THE RELIGIOUS AND THE COMMUNAL ELEMENTS IN INDIAN NATIONALISM
For a time the Mohammedan minority was the hope of the British
Government in India. As far back as 1888, Lord Dufferin[92] and Sir
Auckland Colvin had successfully appealed to their fears, and won them
over by promises of preferential treatment. That policy has been
consistently followed since then, and so far has been a great success.
The bulk of the educated Mohammedans has opposed the Congress, in order
to please the Government and win their gratitude; they also opposed the
_Swadeshi_ Movement, although the success of the _Swadeshi_ was likely
to benefit them very materially, since the handloom industry was
principally in their hands. In return, they received substantial
benefits in the shape of large grants of money for educational purposes,
a larger percentage of posts in government service, a larger number of
titles and honours, a separate and larger representation in the
councils, and so on. Lord Morley confirmed this policy of preference by
making it a special feature of his Reform scheme in 1908. So the
Mohammedans were in very high spirits in 1908. The Nationalist party in
Bengal had a large number of friends and sympathisers among the
Mohammedans, but as compared with the Separatist party, their number was
very small and meagre. In its inception and for some time thereafter the
Nationalist movement in India was thus a pre-eminently Hindu movement.
_Mohammedan Revulsion of Feeling against the British._ The world events
of the last four years, however, have changed the whole aspect of
affairs in India. The events in Turkey, in Tripoli, in Egypt and in
Persia have affected the Mohammedans deeply and have brought about a
revulsion of feeling against the British. The Muslims are a virile and
proud people. The attitude of Britain towards Turkey has offended their
deepest susceptibilities and they have begun to think that the British
in India wanted to bribe them into silent acquiescence in what was
happening to the Muslim people in the other parts of the globe. For the
last four years the Muslim press has been carrying on a strong, vigorous
pan-Islamic propaganda. The Mohammedan classes as well as masses are
full of veiled and subdued hatred of the British. Sometimes this finds
expression on the platform, in the press, and in permanent literature
also. In the last Balkan war and during Turkey’s conflict with Italy
about Tripoli, the Mohammedan mosques rang with loud prayers for the
victory of Turkey, and with strong and open denunciation of their
Christian enemies. There is a perceptible and clear change in the
political pronouncements of the Muslim League,[93] but the political
influence of the Muslim League among the people was, so far, little as
compared with the influence of the Pan-Islamic party. This Pan-Islamic
party is the extreme wing of the Mohammedan Nationalists.
The number of forfeitures of the Moslem papers and publications under
the Press Act, the nature of those publications and the continued
support given to the papers that have been more than once forfeited and
punished by the Government, the change in the tone of the Moslem papers
in their comments on government measures, and the newly born _entente_
between the Hindus and Mohammedans, of which there is unmistakable proof
in the press as well as in actual life, all point in the same direction.
There is every chance of the Hindu extremists and Muslim extremists
making an alliance and joining hands, while even the Mohammedan
moderates are coming nearer the Hindu moderates.[94] The former may not
actually join the Congress in large numbers, but they are thinking and
acting the same way. The Mohammedan moderates are wiser than the Hindu
moderates. They use their extreme party as a trump card in their
negotiations with the Government more effectively than the Hindus do or
have ever done. The Mohammedan extremist receives more substantial
support and sympathy from his moderate co-religionist than the Hindu
extremist does from the Hindu moderates. The Mohammedan moderate is
more outspoken in his criticism of government measures that injuriously
affect the Mohammedans; he is less lavish in his praises of the British
Raj; he is a more skilful negotiator and a decidedly better and more
successful diplomat.
The educated Mohammedans, outside India, are almost to a man identified
with Indian Nationalism. So the Indian Mohammedan’s changed sentiments
towards the British are likely to be a source of great strength to the
national cause and make the situation more hopeful from the point of
view of Indian Nationalism.
_Disaffection among the Sikhs._ But the Mohammedans were not the only
people whom the Britishers had succeeded in keeping aloof from the Hindu
Nationalists. The Sikhs had also so far kept aloof. The treatment of the
Sikhs in Canada, the _Komagata Maru_[95] incident and the influence of
Har Dayal and the Gadar party on the Pacific Coast of America formed by
him, have affected a great change of feeling among the Sikhs also. The
Government may try to win them back by making concessions and conferring
preferments, but a move like the one recently made in giving Mr. K. G.
Gupta’s seat on the Secretary of State’s Council in London to Sirdar
Daljit Singh, a Sikh nobleman, is likely to make them look even more
ridiculous than before. The Britisher’s lack of imagination is
colossal, but we did not know that the war was likely to affect even his
sense of humour.