Gentlemen, of our interior administration, the public lands constitute a

highly important part. This is a subject of great interest, and it ought

to attract much more attention than it has hitherto received, especially

from the people of the Atlantic States. The public lands are public

property. They belong to the people of all the States. A vast portion

of them is composed of territories which were ceded by individual States

to the United States, after the close of the Revolutionary war, and

before the adoption of the present Constitution. The history of these

cessions, and the reasons for making them, are familiar to you. Some of

the Old Thirteen possessed large tracts of unsettled lands within their

chartered limits. The Revolution had established their title to these

lands, and as the Revolution had been brought about by the common

treasure and the common blood of all the Colonies, it was thought not

unreasonable that these unsettled lands should be transferred to the

United States, to pay the debt created by the war, and afterwards to

remain as a fund for the use of all the States. This is the well-known

origin of the title possessed by the United States to lands northwest of

the River Ohio.

By treaties with France and Spain, Louisiana and Florida, containing

many millions of acres of public land, have been since acquired. The

cost of these acquisitions was paid, of course, by the general

government, and was thus a charge upon the whole people. The public

lands, therefore, all and singular, are national property; granted to

the United States, purchased by the United States, paid for by all the

people of the United States.

The idea, that, when a new State is created, the public lands lying

within her territory become the property of such new State in

consequence of her sovereignty, is too preposterous for serious

refutation. Such notions have heretofore been advanced in Congress, but

nobody has sustained them. They were rejected and abandoned, although

one cannot say whether they may not be revived, in consequence of recent

propositions which have been made in the Senate. The new States are

admitted on express conditions, recognizing, to the fullest extent, the

right of the United States to the public lands within their borders; and

it is no more reasonable to contend that some indefinite idea of State

sovereignty overrides all these stipulations, and makes the lands the

property of the States, against the provisions and conditions of their

own constitution, and the Constitution of the United States, than it

would be, that a similar doctrine entitled the State of New York to the

money collected at the custom-house in this city; since it is no more

inconsistent with sovereignty that one government should hold lands,

for the purpose of sale, within the territory of another, than it is

that it should lay and collect taxes and duties within such territory.

Whatever extravagant pretensions may have been set up heretofore, there

was not, I suppose, an enlightened man in the whole West, who insisted

on any such right in the States, when the proposition to cede the lands

to the States was made, in the late session of Congress. The public

lands being, therefore the common property of all the people of all the

States, I shall never consent to give them away to particular States, or

to dispose of them otherwise than for the general good, and the general

use of the whole country.

I felt bound, therefore, on the occasion just alluded to, to resist at

the threshold a proposition to cede the public lands to the States in

which they lie, on certain conditions. I very much regretted the

introduction of such a measure, as its effect must be, I fear, only to

agitate what was well settled, and to disturb that course of proceeding

in regard to the public lands, which forty years of experience have

shown to be so wise, and so satisfactory in its operation, both to the

people of the old States and to those of the new.

But, Gentlemen, although the public lands are not to be given away, nor

ceded to particular States, a very liberal policy in regard to them

ought certainly to prevail. Such a policy has prevailed, and I have

steadily supported it, and shall continue to support it so long as I may

remain in public life. The main object, in regard to these lands, is

undoubtedly to settle them, so fast as the growth of our population, and

its augmentation by emigration, may enable us to settle them.

The lands, therefore, should be sold, at a low price; and, for one, I

have never doubted the right or expediency of granting portions of the

lands themselves, or of making grants of money, for objects of internal

improvement, connected with them.

I have always supported liberal appropriations for the purpose of

opening communications to and through these lands, by common roads,

canals, and railroads; and where lands of little value have been long in

market, and, on account of their indifferent quality are not likely to

command a common price, I know no objection to a reduction of price, as

to such lands, so that they may pass into private ownership. Nor do I

feel any objections to removing those restraints which prevent the

States from taxing the lands for five years after they are sold. But

while, in these and all other respects, I am not only reconciled to a

liberal policy, but espouse it and support it, and have constantly done

so, I still hold the national domain to be the general property of the

country, confided to the care of Congress, and which Congress is

solemnly bound to protect and preserve for the common good.

The benefit derived from the public lands, after all, is, and must

be, in the greatest degree, enjoyed by those who buy them and settle

upon them. The original price paid to government constitutes but a small

part of their actual value. Their immediate rise in value, in the

hands of the settler, gives him competence. He exercises a power of

selection over a vast region of fertile territory, all on sale at the

same price, and that price an exceedingly low one. Selection is no

sooner made, cultivation is no sooner begun, and the first furrow

turned, than he already finds himself a man of property. These are the

advantages of Western emigrants and Western settlers; and they are

such, certainly, as no country on earth ever before afforded to her

citizens. This opportunity of purchase and settlement, this certainty

of enhanced value, these sure means of immediate competence and

ultimate wealth,--all these are the rights and the blessings of the

people of the West, and they have my hearty wishes for their full and

perfect enjoyment.

I desire to see the public lands cultivated and occupied. I desire the

growth and prosperity of the West, and the fullest development of its

vast and extraordinary resources. I wish to bring it near to us, by

every species of useful communication. I see, not without admiration and

amazement, but yet without envy or jealousy, States of recent origin

already containing more people than Massachusetts. These people I know

to be part of ourselves; they have proceeded from the midst of us, and

we may trust that they are not likely to separate themselves, in

interest or in feeling, from their kindred, whom they have left on the

farms and around the hearths of their common fathers.

A liberal policy, a sympathy with its interests, an enlightened and

generous feeling of participation in its prosperity, are due to the

West, and will be met, I doubt not, by a return of sentiments equally

cordial and equally patriotic.

Gentlemen, the general question of revenue is very much connected with

this subject of the public lands, and I will therefore, in a very few

words, express my views on that point.

The revenue involves not only the supply of the treasury with money, but

the question of protection to manufactures. On these connected subjects,

therefore, Gentlemen, as I have promised to keep nothing back, I will

state my opinions plainly, but very shortly.

I am in favor of such a revenue as shall be equal to all the just and

reasonable wants of the government; and I am decidedly opposed to all

collection or accumulation of revenue beyond this point. An extravagant

government expenditure, and unnecessary accumulation in the treasury,

are both, of all things, to be most studiously avoided.

I am in favor of protecting American industry and labor, not only as

employed in large manufactories, but also, and more especially, as

employed in the various mechanic arts, carried on by persons of small

capitals, and living by the earnings of their own personal industry.

Every city in the Union, and none more than this, would feel severely

the consequences of departing from the ancient and continued policy of

the government respecting this last branch of protection. If duties were

to be abolished on hats, boots, shoes, and other articles of leather,

and on the articles fabricated of brass, tin, and iron, and on

ready-made clothes, carriages, furniture, and many similar articles,

thousands of persons would be immediately thrown out of employment in

this city, and in other parts of the Union. Protection, in this respect,

of our own labor against the cheaper, ill-paid, half-fed, and pauper

labor of Europe, is, in my opinion, a duty which the country owes to its

own citizens. I am, therefore, decidedly, for protecting our own

industry and our own labor.

In the next place, Gentlemen, I am of opinion, that, with no more than

usual skill in the application of the well-tried principles of

discriminating and specific duties, all the branches of national

industry may be protected, without imposing such duties on imports as

shall overcharge the treasury.

And as to the revenues arising from the sales of the public lands, I am

of opinion that they ought to be set apart for the use of the States.

The States need the money. The government of the United States does not

need it. Many of the States have contracted large debts for objects of

internal improvement; and others of them have important objects which

they would wish to accomplish. The lands were originally granted for the

use of the several States; and now that their proceeds are not necessary

for the purposes of the general government, I am of opinion that they

should go to the States, and to the people of the States, upon an equal

principle. Set apart, then, the proceeds of the public lands for the use

of the States; supply the treasury from duties on imports; apply to

these duties a just and careful discrimination, in favor of articles

produced at home by our own labor, and thus support, to a fair extent,

our own manufactures. These, Gentlemen, appear to me to be the general

outlines of that policy which the present condition of the country

requires us to adopt.

* * * * *

Gentlemen, proposing to express opinions on the principal subjects of

interest at the present moment, it is impossible to overlook the

delicate question which has arisen from events which have happened in

the late Mexican province of Texas. The independence of that province

has now been recognized by the government of the United States. Congress

gave the President the means, to be used when he saw fit, of opening a

diplomatic intercourse with its government, and the late President

immediately made use of those means.

I saw no objection, under the circumstances, to voting an appropriation

to be used when the President should think the proper time had come; and

he deemed, very promptly, it is true, that the time had already arrived.

Certainly, Gentlemen, the history of Texas is not a little wonderful. A

very few people, in a very short time, have established a government for

themselves, against the authority of the parent state; and this

government, it is generally supposed, there is little probability, at

the present moment, of the parent state being able to overturn.

This government is, in form, a copy of our own. It is an American

constitution, substantially after the great American model. We all,

therefore, must wish it success; and there is no one who will more

heartily rejoice than I shall, to see an independent community,

intelligent, industrious, and friendly towards us, springing up, and

rising into happiness, distinction, and power, upon our own principles

of liberty and government.

But it cannot be disguised, Gentlemen, that a desire, or an intention,

is already manifested to annex Texas to the United States. On a subject

of such mighty magnitude as this, and at a moment when the public

attention is drawn to it, I should feel myself wanting in candor, if I

did not express my opinion; since all must suppose that, on such a

question, it is impossible that I should be without some opinion.

I say then, Gentlemen, in all frankness, that I see objections, I think

insurmountable objections, to the annexation of Texas to the United

States. When the Constitution was formed, it is not probable that either

its framers or the people ever looked to the admission of any States

into the Union, except such as then already existed, and such as should

be formed out of territories then already belonging to the United

States. Fifteen years after the adoption of the Constitution, however,

the case of Louisiana arose. Louisiana was obtained by treaty with

France, who had recently obtained it from Spain; but the object of this

acquisition, certainly, was not mere extension of territory. Other great

political interests were connected with it. Spain, while she possessed

Louisiana, had held the mouths of the great rivers which rise in the

Western States, and flow into the Gulf of Mexico. She had disputed our

use of these rivers already, and with a powerful nation in possession of

these outlets to the sea, it is obvious that the commerce of all the

West was in danger of perpetual vexation. The command of these rivers to

the sea was, therefore, the great object aimed at in the acquisition of

Louisiana. But that acquisition necessarily brought territory along with

it, and three States now exist, formed out of that ancient province.

A similar policy, and a similar necessity, though perhaps not entirely

so urgent, led to the acquisition of Florida.

