In the ensuing Commentaries, the soul is considered as immaterial; and
as possessing a middle nature between intelligibles and sensibles;
but that this important assertion may not remain without proof,
the following demonstrative arguments, derived from the Platonic
philosophy, are offered to the reader’s consideration. And first, that
the soul is an unextended, and consequently immaterial essence, may
be thus proved. If, after the manner of magnitude, it consisted of
continuous parts, it would be impossible that any one part could be
sentient from the passion of another; but the soul, for instance, which
is situated in the finger, would be sensible of passion, as if detached
from soul in the other parts of the body, and existing by itself; for
the soul, from this hypothesis, would be sentient by parts, and not
considered as a whole. Besides, there must be many souls governing
each part of us, different among themselves, and endued with their
own peculiar energies. For whatever may be said of continuity, is to
no purpose, unless it conduces to unity of sensation; so that the
hypothesis which supposes that the sensations gradually arrive at the
principal part of the soul by a certain continued succession, is not
to be admitted, since it may be reasonably asked, How is the principal
part to be peculiarly distinguished? By what rule of quantity can the
parts be discerned, by what difference are they to be distinguished,
where the quantity is one, and the bulk continuous? Besides, is
the principal part alone, or are the other parts, sentient? If the
principal part alone be perceptive, the soul can then alone be sentient
when a sensible passion meets with this principal part, situated in
its peculiar seat; but if a sensible passion falls upon any other part
of the soul destitute of sense, it is impossible that such a part
should be able to transmit the same passion to the principal, or be at
all sentient. For how can that which is void of sense, receive passion,
and convey it entire to a sentient part? Besides, if passion accedes
to the principal, it either falls on one of its parts, and so either
one part alone will be sentient, and the rest without sensation, and
consequently superfluous, or there must be innumerable and dissimilar
sensations; for if the sensation of each of the parts singly, is the
same with the aggregate of them all, of what use is a multitude of
parts? But if the sensations are various, a man may say, as it were, I
am primarily sentient in this place, and secondarily in another; and
every sentient part besides the first, will be ignorant where sensation
is most powerful: or perhaps (from such an hypothesis) every part of
the soul will be equally deceived, each part thinking the passion to
arise in the place where it is situated. But if not the principal
part alone, but every part of the soul be sentient, a principal part
is superfluous for the purpose of sensation; and if the soul be
divisible like magnitude, how is it able to recognize, as belonging
to one subject, the qualities which flow, as it were, through many
senses, as through the eyes and ears? For that part of the soul which
is perceptive through the eyes, distinguishes nothing but colours;
that which energises through the ears, nothing but sounds; and that
which acts through the medium of the touch, nothing but the surfaces
of bodies: what is it then which perceives all these properties of
bodies united in one subject, or what is that which perceives any thing
as a certain one? For unless the intentions of the senses, and of
sensible objects, were collected together in one, the soul could never
be able to judge of the peculiar and different properties of bodies:
Hence it is necessary that the soul should be, as it were, a general
centre; that the several senses should be extended on all sides to
this, similar to lines verging from the circumference of a circle to
the centre; and that a power of this kind, comprehending all things;
should be truly one. For if the soul was any thing divisible, and the
intentions of the senses reached the soul, and ended in its essence
like the extremities of various lines, they must either again concur
in one and the same as a medium, or have different situations, in such
a manner that each sense may perceive different from one another:
as if, for instance, the sense of sight should perceive the form of
Socrates, and the sense of hearing recognize his voice; that essence
which pronounces the whole to be one person, that of Socrates, must
be something different from each of the senses. Hence it is necessary
that the soul should be an indivisible essence; for if she possessed
magnitude, she must be divided along with every sensible object she
perceives; so that one part of the soul would perceive a certain part
of a sensible object, and we should possess no sentient power capable
of perceiving the whole, or of pronouncing any thing one. Thus, in
the perception of a man, considered as one, how is it possible that
the soul can be divided, so that the perception of a part shall be
the same with the perception of the whole. But if we suppose the soul
divisible in all her perceptions, since it is impossible she should
be co-extended with every sentient object, in how many parts is the
division to be made? Is the soul to be distributed into the same number
of parts as the sensible object she perceives, so that every part of
the soul may perceive the same part of the object? Or shall we say that
the parts of the soul have no sensation of the parts of the object?
