Critical State of Foreign Affairs on the Accession of General
Harrison.--Mr. Webster appointed to the State Department.--Death
of General Harrison.--Embarrassed Relations with England.--Formation
of Sir Robert Peel's Ministry, and Appointment of Lord Ashburton
as Special Minister to the United States.--Course pursued by Mr.
Webster in the Negotiations.--The Northeastern Boundary.--Peculiar
Difficulties in its Settlement happily overcome.--Other Subjects
of Negotiation.--Extradition of Fugitives from Justice.--Suppression
of the Slave-Trade on the Coast of Africa.--History of that
Question.--Affair of the Caroline.--Impressment.--Other Subjects
connected with the Foreign Relations of the Government.--Intercourse
with China.--Independence of the Sandwich Islands.--Correspondence
with Mexico.--Sound Duties and the Zoll-Verein.--Importance of
Mr. Webster's Services as Secretary of State.
The condition of affairs in the United States, on the accession of
President Harrison to office, in the spring of 1841, was difficult and
critical, especially as far as the foreign relations of the country were
concerned. Ancient and modern controversies existed with England, which
seemed to defy adjustment. The great question of the northeastern
boundary had been the subject of negotiation almost ever since the peace
of 1783. Every effort to settle it had but increased the difficulties
with which it was beset, by exhausting the expedients of diplomacy. The
Oregon question was rapidly assuming a formidable aspect, as emigrants
began to move into the country in dispute. Not less serious was the
state of affairs on the southwestern frontier, where, although a
collision with Mexico might not in itself be an event to be viewed with
great anxiety, it was probable, as things then stood, that it would have
brought a war with Great Britain in its train.
To the uneasiness necessarily growing out of these boundary questions,
no little bitterness was added by more recent occurrences. The
interruption of our vessels on the coast of Africa was a frequently
recurring source of irritation. Great cause of complaint was sometimes
given by boarding officers, acting on frivolous pretences or in a
vexatious manner. At other times the public feeling in the United
States was excited by the exaggerations and misstatements of unworthy
American citizens, who abused the flag of the country to cover a
detestable traffic, which is made a capital felony by its laws. The
affair of the "Caroline," followed by the arrest of McLeod, created a
degree of discontent on both sides, which discussion had done nothing to
remove, but much to exasperate. A crisis had arisen, which the Minister
of the United States in London[24] deemed so serious, as to make it his
duty to communicate with the commander of the American squadron in the
Mediterranean.[25]
Such was the state of things when General Harrison acceded to the
Presidency, after perhaps the most strenuously contested election ever
known, and by a larger popular vote than had ever before been given in
the United States. As soon as the result was known, the President elect
addressed a letter to Mr. Webster, offering him any place he might
choose in his Cabinet, and asking his advice as to the other members of
which it should be composed. The wants and wishes of the country in
reference to currency and finance having brought about the political
revolution which placed General Harrison in the chair, he was rather
desirous that the Department of the Treasury should be assumed by Mr.
Webster, who had studied those subjects profoundly, and whose opinions
were in full concurrence with his own. Averse to the daily drudgery of
the Treasury, Mr. Webster gave his preference to the Department of
State, without concealing from himself that it might be the post of
greater care and responsibility. In this anticipation he was not
disappointed. Although the whole of the danger did not at once appear,
it was evident from the outset that the moment was extremely critical.
Still, however, the circumstances under which General Harrison was
elected were such as to give to his administration a moral power and a
freedom of action, as to pre-existing controversies, favorable to their
settlement on honorable terms.
But the death of the new President, when just entering upon the
discharge of his duties, changed the state of affairs in this
respect. The great national party which had called him to the helm
was struck with astonishment. No rallying-point presented itself. A
position of things existed, not overlooked, indeed, by the sagacious men
who framed the Constitution, but which, from its very nature, can
never enter practically into the calculations of the enthusiastic
multitudes by which, in times of difficulty and excitement, a favorite
candidate is borne to the chair. How much of the control which it
would otherwise have possessed over public opinion could be retained
by an administration thus unexpectedly deprived of its head, was a
question which time alone could settle. Happily, as far as our
foreign relations were concerned, a character had been assumed by the
administration, from the very formation of General Harrison's
Cabinet, which was steadily maintained, till the adjustment of the
most difficult points in controversy was effected by the treaty of
Washington. President Harrison, as is well known, lived but one
month after his inauguration, but all the members of his Cabinet
remained in office under Mr. Tyler, who succeeded to the Presidency.
With him, of course, rested the general authority of regulating and
directing the negotiations with foreign powers, in which the
government might be engaged. But the active management of these
negotiations was in the hands of the Secretary of State, and it is
believed that no difference of views in regard to important matters
arose between him and Mr. Tyler. For the result of the principal
negotiation, Mr. Tyler manifested great anxiety; and Mr. Webster has
not failed, in public or private, to bear witness to the intelligent and
earnest attention which was bestowed by him on the proceedings,
through all their stages, and to express his sense of the confidence
reposed in himself by the head of the administration, from the
beginning to the end of the transactions.
If the position of things was difficult here, it was not less so on the
other side of the Atlantic; indeed, many of the causes of embarrassment
were common to the two countries. There, as here, the correspondence,
whether conducted at Washington or London, had of late years done
nothing toward an amicable settlement of the great questions at issue.
