proved them to be in more places than was generally observed, and made
some discoveries by glasses. This having met with some reception,
presently the poor man's head was full of nothing but worms; all we eat
and drink, all the whole consistence of human bodies, and those of every
other animal, the very air we breathe, in short, all nature throughout
was nothing but worms: And, by that system, he solved all difficulties,
and from thence all causes in philosophy. Thus it hath fared with our
author, and his independent power. The attack against occasional
conformity, the scarcity of coffee, the invasion of Scotland, the loss
of kerseys and narrow cloths, the death of King William, the author's
turning Papist for preferment, the loss of the battle of Almanza, with
ten thousand other misfortunes, are all owing to this _imperium in
imperio_.
It will be therefore necessary to set this matter in a clear light, by
enquiring whether the clergy have any power independent of the civil,
and of what nature it is.
Whenever the Christian religion was embraced by the civil power in any
nation, there is no doubt but the magistrates and senates were fully
instructed in the rudiments of it. Besides, the Christians were so
numerous, and their worship so open before the conversion of princes,
that their discipline, as well as doctrine, could not be a secret: They
saw plainly a subordination of ecclesiastics, bishops, priests, and
deacons: That these had certain powers and employments different from
the laity: That the bishops were consecrated, and set apart for that
office by those of their own order: That the presbyters and deacons were
differently set apart, always by the bishops: That none but the
ecclesiastics presumed to pray or preach in places set apart for God's
worship, or to administer the Lord's Supper: That all questions relating
either to discipline or doctrine, were determined in ecclesiastical
conventions. These and the like doctrines and practices, being most of
them directly proved, and the rest by very fair consequences deduced
from the words of our Saviour and His apostles, were certainly received
as a divine law by every prince or state which admitted the Christian
religion: and, consequently, what they could not justly alter
afterwards, any more than the common laws of nature. And, therefore,
although the supreme power can hinder the clergy or Church from making
any new canons, or executing the old; from consecrating bishops, or
refuse those that they do consecrate; or, in short, from performing any
ecclesiastical office, as they may from eating, drinking, and sleeping;
yet they cannot themselves perform those offices, which are assigned to
the clergy by our Saviour and His apostles; or, if they do, it is not
according to the divine institution, and, consequently, null and void.
Our Saviour telleth us, "His kingdom is not of this world;" and
therefore, to be sure, the world is not of His kingdom, nor can ever
please Him by interfering in the administration of it, since He hath
appointed ministers of His own, and hath empowered and instructed them
for that purpose: So that, I believe, the clergy, who, as he sayeth, are
good at distinguishing, would think it reasonable to distinguish between
their power, and the liberty of exercising this power. The former they
claim immediately from Christ, and the latter from the permission,
connivance, or authority of the civil government; with which the
clergy's power, according to the solution I have given, cannot possibly
interfere.
But this writer, setting up to form a system upon stale, scanty topics,
and a narrow circle of thought, falleth into a thousand absurdities. And
for a further help, he hath a talent of rattling out phrases, which seem
to have sense, but have none at all: the usual fate of those who are
ignorant of the force and compass of words, without which it is
impossible for a man to write either pertinently or intelligibly upon
the most obvious subjects.