But this would be absurd and impossible. If every part then of the
soul perceived every part of a magnitude as a whole, since magnitude
is divisible to infinity, and since, on this hypothesis, there must
be innumerable sensations of every sensible object, there must be
innumerable images, as it were, of the same thing in our principal
part. Besides, if that which perceives is corporeal, it will not be
possible for it to perceive in any other manner than as if certain
images were impressed from a seal in wax, or in brass, or in any other
sensible substance. But if the images of sensation exist as in humid
bodies (which is most probable), they will certainly be confounded
like images in water; nor can there be any memory, the image departing
with its forming substance. And if we suppose the figures to remain
like impressions in solid bodies, either it will not be possible for
others to succeed while the former endure; and thus, sensations of
other things cannot take place; or if others succeed, the former images
must be immediately destroyed, and memory be no more. So that if we
allow it possible to remember, and, besides this, to perceive other
things, without any hindrance from former impressions, it is impossible
that the soul should be corporeal. Since the soul, therefore, is an
unextended, indivisible, and immaterial substance, it is consequently
incorruptible and immortal; for every thing capable of dissolution and
dispersion is either corporeal and composite, or exists in some subject
from which it is inseparable. And indeed, whatever may be dissolved
is corruptible, as being compounded from many. But whatever naturally
subsists in something different from itself, when it is separated
from its subject, immediately vanishes into non-entity. But the soul,
as we have proved, is incorporeal; it is likewise removed from every
subject, and naturally reverts to itself, and is therefore immortal and
incorruptible.
2. Let us now consider how, and on what account the soul is said to be
of a middle nature, and to be the receptacle of all middle energies,
both vital and gnostic. Since, then, there is a long gradation of
beings, proceeding from the first being, even to formless matter,
which is nothing more than the dark shadow of essence, it is requisite
to enquire what the properties are of the first and last beings, and
what the condition is of the middle orders; for thus we shall know
where the essence of the soul ought to be placed. The properties of
intelligible natures, therefore, are as follows: true being, eternal,
indivisible, immoveable, total, perfect, full of essence, replete with
life, free, moving all things, similitude, presiding over all things,
and at the same time separated from all; for each of these properties
appears in intelligibles, according to the processions of being.
But the properties of sensible natures, different from these by the
greatest interval, are such as, not-true-being, temporal according to
essence, partible, moveable, particular, indigent of another, always
replete with subsistence, living by participation, moved by another,
dissimilitude, and occupying place by parts. But the middle properties
of these are, not-true-being, an essence better than non-being, and
inferior to true-being, according to essence eternal, but according to
its energies extended with time, indivisible according to its divine
part, but divisible according to the various processions of reasons,
self-motive, governing things moved by another, but subordinate to
such as are immoveable, bearing before itself a particular nature,
together with its totality; (for, because it contains in itself all
reasons, it is after a manner a whole, but because it is diminished and
fallen, ends in parts, and suffers a transition of its energy, it must
be esteemed a particular nature): and again, perfecting itself, yet,
nevertheless, perfected by natures prior to its own; filling itself
with power and strength, and at the same time filled by others: living
from itself, and receiving life from others, being more divine, indeed,
than things which live only by participation, but inferior to things
primarily vital; moving other things, and itself moved by others; at
the same time similar and dissimilar; and separated, at the same time,
from last natures, and co-ordinated with them. Such then, being the
properties of the first, middle, and last orders, let us consider where
we ought to place the soul, whether in the first order, or in those
which retain the last place: but if we establish it among the first,
it must be true being, every way eternal and immoveable, and it must
consequently possess every thing which we have attributed to the first
beings; add too, that on this hypothesis we can no longer attribute
to the soul a power of self-motion, nor the discursive processions of
reasoning, nor a variety of other particulars, which manifestly belong
to the soul. But can we place it with propriety among the last of
beings? The least of all: for on this hypothesis we shall make it alone
moved by others, divisible, composite, and alone possessing perfection
from others, the opposite of which is evident in all our souls; since
they move and perfect themselves, and are led wherever they please.