Now, no such necessity, no such policy, requires the annexation of

Texas. The accession of Texas to our territory is not necessary to the

full and complete enjoyment of all which we already possess. Her case,

therefore, stands upon a footing entirely different from that of

Louisiana and Florida. There being no necessity for extending the limits

of the Union in that direction, we ought, I think, for numerous and

powerful reasons, to be content with our present boundaries.

Gentlemen, we all see that, by whomsoever possessed, Texas is likely to

be a slave-holding country; and I frankly avow my entire unwillingness

to do any thing that shall extend the slavery of the African race on

this continent, or add other slave-holding States to the Union. When I

say that I regard slavery in itself as a great moral, social, and

political evil, I only use language which has been adopted by

distinguished men, themselves citizens of slave-holding States. I shall

do nothing, therefore, to favor or encourage its further extension. We

have slavery already amongst us. The Constitution found it in the Union;

it recognized it, and gave it solemn guaranties. To the full extent of

these guaranties we are all bound, in honor, in justice, and by the

Constitution. All the stipulations contained in the Constitution in

favor of the slave-holding States which are already in the Union ought

to be fulfilled, and, so far as depends on me, shall be fulfilled, in

the fullness of their spirit and to the exactness of their letter.

Slavery, as it exists in the States, is beyond the reach of Congress. It

is a concern of the States themselves; they have never submitted it to

Congress, and Congress has no rightful power over it. I shall concur,

therefore, in no act, no measure, no menace, no indication of purpose,

which shall interfere or threaten to interfere with the exclusive

authority of the several States over the subject of slavery as it exists

within their respective limits. All this appears to me to be matter of

plain and imperative duty.

But when we come to speak of admitting new States, the subject assumes

an entirely different aspect. Our rights and our duties are then both

different.

The free States, and all the States, are then at liberty to accept or to

reject. When it is proposed to bring new members into this political

partnership, the old members have a right to say on what terms such new

partners are to come in, and what they are to bring along with them. In

my opinion, the people of the United States will not consent to bring

into the Union a new, vastly extensive, and slave-holding country, large

enough for half a dozen or a dozen States. In my opinion, they ought not

to consent to it. Indeed, I am altogether at a loss to conceive what

possible benefit any part of this country can expect to derive from such

annexation. Any benefit to any part is at least doubtful and uncertain;

the objections are obvious, plain, and strong. On the general question

of slavery, a great portion of the community is already strongly

excited. The subject has not only attracted attention as a question of

politics, but it has struck a far deeper-toned chord. It has arrested

the religious feeling of the country; it has taken strong hold on the

consciences of men. He is a rash man, indeed, and little conversant with

human nature, and especially has he a very erroneous estimate of the

character of the people of this country, who supposes that a feeling of

this kind is to be trifled with or despised. It will assuredly cause

itself to be respected. It may be reasoned with, it may be made willing,

I believe it is entirely willing, to fulfil all existing engagements and

all existing duties, to uphold and defend the Constitution as it is

established, with whatever regrets about some provisions which it does

actually contain. But to coerce it into silence, to endeavor to restrain

its free expression, to seek to compress and confine it, warm as it is,

and more heated as such endeavors would inevitably render it,--should

this be attempted, I know nothing, even in the Constitution or in the

Union itself, which would not be endangered by the explosion which might

follow.

I see, therefore, no political necessity for the annexation of Texas to

the Union; no advantages to be derived from it; and objections to it of

a strong, and, in my judgment, decisive character.

I believe it to be for the interest and happiness of the whole Union to

remain as it is, without diminution and without addition.

* * * * *

Gentleman, I pass to other subjects. The rapid advancement of the

executive authority is a topic which has already been alluded to.

I believe there is serious cause of alarm from this source. I believe

the power of the executive has increased, is increasing, and ought

now to be brought back within its ancient constitutional limits. I

have nothing to do with the motives which have led to those acts,

which I believe to have transcended the boundaries of the Constitution.

Good motives may always be assumed, as bad motives may always be

imputed. Good intentions will always be pleaded for every assumption

of power; but they cannot justify it, even if we were sure that they

existed. It is hardly too strong to say, that the Constitution was

made to guard the people against the dangers of good intention,

real or pretended. When bad intentions are boldly avowed, the people

will promptly take care of themselves. On the other hand, they will

always be asked why they should resist or question that exercise of

power which is so fair in its object, so plausible and patriotic in

appearance, and which has the public good alone confessedly in view?

Human beings, we may be assured, will generally exercise power when

they can get it; and they will exercise it most undoubtedly, in

popular governments, under pretences of public safety or high public

interest. It may be very possible that good intentions do really

sometimes exist when constitutional restraints are disregarded. There

are men, in all ages, who mean to exercise power usefully; but who

mean to exercise it. They mean to govern well; but they mean to

govern. They promise to be kind masters; but they mean to be masters.

They think there need be but little restraint upon themselves. Their

notion of the public interest is apt to be quite closely connected

with their own exercise of authority. They may not, indeed, always

understand their own motives. The love of power may sink too deep in

their own hearts even for their own scrutiny, and may pass with

themselves for mere patriotism and benevolence.

A character has been drawn of a very eminent citizen of Massachusetts,

of the last age, which, though I think it does not entirely belong to

him, yet very well describes a certain class of public men. It was said

of this distinguished son of Massachusetts, that in matters of politics

and government he cherished the most kind and benevolent feelings

towards the whole earth. He earnestly desired to see all nations well

governed; and to bring about this happy result, he wished that the

United States might govern the rest of the world; that Massachusetts

might govern the United States; that Boston might govern Massachusetts;

and as for himself, his own humble ambition would be satisfied by

governing the little town of Boston.

* * * * *

I do not intend, Gentlemen, to commit so unreasonable a trespass on your

patience as to discuss all those cases in which I think executive power

has been unreasonably extended. I shall only allude to some of them,

and, as being earliest in the order of time, and hardly second to any

other in importance, I mention the practice of removal from all

offices, high and low, for opinion's sake, and on the avowed ground of

giving patronage to the President; that is to say, of giving him the

power of influencing men's political opinions and political conduct, by

hopes and by fears addressed directly to their pecuniary interests. The

great battle on this point was fought, and was lost, in the Senate of

the United States, in the last session of Congress under Mr. Adams's

administration. After General Jackson was known to be elected, and

before his term of office began, many important offices became vacant,

by the usual causes of death and resignation. Mr. Adams, of course,

nominated persons to fill these vacant offices. But a majority of the

Senate was composed of the friends of General Jackson; and, instead of

acting on these nominations, and filling the vacant offices with

ordinary promptitude, the nominations were postponed to a day beyond the

4th of March, for the purpose, openly avowed, of giving the patronage of

the appointments to the President who was then coming into office. When

the new President entered on his office, he withdrew these nominations,

and sent in nominations of his own friends in their places. I was of

opinion then, and am of opinion now, that that decision of the Senate

went far to unfix the proper balance of the government. It conferred on

the President the power of rewards for party purposes, or personal

purposes, without limit or control. It sanctioned, manifestly and

plainly, that exercise of power which Mr. Madison had said would deserve

impeachment; and it completely defeated one great object, which we are

told the framers of the Constitution contemplated, in the manner of

forming the Senate; that is, that the Senate might be a body not

changing with the election of a President, and therefore likely to be

able to hold over him some check or restraint in regard to bringing his

own friends and partisans into power with him, and thus rewarding their

services to him at the public expense.

The debates in the Senate, on these questions, were long continued and

earnest. They were of course in secret session, but the opinions of

those members who opposed this course have all been proved true by the

result. The contest was severe and ardent, as much so as any that I have

ever partaken in; and I have seen some service in that sort of warfare.

Gentlemen, when I look back to that eventful moment, when I remember who

those were who upheld this claim for executive power, with so much zeal

and devotion, as well as with such great and splendid abilities, and

when I look round now, and inquire what has become of these gentlemen,

where they have found themselves at last, under the power which they

thus helped to establish, what has become now of all their respect,

trust, confidence, and attachment, how many of them, indeed, have not

escaped from being broken and crushed under the weight of the wheels of

that engine which they themselves set in motion. I feel that an edifying

lesson may be read by those who, in the freshness and fullness of party

zeal, are ready to confer the most dangerous power, in the hope that

they and their friends may bask in its sunshine, while enemies only

shall be withered by its frown.

I will not go into the mention of names. I will give no enumeration of

persons; but I ask you to turn your minds back, and recollect who the

distinguished men were who supported, in the Senate, General Jackson's

administration for the first two years; and I will ask you what you

suppose they think now of that power and that discretion which they so

freely confided to executive hands. What do they think of the whole

career of that administration, the commencement of which, and indeed the

existence of which, owed so much to their own great exertions?

* * * * *

In addition to the establishment of this power of unlimited and

causeless removal, another doctrine has been put forth, more vague, it

is true, but altogether unconstitutional, and tending to like dangerous

results. In some loose, indefinite, and unknown sense, the President has

been called the _representative of the whole American people_. He has

called himself so repeatedly, and been so denominated by his friends a

thousand times. Acts, for which no specific authority has been found

either in the Constitution or the laws, have been justified on the

ground that the President is the representative of the whole American

people. Certainly, this is not constitutional language. Certainly, the

Constitution nowhere calls the President the universal representative of

the people. The constitutional representatives of the people are in the

House of Representatives, exercising powers of legislation. The

President is an executive officer, appointed in a particular manner, and

clothed with prescribed and limited powers. It may be thought to be of

no great consequence, that the President should call himself, or that

others should call him, the sole representative of all the people,

although he has no such appellation or character in the Constitution.

But, in these matters, words are things. If he is the people's

representative, and as such may exercise power, without any other grant,

what is the limit to that power? And what may not an unlimited

representative of the people do? When the Constitution expressly creates

representatives, as members of Congress, it regulates, defines, and

limits their authority. But if the executive chief magistrate, merely

because he is the executive chief magistrate, may assume to himself

another character, and call himself the representative of the whole

people, what is to limit or restrain this representative power in his

hands?

I fear, Gentlemen, that if these pretensions should be continued and

justified, we might have many instances of summary political logic, such

as I once heard in the House of Representatives. A gentleman, not now

living, wished very much to vote for the establishment of a Bank of the

United States, but he had always stoutly denied the constitutional power

of Congress to create such a bank. The country, however, was in a state

of great financial distress, from which such an institution, it was

hoped, might help to extricate it; and this consideration led the worthy

member to review his opinions with care and deliberation. Happily, on

such careful and deliberate review, he altered his former judgment. He

came, satisfactorily, to the conclusion that Congress might incorporate

a bank. The argument which brought his mind to this result was short,

and so plain and obvious, that he wondered how he should so long have

overlooked it. The power, he said, to create a bank, was either given to

Congress, or it was not given. Very well. If it was given, Congress of

course could exercise it; if it was not given, the people still retained

it, and in that case, Congress, as the representatives of the people,

might, upon an emergency, make free to use it.

