ADVANCE BEYOND GAZA. WADI HESI, SAUSAGE RIDGE, ESDUD, KUBEIBEH, NEBI
SAMWIL, TAHTA.
The 31st brought news of the success of the 20th Corps and the fall of
Beersheba. Preparations were made for removal and on the 1st of November
the Brigade went into Corps Reserve at Regent's Park. That night the
other two brigades of our Division and the 53rd Division went over the
top before midnight, and by dawn had taken the whole of the enemy's
front and support lines from Umbrella Hill to the sea. In so doing they
had bent the seaward end of his defence back on the town, but he was so
heavily echeloned far back along the shore, that it was not until the
7th that a passage could be cleared along the edge of the sea. During
those six days the Battalion lay in instant readiness to move. When it
did move the Turk was still in Gaza in considerable numbers, and when we
were as far north as Esdud we heard that certain strong points in his
line were still holding out. He had, however, began his retreat and we
knew that what we would have to deal with would be rear-guards, prepared
to sacrifice themselves to the last man to save their main body.
At eleven o'clock on the morning of the 7th the Brigade had been under
weigh for an hour and we were tramping over the uneven ground which
marked the site of the enemy's old front line, battered out of all shape
by seven days' artillery bombardment. The sand was more than ankle-deep
and the going heavy in the extreme. The day was hot and steel helmets
were never the lightest of head-gear. Still the men marched admirably
and by 17.00 the Battalion was at the Wadi Hesi, twelve miles north of
Gaza, where the B.G.C. gave orders to secure the ridges on the other
side of the wadi. It was an interesting situation. The Battalion had
halted on the shore, on which it had been marching all day, half a mile
or so south of the Wadi Hesi. Darkness was falling; the two leading
companies ("A" and "B") received orders to move at once across the wadi,
turn inland and secure certain small heights which could with difficulty
be seen. They were informed that the 7th H.L.I. would be following to
occupy other heights on the left. The companies moved and almost
immediately met a cavalry picquet which reported having been driven off
our objective, with the loss of their officer, by a large body of Turks.
The companies got across the wadi and turned inland just off the shore
facing their objective, which was just sufficiently visible for a
compass bearing to be taken. The company commanders having got this
bearing felt a load taken off their minds and as it was now quite dark
made sure of the disposition of their companies. Soon the advance
continued, a hill was reached, but firing from the front indicated that
this was not the objective. A patrol moved out under Lieut. Gilchrist,
who reported another hill in front held by the enemy. This hill was
charged, a deep trench being found a little below the summit; a wounded
Turkish officer was captured and one Turk bayoneted, the rest bolted and
got clear. Our casualties in this charge were six. The hill was
consolidated; a picquet going into position in front captured a Turk
with a rifle almost red-hot. The night was fairly quiet, though
continuous rifle and machine-gun fire went on all night, but as the
bullets were nearly all going beyond our left we surmised the Turks'
next position did not face us. The 7th H.L.I. were now on our left. In
the trenches rushed were found bags of oranges and a pot of hot soup,
which looked as if we had effected a surprise.
With the first suggestions of light on the morning of the 8th our
glasses disclosed some Turks in a trench which seemed to run away from
us and face obliquely to our left. No. 1 and 2 platoons of "A" Company
under Lieuts. Sweet and Parr were despatched to rush this trench,
keeping it on their left as they advanced. This was successfully done
and the trench entered from the back and the garrison of nine brought
back with their arms and equipment and one very hot machine-gun. The
prisoners were big fellows with new equipment and clothing. We had no
casualties in this little raid. A picquet was left in the captured
trench.
When morning broke we found that we were on our objective all right. In
front stretched a wonderful view of a plain studded with orange and
lemon groves with fresh green foliage, odd plantations, cactus hedges
and a village or two. Immediately below us on our right lay a big
orchard with some houses and hidden there were some snipers that worried
us a bit and killed a machine-gun officer and Corpl. Kelly of "A"
Company. Looking behind we saw the importance of having secured the hill
we were on. It made a perfect observation post for observing the shore,
which was now crowded with the remainder of our Division and others just
arriving. Unfortunately there was a similar hill on our left which was
not assaulted by the troops on our left until some hours after daybreak.
We could see Turks on it and soon well-directed shell-fire was sprinkled
along the shore. After this hill was taken the fire was indirect and
much less effective; our own portion had only one dose of the enemy's
shell-fire, but it was brisk while it lasted and there were a few
wounded casualties including Lieut. Tomeny.
