CHAPTER XV

FRANCE

On 10th April, 1918, we embarked on _H.M.T. Omrah_ at Alexandria and set

sail for France on the following day. Many were sorry to leave the

Palestine front, where in between the battles the life was often very

pleasant, and no regimental officer was ever heard to say leave in

Cairo, Alexandria or Luxor was unpleasant; but going to France meant a

chance of home leave, and it was a change. We were not so sure of home

leave being open, however, as the German spring offensive was still

going strong, the first word of which we got from a patrol bringing in a

written message by the Turks giving an accurate report of its initial

success. The Division, less the gunners who remained in Palestine, came

over in a convoy of seven ships escorted by Japanese T.B.D.'s. The

voyage was without incident, for which we were thankful, as those who

had not been already torpedoed in the Mediterranean did not wish to be,

and those who had been were not anxious for a second performance. So

Marseilles was reached safely on the 17th, the good ship _Omrah_ leading

the convoy up the channel.

Two days at Marseilles gave one the chance of seeing the place, finding

Cox's, and discovering that the restaurants there were much more

expensive than in Cairo. On the 19th we entrained, in spite of an

R.T.O., and started for the north to a destination unknown. We knew

little of the situation and the reports picked up on the journey were

not very encouraging. Once we were told we were for Versailles, to

defend Paris we surmised; however, Versailles was passed, and then we

were told Amiens had fallen. Still, when the train slowly crawled

through that city we knew things were not so bad. It was a cold journey,

but the railway people were obliging, and no matter how late the train

got, when we had a halt for a meal they gave us enough time. It was our

introduction to the amazing system of troop transport by rail in France.

In the end we arrived at Noyelle-sur-Mer, the "mer" was out of sight,

but a march of five miles or so brought us on the 22nd to St. Valery Sur

Somme, which is on the sea. There we went into billets, under command of

Lieut.-Colonel Neilson who rejoined from home leave.

Having spent some time at Ludd, handing in every article of ordnance

stores we possessed, except the clothes and equipment on the man, we now

were kept busy collecting it all again. In five days we had everything,

horses, limbers, field-cookers, Lewis guns, etc., the horses comparing

unfavourably with those left behind. The establishment for France was

much the same as for Palestine, the main difference being in the

transport supplied for Lewis guns and their ammunition. In France no

special mules are supplied; the whole load is carried in one limber per

company. This sounds simpler than a mixture of limbers and pack animals,

but experience in Palestine had proved the value of pack animals, and

subsequent experiences in France proved the danger of all the eggs in

one basket, or the limber method of carrying these guns.

Life at St. Valery was rather pleasant, though it was very cold and much

depended on the billet. Our cooks were introduced to the mysteries of

the omelette, and they learned by experience that these delicacies, even

though by being kept in an oven for an hour or so remain hot, yet their

virtue departs. A group of the officers was taken by the local

photographer and one appreciated then how many new faces there were.

Whenever we had got our ordnance issues distributed we entrained for

Bourguette on the 28th and from there marched a few miles to a hutment

camp at La Lacque. Here we lived comfortably for a little in what had

been a fine camp, but it had rather a deserted air, as the German

offensive had brought it rather near the line, though that was some six

miles away. Our tactical job was to look after a third line, and this

line was studied by the companies. A water-logged, uninteresting part it

was.

There was much talk about defence in depth, which we in our innocence

had thought had been universally adopted since the famous defence of

Verdun by the French in 1916. The last side show at La Lacque was a

lecture and demonstration given by Colonel Campbell in bayonet fighting.

Most regiments in France had heard it, and we were lucky to have the

chance. Apart from the lecture itself, it was a striking lesson of how

to talk to troops. One of his stories was of a Jock after a charge

finding himself opposite a large Hun who put up his hands saying, "Me

never fight, me shoot minnenwerfer." "Oh, you do, do you," was the

reply, "you're the ---- I've been looking for for two years." Followed by

the necessary action.

When at La Lacque we received our gas training. It took the form of a

route march to a place six miles away, where the whole Division being

assembled as at sports, various demonstrations were made, including the

firing of projectors--tabloid gas training.

Nothing more exciting happened. The Bosche offensive was over, and

entraining at Aire on 7th May we were taken to Maroeuil and marched to

Hills Camp in the back area behind Vimy ridge. We took over from the

54th Canadian Infantry on the night 7/8th May in the third line, which

included the village of Vimy. The whole area from Neuville St. Vaast,

across the ridge and down to the village, was a depressing sight;

villages and fields ravaged by the fire, not of one, but of many

battles. Neuville St. Vaast had once been a town of some size; now one

looked in vain for even one standing wall. There was more of Vimy left

and under collapsed houses were deep dug-outs of German origin. At this

time the army of Prince Ruprecht was somewhere opposite and an attack

was expected. In fact some details were given. There was to be a three

hours' preparatory bombardment, commencing at 22:30 on the 9th, but it

was merely one of these periodical alarms that one had got fairly well

accustomed to. It is a curious fact that as a rule when in the line one

does not expect to be attacked, hence when anything was expected the

wires were busy with "vigilance," etc. About this time leave opened and

many a well-earned leave was granted.

On night of 14/15th we took over part of front line from 7th H.L.I.

Having been regularly supplied in the East with all the military

publications, including books of plans of beautiful trenches, we were

surprised to find what a difference there was between theory and

practice. The explanation was fairly simple, however, as each battalion

had a few miles of trenches in their sector and it was impossible to

have them all dug to a plan. Still, as had always been our lot, there

was any amount of digging to be done and we had to get down to it. Night

patrols here found little. The Bosche front line was only held by a few

posts. Patrolling was found to be very different from Palestine; there

the ground was smooth, except for nullahs, and the stars were always out

to guide one, here shell holes threw one's direction out and the stars

were rarely seen. The result was that the first patrol was a little late

in returning, as it came back the night after it started, having spent a

quiet day sitting in a shell hole and noting the route they should have

taken home the night before.

To give in detail our life in the Vimy sector would not make interesting

reading as it was a quiet time. The enemy shelling was not heavy and was

confined to a few favourite spots. At night he sent over a few gas

shells, but never in great numbers, and the damage done was trifling. On

the other hand, night after night he received thousands of shells of all

sizes from our gunners, especially from 6-inch howitzers, and none

envied the Bosche.

We were in the line in most parts of the Vimy sector, gradually working

our way to the right towards Arras by Willerval and Bailleul. When out

of the line the various camps about Neuville St. Vaast and Mont St. Eloy

housed us. The latter place received some attention from a high velocity

gun, whose shell approached in a most alarming manner. The noise was the

worst part as the effects were generally local; but one night a hut

containing 2nd L.F.A. personnel was hit and twelve killed and sixteen

wounded. A few shells landed on our parade ground but did no damage.

In the course of our wanderings in this part of the line Battalion

Headquarters had a spell in the Thelus chalk caves. They are said to

have once connected with Mont St. Eloy, some three or four miles away.

Now these tunnels are blocked, but they are very extensive and cold;

even in the hot weather cardigans had to be worn below. Electricity

supplied the light for our one and only globe until it got smashed, when

the law of "might" supplied another.

The old German dug-outs in other parts excited our interest, rows of

beds in tiers of wooden frames and rabbit wire reminded one of a

lodging-house, but the latter type of residence is probably fresher. The

beds were delightful for sleeping on, and clean, but one restless

sleeper would make the row oscillate in harmony.

At this time we were in the Eighth Corps, and our corps commander,

Lieut.-General Hunter Weston, paid us a visit in July and made a

complete tour at a high rate of speed, and finished fresh at the head of

an exhausted staff.

One spell out of the line was spent at Villiers au Bois, where some

training was expected, as we had had none worth speaking of in France.

Instead of that we became the village road sweepers and scavengers and

so fitted ourselves for our return to the line.

Lieut. Carmichael, D.S.O., supplied the one thrill in the way of

patrols. The two lines near Arleux lay some 600 yards or so apart and

the Bosche was very inactive. He did not seem to be so keen on roaming

about in the dark as the Turk. One night in July Lieut. Carmichael set

out with two battalion scouts, Ptes. Pirie and Kinniburgh, to

reconnoitre a part of the Bosche wire. The men were armed in the usual

way for those adventures, _i.e._ with bayonet and a few bombs only and

dressed in burberry suits, which made them look more like deep-sea

divers than soldiers. A covering party accompanied them part of the way

and took up a position; the three had examined the wire and were

commencing to withdraw when they were attacked. As the sergeant left in

charge of the covering party reported, the first he heard was a revolver

shot followed by a "D---- it." This relapse to the colloquial we

afterwards heard was owing to a jamb in the revolver. Pirie was seized

by the throat by a Hun, but he put his bayonet through his assailant's

neck and left it there; the Bosche fell dead as Kinniburgh came to the

rescue. A few bombs into the enemy patrol completed their demoralisation

and the three got back safely, though Carmichael got detached and came

in through another unit's lines, getting a couple of bombs to himself

from one of our posts; however, as a miss is as good as a mile, no harm

was done. While the patrol were having their little engagement, a

stretcher bearer, Pte. J. Lamb, thought he might be of use, so on his

own left the covering party to see if anyone was wounded. Nearly

stumbling into a shell hole where six Germans were lying quietly, he

halted on the edge, not knowing whether he was going to be shot or taken

prisoner; then they said, "we your friends," at which he hurled his

stretcher at them and bolted back, falling immediately into another

shell hole, but the Bosche remained talking excitedly and Pte. Lamb

returned safely.

About this time a number of gas beam attacks were made from our line.

These were from the infantry point of view a great advance on the old

system, which meant man-handling innumerable heavy gas cylinders up the

trench system to the firing-line. By the new system a light railway was

run forward to the front line and all the infantry had to do was to push

the bogeys forward. When all were in position the gas expert turned a

handle and a poisonous mixture hissed off towards the enemy. What

casualties, if any, were inflicted we never heard; we certainly had a

number as the result of enemy retaliation by shell fire.

