comes from the same source as the other doctrine--That both members
of the Antiphasis are true. Both doctrines proceed from the sensible
world ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ kai\ ê( peri\ ta\ phaino/mena a)lê/theia
e)ni/ois e)k tô=n ai)sthêtô=n e)lê/luthen]--p. 1009, b. 2; [Greek:
o(moi/ôs] refers back to a. 23--[Greek: au(/tê ê( do/xa], the other
doctrine). Demokritus, Protagoras, and others observe that sensible
phenomena are differently appreciated by different men, by other
animals, and even by the same animal or man at different times. They
do not think that truth upon these points of difference can be
determined by a majority of voices. Demokritus says that either there
is nothing true, or that we cannot know what it is (b. 10). These
reasoners identified intelligence with sensible perception, and
considered that this latter implied a change in the subject (b. 13):
they conceived that what appeared to sense was necessarily true.
Empedokles, Demokritus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Homer, &c., all lay
down the doctrine, that the intelligence of men is varied with and
determined by their sensible perceptions. They thought that men of
wrong intelligence were nevertheless intelligent men, though their
intelligence did not carry them to the same conclusions (b. 30); that
if, both in one case and in the other, there were acts of
intelligence, there must be realities corresponding to both,
justifying the affirmative as well as the negative (b. 33).
That sincere and diligent enquirers should fall into these errors is
very discouraging; but we must remark that their errors originated
from this--that, while investigating the truth respecting Entia, they
supposed that Entia were only the Percepta or Percipibilia (p. 1010,
a. 2). Now in these Entia Perceptionis there is a great deal of the
Indefinite and of mere Potential Entity (a. 3). Hence the theories of
these reasoners were plausible, though not true. They saw that all
the Entia Perceptionis were in perpetual movement, and they thought
it impossible to predicate any thing with truth respecting what was
at all times and in every way changing (a. 9). Kratylus and the
Herakleitizers pushed this to an extreme. Even against their
reasoning, we have something to say in reply. We grant that they have
some ground for imagining that what undergoes change does not exist
at the moment when it changes (a. 16). Yet even here there is room
for dispute; for that which is in the act of casting off, still
retains something of that which is being cast off; and of that which
is being generated, something must already be in existence. As a
general doctrine, if something is in course of being destroyed,
something must be in existence; and, if something is in course of
being generated, there must exist something out of which it proceeds
and by which it is being generated; nor can this go back _ad
infinitum_ (a. 22). Dropping this argument, however, let us advance
another. Change as to Quantity is not the same as change as to
Quality or Form. Let us grant that, as to Quantity, there is change
continuous and perpetual--growth or decay--no such thing as
stationary condition. But all our knowledge relates to Quality or
Form, in which there is no continuous change (a. 24: [Greek: kata\
me\n ou)=n to\ poso/n, e)/stô mê\ me/non; a)lla\ kata\ to\ ei)=dos
a(/panta gignô/skomen.]--Compare Alex. Schol., p. 671, b. 5-22; p.
670, a. 36: Bonitz has good remarks in his note, pp. 202-204**.).
Again, we have a farther reproach to make to these reasoners. Their
argument is based only on the Percepta or Percipienda; yet, even as
to these it is true only as to the minority and untrue as to the
majority. It is true merely as far as the sublunary Percepta; but as
to the superlunary or celestial it is the reverse of truth. Our earth
and its neighbourhood is indeed in continual generation and
destruction; but this is an insignificant part of the whole. In
affirming any thing respecting the whole, we ought to follow the
majority rather than the minority (p. 1010, a. 28-31**).
Lastly, we must repeat against these reasoners the argument urged
just now. We must explain to them, that there exists, apart from and
besides all generation, destruction, change, motion, &c., a certain
Immovable Nature ([Greek: a)ki/nêto/s tis phu/sis]--a. 34). Indeed
their own doctrine--That all things both are and are not--would seem
to imply an universal stationary condition rather than universal
change (a. 38). There can be no change; for there is no prospective
terminus which can be reached by change. Every thing is assumed as
already existing.
We have now to remark upon the special doctrine of
Protagoras--[Greek: pa=n to\ phaino/menon a)lêthe/s]. If we grant that
perception is always true upon matters strictly belonging to it, still
phantasy is not identical with perception and we cannot say that what
appears to the phantasy is always true ([Greek: to\
phaino/menon]--which implies a reference to [Greek: phantasi/a]--p.
1010, b. 2), Besides, it is strange that thinkers should puzzle
themselves about the questions: Whether the magnitude and colour of
objects is that which appears to a spectator near or to a spectator
far off? and to a spectator healthy or jaundiced? Whether the weight
of an object is as it appears to a weak or to a strong man? Whether
objects are truly what they appear to men awake or to men asleep?
Their own actions show that they do not think there is any doubt; for
if, being in Libya, they happen to dream that they are in Athens, none
of them ever think of going to the Odeium (b. 5-11). Moreover,
respecting the future, as Plato remarks, the anticipations of the
ignorant man are not so trustworthy as those of the physician, whether
a patient will recover or not (b. 14). Then, again, in respect of
present sensations, the perception of sight is not equally trustworthy
with the perception of smell about a question of odour (b. 17); and
the perception of smell will never report at the same time and about
the same thing, that it is at once fragrant and not fragrant; nor,
indeed, at different times about the affection itself, but only about
the subject to which the affection belonged (b. 20). The same wine
which tasted sweet last month, may now taste not sweet; but the sweet
taste itself is the same now and last month, and the reports of the
sense are never contradictory on this point. The sweet taste which is
to come in the future will be of necessity like the sweet taste in
the past. Now such necessity is abrogated by all those reasonings
which affirm at once the two members of the Antiphasis. These
reasonings disallow all essence of every thing, and all necessity;
for whatever is necessary, cannot be at once both thus and not thus
(b. 21-30).
On the whole, if nothing exist except Percepta, nothing can exist
without animated beings; since without these last there can be no
perception. It is indeed true, perhaps, that under such a supposition
there exist neither Percepta nor acts of Perception (which are
affections of the Percipient); but that the Substrata which cause
Perception should not exist even without Perception--is an
impossibility (p. 1010, b. 33: [Greek: to\ de\ ta\ u(pokei/mena mê\
ei)=nai, a(\ poiei= tê\n ai)/sthêsin, kai\ a)/neu ai)sthê/seôs,
a)du/naton]). Perception is not perception of itself; there exists
besides, apart from perception, something else which must necessarily
be prior to perception. For the Movens is by nature prior to the
Motum; and this is not the less true, though each of these two is
enunciated in relation to the other (b. 35).
A difficulty is often started, and enquiry made, Who is to be the
judge of health and sickness? Whom are we to recognize as the person
to judge rightly in each particular case? Persons might as well raise
difficulty and make enquiry, Whether we are now awake or asleep? It
is plain by men's actual conduct that they have no real doubt upon
the point in any particular case; and both these enquiries arise from
the same fundamental mistake--that men require to have every thing
demonstrated, and will recognize nothing without demonstration.