Since then it is not possible to place the soul either in the first,
or last order of beings, it is requisite to assign it a middle place,
in imitation of its divine cause Rhea (according to the theologists),
who is the conciliating band of the two parents Saturn and Jupiter,
and is reported, from her prolific bosom to produce the life of the
soul. But though the soul is thus the extremity of intelligible, and
the principle of sensible natures, we must not conceive it to be such
a principle or extremity as a point in a line, for it is not in both
the natures it terminates, like a point in both the sections of a
line; but it is to be called the extremity of intelligibles, because it
appears after an intelligible essence, and the principle of sensibles,
as being abstracted from them, and the source of their motion. And
thus it will preserve to us a certain proportion, that as the natures
which are moved by others, are to those which are moved by themselves,
so are these last to immoveable natures; and hence it will obtain the
condition of a bond, on account of its peculiar mediocrity, unfolding,
indeed, united causes, but reducing the dissipated powers of sensibles
into _one_, and being contained by an immoveable and perpetually
abiding cause; but containing itself the generation, which, moved by
another, is subject to continual mutation. It is likewise intelligible,
if we regard generated natures; but generated, if we compare it with
intelligibles; and thus it exhibits in its middle nature both extremes,
imitating also, by this means, (according to the Greek theologists) its
divine cause, for it is said to be on both sides refulgent, ἀμφιφαὴς,
and to be endued with two faces ἀμφιπρόσωπος, and to receive in its
bosom the processions of intelligible natures. It is likewise said to
be replenished with intellectual life, and to be the fountain of the
ever-running streams of corporeal life, and to contain in itself the
centre of the processions of all beings. On this account it is, with
great propriety, affirmed to be generated, and at the same time without
generation. For true being, according to the Platonists, is without
generation, because it has an infinite power of being totally present
at the same time: and body is said to be generated, because it always
possesses in itself an infinite flowing power, which it cannot at
once totally receive. The soul, therefore, because it is incorporeal,
abiding in itself, has an infinite power of being, and this total
with respect to its essence, and immortal without generation; but
according to parts it may be considered in infinite production. For it
has not the same total infinity ever present, or there would be the
same infinity of the whole and part, of the perfect and imperfect,
of the contained and containing, which is impossible. But neither is
it possible that the whole of its essence should be in the act of
perpetual production, any more than that a part of it should be eternal
being, lest the part should be more worthy and better than the whole.
Hence the ὑπόϛασις, or subsistence of the soul, is at the same time
of infinite power, and is generated in infinitum; for by this means
it participates of being, and obtains the first place among generated
natures; while body alone, both with respect to its whole and parts, is
obnoxious to a perpetual generation.
3. But let us now enquire from what genera Plato composes this
nature of the soul, which contains in itself the bond of all beings;
previous to which it will be requisite to explain what these genera
are, and from whence they originate. Of the species, then, existing
in the intelligible world, or the divine intellect, which contains in
itself the causes of all posterior natures, some are most general,
extending themselves to the universality of things; but others are
more particular, like the most special species, and others subsisting
between these, expand themselves, indeed, to a multitude of things,
but not to all, according to the division, of the Elean guest in the
Sophista. For man is produced from the ideal man, and horse from the
ideal horse, in the intelligible world; but the similitude which is
found in man and horse, and other animals, is produced from likeness
itself, or the ideal similitude, as dissimilitude from unlikeness
itself; but the sameness and difference which are found in all beings,
proceed from the sameness and difference which subsist in ever-vital
energy and perfection, in the supreme intellect, or the ideal world.
Now, as among the sciences some are especially universal, so in
intelligible causes some are perfectly particular, presiding alone
over the proper and peculiar number of one species; but others extend
themselves to a multitude, such as equality, likeness, totality, (for
the whole considered as a whole is not common to all things, since
the part is not a whole); but others, again, expand themselves to all
things, as all beings participate of these, considered as beings, and
not considered as vital or animated, or possessing any other property
exclusive of the denomination of being. Because, therefore, _being_
is the first, the causes of _being_ obtain the most universal order
among genera; and these are five in number, as follows, _essence_,
_sameness_, _difference_, _motion_, and _station_. For every being
is endued with essence; is united to itself; is by itself, or its
own sameness, separated from others; proceeds from itself, and its
own state and principle, and no less appears to participate of a
certain _abiding_, in preserving its own proper species. All things,
therefore, whether intelligibles or sensibles, or subsisting between
both, depend on these genera for their existence. For without the
being of _essence_, nothing could subsist; in like manner, without
_sameness_ every whole would be dissipated, and divided from itself;
and _difference_ being taken away, all things would be one alone, and
multitude be destroyed. But without _motion_ and _station_, all things
would either be inefficacious and dead, or, losing their proper state
and stability, would end in non-entity.
