_Letter from Juan de Ronquillo Governor Tello_
[This report of Ronquillo's is in places abridged, as he repeats
many of his statements. He set sail (from Oton) on February 8, 1597,
the earliest date possible after the receipt of supplies. Two virreys
had been sent ahead under Francisco de Torres, with orders to coast
from island to island, in order to avoid the dangers of the open sea;
they had not yet been heard from. At the port of La Canela (_i.e._,
"cinnamon;" modern Cáuit) Ronquillo found Captain Juan Pacho, who had
gone for fish and salt for his command; and, as the men were scattered
in Zamboanga and Taguima, there was a delay of three days in getting
them together. Pilots from these forces were placed in each vessel to
guide the ships to the river. Ronquillo then embarked on his fragata
and ordered the Sangley vessel and those of the Indian chiefs from
Danganlibor to follow. The brisas or northeasters were dead ahead,
and to avoid the force of the winds he took his course inside of
some islets. The Sangley vessel did not enter, as its draught was
so great that the navigators feared to make the attempt. Since the
Sangley vessel seemed to be in difficulties, he sent a captain to it;
but he came back with the report that all was well. Ronquillo then
sent directions as to their course. He had been informed by the
sailor whom he sent as pilot in the Sangley vessel that there was
water enough in the strait of Mangayao; but, if this should not be so,
they were to keep outside. They remained outside, and the rest of the
fleet sailed safely on to the point of Las Flechas ("the Arrows"),
twelve leguas from the river (Rio Grande, in Mindanao, where the
letter was written). The wind being heavy and the vessels old and
deep in the water, he anchored in a river never before entered, so
far as was known, cutting away trees and branches to do so. When the
fragata was safe, he sent the master-of-camp for the galleys, which
were sinking because of their rottenness. At the same time a virrey
was sent to look for the Sangley vessel. The virrey returned without
news; and though Ronquillo was very anxious he kept on to the river
toward which he was sailing, all assuring him that he would find the
Sangley ship here. A fire was seen at night, apparently a signal that
the vessel would go to La Canela for water, being unable to make the
river because of the winds. After taking in water they left port, and
the next night the Chinese crew mutinied, and killed the Spaniards. The
Chinese had been disarmed, and committed the deed with clubs and
wooden hatchets. Ronquillo asserts that all possible care had been
taken. The vessel carried the bulk of their provisions, clothing,
tow, and some ammunition. In spite of this loss the expedition had
been very successful. Upon reaching the river whence he writes, he
spent five days in repairs upon the fleet; and then, after completing
the fort of Tampaca (modern Tabaca) and storing the ammunition and
food in it, he ascended the river, leaving a guard of thirty-four
men under Sargento-mayor Diego de Chaves, one of whose legs had been
cut off. The force which went up the river numbered two hundred and
thirty, including sailors and gunners. The enemy retired behind some
parapets as soon as the artillery opened upon them, and brought some
artillery to bear on the flagship (one of the galleys), but could
not retard the Spanish advance. Continuing, Ronquillo writes:]
I answered their fire with so great readiness that I forced them to
withdraw their artillery. But, as if they were goblins, they remained
here behind a bush or a tree, firing at us, without being seen. Thus
did they keep us busy until one o'clock at night. I remained three
days without landing, awaiting the arrival of Lumaquan--a chief of
the tingues [_i.e._, hill-people], the best Indian of this island,
and our best friend--and five hundred Indians, who were coming to aid
us. On the very day of his arrival I landed in the following order. I
formed a square of twelve ranks of thirteen men each, closing front,
side, and rear guards with halberds and pikes. There were two captains
in the van-guard, one in the rear-guard, and two at the sides, so that,
wherever the enemy should attack, the soldiers could, by facing about,
fight without at all breaking ranks. I detailed two files of forty
arquebusiers and two captains to go ahead to discover ambushes. Under
cover of their arquebuses went the pioneers to clear the way. As
I heard, according to reports, that the enemy would halt upon this
day, I went ashore and marched straight forward at the head of the
squadron, at times going through the ranks to see if anything was
needed. Upon that day, we busied ourselves until sunset in clearing
the way as fully as great toil and diligence would allow, without the