(Alex. says in Scholia, p. 675, b. 3: [Greek: e)/sti ga\r pro\s a(\
e)k phu/seôs be/ltion e)/chomen ê)\ ô(/ste dei=sthai tê=s peri\
au)tô=n a)podei/xeôs; e)/sti de\ tau=ta ai(/ te ai)sthê/seis, kai\
ta\ a)xiô/mata kai\ ai( phusikai/ te kai\ koinai\ e)/nnoiai.]) Those
who sincerely and seriously feel this difficulty, may be expected to
acquiesce in the explanation here given (p. 1011, a. 2-14). But those
who put forward the difficulty merely for the sake of argument, must
be informed that they require an impossibility. They require to have
a refutative case made out against them (which can only be done by
reducing them to a [Greek: sullogismo\s a)ntipha/seôs]); yet they
themselves begin by refusing to acknowledge this refutation as
sufficient, for they maintain the thesis--That both members of the
Antiphasis are alike and equally true (a. 16; compare Alex. Schol.,
p. 675, b. 20-28).
Those who maintain this last-mentioned thesis say, in other words,
That every thing which appears true, is true. But this thesis of
theirs cannot be defended except by the admission that every thing is
relative, and that nothing is absolute. Accordingly they must take
care to announce their thesis, not in absolute terms as it now
stands, but in terms strictly relative: Every thing which appears
true, appears true to some individual--at a certain moment of
time--under certain circumstances and conditions (p. 1011, a. 24).
For, if they affirm, in absolute phrase, that all things are alike
false and true, on the ground that what appears true is true, urging
that the same things do not appear true either to different persons,
or to the same person at different times--nay, sometimes even to the
same person at the same time, as may be seen by handling a pebble
between two crossed fingers ([Greek: e)n tê=| e)palla/xei tô=n
daktu/lôn]--a. 33), so that it appears two to the touch, but only
one to the sight;--we shall reply, that there is no such
contradiction of judgment, if they confine themselves to the same
person, the same time, and one and the same sense. In these cases,
there is only one affirmation which appears to be true, and
therefore, according to their theory, that affirmation is true.
They are not, therefore, justified in concluding that every thing
is alike true and false (b. 1).
They can only escape this refutation by avoiding to say, This is
true, and by saying, This is true to such an individual, at such a
time, &c.; that is, by making every affirmation relative to some
person's opinion or perception. Hence the inference is, that nothing
either ever has occurred or ever will occur, without the antecedent
opinion of some person ([Greek: mêtheno\s prodoxa/santos]--p. 1011,
b. 6): if any thing ever has so occurred, it cannot be true that all
things are relative to opinion. Moreover, if the Relatum be one, it
must be relative to some one, some definite, Correlate; and, even if
the same Relatum be both half and equal, it will not be equal in
reference to a double Correlate, but half in reference to a double,
and equal in reference to an equal (b. 9). Moreover, if _homo_ and
_conceptum_ have both of them no more than a relative existence--that
is, if both of them exist only in correlation with a
_concipiens_--then the _concipiens_ cannot be _homo_; it will be the
_conceptum_ that is _homo_. And, if every individual thing have
existence only in relation to a _concipiens_, this _concipiens_ must
form the Correlate to an infinite number of Relata (b. 12). (All this
is very briefly and obscurely stated in Aristotle. The commentary of
Alexander is copious and valuable: one might suppose that he had
before him a more ample text; for it is difficult to find in the
present text all that his commentary states**.)
Let thus much be said to establish the opinion, That the two members
of the Antiphasis (the Affirmative and the Negative) are not both
true at the same time. We have shown whence it arises that some
persons suppose both to be true; and what are the consequences in
which those who hold this opinion entangle themselves. Accordingly,
since both sides of the Antiphasis cannot be truly predicated of the
same subject, it is impossible that opposite attributes can belong at
the same time to the same subject (p. 1011, b. 17: [Greek: ou)de\
ta)nanti/a a(/ma u(pa/rchein e)nde/chetai tô=| au)tô=|]). For one of
these opposites includes in itself privation, and privation of a
certain real essence; now privation is the negation of a certain
definite genus. And, since affirmation and negation cannot be truly
applied at the same time, it follows that opposite attributes cannot
belong at the same time to the same subject. At least it is only
possible thus far: one may belong to it absolutely, the other
_secundum quid_; or both of them _secundum quid_ only ([Greek: tô=n
me\n ga\r e)nanti/ôn tha/teron ste/rêsi/s e)stin ou)ch ê(=tton,
ou)si/as de\ ste/rêsis a)po/phasi/s e)stin a)po/ tinos ô(risme/nou
ge/nous]--b. 20).
But, also, there can be nothing intermediate between the two members
of the Antiphasis; we must of necessity either affirm or deny any one
thing of any other (p. 1011, b. 24). This will appear clearly, when
we have first defined what is Truth and Falsehood. To say that Ens is
not, or that Non-Ens is, is false: To say that Ens is, or that
Non-Ens is not, is true. Accordingly, he who predicates _est_--or he
who predicates _non est_--will speak truly or speak falsely, according
as he applies his predicate to Ens or to Non-Ens. But he cannot,
either in application to Ens or to Non-Ens, predicate _est aut non
est_ (b. 29). Such a predication would be neither true nor false, but
improper and unmeaning. (I follow at b. 27 the text of the Berlin
edition: [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn ei)=nai ê)\ mê\ a)lêtheu/sei
ê)\ pseu/setai]--which seems to me here better than that of Bonitz,
who puts [Greek: ô(/ste kai\ o( le/gôn tou=to ei)=nai ê)\ mê\
a)lêtheu/sei ê)\ pseu/setai]--following Alexander's explanation,
Schol., p. 680, a. 33, which I cannot think to be correct, though
Bonitz praises it much. Aristotle defines Truth and Falsehood: When
you say _Ens est_, or _Non-Ens non est_, you speak truth; when you
say _Ens non est_, or _Non-Ens est_, you speak falsehood.
Accordingly, when you employ the predicate _est_, or when you employ
the predicate _non est_, you will speak truly or falsehood, according
as the subject with which you join it is Ens or is Non-Ens. But
neither with respect to the subject Ens nor with respect to the
subject Non-Ens, can you employ the disjunctive predicate--_est aut
non est_.**)
Again, a medium between the two horns of the Antiphasis must be
either a medium between opposites, like grey between white and black,
or like the neither between man and horse. If it be the latter, it
will never change; for all change is either from a negative to its
affirmative (_non-bonum_ to _bonum_) or _vice versâ_: now that which
is both _non-homo_ and _non-equus_ must change, if it change at all,
into that which is both _homo_ and _equus_; but this is impossible.