In the forenoon it looked as if the Turk might develop a counter attack
from the orchard below us, as some 300 Turks were seen advancing in
extended order into a plantation about 2000 yards away, but an hour or
so later they were seen going back and all sniping stopped. The thick
cover afforded by the plantations made it almost impossible to detect
movement near us.
[Illustration: SAUSAGE RIDGE, DEIR SINEID.]
At 12.30 orders were received from the Brigade to have strong patrols
ready to push into Herbieh to cover the right flank of an attack to be
delivered by the 155th Brigade against the ridge about 4000 yards south
by east of Hesi Summit. This was not necessary, for at 14.45 Colonel
Morrison received instructions for an attack on the southern
continuation of the 155th Brigade's objective. Attacks of this sort are
of necessity quickly arranged, and this resulted in our going into
action without any machine-guns accompanying the infantry, as the
enemy's shell-fire had made it necessary to withdraw their mules to
cover and there was no time to get them back for the start, nor did
artillery fire on either sides play any important part in the coming
battle. There was desultory shelling by both sides till darkness fell,
but we felt sure that neither side suffered any casualties from that
source.
From our position the ridge, known afterwards to the Battalion as
Sausage Ridge, was a crest line, quite four thousand yards away, with
orange groves and undulating country between, thickly sown with enemy
trenches, just newly evacuated by the Turks. The 5th A. & S.H. were to
attack on our immediate right, and the 6th H.L.I. to deliver a
converging attack from the south-west. The ridge was to be carried as
soon as possible, and packs were dumped to make the moving lighter. The
frontage of each battalion was approximately 400 yards and a tree marked
the centre of our objective. The bearing was 113° and as the tree
disappeared almost immediately after the attack was launched, the
advance was compass-directed. As we stood, the objective appeared to be
a slight height just beyond a low saddle in a nearer ridge of hills.
Behind this ridge ran the main road from Gaza northwards, and it was
certain that the enemy would defend it desperately.
"C" and "D" Companies were in the firing-line and at 16.00 the men
dropped down through the orange groves of Herbieh, pulling the ripening
fruit as they passed, and made rapidly for the distant ridge. Before
they were half-way across the level ground darkness had set in. The
Argylls on the right were directing but the 155th Brigade on the left
was completely out of touch. Firing could be heard from their direction
and, as a matter of fact, they had enough to do to hold up an enemy
attack on their left from Askalon. At 17.15 the enemy on our own front
opened a very heavy fire from rifles and machine-guns, and, as we drew
nearer, he began to put up flares in large numbers. It was impossible to
keep in touch with Battalion Headquarters, and the conduct of the attack
and the use of reserves had to be decided by the officer in the front
line. Thus it was that both the reserve companies were put into the
fight before any orders could be received from Colonel Morrison.
The configuration of the ground constituting the immediate objective was
afterwards ascertained to be very different from what it had appeared to
be when viewed from a considerable distance in the gathering darkness.
Instead of a long unbroken ridge our attack fell upon an isolated mound
lying in the centre of a decided indentation on the main ridge. In the
first charge the Battalion carried this mound and that part of the ridge
immediately behind it with the bayonet. Further progress was impossible
owing to machine-gun fire from defiladed positions on the main ridge,
while bombs and rifle grenades were freely used by the enemy. Our men
were able to hold on to the mound and make an effort at consolidation,
assisted by the Argylls, but they were soon forced back from the portion
of the ridge which they had occupied. They fell back to a slight nullah
where they were rallied and hurriedly reorganised. A second advance
and their bayonets retook part of the ridge, but only to be driven off
again. Another time and yet another did they return and capture the
ridge, only to find it untenable. Then Major Findlay decided that it was
useless to make a further attempt and that it was better to hold on to
the mound which had been to some extent consolidated and try to
establish a line running N.N.W. from it. But the enemy pushed his
machine-guns forward and concentrated all his fury on our precarious
position, which he enfiladed from the left and left rear. Gradually its
defenders were driven westwards along the west of the mound into the
depression behind, where they rallied and re-formed, and from which they
retook the position. After a game effort to hold on they were once more
compelled to retire. By this time the fog of battle had enveloped
everything. Major Findlay and Captain Townsend were dead on the top of
the hill. Major Brand and eight other officers were out of action; 190
men were dead or wounded. The remaining officers decided that it was
useless to make any further attack and withdrew to Battalion
Headquarters with the remainder of the men. The Argylls and the 6th
H.L.I. continued to hold a line farther south on the ridge, but out of
immediate touch with the enemy. The Turks still continued their heavy
rifle and machine-gun fire but made no attempt to advance. At midnight
their fire ceased entirely and shortly afterwards the 7th H.L.I.
relieved our Battalion, which moved back to a bivouac area near Herbieh.
