The President has exercised his NEGATIVE power on the law for continuing

the bank charter. Here, too, he denies both the constitutionality and

the policy of an existing law of the land. It is true that the law, or a

similar one, has been in operation nearly forty years. Previous

Presidents and previous Congresses have, all along, sanctioned and

upheld it. The highest courts, and indeed all the courts, have

pronounced it constitutional. A majority of the people, greater than

exists on almost any other question, agrees with all the Presidents, all

the Congresses, and all the courts of law. Yet, against all this weight

of authority, the President puts forth his own individual opinion, and

has negatived the bill for continuing the law. Which of the members of

his administration, or whether any one of them, concur in his

sentiments, we know not. Some of them, we know, have recently advanced

precisely the opposite opinions, and in the strongest manner recommended

to Congress the continuation of the bank charter. Having himself

urgently and repeatedly called the attention of Congress to the

subject, and his Secretary of the Treasury--who, and all the other

secretaries, as the President's friends say, are but so many pens in his

hand--having, in his communication to Congress, at this very session,

insisted both on the constitutionality and necessity of the bank, the

President nevertheless saw fit to negative the bill, passed, as it had

been, by strong majorities in both Houses, and passed, without doubt or

question, in compliance with the wishes of a vast majority of the

American people.

The question respecting the constitutional power of Congress to

establish a bank, I shall not here discuss. On that, as well as on the

general expediency of renewing the charter, my opinions have been

elsewhere expressed. They are before the public, and the experience of

every day confirms me in their truth. All that has been said of the

embarrassment and distress which will be felt from discontinuing the

bank falls far short of an adequate representation. What was prophecy

only two months ago is already history.

In this part of the country, indeed, we experience this distress and

embarrassment in a mitigated degree. The loans of the bank are not so

highly important, or at least not so absolutely necessary, to the

present operations of our commerce; yet we ourselves have a deep

interest in the subject, as it is connected with the general currency of

the country, and with the cheapness and facility of exchange.

The country, generally speaking, was well satisfied with the bank. Why

not let it alone? No evil had been felt from it in thirty-six years. Why

conjure up a troop of fancied mischiefs, as a pretence to put it down?

The message struggles to excite prejudices, from the circumstance that

foreigners are stockholders; and on this ground it raises a loud cry

against a moneyed aristocracy. Can any thing, Sir, be conceived more

inconsistent than this? any thing more remote from sound policy and good

statesmanship? In the United States the rate of interest is high,

compared with the rates abroad. In Holland and England, the actual value

of money is no more than three, or perhaps three and a half, per cent.

In our Atlantic States, it is as high as five or six, taking the whole

length of the seaboard; in the Northwestern States, it is eight or ten,

and in the Southwestern ten or twelve. If the introduction, then, of

foreign capital be discountenanced and discouraged, the American

moneylender may fix his own rate anywhere from five to twelve per cent.

per annum. On the other hand, if the introduction of foreign capital be

countenanced and encouraged, its effects to keep down the rate of

interest, and to bring the value of money in the United States so much

the nearer to its value in older and richer countries. Every dollar

brought from abroad, and put into the mass of active capital at home, by

so much diminishes the rate of interest; and by so much, therefore,

benefits all the active and trading classes of society, at the expense

of the American capitalist. Yet the President's invention, for such it

deserves to be called, that which is to secure us against the

possibility of being oppressed by a moneyed aristocracy, is to shut the

door and bar it safely against all introduction of foreign capital!

Mr. President, what is it that has made England a sort of general banker

for the civilized world? Why is it that capital from all quarters of the

globe accumulates at the centre of her empire, and is thence again

distributed? Doubtless, Sir, it is because she invites it, and solicits

it. She sees the advantage of this; and no British minister ever yet did

a thing so rash, so inconsiderate, so startling, as to exhibit a

groundless feeling of dissatisfaction at the introduction or employment

of foreign capital.

Sir, of all the classes of society, the larger stockholders of the bank

are among those least likely to suffer from its discontinuance. There

are, indeed, on the list of stockholders many charitable institutions,

many widows and orphans, holding small amounts. To these, and other

proprietors of a like character, the breaking up of the bank will, no

doubt, be seriously inconvenient. But the capitalist, he who has

invested money in the bank merely for the sake of the security and the

interest, has nothing to fear. The refusal to renew the charter will, it

is true, diminish the value of the stock; but, then, the same refusal

will create a scarcity of money; and this will reduce the price of all

other stocks; so that the stockholders in the bank, receiving, on its

dissolution, their portion respectively of its capital, will have

opportunities of new and advantageous investment.

The truth is, Sir, the great loss, the sore embarrassment, the severe

distress, arising from this VETO, will fall on the public, and

especially on the more active and industrious portion of the public. It

will inevitably create a scarcity of money; in the Western States, it

will most materially depress the value of property; it will greatly

enhance, everywhere, the price of domestic exchange; it threatens,

everywhere, fluctuations of the currency; and it drives all our

well-settled and safe operations of revenue and finance out of their

accustomed channels. All this is to be suffered on the pretended ground

of a constitutional scruple, which no respect for the opinion of others,

no deference to legislative precedent, no decent regard to judicial

decision, no homage to public opinion, expressed and maintained for

forty years, have power to overcome. An idle apprehension of danger is

set up against the experience of almost half a century; loose and flimsy

theories are asserted against facts of general notoriety; and arguments

are urged against continuing the charter, so superficial and frivolous,

and yet so evidently addressed to those of the community who have never

had occasion to be conversant with subjects of this sort, that an

intelligent reader, who wishes to avoid imputing obliquity of motive, is

obliged to content himself with ascribing to the source of the message,

whatever and wherever that source may have been, no very distinguished

share of the endowments of intellect.

Mr. President, as early as December, 1829, the President called the

attention of Congress to the subject of the bank, in the most earnest

manner. Look to his annual message of that date. You will find that he

then felt constrained, by an irresistible sense of duty to the various

interests concerned, not to delay beyond that moment his urgent

invitation to Congress to take up the subject. He brought forward the

same topic again, in all his subsequent annual messages; yet when

Congress _did_ act upon it, and, on the fourth of July, EIGHTEEN HUNDRED

AND THIRTY-TWO, _did_ send him a bill, he returned it with his

objections; and among these objections, he not only complained _that the

executive was not consulted on the propriety of present action_, but

affirmed also, in so many words, _that present action was deemed

premature by the executive department_.

Let me ask, Mr. President, if it be possible that the same President,

the same chief magistrate, the same mind, could have composed these two

messages? Certainly they much more resemble the production of _two_

minds, holding, on this point, precisely opposite opinions. The message

of December, 1829, asserts that the time had _then_ come for Congress to

consider the bank subject; the message of 1832 declares, that, even

then, the action of Congress on the same subject was _premature_; and

both these messages were sent to Congress by the President of the United

States. Sir, I leave these two messages to be compared and considered by

the people.

Mr. President, I will here take notice of but one other suggestion of

the President, relative to the time and manner of passing the late bill.

A decent respect for the legislature of the country has hitherto been

observed by all who have had occasion to hold official intercourse with

it, and especially by all other branches of the government. The purity

of the motives of Congress, in regard to any measure, has never been

assailed from any respectable quarter. But in the veto message there is

one expression, which, as it seems to me, no American can read without

some feeling. There is an expression, evidently not casual or

accidental, but inserted with design and composed with care, which does

carry a direct imputation of the possibility of the effect of _private

interest_ and _private influence_ on the deliberations of the two Houses

of Congress. I quote the passage, and shall leave it without a single

remark:--"Whatever interest or influence, whether public or private, has

given birth to this act, it cannot be found either in the wishes or

necessities of the executive department, by which present action is

deemed premature."

* * * * *

Among the great interests of the country, Mr. President, there is one

which appears to me not to have attracted from the people of this

Commonwealth a degree of attention altogether equal to its magnitude. I

mean the public lands.

If we run our eye over the map of the country, and view the regions,

almost boundless, which now constitute the public domain, and over which

an active population is rapidly spreading itself, and if we recollect

the amount of annual revenue derived from this source, we shall hardly

fail to be convinced that few branches of national interest are of more

extensive and lasting importance. So large a territory, belonging to the

public, forms a subject of national concern of a very delicate nature,

especially in popular governments. We know, in the history of other

countries, with what views and designs the public lands have been

granted. Either in the form of gifts and largesses, or in that of

reduction of prices to amounts merely nominal, or as compensation for

services, real or imagined, the public domain, in other countries and

other times, has not only been diverted from its just use and

destination, but has been the occasion, also, of introducing into the

state and into the public counsels no small portion both of distraction

and corruption.

Happily, our own system of administering this great interest has

hitherto been both safe and successful. Nothing under the government has

been better devised than our land system; and nothing, thus far, more

beneficially conducted. But the time seems to have arrived, in the

progress of our growth and prosperity, when it has become necessary to

reflect, not on any new mode of sale, for that can hardly be improved,

but on some disposition of the proceeds such as shall be just and equal

to the whole country, and shall insure also a constant and vigilant

attention to this important subject from the people of all the States.

It is not to be denied or disguised, that sentiments have recently

sprung up, in some places, of a very extraordinary character, respecting

the ownership, the just proprietary interest, in these lands. The lands

are well known to have been obtained by the United States, either by

grants from individual States, or by treaties with foreign powers. In

both cases, and in all cases, the grants and cessions were to the United

States, for the interest of the whole Union; and the grants from

individual States contain express limitations and conditions, binding up

the whole property to the common use of all the States for ever. Yet, of

late years, an idea has been suggested, indeed seriously advanced, _that

these lands, of right, belong to the States respectively in which they

happen to lie_. This doctrine, Sir, which, I perceive, strikes this

assembly as being somewhat extravagant, is founded on an argument

derived, as is supposed, from the nature of State sovereignty. It has

been openly espoused, by candidates for office, in some of the new

States, and, indeed, has been announced in the Senate of the United

States.