Towards the end of July we moved out of the line and spent ten days at

Lozingham, some miles behind Bethune, while there forming part of G.H.Q.

Reserve. The weather was good and the training much needed. The grounds

of the local chateau had huts in them and there we lived. A charming

countryside it was. But these good times could not last very long, so we

were soon marching back to the area we had left, bivouacking one night

in a large forest near Barlin, the next night at Roclincourt, and the

day following in the line again to the right of our last sector. Here we

saw the S.O.S. signal go up on our right one night early in August and

we had a good view of the pyrotechnics that follow such a signal. It

must have been an expensive evening as thousands of rounds fell in

barrage, but we never heard if there had been a raid by the enemy;

sometimes these signals are sent up, the reason being "wind up." And one

has a certain amount of sympathy for the sentry in a small post in front

of the line who makes a mistake. He knows if an attack is coming he may

only have a few seconds in which to act. His rifle is loaded with the

S.O.S. grenade and all he has to do to let it off is to press the

trigger. All varieties of temperament are represented in these lonely

sentries, hence occasionally a mistake is made.

Our experiences of holding the line as it had been since the enemy

reached the limit of his advance in Spring, finished on 16th August,

when we were relieved by the 8th Division and moved back to Roclincourt,

and thence a ten mile march brought us to a camp in a thick wood near

the Chateau de la Haie. We now began to suspect something would be doing

soon as all surplus baggage was sent to a dump at Aubigny. One may send

much to a dump, but little ever seems to be got back. Four days were

spent near this chateau and then on 21st August a march was made to a

camp at Agnes les Duisans near Arras. Enemy planes were very active at

night dropping bombs wherever they thought there was movement, but a

thick mist obscured the full moon and we moved with a feeling of

security that would have been absent on a clear night. Our own planes at

this time were we knew at least as active behind the German lines. In

addition, our scouts patrolled above us looking for enemy raiders, and

if the latter became caught in the beams of searchlights the scouts soon

shot down the heavier machines.

The camp at Agnes les Duisans was conspicuous by its cleanliness and by

a most beautiful bathing pool near, rising from numerous springs out of

a chalky soil. The pool was clear, cold and deep and set among meadows

and trees--a striking contrast to the dusty road.

On the night 22/23rd we moved further south to Bellecourt and could hear

that we were approaching the battle area. On the 23rd we moved nearer

the line to a rendezvous near Ficheux, arriving about 11 p.m.

At 2 a.m. on the 24th August orders were received for an attack to be

made by the Brigade that morning. On the previous day the 156th Brigade

had advanced the line some distance and the general plan of our attack

was passing through the 156th Brigade to attack eastwards, finally

assaulting and consolidating a portion of the Hindenburg Line front and

support system. The attack was to be delivered by ourselves (on the

left) and 6th H.L.I. (on the right), the 7th being in reserve. At 4.45

the Battalion moved in artillery formation ("A" and "D" Companies

forming the first line, and "B" and "C" the second) to the position of

assembly at the railway embankment. This move sounds simple on paper,

but at night over unknown country the difficulties may be appreciated by

giving the experiences in this early part of the battle of the O.C. "D"

Company. Shortly after 3 a.m. he received a message by orderly to report

at Headquarters for instructions. His company was lying in an old

disused trench, where it had arrived in the dark. The ground all around

was broken up with large and old shell holes, covered with grass and

weeds and in addition high and low wire entanglements, which alone would

have made negotiating this part a difficult task even by daylight. He

receives his orders in an old dug-out lit by a flickering candle, and is

referred to a map of small scale and told to move his company

independently and at once to a rendezvous about 1 or 1-1/2 miles away.

There is no time to explain matters fully to his platoon commanders and

N.C.O.'s. No one has been within miles of this ground before. The

company falls in--into this network of holes and wire--in the dark, and

the harassed company commander wonders if it ever can possibly move in

any direction at all. Finally, with the aid of a luminous compass, he

moves his company in single file in approximately the right direction,

arriving finally at the railway embankment.

At 5.30 a.m. the advance was continued, our bombardment opening at 7

a.m., when we came under shell-fire. The river Cojeul was successfully

crossed, a river only by name, and on crossing the sunken road beyond,

the companies extended. Soon after Colonel Neilson was severely wounded

and Captain Fyfe took command until Captain Parr, the next senior, could

be informed. The advance continued to about 300 yards of the wire in

front of the first objective. Here it was held up by our own barrage

which was falling in some cases behind our front line. This was about 9

a.m. At 9.15 a.m. the right company ("A") was withdrawn about 50 yards

to clear our barrage; at the same time small parties of the enemy were

seen withdrawing from his front line. At this stage of the attack there

was a gap of some 1500 yards between our left and the nearest troops on

their outer flank. At 10 a.m. our barrage still fell, entirely from

heavy artillery. Captain Fyfe then consulted the O.C. 6th H.L.I.

(Colonel James Anderson, D.S.O.) as to the advisability of pushing on

through it. They decided to remain in the present position. By this time

numerous wires had been sent asking the guns to stop. At 10.30 a.m.

Captain Parr took over command. At 11.15 a.m. our heavies stopped and

two platoons of "A" Company and two platoons of "D" Company under

Captain L.H. Watson advanced against the Hindenburg Line. The wire was

exceptionally thick and strong and had not been destroyed by our fire

and on it the enemy concentrated heavy machine-gun and trench-mortar

fire. Casualties were heavy and at 12.15 p.m. the assaulting platoons,

being unable to get through the wire, withdrew to their old line to

allow the trench-mortar and machine-gun fire to be neutralised. At 1.15

p.m. the Brigade commander came to Headquarters and an assault with the

6th H.L.I. was arranged to follow a fifteen minute bombardment on the

Hindenburg front and support lines. Zero time for the assault was fixed

at 3.45 p.m. No bombardment took place till 3.43 p.m. At 3.46 p.m. the

same assaulting platoons again advanced. The wire again caused a serious

check, but by 5 p.m. was penetrated, but there was still 300 yards to

be traversed before reaching the enemy's front trenches, and when

crossing this part continuous trench-mortar and machine-gun fire came

from the enemy's left flank, which was not being attacked. A platoon of

"C" Company was sent up to prolong the left flank, taking up reserve

S.A.A. At 5.30 p.m. the enemy opened a heavy bombardment, but a quarter

of an hour later an assault had been made and a footing obtained in the

first objective. This was all, however, as there was no support on the

left. Touch had been lost on the right and from both sides and the front

a counter attack had commenced. This might have been successfully dealt

with had casualties not been so heavy. As it was the officers in the

trench rightly ordered the men back and the small part of the Hindenburg

Line captured was evacuated, a few of our men being unfortunately

captured. Only two German prisoners were brought back, but from the

nature of the operation to bring back even two was no small achievement.

A line was organised as before the assault and at 8 p.m. the line was

retired two hundred yards to conform with the line formed on our right.

This line consisted mainly of odd shell holes and ditches, a most

uncomfortable place, but suitable for meeting the heavy bombardment put

down by the enemy between 8 p.m. and 9.30 p.m. and at 4 a.m. next

morning. The enemy appeared to be well shaken as our defensive patrols

observed no signs of activity in front of his line.

In this operation Sec.-Lieut. E.D. Turner was killed. Lieut. A.H.

Malcolm died of wounds, Lieut.-Colonel J.B. Neilson, D.S.O., Captain

L.H. Watson, Sec.-Lieut. E.T. Williamson, Sec.-Lieut. C.M. Sanderson,

Lieut. J. Girvan, and Lieut. G.S. Barr were wounded, and Captain R.M.

Miller, Lieut. J.W. Parr (wounded), and Sec.-Lieut. J. M'Kie were

captured. In other ranks 13 were killed, 162 wounded.

On the morning of the 25th Major Brand arrived and took over command,

the Battalion lying in the dispositions of the previous night. All

movement was open to direct machine-gun fire, and this, mixed with

desultory shelling and a very hot day, was very trying. Low flying enemy

planes repeatedly had a good look at us, and at night we were glad to

get an order to withdraw to Brigade reserve in a convenient sunken road

leading from Henin to St. Leger, "A" and "B" Companies under Captain

Fyfe holding Henin Hill on our right until withdrawn at 3 a.m. on the

26th.

Lying in this road gave the companies a chance to pull themselves

together, as reorganisation would have been impossible in the exposed

place we had just left. Here we had a good example of the effect of one

gas shell. Lieut. Cumming and some scouts had been out all day

reconnoitring Henin Hill and reporting on the enemies' dispositions. A

patrol consisting of a small platoon was sent to relieve him. One shell

gassed the whole platoon, but fortunately not badly, still they were

utterly unfit for further work and were evacuated.

Going back to the attack on the 24th, Lieut. J.W. Parr was one of the

officers who got into the Hindenburg Line. After the decision to

withdraw and having seen his few men start for our line he started to

make a bolt himself but got hit in the ankle, tumbling into a shell hole

on the top of a German who surrendered to him. A conversation was

carried on in French, and the German was told to go back to our line and

report his position. This the Bosche would not do as there were too many

bullets flying about. Later the Germans were seen advancing and Lt. Parr

tried to get the German to move into another shell hole in the hope that

he himself might not be discovered. This also the German refused,

preferring the comparative safety of a hole to the risk of the open.

Finally the advancing enemy reached the shell hole and would have

bayoneted Lt. Parr had not his prisoner protected him. The friend turned

out to be a corporal, carried Lt. Parr's pack back for him and saw him

into hospital and in possession of an unlooted pack--an example of the

vicissitudes of war. While going through the casualty clearing station

he got a glimpse of the brutality of the Hun; not that he saw our men

being treated worse than their own, but all were handled in a manner

unknown in our corresponding casualty clearing stations.