So, in the beginning of his preface, page iv, he says, "The Church of
England being established by acts of parliament, is a perfect creature
of the civil power; I mean the polity and discipline of it, and it is
that which maketh all the contention; for as to the doctrines expressed
in the articles, I do not find high church to be in any manner of pain;
but they who lay claim to most orthodoxy can distinguish themselves out
of them." It is observable in this author, that his style is naturally
harsh and ungrateful to the ear, and his expressions mean and trivial;
but whenever he goeth about to polish a period, you may be certain of
some gross defect in propriety or meaning: So the lines just quoted seem
to run easily over the tongue: and, upon examination, they are perfect
nonsense and blunder: To speak in his own borrowed phrase, what is
contained in the idea of established? Surely, not existence. Doth
establishment give being to a thing? He might have said the same thing
of Christianity in general, or the existence of God, since both are
confirmed by acts of parliament. But, the best is behind: for, in the
next line, having named the church half a dozen times before, he now
says, he meaneth only "the polity and discipline of it": As if, having
spoke in praise of the art of physic, a man should explain himself, that
he meant only the institution of a college of physicians into a
president and fellows. And it will appear, that this author, however
versed in the practice, hath grossly transgressed the rules of nonsense,
(whose property it is neither to affirm nor deny) since every visible
assertion gathered from those few lines is absolutely false: For where
was the necessity of excepting the doctrines expressed in the articles,
since these are equally creatures of the civil power, having been
established by acts of parliament as well as the others. But the Church
of England is no creature of the civil power, either as to its polity or
doctrines. The fundamentals of both were deduced from Christ and His
apostles, and the instructions of the purest and earliest ages, and were
received as such by those princes or states who embraced Christianity,
whatever prudential additions have been made to the former by human
laws, which alone can be justly altered or annulled by them.
What I have already said, would, I think, be a sufficient answer to his
whole preface, and indeed to the greatest part of his book, which is
wholly turned upon battering down a sort of independent power in the
clergy; which few or none of them ever claimed or defended. But there
being certain peculiarities in this preface, that very much set off the
wit, the learning, the raillery, reasoning and sincerity of the author;
I shall take notice of some of them, as I pass.
But here, I hope, it will not be expected, that I should bestow remarks
upon every passage in this book, that is liable to exception for
ignorance, falsehood, dulness, or malice. Where he is so insipid, that
nothing can be struck out for the reader's entertainment, I shall
observe Horace's rule:
"Quae desperes tractata nitescere posse, relinquas."
Upon which account I shall say nothing of that great instance of his
candour and judgment in relation to Dr. Stillingfleet,[9] who (happening
to lie under his displeasure upon the fatal test of _imperium in
imperio_) is High Church and Jacobite, took the oaths of allegiance to
save him from the gallows,[10] and subscribed the articles only to keep
his preferment: Whereas the character of that prelate is universally
known to have been directly the reverse of what this writer gives him.
[Footnote 9: Edward Stillingfleet (1635-1699), educated at Cambridge,
wrote in 1659 his "Irenicum, or Weapon Salve for the Church's Wounds."
He also published a "Rational Account of the Protestant Religion" in
1664. He occupied successively the important clerical offices of
Prebendary of St. Paul's, Archdeaconry of London, Deanery of St. Paul's,
and Bishopric of Worcester. The later years of his life were occupied in
a controversy with Locke on that writer's "Essay on the Human
Understanding." [T. S.]]
[Footnote 10: Page v, he quotes Bishop Stillingfleet's "Vindication of
the Doctrine of the Trinity," where the bishop says, that a man might be
very right in the belief of an article, though mistaken in the
explication of it. Upon which Tindal observes: "These men treat the
articles, as they do the oath of allegiance, which, they say, obliges
them not actually to assist the government, but to do nothing against
it; that is, nothing that would bring 'em to the gallows." [Note in
edition 1764, 4to.]]
But before he can attempt to ruin this damnable opinion of two
independent powers, he telleth us; page vi., "It will be necessary to
shew what is contained in the idea of government" Now, it is to be
understood, that this refined way of speaking was introduced by Mr.
Locke; after whom the author limpeth as fast as he is able. All the
former philosophers in the world, from the age of Socrates to ours,
would have ignorantly put the question, _Quid est imperium_? But now it
seemeth we must vary our phrase; and, since our modern improvement of
human understanding, instead of desiring a philosopher to describe or
define a mouse-trap, or tell me what it is; I must gravely ask, what is
contained in the idea of a mouse-trap? But then to observe how deeply
this new way of putting questions to a man's self, maketh him enter into
the nature of things; his present business is to show us, what is
contained in the idea of government. The company knoweth nothing of the
matter, and would gladly be instructed; which he doth in the following
words, p. 5.