Arguments and conclusions in substance like these, Gentlemen, will not

be wanting, if men of great popularity, commanding characters, sustained

by powerful parties, _and full of good intentions towards the public_,

may be permitted to call themselves the universal representatives of the

people.

But, Gentlemen, it is the _currency_, the currency of the country,--it

is this great subject, so interesting, so vital, to all classes of the

community, which has been destined to feel the most violent assaults of

executive power. The consequences are around us and upon us. Not

unforeseen, not unforetold, here they come, bringing distress for the

present, and fear and alarm for the future. If it be denied that the

present condition of things has arisen from the President's interference

with the revenue, the first answer is, that, when he did interfere, just

such consequences were predicted. It was then said, and repeated, and

pressed upon the public attention, that that interference must

necessarily produce derangement, embarrassment, loss of confidence, and

commercial distress. I pray you, Gentlemen, to recur to the debates of

1832, 1833, and 1834, and then to decide whose opinions have proved to

be correct. When the treasury experiment was first announced, who

supported, and who opposed it? Who warned the country against it? Who

were they who endeavored to stay the violence of party, to arrest the

hand of executive authority, and to convince the people that this

experiment was delusive; that its object was merely to increase

executive power, and that its effect, sooner or later, must be injurious

and ruinous? Gentlemen, it is fair to bring the opinions of political

men to the test of experience. It is just to judge of them by their

measures, and their opposition to measures; and for myself, and those

political friends with whom I have acted, on this subject of the

currency, I am ready to abide the test.

But before the subject of the currency, and its present most

embarrassing state, is discussed, I invite your attention, Gentlemen, to

the history of executive proceedings connected with it. I propose to

state to you a series of facts; not to argue upon them, not to _mystify_

them, nor to draw any unjust inference from them; but merely to state

the case, in the plainest manner, as I understand it. And I wish,

Gentlemen, that, in order to be able to do this in the best and most

convincing manner, I had the ability of my learned friend, (Mr. Ogden,)

whom you have all so often heard, and who usually states his case in

such a manner that, when stated, it is already very well argued.

Let us see, Gentlemen, what the train of occurrences has been in regard

to our revenue and finances; and when these occurrences are stated, I

leave to every man the right to decide for himself whether our present

difficulties have or have not arisen from attempts to extend the

executive authority. In giving this detail, I shall be compelled to

speak of the late Bank of the United States; but I shall speak of it

historically only. My opinion of its utility, and of the extraordinary

ability and success with which its affairs were conducted for many years

before the termination of its charter, is well known. I have often

expressed it, and I have not altered it. But at present I speak of the

bank only as it makes a necessary part in the history of events which I

wish now to recapitulate.

Mr. Adams commenced his administration in March, 1825. He had been

elected by the House of Representatives, and began his career as

President under a powerful opposition. From the very first day, he

was warmly, even violently, opposed in all his measures; and this

opposition, as we all know, continued without abatement, either in

force or asperity, through his whole term of four years. Gentlemen, I

am not about to say whether this opposition was well or ill founded,

just or unjust. I only state the fact as connected with other facts.

The Bank of the United States, during these four years of Mr. Adams's

administration, was in full operation. It was performing the fiscal

duties enjoined on it by its charter; it had established numerous

offices, was maintaining a large circulation, and transacting a vast

business in exchange. Its character, conduct, and manner of

administration were all well known to the whole country.

Now there are two or three things worthy of especial notice. One is,

that during the whole of this heated political controversy, from

1825 to 1829, the party which was endeavoring to produce a change of

administration in the general government brought no charge of political

interference against the Bank of the United States. If any thing, it

was rather a favorite with that party generally. Certainly, the party,

as a party, did not ascribe to it undue attachment to other parties,

or to the then existing administration. Another important fact is,

that, during the whole of the same period, those who had espoused the

cause of General Jackson, and who sought to bring about a revolution

under his name, did not propose the destruction of the bank, or its

discontinuance, as one of the objects which were to be accomplished

by the intended revolution. They did not tell the country that the bank

was unconstitutional; they did not declare it unnecessary; they did not

propose to get along without it, when they should come into power

themselves. If individuals entertained any such purposes, they kept them

much to themselves. The party, as a party, avowed none such. A third

fact, worthy of all notice, is, that during this period there was no

complaint about the state of the currency, either by the country

generally or by the party then in opposition.

In March, 1829, General Jackson was inaugurated as President. He came

into power on professions of reform. He announced reform of all abuses

to be the great and leading object of his future administration; and in

his inaugural address he pointed out the main subjects of this reform.

But the bank was not one of them. It was not said by him that the bank

was unconstitutional. It was not said that it was unnecessary or

useless. It was not said that it had failed to do all that had been

hoped or expected from it in regard to the currency.

In March, 1829, then, the bank stood well, very well, with the new

administration. It was regarded, so far as appears, as entirely

constitutional, free from political or party taint, and highly useful.

It had as yet found no place in the catalogue of abuses to be reformed.

But, Gentlemen, nine months wrought a wonderful change. New lights broke

forth before these months had rolled away; and the President, in his

message to Congress in December, 1829, held a very unaccustomed language

and manifested very unexpected purposes.

Although the bank had then five or six years of its charter unexpired,

he yet called the attention of Congress very pointedly to the subject,

and declared,--

1. That the constitutionality of the bank was well doubted by many;

2. That its utility or expediency was also well doubted;

3. That all must admit that it had failed to establish or maintain a

sound and uniform currency; and

4. That the true bank for the use of the government of the United States

would be a bank which should be founded on the revenues and credit of

the government itself.

These propositions appeared to me, at the time, as very extraordinary,

and the last one as very startling. A bank founded on the revenue and

credit of the government, and managed and administered by the executive,

was a conception which I had supposed no man holding the chief executive

power in his own hands would venture to put forth.

But the question now is, what had wrought this great change of feeling

and of purpose in regard to the bank. What events had occurred between

March and December that should have caused the bank, so constitutional,

so useful, so peaceful, and so safe an institution, in the first of

these months, to start up into the character of a monster, and become so

horrid and dangerous, in the last?

Gentlemen, let us see what the events were which had intervened. General

Jackson was elected in December, 1828. His term was to begin in March,

1829. A session of Congress took place, therefore, between his election

and the commencement of his administration.

Now, Gentlemen, the truth is, that during this session, and a little

before the commencement of the new administration, a disposition was

manifested by political men to interfere with the management of the

bank. Members of Congress undertook to nominate or recommend individuals

as directors in the branches, or offices, of the bank. They were kind

enough, sometimes, to make out whole lists, or tickets, and to send them

to Philadelphia, containing the names of those whose appointments would

be satisfactory to General Jackson's friends. Portions of the

correspondence on these subjects have been published in some of the

voluminous reports and other documents connected with the bank, but

perhaps have not been generally heeded or noticed. At first, the bank

merely declined, as gently as possible, complying with these and similar

requests. But like applications began to show themselves from many

quarters, and a very marked case arose as early as June, 1829. Certain

members of the Legislature of New Hampshire applied for a change in the

presidency of the branch which was established in that State. A member

of the Senate of the United States wrote both to the president of the

bank and to the Secretary of the Treasury, strongly recommending a

change, and in his letter to the Secretary hinting very distinctly at

political considerations as the ground of the movement. Other officers

in the service of the government took an interest in the matter, and

urged a change; and the Secretary himself wrote to the bank, suggesting

and recommending it. The time had come, then, for the bank to take its

position. It did take it; and, in my judgment, if it had not acted as it

did act, not only would those who had the care of it have been most

highly censurable, but a claim would have been yielded to, entirely

inconsistent with a government of laws, and subversive of the very

foundations of republicanism.

A long correspondence between the Secretary of the Treasury and the

president of the bank ensued. The directors determined that they

would not surrender either their rights or their duties to the

control or supervision of the executive government. They said they had

never appointed directors of their branches on political grounds, and

they would not remove them on such grounds. They had avoided politics.

They had sought for men of business, capacity, fidelity, and experience

in the management of pecuniary concerns. They owed duties, they said,

to the government, which they meant to perform, faithfully and

impartially, under all administrations; and they owed duties to the

stockholders of the bank, which required them to disregard political

considerations in their appointments. This correspondence ran along

into the fall of the year, and finally terminated in a stern and

unanimous declaration, made by the directors, and transmitted to the

Secretary of the Treasury, that the bank would continue to be

independently administered, and that the directors once for all refused

to submit to the supervision of the executive authority, in any of

its branches, in the appointment of local directors and agents. This

resolution decided the character of the future. Hostility towards the

bank, thenceforward, became the settled policy of the government; and

the message of December, 1829, was the clear announcement of that

policy. If the bank had appointed those directors, thus recommended by

members of Congress; if it had submitted all its appointments to the

supervision of the treasury; if it had removed the president of the

New Hampshire branch; if it had, in all things, showed itself a

complying, political, party machine, instead of an independent

institution;--if it had done this, I leave all men to judge whether such

an entire change of opinion, as to its constitutionality, its utility,

and its good effects on the currency, would have happened between

March and December.

From the moment in which the bank asserted its independence of treasury

control, and its elevation above mere party purposes, down to the end of

its charter, and down even to the present day, it has been the subject

to which the selectest phrases of party denunciation have been

plentifully applied.

But Congress manifested no disposition to establish a treasury bank.

On the contrary, it was satisfied, and so was the country, most

unquestionably, with the bank then existing. In the summer of 1832,

Congress passed an act for continuing the charter of the bank, by

strong majorities in both houses. In the House of Representatives, I

think, two thirds of the members voted for the bill. The President

gave it his negative; and as there were not two thirds of the

Senate, though a large majority were for it, the bill failed to become

a law.

But it was not enough that a continuance of the charter of the bank was

thus refused. It had the deposit of the public money, and this it was

entitled to by law, for the few years which yet remained of its

chartered term. But this it was determined it should not continue to

enjoy. At the commencement of the session of 1832-33, a grave and sober

doubt was expressed by the Secretary of the Treasury, in his official

communication, whether the public moneys were safe in the custody of the

bank! I confess, Gentlemen, when I look back to this suggestion, thus

officially made, so serious in its import, so unjust, if not well

founded, and so greatly injurious to the credit of the bank, and

injurious, indeed, to the credit of the whole country, I cannot but

wonder that any man of intelligence and character should have been

willing to make it. I read in it, however, the first lines of another

chapter. I saw an attempt was now to be made to remove the deposits of

the public money from the bank, and such an attempt was made that very

session. But Congress was not to be prevailed upon to accomplish the end

by its own authority. It was well ascertained that neither house would

consent to it. The House of Representatives, indeed, at the heel of the

session, decided against the proposition by a very large majority.