On 27th August at 4 a.m. we received a warning order that the Brigade

would attack and to be ready to move at 8 a.m. The general orders were

to pierce the Hindenburg Line, capture Fontaine Crosilles and continue

the advance in a south-easterly direction and take Riencourt. 6th and

7th H.L.I. were to be the assaulting battalions, ourselves in Brigade

reserve, two of our companies having the special task of mopping up

Fontaine Crosilles. We were to move about a mile in rear of the

assaulting battalions. The advance commenced covered by a powerful

barrage, and when on the rising ground other barrages covering other

advances could be clearly seen. Against this overwhelming artillery fire

the enemy did not stand in numbers, but his machine-guns, light and

heavy, were bravely manned and caused many casualties. As the advance

progressed great numbers of these guns were passed, as a rule with at

least one dead German beside each gun. A belt of country had to be

passed through on which a hostile heavy artillery barrage had been put

down. It was extraordinary how few casualties were incurred in going

through it. The formation of "blobs" adopted proved most suitable and

elastic, if difficult to direct. The left of the assaulting battalions

was to have touched Fontaine Crosilles but swung away to the right. This

left an unprotected flank to them, as the nearest troops on that flank

were the Canadians near Cherisy. Our leading companies ("B" and "C")

keeping on our original line of advance came under heavy fire as they

crossed the valley of the Sensee river. Captain Fyfe was in command and

at once decided to attack the enemy, who were entrenched on the slope

facing him behind the Fontaine Crosilles--Crosilles road. Between the

road and the river was a line of wire entanglements, and in addition a

field-gun was in action against us at point blank range. Having examined

the wire, Captain Fyfe led the companies through and found the enemy

holding a communication trench running obliquely from the road. This was

at once attacked and five machine-guns captured. At this point a Bosche

coming out of a dug-out raised his rifle and shot Captain Fyfe, who

subsequently died of wounds. The Hun was at once despatched but little

satisfaction did that give for the death of one of our bravest and most

gallant officers. In front of the communication trench a further enemy

post was discovered in trenches. This was bringing machine-gun fire to

bear on the captured position. Lieut. Legate accordingly with four men

attempted to rush this post by advancing from shell hole to shell hole.

But in this gallant attempt he was killed, and the two companies, now

left without a single officer, decided to hold on to what they had

gained. This action, however, made the enemy on our front withdraw and

the left flank of the assaulting battalions was protected.

The remainder of the Battalion which had swung to the left now joined

"B" and "C" Companies, and the whole Battalion moved to the right flank

of the Brigade and formed up on the road in rear of the 6th H.L.I. to

support them in the attack on Riencourt. This was timed for 4 p.m., then

4.30 p.m. Then orders were received that the advance would be against a

limited objective, but that also was cancelled, and the welcome news

came that we would be relieved by the 57th Division. Prior to this we

had to send two companies to hold Fontaine Crosilles, to cover the gap

between ourselves and the Canadians. "A" and "C" Companies were sent

there under command of Acting R.S.M. Jones, as by this time there was

only one company officer left with the Battalion--Lieut. W.H. Milne.

The relief took place and we moved out on the morning of 28th August.

During the night our Headquarters were in a captured pill box, where

files of papers and maps dealing with defence schemes were collected. It

appears that this pill box had been a last obstacle to our attacks in

this part in 1917, but had not been taken then.

The total casualties in the operations from 24th to 28th August were:

Officers killed, 2, died of wounds, 2, missing, 3, wounded, 8; other

ranks killed, 18, died of wounds, 1, wounded and missing, 9, wounded,

247. Total officers, 15; other ranks, 275.

There is a great reaction after a battle. Soon after we left our

position we found our field-kitchens and had a good breakfast, preceded

by a tot of rum, and as we continued our march to Mercatel songs and

jokes filled the air. Arriving at Mercatel dog tired we slept for long.

When we awakened it was to reorganise into four companies of two

platoons each, indent for damaged and lost equipment and generally get

ready to carry on.

On the 1st of September we again were on the move forward, arriving at

Bullecourt on the following day. From there on the 3rd we moved by

Riencourt to a jumping-off point in the Hindenburg Support Line. Here a

bloodless battle was engaged in. The Brigade received orders to attack

Queant and Pronville, taking up a line beyond these places and linking

up with the Guards Division on the right. We along with the 7th H.L.I.

were the leading battalions. As Queant and Pronville were found to be

unoccupied the barrage was cancelled and these places were occupied

without a fight and a section of the Hindenburg Line near Tadpole Copse

was held. This line was held until the 7th when we were relieved and

went into a bivouac area near St. Leger. The day we came out we got

heavily shelled with gas and had a number of casualties. We had a good

rest at St. Leger, where the ingenuity of the man was tested in

erecting shelters, the conditions of Palestine being reproduced as we

lay in an open valley devoid of cover, but here the bivouac was required

not as a shelter from the sun, but from the rain and cold, a more severe

test to the architect. As always happened, the Battalion was very soon

housed, the degree of comfort varying with the skill of the craftsman.

The villages round about were not nearly so badly smashed up as the ones

further back; there were certainly very few roofs to be seen, but most

of the walls stood.

[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS.

24/27th AUGUST, 1918.]

The Bosche airmen were by no means reduced to impotency. On the 15th

September we saw them shoot down in flames six of our sausage balloons,

all on the sector in front of us and apparently without loss to himself.

On other days we saw more of our balloons coming down in flames, but it

never seemed to make any difference, as soon after fresh balloons rose

in their places and these solitary eyes of the gunners had recommenced

their harrying work.

While at St. Leger our Corps commander, Lieut.-General Sir Charles

Ferguson, addressed the Brigade and complimented it on the work done. He

said our Division had made a name for itself in France, but warned us

that reputations made by Divisions in France did not always last. The

Divisional Commander, Major-General John Hill, also visited us and

presented a number of military medals.

On 13th September a party of officers were taken by motor lorry to

Pronville, and after a two-mile tramp across country reached the part of

the Hindenburg Support Line in which the Headquarters of the battalion

we were to relieve were situated. Before, however, these Headquarters

were reached, a miscellaneous assortment of gas shells landed in the

neighbourhood of the trench, and the gas-masks were donned. It was

accordingly an extremely breathless and hot group of officers who

finally arrived at the Headquarters dug-out, and their tempers were not

at all improved by being greeted with shrieks of laughter and told that

the situation was perfectly normal, that gas was put over night and day,

that masks were quite unnecessary, and that with an ample supply of

stout and Irish whiskey the gas actually was good for one and gave one a

better appetite.

By a curious coincidence the battalion we were to relieve were the 1st

Munster Fusiliers, the battalion who had given us our first lesson in

trench warfare, when we had been attached to them for a few days after

our arrival at Gallipoli. We found them now the same cheery fellows, but

we were sorry that they had with them now only one officer who had

served on the Peninsula.

The line here was held in a way we had not encountered yet, although the

general principles of the defence were the same as ever. The main line

of resistance was in the second line of the old Hindenburg Support Line,

and our portion lay between the shattered villages of Inchy and

Moeuvres. In front of this line there were a series of posts in No-Man's

Land, each held by ten or twelve men. The support line was the main

Hindenburg Support Line.

The Munsters had three companies in the line, and one in support. In the

case of the left and centre companies it was fairly simple to get an

idea of the dispositions and make the necessary arrangements for the

relief, although it was impossible to visit the posts outside the line.

The right company, however, was not so simple. There was considerable

doubt as to what ground was held in the neighbourhood of Moeuvres. There

had been continual scrapping. One night we pushed out a new post near

the cemetery, and the next night the enemy drove it in again. It was a

very nasty spot, and it so happened that we had called on the day that

it was our turn to do the pushing, and the Munsters were very busy

making arrangements for the discomfiture of the enemy.

For these reasons it was impossible to find out the dispositions of that

company, and we had to return home with the promise that the situation

would be cleared up before we arrived, and all would be well.

Before we actually went up to the line, we were informed that there was

to be a slight alteration of battalion and brigade boundaries. The

dispositions of our battalion were "D" Company on the right, "C" in the

centre, "B" on the left, and "A" in support. When we did reach the line

to take over on the night of 16th, the redistribution of boundaries cut

out "D" Company's bit of the line altogether, so that they came in as a

second support company, and incidentally they were in the other

brigade's area, as they could not find accommodation in our own sector.

"B" Company were all outside the main trench, and were disposed with two

posts in front and a support with their headquarters in No-Man's Land.

There was no wire on the enemy's side of our position, though there was

a perfect labyrinth of very heavy wire behind us.

"C" Company, which was only thirty-five strong at this time, had their

headquarters in a deep dug-out in the line of resistance, along with a

very small support. The remainder of the company was occupying two

posts, one about 500 yards up a trench which ran straight towards the

enemy, and in which the enemy had a post just over the road beyond ours:

the other was about 250 yards to the right of this, on the far side of

the road and absolutely in the open. This was the post which was held by

Corporal Hunter and six men, and it was merely a small pit dug in the

ground.

"D" Company for that night were housed in a deep dug-out in the main

support line, with their headquarters in a concrete faced shelter in the

back wall of the trench, excellently sited if we had been fighting the

other way, but well-known to the enemy, and getting hit by about three

out of every five shells aimed at it, as did all the other dug-outs and

shelters in the line.

"A" Company were in support on the left flank.

The night of the relief was quiet, and except for continual desultory

gas shelling nothing of note occurred. Early on the 18th it was decided

that "D" Company should relieve "C" Company that night, partly because

the company was outside our Brigade area, but principally because "C"

Company was far too weak numerically for the extent of front it had to

hold, and even the posts were not sufficiently strongly garrisoned.

During the day "D" Company lent "C" Corpl. I. Ross and three men to form

a connecting link between the forward posts and their headquarters, and

these were posted about midway up the communication trench. The relief

was to be carried out as soon as it was dark enough to cover the

movement.

