GALLIPOLI (_concluded_).
Early in December, after a few days in the rest camp, we returned to the
Eski lines, west of Krithia nullah. The Eski line was the first trench
one met on the way up to the front line and was a continuous trench
running across the Peninsula. It had been dug during the early stages of
the campaign, when the original forces had succeeded in getting a
footing on the Peninsula and driving the enemy back from the beaches
towards Achi Baba. The trench had been greatly improved since these days
and was now used by troops in corps reserve.
While here we were unfortunate in losing Captain Fyfe and the
Quartermaster, both wounded by stray bullets. It was a bad place for
this sort of thing as the enemy's spent bullets landed in this
area--proof that the Turk as a rule fired high and was not aiming at the
trenches directly opposite his front line. Neither of these officers
were seriously wounded; although the Quartermaster was lucky in escaping
as lightly as he did.
On the 15th December the C.O. was summoned to Brigade Headquarters and
informed by General Casson that the Battalion was probably to attack two
small trenches held by the enemy known as G11A and G12. This attack was
to be carried out on the 18th or 19th December and instructions were
given to the Colonel that a reconnaissance was to be made and a report
forwarded stating the best possible manner in which the attack could be
successfully carried out. G11A was a peculiar trench situated on a
tongue of land between the two branches of the Krithia nullah, some few
hundred yards north of a point where the nullah divided. The ground on
both sides of this trench stood about forty feet high and was held by us
entirely on the west side and partly on the east side. Owing to our
overlooking this trench the Turks did not occupy it during daylight, but
it was decided that they sent a few men forward at night to garrison
this trench. Several frontal attacks had been made earlier in the year
on this trench but without success. It was accordingly decided that on
this occasion attacks would be made from the flanks. To enable this to
be carried out the Engineers had tunnelled a way through the cliff
rising from West Krithia nullah to a point which they calculated was
directly opposite the western end of G11A. They did not carry the tunnel
right through at this time but left an outer shell which could be
knocked away when the attack was to take place. It was a great piece of
engineering work and in some ways proved very useful when the attack was
ultimately carried out, although in others it probably accounted for a
number of the casualties which the battalion suffered. To enable the
Colonel to submit his report and make the necessary preparations,
officers frequently visited the line and reconnoitred the position.
Major Neilson and Lieut. Leith made a reconnaissance of G11A by night,
entering the trench through a man-hole near the mouth of the tunnel.
They gained the necessary information and the C.O.'s report was
submitted to Brigade Headquarters, who approved of the scheme and orders
were issued that the attack should be carried out on Sunday the 19th
December.
It is a peculiar thing that during the Gallipoli campaign, and in fact
throughout most of the war, that the attacks in which the Battalion took
part were carried out on a Sunday, which we were accustomed to regard as
a day of rest. Whether this was done with the object of deceiving the
Turk is uncertain.
The final orders issued by Battalion Headquarters were on the following
lines. The Battalion was to seize and hold the following enemy trenches.
(_a_) The north-west portion of G11A from West Krithia nullah inclusive
to junction inclusive of G11A, with the main central communication
trench leading north-east from G11A to G12C. If the remaining portion of
G11A was found to be either unoccupied or very lightly occupied that
portion was also to be seized and held.
(_b_) The portion of G12 lying between the East Krithia nullah and the
junction of G12 with the enemy communication trench leading south from
G12 to Grenade Station No. 2.
(_c_) That portion of the communication trench referred to in (_b_) as
leading south from junction with G12 to Grenade Station No. 2.
The above trenches were to be consolidated at once and barricades for
Grenade Stations erected at about points A, B, C, D, E, F and G, as
shown in corresponding red letters on the sketch. In the case of E, F
and G, communication was to be at once opened to our Grenade Stations at
Nos. 4, 3 and 2. If the whole of G11A was secured, a barricade was to be
erected about point D1 in place of D and an emergency one afterwards at
D.
In addition to the Battalion the following troops were to be at the
C.O.'s disposal. Two grenade teams from the 7th H.L.I. and as a reserve
two companies and three grenade teams from the 7th H.L.I., two grenade
teams from the 6th H.L.I. and two from the 5th A. & S.H. In order to
prevent confusion the grenade teams were lettered to correspond with
their allotted stations and each grenadier wore on his arm a red band
marked with the letter of his station, the reserves being distinguished
by prefixing the figure 2.
Special arrangements were made by Brigade signalling officers regarding
signal communication, and throughout the entire attack and afterwards
these arrangements worked admirably.
The attack was divided into two portions, that on G12 and the
communication trench leading into it from Sap 2 being named the East
Attack, that on G11A the West Attack.
The East Attack was carried out by "B" Company under command of Major
Findlay, with the assistance of two grenade teams from the 7th H.L.I.