To the credit of the country, it should be stated, that, up to the

present moment, these notions have not spread widely; and they will be

repudiated, undoubtedly, by the power of general opinion, so soon as

that opinion shall be awakened and expressed. But there is another

tendency more likely, perhaps, to run to injurious excess; and that is,

a constant effort to reduce the price of land to sums almost nominal, on

the ground of facilitating settlement. The sound policy of the

government has been, uniformly, to keep the prices of the public lands

low; so low that every actual settler might easily obtain a farm; but

yet not so low as to tempt individual capitalists to buy up large

quantities to hold for speculation. The object has been to meet, at all

times, the whole actual demand, at a cheap rate; and this object has

been attained. It is obviously of the greatest importance to keep the

prices of the public lands from all influences, except the single one of

the desire of supplying the whole actual demand at a cheap rate. The

present minimum price is one dollar and a quarter per acre; and millions

of acres of land, much of it of an excellent quality, are now in the

market at this rate. Yet every year there are propositions to reduce the

price, and propositions to graduate the price; that is to say, to

provide that all lands having been offered for sale for a certain length

of time at the established rate, if not then sold, shall be offered at a

less rate; and again reduced, if not sold, to one still less. I have

myself thought, that, in some of the oldest districts, some mode might

usefully be adopted of disposing of the remainder of the unsold lands,

and closing the offices; but a universal system of graduation, lowering

prices at short intervals, and by large degrees, could have no other

effect than a general depression of price in regard to the whole mass,

and would evidently be great mismanagement of the public property. This

convention, Sir, will think it singular enough, that a reduction of

prices of the public lands should have been demanded on the ground _that

other impositions for revenue, such as the duty on tea and coffee, have

been removed_; thus considering and treating the sums received for lands

sold as a _tax_, a _burden_, an _imposition_, and a great _drain_ on the

means and the industry of the new States. A man goes from New England to

one of the Western States, buys a hundred acres of the best land in the

world for one hundred and twenty-five dollars, pays his money, and

receives an indisputable title; and immediately some one stands up in

Congress to call this operation the laying of a _tax_, the imposition of

a _burden_; and the whole of these purchases and payments, taken

together, are represented as an intolerable _drain_ on the money and the

industry of the new States. I know not, Sir, which deserves to pass for

the original, and which for the copy; but this reasoning is not unlike

that which maintains that the trading community of the West will be

exhausted and ruined by the privilege of borrowing money of the Bank of

the United States at six per cent interest; this interest being, as is

said in the veto message, a burden upon their industry, and a drain of

their currency, which no country can bear without inconvenience and

distress!

It was in a forced connection with the reduction of duties of impost,

that the subject of the public lands was referred to the Committee of

Manufactures in the Senate, at the late session of Congress. This was a

legislative movement, calculated to throw on Mr. Clay, who was acting a

leading part on the subject of the tariff and the reduction of duties, a

new and delicate responsibility. From this responsibility, however, Mr.

Clay did not shrink. He took up the subject, and his report upon it, and

his speech delivered afterwards in defence of the report, are, in my

opinion, among the very ablest of the efforts which have distinguished

his long public life. I desire to commend their perusal to every citizen

of Massachusetts. They will show him the deep interest of all the

States, his own among the rest, in the security, and proper management,

and disposal, of the public domain. Founded on the report of the

committee, Mr. Clay introduced a bill, providing for the distribution

among all the States, according to population, of the proceeds of the

sales of the public lands for five years, first making a deduction of a

considerable percentage in favor of the new States; the sums thus

received by the States to be disposed of by them in favor of education,

internal improvement, or colonization, as each State might choose for

itself. This bill passed the Senate. It was vigorously opposed in the

House of Representatives by the main body of the friends of the

administration, and finally lost by a small majority. By the provisions

of the bill, Massachusetts would have received, as her dividend, at the

present average rate of sales, one hundred and thirty-seven thousand

dollars a year.

I am free to confess, Sir, that I had hoped to see some unobjectionable

way of disposing of this subject, with the observance of justice towards

all the States, by the government of the United States itself, without a

distribution through the intervention of the State governments. Such a

way, however, I have not discovered. I therefore voted for the bill of

the last session.

Mr. President, let me remind the meeting of the great extent of this

public property.

Only twenty millions of acres have been as yet sold, from the

commencement of the government. One hundred and twenty millions, or

about that quantity, are now cleared from the Indian title, surveyed

into townships, ranges, and sections, and ready in the market for sale.

I think, Sir, the whole surface of Massachusetts embraces about six

millions of acres; so that the United States have a body of land, now

surveyed and in market, equal to twenty States, each of the size of

Massachusetts. But this is but a very small portion of the whole domain,

much the greater part being yet unsurveyed, and much, too, subject to

the original Indian title. The present income to the treasury from the

sales of land is estimated at three millions of dollars a year. The

meeting will thus see, Sir, how important a subject this is, and how

highly it becomes the country to guard this vast property against

perversion and bad management.

* * * * *

Mr. President, among the bills which failed, at the last session, for

want of the President's approval, was one in which this State had a

great pecuniary interest. It was the bill for the payment of interest

to the States on the funds advanced by them during the war, the

principal of which had been paid, or assumed, by the government of the

United States. Some sessions ago, a bill was introduced into the Senate

by my worthy colleague, and passed into a law, for paying a large

part of the principal sum advanced by Massachusetts for militia

expenses for defence of the country. This has been paid. The residue

of the claim is in the proper course of examination; and such parts

of it as ought to be allowed will doubtless be paid hereafter, _vetos_

being out of the way, be it always understood. In the late bill, it

was proposed that _interest_ should be paid to the States on these

advances, in cases where it had not been already paid. It passed both

Houses. I recollect no opposition to it in the Senate nor do I

remember to have heard of any considerable objection in the House of

Representatives. The argument for it lay in its own obvious justice; a

justice too apparent, as it seems to me, to be denied by any one. I

left Congress, Sir, a day or two before its adjournment, and,

meeting some friends in this village on my way home, we exchanged

congratulations on this additional act of justice thus rendered to

Massachusetts, as well as other States. But I had hardly reached

Framingham, before I learned that our congratulations were premature.

The President's signature had been refused, and the bill was not a

law! The only reason which I have ever heard for this refusal is,

that Congress had not been in the practice of allowing interest on

claims. This is not true, as a universal rule; but if it were, might

not Congress be trusted with the maintenance of its own rules? Might

it not make exceptions to them for good cause? There is no doubt

that, in regard to old and long-neglected claims, it has been customary

not to allow interest; but the Massachusetts claim was not of this

character, nor were the claims of other States. None of them had

remained unpaid for want of presentment. The executive and legislature

of this Commonwealth have never omitted to press her demand for justice,

and her delegates in Congress have endeavored to discharge their duty

by supporting that demand. It has been already decided, in repeated

instances, as well in regard to States as to individuals, that when

money has been actually _borrowed_, for objects for which the

general government ought to provide, interest paid on such _borrowed

money_ shall be refunded by the United States. Now, Sir, would it not

be a distinction without a difference to allow interest in such a

case, and yet refuse it in another, in which the State had not borrowed

the money, and paid interest for it, but had raised it by taxation,

or, as I believe was the case with Massachusetts, by the sale of

valuable stocks, _bearing interest_? Is it not apparent, that, in her

case, as clearly as in that of a _borrowing_ State, she has actually

_lost_ the interest? Can any man maintain that between these two cases

there is any sound distinction, in law, in equity, or in morals? The

refusal to sign this bill has deprived Massachusetts and Maine of a

very large sum of money, justly due to them. It is now fifteen or

sixteen years since the money was advanced; and it was advanced for the

most necessary and praiseworthy public purposes. The interest on the

sum already refunded, and on that which may reasonably be expected to

be hereafter refunded, is not less than _five hundred thousand

dollars_. But for the President's refusal, in this unusual mode, to

give his approbation to a bill which had passed Congress almost

unanimously, these two States would already have been in the receipt of

a very considerable portion of this money, and the residue, to be

received in due season, would have been made sure to them.

Mr. President, I do not desire to raise mere pecuniary interests to an

undue importance in political matters. I admit there are principles and

objects of paramount obligation and importance. I would not oppose the

President merely because he has refused to the State what I thought her

entitled to, in a matter of money, provided he had made known his

reasons, and they had appeared to be such as might fairly influence an

intelligent and honest mind. But in a matter of such great and direct

importance to a State, where the justice of the case is so plain, that

men agree in it who agree in hardly any thing else, where her claim

has passed Congress without considerable opposition in either House,

a refusal to approve the bill without giving the slightest reason,

the taking advantage of the rising of Congress to give it a silent

go-by, _is_ an act that may well awaken the attention of the people

in the States concerned. It _is_ an act requiring close examination. It

_is_ an act which calls loudly for justification by its author. And

now, Sir, I will close what I have to say on this particular subject by

stating, that, on the 22d of March, 1832, the President did actually

approve and sign a bill, in favor of South Carolina, by which it was

enacted that her claim _for interest upon money actually expended_ by

her for military stores during the late war should be settled and

paid; _the money so expended having been drawn by the State from a

fund upon which she was receiving interest_. This was precisely the

case of Massachusetts.

* * * * *

Mr. President, I now approach an inquiry of a far deeper and more

affecting interest. Are the principles and measures of the

administration dangerous to the Constitution and to the union of the

States? Sir, I believe them to be so, and I shall state the grounds of

that belief.

In the first place, any administration is dangerous to the Constitution

and to the union of the States, which denies the essential powers of the

Constitution, and thus strips it of the capacity to do the good intended

by it.

The principles embraced by the administration, and expressed in the veto

message, are evidently hostile to the whole system of protection by

duties of impost, _on constitutional grounds_. Here, then, is _one_

great power struck at once out of the Constitution, and one great end of

its adoption defeated. And while this power is thus struck out of the

Constitution, it is clear that it exists nowhere else, since the

Constitution expressly takes it away from all the States.

The veto message denies the constitutional power of creating or

continuing such an institution as our whole experience has approved, for

maintaining a sound, uniform, national currency, and for the safe

collection of revenue. Here is _another_ power, long used, and now

lopped off. And _this_ power, too, thus lopped off from the

Constitution, is evidently not within the power of any of the individual

States. No State can maintain a national currency; no State institution

can render to the revenue the services performed by a national

institution.

The principles of the administration are hostile to internal

improvements. Here is another power, heretofore exercised in many

instances, now denied. The administration denies the power, except with

qualifications which cast an air of ridicule over the whole subject;

being founded on such distinctions as between salt water and fresh

water, places above custom-houses and places below, and others equally

extraordinary.

Now, Sir, in all these respects, as well as in others, I think the

principles of the administration are at war with the true principles of

the Constitution; and that, by the zeal and industry which it exerts to

support its own principles, it does daily weaken the Constitution, and

does put in doubt its long continuance. The inroad of to-day opens the

way for an easier inroad to-morrow. When any one essential part is rent

away, or, what is nearer the truth, when many essential parts are rent

away, who is there to tell us _how long any other part is to remain_?

Sir, our condition is singularly paradoxical. We have an administration

opposed to the Constitution; we have an opposition which is the main

support of the government and the laws. We have an administration

denying to the very government which it administers powers that have

been exercised for forty years; it denies the protective power, the bank

power, and the power of internal improvement. The great and leading

measures of the national legislature are all resisted by it. These,

strange as it may seem, depend on the _opposition_ for support. We have,

in truth, an opposition, without which it would be difficult for the

government to get along at all. I appeal to every member of Congress

present, (and I am happy to see many here,) to say what would now become

of the government, if all the members of the opposition were withdrawn

from Congress. For myself, I declare my own conviction that its

continuance would probably be very short. Take away the opposition from

Congress, and let us see what would probably be done, the first session.