The legislative authority having been thus invoked, and invoked in vain,

it was resolved to stretch farther the long arm of executive power, and

by that arm to reach and strike the victim. It so happened that I was in

this city in May, 1833, and here learned, from a very authentic source,

that the deposits would be removed by the President's order; and in

June, as afterwards appeared, that order was given.

Now it is obvious, Gentlemen, that thus far the changes in our financial

and fiscal system were effected, not by Congress, but by the executive;

not by law, but by the will and the power of the President. Congress

would have continued the charter of the bank; but the President

negatived the bill. Congress was of opinion that the deposits ought not

to be removed; but the President removed them. Nor was this all. The

public moneys being withdrawn from the custody which the law had

provided, by executive power alone, that same power selected the places

for their future keeping. Particular banks, existing under State

charters, were chosen. With these especial and particular arrangements

were made, and the public moneys were deposited in their vaults.

Henceforward these selected banks were to operate on the revenue and

credit of the government; and thus the original scheme, promulgated in

the annual message of December, 1829, was substantially carried into

effect. Here were banks chosen by the treasury; all the arrangements

with them made by the treasury; a set of duties to be performed by them

to the treasury prescribed; and these banks were to hold the whole

proceeds of the public revenue. In all this, Congress had neither part

nor lot. No law had caused the removal of the deposits; no law had

authorized the selection of deposit State banks; no law had prescribed

the terms on which the revenues should be placed in such banks. From the

beginning of the chapter to the end, it was all executive edict. And

now, Gentlemen, I ask if it be not most remarkable, that, in a country

professing to be under a government of laws, such great and important

changes in one of its most essential and vital interests should be

brought about without any change of law, without any enactment of the

legislature whatever? Is such a power trusted to the executive of any

government in which the executive is separated, by clear and

well-defined lines, from the legislative department? The currency of the

country stands on the same general ground as the commerce of the

country. Both are intimately connected, and both are subjects of legal,

not of executive, regulation.

It is worthy of notice, that the writers of the Federalist, in

discussing the powers which the Constitution conferred on the President,

made it matter of commendation, that it withdraws this subject

altogether from his grasp. "He can prescribe no rules," say they,

"concerning the commerce or _currency_ of the country." And so we have

been all taught to think, under all former administrations. But we have

now seen that the President, and the President alone, does prescribe the

rule concerning the currency. He makes it, and he alters it. He makes

one rule for one branch of the revenue, and another rule for another. He

makes one rule for the citizen of one State, and another for the citizen

of another State. This, it is certain, is one part of the treasury order

of July last.

But at last Congress interfered, and undertook to regulate the deposits

of the public moneys. It passed the law of July, 1836, placing the

subject under legal control, restraining the power of the executive,

subjecting the banks to liabilities and duties, on the one hand, and

securing them against executive favoritism, on the other. But this law

contained another important provision; which was, that all the money in

the treasury, beyond what was necessary for the current expenditures of

the government, should be deposited with the States. This measure passed

both houses by very unusual majorities, yet it hardly escaped a veto. It

obtained only a cold assent, a slow, reluctant, and hesitating approval;

and an early moment was seized to array against it a long list of

objections. But the law passed. The money in the treasury beyond the sum

of five millions was to go to the States. It has so gone, and the

treasury for the present is relieved from the burden of a surplus. But

now observe other coincidences. In the annual message of December, 1835,

the President quoted the fact of the rapidly increasing sale of the

public lands as proof of high national prosperity. He alluded to that

subject, certainly with much satisfaction, and apparently in something

of the tone of exultation. There was nothing said about monopoly, not a

word about speculation, not a word about over-issues of paper, to pay

for the lands. All was prosperous, all was full of evidence of a wise

administration of government, all was joy and triumph.

But the idea of a deposit or distribution of the surplus money with the

people suddenly damped this effervescing happiness. The color of the

rose was gone, and every thing now looked gloomy and black. Now no more

felicitation or congratulation, on account of the rapid sales of the

public lands; no more of this most decisive proof of national prosperity

and happiness. The executive Muse takes up a melancholy strain. She

sings of monopolies, of speculation, of worthless paper, of loss both of

land and money, of the multiplication of banks, and the danger of paper

issues; and the end of the canto, the catastrophe, is, that lands shall

no longer be sold but for gold and silver alone. The object of all this

is clear enough. It was to diminish the income from the public lands. No

desire for such a diminution had been manifested, so long as the money

was supposed to be likely to remain in the treasury. But a growing

conviction that some other disposition must be made of the surplus,

awakened attention to the means of preventing that surplus.

Toward the close of the last session, Gentlemen, a proposition was

brought forward in Congress for such an alteration of the law as should

admit payment for public lands to be made in nothing but gold and

silver. The mover voted for his own proposition; but I do not recollect

that any other member concurred in the vote. The proposition was

rejected at once; but, as in other cases, that which Congress refused to

do, the executive power did. Ten days after Congress adjourned, having

had this matter before it, and having refused to act upon it by making

any alteration in the existing laws, a treasury order was issued,

commanding that very thing to be done which Congress had been requested

and had refused to do. Just as in the case of the removal of the

deposits, the executive power acted in this case also against the known,

well understood, and recently expressed will of the representatives of

the people. There never has been a moment when the legislative will

would have sanctioned the object of that order; probably never a moment

in which any twenty individual members of Congress would have concurred

in it. The act was done without the assent of Congress, and against the

well-known opinion of Congress. That act altered the law of the land, or

purported to alter it, against the well-known will of the law-making

power.

For one, I confess I see no authority whatever in the Constitution, or

in any law, for this treasury order. Those who have undertaken to

maintain it have placed it on grounds, not only different, but

inconsistent and contradictory. The reason which one gives, another

rejects; one confutes what another argues. With one it is the joint

resolution of 1816 which gave the authority; with another, it is the law

of 1820; with a third, it is the general superintending power of the

President; and this last argument, since it resolves itself into mere

power, without stopping to point out the sources of that power, is not

only the shortest, but in truth the most just. He is the most sensible,

as well as the most candid reasoner, in my opinion, who places this

treasury order on the ground of the pleasure of the executive, and stops

there. I regard the joint resolution of 1816 as mandatory; as

prescribing a legal rule; as putting this subject, in which all have so

deep an interest, beyond the caprice, or the arbitrary pleasure, or the

discretion, of the Secretary of the Treasury. I believe there is not the

slightest legal authority, either in that officer or in the President,

to make a distinction, and to say that paper may be received for debts

at the custom-house, but that gold and silver only shall be received at

the land offices. And now for the sequel.

At the commencement of the last session, as you know, Gentlemen, a

resolution was brought forward in the Senate for annulling and

abrogating this order, by Mr. Ewing, of Ohio, a gentleman of much

intelligence, of sound principles, of vigorous and energetic character,

whose loss from the service of the country I regard as a public

misfortune. The Whig members all supported this resolution, and all the

members, I believe, with the exception of some five or six, were very

anxious in some way to get rid of the treasury order. But Mr. Ewing's

resolution was too direct. It was deemed a pointed and ungracious attack

on executive polity. It must therefore be softened, modified, qualified,

made to sound less harsh to the ears of men in power, and to assume a

plausible, polished, inoffensive character. It was accordingly put into

the plastic hands of friends of the executive to be moulded and

fashioned, so that it might have the effect of ridding the country of

the obnoxious order, and yet not appear to question executive

infallibility. All this did not answer. The late President is not a man

to be satisfied with soft words; and he saw in the measure, even as it

passed the two houses, a substantial repeal of the order. He is a man of

boldness and decision; and he respects boldness and decision in others.

If you are his friend, he expects no flinching; and if you are his

adversary, he respects you none the less for carrying your opposition to

the full limits of honorable warfare. Gentlemen, I most sincerely regret

the course of the President in regard to this bill, and certainly most

highly disapprove it. But I do not suffer the mortification of having

attempted to disguise and garnish it, in order to make it acceptable,

and of still finding it thrown back in my face. All that was obtained by

this ingenious, diplomatic, and over-courteous mode of enacting a law,

was a response from the President and the Attorney-General, that the

bill in question was obscure, ill penned, and not easy to be understood.

The bill, therefore, was neither approved nor negatived. If it had been

approved, the treasury order would have been annulled, though in a

clumsy and objectionable manner. If it had been negatived, and returned

to Congress, no doubt it would have been passed by two thirds of both

houses, and in that way have become a law, and abrogated the order. But

it was not approved, it was not returned; it was retained. It had passed

the Senate in season; it had been sent to the House in season; but there

it was suffered to lie so long without being called up, that it was

completely in the power of the President when it finally passed that

body; since he is not obliged to return bills which he does not approve,

if not presented to him ten days before the end of the session. The bill

was lost, therefore, and the treasury order remains in force. Here again

the representatives of the people, in both houses of Congress, by

majorities almost unprecedented, endeavored to abolish this obnoxious

order. On hardly any subject, indeed, has opinion been so unanimous,

either in or out of Congress. Yet the order remains.

And now, Gentlemen, I ask you, and I ask all men who have not

voluntarily surrendered all power and all right of thinking for

themselves, whether, from 1832 to the present moment, the executive

authority has not effectually superseded the power of Congress, thwarted

the will of the representatives of the people, and even of the people

themselves, and taken the whole subject of the currency into its own

grasp? In 1832, Congress desired to continue the bank of the United

States, and a majority of the people desired it also; but the President

opposed it, and his will prevailed. In 1833, Congress refused to remove

the deposits; the President resolved upon it, however, and his will

prevailed. Congress has never been willing to make a bank founded on the

money and credit of the government, and administered, of course, by

executive hands; but this was the President's object, and he attained

it, in a great measure, by the treasury selection of deposit banks. In

this particular, therefore, to a great extent, his will prevailed. In

1836, Congress refused to confine the receipts for public lands to gold

and silver; but the President willed it, and his will prevailed. In

1837, both houses of Congress, by more than two thirds, passed a bill

for restoring the former state of things by annulling the treasury

order; but the President willed, notwithstanding, that the order should

remain in force, and his will again prevailed. I repeat the question,

therefore, and I would put it earnestly to every intelligent man, to

every lover of our constitutional liberty, are we under the dominion of

the law? or has the effectual government of the country, at least in all

that regards the great interest of the currency, been in a single hand?