It had degenerated into an exercise of diplomatic logic, with the
effect, in England as well as in America, of strengthening each party in
the belief of its own rights, and of working up the public mind to a
reluctant feeling that the time was at hand when those rights must be
maintained by force. That the British and American governments, during a
considerable part of the administrations of General Jackson and Mr. Van
Buren, should, with the fate of the reference to the King of the
Netherlands before their eyes, have exerted themselves with melancholy
ingenuity in arranging the impossible details of another convention of
exploration and arbitration, shows of itself that neither party had any
real hope of actually settling the controversy, but that both were
willing to unite in a decent pretext for procrastination.
The report of Mr. Featherstonhaugh, erroneously believed, in England, to
rest upon the results of actual exploration, had been sanctioned by the
ministry, and seemed to extinguish the last hope that England would
agree to any terms of settlement which the United States would deem
reasonable. The danger of collision on the frontier became daily more
imminent, and troops to the amount of seventeen regiments had been
poured into the British Provinces. The arrest of McLeod, as we have
already observed, had brought matters to a point at which the public
sensibility of England would not have allowed a minister to blink the
question. Lord Palmerston is known to have written to Mr. Fox, that the
arrest of McLeod, under the authority of the State of New York, was
universally regarded in England as a direct affront to the British
government, and that such was the excitement caused by it, that, if
McLeod should be condemned and executed, it would not be in the power
either of ministers or opposition, or of the leading men of both
parties, to prevent immediate war.
While this was the state of affairs with reference to the immediate
relations of the two countries, Lord Palmerston was urging France into a
cooeperation with the four other leading powers of Europe in the adoption
of a policy, by the negotiation of the quintuple treaty, which would
have left the United States in a position of dangerous insulation on the
subject of the great maritime question of the day.
At this juncture, a change of administration occurred in England,
subsequent but by a few months to that which had taken place in the
government of the United States. Lord Melbourne's government gave way to
that of Sir Robert Peel in the summer of 1841; it remained to be seen
with what influence on the relations of the two countries. Some
circumstances occurred to put at risk the tendency toward an
accommodation, which might naturally be hoped for from a change of
administration nearly simultaneous on both sides of the water. A note of
a very uncompromising character, on the subject of the search of
American vessels on the coast of Africa, had been addressed to Mr.
Stevenson by Lord Palmerston on the 27th of August, 1841, a day only
before the expiration of Lord Melbourne's ministry. To this note Mr.
Stevenson replied in the same strain. The answer of Lord Aberdeen, who
had succeeded Lord Palmerston as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
bears date the 10th of October, 1841, and an elaborate rejoinder was
returned by Mr. Stevenson on the very day of his departure from London.
Lord Aberdeen's reply to this note was of necessity addressed to Mr.
Everett, who had succeeded Mr. Stevenson. It was dated on the 20th of
December, the day on which the quintuple treaty was signed at London by
the representatives of the five powers, and it contained an announcement
of that fact.
Happily, however, affairs were already taking a turn auspicious of
better results. From his first entrance on office as Secretary of State,
Mr. Webster, long familiar with the perplexed history of the negotiation
relative to the boundary, had perceived the necessity of taking a "new
departure." The negotiation had broken down under its own weight. It was
like one of those lawsuits which, to the opprobrium of tribunals,
descend from age to age; a disease of the body politic not merely
chronic, but hereditary. Early in the summer of 1841, Mr. Webster had
intimated to Mr. Fox, the British Minister at Washington, that the
American government was prepared to consider, and, if practicable,
adopt, a conventional line, as the only mode of cutting the Gordian knot
of the controversy. This overture was, of course, conveyed to London.
Though not leading to any result on the part of the ministry just going
out of office, it was embraced by their successors in the same wise and
conciliatory spirit in which it had been made. On the 26th of December,
1841, a note was addressed by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett, inviting him
to an interview on the following day, when he communicated the purpose
of the British government to send a special mission to the United
States, Lord Ashburton being the person selected as minister, and
furnished with full powers to settle every question in controversy.
This step on the part of the British government was as bold as it was
wise. It met the difficulty in the face. It justly assumed the existence
of a corresponding spirit of conciliation on the part of the United
States, and of a desire to bring matters to a practical result. It was
bold, because it was the last expedient for an amicable adjustment, and
because its failure must necessarily lead to very serious and immediate
consequences.
In his choice of a minister, Lord Aberdeen was not less fortunate than
he had been wise in proposing the measure. Lord Ashburton was above the
reach of the motives which influence politicians of an ordinary stamp,
and unencumbered by the habits of routine which belong to men regularly
trained in a career. He possessed a weight of character at home which
made him independent of the vulgar resorts of popularity. He was
animated by a kindly feeling, and bound by kindly associations to this
country. There was certainly no public man in England who united in an
equal degree the confidence of his own government and country with those
claims to the good-will of the opposite party, which were scarcely less
essential to success. The relations of personal friendship contracted by
Mr. Webster with Lord Ashburton in 1839 have already been alluded to, as
influencing the selection. They decided Lord Ashburton in accepting the
appointment. The writer was informed by Lord Ashburton himself, that he
should have despaired of bringing matters to a settlement advantageous
to both countries, but for his reliance on the upright and honorable
character of the American Secretary.
With the appointment of Lord Ashburton, the discussion of the main
questions in controversy between the two countries, as far as it had
been carried on in London, was transferred to Washington. But as an
earnest of the conciliatory spirit which bore sway in the British
counsels, Lord Aberdeen had announced to Mr. Everett, in the interval
which elapsed between Lord Ashburton's appointment and his arrival at
his place of destination, that the Queen's government admitted the wrong
done by the detention of the "Tigris" and "Seamew" in the African
waters, and was prepared to indemnify their owners for the losses
sustained.