The TARIFF would be entirely _repealed_. Every enactment having

protection by duties as its main object would be struck from the

statute-book. This would be the first thing done. Every work of internal

improvement would be stopped. This would follow, as matter of course.

The bank would go down, and a _treasury money agency_ would take its

place. The Judiciary Act of 1789 would be repealed, so that the Supreme

Court should exercise no power of revision over State decisions. And who

would resist the doctrines of NULLIFICATION? Look, Sir, to the votes of

Congress for the last three years, and you will see that each of these

things would, in all human probability, take place at the next session,

if the opposition were to be withdrawn. The Constitution is threatened,

therefore, imminently threatened, by the very fact that those intrusted

with its administration are hostile to its essential powers.

But, Sir, in my opinion, a yet greater danger threatens the Constitution

and the government; and that is from the attempt _to extend the power of

the executive at the expense of all the other branches of the

government, and of the people themselves_. Whatever accustomed power is

denied to the Constitution, whatever accustomed power is denied to

Congress, or to the judiciary, _none is denied to the executive_. Here

there is no retrenchment; here no apprehension is felt for the liberties

of the people; here it is not thought necessary to erect barriers

against corruption.

I begin, Sir, with the subject of removals from office for opinion's

sake, one of the most signal instances, as I think, of the attempt to

extend executive power. This has been a leading measure, a cardinal

point, in the course of the administration. It has proceeded, from the

first, on a settled proscription for political opinions; and this system

it has carried into operation to the full extent of its ability. The

President has not only filled all vacancies with his own friends,

generally those most distinguished as personal partisans, but he has

turned out political opponents, and thus created vacancies, in order

that he might fill them with his own friends. I think the number of

removals and appointments is said to be _two thousand_. While the

administration and its friends have been attempting to circumscribe and

to decry the powers belonging to other branches, it has thus seized into

its own hands a patronage most pernicious and corrupting, an authority

over men's means of living most tyrannical and odious, and a power to

punish free men for political opinions altogether intolerable.

You will remember, Sir, that the Constitution says not one word about

the President's power of removal from office. It is a power raised

entirely by construction. It is a constructive power, introduced at

first to meet cases of extreme public necessity. It has now become

coextensive with the executive will, calling for no necessity, requiring

no exigency for its exercise; to be employed at all times, without

control, without question, without responsibility. When the question of

the President's power of removal was debated in the first Congress,

those who argued for it limited it to _extreme cases_. Cases, they said,

might arise, in which it would be _absolutely necessary_ to remove an

officer before the Senate could be assembled. An officer might become

insane; he might abscond; and from these and other supposable cases, it

was said, the public service might materially suffer if the President

could not remove the incumbent. And it was further said, that there was

little or no danger of the abuse of the power for party or personal

objects. No President, it was thought, would ever commit such an outrage

on public opinion. Mr. Madison, who thought the power ought to exist,

and to be exercised in cases of high necessity, declared, nevertheless,

that if a President should resort to the power when not required by any

public exigency, and merely for personal objects, _he would deserve to

be impeached_. By a very small majority,--I think, in the Senate, by the

casting vote of the Vice-President,--Congress decided in favor of the

existence of the power of removal, upon the grounds which I have

mentioned; granting the power in a case of clear and absolute necessity,

and denying its existence everywhere else.

Mr. President, we should recollect that this question was discussed, and

thus decided, when Washington was in the executive chair. Men knew that

in his hands the power would not be abused; nor did they conceive it

possible that any of his successors could so far depart from his great

and bright example, as, by abuse of the power, and by carrying that

abuse to its utmost extent, to change the essential character of the

executive from that of an impartial guardian and executor of the laws

into that of the chief dispenser of party rewards. Three or four

instances of removal occurred in the first twelve years of the

government. At the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's administration, he

made several others, not without producing much dissatisfaction; so much

so, that he thought it expedient to give reasons to the people, in a

public paper, for even the limited extent to which he had exercised the

power. He rested his justification on particular circumstances and

peculiar grounds; which, whether substantial or not, showed, at least,

that he did not regard the power of removal as an ordinary power, still

less as a mere arbitrary one, to be used as he pleased, for whatever

ends he pleased, and without responsibility. As far as I remember, Sir,

after the early part of Mr. Jefferson's administration, hardly an

instance occurred for near thirty years. If there were any instances,

they were few. But at the commencement of the present administration,

the precedent of these previous cases was seized on, and a _system_, a

regular _plan of government_, a well-considered scheme for the

maintenance of party power by the patronage of office, and this

patronage to be created by general removal, was adopted, and has been

carried into full operation. Indeed, before General Jackson's

inauguration, the party put the system into practice. In the last

session of Mr. Adams's administration, the friends of General Jackson

constituted a majority in the Senate; and nominations, made by Mr. Adams

to fill vacancies which had occurred in the ordinary way, were

postponed, by this majority, beyond the 3d of March, _for the purpose,

openly avowed, of giving the nominations to General Jackson_. A

nomination for a judge of the Supreme Court, and many others of less

magnitude, were thus disposed of.

And what did we witness, Sir, when the administration actually

commenced, in the full exercise of its authority? One universal sweep,

one undistinguishing blow, levelled against all who were not of the

successful party. No worth, public or private, no service, civil or

military, was of power to resist the relentless greediness of

proscription. Soldiers of the late war, soldiers of the Revolutionary

war, the very contemporaries of the independence of the country, all

lost their situations. No office was too high, and none too low; for

_office_ was the spoil, and "_all the spoils_," it is said, "belong to

the _victors_!" If a man holding an office necessary for his daily

support had presented himself covered with the scars of wounds received

in every battle, from Bunker Hill to Yorktown, these would not have

protected him against this reckless rapacity. Nay, Sir, if Warren

himself had been among the living, and had possessed any office under

government, high or low, he would not have been suffered to hold it a

single hour, unless he could show that he had strictly complied with the

party statutes, and had put a well-marked party collar round his own

neck. Look, Sir, to the case of the late venerable Major Melville. He

was a personification of the spirit of 1776, one of the earliest to

venture in the cause of liberty. He was of the Tea Party; one of the

very first to expose himself to British power. And his whole life was

consonant with this, its beginning. Always ardent in the cause of

liberty, always a zealous friend to his country, always acting with the

party which he supposed cherished the genuine republican spirit most

fervently, always estimable and respectable in private life, he seemed

armed against this miserable petty tyranny of party as far as man could

be. But he felt its blow, and he fell. He held an office in the

custom-house, and had held it for a long course of years; and he was

deprived of it, as if unworthy to serve the country which he loved, and

for whose liberties, in the vigor of his early manhood, he had thrust

himself into the very jaws of its enemies. There was no mistake in the

matter. His character, his standing, his Revolutionary services, were

all well known; but they were known to no purpose; they weighed not one

feather against party pretensions. It cost no pains to remove him; it

cost no compunction to wring his aged heart with this retribution from

his country for his services, his zeal, and his fidelity. Sir, you will

bear witness,[98] that, when his successor was nominated to the Senate,

and the Senate were informed who had been removed to make way for that

nomination, its members were struck with horror. They had not conceived

the administration to be capable of such a thing; and yet, they said,

What can _we_ do? The man is removed; _we_ cannot recall him; we can

only act upon the nomination before us. Sir, you and I thought

otherwise; and I rejoice that we did think otherwise. We thought it our

duty to resist the nomination to fill a vacancy thus created. We thought

it our duty to oppose this proscription, when, and where, and as, we

constitutionally could. We besought the Senate to go with us, and to

take a stand before the country on this great question. We invoked them

to try the deliberate sense of the people; to trust themselves before

the tribunal of public opinion; to resist at first, to resist at last,

to resist always, the introduction of this unsocial, this mischievous,

this dangerous, this belligerent principle into the practice of the

government.

Mr. President, as far as I know, there is no civilized country on earth,

in which, on a change of rulers, there is such an _inquisition for

spoil_ as we have witnessed in this free republic. The Inaugural Address

of 1829 spoke of a _searching operation_ of government. The most

searching operation, Sir, of the present administration, has been its

search for office and place. When, Sir, did any English minister, Whig

or Tory, ever make such an inquest? When did he ever go down to

low-water-mark, to make an ousting of tide-waiters? When did he ever

take away the daily bread of weighers, and gaugers, and measurers? When

did he ever go into the villages, to disturb the little post-offices,

the mail contracts, and every thing else in the remotest degree

connected with government? Sir, a British minister who should do this,

and should afterwards show his head in a British House of Commons, would

be received by a universal hiss.

I have little to say of the selections made to fill vacancies thus

created. It is true, however, and it is a natural consequence of the

system which has been acted on, that, within the last three years, more

nominations have been rejected on the ground of _unfitness_, than in all

the preceding forty years of the government. And these nominations, you

know, Sir, could not have been rejected but by votes of the President's

own friends. The cases were too strong to be resisted. Even party

attachment could not stand them. In some not a third of the Senate, in

others not ten votes, and in others not a single vote, could be

obtained; and this for no particular reason known only to the Senate,

but on general grounds of the want of character and qualifications; on

grounds known to every body else, as well as to the Senate. All this,

Sir, is perfectly natural and consistent. The same party selfishness

which drives good men out of office will push bad men in. Political

proscription leads necessarily to the filling of offices with

incompetent persons, and to a consequent mal-execution of official

duties. And in my opinion, Sir, this principle of claiming a monopoly of

office by the right of conquest, unless the public shall effectually

rebuke and restrain it, will entirely change the character of our

government. It elevates party above country; it forgets the common weal

in the pursuit of personal emolument; it tends to form, it does form, we

see that it has formed, a political combination, united by no common

principles or opinions among its members, either upon the powers of the

government, or the true policy of the country; but held together simply

as an association, under the charm of a popular head, seeking to

maintain possession of the government by a _vigorous exercise of its

patronage_; and for this purpose agitating, and alarming, and

distressing social life by the exercise of a tyrannical party

proscription. Sir, if this course of things cannot be checked, good men

will grow tired of the exercise of political privileges. They will have

nothing to do with popular elections. They will see that such elections

are but a mere selfish contest for office; and they will abandon the

government to the scramble of the bold, the daring, and the desperate.

It seems, Mr. President, to be a peculiar and singular characteristic of

the present administration, that it came into power on a cry against

abuses, _which did not exist_, and then, as soon as it was in, as if in

mockery of the perception and intelligence of the people, _it created

those very abuses_, and carried them to a great length. Thus the chief

magistrate himself, before he came into the chair, in a formal public

paper, denounced the practice of appointing members of Congress to

office. He said, that, if that practice continued, _corruption would

become the order of the day_; and, as if to fasten and nail down his own

consistency to that point, he declared that it was _due to himself to

practise what he recommended to others_. Yet, Sir, as soon as he was in

power, these fastenings gave way, the nails all flew, and the promised

_consistency_ remains a striking proof of the manner in which political

assurances are sometimes fulfilled. He has already appointed more

members of Congress to office than any of his predecessors, in the

longest period of administration. Before his time, there was no reason

to complain of these appointments. They had not been numerous under any

administration. Under this, they have been numerous, and some of them

such as may well justify complaint.