* * * * *

Gentlemen, I have done with the narrative of events and measures. I have

done with the history of these successive steps, in the progress of

executive power, towards a complete control over the revenue and the

currency. The result is now all before us. These pretended reforms,

these extraordinary exercises of power from an extraordinary zeal for

the good of the people, what have they brought us to?

In 1829, the currency was declared to be _neither sound nor uniform_; a

proposition, in my judgment, altogether at variance with the fact,

because I do not believe there ever was a country of equal extent, in

which paper formed any part of the circulation, that possessed a

currency so sound, so uniform, so convenient, and so perfect in all

respects, as the currency of this country, at the moment of the delivery

of that message, in 1829.

But how is it now? Where has the improvement brought it? What has reform

done? What has the great cry for hard money accomplished? Is the

currency _uniform_ now? Is money in New Orleans now as good, or nearly

so, as money in New York? Are exchanges at par, or only at the same low

rates as in 1829 and other years? Every one here knows that all the

benefits of this experiment are but injury and oppression; all this

reform, but aggravated distress.

And as to the _soundness_ of the currency, how does that stand? Are the

causes of alarm less now than in 1829? Is there less bank paper in

circulation? Is there less fear of a general catastrophe? Is property

more secure, or industry more certain of its reward? We all know,

Gentlemen, that, during all this pretended warfare against all banks,

banks have vastly increased. Millions upon millions of bank paper have

been added to the circulation. Everywhere, and nowhere so much as where

the present administration and its measures have been most zealously

supported, banks have multiplied under State authority, since the decree

was made that the Bank of the United States should be suffered to

expire. Look at Mississippi, Missouri, Louisiana, Virginia, and other

States. Do we not see that banking capital and bank paper are enormously

increasing? The opposition to banks, therefore, so much professed,

whether it be real or whether it be but pretended, has not restrained

either their number or their issues of paper. Both have vastly

increased.

And now a word or two, Gentlemen, upon this hard-money scheme, and the

fancies and the delusions to which it has given birth. Gentlemen, this

is a subject of delicacy, and one which it is difficult to treat with

sufficient caution, in a popular and occasional address like this. I

profess to be a _bullionist_, in the usual and accepted sense of that

word. I am for a solid specie basis for our circulation, and for specie

as a part of the circulation, so far as it may be practicable and

convenient. I am for giving no value to paper, merely as paper. I abhor

paper; that is to say, irredeemable paper, paper that may not be

converted into gold or silver at the will of the holder. But while I

hold to all this, I believe, also, that an exclusive gold and silver

circulation is an utter impossibility in the present state of this

country and of the world. We shall none of us ever see it; and it is

credulity and folly, in my opinion, to act under any such hope or

expectation. The States will make banks, and these will issue paper; and

the longer the government of the United States neglects its duty in

regard to measures for regulating the currency, the greater will be the

amount of bank paper overspreading the country. Of this I entertain not

a particle of doubt.

While I thus hold to the absolute and indispensable necessity of gold

and silver, as the foundation of our circulation, I yet think nothing

more absurd and preposterous, than unnatural and strained efforts to

import specie. There is but so much specie in the world, and its amount

cannot be greatly or suddenly increased. Indeed, there are reasons for

supposing that its amount has recently diminished, by the quantity used

in manufactures, and by the diminished products of the mines. The

existing amount of specie, however, must support the paper circulations,

and the systems of currency, not of the United States only, but of other

nations also. One of its great uses is to pass from country to country,

for the purpose of settling occasional balances in commercial

transactions. It always finds its way, naturally and easily, to places

where it is needed for these uses. But to take extraordinary pains to

bring it where the course of trade does not bring it, where the state of

debt and credit does not require it to be, and then to endeavor, by

unnecessary and injurious regulations, treasury orders, accumulations at

the mint, and other contrivances, there to retain it, is a course of

policy bordering, as it appears to me, on political insanity. It is

boasted that we have seventy-five or eighty millions of specie now in

the country. But what more senseless, what more absurd, than this boast,

if there is a balance against us abroad, of which payment is desired

sooner than remittances of our own products are likely to make that

payment? What more miserable than to boast of having that which is not

ours, which belongs to others, and which the convenience of others, and

our own convenience also, require that they should possess? If Boston

were in debt to New York, would it be wise in Boston, instead of paying

its debt, to contrive all possible means of obtaining specie from the

New York banks, and hoarding it at home? And yet this, as I think, would

be precisely as sensible as the course which the government of the

United States at present pursues. We have, beyond all doubt, a great

amount of specie in the country, but it does not answer its accustomed

end, it does not perform its proper duty. It neither goes abroad to

settle balances against us, and thereby quiet those who have demands

upon us; nor is it so disposed of at home as to sustain the circulation

to the extent which the circumstances of the times require. A great part

of it is in the Western banks, in the land offices, on the roads

through the wilderness, on the passages over the Lakes, from the land

offices to the deposit banks, and from the deposit banks back to the

land offices. Another portion is in the hands of buyers and sellers of

specie; of men in the West, who sell land-office money to the new

settlers for a high premium. Another portion, again, is kept in private

hands, to be used when circumstances shall tempt to the purchase of

lands. And, Gentlemen, I am inclined to think, so loud has been the cry

about hard money, and so sweeping the denunciation of all paper, that

private holding, or hoarding, prevails to some extent in different parts

of the country. These eighty millions of specie, therefore, really do us

little good. We are weaker in our circulation, I have no doubt, our

credit is feebler, money is scarcer with us, at this moment, than if

twenty millions of this specie were shipped to Europe, and general

confidence thereby restored.

Gentlemen, I will not say that some degree of pressure might not have

come upon us, if the treasury order had not issued. I will not say

that there has not been over-trading, and over-production, and a too

great expansion of bank circulation. This may all be so, and the

last-mentioned evil, it was easy to foresee, was likely to happen when

the United States discontinued their own bank. But what I do say is,

that, acting upon the state of things as it actually existed, and is

now actually existing, the treasury order has been, and now is,

productive of great distress. It acts upon a state of things which gives

extraordinary force to its stroke, and extraordinary point to its

sting. It arrests specie, when the free use and circulation of specie

are most important; it cripples the banks, at a moment when the banks

more than ever need all their means. It makes the merchant unable to

remit, when remittance is necessary for his own credit, and for the

general adjustment of commercial balances. I am not now discussing

the general question, whether prices must not come down, and adjust

themselves anew to the amount of bullion existing in Europe and America.

I am dealing only with the measures of our own government on the

subject of the currency, and I insist that these measures have been

most unfortunate, and most ruinous in their effects on the ordinary

means of our circulation at home, and on our ability of remittance

abroad.

Their effects, too, on domestic exchanges, by deranging and misplacing

the specie which is in the country, are most disastrous. Let him who has

lent an ear to all these promises of a more uniform currency see how he

can now sell his draft on New Orleans or Mobile. Let the Northern

manufacturers and mechanics, those who have sold the products of their

labor to the South, and heretofore realized the prices with little loss

of exchange, let them try present facilities. Let them see what reform

of the currency has done for them. Let them inquire whether, in this

respect, their condition is better or worse than it was five or six

years ago.

Gentlemen, I hold this disturbance of the measure of value, and the

means of payment and exchange, this derangement, and, if I may so say,

this violation of the currency, to be one of the most unpardonable of

political faults. He who tampers with the currency robs labor of its

bread. He panders, indeed, to greedy capital, which is keen-sighted,

and may shift for itself; but he beggars labor, which is honest,

unsuspecting, and too busy with the present to calculate for the

future. The prosperity of the working classes lives, moves, and has

its being in established credit, and a steady medium of payment. All

sudden changes destroy it. Honest industry never comes in for any

part of the spoils in that scramble which takes place when the

currency of a country is disordered. Did wild schemes and projects

ever benefit the industrious? Did irredeemable bank paper ever enrich

the laborious? Did violent fluctuations ever do good to him who

depends on his daily labor for his daily bread? Certainly never. All

these things may gratify greediness for sudden gain, or the rashness

of daring speculation; but they can bring nothing but injury and

distress to the homes of patient industry and honest labor. Who are

they that profit by the present state of things? They are not the

many, but the few. They are speculators, brokers, dealers in money,

and lenders of money at exorbitant interest. Small capitalists are

crushed, and, their means being dispersed, as usual, in various parts of

the country, and this miserable policy having destroyed exchanges, they

have no longer either money or credit. And all classes of labor

partake, and must partake, in the same calamity. And what consolation

for all this is it, that the public lands are paid for in specie?

that, whatever embarrassment and distress pervade the country, the

Western wilderness is thickly sprinkled over with eagles and dollars?

that gold goes weekly from Milwaukie and Chicago to Detroit, and back

again from Detroit to Milwaukie and Chicago, and performs similar

feats of egress and regress in many other instances, in the Western

States? It is remarkable enough, that, with all this sacrifice of

general convenience, with all this sky-rending clamor for government

payments in specie, government, after all, never gets a dollar. So far

as I know, the United States have not now a single specie dollar in the

world. If they have, where is it? The gold and silver collected at the

land-offices is sent to the deposit banks; it is there placed to the

credit of the government, and thereby becomes the property of the

bank. The whole revenue of the government, therefore, after all,

consists in mere bank credits; that very sort of security which the

friends of the administration have so much denounced.

Remember, Gentlemen, in the midst of this deafening din against all

banks, that, if it shall create such a panic as shall shut up the banks,

it will shut up the treasury of the United States also.

Gentlemen, I would not willingly be a prophet of ill. I most devoutly

wish to see a better state of things; and I believe the repeal of the

treasury order would tend very much to bring about that better state of

things. And I am of opinion, that, sooner or later, the order will be

repealed. I think it must be repealed. I think the East, West, North,

and South will demand its repeal. But, Gentlemen, I feel it my duty to

say, that, if I should be disappointed in this expectation, I see no

immediate relief to the distresses of the community. I greatly fear,

even, that the worst is not yet.[107] I look for severer distresses; for

extreme difficulties in exchange, for far greater inconveniences in

remittance, and for a sudden fall in prices. Our condition is one which

is not to be tampered with, and the repeal of the treasury order, being

something which government can do, and which will do good, the public

voice is right in demanding that repeal. It is true, if repealed now,

the relief will come late. Nevertheless its repeal or abrogation is a

thing to be insisted on, and pursued, till it shall be accomplished.