We see change always going on; but it is always change either into
one of the two extremes or into the medium between them. But can we
assume that there is such a medium (so that the case supposed will
belong to the analogy of grey, halfway between white and black)? No,
we cannot assume it; for, if we granted it, we should be forced to
admit that there was change into white not proceeding from that which
is not white: now nothing of the kind is ever perceived. There cannot
therefore be any admissible medium halfway between the two members of
the Antiphasis--something which is neither white nor not-white,
neither black nor not-black (p. 1011, b. 35: [Greek: ei) d' e)/sti
metaxu/]--if such medium be admitted--[Greek: kai\ ou(/tôs ei)/ê a)/n
tis ei)s leuko\n ou)k e)k mê\ leukou= ge/nesis; nu=n d' ou)ch
o(ra=tai]).
Furthermore, whatever our intelligence understands or reasons upon,
it deals with as matter affirmed or denied. The very definition of
truth and falsehood recognizes them as belonging only to affirmation
or negation: when we affirm or deny in a certain way we speak truth;
when in another way, we speak falsely. Nothing is concerned but
affirmation and denial (_i.e._, there is no mental operation midway
between the two--p. 1012, a. 2-5). If there be any such medium or
midway process, it is not confined to this or that particular
Antiphasis, but belongs alike to all, and must lie apart from all the
different Antiphases--at least if it is to be talked of as a reality,
and not as a mere possible combination of words; so that the speaker
will neither speak truth, nor not speak truth; which is absurd (a.
7). It must also lie apart both from Ens and from Non-Ens; so that we
should be compelled to admit a certain mode of change of Essence,
which yet shall neither be generation nor destruction; which is
impossible. **(According to Aristotle's definition, all change of
[Greek: ou)si/a] must be either Generation, _i.e._, passage from
[Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ o)/n], or Destruction, _i.e._,
passage from [Greek: to\ o)/n] to [Greek: to\ mê\ o)/n].--See Alex.
Schol. p. 681, b. 30-40**.)
Again, there are certain genera in which negation carries with it the
affirmation of an opposite; such as odd and even, in numbers. In such
genera, if we are to admit any medium apart from and between the two
members of the Antiphasis, we should be forced to admit some number
which is neither odd nor even (p. 1012, a. 11). This is impossible:
the definition excludes it. (Alexander gives this as the definition
of number: [Greek: pa=s ga\r a)rithmo\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s, kai\ _a)rithmo/s e)stin o(\s ê)\ a)/rtio/s e)stin ê)\
peritto/s_]--Schol. p. 682, a. 16.)
Again, if the Antiphasis could be divided, and a half or intermediate
position found, as this theory contends, the division of it must be
admissible farther and farther, _ad infinitum_. After bisecting the
Antiphasis, you can proceed to bisect each of the sections; and so
on. Each section will afford an intermediate term which may be denied
with reference to each of the two members of the original Antiphasis.
Two new Antiphases will thus be formed, each of which may be bisected
in the same manner; and so bisection, with the formation of
successive new Antiphases, may proceed without end (p. 1012, a. 13).
Again, suppose a questioner to ask you, Is this subject white? You
answer, No. Now you have denied nothing else than the being-white:
this is the [Greek: a)po/phasis], or negative member of the
Antiphasis. But you have neither denied nor affirmed the intermediate
stage between the affirmative and the negative; nor is there any
answer possible by which you could do so. Therefore there is no real
intermediate stage between them ([Greek: e)/ti o(/tan e)rome/nou ei)
leuko/n e)stin ei)/pê| o(/ti ou)/, ou)the\n a)/llo a)pope/phêken ê)\
to\ ei)=nai; a)po/phasis de\ to\ mê\ ei)=nai]--p. 1012, a. 15; see
Alex. Schol. p. 682, b. 15-38, and Bonitz's note. Bonitz suggests,
though timidly, [Greek: a)pope/phêken] instead of the common reading
[Greek: a)pope/phuken], which none of the commentators explain, and
which seems unintelligible. I think Bonitz is right, though [Greek:
a)pope/phêken] is an unknown tense from [Greek: a)po/phêmi]: it is
quite as regular as [Greek: a)pophê/sô] or [Greek: a)pe/phêsa]**.).
The doctrines which we have been just controverting (Aristotle says)
arise, like other paradoxes, either from the embarrassment in which
men find themselves when they cannot solve a sophistical difficulty;
or from their fancying that an explanation may be demanded of every
thing. In replying to them, you must take your start from the
definition, which assigns to each word one fixed and constant
signification. The doctrine of Herakleitus--That all things are and
all things are not--makes all propositions true; that of
Anaxagoras--That every thing is intermingled with every thing--makes
all propositions false: such mixture is neither good, nor not good;
neither of the members of the Antiphasis is true (a. 17-28). Our
preceding reasonings have refuted both these doctrines, and have
shown that neither of the two one-sided extremes can be universally
true: neither the doctrine--Every proposition is true; nor
that--Every proposition is false; still less that which comprehends
them both--Every proposition is both true and false. Among these
three doctrines, the second might seem the most plausible, yet it
is inadmissible, like the other two (b. 4).
In debating with all these reasoners, you must require them (as we
have already laid down), not to admit either existence or
non-existence but, to admit a constant signification for each word.
You must begin by defining truth and falsehood; each of them belongs
only to affirmation in a certain way. Where the affirmation is true
the denial is false; all propositions cannot be false; one member of
each Antiphasis must be true, and the other member must be false.
Each of these doctrines labours under the often-exposed defect--that
it destroys itself (p. 1012, b. 14, [Greek: to\
thrullou/menon]--allusion to the Theætetus, according to Alexander).
For whoever declares all propositions to be true, declares the
contradictory of this declaration to be true as well as the rest, and
therefore his own declaration not to be true. Whoever declares all
propositions to be false, declares his own declaration to be false as
well as all other propositions (b. 17). And, even if we suppose each
of these persons to make a special exception in regard to the
particular propositions here respectively indicated, still this will
not serve. The man who declares all propositions to be false, will be
compelled to admit an infinite number of true propositions; because
the proposition declaring the true proposition to be true, must
itself be true; a second proposition declaring this last to be true,
will itself be true; and so on to a third, a fourth, &c., in endless
scale of ascent. The like may be said about the man who declares all
propositions to be true: he too will be obliged to admit an infinite
number of false propositions; for that which declares a true
proposition to be false, must itself be false; and so on through a
second, a third, &c., in endless scale of ascent as in the former
case (b. 22).
It follows from what has been just proved, that those who affirm
every thing to be at rest, and those who affirm every thing to be in
motion, are both alike wrong. For, if every thing were at rest, the
same propositions would be always true and always false. But this is
plainly contrary to evidence; for the very reasoner who affirms it
was once non-existent, and will again be non-existent. On the other
hand, if every thing were in motion, no proposition would be true,
and all would be false: but we have proved above that this is not so.