Another striking instance of the exhibition of the same characteristics

may be found in the sentiments of the Inaugural Address, and in the

subsequent practice, on the subject of _interfering with the freedom of

elections_. The Inaugural Address declares, that it is necessary to

reform abuses which have _brought the patronage of the government into

conflict with the freedom of elections_. And what has been the

subsequent practice? Look to the newspapers; look to the published

letters of officers of the government, advising, exhorting, soliciting,

friends and partisans to greater exertions in the cause of the party;

see all done, everywhere, which patronage and power can do, to affect,

not only elections in the general government, but also in every State

government, and then say, how well _this_ promise of reforming abuses

has been kept. At what former period, under what former administration,

did public officers of the United Stales thus interfere in elections?

Certainly, Sir, never. In this respect, then, as well as in others, that

which was not true as a charge against previous administrations would

have been true, if it had assumed the form of a prophecy respecting the

acts of the present.

* * * * *

But there is another attempt to grasp and to wield a power over public

opinion, of a still more daring character, and far more dangerous

effects.

In all popular governments, a FREE PRESS is the most important of all

agents and instruments. It not only expresses public opinion, but, to a

very great degree, it contributes to form that opinion. It is an engine

for good or for evil, as it may be directed; but an engine of which

nothing can resist the force. The conductors of the press, in popular

governments, occupy a place, in the social and political system, of the

very highest consequence. They wear the character of public instructors.

Their daily labors bear directly on the intelligence, the morals, the

taste, and the public spirit of the country. Not only are they

journalists, recording political occurrences, but they discuss

principles, they comment on measures, they canvass characters; they hold

a power over the reputation, the feelings, the happiness, of

individuals. The public ear is always open to their addresses, the

public sympathy easily made responsive to their sentiments. It is

indeed, Sir, a distinction of high honor, that theirs is the only

profession expressly protected and guarded by constitutional enactments.

Their employment soars so high, in its general consequences it is so

intimately connected with the public happiness, that its security is

provided for by the fundamental law. While it acts in a manner worthy of

this distinction, the press is a fountain of light, and a source of

gladdening warmth. It instructs the public mind, and animates the spirit

of patriotism. Its loud voice suppresses every thing which would raise

itself against the public liberty; and its blasting rebuke causes

incipient despotism to perish in the bud.

But remember, Sir, that these are the attributes of a FREE press only.

And is a press that is purchased or pensioned more free than a press

that is fettered? Can the people look for truths to partial sources,

whether rendered partial through fear or through favor? Why shall not a

manacled press be trusted with the maintenance and defence of popular

rights? Because it is supposed to be under the influence of a power

which may prove greater than the love of truth. Such a press may screen

abuses in government, or be silent. It may fear to speak. And may it not

fear to speak, too, when its conductors, if they speak in any but one

way, may lose their means of livelihood? Is dependence on government for

bread no temptation to screen its abuses? Will the press always speak

the truth, when the truth, if spoken, may be the means of silencing it

for the future? Is the truth in no danger, is the watchman under no

temptation, when he can neither proclaim the approach of national evils,

nor seem to descry them, without the loss of his place?

Mr. President, an open attempt to secure the aid and friendship of the

public press, by bestowing the emoluments of office on its active

conductors, seems to me, of every thing we have witnessed, to be the

most reprehensible. It degrades both the government and the press.

As far as its natural effect extends, it turns the palladium of

liberty into an engine of party. It brings the agency, activity,

energy, and patronage of government all to bear, with united force, on

the means of general intelligence, and on the adoption or rejection of

political opinions. It so completely perverts the true object of

government, it so entirely revolutionizes our whole system, that the

chief business of those in power is directed rather to the propagation

of opinions favorable to themselves, than to the execution of the laws.

This propagation of opinions, through the press, becomes the main

administrative duty. Some fifty or sixty editors of leading journals

have been appointed to office by the present executive. A stand has

been made against this proceeding, in the Senate, with partial

success; but, by means of appointments which do not come before the

Senate, or other means, the number has been carried to the extent I have

mentioned. Certainly, Sir, the editors of the public journals are

not to be disfranchised. Certainly they are fair candidates either for

popular elections, or a just participation in office. Certainly they

reckon in their number some of the first geniuses, the best scholars,

and the most honest and well-principled men in the country. But the

complaint is against the _system_, against the _practice_, against

the undisguised attempt to secure the favor of the press by means

addressed to its pecuniary interest, and these means, too, drawn from

the public treasury, being no other than the appointed compensations

for the performance of official duties. Sir, the press itself should

resent this. Its own character for purity and independence is at

stake. It should resist a connection rendering it obnoxious to so

many imputations. It should point to its honorable denomination in our

constitutions of government, and it should maintain the character,

there ascribed to it, of a FREE PRESS.

There can, Sir, be no objection to the appointment of an editor to

office, if he is the fittest man. There can be no objection to

considering the services which, in that or in any other capacity, he

may have rendered his country. He may have done much to maintain her

rights against foreign aggression, and her character against insult.

He may have honored, as well as defended her; and may, therefore, be

justly regarded and selected, in the choice of faithful public agents.

But the ground of complaint is, that the aiding, by the press, of the

election of an individual, is rewarded, by that same individual,

with the gift of moneyed offices. Men are turned out of office, and

others put in, and receive salaries from the public treasury, on the

ground, either openly avowed or falsely denied, that they have rendered

service in the election of the very individual who makes this removal

and makes this appointment. Every man, Sir, must see that this is a

vital stab at the purity of the press. It not only assails its

independence, by addressing sinister motives to it, but it furnishes

from the public treasury the means of exciting these motives. It

extends the executive power over the press in a most daring manner. It

operates to give a direction to opinion, not favorable to the

government, in the aggregate; not favorable to the Constitution and

laws; not favorable to the legislature; but favorable to the executive

alone. The consequence often is, just what might be looked for, that

the portion of the press thus made fast to the executive interest

denounces Congress, denounces the judiciary, complains of the laws,

and quarrels with the Constitution. This exercise of the right of

appointment to this end is an augmentation, and a vast one, of the

executive power, singly and alone. It uses that power strongly against

all other branches of the government, and it uses it strongly, too,

for any struggle which it may be called on to make with the public

opinion of the country. Mr. President, I will quit this topic. There

is much in it, in my judgment, affecting, not only the purity and

independence of the press, but also the character and honor, the

peace and security, of the government. I leave it, in all its bearings,

to the consideration of the people.

* * * * *

Mr. President, among the novelties introduced into the government by the

present administration is the frequent use of the President's negative

on acts of Congress. Under former Presidents, this power has been deemed

an extraordinary one, to be exercised only in peculiar and marked cases.

It was vested in the President, doubtless, as a guard against hasty or

inconsiderate legislation, and against any act, inadvertently passed,

which might seem to encroach on the just authority of other branches of

the government. I do not recollect that, by all General Jackson's

predecessors, this power was exercised more than four or five times. Not

having recurred to the journals, I cannot, of course, be sure that I am

numerically accurate in this particular; but such is my belief. I

recollect no instance in the time of Mr. John Adams, Mr. Jefferson, or

Mr. John Quincy Adams. The only cases which occur to me are two in

General Washington's administration, two in Mr. Madison's, and one in

Mr. Monroe's. There may be some others; but we all know that it is a

power which has been very sparingly and reluctantly used, from the

beginning of the government. The cases, Sir, to which I have now

referred, were cases in which the President returned the bill with

objections. The silent veto is, I believe, the exclusive adoption of the

present administration. I think, indeed, that, some years ago, a bill,

by inadvertence or accident, failed to receive the President's

signature, and so did not become a law. But I am not aware of any

instance, before the present administration, in which the President has,

by design, omitted to sign a bill, and yet has not returned it to

Congress. But since that administration came into power, the veto, in

both kinds, has been repeatedly applied. In the case of the Maysville

Road, the Montgomery Road, and the bank, we have had the veto, _with_

reasons. In an internal improvement bill of a former session, in a

similar bill at the late session, and in the State interest bill, we

have had the silent veto, or refusal _without_ reasons.

Now, Sir, it is to be considered, that the President has the power of

recommending measures to Congress. Through his friends, he may and does

oppose, also, any legislative movement which he does not approve. If, in

addition to this, he may exercise a silent veto, at his pleasure, on all

the bills presented to him during the last ten days of the session; if

he may refuse assent to them all, without being called upon to assign

any reasons whatever,--it will certainly be a great practical

augmentation of his power. Any one, who looks at a volume of the

statutes, will see that a great portion of all the laws are actually

passed within the last ten days of each session. If the President is at

liberty to negative any or all of these laws, at pleasure, or rather, to

refuse to render the bills laws by approving them, and still may neglect

to return them to Congress for renewed action, he will hold a very

important control over the legislation of this country. The day of

adjournment is usually fixed some weeks in advance. This being fixed, a

little activity and perseverance may easily, in most cases, and perhaps

in all, where no alarm has been excited, postpone important pending

measures to a period within ten days of the close of the session; and

this operation subjects all such measures to the discretion of the

President, who may sign the bills or not, without being obliged to state

his reasons publicly.

The bill for rechartering the bank would have been inevitably destroyed

by the silent veto, if its friends had not refused to fix an any term

for adjournment before the President should have had the bill in his

possession so long as to be required constitutionally to sign it, or to

send it back with his reasons for not signing it. The two houses did not

agree, and would not agree, to fix a day for adjournment, until the bill

was sent to the President; and then care was taken to fix on such a day

as should allow him the whole constitutional period. This seasonable

presentment rescued the bill from the power of the silent negative.

This practical innovation on the mode of administering the government,

so much at variance with its general principles, and so capable of

defeating the most useful acts, deserves public consideration. Its

tendency is to disturb the harmony which ought always to exist between

Congress and the executive, and to turn that which the Constitution

intended only as an extraordinary remedy for extraordinary cases into a

common means of making executive discretion paramount to the discretion

of Congress, in the enactment of laws.

* * * * *

Mr. President, the executive has not only used these unaccustomed means

to prevent the passage of laws, but it has also refused to enforce the

execution of laws actually passed. An eminent instance of this is found

in the course adopted relative to the Indian intercourse law of 1802.