The enemy decreed otherwise. Just as we were about to "Stand To" in the

evening, a barrage of gas shell and high explosive came down on the

whole line. For three quarters of an hour it was impossible to enter the

main Hindenburg support trench. We could only sit in our dug-outs and

wonder what was happening. The stories we had heard of the Bosches being

in the third and fourth lines of our systems in the March advance,

before it was known that an attack was taking place, came vividly into

our minds, and our great anxiety was that we should not be caught like

rats in a trap.

Every telephone line in the system went "dis" in the first three

minutes, and it was quite impossible to find out what was happening

until the shelling should have moderated a little. We had just to rest

our souls in patience, and relight the candles as they were put out by

the concussion every time a shell struck the dug-out. This was the

constant occupation, both in the deep dug-outs and in the concrete faced

shelters in the main support line, and not for the first time we

blessed the Germans for the good solid workmanship of these dug-outs.

Shortly after the barrage came down details of the battalion on our

right began to pass the dug-out where "D" Company was located, and

Sergt. Meiklejohn, who was in charge there, at once got two platoons out

of their shelter, and formed a flank facing Moeuvres, reporting his

action. Beyond this movement, there was no information of any kind, but

from it we were able to judge that an attack had been made at least on

the right.

As soon as the shelling moderated, it was determined to carry through

the relief of "C" Company. Two platoons of "D" Company were ordered to

move to the relief at once; the remaining two were instructed to hold

the flank position they had taken up, until the situation became a

little clearer, and meantime they were to try to get someone, whose job

it was to hold that part of the line, to take over from them; if they

succeeded in this they were to rejoin their company in "C" Company's

area.

The first thing to be done was to ascertain what had really taken place.

There was a strong suspicion that an attack had been made on the right.

Had it developed on our own front? Were our posts in front still intact?

"C" Company, like everyone else, had had a most uncomfortable time, and

they had not sufficient men to send out patrols to visit their posts. It

was, therefore, determined that as soon as "D" Company arrived, strong

patrols should be sent along the trench to gain touch with the battalion

on our right, if there was one; and forward to find out how the posts

had fared. As soon as this information was obtained, the relief was to

take place, with any new dispositions the information obtained rendered

desirable.

Our first bit of news arrived from a curious quarter. In the general

excitement, Stretcher-Bearer Chester of "C" Company had not been noticed

for some time, although he had not been missed, and now while the

arrangements were being made he arrived at the Company Headquarters. On

being asked where he had been, he told us that he had been out at the

post at the end of the communication trench to see if there was anything

doing in his line. He had found the post and everything was all right.

This information was most reassuring, but it was decided that the patrol

must be sent in spite of it, and with instructions that it was to find

out about the other post as well.

The connecting post half-way up the communication trench had been a

particularly warm corner, and Corpl. I. Ross had been wounded in several

places early in the barrage. In spite of this he had refused to go back,

and had carried on for over an hour, visiting the various posts and

doing invaluable work. It was only now that under a direct order he

consented to leave the line, taking with him to Battalion Headquarters

the first report of the situation. For his plucky conduct he was awarded

the Military Medal.

The patrol sent to "C" Company's posts in front, found that in the

trench intact. After a consultation with the N.C.O. in charge, he and

Sergt. Glover got out of the trench, and went to visit Corpl. Hunter's

post. The two N.C.O.'s had not gone more than 30 yards when they were

met with a shower of stick-grenades thrown from a position between the

posts. They had to beat a hasty retreat, and were lucky to get back to

the trench with no more damage than a wound to "C" Company's corporal.

As soon as this was known, Corpl. M'Ewing and Pte. J. Adams made the

second attempt to reach the post. This time it was an effort to reach

the post across country and unseen, but when M'Ewing and Adams were just

short of the Moeuvres-Inchy Road, a couple of Verey lights were fired

from the far side of the road and a considerable number of Bosches were

seen. A blatter of musketry was opened on them, and they too had to give

up the attempt and return.

A third attempt was made later, but it fared no better than the previous

ones, and we were reluctantly compelled to assume that the post had been

scuppered. The patrol along the trench to the right went as far as the

junction of the shallow trench leading round the cemetery, and did not

get touch with anyone.

It was now determined to carry out the relief at once, and as no

information could be obtained as to what had happened on the right, it

was decided to relieve "C.'s" remaining advanced post, and to form a

defensive flank along the communication trench. The remainder of "D"

Company arrived at this time after handing over to another battalion,

and the new dispositions were made, "C" Company, now reduced to

seventeen men, taking up "D's" old headquarters about 10 p.m.

The remainder of the night was normal, but the situation was most

uncomfortable. Our own patrols had located a considerable number of the

enemy round the posts. We guessed the situation fairly correctly, but it

was not till the 19th that we learned definitely what had happened. The

enemy had made a determined effort to retake Moeuvres, and our right

flank was just on the edge of his attack. Owing to the determined

defence of two companies of the right Brigade, the enemy had not got

much for his pains, but he had succeeded in driving in nearly all the

advanced posts to the right of our sector.

Nothing further occurred till 4 p.m. on the 18th, when a bombing attack

was made on our post at the end of the communication trench. The post

was driven back a short distance, but managed to regain its position

without loss. Meanwhile the S.O.S. had been sent, and for half an hour

we had an excellent daylight firework display, right along the road in

front, and incidentally on Corpl. Hunter's post. The enemy started

retaliation at once, and cut our telephone wires as usual, so that once

we had got the barrage on we could not turn it off without considerable

delay.

At dark on the night of 18th "A" Company relieved "D," who now retired

for a space. Just before dawn on the 19th one man of "C" Company came in

through "B" Company's right post. He was one of Corpl. Hunter's devoted

band, and along with another had been sent to see about rations, and

give information about the post. Unfortunately his pal was killed by an

enemy grenade, and he was the first person to let us know that the post

was still gamely holding out. It was too late, however, to do anything

that night.

In the early afternoon of the 19th we were informed that we were to be

relieved by the Canadians that night, and about 4 p.m. we were told that

the Brigade on our right was going to re-establish all the lost ground

under a barrage at 5 p.m. The barrage was to extend along the whole

front, and our "A" Company was to push forward the post in the

communication trench and to re-occupy Hunter's post, on the assumption

that it was lost, but we hoped otherwise. The 7th H.L.I., acting on our

right flank, were to re-establish the posts round the cemetery, and form

a link between us and the battalion on our right.

Lieut. W.H. Milne, with one half of "A" Company, endeavoured to push

forward in the communication trench, but failed to get beyond the road.

Meanwhile Captain Donald, with the other half of the company, jumping

off from the centre of the communication trench, followed hard on the

barrage. But Captain Donald was killed, and his party had heavy

casualties and rather lost direction.

Between 7 and 8 o'clock "D" Company was sent up to support "A." The

situation was extremely obscure. We knew what had happened in the

trench, but no reports had been received yet from either Captain

Donald's party or the 7th H.L.I., who had jumped off from the same

place. Some of the men who had gone over, came in about 8 o'clock, and

from various reports we were able to piece together the fact that 7th

H.L.I. had got their objectives. A little later two men of "C" Company

came in to Advanced Company Headquarters, and told us that they belonged

to Hunter's post, and that he was still holding the post with two men,

and had sent them in to try to find out what was happening. A platoon

was at once told off to relieve them, and a few minutes later we were

able to welcome them back.

[Illustration: MOEUVRES, SEPT. 1918.

SCALE, 1: 20,000.]

These men had gamely stuck to their post for 96 hours. They had no food

or water other than what they had taken with them, namely, what is

technically known as "the unexpired portion of the day's ration," and an

iron ration each and a water bottle full of water. They had been

continually surrounded by enemies and had beaten off every attack. They

had yielded not a foot of ground, in spite of the fact that our own

barrage had twice passed over them. They had no information, and no

orders beyond those given when they were mounted, and yet they remained

at their post until they were covered by our own troops in front of

them. For this deed Corpl. Hunter got the V.C. and was promoted

Sergeant: the other six men of his post each got the D.C.M.

Between ten and eleven a full strength battalion of the Canadians

relieved us, and they found that their first job was to dig shelters for

their men, as the three or four dug-outs which had served to protect our

small battalion were quite insufficient for them. By midnight we were on

our way home to Queant.

Our four days at Moeuvres were among the most trying we spent in the

war, and we have the presumption to think we did well. Three companies

received a special message from the Brigadier. The fourth company would

have got it also, but by the luck of the war it was out of all the

scrapping. "B" Company were occupying a most uncomfortable position for

four days in No-Man's Land, but the enemy did not think it worth while

visiting them. Consequently this company, owing to the fact that they

had no opposition, had to hold the front for four days unrelieved, and

were through no fault of their own omitted.

The telephones were never working when they were most required, but that

was no fault of the signallers. The incessant enemy shelling was

continually cutting the wires, and it was as a rule only for odd

intervals of half an hour at a time when things were quiet that

Headquarters was through to companies. In spite, however, of the

heaviest shelling the signallers never allowed a break to go unmended,

and they were continually out under heavy fire repairing the damage. The

state of the telephone service forced us to rely on a sadly depleted

staff of runners, and right well did they do their job. All companies

were so weak that two men was the most they could spare for this most

important service, yet these men, without a grouse and with no rest for

four days, were continually carrying messages between the different

headquarters, and that too in record time. From "C" Company Headquarters

to Battalion Headquarters was a good seventeen minutes hard walking, yet

runners from these Headquarters frequently delivered messages within ten

minutes of the time they were written, and were back with a reply in

twenty minutes. The good work of at least three runners was recognised

with the award of the Military Medal.