This executive control over the currency, this power of discriminating,

by treasury order, between one man's debt and another man's debt, is a

thing not to be endured in a free country; and it should be the

constant, persisting demand of all true Whigs, "Rescind the illegal

treasury order, restore the rule of the law, place all branches of the

revenue on the same grounds, make men's rights equal, and leave the

government of the country where the Constitution leaves it, in the hands

of the representatives of the people in Congress." This point should

never be surrendered or compromised. Whatever is established, let it be

equal, and let it be legal. Let men know, to-day, what money may be

required of them to-morrow. Let the role be open and public, on the

pages of the statute-book, not a secret, in the executive breast.

Gentlemen, in the session which has now just closed, I have done my

utmost to effect a direct and immediate repeal of the treasury order.

I have voted for a bill anticipating the payment of the French and

Neapolitan indemnities by an advance from the treasury.

I have voted with great satisfaction for the restoration of duties on

goods destroyed in the great conflagration in this city.

I have voted for a deposit with the States of the surplus which may be

in the treasury at the end of the year. All these measures have failed;

and it is for you, and for our fellow-citizens throughout the country,

to decide whether the public interest would, or would not, have been

promoted by their success.

But I find, Gentlemen, that I am committing an unpardonable trespass on

your indulgent patience. I will pursue these remarks no further. And yet

I cannot persuade myself to take leave of you without reminding you,

with the utmost deference and respect, of the important part assigned to

you in the political concerns of your country, and of the great

influence of your opinions, your example, and your efforts upon the

general prosperity and happiness.

Whigs of New York! Patriotic citizens of this great metropolis! Lovers

of constitutional liberty, bound by interest and by affection to the

institutions of your country, Americans in heart and in principle!--you

are ready, I am sure, to fulfil all the duties imposed upon you by your

situation, and demanded of you by your country. You have a central

position; your city is the point from which intelligence emanates, and

spreads in all directions over the whole land. Every hour carries

reports of your sentiments and opinions to the verge of the Union. You

cannot escape the responsibility which circumstances have thrown upon

you. You must live and act, on a broad and conspicuous theatre, either

for good or for evil to your country. You cannot shrink from your public

duties; you cannot obscure yourselves, nor bury your talent. In the

common welfare, in the common prosperity, in the common glory of

Americans, you have a stake of value not to be calculated. You have an

interest in the preservation of the Union, of the Constitution, and of

the true principles of the government, which no man can estimate. You

act for yourselves, and for the generations that are to come after you;

and those who ages hence shall bear your names, and partake your blood,

will feel, in their political and social condition, the consequences of

the manner in which you discharge your political duties.

Having fulfilled, then, on your part and on mine, though feebly and

imperfectly on mine, the offices of kindness and mutual regard required

by this occasion, shall we not use it to a higher and nobler purpose?

Shall we not, by this friendly meeting, refresh our patriotism, rekindle

our love of constitutional liberty, and strengthen our resolutions of

public duty? Shall we not, in all honesty and sincerity, with pure and

disinterested love of country, as Americans, looking back to the renown

of our ancestors, and looking forward to the interests of our posterity,

here, to-night, pledge our mutual faith to hold on to the last to our

professed principles, to the doctrines of true liberty, and to the

Constitution of the country, let who will prove true, or who will prove

recreant? Whigs of New York! I meet you in advance, and give you my

pledge for my own performance of these duties, without qualification and

without reserve. Whether in public life or in private life, in the

Capitol or at home, I mean never to desert them. I mean never to forget

that I have a country, to which I am bound by a thousand ties; and the

stone which is to lie on the ground that shall cover me, shall not bear

the name of a son ungrateful to his native land.

FOOTNOTES

[106] A Speech delivered at Niblo's Saloon, in New York, on the 15th of

March, 1837.

[107] On the 10th of June following the delivery of this speech, all the

banks in the city of New York, by common consent, suspended the

payment of their notes in specie. On the next day, the same step

was taken by the banks of Boston and the vicinity, and the

example was followed by all the banks south of New York, as they

received intelligence of the suspension of specie payments in

that city. On the 15th of June, (just three months from the day

this speech was delivered,) President Van Buren issued his

proclamation calling an extra session of Congress for the first

Monday of September.

RECEPTION AT WHEELING.[108]

The following toast having been proposed,--"Our distinguished

guest,--his manly and untiring, though unsuccessful, efforts to

sustain the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws against the

encroachments of executive power, and to avert the catastrophe that

now impends over the country, have given him a new claim to the

gratitude of his countrymen, and added a new lustre to that fame

which was already imperishably identified with the history of our

institutions,"--Mr. Webster rose and responded, in substance, as

follows.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND FELLOW-CITIZENS:--I cannot be indifferent to the

manifestations of regard with which I have been greeted by you, nor can

I suffer any show of delicacy to prevent me from expressing my thanks

for your kindness.

I travel, Gentlemen, for the purpose of seeing the country, and of

seeing what constitutes the important part of every country, the people.

I find everywhere much to excite, and much to gratify admiration; and

the pleasure I experience is only diminished by remembering the

unparalleled state of distress which I have left behind me, and by the

apprehension, rather than the feeling, of severe evils, which I find to

exist wherever I go.

I cannot enable those who have not witnessed it to comprehend the full

extent of the suffering in the Eastern cities. It was painful, indeed,

to behold it. So many bankruptcies among great and small dealers, so

much property sacrificed, so many industrious men altogether broken up

in their business, so many families reduced from competence to want, so

many hopes crushed, so many happy prospects for ever clouded, and such

fearful looking for still greater calamities,--all united form such a

mass of evil as I had never expected to see, except as the result of

war, a pestilence, or some other external calamity.

I have no wish, in the present state of things, nor should I have,

indeed, if the state of things were different, to obtrude the expression

of my political sentiments on such of my fellow-citizens as I may happen

to meet; nor, on the other hand, have I any motive for concealing them,

or suppressing their expression, whenever others desire that I should

make them known. Indeed, on the great topics that now engage public

attention, I hope I may flatter myself that my opinions are already

known.

Recent evils have not at all surprised me, except that they have come

sooner and faster than I had anticipated. But, though not surprised, I

am afflicted; I feel any thing but pleasure in this early fulfilment of

my own predictions. Much injury is done, which the wisest future

counsels can never repair, and much more that can never be remedied but

by such counsels and by the lapse of time. From 1832 to the present

moment, I have foreseen this result. I may safely say I have foreseen

it, because I have foretold and proclaimed its approach in every

important discussion and debate in the public body of which I am a

member. In 1832, I happened to meet with a citizen of Wheeling, now

present, who has this day reminded me of what I then anticipated, as the

result of the measures which the administration appeared to be adopting

in regard to the currency. In the summer of the next year, 1833, I was

here, and suggested to friends what I knew to be resolved upon by the

executive, namely, the removal of the deposits of the public funds from

the Bank of the United States, which was announced two months

afterwards. That was the avowed and declared commencement of the

"experiment." You know, Gentlemen, the obloquy then and since cast upon

those of us who opposed this "experiment." You know that we have been

called bank agents, bank advocates, bank hirelings. You know that it has

been a thousand times said, that the experiment worked admirably, that

nothing could do better, that it was the highest possible evidence of

the political wisdom and sagacity of its contrivers, and that none

opposed it or doubted its efficiency but the wicked or the stupid. Well,

Gentlemen, here is the end, if this _is_ the end, of this notable

"experiment." Its singular wisdom has come to this; its fine workings

have wrought out an almost general bankruptcy.

Its lofty promises, its grandeur, its flashes, that threw other men's

sense and understanding back into the shade, where are they now? Here is

the "fine of fines and the recovery of recoveries." Its panics, its

scoffs, its jeers, its jests, its gibes at all former experience,--its

cry of "a new policy," which was so much to delight and astonish

mankind,--to this conclusion has it come at last.

"But yesterday, it might

Have stood against the world; now lies it there,

And none so poor to do it reverence!"

It is with no feelings of boasting or triumph, it is with no

disposition to arrogate superior wisdom or discernment, but it is with

mortification, with humiliation, with unaffected grief and affliction,

that I contemplate the condition of difficulty and distress to which

this country, so vigorous, so great, so enterprising, and so rich in

internal wealth, has been brought by the policy of her government.

We learn to-day that most of the Eastern banks have stopped payment, the

deposit banks as well as others. The experiment has exploded. That

bubble, which so many of us have all along regarded as the offspring of

conceit, presumption, and political quackery, has burst. A general

suspension of payment must be the result; a result which has come even

sooner than was predicted. Where is now that better currency that was

promised? Where is that specie circulation? Where are those rivers of

gold and silver, which were to fill the treasury of the government as

well as the pockets of the people? Has the government a single hard

dollar? Has the treasury any thing in the world but credit and deposits

in banks that have already suspended payment? How are public creditors

now to be paid in specie? How are the deposits, which the law requires

to be made with the States on the 1st of July, now to be made? We must

go back to the beginning, and take a new start. Every step in our

financial banking system, since 1832, has been a false step; it has been

a step which has conducted us farther and farther from the path of

safety.

The discontinuance of the national bank, the illegal removal of the

deposits, the accumulation of the public revenue in banks selected by

the executive, and for a long time subject to no legal regulation or

restraint, and finally the unauthorized and illegal treasury order, have

brought us where we are. The destruction of the national bank was the

signal for the creation of an unprecedented number of new State banks,

often with nominal capitals, out of all proportion to the business of

the quarters where they were established. These banks, lying under no

restraint from the general government or any of its institutions, issued

paper money corresponding to their own sense of their immediate

interests and hopes of gain. The deposit with the State banks of the

whole public revenue, then accumulated to a vast amount, and making this

deposit without any legal restraint or control whatever, increased both

the power and disposition of these banks for extensive issues. In this

way the government seems to have administered every possible provocation

to the banks to induce them to extend their circulation. It uniformly,

zealously, and successfully opposed the land bill, a most useful

measure, by which accumulation in the treasury would have been

prevented; and, as if it desired and sought this accumulation, it

finally resisted, with all its power, the deposit among the States. It

is urged as a reason for the present overthrow, that an extraordinary

spirit of speculation has gone abroad, and has been manifested

particularly and strongly in the endeavor to purchase the public lands;

but has not every act of the government directly encouraged this spirit?

It accumulated revenue which it did not need, all of which is left in

the deposit banks. The banks had money to lend, and there were enough

who were ready to borrow, for the purpose of purchasing the public lands

at government prices. The public treasury was thus made the great and

efficient means of effecting those purchases which have since been so

much denounced as extravagant speculation and extensive monopoly. These

purchasers borrowed the public money; they used the public money to buy

the public property; they speculated on the strength of the public

money; and while all this was going on, and every man saw it, the

administration resisted, to the utmost of its power, every attempt to

withdraw this money from the banks and from the hands of those

speculators, and distribute it among the people to whom it belonged.