Upon being applied to, in behalf of the MISSIONARIES, to execute that

law, for their relief and protection, the President replied, that, _the

State of Georgia having extended her laws over the Indian territory, the

laws of Congress had thereby been superseded_. This is the substance of

his answer, as communicated through the Secretary of War. He holds,

then, that the law of the State is paramount to the law of Congress. The

Supreme Court has adjudged this act of Georgia to be void, as being

repugnant to a constitutional law of the United States. But the

President pays no more regard to this decision than to the act of

Congress itself. The missionaries remain in prison, held there by a

condemnation under a law of a State which the supreme judicial tribunal

has pronounced to be null and void. The Supreme Court have decided that

the act of Congress is constitutional; that it is a binding statute;

that it has the same force as other laws, and is as much entitled to be

obeyed and executed as other laws. The President, on the contrary,

declares that the law of Congress has been superseded by the law of the

State, and therefore he will not carry its provisions into effect. Now

we know, Sir, that the Constitution of the United States declares, that

that Constitution, and all acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it,

shall be the supreme law of the land, any thing in any State law to the

contrary notwithstanding. This would seem to be a plain case, then, in

which the law should be executed. It has been solemnly decided to be in

actual force, by the highest judicial authority; its execution is

demanded for the relief of free citizens, now suffering the pains of

unjust and unlawful imprisonment; yet the President refuses to execute

it.

In the case of the Chicago Road, some sessions ago, the President

approved the bill, but accompanied his approval by a message, saying how

far he deemed it a proper law, and how far, therefore, it ought to be

carried into execution.

In the case of the harbor bill of the late session, being applied to by

a member of Congress for directions for carrying parts of the law into

effect, he declined giving them, and made a distinction between such

parts of the law as he should cause to be executed, and such as he

should not; and his right to make this distinction has been openly

maintained, by those who habitually defend his measures. Indeed, Sir,

these, and other instances of liberties taken with plain statute

laws, flow naturally from the principles expressly avowed by the

President, under his own hand. In that important document, Sir, upon

which it seems to be his fate to stand or to fall before the American

people, the veto message, he holds the following language:--"Each

public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears

that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is

understood by others." Mr. President, the general adoption of the

sentiments expressed in this sentence would dissolve our government.

It would raise every man's private opinions into a standard for his

own conduct; and there certainly is, there can be, no government, where

every man is to judge for himself of his own rights and his own

obligations. Where every one is his own arbiter, force, and not law,

is the governing power. He who may judge for himself, and decide for

himself, must execute his own decisions; and this is the law of

force. I confess, Sir, it strikes me with astonishment, that so

wild, so disorganizing, a sentiment should be uttered by a President

of the United States. I should think it must have escaped from its

author through want of reflection, or from the habit of little

reflection on such subjects, if I could suppose it possible, that, on

a question exciting so much public attention, and of so much national

importance, any such extraordinary doctrine could find its way,

through inadvertence, into a formal and solemn public act. Standing as

it does, it affirms a proposition which would effectually repeal all

constitutional and all legal obligations. The Constitution declares,

that every public officer, in the State governments as well as in the

general government, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of

the United States. This is all. Would it not have cast an air of

ridicule on the whole provision, if the Constitution had gone on to add

the words, "as he understands it"? What could come nearer to a

solemn farce, than to bind a man by oath, and still leave him to be his

own interpreter of his own obligation? Sir, those who are to execute

the laws have no more a license to construe them for themselves, than

those whose only duty is to obey them. Public officers are bound to

support the Constitution; private citizens are bound to obey it; and

there is no more indulgence granted to the public officer to support

the Constitution only _as he understands it_, than to a private citizen

to obey it only _as he understands it_; and what is true of the

Constitution, in this respect, is equally true of any law. Laws are to

be executed, and to be obeyed, not as individuals may interpret

them, but according to public, authoritative interpretation and

adjudication. The sentiment of the message would abrogate the

obligation of the whole criminal code. If every man is to judge of

the Constitution and the laws for himself, if he is to obey and

support them only as he may say he understands them, a revolution, I

think, would take place in the administration of justice; and

discussions about the law of treason, murder, and arson should be

addressed, not to the judicial bench, but to those who might stand

charged with such offences. The object of discussion should be, if we

run out this notion to its natural extent, to enlighten the culprit

himself how he ought to understand the law.

Mr. President, how is it possible that a sentiment so wild, and so

dangerous, so encouraging to all who feel a desire to oppose the laws,

and to impair the Constitution, should have been uttered by the

President of the United States at this eventful and critical moment? Are

we not threatened with dissolution of the Union? Are we not told that

the laws of the government shall be openly and directly resisted? Is not

the whole country looking, with the utmost anxiety, to what may be the

result of these threatened courses? And at this very moment, so full of

peril to the state, the chief magistrate puts forth opinions and

sentiments as truly subversive of all government, as absolutely in

conflict with the authority of the Constitution, as the wildest theories

of nullification. Mr. President, I have very little regard for the law,

or the logic, of nullification. But there is not an individual in its

ranks, capable of putting two ideas together, who, if you will grant him

the principles of the veto message, cannot defend all that nullification

has ever threatened.

To make this assertion good, Sir, let us see how the case stands. The

Legislature of South Carolina, it is said, will nullify the late revenue

or tariff law, because, _they say_, it is not warranted by the

Constitution of the United States, _as they understand the

Constitution_. They, as well as the President of the United States, have

sworn to support the Constitution. Both he and they have taken the same

oath, in the same words. Now, Sir, since he claims the right to

interpret the Constitution as he pleases, how can he deny the same right

to them? Is his oath less stringent than theirs? Has he a prerogative

of dispensation which they do not possess? How can he answer them, when

they tell him, that the revenue laws are unconstitutional, _as they

understand the Constitution_, and that therefore they will nullify them?

Will he reply to them, according to the doctrines of his annual message

in 1830, that _precedent_ has settled the question, if it was ever

doubtful? They will answer him in his own words in the veto message,

that, in such a case, _precedent_ is not binding. Will he say to them,

that the revenue law is a law of Congress, which must be executed until

it shall be declared void? They will answer him, that, in other cases,

he has himself refused to execute laws of Congress which had not been

declared void, but which had been, on the contrary, declared valid. Will

he urge the force of judicial decisions? They will answer, that he

himself does not admit the binding obligation of such decisions. Sir,

the President of the United States is of opinion, that an individual,

called on to execute a law, may himself judge of its constitutional

validity. Does nullification teach any thing more revolutionary than

that? The President is of opinion, that judicial interpretations of the

Constitution and the laws do not bind the consciences, and ought not to

bind the conduct, of men. Is nullification at all more disorganizing

than that? The President is of opinion, that every officer is bound to

support the Constitution only according to what ought to be, in his

private opinion, its construction. Has nullification, in its wildest

flight, ever reached to an extravagance like that? No, Sir, never. The

doctrine of nullification, in my judgment a most false, dangerous, and

revolutionary doctrine, is this; that _the State_, or _a State_, may

declare the extent of the obligations which its citizens are under to

the United States; in other words, that a State, by State laws and State

judicatures, may conclusively construe the Constitution for its own

citizens. But that every individual may construe it for himself is a

refinement on the theory of resistance to constitutional power, a

sublimation of the right of being disloyal to the Union, a free charter

for the elevation of private opinion above the authority of the

fundamental law of the state, such as was never presented to the public

view, and the public astonishment, even by nullification itself. Its

first appearance is in the veto message. Melancholy, lamentable, indeed,

Sir, is our condition, when, at a moment of serious danger and

wide-spread alarm, such sentiments are found to proceed from the chief

magistrate of the government. Sir, I cannot feel that the Constitution

is safe in such hands. I cannot feel that the present administration is

its fit and proper guardian.

But let me ask, Sir, what evidence there is, that the President is

himself opposed to the doctrines of nullification: I do not say to the

political party which now pushes these doctrines, but to the doctrines

themselves. Has he anywhere rebuked them? Has he anywhere discouraged

them? Has his influence been exerted to inspire respect for the

Constitution, and to produce obedience to the laws? Has he followed the

bright example of his predecessors? Has he held fast by the institutions

of the country? Has he summoned the good and the wise around him? Has he

admonished the country that the Union is in danger, and called on all

the patriotic to come out in its support? Alas! Sir, we have seen

nothing, nothing, of all this.

Mr. President, I shall not discuss the doctrine of nullification. I am

sure it can have no friends here. Gloss it and disguise it as we may, it

is a pretence incompatible with the authority of the Constitution. If

direct separation be not its only mode of operation, separation is,

nevertheless, its direct consequence. That a State may nullify a law of

the Union, and still remain in the Union; that she may have Senators and

Representatives in the government, and yet be at liberty to disobey and

resist that government; that she may partake in the common councils, and

yet not be bound by their results; that she may control a law of

Congress, so that it shall be one thing with her, while it is another

thing with the rest of the States;--all these propositions seem to me so

absolutely at war with common sense and reason, that I do not understand

how any intelligent person can yield the slightest assent to them.

Nullification, it is in vain to attempt to conceal it, is dissolution;

it is dismemberment; it is the breaking up of the Union. If it shall

practically succeed in any one State, from that moment there are

twenty-four States in the Union no longer. Now, Sir, I think it

exceedingly probable that the President may come to an open rupture with

that portion of his original party which now constitutes what is called

the Nullification party. I think it likely he will oppose the

proceedings of that party, if they shall adopt measures coming directly

in conflict with the laws of the United States. But how will he oppose?

What will be his course of remedy? Sir, I wish to call the attention of

the Convention, and of the people, earnestly to this question,--How will

the President attempt to put down nullification, if he shall attempt it

at all?

Sir, for one, I protest in advance against such remedies as I have heard

hinted. The administration itself keeps a profound silence, but its

friends have spoken for it. We are told, Sir, that the President will

immediately employ the military force, and at once blockade Charleston!

A military remedy, a remedy by direct belligerent operation, has been

thus suggested, and nothing else has been suggested, as the intended

means of preserving the Union. Sir, there is no little reason to think,

that this suggestion is true. We cannot be altogether unmindful of the

past, and therefore we cannot be altogether unapprehensive for the

future. For one, Sir, I raise my voice beforehand against the

unauthorized employment of military power, and against superseding the

authority of the laws, by an armed force, under pretence of putting down

nullification. The President has no authority to blockade Charleston;

the President has no authority to employ military force, till he shall

be duly required so to do, by law, and by the civil authorities. His

duty is to cause the laws to be executed. His duty is to support the

civil authority. His duty is, if the laws be resisted, to employ the

military force of the country, if necessary, for their support and

execution; but to do all this in compliance only with law, and with

decisions of the tribunals. If, by any ingenious devices, those who

resist the laws escape from the reach of judicial authority, as it is

now provided to be exercised, it is entirely competent to Congress to

make such new provisions as the exigency of the case may demand. These

provisions undoubtedly would be made. With a constitutional and

efficient head of the government, with an administration really and

truly in favor of the Constitution, the country can grapple with

nullification. By the force of reason, by the progress of enlightened

opinion, by the natural, genuine patriotism of the country, and by the

steady and well-sustained operations of law, the progress of

disorganization may be successfully checked, and the Union maintained.