"It would be in vain for one intelligent being to pretend to set rules
to the actions of another, if he had it not in his power to reward the
compliance with, or punish the deviations from, his rules by some good,
or evil, which is not the natural consequence of those actions; since
the forbidding men to do or forbear an action on the account of that
convenience or inconvenience which attendeth it, whether he who forbids
it will or no, can be no more than advice."
I shall not often draw such long quotations as this, which I could not
forbear to offer as a specimen of the propriety and perspicuity of this
author's style. And, indeed, what a light breaketh out upon us all, as
soon as we have read these words! How thoroughly are we instructed in
the whole nature of government? What mighty truths are here discovered;
and how clearly conveyed to our understandings? And therefore let us
melt this refined jargon into the old style for the improvement of such,
who are not enough conversant in the new.
If the author were one who used to talk like one of us, he would have
spoke in this manner: "I think it necessary to give a full and perfect
definition of government, such as will shew the nature and all the
properties of it; and my definition is thus: One man will never cure
another of stealing horses, merely by minding him of the pains he hath
taken, the cold he hath got, and the shoe-leather he hath lost in
stealing that horse; nay, to warn him, that the horse may kick or fling
him, or cost him more than he is worth in hay and oats, can be no more
than advice. For the gallows is not the natural effect of robbing on the
highway, as heat is of fire: and therefore, if you will govern a man,
you must find out some other way of punishment, than what he will
inflict upon himself."
Or, if this will not do, let us try it in another case (which I
instanced before) and in his own terms. Suppose he had thought it
necessary (and I think it was as much so as the other) to shew us what
is contained in the idea of a mousetrap, he must have proceeded in these
terms. "It would be in vain for an intelligent being, to set rules for
hindering a mouse from eating his cheese, unless he can inflict upon
that mouse some punishment, which, is not the natural consequence of
eating the cheese. For, to tell her, it may lie heavy on her stomach;
that she will grow too big to get back into her hole, and the like, can
be no more than advice: therefore, we must find out some way of
punishing her, which hath more inconveniences than she will ever suffer
by the mere eating of cheese." After this, who is so slow of
understanding, as not to have in his mind a full and complete idea of a
mouse-trap? Well.--The Free thinkers may talk what they please of
pedantry, and cant, and jargon of schoolmen, and insignificant terms in
the writings of the clergy, if ever the most perplexed and perplexing
follower of Aristotle from Scotus to Suarez[11] could be a match for
this author.
[Footnote 11: Duns Scotus flourished in the thirteenth century. He
studied at Oxford and Paris, and his learning and acumen in reasoning
earned for him the title _The Subtle Doctor_. He died at Cologne in
1308. He was a strong upholder of the doctrine of the Immaculate
Conception. His works are published in twelve volumes folio.
Francis Suarez (1548-1617) was a Spanish Jesuit who wrote a work by
command of the Pope against the English Reformation. He published some
very able religio-philosophical treatises, from the Roman Catholic point
of view; but, indeed, his writings altogether were enormous, so far as
their number are concerned. [T. S.]]
But the strength of his arguments is equal to the clearness of his
definitions. For, having most ignorantly divided government into three
parts, whereof the first contains the other two; he attempteth to prove
that the clergy possess none of these by a divine right. And he argueth
thus, p. vii. "As to a legislative power, if that belongs to the clergy
by a divine right, it must be when they are assembled in convocation:
but the 25 Hen. VIII. c. 19 is a bar to any such divine right, because
that act makes it no less than a _praemunire_ for them, so much so as to
meet without the king's writ, &c." So that the force of his argument
lieth here; if the clergy had a divine right, it is taken away by the
25th of Henry the Eighth. And as ridiculous as this argument is, the
preface and book are founded upon it.
Another argument against the legislative power in the clergy of England,
is, p. viii. that Tacitus telleth us; that in great affairs, the Germans
consulted the whole body of the people. "_De minoribus rebus principes
consultant, de majoribus omnes: Ita tamen, ut ea quoque, quorum penes
plebem arbitrium est, apud principes pertractentur."--Tacitus de Moribus
et Populis Germaniae_. Upon which Tindal observeth thus: "_De majoribus
omnes_, was a fundamental amongst our ancestors long before they arrived
in Great Britain, and matters of religion were ever reckoned among their
_majora_." (See Pref. p. viii. and ix.) Now it is plain, that our
ancestors, the Saxons, came from Germany: It is likewise plain, that
religion was always reckoned by the heathens among their _majora_: And
it is plain, the whole body of the people could not be the clergy, and
therefore, the clergy of England have no legislative power.