Nor is it true that all things are alternately in motion or at rest;
for there must be something ever-moving and other things
ever-moved--and this prime movent must be itself immovable (p. 1012,
b. 22-30).
. . . . . .
Book E.
The First Philosophy investigates the causes and principles of Entia
_quatenus_ Entia (p. 1025, b. 3). It is distinguished from other
sciences, by applying to all Entia, and in so far as they are Entia;
for each of the other sciences applies itself to some separate branch
of Entia, and investigates the causes and principles of that branch
exclusively. Each assumes either from data of perception, or avowedly
by way of hypothesis, the portion or genus of Entia to which it
applies; not investigating the entity thereof, but pre-supposing this
process to have been already performed by Ontology: each then
investigates the properties belonging _per se_ to that genus (b. 13).
It is plain that by such an induction not one of these sciences can
demonstrate either the essence of its own separate genus, nor whether
that genus has any real existence. Both these questions--both [Greek:
ei) e)/stin] and [Greek: ti/ e)stin]--belong to Ontology (b. 18).
(The belief derived from perception and induction never amounts to
demonstration, as has been shown in the Analytica; you may always
contest the universality of the conclusion--Alex. p. 734, b. 16, Br.)
Apart from Ontology, each of these separate sciences is either
theoretical, or practical, or constructive (p. 1025, b. 21). Two of
the separate sciences are theoretical--Physics and Mathematics; and,
as Ontology (or Theology) is also theoretical, there are three
varieties of theoretical science (p. 1026, a. 18).
Physical Science applies to subjects having in themselves the
principle of mobility or change, and investigates, principally and
for the most part, the Essence or Form thereof; yet not exclusively
the Form, for the Form must always be joined with Matter. The subject
of Physics includes Matter in its definition, like hollow-nosed, not
like hollow (p. 1025, b. 33). All the animal and vegetable world is
comprised therein; and even some soul, as far as soul is inseparable
from Matter ([Greek: peri\ psuchê=s **e)ni/as theôrê=sai tou=
phusikou=, o(/sê mê\ a)/neu tê=s u(/lês e)sti/n]--p. 1026, a. 5).
Mathematics is another branch of theoretical science; applying to
subjects immovable and in part inseparable from Matter; that is,
separable from Matter only in logical conception (p. 1026, a. 7-15).
Theology, or First Philosophy, or Ontology, is conversant with
subjects self-existent, immovable, and separable from Matter (p.
1026, a. 16).
Now all causes are necessarily eternal; but these more than any
other, because they are the causes active among the visible divine
bodies; for, clearly, if the Divinity has any place, it must be found
among subjects of that nature; and the most venerable science must
deal with the most venerable subjects (p. 1026, a. 19). The
theoretical sciences are more worthy than the rest ([Greek:
ai(retô/terai]), and First Philosophy is the most worthy among the
theoretical sciences (a. 22). A man may indeed doubt whether First
Philosophy is distinguished from the other theoretical sciences by
being more universal, and by comprehending them all as branches; or
whether it has a separate department of its own, but more venerable
than the others; as we see that Mathematics, as a whole, comprehends
Geometry and Astronomy (a. 27). If there exist no other distinct
Essence beyond the compounds of Nature ([Greek: para\ ta\s phu/sei
sunestêkui/as]--a. 28), Physics would be the first of all sciences.
But if there be a distinct immovable Essence, that is first;
accordingly the science which deals with it is first, and, as being
first, is for that reason universal ([Greek: kai\ katho/lou ou(/tôs
o(/ti prô/tê]--a. 30). It is the province of this First Philosophy to
theorize respecting Ens _quâ_ Ens--what it is and what are its
properties _quâ_ Ens (a. 32). (Alexander says the First Philosophy is
more universal than the rest, but does not comprehend the rest:
[Greek: prô/tê pa/ntôn kai\ katho/lou ô(s pro\s ta\s a)/llas, ou)
perie/chousa e)kei/nas, a)ll' ô(s prô/tê]--Schol. p. 736, a. 27.)
Now Ens has many different meanings:--
1. Ens [Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s].
2. Ens [Greek: ô(s a)lêthe/s]--Non-Ens [Greek: ô(s pseu=dos].
3. Ens [Greek: kata\ ta\ schê/mata tê=s katêgori/as] (decuple).
4. Ens [Greek: duna/mei kai\ e)nergei/a|].
1. Respecting the first, there can be no philosophical speculation
(p. 1026, b. 3). No science, either theoretical, or practical, or
constructive, investigates Accidents. He who constructs a house, does
not construct all the accidents or concomitants of the house; for
these are endless and indeterminate. It may be agreeable to one man,
hurtful to a second, profitable to a third, and something different
in relation to every different Ens; but the constructive art called
house-building is not constructive of any one among these
concomitants (b. 7-10). Nor does the geometer investigate the
analogous concomitants belonging to his figures; it is no part of his
province to determine whether a triangle is different from a triangle
having two right angles (b. 12). This is easy to understand: the
Concomitant is little more than a name--as it were, a name and
nothing beyond (b. 13). Plato came near the truth when he declared
that Sophistic was busied about Non-Ens; for the debates of the
Sophists turn principally upon Accidents or Concomitants, such as,
Whether musical and literary be the same or different? Whether
Koriskus or literary Koriskus, be the same or different? Whether
everything which now is, but has not always been, has become; as in
the case of a man who being musical has become literary or being
literary has become musical? and such like debates (see Alexander,
Schol. p. 736, b. 40). For the Concomitant or Accident appears
something next door to Non-Ens ([Greek: e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos],
p. 1026, b. 21), as we may see by these debates. Of other Entia there
is generation or destruction, but of Accidents there is none (b. 23).
Nevertheless, we shall state, as far as the case admits, what is the
nature of the Accident, and through what cause it is ([Greek: ti/s ê(
phu/sis au)tou=, kai\ dia/ tin' ai)ti/an e)sti/n;]--p. 1026, b. 25):
we shall perhaps at the same time explain why there can be no science
respecting it. Among Entia, some are always and necessarily the same,
others are usually but not always the same. These which come to pass
in neither of these two ways, are called Accidents or Concomitants.
Of the first two, the Constant and the Usual, there is always some
definite cause; of the third, or Accidents, there is none: the cause
of these is an Accident (p. 1027, a. 8). In fact, Matter is the cause
of Accidents, admitting as it does of being modified in a way
different from the usual and ordinary way (a. 13). It is plain that
there can be neither science nor teaching of Accidents: the teacher
can teach only what is constant or usual, and nothing beyond (a. 20).