[Illustration: AREA OF OPERATIONS.
7/8TH NOVEMBER, 1917.
SCALE 1 INCH TO A MILE]
This was the most severe of our night attacks and the most costly. There
must have been many individual acts of gallantry but the most
outstanding feature of the operations was the collective grit,
determination and bravery of the Battalion. Looking at the position next
day, with our dead lying where they fell, one wondered how any human
valour could have sufficed to capture it, and that not once but four
times. There was none of the glamour of leadership about this fight. In
the pitch blackness every man had to lead himself and it says much that
all led enemywards.
A day's rest, and the Battalion was rear-guard to the Brigade as far as
el Butani, where the 5th A. & S.H. and the 7th H.L.I. were set to clear
the enemy from their positions on the ridges south-west of Esdud. The
6th H.L.I. were in support and our Battalion was not called upon. Next
day was Sunday and Colonel Morrison spent the day in reorganising the
Battalion into two companies; No. 1 company being commanded by Captain
W.L. Buchanan and No. 2 company by Captain R.H. Morrison, while six
Lewis guns went into battalion reserve. The Australian Mounted Division
were at Esdud next day and their innate love for chickens caused a large
picquet of the battalion to be sent into the town to preserve order. The
picquet squatted on the public square, gazed at solemnly by bearded and
unclean descendants of the Philistines and unmoved by the rustlings and
stifled laughter of hidden females. The town itself is almost certainly
built on the site of the ancient Ashdod, one of the Philistine
strongholds, but, if the architecture of the houses lends colour to the
story of Samson's pulling down a temple, it also makes it apparent that
Goliath must have had great difficulty in finding a lodging. No house in
Esdud could have afforded shelter for more than three quarters of him.
For three days the Battalion remained at Esdud and on the 12th moved out
against Yebnah. On the march signs were multiplying to assure us that
the enemy was not standing upon the order of his going, but this day we
expected to get into touch again. There is a long, low line of hills
running north and south through Katrah and Mughair to Zernukah, and here
the enemy stood to guard the road to Ramleh and his lateral
communications to Jerusalem. The Battalion was fortunate for Yebnah fell
without a shot. Not so fortunate the 155th Brigade, for they had a
very stiff day's fighting at Katrah, and only the arrival of the
Yeomanry Division enabled them to carry the position. However by 16.00
the Turks were again in flight on the road to Jaffa. At Yebnah the
Battalion remained for five days, holding an outpost line. From the roof
of a house, which was our observation post, we could see the gleaming
white tower of the monastery of Ramleh, and could hear the sound of its
bells. The natives of Yebnah had oranges and figs for sale but they did
not appreciate the fixation of prices, and their admiration for Colonel
Morrison, their first Christian governor for six centuries, was tempered
by their love of profiteering, now impossible of fulfilment. It was in
this town that the Colonel gave orders to the omdeh or provost for the
production of all arms held by the inhabitants. In about an hour some
forty of the male population paraded at Battalion Headquarters in proud
possession of the most suicidal collection of converted gas-pipes that
the eye of man ever beheld. Abraham might have used them on the plains
of Mamre. There were guns seven feet long, there were guns which might
have been fired in the days of the owner's grandfather, but there was no
gun which would not have been infinitely more dangerous to the firer
than to the target. Of modern rifles, Turkish or British, there was
none. They were probably too deeply buried to be dug up at half an
hour's notice.
[Illustration: ORANGE SELLERS, MEJDEL.]
At 10.30 on the morning of the 18th the Brigade moved northwards along a
road strewed with the jetsam of a retreating army, until Ramleh was
reached. Here a bivouac area was taken up in an olive grove but after
three hours' halt, orders were received for an advance on Ludd, the
ancient Lydda. We arrived at 19.00 and bivouacked beside the road about
half a mile south-west of the town.