4. Such then being the middle nature of the soul, Plato, with great
propriety, in the Phædrus, and in his tenth book of laws, defines it to
be number moving itself; which definition he received from Philolaus,
and Philolaus from Pythagoras. For since mathematical species have
a middle subsistence, as is proved in the following Commentaries,
they are of all things most accommodated to the nature of the soul.
Hence Plato, in imitation of Pythagoras, sometimes explains the
soul by number, as in the present instance; and sometimes by figure
and magnitude, as in the Timæus; while he considers in the soul the
intersection of lines, and a twofold circle. For since mathematical
forms are separated from the flux and inconstancy of matter, they
participate of a certain, exact, sure, and exquisite condition, by
means of which they eminently confer to the elevation of our ingenuity,
and the explication of latent concerns; and, on this account, as they
pertain to numbers, we may say, preserving the analogy, that there are
five orders of numbers, _the divine_, _the essential_, _the
animative_, _the natural_, and _the mathematic_. The first
of these is uniform, the second immoveable, the third self-motive, the
fourth moved by another, and the last the image of the others, and
their external measure. The divine number is considered eminently in
the deity, as in the principle of all things; the essential belongs to
intellect through ideas, and is called _essence_, _unity_,
and _the first being_; the animative number belongs to the soul,
through the medium of her inherent reasons; the natural to physical
concerns, through the seeds of nature; and lastly, the mathematical
belongs to opinion, as it is nothing more than the image of essential
number, formed by the energies of the rational soul. The soul,
therefore, is number, not limited by quantity, and mathematical,
but animative; it is number, not indeed numbering, but numbered,
generating and converted into itself. Hence too, because harmony arises
from number, the soul is called harmony; not, indeed, a harmony of
the parts of the body, nor the harmonic quantity which subsists in
sound or in voice; but a harmony arising from its essential numbers,
placed in its inherent reasons, and in the genera which constitute its
nature. It is this harmony which produces, as from its proper cause,
the harmony of the corporeal parts, the rhythm of motions, and the
melody of voices and sounds. It is this which produces that delight
in the soul from sensible harmony, which sufficiently indicates it to
be something familiar and domestic to her nature. From hence it may
be inferred, that Plato is not inconsistent with himself when, in the
Phædo, he denies, and in the Timæus affirms, the soul to be harmony;
for he denies that it is a harmony of a definite quantity, or such as
arises from the parts of the body; but he asserts it to be a harmony
in the manner already explained. It may likewise be inferred, that
Plato is ignorantly accused by a many, for affirming that the soul is
harmony, or number; for they only regard vulgar mathematical number,
and sensible harmony; while Plato, far more elevated, discourses of
intelligible numbers, and ideal harmony, subsisting in immaterial
energy and perfection.