Now of these Accidents, there is a certain principle or cause which
it is indispensable to admit--Chance ([Greek: ê( tou= o(po/ter'
e)/tuchen]--p. 1027, b. 12). There must be principles and causes,
generable and destructible, yet which never are either generated or
destroyed; if this were not so, all events would occur by necessity
(p. 1026, b. 29-31). (Thus the builder, considered as cause of the
house which he builds, has been generated, _i.e._, he has acquired
the art of building and the proper accessories; and he will be
destroyed, _i.e._, he will lose his art, and its conditions of being
exercised. But, considered as the cause of the accidents belonging to
the house, of its being annoying or inconvenient to A or B, he has
not been generated nor will he be destroyed; _i.e._, he has neither
acquired, nor will he lose, any skill or conditions tending to the
production of this effect. As the contact of two substances is not
generated, but appears of itself along with the substances when they
are generated; as the limits of periods of time appear without
generation along with the periods of time themselves; so the builder,
when he acquires the power of building the house, stands possessed
thereby, without any additional time or special generation, of the
power to produce the concomitant accidents of the house. The house is
thus produced by necessity; its concomitant accidents not by
necessity--Alex. Schol. p. 738, a. 19-33.)
But whether this [Greek: to\ o(po/ter' e)/tuchen] is to be considered
as referable to Matter, End, or Movent, is a point important to be
determined (p. 1027, b. 15). Aristotle shows elsewhere that it is
referable to the last of the three--[Greek: to\ poiêtiko/n]
(Asklepius, p. 738, b. 41).
Having now said enough upon Ens _per Accidens_, we proceed to touch
upon the second variety of Ens--Ens as the True, Non-Ens as the
False.
This variety of Ens depends upon conjunction and disjunction, and
forms an aggregate of two portions separately exhibited and brought
together in the Antiphasis. Such conjunction and disjunction is not
in things themselves; but in the act of intelligence which thinks the
two things together and not successively: in regard to simple matters
and Essence, not even any special conjoining act of intelligence is
required; such things must be conceived together, or not conceived at
all (p. 1027, b. 27). The mental act of apprehension, in these cases,
is one and indivisible: you either have it entire at once, or not at
all.
The cause of this variety of Ens is to be found in a certain
affection of the intelligence; that of the preceding variety of Ens
is an undefined or indeterminate cause (b. 34). Both these two
varieties of Ens are peculiar, standing apart from what is most
properly and _par excellence_ Ens, _i.e._, from the Ens according to
the ten Categories, on which we shall now say something.
. . . . . .
Book Z.
We have already stated that Ens is a [Greek: pollachô=s
lego/menon]--distinguished according to the ten figures or genera
called Categories. The first is [Greek: ti/ e)stin], or [Greek:
ou)si/a] (_sensu dignissimo_)--Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15).
The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing
it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all
of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All
the other Categories are called Entia only because they are
quantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man
may even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of
them is either _per se_ or separable. We ought hardly to say that a
quality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all--such
as _currere_, _sedere_, _sanitas_: we ought more properly to say that
_currens equus_, _sedens homo_, _sanus miles_, are Entia, enunciating
along with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance
to which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because
the subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27).
Essentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gô|], a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the
rest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition,
because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are
able to answer _Quid est_? and say that it is _homo_ or _ignis_; not
simply when we are able to answer _Quale_ or _Quantum est_? So that
in answering the great and often-considered question, _Quid est Ens_?
we shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (_hoc sensu
dignissimo_), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, [Greek: peri\ tou=
_ou(/tôs_ o)/ntos]).
Essentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most
manifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the
parts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like,
as well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and
its parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these
the only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an
error to call _these_ Essences, and are all Essences really something
different from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that
the limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even
more than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all
beyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other
Essences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for
example, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two
distinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the
scale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number
of Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers,
Magnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct [Greek: a)rchê/] or principle
for each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the
same nature, and that there are other things coming near to these,
such as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and
the Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these
doctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond
the Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any
separable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or
whether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague
outline what Essence is generally ([Greek: u(potupôsame/nois], b.
31).
There are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia,
[Greek: kuri/ôs] or _sensu dignissimo_: (1) [Greek: to\ ti/ ê)=n
ei)=nai], (2) [Greek: to\ katho/lou], (3) [Greek: to\ ge/nos], (4)
[Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon].
We shall first speak about the fourth--Substratum--which is the
subject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any
subject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, [Greek:
to\ u(pokei/menon prô=ton]. This name applies, in one point of view,
to Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of
the two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): _e.g._, the brass, the
figure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the
Form be _prius_, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will
be also _prius_ and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We
get thus far in the adumbration of Essentia--that it is the subject
of all predicates, but never itself a predicate.
But this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains
obscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be
not so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing
else be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else
are either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while
length, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence,
Quantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First
Subject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only
that something which these three circumscribe; in other words,
Matter--that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither
Quantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other
Categories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of
Essence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining
_per se_ (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain
neither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative
predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others
(a. 25).
Upon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet,
on the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the
principal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc
Aliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter
together, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may
be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than
Matter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the
two components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the
Form, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).
We shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which
are acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this
starting-point to what is more cognizable ([Greek: pro\ e)/rgou ga\r
to\ metabai/nein ei)s to\ gnôrimô/teron]--p. 1029, b. 3. These words
ought properly to come immediately after [Greek: zêtête/on
prô=ton]--p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in
the text, [Greek: e)pei\ d' e)n a)rchê=|--peri\ au)tou=], ought to be
transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately
before the words, [Greek: kai\ prô=ton ei)/pômen]--p. 1029, b. 12.
Bonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp.
129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man
learns in this way--by proceeding from what is less cognizable by
nature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business ([Greek:
e)/rgon]) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to
nature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical
matters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good
by nature good also for each man's self. For it will often happen
that things first and most cognizable to each man's self, are only
faintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet
still, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by
beginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).
Taking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for
Essentia in them, we shall first advert to [Greek: ti/ ê)=n ei)=nai],
which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia,
saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it
(p. 1029, a. 12). The [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each subject is what is
affirmed of it _per se_ ([Greek: e)/sti to\ t.ê.e. e(ka/stô| o(\
le/getai kath' au(to/]--a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical;
you are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are _by
yourself_. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself.
Surface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of
surface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white
surface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because
white itself is included in the definition of white--which cannot be
tolerated. The definition, which explains [Greek: t.ê.e.], must not
include the very word of which you intend to declare the [Greek:
t.ê.e.] If you intend to declare the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of white surface
by the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only
declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).
Now, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we
must enquire whether there is a [Greek: t.ê.e.] belonging to each of
these. Is there, for example, a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for white man? Let
the meaning of these two words be included in the single word
garment. Is there a [Greek: t.ê.e.] for garment? What is it to be a
garment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation _per
se_ (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two
distinct sorts of enunciation _per se_: one including an addition
([Greek: e)k prosthe/seôs]), the other, not? You may define by
intimating something to which the matter defined belongs; _e.g._, in
defining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may
define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory
to the matter defined; _e.g._, garment signifying white man, you may
define garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white
man is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him
(p. 1030, a. 1).