Let it be remembered, that, where nullification is most powerful, it is

not unopposed. Let it be remembered, that they who would break up the

Union by force have to march toward that object through thick ranks of

as brave and good men as the country can show; men strong in character,

strong in intelligence, strong in the purity of their own motives, and

ready, always ready, to sacrifice their fortunes and their lives to the

preservation of the constitutional union of the States. If we can

relieve the country from an administration which denies to the

Constitution those powers which are the breath of its life; if we can

place the government in the hands of its friends; if we can secure it

against the dangers of irregular and unlawful military force; if it can

be under the lead of an administration whose moderation, firmness, and

wisdom shall inspire confidence and command respect,--we may yet

surmount the dangers, numerous and formidable as they are, which

surround us.

Sir, I see little prospect of overcoming these dangers without a change

of men. After all that has passed, the reflection of the present

executive will give the national sanction to sentiments and to measures

which will effectually change the government; which, in short, must

destroy the government. If the President be reflected, with concurrent

and cooeperating majorities in both houses of Congress, I do not see,

that, in four years more, all the power which is suffered to remain in

the government will not be held by the executive hand. Nullification

will proceed, or will be put down by a power as unconstitutional as

itself. The revenues will be managed by a treasury bank. The use of the

veto will be considered as sanctioned by the public voice. The Senate,

if not "cut down," will be bound down, and, the President commanding the

army and the navy, and holding all places of trust to be party property,

what will then be left, Sir, for constitutional reliance?

Sir, we have been accustomed to venerate the judiciary, and to repose

hopes of safety on that branch of the government. But let us not deceive

ourselves. The judicial power cannot stand for a long time against the

executive power. The judges, it is true, hold their places by an

independent tenure; but they are mortal. That which is the common lot of

humanity must make it necessary to renew the benches of justice. And how

will they be filled? Doubtless, Sir, they will be filled by judges

agreeing with the President in his constitutional opinions. If the court

is felt as an obstacle, the first opportunity and every opportunity

will certainly be embraced to give it less and less the character of an

obstacle. Sir, without pursuing these suggestions, I only say that the

country must prepare itself for any change in the judicial department

such as it shall deliberately sanction in other departments.

But, Sir, what is the prospect of change? Is there any hope that the

national sentiment will recover its accustomed tone, and restore to the

government a just and efficient administration?

Sir, if there be something of doubt on this point, there is also

something, perhaps much, of hope. The popularity of the present

chief magistrate, springing from causes not connected with his

administration of the government, has been great. Public gratitude

for military service has remained fast to him, in defiance of many

things in his civil administration calculated to weaken its hold. At

length there are indications, not to be mistaken, of new sentiments

and new impressions. At length, a conviction of danger to important

interests, and to the security of the government, has made its

lodgement in the public mind. At length, public sentiment begins to have

its free course and to produce its just effects. I fully believe,

Sir, that a great majority of the nation desire a change in the

administration; and that it will be difficult for party organization

or party denunciation to suppress the effective utterance of that

general wish. There are unhappy differences, it is true, about the

fit person to be successor to the present incumbent in the chief

magistracy; and it is possible that this disunion may, in the end,

defeat the will of the majority. But so far as we agree together, let

us act together. Wherever our sentiments concur, let our hands

cooeperate. If we cannot at present agree who should be President, we are

at least agreed who ought not to be. I fully believe, Sir, that

gratifying intelligence is already on the wing. While we are yet

deliberating in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania is voting. This week, she

elects her members to the next Congress. I doubt not the result of

that election will show an important change in public sentiment in

that State; nor can I doubt that the great States adjoining her,

holding similar constitutional principles and having similar interests,

will feel the impulse of the same causes which affect her. The people

of the United States, by a countless majority, are attached to the

Constitution. If they shall be convinced that it is in danger, they

will come to its rescue, and will save it. It cannot bi destroyed,

even now, if THEY will undertake its guardianship and protection.

But suppose, Sir, there was less hope than there is, would that

consideration weaken the force of our obligations? Are we at a post

which we are at liberty to desert when it becomes difficult to hold it?

May we fly at the approach of danger? Does our fidelity to the

Constitution require no more of us than to enjoy its blessings, to bask

in the prosperity which it has shed around us and our fathers? and are

we at liberty to abandon it in the hour of its peril, or to make for it

but a faint and heartless struggle, for the want of encouragement and

the want of hope? Sir, if no State come to our succor, if everywhere

else the contest should be given up, here let it be protracted to the

last moment. Here, where the first blood of the Revolution was shed, let

the last effort be made for that which is the greatest blessing obtained

by the Revolution, a free and united government. Sir, in our endeavors

to maintain our existing forms of government, we are acting not for

ourselves alone, but for the great cause of constitutional liberty all

over the globe. We are trustees holding a sacred treasure, in which all

the lovers of freedom have a stake. Not only in revolutionized France,

where there are no longer subjects, where the monarch can no longer say,

I am the state; not only in reformed England, where our principles, our

institutions, our practice of free government, are now daily quoted and

commended; but in the depths of Germany, also, and among the desolated

fields and the still smoking ashes of Poland, prayers are uttered for

the preservation of our union and happiness. We are surrounded, Sir, by

a cloud of witnesses. The gaze of the sons of liberty, everywhere, is

upon us, anxiously, intently, upon us. They may see us fall in the

struggle for our Constitution and government, but Heaven forbid that

they should see us recreant.

At least, Sir, let the star of Massachusetts be the last which shall be

seen to fall from heaven, and to plunge into the utter darkness of

disunion. Let her shrink back, let her hold others back if she can, at

any rate, let her keep herself back, from this gulf, full at once of

fire and of blackness; yes, Sir, as far as human foresight can scan, or

human imagination fathom, full of the fire and the blood of civil war,

and of the thick darkness of general political disgrace, ignominy, and

rain. Though the worst may happen that can happen, and though she may

not be able to prevent the catastrophe, yet let her maintain her own

integrity, her own high honor, her own unwavering fidelity, so that with

respect and decency, though with a broken and a bleeding heart, she may

pay the last tribute to a glorious, departed, free Constitution.

FOOTNOTES

[96] A Speech delivered at the National Republican Convention held at

Worcester, Mass., on the 12th of October, 1832, preparatory to

the Annual Elections.

[97] See page 269, _infra_.

[98] Hon. Nathaniel Silsbee, President of the Convention, was Mr.

Webster's colleague in the Senate at the time referred to.

[99] A Speech delivered at a Public Dinner in Honor of the Centennial

Birthday of Washington, on the 22d of February, 1832.

[100] Extract of a letter written by John Adams to Nathan Webb, dated

at Worcester, Massachusetts, October 12, 1755.

"Soon after the Reformation, a few people came over into this

New World, for conscience' sake. Perhaps this apparently

trivial incident may transfer the great seat of empire into

America. It looks likely to me; for, if we can remove the

turbulent Gallics, our people, according to the exactest

computations, will, in another century, become more numerous

than England itself. Should this be the case, since we have, I

may say, all the naval stores of the nation in our hands, it

will be easy to obtain a mastery of the seas; and then the

united force of all Europe will not be able to subdue us. The

only way to keep us from setting up for ourselves is to

disunite us."

RECEPTION AT BUFFALO.[101]

In the summer of 1833, Mr. Webster made a visit to the State of

Ohio. On his way thither, while at Buffalo, New York, he was invited

by the citizens of that place to attend a public dinner, which his

engagements, and the necessity of an early departure, compelled him

to decline. He accepted, however, an invitation to be present at the

launching of a steamboat, to which the proprietors had given the

name of DANIEL WEBSTER, and, in reply to an address from one of

them, made the following remarks:--

I avail myself gladly of this opportunity of making my acknowledgments

to the proprietors of this vessel, for the honor conferred upon me by

allowing her to bear my name. Such a token of regard, had it proceeded

from my immediate friends and neighbors, could not but have excited

feelings of gratitude. It is more calculated to awaken these sentiments,

when coming from gentlemen of character and worth with whom I have not

had the pleasure of personal acquaintance, and whose motive, I may

flatter myself, is to be found in an indulgent opinion towards

well-intentioned services in a public situation.

It gives me great pleasure, also, on the occasion of so large an

assembly of the people of Buffalo, to express to them my thanks for the

kindness and hospitality with which I have been received in this young,

but growing and interesting city. The launching of another vessel on

these inland seas is but a fresh occasion of congratulation on the rapid

growth, the great active prosperity, and the animating prospects of this

city. Eight years ago, fellow-citizens, I enjoyed the pleasure of a

short visit to this place. There was then but one steamboat on Lake

Erie; it made its passage once in ten or fifteen days only; and I

remember that persons in my own vicinity, intending to travel to the Far

West by that conveyance, wrote to their friends here to learn the day of

the commencement of the contemplated voyage. I understand that there are

now eighteen steamboats plying on the lake, all finding full employment;

and that a boat leaves Buffalo twice every day for Detroit and the ports

in Ohio. The population of Buffalo, now four times as large as it was

then, has kept pace with the augmentation of its commercial business.

This rapid progress is an indication, in a single instance, of what is

likely to be the rate of the future progress of the city. So many

circumstances incline to favor its advancement, that it is difficult to

estimate the rate by which it may hereafter proceed. It will probably

not be long before the products of the fisheries of the East, the

importations of the Atlantic frontier, the productions, mineral and

vegetable, of all the Northwestern States, and the sugars of Louisiana,

will find their way hither by inland water communication. Much of this,

indeed, has already taken place, and is of daily occurrence. Many, who

remember the competition between Buffalo and Black Rock for the site of

the city, will doubtless live to see the city spread over both. This

singular prosperity, fellow-citizens, so gratifying for the present, and

accompanied with such high hopes for the future, is due to your own

industry and enterprise, to your favored position, and to the

flourishing condition of the internal commerce of the country; and the

blessings and the riches of that internal commerce, be it ever

remembered, are the fruits of a united government, and one general,

common commercial system.

It is not only the trade of New York, of Ohio, of New England, of

Indiana, or of Michigan, but it is a part of the great aggregate of the

trade of all the States, in which you so largely and so successfully

partake. Who does not see that the advantages here enjoyed spring from a

general government and a uniform code? Who does not see, that, if these

States had remained severed, and each had existed with a system of

imposts and commercial regulations of its own, all excluding and

repelling, rather than inviting, the intercourse of the rest, the place

could hardly have hoped to be more than a respectable frontier post? Or

can any man look to the one and to the other side of this beautiful

lake and river, and not see, in their different conditions, the plain

and manifest results of different political institutions and commercial

regulations?

It would be pleasant, fellow-citizens, to dwell on these topics, so

worthy at all times of regard and reflection; and especially so fit to

engage attention at the present moment. But this is not the proper

moment to pursue them; and, tendering to you once more my thanks and

good wishes, I take my leave of you by expressing my hope for the

continued success of that great interest, so essential to your

happiness,--THE COMMERCE OF THE LAKES, A NEW-DISCOVERED SOURCE OF

NATIONAL PROSPERITY, AND A NEW BOND OF NATIONAL UNION.

