of monarchy, and justification of absolute obedience to a prince, there
seemed to be one of a singular nature: It was urged that Heaven was
governed by a monarch, who had none to control his power, but was
absolutely obeyed: Then it followed, that earthly governments were the
more perfect, the nearer they imitated the government in Heaven. All
which I look upon as the strongest argument against despotic power that
ever was offered; since no reason can possibly be assigned why it is
best for the world that God Almighty hath such a power, which doth not
directly prove that no mortal man should ever have the like.
But though a Church of England man thinks every species of government
equally lawful, he does not think them equally expedient; or for every
country indifferently. There may be something in the climate, naturally
disposing men toward one sort of obedience, as is manifest all over
Asia, where we never read of any commonwealth, except some small ones on
the western coasts established by the Greeks. There may be a great deal
in the situation of a country, and in the present genius of the people.
It hath been observed, that the temperate climates usually run into
moderate governments, and the extremes into despotic power. 'Tis a
remark of Hobbes, that the youth of England are corrupted in their
principles of government, by reading the authors of Greece and Rome who
writ under commonwealths. But it might have been more fairly offered for
the honour of liberty, that while the rest of the known world was
overrun with the arbitrary government of single persons; arts and
sciences took their rise, and flourished only in those few small
territories were the people were free. And though learning may continue
after liberty is lost, as it did in Rome, for a while, upon the
foundations laid under the commonwealth, and the particular patronage of
some emperors; yet it hardly ever began under a tyranny in any nation:
Because slavery is of all things the greatest clog and obstacle to
speculation. And indeed, arbitrary power is but the first natural step
from anarchy or the savage life; the adjusting of power and freedom
being an effect and consequence of maturer thinking: And this is nowhere
so duly regulated as in a limited monarchy: Because I believe it may
pass for a maxim in state, that the administration cannot be placed in
too few hands, nor the legislature in too many. Now in this material
point, the constitution of the English government far exceeds all others
at this time on the earth, to which the present establishment of the
Church doth so happily agree, that I think, whoever is an enemy to
either, must of necessity be so to both.
He thinks, as our monarchy is constituted, a hereditary right is much to
be preferred before election. Because the government here, especially by
some late amendments, is so regularly disposed in all its parts, that it
almost executes itself. And therefore upon the death of a prince among
us, the administration goes on without any rub or interruption. For the
same reasons we have little to apprehend from the weakness or fury of
our monarchs, who have such wise councils to guide the first, and laws
to restrain the other. And therefore this hereditary right should be
kept so sacred, as never to break the succession, unless where the
preserving of it may endanger the constitution; which is not from any
intrinsic merit, or unalienable right in a particular family, but to
avoid the consequences that usually attend the ambition of competitors,
to which elective kingdoms are exposed; and which is the only obstacle
to hinder them from arriving at the greatest perfection that government
can possibly reach. Hence appears the absurdity of that distinction
between a king _de facto_, and one _de jure_, with respect to us. For
every limited monarch is a king _de jure_, because he governs by the
consent of the whole, which is authority sufficient to abolish all
precedent right. If a king come in by conquest, he is no longer a
limited monarch, if he afterward consent to limitations, he becomes
immediately king _de jure_ for the same reason.
