighting to little purpose; after the loss of above an
hundred thousand men, and a debt remaining of twenty millions, we at
length hearkened to the terms of a peace, which was concluded with great
advantages to the empire and Holland, but none at all to us;[31] and
clogged soon after by the famous treaty of partition;[32] by which,
Naples, Sicily, and Lorrain, were to be added to the French dominions;
or if that crown should think fit to set aside the treaty, upon the
Spaniards refusing to accept it, as they declared they would, to the
several parties at the very time of transacting it; then the French
would have pretensions to the whole monarchy. And so it proved in the
event; for the late King of Spain reckoning it an indignity to have his
territories cantoned out into parcels, by other princes, during his own
life, and without his consent, rather chose to bequeath the monarchy
entire to a younger son of France: And this prince[33] was acknowledged
for King of Spain both by us and Holland.
It must be granted, that the counsels of entering into this war were
violently opposed by the church-party, who first advised the late king
to acknowledge the Duke of Anjou; and particularly, 'tis affirmed that a
certain great person,[34] who was then in the church interest, told the
king in November, 1701, That since His Majesty was determined to engage
in a war so contrary to his private opinion, he could serve him no
longer, and accordingly gave up his employment; though he happened
afterwards to change his mind, when he was to be at the head of the
Treasury, and have the sole management of affairs at home; while those
abroad were to be in the hands of one, whose advantage, by all sorts of
ties, he was engaged to promote.
The declarations of war against France and Spain, made by us and
Holland, are dated within a few days of each other. In that published by
the States, they say very truly That "they are nearest, and most exposed
to the fire; that they are blocked up on all sides, and actually
attacked by the Kings of France and Spain; that their declaration is the
effect of an urgent and pressing necessity;" with other expressions to
the same purpose. They "desire the assistance of all kings and princes,"
&c. The grounds of their quarrel with France, are such as only affect
themselves, or at least more immediately than any other prince or state;
such as, "the French refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the treaty
of Ryswick; the loading the Dutch inhabitants settled in France, with
excessive duties, contrary to the said treaty; the violation of the
Partition Treaty, by the French accepting the King of Spain's will, and
threatening the States, if they would not comply; the seizing the
Spanish Netherlands by the French troops, and turning out the Dutch, who
by permission of the late King of Spain were in garrison there; by which
means that republic was deprived of her barrier, contrary to the treaty
of partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish
Netherlands should be left to the archduke." They alleged, that "the
French king governed Flanders as his own, though under the name of his
grandson, and sent great numbers of troops thither to fright them: That
he had seized the city and citadel of Liège, had possessed himself of
several places in the archbishopric of Cologne, and maintained troops in
the country of Wolfenbuttel, in order to block up the Dutch on all
sides; and caused his resident to give in a memorial, wherein he
threatened the States to act against them, if they refused complying
with the contents of that memorial."
The Queen's declaration of war is grounded upon the grand alliance, as
this was upon the unjust usurpations and encroachments of the French
king; whereof the instances produced are, "his keeping in possession a
great part of the Spanish dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low
Countries, making himself master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving
satisfaction in these points, his putting an indignity and affront on
Her Majesty and kingdoms, by declaring the pretended Prince of Wales, K.
of England, &c.," which last was the only personal quarrel we had in the
war; and even this was positively denied by France, that king being
willing to acknowledge Her Majesty.
I think it plainly appears by both declarations, that England ought no
more to have been a principal in this war, than Prussia, or any other
power, who came afterwards into that alliance. Holland was first in the
danger, the French troops being at that time just at the gates of
Nimeguen. But the complaints made in our declaration, do all, except the
last, as much or more concern almost every prince in Europe.
For, among the several parties who came first or last into this
confederacy, there were but few who, in proportion, had more to get or
to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill success of this war,
than we. The Dutch took up arms to defend themselves from immediate
ruin; and by a successful war, they proposed to have a larger extent of
country, and a better frontier against France. The emperor hoped to
recover the monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger son,
chiefly at the expense of us and Holland. The King of Portugal had
received intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old pretensions
of Spain upon that kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all
sides, except towards the sea, and could therefore only be defended by
maritime powers. This, with the advantageous terms offered by K.
Charles,[35] as well as by us, prevailed with that prince to enter into
the alliance. The Duke of Savoy's temptations and fears were yet
greater: The main charge of the war on that side was to be supplied by
England, and the profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be
conquered, it was stipulated that his highness should have the Duchy of
Montferrat, belonging to the Duke of Mantua, the provinces of Alexandria
and Valencia, and Lomellino, with other lands between the Po and the
Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it, an equivalent
out of the province of Novara, adjoining to his own state; beside
whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the confederate
forces. Then, he was in terrible apprehensions of being surrounded by
France, who had so many troops in the Milanese, and might have easily
swallowed up his whole duchy.