Notwithstanding the favorable circumstances under which the mission of
Lord Ashburton was instituted, the great difficulties to be overcome
soon disclosed themselves. The points in dispute in reference to the
boundary had for years been the subject of discussion, more or less,
throughout the country, but especially in Massachusetts and Maine (the
States having an immediate territorial interest in its decision), and,
above all, in the last-named State. Parties differing on all other great
questions emulated each other in the zeal with which they asserted the
American side of this dispute. So strong and unanimous was the feeling,
that, when the award of the King of the Netherlands arrived, the firm
purpose of General Jackson to accept it was subdued. The writer of these
pages was informed by the late Mr. Forsyth, while Secretary of State,
that, when the award reached this country, General Jackson regarded it
as definitive, and was disposed, without consulting the Senate, to issue
his proclamation announcing it as such; and that he was driven from this
course by the representations of his friends in Maine, that it would
change the politics of the State. He was accustomed to add, in reference
to the inconveniences caused by the rejection of the award, and the
still more serious evils to be anticipated, that "it was somewhat
singular that the only occasion of importance in his life in which he
had allowed himself to be overruled by his friends, was one of all
others in which he ought to have adhered to his own opinions."
From the diplomatic papers contained in the sixth volume of the present
edition of Mr. Webster's works it appears that the first step taken by
Mr. Webster, after receiving the directions of the President in
reference to the negotiation, was to invite the cooeperation of
Massachusetts and Maine, the territory in dispute being the property
of the two States, and under the jurisdiction of the latter. The extent
of the treaty-making power of the United States, in a matter of such
delicacy as the cession of territory claimed by a State to be within
its limits, belongs to the more difficult class of constitutional
doctrines. We have just seen both the theory and practice of General
Jackson on this point. The administration of Mr. Tyler took for
granted that the full consent of Massachusetts and Maine was necessary
to any adjustment of this great dispute on the principle of mutual
cession and equivalents, or any other principle than that of the
ascertainment of the true, original line of boundary by agreement,
mutual commission, or arbitration. Communications were accordingly
addressed to the governors of the two States. Massachusetts had
anticipated the necessity of the measure, and made provision for the
appointment of commissioners. The legislature of Maine was promptly
convened for the same purpose by the late Governor Fairfield. Four
parties were thus in presence at Washington for the management of the
negotiation: the United States and Great Britain, Massachusetts and
Maine. Recollecting that the question to be settled was one which
had defied all the arts of diplomacy for half a century, it seemed to
a distant, and especially a European observer, as if the last
experiment, exceeding every former step in its necessary complication,
was destined to a failure proportionably signal and ignominious. The
course pursued by the American Secretary, in making the result of
the negotiation relative to the boundary contingent upon the approval
of the State commissioners, was regarded in Europe as decidedly
ominous of its failure.
It undoubtedly required a high degree of political courage thus to put
the absolute control of the subject, to a certain extent, out of the
hands of the national government; but it was a courage fully warranted
by the event. It is now evident that this mode of procedure was the only
one which could have been adopted with any hope of success. Though
complicated in appearance, it was in reality the simplest mode in which
the cooeperation of the States could have been secured. The commissions
were, upon the whole, happily constituted; they were framed in each
State without reference to party views. By their presence in Washington,
it was in the power of the Secretary of State to avail himself, at every
difficult conjuncture, of their counsel. Limited in number, they yet
represented the public opinion of the two States, as fully as it could
have been done by the entire body of their legislatures; while it is
quite evident that any attempt to refer to large deliberative bodies at
home the discussion of the separate points which arose in the
negotiation, would have been physically impossible and politically
absurd. The commissioners were, on the part of Maine, Messrs. Edward
Kavanagh, Edward Kent, William P. Preble, and John Otis; and on the part
of Massachusetts, Messrs. Abbott Lawrence, John Mills, and Charles
Allen.
While we name with honor the gentlemen forming the commissions, a
tribute of respect is also due to the patriotism of the States
immediately concerned, and especially of Maine. To devolve on any
individuals, however high in the public regard, a power of transferring,
without ratification or appeal, a portion of the territory of the State,
for such consideration as those individuals might judge to be adequate,
was a measure to be expected only in a case of clear necessity and high
confidence. Mr. Webster is known to have regarded this with the utmost
concern and anxiety, as the turning-point of the whole attempt. His
letter to Governor Fairfield states the case with equal strength and
fairness, and puts the course there recommended in striking contrast
with that of proceeding to agree to another arbitration, as had been
offered by the preceding administration, and assented to by England. The
fate of the negotiation might be considered as involved in the success
of this appeal to the chief magistrate of Maine, and through him to his
constituents. It is said that, when Mr. Webster heard that the
legislature of Maine had adopted the resolutions for the commission, he
went to President Tyler and said, with evident satisfaction and some
animation, "_The crisis is past!_"
A considerable portion, though not the whole, of the official
correspondence between the Secretary of State and the other parties to
the negotiation is contained in the sixth volume of this collection. The
documents published exhibit full proof of the ability with which the
argument was conducted. They probably furnish but an inadequate specimen
of the judgment, tact, and moral power required to conduct such a
negotiation to a successful result. National, State, and individual
susceptibilities were to be respected and soothed; adverse interests,
real or imaginary, to be consulted; the ordeal of the Senate to be
passed through, after every other difficulty had been overcome; and all
this in an atmosphere as little favorable to such an operation as can
well be imagined. What neither Mr. Monroe in the "era of good feelings,"
nor the ability and experience of Messrs. Adams, Clay, and Gallatin, nor
General Jackson's overwhelming popularity, had been able to bring about,
was effected under the administration of Mr. Tyler, though that
administration seemed already crumbling for want of harmony between some
of the members and the head, and between that head and the party which
had brought him into power. No higher tribute can be paid to the ability
and temper which were brought to the work.