5. And here it is necessary to consider what number, in a particular
manner belongs to the soul; for various numbers, differently
considered, accord with her self-motive nature. In the first place,
union and unity may be considered in the soul, as in her proper degree
she participates of divine unity; and likewise with relation to her
totality, for she is one certain whole. And because _a whole_ may
be considered in a triple respect, one before the parts, another rising
from the aggregate of parts, and a third subsisting in the single
parts; the soul is a whole in each of these respects. Thus she is a
whole prior to the parts, while she is considered as divisible into
them, in an incorporeal manner; she is a whole rising from parts, while
assuming the parts in the first place, we consider how her nature is
fabricated from their conjunction; and she is a whole in the single
parts, since she is total in the whole, and in every part. Besides,
the duad belongs to the soul, because she contains in her nature bound
and infinite, sameness and difference; and lastly, a conversion to
intelligibles and sensibles. And, indeed, the duad conjoined with
unity, very properly accords with the soul; for to intellect above
soul, unity particularly belongs; to body beneath soul, the infinite
alone; and to soul situated in the middle, duality properly agrees,
being, as it were, infinite, connected with unity. Again, the ternary
number is attributed to the soul, as well on account of her beginning,
middle, and end, as because she abides in herself, proceeds to
inferiors, and returns to supernal natures. Besides, she flows from
_the one_, recedes from him, and is reflected into the one when
she acquires her proper perfection. Lastly, as Proclus observes, the
nature of the soul is divided into essence, power, and energy; so that
she may be said to rejoice in the ternary number, and to be replete
with its perfection. But the quaternary number belongs to the soul
so far as she is connected with matter, which is tempered with four
qualities, and four elements; and she is endued with four principal
faculties, nutrition, sensation, local motion, and intellection. But to
omit other numbers, and their conformity with the soul, the quinary,
and septenary numbers are especially attributed to the soul. The
quinary, because the soul is composed from the five genera of things,
we have previously explained; and because five particulars merit a
principal consideration in the soul; first, her essence; secondly,
the harmony of her reasons; thirdly, the species arising from the
concord of her parts or reasons; fourthly, her virtue; and, lastly, her
energies: and on this account, Proclus observes, the consideration
of the soul ought to receive a quintuple distribution. Besides, as
the soul consists from a divisible and indivisible nature; so the
quinary is composed from the first even and the first odd number.
Lastly, as the soul is the connecting medium of the universe; so the
quinary obtains the middle situation in universal number, that is in
the decad. But the septenary number belongs to the soul, because, as
Plato shews, in his Timæus, all harmonical reasons are contained in
the seven numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 8, 27; and from these the soul is
composed. Hence Proclus elegantly observes, that the septenary number
is dedicated to Apollo, the parent of all harmony; because in one, two,
and four, from which the septenary results, the first bisdiapason is
found. Besides, the writers on harmony affirm that all the difference
of voices proceeds as far as to the seventh degree. So that Plato uses,
with great propriety, the septenary number for the composition of the
soul. Again, in these numbers of the soul, every medium is found in
a convenient proportion; in these the geometric medium is contained,
corresponding to the right institution of laws; of which Plato, in his
Republic, says, that by this cities are properly governed: there is
found too, an harmonical medium, which is the similitude of justice:
and lastly, we may discover an arithmetical medium, which is called
the illustrious symbol of peace. After this manner, therefore, Plato,
with a wonderful fecundity of significations, affirms that the soul is
composed from numbers. He likewise considers the figures she contains,
I mean the circle and triangle; because as the soul is the first
nature which verges to body, so these are the first of all figures, as
well rectilinear as curvilinear. Besides, an orbiculation agrees to
the soul, through intellect; but progression and rectitude according
to her own proper nature; and on this account she contains both a
straight and circular figure. I omit other correspondencies of a circle
and triangle with the soul, as they are exhibited in the following
Commentaries; and particularly by Proclus, in the third book of his
Commentaries on the Timæus: it is sufficient to the design of this
Dissertation, just to have mentioned this analogy, that the nature of
the numbers and figures may appear, which are considered by Plato in
the composition of the soul.
6. Let us now pass from contemplating the nature of the soul, to
a survey of its various gradations of knowledge, and the means
by which it acquires the illuminations of science; as this is a
speculation perfectly essential to a full comprehension of the ensuing
Commentaries. According to Plato, then, in the sixth and seventh
books of his Republic[28], there are four degrees of the internal
cognitions of our soul; imagination, or assimilation; faith, cogitation
(διάνοια); and lastly, science or wisdom. The two first degrees
conjoined constitute opinion; but the two last equally joined produce
intelligence in its large acceptation. I say in its large acceptation,
because the word intelligence is considered by the Platonists in a
triple respect. First, as it rises from opinion and science; as Plato
asserts, in the seventh book of his Republic. Secondly, as it passes
into the same with science; for thus, in the end of the sixth book,
he considers intelligence and science as the same. Lastly, as it is
distinguished from science, and intelligible from that which is the
object of cognition: thus, science regards the essential reasons
of the soul; but intelligence elevates us to ideas, and this is
intelligence in its proper acceptation. The distinction of these four
degrees, especially depends on the distinction of things with which
the soul is conversant. For these four degrees of things are, the
image of a sensible object, the sensible object itself, the image of
an intelligible object, and the intelligible itself. Imagination or
assimilation regards the image of the sensible object; which image is
nothing more than the shadow or resemblance appearing in water, or
other lucid and polished bodies. Faith is conversant with sensible
objects; and these are animals, plants, and every thing subject to
the energies of sense. From the junction of imagination and faith,
opinion is produced. Cogitation is conversant with the image of an
intelligible object; which is nothing more than a certain universal,
collected from sensibles, related to the reasons of things existing
in the soul, and constituted by their assistance; but not elevated to
ideas, and resolved into their lucid nature. Those who are conversant
with this image of an intelligible object, use hypotheses; which do
not elevate us to principles, which are reasons and ideas, but bring
us down to subordinate objects. Lastly, science, considered as the
same with intelligence, is conversant with that which is intelligible,
or the essence of things; and of this kind are reasons pertaining to
the soul, and ideas to intellect. Hence, as _intelligible_ is to
_sensible_ in splendor and truth, and form to its image; such is
the relation of the superior to the inferior degrees of cognition.