During this tour we lost four valuable officers. Captain W.F. Donald,

M.C., who had been with us rather less than a fortnight, was killed

while leading his company to retake Hunter's post. In the late days of

the war we had felt fortunate in having an experienced officer of his

calibre posted and had welcomed him as a company commander, an officer

very difficult to replace. Lieut. A. Bryson, another newcomer, was

dangerously wounded on the night of 19th September while acting as

Liaison Officer between 7th H.L.I. and ourselves, and died three days

later. On the 17th our M.O., Captain K. Ross, was killed by a shell

while visiting the companies, and Lieut. T.B. Clerk, the Adjutant, was

wounded at the same time.

Lieut. R. Turnbull was blown down one of the shafts of "C" Company's

Headquarters by the concussion of a shell on the night of 17th but

fortunately no damage was done. Lieut. Hillson met a gas shell in the

entrance passage of Battalion Headquarters, and had an extraordinarily

jaundiced appearance for days, but otherwise was neither physically nor

mentally upset. Lieut. W.H. Milne was struck on the back by a grenade on

the last night, but he too was unhurt.

On the 24th we relieved the 6th H.L.I. in a sector to the right of

Moeuvres and little happened there, a contrast to our last tour in the

line. A few deserters came over, a convenient road being by a

communication trench which led from one line to the other. One deserter

had been an Orderly Room Clerk at Cologne; he forged a railway pass for

himself to Cambrai, walked from there to the German front line until he

came to the Bosche block in this communication trench opposite ours. He

then told the corporal he was going to desert, and far from being

discouraged was told by the corporal that had it not been for a wife and

family in Germany he would have joined him. Later on one of the post

also came over. The Division opposite was a cavalry one and they were

poor fighters and were practically all captured later on.

On the 27th a general attack was made on the Canal du Nord and

continuing to the right of Bourlon Wood. In this attack our Brigade had

to clear up the Hindenburg front line between Moeuvres and the

Bapaume-Cambrai road. We were in reserve to the Brigade and for a change

were spectators of the battle, the only active operations falling to us

in the plan of battle being to rush two posts in a communication trench

just in front of our line when the barrage commenced. This was

successfully done and we remained in our old front line. Some tanks came

up over night and made good tracks through the dense wire in front of

us. As only a hurried reconnaissance had been made on the previous

afternoon it spoke much for their eye for country that they were led to

the exact spots arranged. The barrage opened just before daybreak and as

the light increased we saw that the tanks had got across the canal and

were labouring up the hill beyond, all very busy shooting and none

knocked out. As the result of this attack, Bourlon Wood was evacuated by

the enemy and positions established by our troops beyond and on both

flanks of the wood. Soon after daylight the stream of prisoners began to

pass through us and continued all day. It was a good sight to see them

being made to carry our wounded. They seemed very ready to volunteer,

though certainly for no philanthropic reasons. Unwounded prisoners were

not allowed to go back without assisting our casualties, hence the

volunteers.

After a successful battle one was always struck with the altered

conditions of the old front line. What one morning may have been a very

hot spot, in the afternoon becomes quiet and pleasant. No-Man's Land is

explored and the various problems about the enemy's posts and trenches

are solved. The enemy wire was extraordinary thick but the tank tracks

excellent. Here and there had been made tank traps--large pits with

vertical sides--but they had been avoided.

On the night after this battle we settled for a few days in our old

front line, to the left of the Cambrai-Bapaume road, not sleeping much

owing to the cold. Some salving was done round about Moeuvres. Meanwhile

other Divisions were continuing the advance and the outskirts of Cambrai

had been reached, and following the usual practice both flanks were

pushing on, leaving the town itself in a salient. On the 1st of October

we moved forward again, crossing the St. Quentin canal and going into a

line in support of the front line. Our transport lines were established

at Cantaing, beside the field-guns. This shows the change that had taken

place in our dispositions; it was now approaching a war of movement.

While it was handy to have transport lines close up, it was costly in

horse-flesh, the gunners having heavy losses, mostly from high velocity

shells. "C" Company Headquarters, which was merely an uncovered cut in a

trench, got a shell into it and four officers were wounded and C.S.M.

Jones, who had acted as R.S.M. for some time, was killed. He was a very

brave soldier and had been with us since early in 1916. Our area in

front of Cambrai was constantly being shelled; probably the enemy was

getting rid of his ammunition dumps in this way, preferring to send his

shells over at us to blowing them up later on. Whatever the reason was,

it was a lively spot, the bridges on the St. Quentin canal among the

woods and his old ammunition dumps in these woods being favourite

targets, the sound of the bursting shells and exploding dumps being

intensified by the trees and hollows.

On the night 4/5th October we took over the line from the 5th Royal

Scots Fusiliers and elements of the 4th K.O.S.B. They had been in action

in an attack against a suburb of Cambrai called the Fauberg de Paris. We

were informed that the line consisted of posts and a redoubt and that

these could not be visited by day, as no communication trenches led up

to them and the ground was under direct machine-gun fire from the enemy.

"D" Company was sent to take over the redoubt; Headquarters was

established in a pill box on a road leading towards Cambrai. This became

a popular rendezvous for tourists in the disguise of gunners and others,

and resulted in some brisk shelling from the enemy, but these pill boxes

were well made and no damage was done. At night we nearly lost our

Quartermaster and rations, as speeding up the road he passed the pill

box, and was only stopped by a forward post from going over to the

enemy by mistake. These discoveries cannot be pleasant and one can

imagine the rations came back even quicker than they went up. "D"

Company found the redoubt they were supposed to be taking over to be a

myth. There was no redoubt, only a maze of trenches a foot or so in

depth, sufficient to appear on air photos and so inserted on our maps of

the enemy's trenches. They had a hard time patrolling to send back

correct dispositions; they were more or less in the air. In addition to

the work on hand "D" Company received orders to make an attack along a

trench to their right; this, however, was cancelled, as we got word that

the 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers would relieve us on the night of the

5/6th. This relief was completed by 2.30 on the morning of the 6th and

we marched back to the area recently left by us near the Canal du Nord.

As we crossed the bridge of the St. Quentin Canal not a shot was fired

at us, a very remarkable thing, as intermittent shelling there had been

going on all night. A few high velocity shells chased us through

Cantaing, and then no interruption to a weary march finishing for the

different companies at various hours after daybreak. The spell in the

line at Cambrai was very short but as breezy a 24 hours as one could

want, considering there was no special battle on.

We were now sent away from the battle area for a rest and on the 8th

October arrived at Lignereuil, where we remained for ten days. Here for

some unaccountable reason we had a first class chateau to ourselves. The

estaminet attached sold very bad red wine at twelve francs a bottle.

Only troops just out of the line would have bought it. Lignereuil lies

near Avesne le Compte in very pretty country, and we were much the

better of the rest in a place not churned up with shell holes.

On 19th October we moved back to our old quarters in Mont St. Eloy,

finding there no trace of our previous labours at improvement; beds and

tables all gone west. The next day the march to Henin Lietard was most

interesting, though the rain fell in torrents. Our route was by Neuville

St. Vaast, Vimy Ridge, Willerval, through the area we had been in for

some months; now the ridge was miles behind the line. The roads leading

up to the old enemy line were execrable. After getting about four miles

behind the old line the villages were not so shattered and at Henin

Lietard some houses were almost intact; the coal mines, however, had

been ruined, and into some canals had been turned. Booby traps were

numerous, and special companies were hunting for them. Their presence

gave us confidence in living in the houses chosen for billets; but a few

days later, we afterwards heard, a number of these were blown up by

mines with delayed action. We continued our march in the direction of

Douai, reaching Planque on the 21st and stopping there for three days.

The further we went the better the condition of the villages became. At

Planque the houses looked intact, though the interiors were strewn with

rubbish; still after some cleaning up it looked quite well and by a

little selection the billets became quite well furnished. The only place

the enemy had blown up was his bathing establishment and delousing

plant, a fine place built of concrete.

From Flines we marched to Landas, and after one night there we moved to

Lecelles. We were gradually overtaking the Hun, and this village

received unwelcome attentions from his guns and aeroplanes. The

civilians had been sent away, but many of them visited their homes by

day to collect the produce of their gardens and to salve odd pieces of

furniture. Part of the village seemed to disappear daily, and one could

see that a comparatively short time was required to produce such sad

sights as we had seen around Vimy. During our week at Lecelles we did

some useful training. The Corps Commander announced his intention of

inspecting the Battalion at work; and, having made the most minute

preparations for this event, including the engaging at great risk of a

L.T.M. Battery to give a vivid touch to our company schemes, we got

orders to move to St. Amand, being now in Brigade reserve. Once more we

were fortunate in our billets, but at this stage of the war even the

front line was not without its comforts.

On our Divisional front the enemy was holding a line fortified by the

River Escaut, the Jard Canal, and a flooded area. It was not intended

that we should attack him here. The plan was to push him on both flanks

and thus force his withdrawal from a position, a frontal assault upon

which would have involved heavy loss, even granted that his numbers were

few. Very close touch was maintained by means of patrols, which had to

employ somewhat primitive rafts to negotiate the intervening water. The

Hun's withdrawal was clearly a matter of hours, and on the morning of

the 8th November we moved forward to Odomez in readiness for the chase.

The same day we received the code word which set in motion the machinery

of pursuit.

The following morning, with the aid of a very temporary bridge, we

continued our advance. The retreating enemy had made a thorough job of

the cross-roads, and guns and transport had to make wide detours. But

before we arrived the civilians were busy, some with shovels, others

with their hands, filling in the enormous craters. The people seemed to

be dazed with excitement. The sudden relief after four years of misery

proved too much for one poor woman, who in her sheer joy lost the kindly

light of reason. We halted for a few hours at Chene Raoul, but time was

precious, and by night we were in comfortable billets across the Belgian

border.

At dawn on the 10th November we set out for our last taste of the war,

little thinking that our hours of danger and discomfort were now

numbered. The Battalion was advanced guard to the Brigade, which was

moving forward via Pommeroeul, Hautrage, and the Bois de Baudour.