It was, however, in truth, an adjustment equally honorable and
advantageous to all parties. There is not an individual of common sense
or common conscience in Maine or Massachusetts, in the United States or
Great Britain, who would now wish it disturbed. It took from Maine a
tract of land northwest of the St. John, which the people of Maine
believed to belong to them under the treaty of 1783. But it is not
enough that we think ourselves right; the other party thinks the same;
and when there is no common tribunal which both acknowledge, there must
be compromise. The tract of land in question, for any purpose of
cultivation or settlement, was without value; and had it been otherwise,
it would not have been worth the cost of a naval armament or one
military expedition, to say nothing of the abomination of shedding blood
on such an issue. But the disputed title to the worthless tract of
morass, heath, and rock, covered with snow or fog throughout a great
part of the year, was not ceded gratuitously. We obtained the navigation
of the St. John, the natural outlet of the whole country, without which
the territory watered by it would have been of comparatively little
value; we obtained a good natural boundary as far as the course of the
river was followed; and we established the line which we claimed at the
head of the Connecticut, on Lake Champlain, and on the upper lakes;
territorial objects of considerable interest. Great Britain had equal
reason to be satisfied with the result. For her the territory northwest
of the St. John, worthless to us, had a geographical and political
value; it gave her a convenient connection between her provinces, which
was all she desired. Both sides gained the only object which really was
of importance to either, a settlement by creditable means of a wearisome
national controversy; an honorable escape from the scourge and curse of
war.
Both governments appear to have been fortunate in the constitution of
the joint commission to survey, run, and mark the long line of
boundary. Mr. Albert Smith, of Maine, was appointed commissioner on
the part of the United States, with Major James D. Graham, of the United
States Topographical Engineers as head of a scientific corps, and
Mr. Edward Webster[26] as his secretary. On the part of Great
Britain, Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. B. Estcourt, of her Majesty's
service, was appointed commissioner, with Captain W. H. Robinson, of
the Royal Engineers, as principal astronomer, and J. Scott, Esq., as
secretary. Other professional gentlemen were also employed on both
sides. Great harmony characterized all the proceedings and results of
the commission. The lines were accurately run, and that part of them
not designated by rivers was marked all the way by substantial cast-iron
monuments, with suitable inscriptions, at every mile, and at most of
the principal angles; and wherever the lines extended through
forests, the trees were cut down and cleared to the width of thirty
feet. All the islands in the St. John were also designated with iron
monuments, with inscriptions indicating the government to which they
belonged; and upon that and all other streams forming portions of the
boundary, monuments were erected at the junction of every branch with
the main river.
But it is time to advert to the other great and difficult questions
included in this adjustment. The extradition of fugitives from
justice is regarded by Grotius and other respectable authorities as
the duty of states, by the law of nations. Other authorities reject
this doctrine;[27] and if it be the law of nations, it requires for
its execution so much administrative machinery as to be of no
practical value without treaty stipulations. The treaty of 1794 with
Great Britain (Jay's treaty) made provision for a mutual extradition
of fugitives, in cases of murder and forgery; and the case of Jonathan
Robbins, memorable for the argument of Chief Justice Marshall in
defence of his surrender, gave a political notoriety to that feature of
the treaty not favorable to its renewal in subsequent negotiations.
This treaty stipulation expired by its own limitation in 1806.
Besides the convenience of such an understanding on the part of the two
great commercial countries, from which language, personal appearance,
and manners render mutual escape so easy, the condition of the frontier
of the United States and Canada was such as to make this provision all
but necessary for the preservation of the peace of the two countries. An
extensive secret organization existed in the border States, the object
of which was, under the delusive name of "sympathy," to foment and aid
rebellion in the British Provinces. Although an agreement for mutual
extradition of necessity left untouched a great deal of political
agitation unfriendly to border peace, murder and arson were, of course,
within its provisions. It appears from the testimony of the parties best
informed on the subject, that the happiest consequences flowed from this
article of the treaty of Washington. No more was heard of border forays,
"Hunters' Lodges," "Associations for the Liberty of Canada," or
violences offered or retaliated across the line. The mild, but certain
influence of law imposed a restraint, which even costly and formidable
military means had not been found entirely adequate to produce.
The stipulations for extradition in the treaty of Washington appear to
have served as a model for those since entered into between the most
considerable European powers. A convention for the same purpose was
concluded between England and France on the 13th of February, 1843, and
other similar compacts have still more recently been negotiated. Between
the United States and Great Britain the operation of this part of the
treaty has, in all ordinary cases, been entirely satisfactory. Persons
charged with the crimes to which its provisions extend have been
mutually surrendered; and the cause of public justice, and in many cases
important private interests, have been materially served on both sides
of the water.
Not inferior in importance and delicacy to the other subjects provided
for by the treaty was that which concerned the measures for the
suppression of "the slave-trade" on the coast of Africa. In order to
understand the difficulties with which Mr. Webster had to contend on
this subject, a brief history of the question must be given. The law of
nations, as understood and expounded by the most respectable authorities
and tribunals, European and American, recognizes the right of search of
neutral vessels in time of war, by the public ships of the belligerents.
It recognizes no right of search in time of peace. It makes no
distinction between a right of visitation and a right of search. To
compel a trading-vessel, against the will of her commander, to come to
and be boarded, for any purpose whatsoever, is an exercise of the right
of search which the law of nations concedes to belligerents for certain
purposes. To do this in time of peace, under whatever name it may be
excused or justified, is to perform an act of mere power, for which the
law of nations affords no warrant. The moral quality of the action, and
the estimate formed of it, will of course depend upon circumstances,
motives, and manner. If an armed ship board a vessel under reasonable
suspicion that she is a pirate, and when there is no other convenient
mode of ascertaining that point, there would be no cause of blame,
although the suspicion turned out to be groundless.