The great advocates for succession, who affirm it ought not to be
violated upon any regard or consideration whatsoever, do insist much
upon one argument that seems to carry little weight. They would have it,
that a crown is a prince's birthright, and ought at least to be as well
secured to him and his posterity as the inheritance of any private man:
In short, that he has the same title to his kingdom which every
individual has to his property. Now the consequence of this doctrine
must be, that as a man may find several ways to waste, misspend, or
abuse his patrimony, without being answerable to the laws; so a king may
in like manner do what he will with his own, that is, he may squander
and misapply his revenues, and even alienate the crown, without being
called to an account by his subjects. They allow such a prince to be
guilty indeed of much folly and wickedness, but for those he is to
answer to God, as every private man must do that is guilty of
mismanagement in his own concerns. Now the folly of this reasoning will
best appear, by applying it in a parallel case. Should any man argue,
that a physician is supposed to understand his own art best; that the
law protects and encourages his profession; and therefore although he
should manifestly prescribe poison to all his patients, whereof they
should immediately die, he cannot be justly punished, but is answerable
only to God: Or should the same be offered in behalf of a divine, who
would preach against religion and moral duties; in either of these two
cases everybody would find out the sophistry, and presently answer, that
although common men are not exactly skilled in the composition or
application of medicines, or in prescribing the limits of duty; yet the
difference between poisons and remedies is easily known by their
effects, and common reason soon distinguishes between virtue and vice:
And it must be necessary to forbid both these the further practice of
their professions, because their crimes are not purely personal to the
physician or the divine, but destructive to the public. All which is
infinitely stronger in respect to a prince, with whose good or ill
conduct the happiness or misery of a whole nation is included; whereas
it is of small consequence to the public, farther than examples, how any
private person manages his property.
But granting that the right of a lineal successor to a crown were upon
the same foot with the property of a subject, still It may at any time
be transferred by the legislative power, as other properties frequently
are. The supreme power in a state can do no wrong, because whatever that
doth, is the action of all; and when the lawyers apply this maxim to the
king, they must understand it only in that sense as he is administrator
of the supreme power, otherwise it is not universally true, but may be
controlled in several instances easy to produce.
And these are the topics we must proceed upon to justify our exclusion
of the young Pretender in France; that of his suspected birth being
merely popular, and therefore not made use of as I remember, since the
Revolution in any speech, vote, or proclamation where there was occasion
to mention him.
As to the abdication of King James, which the advocates on that side
look upon to have been forcible and unjust, and consequently void in
itself, I think a man may observe every article of the English Church,
without being in much pain about it. 'Tis not unlikely that all doors
were laid open for his departure, and perhaps not without the privity of
the Prince of Orange, as reasonably concluding that the kingdom might be
settled in his absence: But to affirm he had any cause to apprehend the
same treatment with his father, is an improbable scandal flung upon the
nation by a few bigotted French scribblers, or the invidious assertion
of a ruined party at home, in the bitterness of their souls: Not one
material circumstance agreeing with those in 1648; and the greatest part
of the nation having preserved the utmost horror for that ignominious
murder: But whether his removal were caused by his own fears or other
men's artifices, 'tis manifest to me, that supposing the throne to be
vacant, which was the foot they went upon, the body of the people were
thereupon left at liberty, to choose what form of government they
pleased, by themselves or their representatives.
The only difficulty of any weight against the proceedings at the
Revolution, is an obvious objection, to which the writers upon that
subject have not yet given a direct or sufficient answer, as if they
were in pain at some consequences which they apprehend those of the
contrary opinion might draw from it, I will repeat this objection as it
was offered me some time ago, with all its advantages, by a very pious,
learned, and worthy gentleman[11] of the nonjuring party.
[Footnote 11: Mr. Nelson, author of "The Feasts and Fasts of the Church
of England."]
The force of his argument turned upon this; that the laws made by the
supreme power, cannot otherwise than by the supreme power be annulled:
That this consisting in England of a King, Lords, and Commons, whereof
each have a negative voice, no two of them can repeal or enact a law
without consent of the third; much less may any one of them be entirely
excluded from its part of the legislature by a vote of the other two.
That all these maxims were openly violated at the Revolution; where an
assembly of the nobles and people, not summoned by the king's writ
(which was an essential part of the constitution) and consequently no
lawful meeting, did merely upon their own authority, declare the king to
have abdicated, the throne vacant, and gave the crown by a vote to a
nephew, when there were three children to inherit; though by the
fundamental laws of the realm the next heir is immediately to succeed.
Neither does it appear how a prince's abdication can make any other sort
of vacancy in the throne, than would be caused by his death, since he
cannot abdicate for his children (who claim their right of succession by
act of parliament) otherwise than by his own consent in form to a bill
from the two houses.