The parties were specially detailed for certain objectives and shortly
before 2 o'clock the attacking parties were all in position. At 2.15
p.m. a mine was exploded at point E, and immediately the grenade teams
and assaulting parties were seen doubling forward to their objectives,
followed at a brief interval by the consolidating parties. Immediately
the positions were reached the erection of the barricade was proceeded
with. All parties reached their objectives without casualties, but very
shortly afterwards the enemy opened heavy shell-fire and some
rifle-fire. A number of casualties soon resulted. The consolidating
parties had a very stiff job to face, as these trenches had been
continually bombarded for some months, with the result that there was a
large amount of broken earth to be cleared away before reaching hard
undersoil. It was almost like working in sand. The work was continued
with great perseverance and after some hours our labours began to show
satisfactory results. About 9 o'clock the enemy launched a counter
attack against F and G barricades without success, and again at about
midnight a second counter attack also failed. Our casualties, excluding
those of the attached grenadiers, were two officers wounded, Lieut.
M'Culloch and Lieut. Dewar. Other ranks, eleven killed and thirty-six
wounded.
The West Attack was commanded by Major Neilson. G11A was known usually
to be unoccupied by the enemy at least by day, but the main central
communication trench running back from G11A to G12C was known to be held
by the Turks at various points, and it appeared to be very much a
question of time whether they or the attacking party could first reach
the junction of this trench with G11A. The attack too was obviously
handicapped in this race by the fact that it must be initiated from the
mouth of a tunnel, entrance to which was difficult and from which it
would be necessary to emerge into the nullah man by man. Time was bound
to be lost in hastily assembling each party at the mouth of the tunnel
and getting it started on its mission, while to rush men forward
individually as they left the tunnel would inevitably result in
confusion, disorganisation and possible disaster. Instructions were
therefore that each party was to assemble in the nullah and move as
quickly as possible on its objective as soon as it was complete.
[Illustration: SKETCH TO ILLUSTRATED POSITION ON NIGHTS 19/20 DECEMBER
1915.
POSITION OF EXPLODED MINES INDICATED BY CIRCLES.
a, b, c, d, e, f, g, DENOTE OBJECTIVES OF GRENADE PARTIES. e, f, g, IN
EAST ATTACK WERE ESTABLISHED a, b, c, d, IN WEST ATTACK WERE NOT
ESTABLISHED THE BARRICADES ERECTED BEING NAMED No. 6 and No.
6a.]
"C" Company was employed in this attack with grenade teams from other
companies of the battalion to make it up to the necessary number of
parties, while each had a definite object as in the east attack. At 2.15
p.m., simultaneously with the mine which was exploded at point E,
another mine was exploded in the cliff of Krithia nullah some yards
north of the tunnel. A few minutes after this explosion one of the
grenade parties, whose objective was the main central communication
trench, had got clear of the tunnel, assembled and was moving up the
slope outside the west parapet of G11A. It was closely followed by two
other parties, all three being clear of the nullah five minutes after
the exploding of the mine. These parties, which were moving along in
front of G11A, came under heavy rifle-fire and had to drop into the
trench. The overhead traverses, which were in a state of disrepair owing
to the trench being unoccupied by the enemy, were low and made progress
difficult and slow. Lieut. Aitken, who was leading the first grenade
team, had rounded a bend in the trench with a bayonet man of his team
when they came under fire from a few yards range from an erection at
the junction of the main communication trench with G11A. The bayonet man
was killed and Lieut. Aitken wounded in the arm and leg. By this time
the enemy were beginning to throw grenades from their central
communication trench and getting them into G11A. Lieut. Milne, Lieut.
M'Dougall and many of the men were wounded. The parties were crowded,
there being about forty of all ranks in twelve yards of trench; the
assault party was entering the trench at its northern end and the tunnel
was still full of the rear parties coming down. Communication with the
attack commander was impossible, and Lieut. Leith, who was the only
unwounded officer in the trench, decided to erect a barricade at the
furthest point which had been reached. The barricade was completed by
3.30 p.m., and during its erection grenades were constantly thrown at
the enemy communication trench but with little effect, as they had to be
thrown uphill from the trench while the enemy's grenades frequently
rolled down into it. In the meantime another grenade party under Lieut.
Pitchford had entered the trench at its northern end; they found a party
of the enemy behind a barricade of bags about twenty yards up the
communication trench, which runs parallel to the nullah. On throwing a
few grenades the enemy began to retire. The grenadiers, however, and
Lieut. Pitchford advanced up the trench with a bayonet man, but on
arriving at the barricade he found none of his grenadiers had been able
to follow him as they had got entangled with the head of the assault
party which was pushing up G11A. As he went back to fetch his
grenadiers, the Turks reoccupied their barricade and opened a brisk
rifle-fire; he then decided to erect his barricade at the junction of
the trenches, and in spite of the enemy fire the work was carried out.