square being thrown into any confusion, or any man falling out. But
as we could not come in sight of the fort, I returned to pass the
night in the fleet, for until the road should be open and known, and
its distance, I did not care to land my artillery, as I had so few
men. Besides those who were clearing the path, I had no men to fire
the artillery. Immediately on the following day I continued my plans
in the same order. As one of my legs pained me, because of a fall
backward two days previously down the hatchway of the galley--and by
good luck I did not break my neck--from which I am still suffering,
I did not go ashore. Also, I thought that, since the enemy had not
attacked us in the most dangerous places, they would not do so in
places not to their advantage. Thus the path was cleared, upon this
day, without encountering any enemy or sighting their fort. Again
the men returned to the fleet for the night. On the third day,
as the work of reconnoitering was proceeding, a large ambuscade of
Indians attacked us in the open near a palm-grove. As was learned
later, they numbered about two thousand. They attacked us with the
greatest fury and determination, in small bodies of skilful troops. As
the soldiers were ordered immediately to form their square, when the
enemy arrived in front of it, and saw it so well ordered and bristling
with halberds, they did not dare to break it, but turned and fled. In
the assault five of their men were killed with arquebus-shots, and
several others wounded. Among those killed were two of their bravest
and most esteemed men. One was from Terrenate and was a _casis_
[38] who instructed them in their religion. Of a truth, they showed
clearly that they were brave; for I do not believe that there are
many peoples who would attack with so gallant a determination, when
they were armed with nothing but shields and canpilans. They killed
five of my Indians who were clearing the path, who did not use good
judgment in retiring. This took place quite near their fort. As soon
as I was advised of this occurrence, for I had not gone ashore on this
day also, I sent at once as many men as possible from the galleys,
with axes, shovels, spades, and wicker baskets. I ordered them to
entrench themselves in as advanced a position as possible.
_They commenced to attack the fort. The enemy begged for peace on
the second day._ [39] The next day I landed my artillery, and went
with it to attack the enemy's fort. As the distance was quite great,
I moved my entrenchments nearer twice, and with great difficulty,
for the enemy never ceased shooting at us. They wounded three gunners
and several other men; surely they were very lucky shots. Finally I
planted my battery of eight pieces somewhat over one hundred paces
from the fort. Although I battered the fort hotly, I could not effect
a breach through which to make an assault. All the damage that I did
them by day, they repaired by night. Immediately on the following
day they began to call from their walls. When I asked them what they
wanted they said that they wished to be friends. I was very short
of ammunition, for I had only three thousand arquebus-bullets left,
and very few cannon-balls; and both would be spent in one day's
fighting, during which, should we not gain the fort, we would be
lost--and with no power to defend ourselves while withdrawing our
artillery and camp. At the same time, I reconnoitered the fort
and its situation, for it is located at the entrance of a lagoon,
thus having only water at the back, and swampy and marshy ground
at the sides. It has a frontage of more than one thousand paces,
is furnished with very good transversals, and is well supplied with
artillery and arquebuses. Moreover, it has a ditch of water more
than four brazas wide and two deep, and thus there was a space of
dry ground of only fifteen paces where it was possible to attack;
and this space was bravely defended, and with the greatest force of
the enemy. The inner parts were water, where they sailed in vessels,
while we had no footing at all. Again, I reflected that those who
had awaited us so long, had waited with the determination to die
in defense of the fort; and if they should see the contest ending
unfavorably for them, no one would prevent their flight. Further,
if they awaited the assault it would cost me the greater part of
my remaining ammunition, and my best men; while, if the enemy fled,
nothing would be accomplished, but on the contrary a long, tedious,
and costly war would be entered upon. Hence, with the opinion and
advice of the captains I negotiated for peace; and told them that I
would admit them to friendship under the following conditions:
_Treaty of peace and conditional covenants_
First, that first and foremost, they must offer homage to his Majesty,
and pay something as recognition.