_Thirdly_, p. ix. They have no legislative power, because Mr.
Washington, in his "Observations on the Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction of
the Kings of England," sheweth, from "undeniable authorities, that in
the time of William the Conqueror, and several of his successors, there
were no laws enacted concerning religion, but by the great council of
the kingdom." I hope, likewise, Mr. Washington observeth that this great
council of the kingdom, as appeareth by undeniable authorities, was
sometimes entirely composed of bishops and clergy, and called the
parliament, and often consulted upon affairs of state, as well as
church, as it is agreed by twenty writers of three ages; and if Mr.
Washington says otherwise, he is an author just fit to be quoted by
beaux.
_Fourthly_,--But it is endless to pursue this matter any further; in
that, it is plain, the clergy have no divine right to make laws; because
Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Queen Elizabeth, with their parliaments will
not allow it them. Now, without examining what divine right the clergy
have, or how far it extendeth; is it any sort of proof that I have no
right, because a stronger power will not let me exercise it? Or doth
all, that this author says through his preface, or book itself, offer
any other sort of argument but this, or what he deduces the same way?
But his arguments and definitions are yet more supportable than the
grossness of historical remarks, which are scattered so plentifully in
his book, that it would be tedious to enumerate, or to shew the fraud
and ignorance of them. I beg the reader's leave to take notice of one
here just in my way; and, the rather, because I design for the future to
let hundreds of them pass without further notice. "When," says he, p. x.
"by the abolishing of the Pope's power, things were brought back to
their ancient channel, the parliament's right in making ecclesiastical
laws revived of course." What can possibly be meant by this "ancient
channel?" Why, the channel that things ran in before the Pope had any
power in England: that is to say, before Austin the monk converted
England, before which time, it seems, the parliament had a right to make
ecclesiastical laws. And what parliament could this be? Why, the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal, and the Commons met at Westminster.
I cannot here forbear reproving the folly and pedantry of some lawyers,
whose opinions this poor creature blindly followeth, and rendereth yet
more absurd by his comments. The knowledge of our constitution can be
only attained by consulting the earliest English histories, of which
those gentlemen seem utterly ignorant, further than a quotation or an
index. They would fain derive our government as now constituted, from
antiquity: And, because they have seen Tacitus quoted for his _majoribus
omnes_; and have read of the Goths' military institution in their
progresses and conquests, they presently dream of a parliament. Had
their reading reached so far, they might have deduced it much more
fairly from Aristotle and Polybius, who both distinctly name the
composition of _rex, seniores, et populus_; and the latter, as I
remember particularly, with the highest approbation. The princes, in the
Saxon Heptarchy, did indeed call their nobles sometimes together upon
weighty affairs, as most other princes of the world have done in all
ages. But they made war and peace, and raised money by their own
authority: They gave or mended laws by their charters, and they raised
armies by their tenures. Besides, some of those kingdoms fell in by
conquests, before England was reduced under one head, and therefore
could pretend no rights, but by the concessions of the conqueror.
Further, which is more material, upon the admission of Christianity,
great quantities of land were acquired by the clergy, so that the great
council of the nation was often entirely of churchmen, and ever a
considerable part. But, our present constitution is an artificial thing,
not fairly to be traced, in my opinion, beyond Henry I. Since which time
it hath in every age admitted several alterations; and differeth now as
much, even from what it was then, as almost any two species of
government described by Aristotle. And, it would be much more reasonable
to affirm, that the government of Rome continued the same under
Justinian, as it was in the time of Scipio, because the senate and
consuls still remained, although the power of both had been several
hundred years transferred to the emperors.