In the advance from Vimy we had so far been only among the first

friendly troops to enter the villages deserted by the Hun; now we were

the first, and we shall not readily forget the enthusiasm with which we

were greeted. We were bombarded with flowers, coffee, and cigars. The

generosity of these kind people was much greater than their knowledge of

the enemy's dispositions, with the result that our approach was well

advertised. The latter part of our advance was along the north edge of

the Bois de Baudour. Immediately east of Garenne we had to cross a wide

gap, and here the enemy machine-guns, which were cunningly sited and

carefully concealed, got busy. As our van-guard closed with him, one

Hun, whose gun was mounted at the top window of a house, waved the white

flag. The ruse, however, was transparent, and the last shot of the war,

as far as we were concerned, silenced him.

At 17.00 we got orders to relieve the cavalry outposts; but, as this

would have involved a considerable march in an anti-Bosche direction,

the spirit, rather than the letter, of this order was obeyed. At about

midnight the shelling, which had been fairly heavy, ceased, and some

hours later there was not a sound to be heard. Patrols sent out before

dawn reported that all was clear for over a mile. It had been a bitterly

cold night, and we were quite glad when it was time to move again.

At 07.00 on the 11th November we set out for our last attack, our

objective being the Mons-Jurbise road. There was no opposition of any

kind and by 09.00 we had reached the objective. Our job had proved an

easy one, and we quite expected to get orders to continue the pursuit.

But of a sudden there arose a clatter of hoofs and an obviously excited

transport officer dashed up to the Commanding Officer, brandishing one

of the pink forms we had learned to hate. But never before had an Army

Form borne such a message as this: "Hostilities will cease at 11.00;

until further orders units will not move beyond the position occupied at

that time." At last there had dawned the day for which we had lived--and

so many had died. Strange to relate there was no tremendous excitement.

Perhaps the philosopher spoke truly when he said that one always has a

feeling of regret on doing a thing for the last time. Perhaps we had

been fed on rumours so often that we took this for one. Perhaps we were

too weary in mind and body to grasp the significance of the stupendous

news. Or was it that our thoughts turned at this time to those grand men

who had given their lives for this great end? Whatever the reason, the

fact remains that there was no enthusiasm in keeping with the event.

We had a short spell of outpost duty, and then moved to Erbisoeul a

village about five miles from Mons. Little need be said regarding our

life after the Armistice. On the whole it was quite a pleasant blend of

training, inspections, dances, concerts, football and leave. Erbisoeul

was an attractive village, and there we remained until, thinned by

demobilisation, we were reduced to cadré strength. The last remnant of

the Battalion reached Gailes in May, 1919.

APPENDICES.

I. LIST OF OFFICERS, SENIOR N.C.O.'S, ETC., WHO EMBARKED IN MAY, 1915.

II. ROLL OF OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS

AND MEN WHO DIED ON SERVICE.

III. HONOURS AND AWARDS.

IV. TURKISH ORDERS FOR ADVANCE ON ROMANI.

APPENDIX I

LIST OF OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, AND SENIOR N.C.O.'s WHO EMBARKED FOR

OVERSEAS IN MAY, 1915.

Commanding Officer Colonel F.L. MORRISON, V.D.

Second in Command Major T.L. JOWITT.

Adjutant Major J.R. SIMSON, H.L.I.

Quartermaster Lieut. T. CLARK.

Padre Major A.J. CAMPBELL.

Medical Officer Captain A.D. KENNEDY.

Signalling Officer Lieut. R.H. MORRISON.

Machine Gun Officer Lieut. A.B. CURRIE.

Transport Officer Lieut. W.L. BUCHANAN.

R.S.M. J. ALEXANDER, H.L.I.

R.Q.M.S. A.M. STEEDMAN.

Pipe Major J. THOMSON.

Orderly Room Sergeant A. KELLY.

Transport Sergeant R. BIRRELL.

Pioneer Sergeant W. STEVENSON.

Signalling Sergeant D. BONE.

"A" COMPANY.

O.C. Major A. MARSHALL DOWNIE.

Second in Command Captain GEORGE MORTON, JUNR.

C.S.M. J. MATHIESON.

C.Q.M.S. D.K. MILLER.

No. 1 Platoon. Lieut. W. BECKETT. SERGT. D. ORR.

No. 2 " " " T. KEANEY.

No. 3 " " L.G. AITKEN. " D. M'DONALD.

No. 4 " " J.G. MILNE. " R. ROBERTSON.

"B" COMPANY.

O.C. Captain J. M'DONALD.

Second in Command

C.S.M. J. SMITH.

C.Q.M.S. F.W. ADAMS.

No. 5 Platoon. Lieut. N.R. CAMPBELL. Sergt. J. ARTHUR.

No. 6 " 2nd Lieut. LEWIS MACLELLAN. " R. ALLAN.

No. 7 " 2nd " R.E. MAY. " J. STEWART.

No. 8 " 2nd " R.M. MILLER. " G. MILLER.

"C" COMPANY.

O.C. Captain J.B. NEILSON.

Second in Command Captain D.E. BRAND.

C.S.M. D. CHRISTIE.

C.Q.M.S. H. CAMERON.

No. 9 Platoon. 2nd Lieut. J.W. MALCOLM. Sergt. J. STANGER.

No. 10 " " T.A. FYFE. " W. M'INTOSH.

No. 11 " 2nd " J.W. MAIN. " J. COUBROUGH.

No. 12 " 2nd " J.C. CLARK. " W. THOMSON.

"D" COMPANY.

O.C. Captain J.A. FINDLAY.

Second in Command Captain J.D. BLACK.

C.S.M. R. M'LEOD.

C.Q.M.S. W.C. HENDERSON.

No. 13 Platoon. Lieut. J.F. MOIR. Sergt. A. CLIMIE.

No. 14 " 2nd Lieut. E.T. TOWNSEND. " R. BEST.

No. 15 " 2nd " L.H. WATSON. " E. ROBINSON.

No. 16 " " E.M. LEITH. " D.T. PATTERSON.

APPENDIX II

ROLL OF OFFICERS, WARRANT OFFICERS, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND MEN

WHO DIED ON SERVICE.

(A) OFFICERS

Col. F.L. Morrison, C.B., D.S.O., V.D.

Lt.-Col. J.R. Simson, D.S.O., att. 5th K.O.S.B.

Major A.M. Downie.

Major J.A. Findlay, D.S.O.

Major T.L. Jowitt.

Capt. J.D. Black, M.C.

Capt. W.L. Buchanan.

Capt. W.F. Donald, M.C., 9th H.L.I.

Capt. T.A. Fyfe, M.C.

Capt. E.F.M. Frost.

Capt. J. MacDonald.

Capt. L. MacLellan, M.C.

Capt. J.G. Milne.

Capt. G. Morton, Junr.

Capt. P. M'L. Thomson, att. 5th A. & S.H.

Capt. E.T. Townsend.

Lieut. A.E. Barbé, att. R.A.F.

Lieut. R.G. Gardner.

Lieut. F. Legate.

Lieut. A.H. Malcolm, 9th H.L.I.

Lieut. J.W. Malcolm.

Lieut. C.T. Price.

Lieut. W.P. Scott.

Lieut. G. Sillars.

Sec.-Lieut. A. Bryson.

Sec.-Lieut. W. Dow, 8th S.R.

Sec.-Lieut. S. Kirby, Border Regt.

Sec.-Lieut. R.E. May.

Sec.-Lieut. E.D. Turner.

Sec.-Lieut. A.M. Turner.

Capt. K. Ross, R.A.M.C.

(B) OTHER RANKS.

1938 Pte. C. Adams.

55801 " W. Adam.

200432 " A. Ainslie.

3132 " D. Aitkenhead.

200515 Cpl. J. Allcock.

201049 Pte. D. Anderson.

1409 " A. Anderson.

2244 " J. Anderson.

1755 " J. Anderson.

2146 " W. Armstrong.

222 Sgt. W. Arthur.

2293 Pte. W. Auld.

1169 " J. Barr.

200498 " R. Bennett.

201368 " S. Bickerstaff.

201733 Sgt. J. Black, M.M.

55880 Pte. W. Black.

1890 " W. Blair.

55853 " E. Booth.

55769 " C. Bolland.

55803 Pte. C. Bowman.

1819 " W. Bogle.

201609 " P. Brady.

201427 " J. Bradley.

1676 " A. Brandie.

200816 " J. Brannigan.

B/8918 " M. Breen.

201488 L.C. G. Bremner.

1549 Pte. J. Broadfoot.

201467 " J. Brophy.

33081 Sgt. J. Brown.

201167 Pte. R. Brown.

201367 " T. Brown.

26955 " J. Bruce.

201153 " J. Burns.

2437 " S. Bustard.

58 " J. Callaghan (1/1st L.D.C.C.)

3583 Cpl. W. Callaghan.

1372 " R. Cameron.

200183 " J. Campbell.

3323 Pte. J. Campbell.

27497 " D. Chisholm.

1612 " C. Chisholm.

200177 " A. Christie.

200587 " J. Clark.

201529 " H. Clark.

2013 " J. Cleugh.

36334 " E. Cockburn.

200417 " G. Collins.

2847 Sgt. T. Conley.

25484 Pte. R. Constable.

465 " P. Croal.

2161 " A. Crystall.

2275 " J. Curran.

9 " W. Currie.

1741 Cpl. G. Cuthbertson.

3376 Sgt. A. Denny.

5000 Pte. J. Deuchar.

203411 " W. Dickson.

55809 " J. Dixon.

200664 Sgt. T. Dobbie.

201175 " J. Docherty.

3174 " C. Docherty.

4075 " P. Docherty.

2669 " C. Donnaghue.

200864 " J. Dornan.

1610 Pte. J. Dow.

1669 Sgt. D. Downs.

200393 Cpl. J. Dunbar.

200664 Sgt. T. Dobbie.

201628 Pte. J. Espy.

6537 " J. Faichney.