But can we in any way affirm that there is any [Greek: t.ê.e.] to
garment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is
none (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti] ([Greek: o(/per ga\r to/de ti
e)/sti to\ t.ê.e.]--a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, _i.e._, a particular
concrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say
white man, this is not of the nature of [Greek: to/de ti], if [Greek:
to/de ti] belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that
[Greek: to/de ti] belongs to all those matters of which the rational
explanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of
a name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if
this were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be
called a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary
something; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something
about another (a. 10). There will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.], therefore,
except for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is
not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation.
Respecting every thing besides, there will be no [Greek: t.ê.e.] or
definition, but there may be a rational explanation ([Greek: lo/gos])
of what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted
in place of a simpler (a. 16).
Yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of
[Greek: t.ê.e.] and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that
both the one and the other are used in many different senses (p.
1030, a. 18)? For the _Quid est_ ([Greek: to\ ti/ e)stin]) signifies
in one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the
other Categories each respectively. To all of them _Est_ belongs,
though not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially
to the rest; so also _Quid est_ belongs simply and directly to
Essence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting
Quale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire _Quid Est_? so that
Quale also comes under the _Quid est_, though not absolutely or
directly ([Greek: ou)ch a(plô=s], a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens;
for some assert in words that _Est_ belongs to Non-Ens also though
not absolutely, viz., Non Ens _est_ Non-Ens--(a. 26).
Now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any
particular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine
how the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: [Greek: dei=
me\n ou)=n skopei=n kai\ to\ pô=s dei= le/gein peri\ e(/kaston, ou)
mê\n ma=llo/n ge ê)\ to\ pô=s e)/chei.] This contrast of [Greek: pô=s
dei= le/gein] with [Greek: pô=s e)/chei] appears to refer to what had
been said two lines before: [Greek: _logikô=s_ phasi/ tines ei)=nai
to\ mê\ o)/n]--verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The
phraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore
recognize that [Greek: t.ê.e.], as well as [Greek: ti/ e)sti],
belongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way
to the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but [Greek: poiô=|
t.ê.e., po/sô| t.ê.e.], &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the
Categories to be simply _æquivoca_, or we must recognize this
addition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the
non-cognizable cognizable ([Greek: ô(/sper kai\ to\ mê\ e)pistêto\n
e)pistêto/n]--a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the
Scholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is,
that they are neither _æquivoca_ nor _univoca_, but in an
intermediate grade of relation--not [Greek: kath' e(/n], but [Greek:
pro\s e(/n] (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they
like; but the truth is, that there is both [Greek: t.ê.e.] and
Definition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other
Categories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you
may give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply
in a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).
There is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define
any matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more
elements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness
out of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and
hollowness belonging to the nose _per se_, not as an affection or
accessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male
belongs to animal, or equal to quantity, _i.e._, _per se_ (p. 1030,
b. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and
you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates
belong to their subject _per se_, but in a different sense (see
Bonitz's note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given
above (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be
in a different sense: Definition and [Greek: t.ê.e.] being recognized
both of them as [Greek: pollachô=s lego/mena]. Definition therefore
is the mode of explanation which declares the [Greek: t.ê.e.], and
belongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily,
directly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).
We have now to enquire--Whether each particular thing, and its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This
will assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each
thing is not different from its own Essence, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.]
is said to be the Essence of each thing.
In regard to subjects enunciated _per accidens_, the above two would
seem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white
man. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as
the being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that
man, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the
being a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this
last inference is not necessary; for _same_ is used in a different
sense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you
say, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But
perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same _per
accidens_ (_i.e._, by being truly predicated of the same subject);
and that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white--Sokrates is
musical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the
same as the being musical. But this will be denied ([Greek: dokei= d'
ou)/]--p. 1031, a. 28).
In regard to subjects enunciated _per se_, the case is otherwise:
here each thing is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.] Suppose, _e.g._,
there exist any Essentiæ (such as Plato and others make the Ideas)
prior to all others; in that case, if the [Greek: au)toagatho/n] were
distinct from [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai], and the [Greek:
au)tozô=|on] distinct from [Greek: to\ zô/|ô| ei)=nai], there must be
other Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we
believe [Greek: t.ê.e.] to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia
anterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover,
if the Essentiæ or Ideas, and the [Greek: t.ê.e.], be disjoined
([Greek: a)polelume/nai]--p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be
uncognizable, and the last will be non-existent ([Greek: ta\ d' ou)k
e)/stai]--b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its
[Greek: t.ê.e.] This will be alike true of all [Greek: t.ê.e.]; all
of them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If [Greek:
to\ o)/nti ei)=nai] be not identical with [Greek: to\ o)/n], neither
is [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] identical with [Greek: to\
a)gatho/n], &c. But that of which [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai] is
not truly predicable, is not [Greek: a)gatho/n] (b. 11).
Hence we see that of necessity [Greek: to\ a)gatho/n] is one and the
same with [Greek: to\ a)gathô=| ei)=nai]; likewise [Greek: to\
kalo/n], with [Greek: to\ kalô=| ei)=nai]; and so in all cases where
the term enunciates a subject primarily and _per se_, not a predicate
of some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: [Greek: o(/sa mê\
kat' a)/llo le/gêtai, a)lla\ kath' au(ta\ kai\ prô=ta]). This last is
the characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be
not admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b.
14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato
declares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot
be Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as
predicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense,
they would be Essences _per participationem_; which is inconsistent
with what is said about them by Plato ([Greek: e)/sontai ga\r kata\
me/thexin]--b. 18).
These reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated _per se_
and not _per accidens_, is the same with its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that to
know each thing, is, to know its [Greek: t.ê.e.]; that, if you
proceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same ([Greek:
ô(/ste kata\ tê\n e)/kthesin a)na/gkê e(/n ti ei)=nai a)/mphô]--p.
1031, b. 21; with Bonitz's explanation of [Greek: e)/kthesis] in his
Note).
But that which is enunciated _per accidens_ (_e.g._, _album_,
_musicum_) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its
[Greek: t.ê.e.], because it has a double signification: it signifies
both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so
that in a certain aspect it is identical with its [Greek: t.ê.e.],
and in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26).
The being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the
subject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: [Greek: ou)
tau)to\, pa/thei de\ tau)to/]--obscure). The absurdity of supposing,
that the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a thing is different from the thing
itself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the
[Greek: t.ê.e.] For there must be another [Greek: t.ê.e.] above this,
being the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of the first [Greek: t.ê.e.]; and it would
be necessary to provide a new name for the second [Greek: t.ê.e.];
and so forward, in an ascending march _ad infinitum_. What hinders us
from admitting some things at once, as identical with their [Greek:
t.ê.e.], if the [Greek: t.ê.e.] be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the
preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with
its [Greek: t.ê.e.], but that the rational explanation ([Greek:
lo/gos]) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and
the same not _per accidens_, but _per se_ (p. 1032, a. 2). If they
were different, you would have to ascend to a higher [Greek: t.ê.e.]
of the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a.