_Obligation to return their prisoners to his Majesty_. That all
the natives who had been taken from the Pintados Islands last year,
must be restored.
_To break friendship with Terrenate._ That they must break the peace
and confederation made with the people of Terrenate, and must not
admit the latter into their country.
_Friendship with those who were friends formerly._ That they must
be friends with Danganlibor and Lumaquan, chiefs of this island,
who have rendered homage to his Majesty; and must not make war on
any of their vassals.
That all the chiefs must go to live in their old villages.
They accepted all the conditions, and Raxa Mura, Sala, Silonga,
and the other chiefs swore to keep the peace on these conditions,
and paid homage to his Majesty, paying a certain sum in gold as
recognition. Inasmuch as they had taken the Vizcayans whom they
had enslaved to a great distance, so that they should not escape,
they paid another like sum of gold as pledges that they would deliver
them to the Spaniards. As the friendly Indians said that the end for
which I was making peace was, under pretext of it, to seize the chief
men and hang them and separate them from the others, the chiefs did
not venture to come immediately. However, they said that when they
should ascertain our treaty, and if our purpose was not as aforesaid,
they would come. Although such a thing had not even entered my mind,
as I shall not make any promises in his Majesty's name that cannot be
fulfilled, it was true that the friendly Indians said it; for they
wished to break trie peace, in order to see if they could not rob
these people at our cost.
After making this treaty and securing this result (which, of a truth,
your Lordship may regard as most felicitous and of great importance,
and as the beginning of much good), I retired to my fleet. Next day the
chiefs came to the river-bank, and I made them friends with Danganlibor
and Lumaquan, and they embraced each other. Some of them boarded the
galleys, and began thus to lose their fear gradually. Already some of
the chiefs have started to go to their villages, and have collected
their people in order to settle them. I hope, God willing, that
everything will assume a settled and quiet condition. And albeit that
my toil and my service rendered to your Lordship in this affair do not
equal my desire, still your Lordship can represent it to his Majesty
as one of the greatest that have been rendered in these islands. I
am not going to leave them; so, when any greater opportunity arises,
your Lordship may entrust it to me. I assert that if this occasion
had not had the almost unexpected favorable ending, and if our Lord
had not evidently been pleased to lend His aid, your Lordship would
suffer great anxiety and all the islands would be in great straits;
for, with the alliance that they had formed with Terrenate, there
would be no safety in the entire district.
[The victorious troops were in the greatest need. There were many
messes of four or five with only one shirt among them, which they wore
by turns. There was only ammunition enough for two hours. There was
only rice enough to allow fifteen gantas a month to Spaniards and
ten to Indians; and even this ration would only last till the end
of August. They had no meat or fish. Ronquillo had "set a dragnet,"
and taken the rice of all the people within reach, beginning with
himself. Then he sent out officers in fragatas to search for rice,
giving them four hundred pesos for the purpose, and directing them to
pay as long as the money lasted, and then to take provisions in any
way in which they could get them. They were, if necessary, to use force
to obtain supplies from encomenderos or Indians, for their pay giving
them orders on the charges of the land (_situado_), or the tribute,
or to be paid when possible. As for the other parts of the island,
the very chiefs were perishing of hunger, because of the war, and came
daily to beg for rice. This they received, in order that they might be
bound to the Spaniards. Accordingly Ronquillo asks for assistance and
supplies from Manila until the stress should be over in Mindanao. He
gives honorable mention to his officers and troops, many of whom were
wounded. He looks forward to great difficulties as soon as any attempt
shall be made to collect tributes. The leading chiefs collect tribute
from their vassals; and the only demand hitherto has been for open
friendship and the recognition of the sovereignty of Spain. If these
men--Raxa Mura, Sala, Silonga, and Lumaquan--are now told that they
must not collect tribute, but that all the tribute must be paid to
his Majesty and to individuals, "it will be a very bitter draught for
them to swallow." These Indians, Ronquillo says, are not like those
in Luzon, but are accustomed to power and sovereignty. Some collect
five or six thousand tributes. If the tributes are to be collected,
two hundred more soldiers and a large quantity of ammunition will be
necessary, or much additional time. The troops have not been paid
what Figueroa owed them; and it is plain that no profit is to be
expected in the island for a long time to come. When it does come,
the encomenderos, who have fraudulently remained at leisure in Manila,
will get it. Hence the soldiers have petitioned that the property
of Figueroa in the island be sold and the proceeds applied to their
payment. Fourteen hundred pesos of worked silver was sold; and the
soldiers received six pesos each. The captains also asked and received
some compensation. The discontent was so great that Ronquillo declares
that no resolution can command men so ragged and starving, penniless
and unpaid; and that they are already saying that they cannot eat good
words. He concludes this section by asking for twenty thousand pesos
and eight hundred Indian rowers, and for some exchanges of his men.]