Next morning the Battalion passed their starting-point, the
railway-crossing of the Ramleh-Ludd road, at 09.30 and struck eastwards
for Jimzu and Jerusalem. By this time our cavalry had entered Jaffa and
the right wing of the Turkish army was far to the north. The left of
their Gaza force were retreating on or through Jerusalem, and the
intention of our G.H.Q. now was to throw the 52nd and 75th Divisions
across country to try and cut the road running north out of the Holy
City. The 75th had been coming up on our right but some miles away and
slightly in rear, so that while we were crossing the Judean Hills they
were skirting the foothills and advancing through Enab to Biddu. The
155th Brigade was pushed up to Berfilyah and the 156th to Beit Likkia to
protect the left flank of our march across the face of the enemy. The
only road across the hills appeared on the map as an ancient Roman Road,
but it was no better than a goat-track, and in places impossible of
identification. Limbers had to be left midway between Berfilyah and Beit
Likkia. Darkness came down and with it heavy rain, with a strong,
driving south-west wind. The distance as the crow flies is twelve miles
but the actual distance covered must have been nearer twenty. At 22.00
the Battalion reached Likkia, just occupied by the 156th Brigade, and
bivouacked beside the road. The ground was sodden. The men were in light
tropical uniform and drenched to the skin. No fires could be lit and so
the hours passed until the Battalion got orders at dawn to move. Our
objective was Beit Dukka and the establishment of defensive positions to
the south and south-east of it. If ever a road disgraced its name it was
this Roman Road of the maps. Here was no purposeful track, broad, smooth
and white, keeping its way straight through every obstacle. It bent and
twisted and turned. Often it crept underneath a great rock and lost
itself. Fifty yards farther on one would find it, shy and retiring,
slipping down the face of a slab of rock, always with the deceitful
promise that over the next hill it would be better behaved. Instead it
grew worse, until the column was walking in Indian file up steep hill
sides and across the necks of the valleys. At 08.00 the 7th H.L.I.
branched off to strike the town from the north, while the rest of the
Brigade kept on, trying to identify their objective among the numerous
villages which clung under the crests of the hills. The maps were not
exact and the information from G.H.Q. was that Dukka was a village on a
hill commanding considerable country. The village did sit on a hill,
but, unfortunately, the hill was commanded on every side by much higher
hills and Dukka was of no tactical value. So the Brigadier decided to
move on Beit Anan, a similar village situated on the hill commanding
Dukka from the south, and on the road to Kubeibeh, the ancient Emmaus.
Scouts were pushing forward to search Beit Anan, and the head of the
column had just appeared over a crest about 1500 yards from the village,
when a brisk rifle-fire threw the leading companies into some confusion,
and the second in command and scout officer had an experience they will
not quickly forget, lying flat in the open being sniped at by a
machine-gun. The enemy were not in any strength, but it was ten o'clock
before the village was secured. Losses were not slight for they included
Captain W.L. Buchanan, commanding No. 1 company, who was mortally
wounded and died next day.
On being driven out of Beit Anan, the enemy retired up the neck of the
hill to a walled garden situated on its very point and commanding Beit
Anan, as well as the ridges running down from the garden itself. Later
in the day the Turks occupied also the crest to the north-east of Dukka,
from which a dropping machine-gun fire was kept up on the left of our
position. No. 1 company, now commanded by Lieut. M'Lellan, was sent
forward to the ridge, about 800 yards west of the enemy's position,
where they remained that day and next night. No. 2 company held the
front and left of the village. All day we could hear the thunder of the
artillery of the 75th Division far to the south-west of us, beyond the
hills, as they drove the Turks back on Jerusalem. Night fell with a
bitter wind blowing and a chill rain which penetrated to the bone and
tried No. 1 company to the limit of endurance. Tea and blankets were got
out to No. 2 company but, though several attempts were made, it was
impossible to get them to No. 1 company. For twenty hours those men, in
their tropical kit, endured the enemy's sniping and machine-gun firing,
and the bitter cold and hunger and misery, hearing in the early morning
the wind-borne chimes of the chapel bell in Kubeibeh calling the
brothers to matins, until dawn found many of them unable to speak.
During the night a squadron patrol of Hyderabad Lancers rode across the
hills from the 75th Division into our lines, a truly wonderful feat
across unknown country held by the enemy. At dawn the problem was, had
the enemy evacuated the garden. Lieut. Agnew, the scout officer, set out
to find out and C.Q.M.S. Kelly and Sergt. Black volunteered to accompany
him. This is one of the nastiest jobs one can be asked to do. If the
place is held the chances are against the first of the patrol returning
alive. No observation from without was possible as a high wall
surrounded the garden, which belonged to the Summer House of the Latin
Hospice of Emmaus. The wall was approached with some difficulty,
climbed, and only then was it certain that the Turk had gone and had
evacuated his stronghold. The Battalion then moved into the garden and
occupied Kubeibeh.