If, then, there has been over-trading, the government has encouraged

it; if there have been rash speculations in the public lands, the

government has furnished the means out of the treasury. These

unprecedented sales of the public domain were boasted of as proofs of a

happy state of things, and of a wise administration of the government,

down to the moment when Congress, in opposition to executive wishes,

passed the distribution law, thus withdrawing the surplus revenue from

the deposit banks. The success of that measure compelled a change in the

executive policy, as the accumulation of a vast amount of money in the

treasury was no longer desirable. This is the most favorable motive to

which I can ascribe the treasury order of July. It is now said that that

order was issued for the purpose of enforcing a strict execution of the

law which forbids the allowance of credits upon purchases of the public

lands; but there was no such credit allowed before; not an hour was

given beyond the time of sale. In this respect, the order produces no

difference whatever. Its only effect is to require an immediate payment

in specie, whereas, before, an immediate payment in the bills of

specie-paying banks was demanded. There is no more credit in the one

case than in the other; and the government gets just as much specie in

one case as in the other; for no sooner is the specie, which the

purchaser is compelled to procure, often at great charge, paid to the

receiver, than it is sent to the deposit banks, and the government has

credit for it on the books of the bank; but the specie itself is again

sold by the bank, or disposed of as it sees fit. It is evident that the

government gets nothing by all this, though the purchasers of small

tracts are put to great trouble and expense. No one gains any thing but

the banks and the brokers. It is, moreover, most true that the art of

man could not have devised a plan more effectually to give to the large

purchasers or speculators a decided preference and advantage over small

purchasers, who bought for actual settlement, than the treasury order of

July, 1836. The stoppage of the banks, however, has now placed the

actual settler in a still more unfortunate situation. How is he to

obtain money to pay for his quarter-section? He must travel three or

four times as many miles for it as he has dollars to pay, even if he

should be able to obtain it at the end of that journey.

I will not say that other causes, at home and abroad, have not had an

agency in bringing about the present derangement. I know that

credits have been used beyond all former example. It is probable the

spirit of trade has been too highly excited, and that the pursuit of

business may have been pressed too fast and too far. All this I am

ready to admit. But instead of doing any thing to abate this tendency,

the government has been the prime instrument of fostering and

encouraging it. It has parted voluntarily, and by advice, with all

control over the actual currency of the country. It has given a free

and full scope to the spirit of banking; it has aided the spirit of

speculation with the public treasures; and it has done all this, in the

midst of loud-sounding promises of an exclusive specie medium, and a

professed detestation of all banking institutions.

It is vain, therefore, to say that the present state of affairs is

owing, not to the acts of government, but to other causes, over which

government could exercise no control. Much of it _is_ owing to the

course of the national government; and what is not so, is owing to

causes the operation of which government was bound in duty to use all

its legal powers to control.

Is there an intelligent man in the community, at this moment, who

believes that, if the Bank of the United States had been continued, if

the deposits had not been removed, if the specie circular had not been

issued, the financial affairs of the country would have been in as bad a

state as they now are? When certain consequences are repeatedly depicted

and foretold from particular causes, when the manner in which these

consequences will be produced is precisely pointed out beforehand, and

when the consequences come in the manner foretold, who will stand up and

declare, that, notwithstanding all this, there is no connection between

the cause and the consequence, and that all these effects are

attributable to some other causes, nobody knows what?

No doubt but we shall hear every cause but the true one assigned for the

present distress. It will be laid to the opposition in and out of

Congress; it will be laid to the bank; it will be laid to the merchants;

it will be laid to the manufacturers; it will be laid to the tariff; it

will be laid to the north star, or to the malign influence of the last

comet, whose tail swept near or across the orbit of our earth, before we

shall be allowed to ascribe it to its just, main causes, a tampering

with the currency, and an attempt to stretch executive power over a

subject not constitutionally within its reach.

We have heard, Gentlemen, of the suspension of some of the Eastern banks

only; but I fear the same course must be adopted by all the banks

throughout the country. The United States Bank, now a mere State

institution, with no public deposits, no aid from government, but, on

the contrary, long an object of bitter persecution by it, was, at our

last advices, still firm. But can we expect of that bank to make

sacrifices to continue specie payment? If it continue to do so now that

the deposit banks have stopped, the government, if possible, will draw

from it its last dollar, in order to keep up a pretence of making its

own payments in specie. I shall be glad if this institution find it

prudent and proper to hold out;[109] but as it owes no more duty to the

government than any other bank, and, of course, much less than the

deposit banks, I cannot see any ground for demanding from it efforts and

sacrifices to favor the government, which those holding the public

money, and owing duty to the government, are unwilling or unable to

make. Nor do I see how the New England banks can stand alone in the

general crash. I believe those in Massachusetts are very sound and

entirely solvent; I have every confidence in their ability to pay and I

shall rejoice if, amidst the present wreck, we find them able to

withstand the storm. At the same time, I confess I shall not be

disappointed, if they, seeing no public object to be attained

proportioned to the private loss, and individual sacrifice and ruin,

which must result from resorting to the means necessary to enable them

to hold out, should not be distinguished from their Southern and Western

neighbors.

I believe, Gentlemen, the "experiment" must go through. I believe every

part and portion of our country will have a satisfactory taste of the

"better currency." I believe we shall be blest again with the currency

of 1812, _when money was the only uncurrent species of property_. We

have, amidst all the distress that surrounds us, men in and out of

power, who condemn a national bank in every form, maintain the efficacy

and efficiency of State banks for domestic exchange, and, amidst all the

sufferings and terrors of the "experiment," cry out, that they are

establishing "a better currency." The "experiment,"--the experiment upon

what? The experiment of one man upon the happiness, the well-being,

and, I may almost say, upon the lives, of twelve millions of human

beings,--an "experiment" that found us in health, that found us with the

best currency on the face of the earth, the same from the North to the

South, from Boston to St. Louis, equalling silver or gold in any part of

our Union, and possessing the unlimited confidence of foreign countries,

and which leaves us crushed, ruined, without means at home, and without

credit abroad.

This word "experiment" appears likely to get into no enviable notoriety.

It may probably be held, in future, to signify any thing which is too

excruciating to be borne, like a pang of the rheumatism or an

extraordinary twinge of the gout. Indeed, from the experience we now

have, we may judge that the bad eminence of the Inquisition itself may

be superseded by it, and if one shall be hereafter stretched upon the

rack, or broken on the wheel, it may be said, while all his bones are

cracking, all his muscles snapping, all his veins are pouring, that he

is only passing into a better state through the delightful process of an

"experiment."

Gentlemen, you will naturally ask, Where is this to end, and what is

to be the remedy? These are questions of momentous importance; but

probably the proper moment has not come for considering this. We are yet

in the midst of the whirlwind. Every man's thoughts are turned to his

own immediate preservation. When the blast is over, and we have

breathing-time the country must take this subject, this all-important

subject of relief for the present and security for the future, into

its most serious consideration. It will, undoubtedly, first engage

the attention and wisdom of Congress. It will call on public men,

intrusted with public affairs, to lay aside party and private

preferences and prejudices, and unite in the great work of redeeming

the country from this state of disaster and disgrace. All that I mean

at present to say is, that the government of the United States stands

chargeable, in my opinion, with a gross dereliction from duty, in

leaving the currency of the country entirely at the mercy of others,

without seeking to exercise over it any control whatever. The _means_ of

exercising this control rest in the wisdom of Congress, but the duty I

hold to be imperative. It is a power that cannot be yielded to others

with safety to itself or to them. It might as well give up to the

States the power of making peace or war, and leave the twenty-six

independent sovereignties to select their own foes, raise their own

troops, and conclude their own terms of peace. It might as well leave

the States to impose their own duties and regulate their own terms and

treaties of commerce, as to give up control over the currency in which

all are interested.

The present government has been in operation forty-eight years. During

forty of these forty-eight years we have had a national institution

performing the duties of a fiscal agent to the government, and

exercising a most useful control over the domestic exchanges and over

the currency of the country. The first institution was chartered on the

ground that such an institution was _necessary_ to the safe and

economical administration of the treasury department in the collection

and disbursement of its revenue. The experience of the new government

had clearly proved this necessity. At that time, however, there were

those who doubted the power of Congress, under the provisions of the

Constitution, to incorporate a bank; but a majority of both houses were

of a different opinion. President Washington sanctioned the measure, and

among those who entertained doubts on the subject, the statesmen of most

weight and consideration in the Union, and whose opinions were entitled

to the highest respect, yielded to the opinion of Congress and the

country, and considered it a settled question. Among those who first

doubted of the power of the government to establish a national bank, was

one whose name should never be mentioned without respect, one for whom I

can say I feel as high a veneration as one man can or ought to feel for

another, one who was intimately associated with all the provisions of

the Constitution,--Mr. Madison. Yet, when Congress had decided on the

measure, by large majorities, when the President had approved it, when

the judicial tribunals had sanctioned it, when public opinion had

deliberately and decidedly confirmed it, _he_ looked on the subject as

definitely and finally settled. The reasoners of our day think

otherwise. No decision, no public sanction, no judgment of the

tribunals, is allowed to weigh against their respect for their own

opinions. They rush to the argument as to that of a new question,

despising all lights but that of their own unclouded sagacity, and

careless alike of the venerable living and of the mighty dead. They

poise this important question upon some small points of their own

slender logic, and decide it on the strength of their own unintelligible

metaphysics. It never enters into all their thoughts that this is a

question to be judged of on broad, comprehensive, and practical grounds;

still less does it occur to them that an exposition of the Constitution,

contemporaneous with its earliest existence, acted on for nearly half a

century, in which the original framers and government officers of the

highest note concurred, ought to have any weight in their decision, or

inspire them with the least doubt of the accuracy and soundness of their

own opinions. They soar so high in the regions of self-respect as to be

far beyond the reach of all such considerations.

For sound views upon the subject of a national bank, I would commend

you, Gentlemen, to the messages of Mr. Madison, and to his letter on the

subject. They are the views of a truly great man and a statesman.