REMARKS ON THE PREFACE.[12]
[Footnote 12: References to Tindal's book, and remarks upon it, which
the author left thus indigested, being hints for himself to use in
answering the said book.]
Page iv, v. "If men of opposite sentiments can subscribe the same
articles, they are as much at liberty as if there were none." May not a
man subscribe the whole articles, because he differs from another in the
explication of one? How many oaths are prescribed, that men may differ
in the explication of some part of them? Instance, &c.
Page vi. "Idea of Government." A canting pedantic way, learned from
Locke; and how prettily he sheweth it. Instance--
Page vii, "25 Hen. VIII. c. 19 is a bar to any such divine right [of a
legislative power in the clergy.]" Absurd to argue against the clergy's
divine right, because of the statute of Henry VIII. How doth that
destroy divine right? The sottish way of arguing; from what the
parliament can do; from their power, &c.
Page viii. "If the parliament did not think they had a plenitude of
power in this matter, they would not have damned all the canons of
1640." What doth he mean? A grave divine could not answer all his
playhouse and Alsatia[13] cant, &c. He hath read Hudibras, and many
plays.
[Footnote 13: Or Whitefriars, then a place of asylum, and frequented by
sharpers, of whose gibberish there are several specimens in Shadwell's
comedy, "The Squire of Alsatia." [T. S.]]
_Ibid_. "If the parliament can annul ecclesiastical laws, they must be
able to make them." Distinguish, and shew the silliness, &c.
_Ibid_. All that he saith against the discipline, he might say the same
against the doctrine, nay, against the belief of a God, _viz_. That the
legislature might forbid it. The Church formeth and contriveth canons;
and the civil power, which is compulsive, confirms them.
Page ix. "There were no laws enacted but by the great council of the
kingdom." And that was very often, chiefly, only bishops.
_Ibid_. "Laws settled by parliament to punish the clergy." What laws
were those?
Page x. "The people are bound to no laws but of their own choosing." It
is fraudulent; for they may consent to what others choose, and so people
often do.
Page xiv. paragraph 6. "The clergy are not supposed to have any divine
legislature, because that must be superior to all worldly power; and
then the clergy might as well forbid the parliament to meet but when and
where they please, &c." No such consequence at all. They have a power
exclusive from all others. Ordained to act as clergy, but not govern in
civil affairs; nor act without leave of the civil power.
Page xxv. "The parliament suspected the love of power natural to
churchmen." Truly, so is the love of pudding, and most other things
desirable in this life; and in that they are like the laity, as in all
other things that are not good. And, therefore, they are held not in
esteem for what they are like in, but for their virtues. The true way to
abuse them with effect, is to tell us some faults of theirs, that other
men have not, or not so much of as they, &c. Might not any man speak
full as bad of senates, diets, and parliaments, as he can do about
councils; and as bad of princes, as he does of bishops?
Page xxxi. "They might as well have made Cardinals Campegi and de
Chinuchii, Bishops of Salisbury and Worcester, as have enacted that
their several sees and bishoprics were utterly void." No. The
legislature might determine who should not be a bishop there, but not
make a bishop.
_Ibid_. "Were not a great number deprived by parliament upon the
Restoration?" Does he mean presbyters? What signifies that?
_Ibid_. "Have they not trusted this power with our princes?" Why, aye.
But that argueth not right, but power. Have they not cut off a king's
head, &c. The Church must do the best they can, if not what they would.
Page xxxvi. "If tithes and first-fruits are paid to spiritual persons as
such, the king or queen is the most spiritual person, &c." As if the
first-fruits, &c. were paid to the king, as tithes to a spiritual
person.
Page xliii. "King Charles II. thought fit that the bishops in Scotland
should hold their bishoprics during will and pleasure; I do not find
that the High Church complained of this as an encroachment, &c." No; but
as a pernicious counsel of Lord Loch.[14]
[Footnote 14: Scott thinks this refers to Lord Lauderdale. [T.S.]]
Page xliv. "The common law judges have a power to determine, whether a
man has a legal right to the sacrament." They pretend it, but what we
complain of as most abominable hardship, &c.