And this is the difficulty that seems chiefly to stick with the most
reasonable of those, who from a mere scruple of conscience refuse to
join with us upon the revolution principle; but for the rest, are I
believe as far from loving arbitrary government, as any others can be,
who are born under a free constitution, and are allowed to have the
least share of common good sense.
In this objection there are two questions included: First, whether upon
the foot of our constitution, as it stood in the reign of the late King
James, a king of England may be deposed? The second is, whether the
people of England convened by their own authority, after the king had
withdrawn himself in the manner he did, had power to alter the
succession?
As for the first; it is a point I shall not presume to determine, and
shall therefore only say, that to any man who holds the negative, I
would demand the liberty of putting the case as strongly as I please. I
will suppose a prince limited by laws like ours, yet running into a
thousand caprices of cruelty like Nero or Caligula. I will suppose him
to murder his mother and his wife, to commit incest, to ravish matrons,
to blow up the senate, and burn his metropolis, openly to renounce God
and Christ, and worship the devil. These and the like exorbitances are
in the power of a single person to commit without the advice of a
ministry, or assistance of an army. And if such a king as I have
described, cannot be deposed but by his own consent in parliament, I do
not well see how he can be resisted, or what can be meant by a limited
monarchy; or what signifies the people's consent in making and repealing
laws, if the person who administers hath no tie but conscience, and is
answerable to none but God. I desire no stronger proof that an opinion
must be false, than to find very great absurdities annexed to it; and
there cannot be greater than in the present case: For it is not a bare
speculation that kings may run into such enormities as are
above-mentioned; the practice may be proved by examples not only drawn
from the first Caesars or later emperors, but many modern princes of
Europe; such as Peter the Cruel, Philip the Second of Spain, John
Basilovitz[12] of Muscovy, and in our own nation, King John, Richard the
Third, and Henry the Eighth. But there cannot be equal absurdities
supposed in maintaining the contrary opinion; because it is certain,
that princes have it in their power to keep a majority on their side, by
any tolerable administration; till provoked by continual oppressions, no
man indeed can then answer where the madness of the people will stop.
[Footnote 12: Peter the Cruel is Pedro of Castile. Ivan Basilovitz was
the first emperor of Russia who assumed the title of Czar. He was born
in 1529, and died in 1584.]
As to the second part of the objection; whether the people of England
convened by their own authority, upon King James's precipitate
departure, had power to alter the succession?
In answer to this, I think it is manifest from the practice of the
wisest nations, and who seem to have had the truest notions of freedom,
that when a prince was laid aside for mal-administration, the nobles and
people, if they thought it necessary for the public weal, did resume the
administration of the supreme power (the power itself having been always
in them) and did not only alter the succession, but often the very form
of government too; because they believed there was no natural right in
one man to govern another, but that all was by institution, force, or
consent. Thus, the cities of Greece, when they drove out their
tyrannical kings, either chose others from a new family, or abolished
the kingly government, and became free states. Thus the Romans upon the
expulsion of Tarquin found it inconvenient for them to be subject any
longer to the pride, the lust, the cruelty and arbitrary will of single
persons, and therefore by general consent entirely altered the whole
frame of their government. Nor do I find the proceedings of either, in
this point, to have been condemned by any historian of the succeeding
ages.
But a great deal hath been already said by other writers upon this
invidious and beaten subject; therefore I shall let it fall, though the
point is commonly mistaken, especially by the lawyers; who of all others
seem least to understand the nature of government in general; like
under-workmen, who are expert enough at making a single wheel in a
clock, but are utterly ignorant how to adjust the several parts, or
regulate the movements.
To return therefore from this digression: It is a Church of England
man's opinion, that the freedom of a nation consists in an absolute
unlimited legislative power, wherein the whole body of the people are
fairly represented, and in an executive duly limited; because on this
side likewise there may be dangerous degrees, and a very ill extreme.