This village was mainly a colony of Franciscan brothers, Italian and
Spanish, who had a magnificent church and hospice and under whose shadow
the native houses were built. They welcomed us effusively and State
calls were exchanged by Colonel Morrison and the Brother Superior. The
latter esteemed us highly and, although the 75th Divisional Staff
afterwards occupied his hospice, even the glamour of Staff scarlet
failed to dim his eyes to the worth of the plain Scots battalion who
first entered Emmaus. The monastery kept a pig but it was sacrificed
on the altar of friendship and Battalion Headquarters blessed the hand
of S. Francis. In the monastery garden on the hill-top the Battalion
rested for three days, that is, rested from fighting and marching, but
the time was not wasted. The Division set to work on the Roman Road with
pick and shovel and gunpowder and in the three days made it passable for
60-pounder guns from Berfilyah to Biddu.
[Illustration: BERFYLIA.]
On the 22nd the 75th Division crossed our front at Biddu, about two
miles away, and that night they took the Hill Mizpah and the Mosque of
Nebi Samwil with the bayonet. This created a very sharp salient in the
enemy's line defending Jerusalem and its northern exit on the west. The
Turk held firmly to his positions north-east and south of this wedge,
and counter-attacked Nebi Samwil with vigour. On the 24th the 52nd
Division tried to deepen and lengthen the salient, thrusting it right
across the Jerusalem road. The plan was that the 155th Brigade should
capture El Jib and Nebala, and, that being done, the 156th should attack
Kulundia, establishing a defensive flank to the north, while the 157th
Brigade pushed right across the road and carried Er Ram. Our line of
advance was to be round the southern face of Nebi Samwil, but heavy
machine-gun fire from a Turkish position at Beit Iksa prevented this.
The route was changed and we kept close under the north-western slopes
of the ridge. The worst part of the day was the moving across the open
valley to the shelter of the Nebi Samwil ridge. The enemy had guns at
Beitunia and at Lifta and behind El Jib, and he did not spare his
gunners that day. Fortunately for us he used mostly percussion shrapnel
and his percentage of duds was high. At 16.25 the advance was abandoned
as the attacks of both the other brigades were held up, and the
Battalion was ordered to assist the 155th which was attacking El Jib and
Nebala. This attack was not proceeded with and at 21.30 the Brigade
took up an outpost line from Beit Izza to Khurbet Neda.
The position was the crest of a slight ridge running across the south of
the long valley in front of El Jib, and distant some 3000 yards from
that town. By day the companies withdrew into the bivouac area on the
reverse slope of the hill, leaving observation posts well supplied with
machine and Lewis guns on the ridge. A mountain battery had taken up its
quarters close to our transport lines, and the enemy's search for it
made us acutely uncomfortable. On the 27th November he shelled the
bivouac area heavily, killing two men and wounding the Adjutant, Lieut.
L.H. Watson, and eight others. That night the 21st and 23rd London of
the 60th Division arrived to take over, and the Battalion moved back
through Biddu and Kubeibeh to a rest area below Beit Anan, where No. 1
company had spent such a terrible night on the 20th. Rumours of rest and
reserve, of letters and cigarettes, were current. A liberal rum ration
added cheerfulness and the Battalion settled down to await relief by a
brigade of the 74th Division. Then a long march back and a month of rest
and food and sleep would make the men fit for anything.
That relief never came. Our line at the time ran from north of Jaffa,
through El Yehudiyeh, Deir Tureif, and Beit Ur El Tahta to Nebi Samwil,
where it was swung back almost to Saris, and the enemy threw all his
reserves from Damascus against it in a last attempt to save Jerusalem.
He made his effort at Tahta, where the town and its prolonged ridge to
Khurbet Hellabi were held by the Yeomanry, who proved unequal to the
strain. Fortunately the 4th Australian Light Horse got up after a day's
hard riding and stopped the gap. They were in no condition for a
prolonged defence, and on the night of the 29th the battle-worn 52nd
Division was again taking over the work of danger. The 5th occupied the
line from the village of Tahta to the ruins at Hellabi with No. 2
company, under Captain Morrison, on the right and No. 1, commanded by
Captain N.R. Campbell, who had returned from D.H.Q. for duty, on the
left.