The rest of the allies came in purely for subsidies, whereof they sunk
considerable sums into their own coffers, and refused to send their
contingent to the emperor, alleging their troops were already hired by
England and Holland.
Some time after the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the monarchy of Spain,
in breach of the partition treaty, the question here in England was,
Whether the peace should be continued, or a new war begun. Those who
were for the former alleged the debts and difficulties we laboured
under; that both we and the Dutch had already acknowledged Philip for
King of Spain; that the inclinations of the Spaniards to the house of
Austria, and their aversion for that of Bourbon, were not so surely to
be reckoned upon, as some would pretend; that we thought it a piece of
insolence, as well as injustice, in the French to offer putting a king
upon us; and the Spaniards would conceive, we had as little reason to
force one upon them; that it was true, the nature and genius of those
two people differed very much, and so would probably continue to do, as
well under a king of French blood, as one of Austrian; but, that if we
should engage in a war for dethroning the D. of Anjou, we should
certainly effect what, by the progress and operations of it, we
endeavoured to prevent, I mean an union of interest and affections
between the two nations; for the Spaniards must of necessity call in
French troops to their assistance: This would introduce French
counsellors into King Phillip's court; and this, by degrees, would
habituate and reconcile the two nations: That to assist King Charles by
English or Dutch forces, would render him odious to his new subjects,
who have nothing in so great an abomination, as those whom they hold for
heretics: That the French would by this means become masters of the
treasures in the Spanish West Indies: That, in the last war, when Spain,
Cologne, and Bavaria were in our alliance, and by a modest computation
brought sixty thousand men into the field against the common enemy; when
Flanders, the seat of war, was on our side, and His Majesty, a prince of
great valour and conduct, at the head of the whole confederate army; yet
we had no reason to boast of our success: How then should we be able to
oppose France with those powers against us, which would carry sixty
thousand men from us to the enemy, and so make us, upon the balance,
weaker by one hundred and twenty thousand men at the beginning of this
war, than of that in 1688?
On the other side, those whose opinion, or some private motives,
inclined them to give their advice for entering into a new war, alleged
how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of
Spain; that we could have no security for our trade, while that kingdom
was subject to a prince of the Bourbon family; nor any hopes of
preserving the balance of Europe, because the grandfather would, in
effect, be king, while his grandson had but the title, and thereby have
a better opportunity than ever of pursuing his design for universal
monarchy. These and the like arguments prevailed; and so, without
offering at any other remedy, without taking time to consider the
consequences, or to reflect on our own condition, we hastily engaged in
a war which hath cost us sixty millions; and after repeated, as well as
unexpected success in arms, hath put us and our posterity in a worse
condition, not only than any of our allies, but even our conquered
enemies themselves.
The part we have acted in the conduct of this whole war, with reference
to our allies abroad, and to a prevailing faction at home, is what I
shall now particularly examine; where I presume it will appear, by plain
matters of fact, that no nation was ever so long or so scandalously
abused by the folly, the temerity, the corruption, the ambition of its
domestic enemies; or treated with so much insolence, injustice and
ingratitude by its foreign friends.
This will be manifest by proving the three following points.
_First_, That against all manner of prudence, or common reason, we
engaged in this war as principals, when we ought to have acted only as
auxiliaries.
_Secondly_, That we spent all our vigour in pursuing that part of the
war which could least answer the end we proposed by beginning of it; and
made no efforts at all where we could have most weakened the common
enemy, and at the same time enriched ourselves.
_Lastly_, That we suffered each of our allies to break every article in
those treaties and agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the
burthen upon us.
[30] Dr. Gilbert Burnet, Bishop of Sarum.
[31] The Peace of Ryswick, concluded in October, 1697. All that Louis
did for England by that peace was to acknowledge William as King of
England, and to engage not to assist his enemies. The Dutch and Leopold,
however, were much better treated. The former had its commerce
re-established, while to the latter were given many fortresses and
towns, and advantages strengthening his empire. The Peace of Ryswick was
truly not a peace, but a temporary cessation of hostilities.
[32] The Partition Treaties arose out of the troublesome question of the
Spanish succession. After the Peace of Ryswick William III. and Louis
XIV. attempted to settle this question by a partition of the Spanish
possessions.
[33] This was Philip of Anjou, second son of the Dauphin.
[34] Sidney Godolphin, one of the greatest financiers among English
statesmen. He was Lord High Treasurer under Queen Anne, and an intimate
friend, as well as relative by marriage, of Marlborough. He was created
an Earl in 1706, but was removed from his office at the fall of the Whig
ministry in 1710.
[35] The Archduke Charles, who styled himself Charles III. of Spain.