The assault party was now working up the trench from the tunnel. Captain
Frost led the party and was mortally wounded just as he reached the
parapet. He crawled back with difficulty, and in spite of his wounds
continued to direct the advance; the men were somewhat shaken by losing
their leader and were inclined to hang back, but C.S.M. M'Kean, who was
in the rear of the party and still in the tunnel, pushed his way
forward, put the necessary stiffening into the men and led them into the
trench. The consolidating party were now working down the tunnel and
their progress was extremely difficult as each man was carrying a pick
and a shovel as well as his rifle. Before they emerged an urgent message
was passed back for a supply of bombs and the consolidating party was
stopped while these were passed through. A party under Lieut. Dow, whose
objective was to remove one of the barricades, followed the assault
party. Lieut. Dow was killed as he entered the enemy trench. Lieut.
Kirbe, in charge of another party detailed to deal with the barricade at
the nullah, was also killed a few minutes after leaving the tunnel, but
Sergt. Waddell, the N.C.O. of the party, doing splendid work, had the
barricade completed by 4 o'clock, which rendered the passage across the
nullah from the exit of the tunnel to the trench quite secure.
Another small party whose work was to establish a dump for stores and
ammunition went forward under the charge of Lieut. Turner and C.Q.M.S.
Stewart. Lieut. Turner was mortally wounded and C.Q.M.S. Stewart killed
before the dump was established. It will be gathered that the casualties
were extremely heavy, all five officers of "C" Company having been
killed or wounded within a few minutes of entering the trench, and at 4
o'clock Captain Morrison was taken from his company which was in support
and sent forward into G11A to take command.
The light was now beginning to fail and it was apparent that no further
progress could be made to secure the junction of the central
communication trench with G11A. It was reported to Brigade Headquarters
that no further progress could be made that night and all energies were
applied to the consolidation of the portion of the objective actually
secured. From the very beginning the work had been carried on with
difficulty owing to the congestion in the trench. Steps were taken,
however, to get the casualties removed and the work was carried on more
rapidly. The enemy's communication trench was severely bombed by the
grenade teams which had been established at the various stations and the
enemy bombers became much less troublesome.
The casualties in the west attack were: killed, three officers and six
other ranks; wounded, four officers and thirty-one other ranks, being in
all nearly one-third of those employed in the actual attack. We were
unfortunate in the fact that nearly all the officer casualties occurred
within a few minutes of the commencement of the attack, and it reflects
great credit on the N.C.O.'s and men the manner in which the work was
carried through.
From the manner in which the enemy opened fire on the whole position
which we were attacking a few minutes after the explosion of the mine,
it must be inferred that he had some knowledge that the attack was to
take place. His fire was specially directed at the mouth of the tunnel,
and whether he had heard mining operations being carried out on the
cliff or not cannot be definitely stated, but this fire was responsible
for a great number of the casualties which we suffered.
The Battalion was greatly indebted on that day to the 155th Brigade, who
were holding the trenches from which the parties in both attacks
started. They supplied the Battalion with several hot meals, the benefit
of which was fully realised, especially after our previous engagement in
July, when such thorough arrangements could not be carried out.
On the morning of 20th December the Commanding Officer received messages
of congratulation from the Brigade, Divisional and Corps commanders.
The Brigadier visited the trenches and informed us that the evacuation
of Anzac had been successfully carried out the previous night. The
object of our local attack at Krithia nullah, which was timed to take
place in conjunction with other two attacks, one on the right carried
out by the French, and one on the left carried out by the 42nd Division,
was to hold the enemy to the Helles line should the Turks at Anzac and
Suvla discover that our forces were evacuating the latter position.
With the news that the General brought us, it was apparent that the
object had been successfully accomplished, and it was certainly
gratifying to learn this, as the actual results of the attacks judged in
yards of trenches gained did not seem to justify the number of splendid
officers and men whom we had lost.
On the 21st December the Battalion was relieved from the trenches which
they had recently captured and moved into support lines where we
remained for a few days. The time here was not altogether comfortable,
as we had several nights heavy rain and a considerable amount of
shelling from the enemy's artillery.
We moved back into the line again a day before Christmas, and on
Christmas day the Turk gave us a very heavy bombardment by way of
greeting.
That night orders were issued that all troops on the Peninsula would
cease fire at a certain hour and this was to be continued until the moon
was well up. These tactics had been carried out at Anzac prior to the
evacuation and it was hoped that the Turk might be induced to attack
when he found us doing the same at Helles, but he was not to be drawn.
It was a very peculiar sensation in the trenches that night with not a
sound from our own lines and only an occasional rifle shot from the
Turks. Sentries were doubled and a very sharp look-out was kept. The men
were beginning to get a little bit "jumpy," when suddenly on our right
a burst of rifle-fire started; every one seized his rifle and before you
could count ten the whole line across the Peninsula had followed suit.