And as these four degrees may be resolved into five, by separating
intelligence from science; so they are reduced by Plato into two
principal degrees; so far as the two first are conversant about
generation; but the two last about essence. And thus much for the first
particular proposed.
It now remains that we investigate the mode in which science is
produced in the soul, according to the doctrine of Plato. For this
purpose, I think it will be necessary to consider the rational soul,
in whose nature all reasons corresponding to ideas, have been inserted
from eternity, received into the human body, as into the plain of
oblivion; bordering on the river of negligence, that is placed near to
the flux of humours; which producing in its nature various kinds of
perturbations, are the causes of its self-oblivion and neglect. Hence
the soul, thus constituted, as it were, sleeping and intoxicated;
sleeping before it is roused; intoxicated before it is purified; begins
from external sensible objects to be moved and excited, and to seek
with avidity, the knowledge congenial to its nature. The soul now,
enquiring after truth and the sciences, is first conversant with the
external images of things, in which the glimmering light of similitude
to truth, presents itself to the view; then it distinguishes these
images among themselves by its reasoning power; and if they agree
in any particular, collects them into one. Thus, being employed in
separating into many, things united, and reducing many into one, it
advances from shade to substance, and is elevated from similitude
to truth itself; and thus apprehends the essence of a thing free
from every foreign or contrary quality, shining in _reason_ and
_idea_. Afterwards, from this contact, especially salutary to
itself, it experiences an ineffable joy, as from a return into its
proper nature, and best disposition; and so great is its exultation,
that it neglects and despises the shadows which it formerly pursued.
Then the soul truly knows, that while a man regards corporeal natures,
he is employed in resemblances; and that though he may esteem himself
knowing in many things, he knows nothing in reality; but is then alone
elevated to the sublime degree of science, when he arrives at ideas.
Hence it appears, that there are four subordinate dispositions of
mankind in order to science. For, in the first place, children, as
new guests of this world, are ignorant of every thing, without being
conscious of their ignorance. But as they advance in years, they are
employed in the shadows and images of natural concerns; and not being
yet converted to the essences of things, though they possess no real
knowledge, yet they conceive themselves to abound in knowledge. But
in the third place, being elevated to supernal natures, and judging
these to be alone true, they affirm themselves to be ignorant of all
they formerly imagined themselves to know; in which degree Socrates
professed to find himself, when he said, _this one thing I know,
that I know nothing_; an ignorance preferable to all the knowledge
gained by the most unwearied experimental enquiries. Indeed, this order
is indicated by Socrates himself, in the Phædo, when he says, that on
his first acquaintance with natural concerns, he thought he abounded
in knowledge, but as he advanced in these pursuits, he perceived that
he knew nothing. Lastly, when, through the piercing sight of the soul,
men are elevated to ideas, they become illustrated with the splendors
of true science, and pass into the regions of perfect reality. And
hence it appears how true science, which is the same with intelligence
and wisdom, produces piety and religion: for science elevates us to
intellect and divinity; and copulates the soul with natures of the
greatest purity and perfection; so that an union of this kind cannot
take place without piety, sanctity, and religion; as dissimilars can
never be blended in amicable conjunction.