The British government, for the praiseworthy purpose of putting a stop
to the traffic in slaves, has at different times entered into
conventions with several of the states of Europe authorizing a mutual
right of search of the trading-vessels of each contracting party by the
armed cruisers of the other party. These treaties give no right to
search the vessels of nations not parties to them. But if an armed ship
of either party should search a vessel of a third power under a
reasonable suspicion that she belonged to the other contracting party,
and was pursuing the slave-trade in contravention of the treaty, this
act of power, performed by mistake, and with requisite moderation and
circumspection in the manner, would not be just ground of offence. It
would, however, authorize a reasonable expectation of indemnification on
behalf of the private individuals who might suffer by the detention, as
in other cases of injury inflicted on innocent persons by public
functionaries acting with good intentions, but at their peril.
The government of the United States, both in its executive and
legislative branches, has at almost all times manifested an extreme
repugnance to enter into conventions for a mutual right of search. It
has not yielded to any other power in its aversion to the slave-trade,
which it was the first government to denounce as piracy. The reluctance
in question grew principally out of the injuries inflicted upon the
American commerce, and still more out of the personal outrages in the
impressment of American seamen, which took place during the wars of
Napoleon, and incidentally to the belligerent right of search and the
enforcement of the Orders in Council and the Berlin and Milan Decrees.
Besides a wholesale confiscation of American property, hundreds of
American seamen were impressed into the ships of war of Great Britain.
So deeply had the public sensibility been wounded on both points, that
any extension of the right of search by the consent of the United States
was for a long time nearly hopeless.
But this feeling, strong and general as it was, yielded at last to the
detestation of the slave-trade. Toward the close of the second
administration of Mr. Monroe the executive had been induced, acting
under the sanction of resolutions of the two houses of Congress, to
agree to a convention with Great Britain for a mutual right of search of
vessels suspected of being engaged in the traffic. This convention was
negotiated in London by Mr. Rush on the part of the United States, Mr.
Canning being the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
In defining the limits within which this right should be exercised, the
coasts of America were included. The Senate were of opinion that such a
provision might be regarded as an admission that the slave-trade was
carried on between the coasts of Africa and the United States, contrary
to the known fact, and to the reproach either of the will or power of
the United States to enforce their laws, by which it was declared to be
piracy. It also placed the whole coast of the Union under the
_surveillance_ of the cruisers of a foreign power. The Senate,
accordingly, ratified the treaty, with an amendment exempting the coasts
of the United States from the operation of the article. They also
introduced other amendments of less importance.
On the return of the treaty to London thus amended, Mr. Canning gave way
to a feeling of dissatisfaction at the course pursued by the Senate, not
so much on account of any decided objection to the amendment in itself
considered, as to the claim of the Senate to introduce any change into a
treaty negotiated according to instructions. Under the influence of this
feeling, Mr. Canning refused to ratify the treaty as amended, and no
further attempt was at that time made to renew the negotiation.
It will probably be admitted on all hands, at the present day, that Mr.
Canning's scruple was without foundation. The treaty had been
negotiated by this accomplished statesman, under the full knowledge that
the Constitution of the United States reserves this power to the Senate.
That it should be exercised was, therefore, no more matter of complaint,
than that the treaty should be referred at all to the ratification of
the Senate. The course pursued by Mr. Canning was greatly to be
regretted, as it postponed the amicable adjustment of this matter for
eighteen years, not without risk of serious misunderstanding in the
interval.
Attempts were made on the part of England, during the ministry of Lord
Melbourne, to renew the negotiation with the United States, but without
success. Conventions between France and England, for a mutual right of
search within certain limits, were concluded in 1831 and 1833, under the
ministry of the Duc de Broglie, without awakening the public sensibility
in the former country. As these treaties multiplied, the activity of the
English cruisers increased. After the treaty with Portugal, in 1838, the
vessels of that country, which, with those of Spain, were most largely
engaged in the traffic, began to assume the flag of the United States as
a protection; and in many cases, also, although the property of vessels
and cargo had, by collusive transfers on the African coast, become
Spanish or Portuguese, the vessels had been built and fitted out in the
United States, and too often, it may be feared, with American capital.
Vessels of this description were provided with two sets of papers, to be
used as occasion might require.
Had nothing further been done by British cruisers than to board and
search these vessels, whether before or after a transfer of this kind,
no complaint would probably have been made by the government of the
United States. But, as many American vessels were engaged in lawful
commerce on the coast of Africa, it frequently happened that they were
boarded by British cruisers, not always under the command of discreet
officers. Some voyages were broken up, officers and men occasionally
ill-treated, and vessels sent to the United States or Sierra Leone for
adjudication.
In 1840 an agreement was made between the officers in command of the
British and American squadrons respectively, sanctioning a reciprocal
right of search on the coast of Africa. It will be found among the
papers pertaining to this subject, in the sixth volume of this
collection. It was a well-meant, but unauthorized step, and was
promptly disavowed by the administration of Mr. Van Buren. Its
operation, while it lasted, was but to increase the existing
difficulty. Reports of the interruptions experienced by our commerce
in the African waters began greatly to multiply; and there was a
strong interest on the part of those surreptitiously engaged in the
traffic to give them currency. A deep feeling began to be manifested
in the country; and the correspondence between the American Minister in
London and Lord Palmerston, in the last days of the Melbourne ministry,
was such as to show that the controversy had reached a critical point.