The ridge was about 1400 feet high, covered with rocky out-croppings and
fell sheer away to the valley below; the same valley which saw the
slaughter of the Amorites that day when Joshua stayed the sun's going
down. The enemy held the ridges across the valley and from them directed
an accurately ranged machine-gun fire in enfilade. No trenches could be
dug. On the left was a short sangar or breastwork of stones, which
afforded both protection and cohesion of forces, but between that and
the village the men sheltered behind rocks and in the natural
depressions of the ground, thereby making a line which it was very
difficult to keep intact. The Battalion had taken over from the
Australians by 01.00 and at 03.00 the enemy began his attack. A
succession of bombing rushes came up the hill and engaged the whole
line. These were repulsed by bomb and rifle fire but not without loss.
On the left, Bloody Post, a little in advance of the sangar, took its
toll of the defenders. Captain Campbell was hit, Lieut. M'Lellan was
killed instantaneously by a bullet, Lieut. Pitchford got a bomb splinter
through his steel helmet, and No. 1 company was left with one officer.
The fighting was not so heavy on the right but at six o'clock a strong
and concerted attack developed on the whole Battalion front, and, with
bomb and bayonet, forced back the right of No. 1, making a breach at the
junction of the companies. The position was dangerous in the extreme but
the men fought stubbornly and Major Neilson with Headquarters Company
restored the line by a bayonet charge. Dawn came and the front held
firm. In the last attack 2nd Lieut. C.T. Price of No. 2 company had been
killed and Lieuts. J.S. Agnew and Gilchrist wounded. The casualties in
the ranks were thirteen killed and twenty-two wounded, amongst them
C.S.M. Milne of "B" Company and Sergt. Black of "A" Company, both
serious losses to the battalion.
All day the enemy was quiet but night brought renewed activity. The
Brigadier had given Colonel Morrison a company of the 5th A. & S.H. for
use in the line, which, with a company of the 5th K.O.S.B.'s and an
adequate supply of trench-mortars and artillery support, gave greater
hope of security. Just after midnight a general attack of no great
weight commenced, but the enemy did not push it home, although the
steepness of the sides of the valley prevented the full effect of our
artillery fire, and the machine-guns posted in Tahta and firing up the
valley made little impression. Soon after 02.00 the enemy attack forced
back the right of the line and Colonel Morrison had to throw in the
Brigade Reserve Company of the Argylls which the Brigadier had
authorised him to use. They recovered the crest of the ridge without
opposition or casualty. The enemy's attacks were half-hearted and by
dawn had ceased entirely. During the night Lieut. Sillars was killed,
and Captain Moir and Lieut. Girvan wounded, the total casualties being
six killed and sixteen wounded. Next night the 1st Royal Irish of the
10th Division relieved us and the Battalion went into well-earned rest.
On the 7th November the Battalion marched out from Regent's Park with 29
officers and 699 men. By the 1st of December it had lost 25 officers and
368 men, more than half its total strength. In the three weeks the men
had not ceased from fighting and marching. They had been often on half
rations, without tobacco or home mail, never sufficiently clad and
without any real rest or sleep. The fighting had been mainly night
attacks, over unknown and unseen ground, to positions which had to be
located by the enemy's fire. Nothing tries troops like fighting in pitch
blackness. Every man is a law unto himself and the only things that tell
are grit and discipline. The Battalion might be weary and footsore,
hungry and tired, battle-weary and nerve-wrecked, yet the men always had
that little reserve of heart left which lifted them through the most
trying day or the most deadly night.
[Illustration: SKETCH SHOWING ROUTE TAKEN BY BATTN. BETWEEN GAZA AND
JAFFA NOVR-DECR. 1917]
The month of November, 1917, marked a great change in the Battalion. The
good days of Sinai, when war meant only an enemy aeroplane in the grey
morning, were gone. Then we knew that to-morrow would be like to-day and
that there would be no gaps in the ranks when next the earth swung into
the morning sunlight. But November tore old associations to shreds. We
left Major Findlay and Lieuts. Townsend and Scott beyond the pleasant
orange-groves of Herbieh, sleeping among old comrades on the bare ridges
of Sineid. Captain Buchanan left us on the road to Emmaus. Lieuts.
M'Lellan and Price and Sillars lay on the rocky hill-top of Beth-horon.
With them a goodly company of non-commissioned officers and men, who
marched with us and drilled with us and fought with us and died gamely
with their faces to the enemy.