For when two parties in a state are pretty equal in power, pretensions,
merit, and virtue, (for these two last are with relation to parties and
a court, quite different things) it hath been the opinion of the best
writers upon government, that a prince ought not in any sort to be under
the guidance or influence of either, because he declines by this means
from his office of presiding over the whole, to be the head of a party;
which besides the indignity, renders him answerable for all public
mismanagements and the consequences of them; and in whatever state this
happens, there must either be a weakness in the prince or ministry, or
else the former is too much restrained by the legislature.[1]
[Footnote 1: This is as given in the "Miscellanies" (1711). Scott and
Faulkner print "by the nobles, or those who represent the people." [T.
S.]]
To conclude: A Church of England man may with prudence and a good
conscience approve the professed principles of one party more than the
other, according as he thinks they best promote the good of Church and
State; but he will never be swayed by passion or interest, to advance an
opinion merely because it is that of the party he most approves; which
one single principle he looks upon as the root of all our civil
animosities. To enter into a party as into an order of friars with so
resigned an obedience to superiors, is very unsuitable both with the
civil and religious liberties we so zealously assert. Thus the
understandings of a whole senate are often enslaved by three or four
leaders on each side; who instead of intending the public weal, have
their hearts wholly set upon ways and means how to get or to keep
employments. But to speak more at large, how has this spirit of faction
mingled itself with the mass of the people, changed their nature and
manners, and the very genius of the nation; broke all the laws of
charity, neighbourhood, alliance and hospitality; destroyed all ties of
friendship, and divided families against themselves! And no wonder it
should be so, when in order to find out the character of a person,
instead of inquiring whether he be a man of virtue, honour, piety, wit,
good sense, or learning; the modern question is only, whether he be a
Whig or a Tory, under which terms all good and ill qualities are
included.
Now, because it is a point of difficulty to choose an exact middle
between two ill extremes, it may be worth enquiring in the present case,
which of these, a wise and good man would rather seem to avoid: Taking
therefore their own good and ill characters with due abatements and
allowances for partiality and passion; I should think that in order to
preserve the constitution entire in Church and State, whoever has a true
value for both, would be sure to avoid the extremes of Whig for the sake
of the former, and the extremes of Tory on account of the latter.
I have now said all that I could think convenient upon so nice a
subject, and find I have the ambition common with other reasoners, to
wish at least that both parties may think me in the right, which would
be of some use to those who have any virtue left, but are blindly drawn
into the extravagancies of either, upon false representations, to serve
the ambition or malice of designing men, without any prospect of their
own. But if that is not to be hoped for, my next wish should be, that
both might think me in the wrong; which I would understand as an ample
justification of myself, and a sure ground to believe, that I have
proceeded at least with impartiality, and perhaps with truth.
***** ***** ***** *****
REMARKS
UPON A
BOOK,
INTITULED,
"THE RIGHTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, &c."
WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1708, BUT LEFT UNFINISHED.
NOTE.
Dr. Matthew Tindal, of whom a short account has already been given (see
note, p. 9), issued his "Rights of the Christian Church" in 1706. In
1707 it had already gone through three editions. The full title of the
work is: "The Rights of the Christian Church asserted, against the
Romish and all other Priests, who claim an independent Power over it:
with a Preface concerning the Government of the Church of England, as by
law established." Ostensibly the book was an attack on the Roman
Catholic Church, but the attack was so cleverly veiled that it included
in its criticisms the Church of England also; and must take its place
among the works of the deistical writers of the time who aimed at
subverting the foundations of the relationships between the Church and
the State. According to Dr. Hicks, who wrote several works in reply to
Tindal's book, Tindal told a gentleman, who found him at work on it,
that "he was writing a book which would make the clergy mad." If so, he
did not fall short of his intention; for not only the clergy, but even
learned laymen became "mad." In addition to Dr. Hicks of Oxford, the
Church of England found champions in Dr. William Wotton, Samuel Hill,
Conyers-Place, Mr. Oldisworth, and Swift. Swift delayed the preparation
of the materials for his reply, or else he found other matters to occupy
his time--the Sacheverel business came on soon after, and the Tindal
controversy lost interest in this more immediate and more important
affair. So that Swift's criticism remained unfinished, and was only
published when his editors came to search among his papers. In 1710
Tindal's work was ordered, by a vote of the House of Commons, to be
publicly burned by the hangman. The grand jury of Middlesex were
presented that the author, printer, and publisher of "The Rights of the
Christian Church" to be dangerous and disaffected persons, and promoters
of sedition and profaneness; and this charge was grounded on the
following extracts. I take these from Scott's note, and I find that the
page references are to the second edition of Tindal's work issued in
1706.