_That the country is not such as it has been painted, and not so
excellent as has been reported._ Hitherto it has not been possible
to tell your Lordship anything certain of this country, except that
it will be of but little advantage to his Majesty, but a source of
great expense. It has far fewer inhabitants than was reported, and
all are very poor, so that their breakfast consists only in cleaning
their arms, and their work in using them, and not in cultivating the
land, which is low and swampy in this river. There is no chief who
can raise twenty taes of gold. Rice is very scarce; in the tingues is
found a small amount, which is used for food by the chiefs only. They
are some swine, and a few fowls that are very cunning, and less
fruit. It abounds in fish in some districts, but this river contains
only eels. They are as good as those of España. They are not found
all the year round, but only during the rainy season. The climate
does not differ much from that there. It has very dense fogs. I have
been unable to make a complete map of the island. I am sending your
Lordship only that of this river, made with exactness, with all its
arms and estuaries, and their settlements. The arithmetical symbols
represent the number of people in each, and the letters the names
of the chiefs. I have corrected it with all care. We have already
examined almost everything from the coast of La Canela, Dapitan,
and Botran [Butúan?]. There is a full report there which may be filed
with this map.
_The island of Matheo is excellent, and a better expedition could
be made there._ Concerning the island of Matheo, I have been able to
learn from men who have been there that it is very fertile, thickly
populated, and rich in food products, including rice. The inhabitants
are not very warlike. Would to God that your Lordship had expended
there what was left here, for with less effort we would have gained
more. Terrenate has some dealings with this island. [I say this]
in case anything is to be done before it has more. Of Maluco I have
not ascertained anything new, except that things are in their usual
condition.
_He has not effected a settlement, as he has not found a convenient
site. He is awaiting the pleasure of your Lordship, and [a more
favorable] season._ As yet I have not effected any settlement,
as I have not found a suitable and convenient location for it, for
all the river above is swampy; and, if we were to look for dry land
along its course, it is so far away that it would take a week to
reach it from the mouth of the river. Although beyond this river,
toward La Canela, there is a good place for a settlement, yet it
is not advisable to leave this river now until matters are more
settled and quiet. This river is the residence of the chief men of
the island. Accordingly I shall wait the result of this rainy season;
and if the discomfort be not too great, I shall settle on the site
where I am now established, which is in a very good position, and
here I shall await your Lordship's decision.