As the first Bank of the United States had its origin in necessity, so

had the second; and, although there was something of misfortune, and

certainly something of mismanagement, in its early career, no candid and

intelligent man can, for a moment, doubt or deny its usefulness, or that

it fully accomplished the object for which it was created. Exchanges,

during all the later years of its existence, were easily effected, and a

currency the most uniform of any in the world existed throughout the

country. The opponents of these institutions did not deny that general

prosperity and a happy state of things existed at the time they were in

operation, but contended that equal prosperity would exist without them,

while specie would take the place of their issues as a circulating

medium. How have their words been verified? Both in the case of the

first bank and that of the last, a general suspension of specie payments

has happened in about a year from the time they were suffered to expire,

and a universal confusion and distrust prevailed. The charter of the

first bank expired in 1811, and all the State banks, south of New

England, stopped payment in 1812. The charter of the late bank expired

in March, 1836, and in May, 1837, a like distrust, and a like suspension

of the State banks, have taken place.

The same results, we may readily suppose, are attributable to the same

causes, and we must look to the experience and wisdom of the people and

of Congress to apply the requisite remedy. I will not say the only

remedy is a national bank; but I will say that, in my opinion the only

sure remedy for the evils that now prey upon us is the assumption, by

the delegates of the people in the national government, of some lawful

control over the finances of the nation, and a power of regulating its

currency.

* * * * *

Gentlemen, allow me again to express my thanks for the kindness you have

shown me this day, and in conclusion to assure you, that, though a

representative in the federal government of but a small section, when

compared with the vast territory that acknowledges allegiance to that

government, I shall never forget that I am acting for the whole country,

and, so far as I am capable, will pledge myself impartially to use every

exertion for that country's welfare.

FOOTNOTES

[108] A Speech delivered on the 17th of May, 1837, at a Public Dinner

given to Mr. Webster by the Citizens of Wheeling, Virginia.

[109] The mail of that day brought advice of its suspension. See the

note on page 378.

RECEPTION AT MADISON.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

The following account of Mr. Webster's visit to Madison, Indiana, is

taken from the "Republican Banner," of the 7th of June, 1837.

"DANIEL WEBSTER visited our town on Thursday last. Notice had been given

the day previous of the probable time of his arrival. At the hour

designated, crowds of citizens from the town and country thronged the

quay. A gun from the Ben Franklin, as she swept gracefully round the

point, gave notice of his approach, and was answered by a gun from the

shore. Gun followed gun in quick succession, from boat and shore, and

the last of the old national salute was echoing from hill and glen as

the Franklin reached the wharf. Mr. Webster was immediately waited on by

the committee appointed to receive him, and, attended by them, a

committee of invitation from Cincinnati, and several gentlemen from

Louisville, he landed amidst the cheers and acclamations of the

assembled multitude. He was seated in an elegant barouche, supported by

Governor Hendricks and John King, Esq., and, with the different

committees, and a large procession of citizens in barouches, on

horseback, and on foot, formed under the direction of Messrs. Wharton

and Payne of the committee of arrangements, marshals of the day,

proceeded to the place appointed for his reception, an arbor erected at

the north end of the market-house, fronting the large area formed by the

intersection of Main and Main Cross Streets and the public square, and

tastefully decorated with shrubbery, evergreens, and wreaths of flowers.

In the background appeared portraits of Washington and Lafayette, the

Declaration of Independence, and several other appropriate badges and

emblems, while in front a flag floated proudly on the breeze, bearing

for its motto the ever-memorable sentiment with which he concluded his

immortal speech in defence of the Constitution, 'LIBERTY AND UNION, NOW

AND FOR EVER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE.' When the procession arrived, Mr.

Webster ascended the stand in the arbor, supported by Governor Hendricks

and the committee of arrangements, when he was appropriately and

eloquently addressed by J. G. Marshall, Esq., on behalf of the citizens,

to which he responded in a speech of an hour's length."

The following correspondence preceded Mr. Webster's visit.

"_Louisville, May 30, 1837._

"HON. DANIEL WEBSTER:--

"Sir,--Your fellow-citizens of the town of Madison, Indiana, deeply

impressed with a sense of the obligations which they and all the true

lovers of constitutional liberty, and friends to our happy and glorious

Union, owe you for the many prominent services rendered by you to their

beloved, though now much agitated and injured country, having appointed

the undersigned a committee through whom to tender you their salutations

and the hospitalities of their town, desire us earnestly to request you

to partake of a public dinner, or such other expression of the high

estimation in which they hold you as may be most acceptable, at such

time as you may designate.

"Entertaining the hope that you may find it convenient to comply with

this request of our constituents and ourselves, we beg leave, with

sentiments of the most profound respect and regard, to subscribe

ourselves,

"Your fellow-citizens,

W. LYLE,

W. J. MCCLURE,

WM. F. COLLUM,

A. W. PITCHER,

JAS. E. LEWIS,

D. L. MCCLURE,

} _Committee_."

* * * * *

ANSWER.

_Louisville, May 30, 1837._

"GENTLEMEN,--I feel much honored by the communication which I have

received from you, expressing the friendly sentiments of my

fellow-citizens of Madison, and desiring that I should pay them a

visit.

"Although so kind an invitation, meeting me at so great a distance, was

altogether unlooked for, I had yet determined not to pass so interesting

a point on the Ohio without making some short stay at it. I shall leave

this place on Thursday morning, and will stop at Madison, and shall be

most happy to see any of its citizens who may desire to meet me. I must

pray to be excused from a formal public dinner, as well from a regard to

the time which it will be in my power to pass with you, as from a

general wish, whenever it is practicable, to avoid every thing like

ceremony or show in my intercourse with my fellow-citizens.

"You truly observe, Gentlemen, that the country at the present moment is

agitated. I think, too, that you are right in saying it is injured; that

is, I think public measures of a very injurious character and tendency

have been unfortunately adopted. But our case is not one that leads us

to much despondency. The country, the happy and glorious country in

which you and I live, is great, free, and full of resources; and, in the

main, an intelligent and patriotic spirit pervades the community. These

will bring all things right. Whatsoever has been injudiciously or rashly

done may be corrected by wiser counsels. Nothing can, for any great

length of time, depress the great interests of the people of the United

States, if wisdom and honest good-sense shall prevail in their public

measures. Our present point of suffering is the _currency_. In my

opinion, this is an interest with the preservation of which Congress is

charged, solemnly and deeply charged. A uniform currency was one of the

great objects of the Union. If we fail to maintain it, we so far fail of

what was intended by the national Constitution. Let us strive to avert

this reproach from that government and that Union, which make us, in so

many respects, ONE PEOPLE! Be assured, that to the attainment of this

end every power and faculty of my mind shall be directed; and may

Providence so prosper us, that no one shall be able to say, that in any

thing this glorious union of the States has come short of fulfilling

either its own duties or the just expectations of the people.

"With sentiments of true regard, Gentlemen, I am your much obliged

friend and fellow-citizen,

"DANIEL WEBSTER.

"To W. LYLE,

W. J. MCCLURE,

WM. F. COLLUM,

A. W. PITCHER,

JAMES E. LEWIS,

D. L. MCCLURE,

} _Committee_."

The address of Mr. Marshall, above alluded to, was as follows:--

"SIR,--The people now assembled around you, through me, the humble organ

of their selection, do most sincerely and cordially welcome you to

Madison. In extending to you the most liberal hospitality, they do no

more, however, than they would be inclined to do towards the humblest

citizen of our common country. But this public and formal manifestation

of the feeling of regard which they entertain for you is intended to do

more than inform you of the simple fact that here you can find food and

shelter, and partake with them of the pleasures of the social circle. If

this were all, it might be communicated in a manner more acceptable, by

extending to you the hand of friendship and kindly pointing you to the

family board; but by this public parade, this assembling of the people

around you, it is intended to give you that consolation, (most grateful

and cheering to every true American heart,) _the people's_ approbation

of your acts as a public servant. This is done, not with that abject

feeling which characterizes the homage of subjects, but with that nobler

feeling which prompts freemen to honor and esteem those who have been

their country's benefactors. Prompted by such feeling, the patriots of

the Revolution delighted to honor the _father of our country_. He led

his armies to victory, and thus wrested the liberties of his countrymen

from the grasp of a tyrant; and may we not from like impulses manifest

gratitude towards those who, by the power of their intellects, have

effectually rebuked erroneous principles, which were evidently

undermining and endangering the very existence of our beloved Union?

Yes, Sir, our country has now nothing to fear from external violence. It

is a danger which the whole country can see on its first approach, and

every arm will be nerved at once to repel it; it can be met at the point

of the bayonet, and millions would now, as in days that are past, be

ready to shed their blood in defence of their country. But, Sir, in

_those_ who artfully excite the passions and prejudices of the people,

and, by presenting to them the most plausible pretexts (for their own

selfish purposes), lead them thoughtlessly to abandon the sacred

principles upon which our government is founded, and to reject the

measures which can alone promote the prosperity of the country,--in such

we meet an enemy against whom the most daring bravery of the soldier is

totally unavailing.

"The injury which is inflicted is not at first felt; time is required to

develop it; and when developed, the closest investigation may be

necessary to trace it to its cause; this the people may not be able to

accomplish. This enemy to the country can only be discerned by the keen

eye of the statesman, and met and conquered by the power of his

intellect. And he who is successful in thus defending his country may

well be held in grateful remembrance by his fellow-citizens. It is for

such reasons, Sir, that we have presented to you these testimonials of

our approbation. Though personally a stranger to us, your public

character, your masterly efforts in defence of the Constitution, the

services you have rendered the West, and the principles and measures

which you have so ably advocated, are known and approved, and I hope

will ever be remembered by us. And although some of your efforts have

proved for the time unsuccessful, it is to be hoped they would now have

a different effect. When the old and established measures of any

government have been abandoned for new ones, simply as an _experiment_,

and when that experiment, if it does not produce, is, to say the least,

immediately followed by, ruin and distress in every part of the country,

may we not hope that men will at least calmly and dispassionately hear

and weigh the reasons why a different policy should be adopted? But if

the people's representatives cannot be convinced of the error into which

they have been led, it is high time the people themselves should awake

from their slumbers. A dark cloud hangs over the land, so thick, so

dark, a ray of hope can hardly penetrate it. But shall the people gird

on their armor and march to battle? No, Sir; it is a battle which they

must fight through the ballot-box; and perhaps they do not know against

what to direct their effort; they are almost in a state of despondency,

ready to conclude that they are driven to the verge of ruin by a kind of

irresistible destiny. The cause of the evil can be discovered only by

investigation; and to their public men they must look for information

and for wisdom to direct them. But, Sir, it is not our object to relate

to you our grievances, or recount the past services which you have

rendered your country. We wish to cheer you on to increased efforts in

urging the measures you have heretofore so zealously and ably advocated.

May your success be equal to your efforts, and may happiness and

prosperity attend you through life."

RECEPTION AT MADISON.[110]