Such was the state of the question when Mr. Webster entered the
Department of State.
The controversy was transmitted, as we have seen, to the new
administrations on both sides of the water, but soon assumed a somewhat
modified character. The quintuple treaty, as it was called, was
concluded at London, on the 20th of December, 1841, by England, France,
Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and information of that fact, as we have
seen above, was given by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett the same day. A
strong desire was intimated that the United States would join this
association of the great powers, but no formal invitation for that
purpose was addressed to them. But the recent occurrences on the coast
of Africa, and the tone of the correspondence above alluded to, had
increased the standing repugnance of the United States to the
recognition of a right of search in time of peace.
In the mean time, the same complaints, sometimes just, sometimes
exaggerated, sometimes groundless, had reached France from the coast of
Africa, and a strong feeling against the right of search was produced in
that country. The incidents connected with the adjustment of the Syrian
question, in 1840, had greatly irritated the French ministry and people,
and the present was deemed a favorable moment for retaliation. On the
assembling of the Chambers, an amendment was moved by M. Lefebvre to the
address in reply to the king's speech in the following terms: "We have
also the confidence, that, in granting its concurrence to the
suppression of a criminal traffic, your government will know how to
preserve from every attack the interest of our commerce and the
independence of our flag." This amendment was adopted by the unanimous
vote of the Chambers.
This was well understood to be a blow aimed at the quintuple treaty. It
was the most formidable parliamentary check ever encountered by M.
Guizot's administration. It excited profound sensation throughout
Europe. It compelled the French ministry to make the painful sacrifice
of a convention negotiated agreeably to instructions, and not differing
in principle from those of 1831 and 1833, which were consequently
liable to be involved in its fate. The ratification of the quintuple
treaty was felt to be out of the question. Although it soon appeared
that the king was determined to sustain M. Guizot, it was by no means
apparent in what manner his administration was to be rescued from
the present embarrassment.
The public feeling in France was considerably heightened by various
documents which appeared at this juncture, in connection with the
controversy between the United States and Great Britain. The President's
message and its accompanying papers reached Europe about the period of
the opening of the session. A very sew days after the adoption of M.
Lefebvre's amendment, a pamphlet, written by General Cass, was published
in Paris, and, being soon after translated into French and widely
circulated, contributed to strengthen the current of public feeling. A
more elaborate essay was, in the course of the season, published by Mr.
Wheaton, the Minister of the United States at Berlin, in which the
theory of a right of search in time of peace was vigorously assailed.
The preceding sketch of the history of the question will show the
difficulty of the position in reference to this most important interest,
at the time Lord Ashburton's mission was instituted. With what practical
good sense and high statesmanship the controversy was terminated is well
known to the country. It is unnecessary here to retrace the steps of the
correspondence, to comment on the eighth article of the treaty of
Washington, or to analyze the parliamentary and diplomatic discussions
to which in the following year it gave rise. It is enough to say, that,
under circumstances of some embarrassment to the Department of State, a
course of procedure was happily devised by Mr. Webster, and incorporated
into the treaty, which, leaving untouched the metaphysics of the
question, furnished a satisfactory practical solution of the
difficulty. Circumstances having made a restatement expedient of the
principles maintained by the United States on this most important
subject, a letter was addressed by Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett, on the
28th of March, 1843, to be read to the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, in which the law of nations applicable to the subject
was expounded by the American Secretary with a clearness and power which
will render any further discussion of the subject, under its present
aspects, entirely superfluous. Nor will it be thought out of place to
acknowledge the fairness, good temper, and ability with which the
doctrine and practice of the English government were sustained by the
Earl of Aberdeen.
The wisdom with which the eighth article of the treaty was drawn up was
soon seen in its consequences. Its effect was decisive. It put a stop to
all discontent at home in reference to the interruption of our lawful
commerce on the coast of Africa. Abroad, it raised the jealousy already
existing in France on this subject to the point of uncontrollable
repugnance. The ratification of the quintuple treaty had long been
abandoned. It was soon evident that the conventions of 1831 and 1833
must be given up. In the course of the year 1844, the Duc de Broglie,
the honorable and accomplished minister by whom they had been
negotiated, accepted a special mission to London, for the purpose of
coming to some satisfactory arrangement by way of substitute, and a
convention was soon concluded with the British government on precisely
the same principles with those of the treaty of Washington.
It may be hoped that the important suggestion of Mr. Webster will be
borne in mind, in any future discussions of this and other maritime
questions, that the policy of the United States is not that of a feeble
naval power interested in exaggerating the doctrine of neutral
inviolability. A respect for every independent flag is a common interest
of all civilized states, powerful or weak; but the rank of the United
States among naval powers, and their position as the great maritime
power on the western coasts of the Atlantic and the eastern coasts of
the Pacific, may lead them to doubt the expediency of pressing too far
the views they have hitherto held, and moderate their anxiety to
construe with extreme strictness the rights which the law of nations
concedes to public vessels.
The three subjects on which we have dwelt, namely, the northeastern
boundary, the extradition of fugitives, and the suppression of the
slave-trade, were the only ones which required to be provided for by
treaty stipulation. Other subjects, scarcely less important and fully as
difficult were happily disposed of in the correspondence of the
plenipotentiaries. These were the affair of the "Caroline," that of the
"Creole," and the question of impressment. Our limits do not permit us
to dwell at length on these topics; but we shall be pardoned for one or
two reflections.