1908 " G. Fallow.

60556 " J. Farrell.

910 " J. Ferguson.

3541 " A. Ferguson.

4163 " A. Ferrie.

200158 Cpl. J. Field, M.M.

201496 Pte. J. Findlay.

204075 " W. Finlay.

198 Sgt. J. Fleming.

41182 Pte. W. Flynn.

200341 L/C. F. Fraser.

3030 Pte. J. Fraser

201732 Cpl. H. Fricker.

1342 L/C. A. Friel.

1958 Pte. J. Gibson.

203286 " J. Gilliver.

203054 " E. Gittens.

200233 " F. Glancey.

3414 " P. Glen.

4365 " R. Gordon.

201397 " D. Graham.

1206 " J. Green.

2424 " J. Graham.

1424 " H. Grimm.

50559 " E. Halley.

203080 " T. Hamilton.

201704 " W. Harvey.

1769 " J. Haveron.

55834 " G. Hendry.

2845 " R. Herd.

293 " J. Heron.

1628 " S. Hill.

3114 " R. Hinshelwood.

1307 " W. Hogg.

38994 " F. Hopkinson.

2318 " R. Horsburgh.

4109 " G. Houston.

200138 Sgt. W. Howie.

1999 Pte. W. Hunter.

2600 " W. Hutchison.

200571 " J. Hutton.

1678 " W. Jolly.

201135 C.S.M. J. Jones.

1667 Pte. F. Keenan.

33693 " W. Keiller.

203299 Cpl. J. Kelly.

1925 Pte. J. Kelly.

200775 " W. Kennedy.

203051 Cpl. S. Kerr.

32629 Pte. P. King.

200071 L/C. J. Lawson.

1313 Pte. H. Lennie.

1526 " N. Lewis.

1964 Sgt. J. Lindsay.

2814 Pte. J. M'Atomney.

714 " A. M'Aulay.

2797 " S. M'Aulay.

1898 " J. M'Aulay.

201657 " J. M'Bride.

2253 " O. M'Cabe.

201348 L/C. J. M'Cann.

203403 Pte. D. M'Donald.

201103 " J. M'Donald.

113 Sgt. D. M'Donald.

201299 Pte. J. M'Donald.

31040 " A. M'Farlane.

200697 " F. M'Ghee.

55759 " G. M'Gonigle.

200299 L/C. A. M'Gregor.

201081 Pte. D. M'Intyre.

201576 " W. M'Kay.

3128 " J. M'Kechnic.

200407 " N. M'Kenzie.

200665 " R. M'Kenzie.

1943 L/C. D. M'Kenzie.

203298 Pte. R. M'Kie.

1694 Sgt. J. M'Larty.

343 C.S.M. R. M'Leod.

201199 Pte. H. M'Leod.

201727 " C. M'Neil.

1449 Sgt. D. M'Nelly.

1592 Pte. J. M'Phee.

9333 " A. M'Pherson.

2969 " D. M'Pherson.

2895 " W. M'Roberts.

201158 " A. M'Shane.

1799 " J. M'Swann.

201616 " M. M'Varish.

130 " J. M'Gregor, (1/1st L.D.C.C.)

55858 " T. Maban.

832 Pte. J. Main.

35749 " R. Mair.

3051 " A. Maitland.

201129 " J. Malarky.

40190 " D. Malien.

203419 " A. Maun.

2153 " H. Martin.

2154 " J. Matchett.

1561 Sgt. J. Melrose, D.C.M., Croix de Guerre.

1362 Bugler C. Menzies.

484 Pte. D. Mercer.

200429 L/C. R. Miller.

200708 " F. Miller.

201376 Pte. R. Miller.

200239 C.S.M. T. Milne, D.C.M., Serbian Silver Star.

331505 Pte. W. Mitchell.

2360 " G. Mitchell.

1918 " F. Montgomery.

203402 " J. Montgomery.

3688 " J. Morrison.

201459 " S. Morrison.

1184 " W. Morrow.

55784 " T. Mulhill.

2896 " F. Mullan.

200550 " R. Munsey.

1903 L/C. W. Murray.

1704 Pte. A. Murray.

1181 " P. Murray.

201079 " J. Murray.

200591 " D. Murray.

201036 " J. Murray.

201272 " J. Neill.

3013 " C. Neillie.

200701 " H. Nesbit.

2327 " J. Nesbit.

6521 " E. Norris.

203518 Cpl. J. O'Donnell.

1955 Sgt. W. Paterson.

2021 L/C. W. Paterson.

1653 Pte. W. Paterson.

2024 " H. Payne.

42976 " B. Pendrick.

891 " R. Pollock.

652 Cpl. R. Pollock.

200380 L/C. R. Porter.

200128 Cpl. T. Primrose.

2812 Pte. J. Rae.

3133 " J. Rafferty.

201159 " J. Revie.

201318 " G. Rhodes.

200700 " G. Robertson.

55838 L/C. A. Robertson.

371 Sgt. R. Robertson.

344 " E. Robertson.

55829 Pte. D. Ross.

50166 " W. Ross.

1480 " R. Ross.

200698 " W. Roy.

201285 " G. Russell.

32405 " T. Scott.

55862 " W. Senior.

1473 L/C. J. Shields.

200319 Pte. J. Sinclair.

201052 " H. Singleton.

3947 " W. Smillie.

200052 C.S.M. J. Smith.

203287 Pte. J. Smith.

200088 Sgt. P. Smith.

18274 Cpl. W. Smith.

2514 Pte. W. Smith.

1884 L/C. P. Smith.

1241 Pte. W. Smith.

29061 " J. Smullen.

1665 " F. Smythe.

1443 " J. Spears.

4156 " J. Speirs.

99 " W. Spence.

200042 " B. Stafford.

1319 " T. Stark.

200593 " A. Steele.

1866 " A. Steven.

55900 " R. Stewart.

558 C.Q.M.S. J. Stewart.

1726 L/C. H. Stewart.

2041 Pte. A. Stirling.

18473 Pte. A. Sutherland.

33183 " R. Sweeney.

1454 " H. Sweeney.

1911 " J. Sweeney.

201578 " C. Tait.

50109 " G. Taylor.

306 Sgt. J. Thomson.

1991 L/C. C. Thomson.

201347 Pte. D. Thomson.

55741 " H. Tilsley.

50567 " J. Tulloch.

4211 " A. Turnbull.

201178 " W. Turner.

200246 " E. Twaddle.

200473 Sgt. R. Tweedie.

200237 " G. Ure.

2175 Pte. A. Waddell.

55876 " C. Wallace.

1366 " J. Wallace.

2992 " J. Watt.

200236 L/C. A. Watson.

2129 Pte. D. Watson.

3633 " D. Weir.

200834 " C. Wilkinson.

27486 " J. Wilson.

201388 " R. Wilson.

200981 " T. Wilson.

6487 " R. Wilson.

1378 Cpl. W. Wood.

200192 Pte. A. Wotherspoon, D.C.M.

201716 " J. Wyne.

42728 " W. Yorkston.

APPENDIX III

HONOURS AND AWARDS.

(A) Officers.

_Companion of the Bath._

Colonel F.L. MORRISON.

_Companion of Saint Michael and Saint George._

Lieut.-Col. J.B. NEILSON.

_The Distinguished Service Order._

Colonel F.L. MORRISON. Major D.E. BRAND.

Lieut.-Col. J.B. NEILSON. Major J.A. FINDLAY.

_The Military Cross._

Captain J.D. BLACK. Captain L. MACLELLAN.

Captain N.R. CAMPBELL. Captain R.H. MORRISON.

Captain T.A. FYFE. Captain J.T. TULLOCH.

Captain E.M. LEITH. Captain L.H. WATSON.

Captain A.R. MACEWAN. Lieut. I. CARMICHAEL.

Lieut. R.L. SWEET.

_Bar To the Military Cross._

Captain R.H. MORRISON.

_Order of the British Empire._

Captain V.B. STEWART.

_Croix de Guerre._

Lieut. D.M. PITCHFORD.

_Italian Silver Medal._

Captain W. BECKETT.

_Chevalier of the Order of Avis._

Captain E.M. LEITH.

_Chevalier of the Crown of Roumania._

Captain E.M. LEITH.

_Mentioned in Despatches._

Colonel F.L. MORRISON, C.B., D.S.O., V.D.

Lieut.-Col. J.B. NEILSON, C.M.G., D.S.O.

Major D.E. BRAND, D.S.O.

Major J.A. FINDLAY, D.S.O.

Captain W. BECKETT.

Captain N.R. CAMPBELL, M.C.

Captain E.M. LEITH, M.C.

Captain John MACDONALD.

Captain R.H. MORRISON, M.C.

Captain J.T. TULLOCH.

Captain and Q.M. T. CLARK.

Lieut. J.S. AGNEW.

Lieut. W. CUMMING.

2nd Lieut. J.W. MALCOLM.

(B) Other Ranks.

_The Victoria Cross._

43247 Sgt. D.F. HUNTER.

_The Distinguished Conduct Medal._

1854 R.S.M. J. Mathieson.

200244 R.S.M. M. Mackean.

200010 C.S.M. J. Coubrough.

200239 C.S.M. T.G. Milne.

200238 C.S.M. J.J. Twentyman.

203295 Sgt. J. Bryden.

24344 " J. Campbell.

200375 " W. MacGroarty.

200474 " G. Meiklejohn.

1567 " J. Melrose.

200027 " W. Sykes.

201725 Pte. C. Devany.

40666 " J. Fleming.

41617 " W. Gray.

55770 " W. Jones.

200825 " J. MacEwan.

203406 " D. MacFarlane.

200062 " J. Phillips.

201303 " L. Urquhart.

203296 " W. Webster.

200192 " A. Wotherspoon.

_The Military Medal._

201733 Sgt. J. Black.

200846 " J. Creek.