This was only "wind up" and it died away very shortly afterwards, but it
showed that all troops were at extreme tension.
The following day we moved back to the rest camp and Major Simson left
us on his appointment to the 155th Brigade as Brigade-Major. Major
Neilson took up duties as Adjutant.
On the 30th December a message was received from Brigade Headquarters
that all surplus stores were to be returned to Ordnance and all baggage
was to be sent that night to the beach. The reason given for this was
the early relief of the 8th army corps by the 9th army corps, but in
view of the recent evacuation of the position further north this story
of relief was very much doubted and an opportunity was given to many to
circulate the wildest of rumours. We were all decided, however, that we
were not sorry to be spending our last few days on Gallipoli. The
following day the Colonel left the Battalion to take over command of the
Brigade and secret instructions were issued that the evacuation of the
Helles position was to be carried out within the next week.
A few days later the Battalion moved up to the eastern section of the
Eski line, a position joining the French. There was little done in the
few days we spent there except in making detailed arrangements in
connection with the evacuation. It was a very tedious time and as
rations were none too plentiful, foraging parties used to go down to the
beaches with the hope of collecting any odd dainties, such as tinned
chicken or tinned fruit that might be found in the vicinity of the
canteens that were being rapidly dismantled.
It might be mentioned that while one of the largest canteens was packing
up stores, the working party came across several cases of bulbs for
sparklet syphons; there had been a great demand for these during the hot
weather, and the canteens had always been without a supply, now they
were discovered when nobody wanted them.
At night-time shortly after it became dark the Turkish artillery which
had been reinforced with some heavier guns from Anzac and Suvla
subjected the beaches to pretty heavy shell fire. This caused much
discussion and difference of opinion as to what his action would be on
the night of the evacuation, and it was thought by most of us that we
were going to have a pretty thin time of it, as we considered the Turk
was too wily to be tricked a second time.
At last the day arranged for our departure came, the 8th January. Early
in the morning the Battalion returned from the Eski line to the rest
camp. The day was spent in destroying stores and equipment which had not
been removed so that nothing of any value would fall into the enemy's
hands. The orders issued with regard to movements of troops to the
beaches for embarkation were, that parties of fifty should be made up
including one officer. This was for purposes of checking at the various
control stations the numbers embarked. The Battalion being in rest camp
was included in the first embarkation, which was timed to take place
about 9 p.m. Just as it was growing dusk the parties of fifty already
detailed moved off and after various checks and halts reached "V" beach.
Up till now everything had been perfectly quiet. As the troops moved
forward on to the landing stages which led on to the _River Clyde_, the
famous Asiatic gun, known as "Asiatic Annie," started firing. That
morning she had had two direct hits on this landing stage and at the
moment, owing to some delay on the part of the lighters which were
carrying the troops off to the waiting transport, every square inch of
the landing stage was occupied; we passed a very anxious few minutes
there. It was a question of so near and yet so far, and we were greatly
relieved when the gun stopped firing after sending over three or four
rounds, none of which came nearer than about 25 yards away, landing in
the sea with a tremendous explosion and splash. Ultimately the
congestion was relieved and we moved forward into the province of the
navy, who were in charge of the operations as soon as we got on board
the lighters. Organisation up till this point had been perfect, but the
naval officers did not seem to care about keeping units together, the
one object being to get everyone off and load up the waiting transports
as quickly as possible. The result was that Battalion Headquarters found
themselves on _H.M.T. Osmanieh_ with about eleven hundred men of the
Royal Naval Division. The rest of the Battalion, which was only about
258 strong, was scattered over other ships, but very relieved to find
themselves where they were with a feeling of great safety, although in
reality the danger from enemy submarines was considerable. Luckily
nothing of this nature occurred and about 11 p.m. the first convoy of
transports sailed.
The parties which had been holding the front line trenches left their
positions at about 10 p.m. and, protected by rear parties, made their
way to the beaches. Embarkation throughout the entire night was carried
out without any interference by the Turk and about 2 a.m. everyone was
clear of the Peninsula and not a moment too soon, because the wind which
had disappeared during the earlier part of the night had now sprung up
and was blowing pretty fresh, which would have meant considerable
difficulty in embarkation if it had to be carried out later.
It was with very mixed feelings that we left Gallipoli. When we landed
in July it had been with the hope that we would be successful in driving
the Turk north from the positions which he held and even some had
pictured themselves taking part in a triumphal entry into
Constantinople. We had soon realised the impossibility of the situation
and in reality were glad to get away from the scene of so many
disappointments and hardships. Our greatest regret was the number of
officers and men whom we had left behind, and it seemed wrong that we
could not remain to avenge the sacrifice which they had made.