An address was also made to Mr. Webster in behalf of the mechanics

and manufacturers of Buffalo, to which he returned the following

reply:--

I need hardly say, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, that it gives me much

satisfaction to receive this mark of approbation of my public conduct

from the manufacturers and mechanics of Buffalo. Those who are the most

immediately affected by the measures of the government are naturally the

earliest to perceive their operation, and to foresee their final

results. Allow me to say, Gentlemen, that the confidence expressed by

you in my continuance in the general course which I have pursued must

rest, and may rest safely, I trust, on the history of the past. Desiring

always to avoid extremes, and to observe a prudent moderation in regard

to the protective system, I yet hold steadiness and perseverance, in

maintaining what has been established, to be essential to the public

prosperity. Nothing can be worse than that laws concerning the daily

labor and the daily bread of whole classes of the people should be

subject to frequent and violent changes. It were far better not to move

at all than to move forward and then fall back again.

My sentiments, Gentlemen, on the tariff question, are generally

known. In my opinion, a just and a leading object in the whole system is

the encouragement and protection of American manual labor. I confess,

that every day's experience convinces me more and more of the high

propriety of regarding this object. Our government is made for all,

not for a few. Its object is to promote the greatest good of the whole;

and this ought to be kept constantly in view in its administration.

The far greater number of those who maintain the government belong

to what may be called the industrious or productive classes of the

community. With us labor is not depressed, ignorant, and unintelligent.

On the contrary, it is active, spirited, enterprising, seeking its own

rewards, and laying up for its own competence and its own support. The

motive to labor is the great stimulus to our whole society; and no

system is wise or just which does not afford this stimulus, as far as

it may. The protection of American labor against the injurious

competition of foreign labor, so far, at least, as respects general

handicraft productions, is known historically to have been one end

designed to be obtained by establishing the Constitution; and this

object, and the constitutional power to accomplish it, ought never in

any degree to be surrendered or compromised.

Our political institutions, Gentlemen, place power in the hands of all

the people; and to make the exercise of this power, in such hands,

salutary, it is indispensable that all the people should enjoy, first,

the means of education, and, second, the reasonable certainty of

procuring a competent livelihood by industry and labor. These

institutions are neither designed for, nor suited to, a nation of

ignorant paupers. To disseminate knowledge, then, universally, and to

secure to labor and industry their just rewards, is the duty both of the

general and the State governments, each in the exercise of its

appropriate powers. To be free, the people must be intelligently free;

to be substantially independent, they must be able to secure themselves

against want, by sobriety and industry; to be safe depositaries of

political power, they must be able to comprehend and understand the

general interests of the community, and must themselves have a stake in

the welfare of that community. The interest of labor, therefore, has an

importance, in our system, beyond what belongs to it as a mere question

of political economy. It is connected with our forms of government, and

our whole social system. The activity and prosperity which at present

prevail among us, as every one must notice, are produced by the

excitement of compensating prices to labor; and it is fervently to be

hoped that no unpropitious circumstances and no unwise policy may

counteract this efficient cause of general competency and public

happiness.

I pray you, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, to receive personally my thanks

for the manner in which you have communicated to me the sentiments of

the meeting which you represent.

FOOTNOTES

[101] Remarks made to the Citizens of Buffalo, June, 1833.

RECEPTION AT PITTSBURG.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

Mr. Webster arrived at Pittsburg on the evening of the 4th of July

accompanied by a numerous cavalcade of citizens. He was immediately

waited on by a committee, with the following letter:--

"TO THE HON. DANIEL WEBSTER.

"_Pittsburg, July 4, 1833._

"SIR,--At a meeting of the citizens of Pittsburg, the undersigned were

appointed a committee to convey to you a cordial welcome, and an

assurance of the exalted sense which is entertained of your character

and public services.

"The feeling is one which pervades our whole community, scorning any

narrower discrimination than that of lovers of our sacred Union, and

admirers of the highest moral and intellectual qualities, steadily and

triumphantly devoted to the noblest purposes.

"The resolutions under which the committee act indicate no particular

form of tribute, but contain only an earnest injunction to seek the best

mode by which to manifest the universal recognition of your claim to the

admiration and gratitude of every American citizen. It will be deeply

mortifying to us, if our execution of this trust shall fail adequately

to represent the enthusiastic feeling in which it had its origin.

"The committee will have the honor of waiting on you in person, at such

an hour as you may please to designate, with a view to ascertain how

they can best fulfil the purposes of their appointment. It will be very

gratifying if your convenience will permit you to partake of a public

dinner at any period during your stay.

"We have the honor to be, with the highest respect, &c.

JAMES ROSS,

BENJAMIN BAKEWELL,

CHARLES AVERY,

WILLIAM WADE,

SAMUEL PETTIGREW,

GEORGE MILTENBERGER,

ISAAC LIGHTNER,

SYLVANUS LATHROP,

JOHN ARTHURS,

ALEX. BRACKENRIDGE,

WILLIAM ROBINSON, JUN.

GEORGE A. COOK,

W. W. FETTERMAN,

SAMUEL ROSEBURGH,

WILLIAM MACKEY,

JAMES JOHNSTON,

RICHARD BIDDLE,

SAMUEL P. DARLINGTON,

MICHAEL TIERNAN,

SAMUEL FAHNESTOCK,

THOMAS BAKEWELL,

WALTER H. LOWRIE,

WILLIAM W. IRWIN,

ROBERT S. CASSAT,

CORNELIUS DARRAGH,

BENJAMIN DARLINGTON,

NEVILLE B. CRAIG,

WILSON McCANDLES,

OWEN ASHTON,

CHARLES SHALER,

THOMAS SCOTT,

CHARLES H. ISRAEL."

To this letter Mr. Webster returned the following reply:--

"_Pittsburg, July 5, 1833._

"GENTLEMEN,--I hardly know how to express my thanks for the hospitable

and cordial welcome with which the citizens of Pittsburg are disposed to

receive me on this my first visit to their city. The terms in which you

express their sentiments, in your letter of yesterday, far transcend all

merits of mine, and can have their origin only in spontaneous kindness

and good feeling. I tender to you, Gentlemen, and to the meeting which

you represent, my warmest acknowledgments. I rejoice sincerely to find

the health of the city so satisfactory; and I reciprocate with all the

people of Pittsburg the most sincere and hearty good wishes for their

prosperity and happiness. Long may it continue what it now is, an abode

of comfort and hospitality, a refuge for the well-deserving from all

nations, a model of industry, and an honor to the country.

"It is my purpose, Gentlemen, to stay a day or two among you, to see

such of your manufactories and public institutions as it may be in my

power to visit. I most respectfully pray leave to decline a public

dinner, but shall have great pleasure in meeting such of your

fellow-citizens as may desire it, in the most friendly and unceremonious

manner.

"I am, Gentlemen, with very true regard, yours,

"DANIEL WEBSTER.

"To HON. JAMES ROSS and others, Gentlemen of the Committee."

In deference to Mr. Webster's wishes, the idea of a formal dinner

was abandoned; but, as there was a general desire for some

collective expression of public esteem, it was determined to invite

him to meet the citizens in a spacious grove, at four o'clock on the

afternoon of the 8th. Refreshments of a plain kind were spread

around, under the charge of the committee; but the tables could

serve only as a nucleus to the multitude. His Honor the Mayor called

the company to order, and addressed them as follows:--

"I have to ask, Gentlemen, your attention for a few moments.

"We are met here to mark our sense of the extraordinary merits of a

distinguished statesman and public benefactor. At his particular

request, every thing like parade or ceremonial has been waived; and, in

consequence, he has been the better enabled to receive, and to

reciprocate, the hearty and spontaneous expression of your good-will. I

am now desired to attempt, in your name, to give utterance to the

universal feeling around me.

"Gentlemen, we are this day citizens of the _United_ States. The Union

is safe. Not a star has fallen from that proud banner around which our

affections have so long rallied. And when, with this delightful

assurance, we cast our eyes back upon the eventful history of the last

year,--when we recall the gloomy apprehensions, and perhaps hopeless

despondency, which came over us,--who, Gentlemen, can learn, without a

glow of enthusiasm, that the great champion of the Constitution, that

DANIEL WEBSTER, is now in the midst of us. To his mighty intellect, the

nation, with one voice, confided its cause,--of life or death. Shall

there be withheld from the triumphant advocate of the nation a nation's

gratitude? Ours, Gentlemen, is a government not of force, but of

opinion. The reason of the people must be satisfied before a call to

arms. The mass of our peaceful and conscientious citizens cannot, and

ought not, except in a clear case, to be urged to abandon the implements

of industry for the sword and the bayonet. This consideration it is that

imparts to intellectual preeminence in the service of truth its

incalculable value. And hence the preciousness of that admirable and

unanswerable exposition, which has put down, once and for ever, the

artful sophisms of nullification.

"If, Gentlemen, we turn to other portions of the public history of our

distinguished guest, it will be found that his claims to grateful

acknowledgment are not less imposing. The cause of domestic industry, of

internal improvement, of education, of whatever, in short, is calculated

to render us a prosperous, united, and happy people, has found in him a

watchful and efficient advocate. Nor is it the least of his merits, that

to our gallant _Navy_ Mr. Webster has been an early, far-sighted, and

persevering friend. Our interior position cannot render us cold and

unobservant on this point, whilst the victory of Perry yet supplies to

us a proud and inspiring anniversary. And such is the wonderful chain of

mutual dependence which binds our Union, that, in the remotest corner of

the West, the exchangeable value of every product must depend on the

security with which the ocean can be traversed.

"Gentlemen, I have detained you too long; yet I will add one word. I do

but echo the language of the throngs that have crowded round Mr. Webster

in declaring, that the frank and manly simplicity of his character and

manners has created a feeling of personal regard which no mere

intellectual ascendency could have secured. We approached him with

admiration for the achievements of his public career, never supposing

for a moment that our hearts could have aught to do in the matter; we

shall part as from a valued friend, the recollection of whose virtues

cannot pass away."

MR. WEBSTER then addressed the assembly as follows:

RECEPTION AT PITTSBURG.[102]

Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen:--I rise, fellow-citizens, with unaffected

sensibility, to give you my thanks for the hospitable manner in which

you have been kind enough to receive me, on this my first visit to

Pittsburg, and to make all due acknowledgments to your worthy Mayor, for

the sentiments which he has now seen fit to express.

Although, Gentlemen, it has been my fortune to be personally acquainted

with very few of you, I feel, at this moment, that we are not strangers.

We are fellow-countrymen, fellow-citizens, bound together by a thousand

ties of interest, of sympathy, of duty; united, I hope I may add, by

bonds of mutual regard. We are bound together, for good or for evil, in

our great political interests. I know that I am addressing Americans,

every one of whom has a true American heart in his bosom; and I feel

that I have also an American heart in my bosom. I address you, then,

Gentlemen, with the same fervent good wishes for your happiness, the

same brotherly affection, and the same feelings of regard and esteem, as

if, instead of being upon the borders of the Ohio, I stood by the

Connecticut or the Merrimack. As citizens, countrymen, and neighbors, I

give you my hearty good wishes, and thank you, over and over again, for

your abundant hospitality.