_That the Indians are warlike and have fortified themselves, with
their forces now there, and others that they will collect, when the
proposal is made that they must pay tribute. Hence, reënforcements
of soldiers, ammunition and food are necessary, and time._ Although
things have so fortunate a beginning as I have related, it is by way
of peace. All the chiefs retain their full complements of artillery
and arquebuses, so that, whenever they wish to defend themselves,
they may do so. Beyond any doubt, on the day that tribute is demanded
from them, not only our new friends, but Danganlibor and Lumaquan as
well, who rendered homage of their own free will, will rebel. For the
speedy subjection of them all, we need a large force. Hence I repeat
to your Lordship, in order that you may not be deceived by certain
opinions of persons who have not seen this region for many years--for
it is not as of yore, and they did not know it, and the inhabitants
are Indians only in name--that a great force of soldiers is needed,
as well as ammunition, in order to make them pay tribute. This matter
is of prime importance. I would not be complying with my obligation
unless I entreated your Lordship to consider this matter deeply. You
should consider whether this enterprise must be given up or sustained,
for it is very costly, and we must not allow odds to be taken of us
when we have our best opportunity. Thus I think that we can finish this
matter at one time, and that your Lordship should send two hundred
men in one summer. With this number we can overrun all districts,
take away the natives' artillery, and collect tribute. This manner
of proceeding would be very economical.
_All the men, counting those maimed, number two hundred and sixty._
The number of men that I found in this island and those who should
be brought from Zibu fell far short of what I expected. All that I
could gather together--gunners, sailors, and maimed men--do not number
more than two hundred and sixty-four men. Some of them have died. I
am sending there the crippled and maimed, who are useless, so that I
shall have left in this river a trifle above two hundred men, many of
whom are sick, because of past hardships and their wretched existence.
_That medicines and delicacies be provided._ The master-of-camp
is sick, and I fear lest, with the advance of the rainy season,
the sickness will continue to increase; for it cannot be alleviated
by medicines and delicacies, because we have none. This is a great
pity. I entreat your Lordship to have medicines and some delicacies
provided for the sick, and clothing for the hospital.
_That religious are not going there to furnish instruction_. Father
Chirinos [40] came to this island with the sargento-mayor, and on
his first sight of it was so discontented that for no other reason,
he turned his back upon it, and was in so great a hurry to return that
he declared that if a vessel were not given him immediately in which
to leave, he would swim away. He went away speaking ill of this place,
and has caused great annoyance and wrong to these poor soldiers. If
a religious who ought to be happy with a hard life, and who ought
to seek hardships in which to serve God better, refused those which
might be offered him here, the soldiers, who are less perfect and less
filled with God, will do but little. Father Juan de Sanlucar asked
me for leave likewise to go there with this vessel, in order to go to
get a companion, as he could not stay here alone. I did not grant it
him. If the fathers of the Society are to have this place in charge,
it will be right for them to send religious. If not, then they should
say so, and your Lordship should request the ecclesiastical government
to provide ministers. The one here at present has labored to our great
approbation and has set a good example. But he is greatly grieved at
being alone, and he is not without reason, for he has no one to whom
to make his confession.
The ration given to these people is so small that it can only be
endured in times of great stress. Indeed it is doubtful whether a
Spaniard could live on only one-half ganta of rice, without anything
else; and even the Indian is unable to do so without having some fish
with it. For the future we need abundance of provisions; for, as I
have noted, we cannot expect this land to furnish them, because it
does not have any. Your Lordship must have them provided in accordance
with the accompanying memorandum.
_That it is advisable to send hither the encomenderos, and from there
to give the soldiers and captains some gratification and pay._ All the
captains and soldiers of this camp perform their duties grumblingly,
since the encomenderos enjoy the fruits of their labor. Through false
representations the encomenderos have remained behind, instead of
coming here on this pacification. If each encomendero has to live on
his encomienda, and the heirs of Estevan Rodriguez in some part of the
island, there is nothing left for the captains and soldiers. The owners
should come, therefore, to reduce their encomiendas to subjection,
since they take the gain. They do not go very far upon the road,
and it is not a good argument to say that each one will pacify his
own encomienda; for so long as this river is unpacified, nothing
is pacified. Your Lordship should order all of them, without any
exception, to come in person, and to bring some soldiers at their own
cost, with sufficient food for a year's maintenance. In this way,
something will be done; for an encomienda cannot be pacified with
only one soldier, paid by an encomendero. I entreat your Lordship to
decide quickly upon the course to be taken, and, with the same haste,
to send me immediate advice by a birey. The route is open, and the
virey can come here any time in June; thus I may be advised in advance
of your Lordship's orders as to the course to pursue here, and this
needy people may be encouraged with the hope of speedy relief. Your
Lordship should write to them, thanking them for their labors, and
encouraging them with their pay, to continue their work. May God
preserve your Lordship many years, with the increase of dignities
that we your servants desire. Tanpaca, May 10, 97. Your Lordship's
most humble servant.