4).
It is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated _per se_ and
primarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its [Greek:
t.ê.e.] The refutations brought by the Sophists against this
doctrine, and the puzzles which they start, _e.g._, Whether Sokrates
and the being Sokrates are the same,--may be cleared up by the
explanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference
what particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve
as another (a. 10).
Of things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some
Spontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something,
by something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12).
The word _something_ applies to each and all the Categories. Natural
generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from
Nature ([Greek: e)k phu/seôs]); having [Greek: to\ e)x ou(=]--what we
call Matter, [Greek: to\ u(ph' ou(=]--one of the things existing by
nature ([Greek: tô=n phu/sei ti o)/ntôn]--a. 17), and [Greek: to\
ti/], such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in
the fullest sense ([Greek: ma/lista ou)si/as]). All things generated
either by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them
may be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a.
20). As an universal truth ([Greek: katho/lou]), Nature includes (1)
That _out of which_, or Matter; (2) That _according to which_
([Greek: kath' o(/]), every thing which is generated having a
definite nature or Form, such as plant or animal; That _by which_, or
nature characterized according to the Form, being the same Form as
the thing generated but in another individual; for a man begets a man
(a. 24).
The other generations are called Constructions ([Greek: poiê/seis]),
which are either from Art, or from Power, or from Intelligence. It is
with these as with natural generations: some of them occur both by
spontaneity and by chance ([Greek: kai\ a)po\ tau)toma/tou kai\ a)po\
tu/chês]--p. 1032, a. 29; the principle of these last is apparently
[Greek: _du/namis_], the second of the three _principia_ announced
just before (?)); both in the one and in the other, some products
arise without seed as well as with seed, which we shall presently
advert to.
The generations from Art are those of which the Form is in the mind.
By Form I mean the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of each thing and its First
Essence ([Greek: tê\n prô/tên ou)si/an], p. 1032, b. 1). For, in a
certain way, the Form even of contraries is the same; since the
essence of privation is the opposite essence: for example, health is
the essence of disease; for disease is declared or described as
absence of health, and health is the rational notion existing in the
mind and in science. Now a healthy subject is generated by such an
antecedent train of thought as follows ([Greek: gi/gnetai dê\ to\
u(gie\s noê/santos ou(/tôs]--b. 6):--Since health is so and so, there
is necessity, if the subject is to attain health, that such and such
things should occur, _e.g._, an even temperature of the body, for
which latter purpose heat must be produced; and so on farther, until
the thought rests upon something which is in the physician's power to
construct. The motion proceeding from this last thought is called
Construction (b. 10), tending as it does towards health. So that, in
a certain point of view, health may be said to be generated out of
health, and a house out of a house; for the medical art is the form
of health and the building art the form of the house: I mean the
[Greek: t.ê.e.], or the Essence without Matter, thereof (b. 14). Of
the generations and motions here enumerated, one is called Rational
Apprehension, viz., that one which takes its departure from the
Principle and the Form; the other, Construction, viz., that which
takes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational
apprehension ([Greek: a)po\ tou= teleutai/ou tê=s noê/seôs]--b. 17).
The like may be said about each of the intermediate steps: I mean, if
the patient is to be restored to health, he must be brought to an
even temperature. But the being brought to an even temperature, what
is it? It is so and so; it will be a consequence of his being warmed.
And this last again--what is it? So and so; which already exists
potentially, since it depends upon the physician to produce it, the
means being at his command ([Greek: tou=to d' ê)/dê e)p' au)tô=|]--b.
21).
We see thus that the Constructive Agency ([Greek: to\ poiou=n]) and
the point from which the motion towards producing health takes its
origin, is, when the process is one of Art, the Form present in the
mind; and, when the process is one of Spontaneity, it proceeds from
that which would be the first proceeding of the artist, if Art had
been concerned. In the medical art, _e.g._, the artist begins by
imparting warmth. He does this by rubbing. But this warmth might
perhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by
the artist. The warmth is the prime agent, in the case of spontaneous
production. The warmth is either a part of health, or a condition to
the existence of health, as bricks are to that of a house (p. 1032,
b. 30).
Nothing can be generated, if nothing pre-existed--as has been already
said before. Some part of what is generated must exist before: Matter
pre-exists, as in-dwelling and not generated ([Greek: ê( ga\r u(/lê
me/ros; e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ gi/gnetai au(/tê]--p. 1033, a. 1. I do
not understand these last words: it ought surely to be--[Greek:
e)nupa/rchei ga\r kai\ _ou)_ gi/gnetai au(/tê]. Bonitz's explanation
suits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual
text.).
But something of the Form or rational explanation ([Greek: tô=n e)n
tô=| lo/gô|]) must also pre-exist. In regard to a brazen circle, if
we are asked, _Quid est_? we answer in two ways: We say of the
Matter--It is brass; We say of the Form--It is such and such a
figure. And this is the genus in which it is first placed (p. 1033,
a. 4).
The brazen circle has Matter in its rational explanation. But that
which is generated, is called not by the name of the Matter out of
which it is generated, but by a derivative name formed therefrom; not
[Greek: e)kei=no], but [Greek: e)kei/ninon]. A statue is called not
[Greek: li/thos], but [Greek: li/thinos]. But, when a man is made
healthy, he is not said to be the Matter out of which the health is
generated; because that which we call the Matter is generated out of
Privation along with the subject. Thus, both the man becomes healthy,
and the patient becomes healthy; but the generation is more properly
said to come out of Privation: we say, _Sanus ex ægroto generatur_,
rather than, _Sanus ex homine generatur_ (p. 1033, a. 12). In cases
where the Privation is unmarked and unnamed, as, in the case of
brass, privation of the spherical, or any other, figure, and, in the
case of a house, the privation of bricks or wood, the work is said to
be generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man (a.
14). Nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the
material out of which it is made, but by a paronym thereof; not
[Greek: xu/lon] but [Greek: xu/linon] (a. 18). In strict propriety,
indeed, we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass, nor
the house out of wood; for the _materia ex quâ_ ought to be something
which undergoes change, not something which remains unchanged (a.
21).
It was remarked that in Generation there are three things or aspects
to be distinguished--
1. [Greek: To\ u(ph' ou(=, o(/then ê( a)rchê\ tê=s gene/seôs].
2. [Greek: To\ e)x ou(=]--rather [Greek: u(/lê] than [Greek:
ste/rêsis].
3. [Greek: Ti/ gi/gnetai].
Having already touched upon the two first, I now proceed to the
third. What is it that is generated? Neither the Matter, nor the
Form, but the embodiment or combination of the two. An artisan does
not construct either the brass or the sphere, but the brazen sphere.