"The church is a private society, and no more power belonging to it than
to other private companies and clubs, and, consequently, all the right
anyone has to be an ecclesiastical officer, and the power he is
entrusted with, depends on the consent of the parties concerned, and is
no greater than they can bestow." Preface, p. xxx.
"The Scriptures nowhere make the receiving the Lord's Supper from the
hands of a priest necessary." p. 104.
"The remembrance of Christ's sufferings a mere grace-cup delivered to be
handed about." p. 105.
"Among Christians, one no more than another can be reckoned a priest
from Scripture"--"And the clerk has as good a title to the priesthood as
the parson ... Every one, as well as the minister, rightly consecrateth
the elements to himself ... Anything farther than this, may rather be
called Conjuration than Consecration." p. 108.
"The absurdities of bishops being by divine appointment, governors of
the Christian Church, and no others are capable of being of that number,
who derive not their right by an uninterrupted succession of bishops in
the Catholic Church." p. 313.
"The supreme powers had no way to escape the heavier oppressions, and
more insupportable usurpations of their own clergy, than by submitting
to the Pope's milder yoke and gentler authority." p. 255.
"One grand cause of mistake is, not considering when God acts as
governor of the universe, and when as prince of a particular nation. The
Jews, when they came out of the land of bondage, were under no settled
government, till God was pleased to offer himself to be their king, to
which all the people expressly consented ... God's laws bound no nation,
except those that agreed to the Horeb contract." p. 151.
"Not only an independent power of excommunication, but of ordination in
the clergy, is inconsistent with the magistrate's right to protect the
commonwealth." p. 87.
"Priests, no better than spiritual make-baits, baraters, boute-feux, and
incendiaries, and who make churches serve to worse purposes than bear
gardens." p. 118.
"It is a grand mistake to suppose the magistrate's power extends to
indifferent things ... Men have liberty as they please, and a right ...
to form what clubs, companies, or meetings, they think fit, either for
business or pleasure, which the magistrate ... cannot hinder, without
manifest injustice." p. 15.
"God ... interposed not among the Jews, until they had chosen him for
their king." p. 312.
For a full account of Tindal and his work, see the "Memoirs of the Life
and Writings of Matthew Tindal, with a History of the Controversies
wherein he was engaged," published in 1733. The text of the present
reprint of Swift's "Remarks" is based on that given in "Works," vol.
vii. of the 4to edition of 1764. It has also been collated with the 8vo
edition of same date (vol. xiii.) and with that of 1762 (vol. xiii.).
[T. S.]
REMARKS UPON A BOOK INTITULED
"THE RIGHTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH, &c."
Before I enter upon a particular examination of this treatise, it will
be convenient to do two things:
_First_, To give some account of the author, together with the motives,
that might probably engage him in such a work. And,
_Secondly_, to discover the nature and tendency in general, of the work
itself.
The first of these, although it hath been objected against, seems highly
reasonable, especially in books that instil pernicious principles. For,
although a book is not intrinsically much better or worse, according to
the stature or complexion of the author, yet, when it happens to make a
noise, we are apt, and curious, as in other noises, to look about from
whence it cometh. But however, there is something more in the matter.