Gentlemen, the Mayor has been pleased to advert, in terms beyond all

expectation or merit of my own, to my services in defence of the

glorious Constitution under which we live, and which makes you and me

all that we are, and all that we desire to be. He has done much more

than justice to my efforts; but he has not overstated the importance of

the occasion on which those efforts were made.

Gentlemen, it is but a few short months since dark and portentous clouds

_did_ hang over our heavens, and _did_ shut out, as it were, the sun in

his glory. A new and perilous crisis was upon us. Dangers, novel in

their character, and fearful in their aspect, menaced both the peace of

the country and the integrity of the Constitution. For forty years our

government had gone on, I need hardly say how prosperously and

gloriously, meeting, it is true, with occasional dissatisfaction, and,

in one or two instances, with ill-concerted resistance to law. Through

all these trials it had successfully passed. But now a time had come

when the authority of law was opposed by authority of law, when the

power of the general government was resisted by the arms of State

government, and when organized military force, under all the sanctions

of State conventions and State laws, was ready to resist the collection

of the public revenues, and hurl defiance at the statutes of Congress.

'Gentlemen, this was an alarming moment. In common with all good

citizens, I felt it to be such. A general anxiety pervaded the breasts

of all who were, at home, partaking in the prosperity, honor, and

happiness which the country had enjoyed. And how was it abroad? Why,

Gentlemen, every intelligent friend of human liberty, throughout the

world, looked with amazement at the spectacle which we exhibited. In a

day of unparalleled prosperity, after a half-century's most happy

experience of the blessings of our Union; when we had already become the

wonder of all the liberal part of the world, and the envy of the

illiberal; when the Constitution had so amply falsified the predictions

of its enemies, and more than fulfilled all the hopes of its friends; in

a time of peace, with an overflowing treasury; when both the population

and the improvement of the country had outrun the most sanguine

anticipations;--it was at this moment that we showed ourselves to the

whole civilized world as being apparently on the eve of disunion and

anarchy, at the very point of dissolving, once and for ever, that Union

which had made us so prosperous and so great. It was at this moment that

those appeared among us who seemed ready to break up the national

Constitution, and to scatter the twenty-four States into twenty-four

unconnected communities.

Gentlemen, the President of the United States was, as it seemed to me,

at this eventful crisis, true to his duty. He comprehended and

understood the case, and met it as it was proper to meet it. While I am

as willing as others to admit that the President has, on other

occasions, rendered important services to the country, and especially on

that occasion which has given him so much military renown, I yet think

the ability and decision with which he rejected the disorganizing

doctrines of nullification create a claim, than which he has none

higher, to the gratitude of the country and the respect of posterity.

The appearance of the proclamation of the 10th of December inspired me,

I confess, with new hopes for the duration of the republic. I regarded

it as just, patriotic, able, and imperiously demanded by the condition

of the country. I would not be understood to speak of particular clauses

and phrases in the proclamation; but I regard its great and leading

doctrines as the true and only true doctrines of the Constitution. They

constitute the sole ground on which dismemberment can be resisted.

Nothing else, in my opinion, can hold us together. While these opinions

are maintained, the Union will last; when they shall be generally

rejected and abandoned, that Union will be at the mercy of a temporary

majority in any one of the States.

I speak, Gentlemen, on this subject, without reserve. I have not

intended heretofore, and elsewhere, and do not now intend here, to stint

my commendation of the conduct of the President in regard to the

proclamation and the subsequent measures. I have differed with the

President, as all know, who know any thing of so humble an individual as

myself, on many questions of great general interest and importance. I

differ with him in respect to the constitutional power of internal

improvements; I differ with him in respect to the rechartering of the

Bank, and I dissent, especially, from the grounds and reasons on which

he refused his assent to the bill passed by Congress for that purpose. I

differ with him, also, probably, in the degree of protection which ought

to be afforded to our agriculture and manufactures, and in the manner in

which it may be proper to dispose of the public lands. But all these

differences afforded, in my judgment, not the slightest reason for

opposing him in a measure of paramount importance, and at a moment of

great public exigency. I sought to take counsel of nothing but

patriotism, to feel no impulse but that of duty, and to yield not a

lame and hesitating, but a vigorous and cordial, support to measures

which, in my conscience, I believed essential to the preservation of the

Constitution. It is true, doubtless, that if myself and others had

surrendered ourselves to a spirit of opposition, we might have

embarrassed, and probably defeated, the measures of the administration.

But in so doing, we should, in my opinion, have been false to our own

characters, false to our duty, and false to our country. It gives me the

highest satisfaction to know, that, in regard to this subject, the

general voice of the country does not disapprove my conduct.

I ought to add, Gentlemen, that, in whatever I may have done or

attempted in this respect, I only share a common merit. A vast majority

of both houses of Congress cordially concurred in the measures. Your own

great State was seen in her just position on that occasion, and your own

immediate representatives were found among the most zealous and

efficient friends of the Union.

Gentlemen, I hope that the result of that experiment may prove

salutary in its consequences to our government, and to the interests

of the community. I hope that the signal and decisive manifestation of

public opinion, which has, for the time at least, put down the

despotism of nullification, may produce permanent good effects. I know

full well that popular topics may be urged against the proclamation.

I know it may be said, in regard to the laws of the last session,

that, if such laws are to be maintained, Congress may pass what laws

they please, and enforce them. But may it not be said, on the other

side, that, if a State may nullify one law, she may nullify any other

law also, and, therefore, that the _principle_ strikes at the whole

power of Congress? And when it is said, that, if the power of State

interposition be denied, Congress may pass and enforce what laws it

pleases, is it meant to be contended or insisted, that the Constitution

has placed Congress under the guardianship and control of the State

legislatures? Those who argue against the power of Congress, from the

possibility of its abuse, entirely forget that, if the power of

State interposition be allowed, that power may be abused also. What is

more material, they forget the will of the people, as they have plainly

expressed it in the Constitution. They forget that _the people have

chosen_ to give Congress a power of legislation, independent of State

control. They forget that the Confederation has ceased, and that a

_Constitution_, a _government_, has taken its place. They forget that

this government is a popular government, that members of Congress are

but agents and servants of the people, chosen for short periods,

periodically removable by the people, as much subservient, as much

dependent, as willingly obedient, as any other of their agents and

servants. This dependence on the people is the security that they will

not act wrong. This is the security which the people themselves have

chosen to rely on, in addition to the guards contained in the

Constitution itself.

I am quite aware, Gentlemen, that it is easy for those who oppose

measures deemed necessary for the execution of the laws, to raise the

cry of _consolidation_. It is easy to make charges, and to bring general

accusations. It is easy to call names. For one, I repel all such

imputations. I am no _consolidationist_. I disclaim the character

altogether, and, instead of repeating this general and vague charge, I

will be obliged to any one to show how the proclamation, or the late law

of Congress, or, indeed, any measure to which I ever gave my support,

tends, in the slightest degree, to consolidation. By consolidation is

understood a grasping at power, on behalf of the general government, not

constitutionally conferred. But the proclamation asserted no new power.

It only asserted the right in the government to carry into effect, in

the form of law, power which it had exercised for forty years. I should

oppose any grasping at new powers by Congress, as zealously as the most

zealous. I wish to preserve the Constitution as it is, without addition,

and without diminution, by one jot or tittle. For the same reason that I

would not grasp at powers not given, I would not surrender nor abandon

powers which are given. Those who have placed me in a public station

placed me there, not to alter the Constitution, but to administer it.

The power of change the people have retained to themselves. _They_ can

alter, they can modify, they can change the Constitution entirely, if

they see fit. _They_ can tread it under foot, and make another, or make

no other; but while it remains unaltered by the authority of the people,

it is our power of attorney, our letter of credit, our credentials; and

we are to follow it, and obey its injunctions, and maintain its just

powers, to the best of our abilities. I repeat, that, for one, I seek

to preserve to the Constitution those precise powers with which the

people have clothed it. While no encroachment is to be made on the

reserved rights of the people or of the States, while nothing is to be

usurped, it is equally clear that we are not at liberty to surrender,

either in fact or form, any power or principle which the Constitution

does actually contain.

And what is the ground for this cry of consolidation? I maintain that

the measures recommended by the President, and adopted by Congress, were

measures of self-defence. Is it consolidation to execute laws? Is it

consolidation to resist the force that is threatening to upturn our

government? Is it consolidation to protect officers, in the discharge of

their duty, from courts and juries previously sworn to decide against

them?

Gentlemen, I take occasion to remark, that, after much reflection upon

the subject, and after all that has been said about the encroachment of

the general government upon the rights of the States, I know of no one

power, exercised by the general government, which was not, when that

instrument was adopted, admitted by the immediate friends and foes of

the Constitution to have been conferred upon it by the people. I know of

no one power, now claimed or exercised, which every body did not agree,

in 1789, was conferred on the general government. On the contrary, there

are several powers, and those, too, among the most important for the

interests of the people, which were then universally allowed to be

conferred on Congress by the Constitution of the United States, and

which are now ingeniously doubted, or clamorously denied.

Gentlemen, upon this point I shall detain you with no further remarks.

It does, however, give me the most sincere pleasure to say, that, in a

long visit through the State west of you, and the great State north of

you, as well as in a tour of some days' duration in the respectable

State to which you belong, I find but one sentiment in regard to the

conduct of the government upon this subject. I know that those who have

seen fit to intrust to me, in part, their interests in Congress, approve

of the measures recommended by the President. We see that he has taken

occasion, during the recess of Congress, to visit that part of the

country; and we know how he has been received. Nowhere have hands been

extended with more sincerity of friendship; and for one, Gentlemen, I

take occasion to say, that, having heard of his return to the seat of

government with health rather debilitated, it is among my most earnest

prayers that Providence may spare his life, and that he may go through

his administration and come out of it with as much success and glory as

any of his predecessors.

Your worthy chief magistrate has been kind enough, Gentlemen, to express

sentiments favorable to myself, as a friend of domestic industry.

Domestic industry! How much of national power and opulence, how much of

individual comfort and respectability, that phrase implies! And with

what force does it strike us, as we stand here, at the confluence of the

two rivers whose united currents constitute the Ohio, and in the midst

of one of the most flourishing and distinguished manufacturing cities in

the Union! Many thousand miles of inland navigation, running through a

new and rapidly-improving country, stretch away below us. Internal

communications, completed or in progress, connect the city with the

Atlantic and the Lakes. A hundred steam-engines are in daily operation,

and nature has supplied the fuel which feeds their incessant flames on

the spot itself, in exhaustless abundance. Standing here, Gentlemen, in

the midst of such a population, and with such a scene around us, how

great is the import of these words, "domestic industry"!