200160 " J. Glover.

200015 " R. Lyon.

200377 " J. Logan.

200811 " C.C. MacLean.

200992 " J. MacNaught.

201215 " J. Malley.

200266 " D. Smith.

200877 Cpl. J. Davidson.

200158 " J.W. Field.

200869 " H. Masterton.

202105 " M. Stevenson.

200553 L/C. A.G. Ross.

201014 " I. Ross.

50155 Pte. J. Alford.

55802 " N. Auld.

55853 " E. Booth.

200307 Pte. G. Clark.

200844 " J. Drummond.

200351 " W. Earl.

27648 " R. Gavin.

21306 " S. Irvine.

201093 " J. Lamb.

40490 Pte. D. Mitchell.

200270 " D. Pirie.

201534 " A. Robertson.

200066 " S. Ross.

202105 " T. Stroyan.

_The Meritorious Service Medal._

200463 R.Q.M.S. G. JENNISON.

200201 Sgt. F.C. CAMERON.

200777 Sgt. T. MARTIN.

200683 Sgt. A. PATERSON.

_Croix de Guerre._

1567 Sgt. J. MELROSE.

_Medaille Militaire._

200094 Sgt. G. DOWNIE.

_Medaille d'Honneur._

200896 Pte. J. KINNIBURGH.

_The Russian Cross of St. George, 4th Class._

200099 Sgt. J. WADDELL.

_Serbian Silver Star, 2nd Class._

200239 C.S.M. T.J. MILNE.

1494 Pte. R. REID.

_Mentioned in Despatches._

200366 R.S.M. J. MATHIESON.

200274 R.S.M. D. MACLAREN.

200012 R.Q.M.S. F.W. ADAMS.

200230 C.S.M. J. ANGUS.

200451 Cpl. J. NOLAN.

200324 L/Cpl. R. BULLOCH.

200681 L/Cpl. E. HAMIL.

2968 Pte. J. M'EWAN.

1567 Pte. J. MELROSE.

APPENDIX IV

TURKISH ORDERS FOR ADVANCE ON ROMANI.

The following is a translation of Turkish orders, found on prisoners

captured near Katia in July, 1916:

MILITARY.

_GENERAL ORDERS--Infantry and Machine-Guns._

1. I expect every officer, of whatever grade, to give an example of

courage to his subordinates. I expect the rank and file to show the

superiority of Turks to British troops, as their comrades have done at

Gallipoli and in Irak.

2. Men are to make all possible use of entrenching tools and sandbags

during attack and defence.

3. Since a continuous supply of S.A.A. cannot be effected, great economy

is to be observed in its expenditure. Consequently both in attack and

defence fire must be opened only at short ranges.

4. Flanking detachments must exercise the utmost vigilance against flank

attacks. Owing to the enemy's great strength in Cavalry, great vigilance

is imperative. On this account unsupported wings must dig in as deeply

as possible.

5. The effect of the enemy's fire on our firing line must be

communicated to the neighbouring Artillery and M.G. Officers, who are

ordered to support our firing line.

If the firing line is not so supported, the effect of the enemy's fire

is to be communicated to the O.C. Infantry for transmission to the

Artillery and M.G. Companies, so that the effect of the enemy's fire may

be countered by Artillery or M.G. assistance to our troops.

6. Infantry must be provided with pistols, firing flares, and red

signalling flags. Our artillery will thus be better enabled to lengthen

their ranges.

7. Our own positions must be indicated by triangular red cloths in

wooden frames, which, however, must not be visible to the enemy.

8. Owing to the close nature of the country and the frequency of mist

(haze) in the morning, constant communication must be kept up with the

first line to avoid accidents from the fire of our own guns.

9. Two Modjidies for every soldier bringing in an enemy rifle.

CAVALRY.

1. In close country, with many hills and obstacles, our reconnaissances

will have a good opportunity of observing the enemy's movements and

camps, beginning with his actual front.

£T.5 reward for all valuable information about the enemy.

2. Reconnoitring parties must do all in their power to capture

prisoners. £T.5 reward per head.

3. As there are no cavalry, reconnaissances will be carried out under

the direction of mounted officers by Beduins attached to them.

ARTILLERY.

1. In the case of entrenched positions. The Turkish Mountain Gun, firing

Austrian Mtn. Gun Shell is to be used against moving (or movable)

targets in the enemy's lines, while the German Heavy Guns are to be

employed against the entrenched positions thereof.

2. As shell is scarce and can only be replaced with great difficulty,

great economy is to be displayed by the Artillery.

3. (Obscure.)

4. Among the chief duties of O.C. Batteries will be choice of

observation stations. With this object, when required, the O.C. Battery

will leave his Battery and observe fearlessly, keeping up communication

with his Battery by telephone over the intervening space.

5. To prevent dust caused by discharge betraying gun positions, mats are

to be spread under the muzzle of each gun.

6. During prolonged infantry encounters O.C.'s of Infantry Units will

send officers to observe the effect of the Turkish Mountain Batteries

and Austrian shells on the enemy's firing line.

H.Q. 1ST EXPEDITIONARY FORCE,

July 9th, 1916.

ORDERS FOR ADVANCE FROM EL ARISH.

1. The regulations regarding the march have been explained in previous

orders.

2. Fresh orders will be issued to the advanced guard on reaching the

line Oghratina--Hod-el-Messia--Mugheibra and to the detachment

proceeding to Bir-el-Abd.

The orders issued on July 8th, 1916, refer to the advance from El Arish.

THE MARCH.

1. The march under war conditions commences from El Arish, _i.e._ it

being probable that hostile reconnaissances will be encountered, the

advance must be effected with the necessary screen. There being a

Turkish Detachment at Bir-el-Mazar, up to this point precautions need be

observed. From Bir-el-Mazar the war zone commences. From this point it

is necessary to separate the advanced guard and main body and send

reconnoitring detachments ahead of the advanced guard.

2. Silence is to be strictly observed on the march. Special attention

must be paid to this by troops moving along the shore. Orders must be

given quietly during night marches. No smoking at night and no use to be

made, if possible, of electric torches after Bir-el-Mazar.

3. It is probable that units moving along the shore may be exposed to

the fire of enemy ships. In this event troops will take to the nearest

cover in an orderly manner without waiting for orders.

4. Every precaution must be taken to facilitate the march, _e.g._

collars, shirts, head-covering to be opened, boots to be removed.

To prevent confusion among the units on the march, the intervals by day

must be increased to 100 metres. Files must be opened to give the men

air. They must be closed at night and all straggling stopped

immediately.

To take advantage of the cool nights to cover long distances, halts must

be shortened.

As a rule the troops will march between 6 and 7 p.m. till 11 p.m. After

a halt from 11 p.m. to 1 a.m. they will proceed so as to reach their

destination by 7 a.m. After every 100 minutes marching troops to halt 20

minutes. Men and animals to be given "a breather" (soluk molasi) after

passing through difficult ground.

5. Draught oxen to be watered at every watering place.

6. In difficult ground where guns and carts cannot be moved by the

teams, they will have to be hauled by guy ropes attached to the wheels.

Where planks have been laid down the assistance of men (hauling) is

necessary. It is every C.O.'s duty and "his honour" (sheref) to render

the maximum assistance to guns and carts in difficult ground. On such

ground limbers and carts will have to be emptied if necessary.

Infantry _must_ assist artillery in the above manner. Artillery Officers

must inform Infantry Officers of extent of their requirements in men for

haulage, and Infantry Officers must obey instructions under this head

issued by their C.O.'s or by Artillery Officers.

INSTRUCTIONS.

1. In order to minimise the results of aeroplane bombs, tents in

encampments are to be scattered and distributed over a considerable

area. Men, animals and transport to be divided into small groups.

2. As enemy aircraft are likely to fly above our camps between 4 a.m.

and 7 a.m. and between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m., and to take our tents as

targets, on the approach of enemy aircraft being reported, troops will

disperse in small groups (which are then to remain stationary) for some

hundred yards away from the centre of the camp. O.C.'s are to select

positions for infantry and machine gun fire against aircraft attacking

camps.

No other units (except those detailed for the purpose) are to fire on

enemy aircraft, and machine-gun and infantry fire is not to be employed

against aeroplanes flying very high.

3. All existing means, and any which can be improvised are to be

employed to protect (men) against the sun, and measures must be taken to

meet cases in which tents are insufficient.

4. As far as Bir-el-Mazar, the covering troops need not be in great

strength. Beyond Bir-el-Mazar the covering forces must be strengthened

and precautions organised against surprise.

Patrols and sentries must be posted during daylight on all dominating

points, and Beduin camel scouts sent out to observe enemy movements and

report in time to the O.C.

In case of surprise the (situation of the) rallying points fixed upon

must be carefully kept in mind. These positions must be shown to

Officers who are Second-in-Command (lit. Assistant C.O.'s) and must be

defensively organised.

5. To avoid discovery by enemy aircraft, tents are to be covered with

earth, mud, scrub, etc.

6. Near camps "simili-camps" (Dummy Camps) are to be pitched in order to

attract the attention of aircraft. Holes are to be dug in the earth to

simulate tents.

7. When the troops are resting a few sentries are to be posted the

better to protect their repose.

8. In order to mark the whereabouts of C.O.'s and other high officers,

special indications must be placed on their quarters (tents).

9. In cases where detachments are separated by a considerable distance,

roads are to be indicated by simple signs.

10. On enemy aeroplanes coming in sight all ranks will lie down, and try

to bury themselves in the sand (Kumlar arasinda kendilerini gyome jek

dir) in order to avoid fragments of bombs.

GLASGOW: PRINTED AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS BY ROBERT MACLEHOSE AND CO.

LTD.

[Illustration: GALLIPOLI AND THE DARDANELLES

(BIRD'S-EYE VIEW)

LOOKING N-EAST FROM CAPE HELLES

NOT DRAWN TO SCALE]