So urgent is the pressure on the public mind of the successive events
which demand attention each as it presents itself, that the formidable
difficulties growing out of the destruction of the "Caroline" and the
arrest of McLeod are already fading from recollection. They formed, in
reality, a crisis of a most serious and delicate character. A glance at
the correspondence of the two governments at Washington and London
sufficiently shows this to be the case. The violation of the territory
of the United States in the destruction of the "Caroline," however
unwarrantable the conduct of the "sympathizers" which provoked it,
became, from the moment the British government assumed the
responsibility of the act, an incident of the gravest character. On the
other hand, the inability of the government of the United States to
extricate McLeod from the risks of a capital trial in a State court,
although the government of England demanded his liberation on the ground
that he was acting under the legal orders of his superior, presented a
difficulty in the working of our system equally novel and important.
Other cases had arisen in which important constitutional principles had
failed to take effect, for want of the requisite legislative provisions.
It is believed that this was the first time in which a difficulty of
this kind had presented itself in our foreign relations. A more
threatening one can scarcely be imagined. In addition to the
embarrassment occasioned by the refusal of the executive and judiciary
of New York to yield to the representations of the general government,
the violent interference of the mob presented new difficulties of the
most deplorable character. If McLeod had been executed, it is not too
much to say, that war would at once have ensued. His acquittal averted
this impending danger. The conciliatory spirit cannot be too warmly
commended with which, on the one hand, the proper reparation was made by
Lord Ashburton for the violation of the American territory, and, on the
other hand, Congress, by the passage of an appropriate law, provided an
effectual legislative remedy for any future similar case. They show with
what simplicity and ease the greatest evils may be averted, and the most
desirable ends achieved, by statesmen and governments animated by a
sincere desire to promote the welfare of those who have placed power in
their hands, not for selfish, party purposes, but for the public good.
There is, perhaps, no one of the papers written by Mr. Webster as
Secretary of State, in which so much force of statement and power of
argument are displayed as in the letter on "impressment." To incorporate
a stipulation on this subject into a treaty was, regarding the
antecedents of the question, impracticable. But the reply of Lord
Ashburton to Mr. Webster's announcement of the American principle must
be considered as acquiescence on the part of his government. It may be
doubted whether this odious and essentially illegal practice will ever
again be systematically resorted to, even in England.[28] Considering
the advance made by public sentiment an all questions connected with
personal liberty, "a hot-press on the Thames" would hardly stand the
ordeal of an investigation in Parliament at the present day. It is
certain that the right of impressing seamen from American vessels could
never be practically asserted in a future war with any other effect than
that of adding the United States to the parties in the contest. No
refinements in the doctrine of natural allegiance, although their
theoretical soundness might equal their subtilty, would be of the least
avail here. To force seamen from the deck of a peaceful neutral vessel,
pursuing a lawful commerce, and compel them to serve for an indefinite
and hopeless period on board a foreign man-of-war, is an act of power
and violence to which no nation will submit that is able to resist it.
In the case of the United States and Great Britain, that community of
language and resemblance in general appearance which may have been
considered as palliating the most deplorable results of the exercise of
this power, in reality constitute the strongest reason for its
abandonment. The unquestionable danger that, with the best intentions,
the boarding officer may mistake an American for an Englishman; the
certainty that a reckless lieutenant, unmindful of consequences, but
bent upon recruiting his ship on a remote foreign station, will pretend
to believe that he is seizing the subjects of his own government,
whatever may be the evidence to the contrary, are reasons of themselves
for denying on the threshold the existence of a right exposed to such
inevitable and intolerable abuse.
These and other views of the subject are presented in Mr. Webster's
letter to Lord Ashburton of the 8th of August, 1842, with a strength of
reasoning and force of illustration not often equalled in a state paper.
That letter was spoken of, in the hearing of the writer of this memoir,
by one whose name, if it could be mentioned with propriety, would give
the highest authority to the remark, as a composition not surpassed by
any thing in the language. The principles laid down in it may be
considered as incorporated into the public law of the United States, and
will have their influence beyond our own territorial limits and beyond
our own time.
Some disappointment was probably felt, when the treaty of Washington was
published, that a settlement of the Oregon question was not included
among its provisions. It need not be said that a subject of such
magnitude did not escape the attention of the negotiators. It was,
however, speedily inferred by Mr. Webster, from the purport of his
informal conferences with Lord Ashburton on this point, that an
arrangement of this question was not then practicable, and that to
attempt it would be to put the entire negotiation to great risk of
failure. On the other hand, it was not less certain that, by closing up
the other matters in controversy, the best preparation was made for
bringing the Oregon dispute to an amicable issue, whenever circumstances
should favor that undertaking. Considerable firmness was no doubt
required to act upon this policy, and to forego the attempt, at least,
to settle a question rapidly growing into the most formidable magnitude.
It is unnecessary to say how completely the course adopted has been
justified by the event.
* * * * *
We have in the preceding remarks confined ourselves to the topics
connected with the treaty of Washington. But other subjects of great
importance connected with the foreign affairs of the country engaged the
attention of Mr. Webster as Secretary of State.
The first of these pertained to our controversies with Mexico, and was
treated in a letter to M. de Bocanegra, the Mexican Secretary of State
and Foreign Relations. The great and unexpected changes which have taken
place in that quarter since the date of this correspondence will not
impair the interest with which it will be read. It throws important
light on the earlier stages of our controversy with that ill-advised and
infatuated government. Among the papers in this part of the volume are
those which relate to the Santa Fe prisoners and Captain Jones's attack
on Monterey.