_Don Juan Ronquillo_
[_Endorsed:_ "Mindanao, 1597. General Don Juan Rronquillo."]
_The campaign_
The sargento-mayor of the city of Manila left for Mindanao on the
thirtieth of December of ninety-six, and arrived at the city of Zebu
on the fourteenth of January. He left there for La Caldera [41]
on the twenty-ninth of the said month, and arrived at La Caldera
on the second of February, where he found the fleet of Mindanao,
which had gone away for lack of supplies. The whole fleet left La
Caldera on the sixth of said month, in the direction of Mindanao;
and on the eleventh Captain Torivio de Misa was sent forward with a
galliot and two lapis, as he suspected that the unfriendly Indians
had surrounded the friendly natives from Tanpacon. On the fourteenth
he sent Sargento-mayor Diego de Chaves with two galleys, and other
light vessels, to follow up Torivio de Miranda; and he remained
behind with the three fragatas, which, as they were heavy vessels,
could not follow the rest of the fleet.
On the fifteenth of December, Captain Graviel Gonzales, who was
on board one of the lapis which accompanied Torivio de Miranda,
was drowned while passing Las Flechas, at the edge of the river of
Mindanao. On the seventeenth, Captain Torivio de Miranda entered
the river, where he found that the enemy had drawn a blockade about
our friends of Tanpacon, and had killed more than seventy of them;
but at his arrival they raised the blockade, and retired to their
fort in flight.
On the eighth of January, Captain Chaves arrived with his fragatas
at the river, and on the twelfth planned and founded the fort of
Tanpacan near this settlement of our friends. On the twenty-fifth,
the sargento-mayor sailed for the river of Simay to capture certain
vessels belonging to the enemy, in which they were going to seek
aid from Terrenate. During a certain battle which they had there
with the enemy, he had a leg cut off, well toward the thigh, and
recived a shot in the helmet above the ear. One of his comrades, who
was fighting at his side, had his right leg cut off. On the tenth of
March, the master-of-camp arrived; and, on the twenty-first, General
Don Juan Ronquillo.
On the tenth of April the enemy's fleet came up, and on the seventeenth
they landed, sweeping along the allies in front of them, together
with forty arquebusiers, who were escorting them in their line, and
on their right wing. A few days ago the enemy made an attack from
ambuscade, with more than two thousand men. They came on, closing
in until they reached the squadron, where they encountered the
resistance of arms to their advance, and retired fleeing. They left
some of their bravest dead, together with a few Terrenatans, without
doing any damage to us, except killing five Visayans. Accordingly our
squadron, which consisted of a hundred and sixty-nine men, on the
fourth day intrenched themselves as best they could; and little by
little moved the intrenchments forward until they were a hundred and
sixty-six paces from the enemy. During this time the enemy defended
themselves with a park of small artillery and two large guns. On
the twenty-fifth, the general sent to consult Sargento-mayor Diego
de Chaves, who was in the fleet; and by his opinion a traverse was
built as a half-moon, where were stationed seven pieces of artillery,
with which they battered the fort of the enemy.
On the twenty-eighth, when the enemy saw the damage which our artillery
was doing them, they rendered obedience and sued for peace; and on the
twenty-ninth peace was agreed upon with the following conditions: They
were to return the Visayan slaves whom they hold, and pay tribute,
and must not receive Terrenatans in their country. They were to
give obedience to his Majesty, and the chiefs were to give oath;
and in pledge of this they gave a golden chain. They are all going
back to their villages, and gathering up the Visayan slaves. It will
be well to reënforce the Spaniards with troops and money this year,
so that matters may remain settled and they shall not try to create
a disturbance again.