Under the head of "Relations with Spain" will be found a correspondence
of great interest between the Chevalier d'Argaiz, the representative of
that government, and Mr. Webster, on the subject of the "Amistad." The
pertinacity with which this matter was pursued by Spain, after its
adjudication by the Supreme Court of the United States, furnishes an
instructive commentary upon the sincerity of that government in its
measures for the abolition of the slave-trade. The entire merits of this
important and extraordinary case are condensed in Mr. Webster's letters
of the 1st of September, 1841, and 21st of June, 1842.
Of still greater interest are the institution of the mission to China,
and the steps which led to the establishment of the independence of the
Sandwich Islands. The sixth volume of this collection contains the
instructions given to Mr. Cushing as commissioner to China, and the
correspondence between Mr. Webster and Messrs. Richards and Haalilio on
behalf of the Sandwich Islands. At any period less crowded with
important events the opening of diplomatic relations with China, and the
conclusion of a treaty of commerce with that power, would have been
deemed occurrences of unusual importance. It certainly reflects great
credit on the administration, that it acted with such promptitude and
efficiency in seizing this opportunity of multiplying avenues of
commercial intercourse. Nor is less praise due to the energy and skill
of the negotiator,[29] to whom this novel and important undertaking was
confided, and who was able to embark from China, on his return homeward,
in six months after his arrival, having in the mean time satisfactorily
concluded the treaty.
The application of the representatives of the Sandwich Islands to the
government of the United States, and the countenance extended to them at
Washington, exercised a most salutary and seasonable influence over the
destiny of those islands. The British government was promptly made aware
of the course pursued by the United States, and was no doubt led, in a
considerable degree, by this circumstance, to promise the Hawaiian
delegates, on the part of England, to respect the independent neutrality
of their government. In the mean time, the British admiral on that
station had taken provisional possession of them on behalf of his
government, in anticipation of a similar movement which was expected on
the part of France. If intelligence of this occurrence had been received
in London before the promise above alluded to was given by Lord Aberdeen
to Messrs. Richards and Haalilio, it is not impossible that Great
Britain might have felt herself warranted in retaining the protectorate
of the Hawaiian Islands as an offset for the occupation of Tahiti by the
French. As it was, the temporary arrangement of the British admiral was
disavowed, and the government restored to the native chief.
Among the papers contained in the sixth volume will be found a
correspondence between Mr. Webster and the Portuguese Minister, on the
subject of duties on Portuguese wines, and a report of great importance
on the Sound duties and the Zoll-Verein, topics to which the recent
changes in the Germanic system will henceforward impart a greatly
increased importance.
This brief enumeration will of itself sufficiently show the extensive
range of the subjects to which the attention of Mr. Webster was called,
during the two years for which he filled the Department of State.
The published correspondence probably forms but a small portion of the
official labors of the Department of State for the period during which
it was filled by Mr. Webster. They constitute, nevertheless, the most
important part of the documentary record of a period of official
service, brief, indeed, but as beneficial to the country as any of which
the memory is preserved in her annals. The administration of General
Harrison found the United States, in the spring of 1841, on the verge of
a war, not with a feeble Spanish province, scarcely capable of a
respectable resistance, but with the most powerful government on earth.
The conduct of our foreign relations was intrusted to Mr. Webster, as
Secretary of State, and in the two years during which he filled that
office controversies of fifty years' standing were terminated, new
causes of quarrel that sprung up like hydra's heads were settled, and
peace was preserved upon honorable terms. The British government, fresh
from the conquest of China, perhaps never felt itself stronger than in
the year 1842, and a full share of credit is due to the spirit of
conciliation which swayed its counsels. Much is due to the wise and
amiable minister who was despatched from England on the holy errand of
peace; much to the patriotism of the Senate of the United States, who
confirmed the treaty of Washington by a larger majority than ever before
sustained a measure of this kind which divided public opinion; but the
first meed of praise is unquestionably due to the American negotiator.
Let the just measure of that praise be estimated, by reflecting what
would have been our condition during the last few years, if, instead of,
or in addition to, the war with Mexico, we had been involved in a war
with Great Britain.
FOOTNOTES
[23] This chapter is republished, with but slight modifications, from
the volume of Mr. Webster's Diplomatic and Official Papers which
appeared in 1848, to which it served as the Introduction.
[24] Mr. Stevenson.
[25] Senate Papers, Twenty-seventh Congress, First Session, No. 33.
[26] Younger son of Mr. Webster, who died in Mexico, in 1848, being a
major in the regiment of Massachusetts Volunteers.
[27] The authorities are given in Story's Commentaries Vol. III. pp.
675, 676; Conflict of Laws, pp. 520, 522; and in Kent's
Commentaries, Vol. I. pp. 36, 37.
[28] The following passage from a letter of Robert Walsh, Esq., to the
editors of the National Intelligencer, dated Paris, 28th
October, 1842, furnishes confirmation of the remark in the
text:--
"The former journal [The Times], of the 18th instant,
acknowledges that Mr. Webster 'has not exaggerated the
hardships and evils which the practice of impressment
occasioned in the last war.' It ratifies his ideas of the
probable aggravation of them, if the practice should be ever
renewed; it would even dispense with press-warrants at home, as
adverse to the general principles of British liberty and law:
it advises some general measure for the entire abolition of
arbitrary impressment both at home and abroad, and it expresses
its belief of a very strong probability, that, in the event
of a war, no instructions for the impressment of British
seamen found in American merchant-vessels will be issued to her
Majesty's cruisers. The Standard chimes with the great oracle,
and concludes in this strain: 'We may infer that, whatever
may be the plan hereafter for managing our navy, impressment
will never again be resorted to; this is beyond a doubt: _the
practice complained of by Mr. Webster will be abandoned_.'"
[29] Mr. Cushing.