If he be said to construct the sphere, it is only by accident
([Greek: kata\ sumbebêko/s]), since the sphere in this particular
case happens to be of brass. Out of the entire subject-matter, he
constructs a distinct individual Something (p. 1033, a. 31). To make
the brass round, is not to make the round, or to make the sphere, but
to make a something different: that is the Form (of sphericity)
embodied in another thing (a. 32). For, if the artisan made the round
or the sphere, he must make them out of something different,
pre-existing as a subject: _e.g._, he makes a brazen sphere, and in
this sense--that he makes out of that Matter, which is brass, this
different something, which is a sphere. If he made the sphere
itself--the Form of sphere--he must make it out of some pre-existent
subject; and you would thus carry back _ad infinitum_ the different
acts of generation and different pre-existent subjects (b. 4).
It is, therefore, clear that [Greek: to\ ei)=dos], or by whatever
name the shape of the percipiend is to be called, is not generated,
nor is generation thereof possible; nor is there any [Greek: t.ê.e.]
thereof; that is, of the Form abstractedly: for it is this very
[Greek: t.ê.e.] which is generated or becomes embodied in something
else, either by nature, or by art, or by spontaneous power (p. 1033,
b. 8). The artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist, for he makes it
out of brass (Matter), and the sphere (Form): he makes or embodies
the Form into this Matter, and that is a brazen sphere (b. 11). If
there be any generation of the sphere _per se_ ([Greek: tou=
sphaira=| ei)=nai]), it must be Something out of Something; for the
Generatum must always be resolvable into a certain Matter and a
certain Form. Let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points
of the circumference are equidistant from the centre; here are three
things to be considered: (1) That in which what is constructed
resides; (2) That which does so reside; (3) The entire Something
generated or constructed--the brazen sphere. We see thus plainly that
what is called the Form or Essence itself is not generated, but the
combination called _according to the Form_ is generated; moreover
that in every Generatum there is Matter, so that the Generatum is in
each case this or that (b. 19).
Can it be true, then, that there exists any sphere or house beyond
those which we see or touch (_i.e._, any Form or Idea of a sphere,
such as Plato advocates)? If there existed any such, it could never
have become or been generated into Hoc Aliquid. It signifies only
_tale_. It is neither This nor That nor any thing defined: but it (or
rather the Constructive Agency) makes or generates _ex hoc tale_; and
when this last has been generated, it is Tale Hoc (p. 1033, b. 22),
and the entire compound is Kallias, or Sokrates, or _this_ brazen
sphere, while man, animal, &c., are analogous to brazen sphere
generally. Even if there exist Platonic Forms by themselves, they
could be of no use towards generation or the production of Essences.
Frequently it is obvious that the Generans is like the Generatum,
only a different individual. There is no occasion to assume the
Platonic Form as an Exemplar; for the generating individual is quite
sufficient of itself to be the cause of the Form in a new mass of
Matter. The entire result is the given Form in these particular bones
and flesh--called Kallias or Sokrates: each is different so far as
Matter, but the same in the Form; for the Form is indivisible (p.
1034, a. 7).
But how does it happen that there are some things which are generated
sometimes by art, sometimes spontaneously (_e.g._, health), while in
other things (_e.g._, a house) spontaneous production never takes
place? The reason is, that, in the first class of cases, the Matter
which governs the work of generation by the artist, and in which
itself a part of the finished product resides, is of a nature to be
moved or modified by itself, while, in the second, this is not the
fact; and to be moved, besides, in a certain manner and direction;
for there are many things which are movable by themselves, but not in
such manner and direction as the case which we are supposing
requires. For example, stones are incapable of being moved in certain
directions except by some other force, but they are capable of being
moved by themselves in another direction; the like with fire. It is
upon this that the distinction turns between some results which
cannot be realized without an artist, and others which may perhaps be
so realized (a. 17).
It is plain from what has been said that, in a certain sense,
everything is generated from something of the same name, as natural
objects are (_e.g._, a man); or from something in part bearing the
same name (as a house out of the ideal form of a house), or from
something which possesses that which in part bears the same name; for
the first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing
generated. The heat in the motion generates heat in the body; and
this is either health, or a part of health, or the antecedent of one
or other of these; hence it is said to produce or generate health,
because it produces that of which health is concomitant and
consequent (p. 1034, a. 30; see Bonitz's correction in his Note).
Essence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all
generations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or
principle of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths
of Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art
constructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form,
and that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the
same name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find
_all_ generations analogous to that of man from man--woman also is
generated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule--though
this is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b.
3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in
that of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same
manner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved
by itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from
similar predecessors (b. 7, [Greek: e)x au)tô=n]--compare Bonitz's
note: "non ex ipsis, sed [Greek: e)x au)tô=n tô=n poiou/ntôn]").
This doctrine--That the Form is not generated, does not belong to
Essence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike--Quality,
Quantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality
_per se_ which is generated, but _tale lignum_, _talis homo_: nor the
Form Quantity _per se_, but _tantum lignum_ or _animal_ (b. 15). But,
in regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as
compared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence,
there must pre-exist as generator another _actual_ and _complete_
Essence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing
pre-existing beyond a _potential_ Quality or a _potential_ Quantity
(b. 16).
A difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a
rational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the
explanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the
thing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or
not, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in
the rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases
it appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a
circle does not include that of its segments; but the rational
explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters.
Moreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle
be a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the
acute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the
man. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems
prior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is
given from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to
existing without the other, right angle and man seem _priora_. In
fact the word _part_ is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings
to call it--that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But
let us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is
that Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter,
(2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be
Essence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of
something, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of
view, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the
rational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus,
flesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness
is generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness;
the brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the
statue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may
discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form
(apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the
material part _per se_, or the statue considered as Matter only (a.
7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain
that of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of
the syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters
are parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form
is superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the
Matter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12):
they are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form
of a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain
way, indeed, it cannot be said that _all_ the letters are contained
in the rational explanation of the syllables; _e.g._, the letters
inscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those
letters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable,
in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: [Greek:
ô(s u(/lê ai)sthêtê/]). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to
bones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the
man is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of
his Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form,
nor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly
they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational
explanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or
concrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed
into the same _principia_ out of which they are formed; in other
cases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in
conjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen
circle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from
Matter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (_i.e._, the
concretes) have thus both _principia_ and parts subordinate; but
neither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The
plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle
into brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when
understood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle
is used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle,
sometimes to designate this or that particular circle--particular
circles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).
That which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to
recapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts
of the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is
divided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the
notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one
of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided;
for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right
angle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without
introducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the
man--the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into
which man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into
which man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are
prior to man--at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the
soul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being--b. 15)
is the Essence and the Form and the [Greek: t.ê.e.] of a suitably
arranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be
given, which does not include the function of that part, and this
cannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows
that the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to
the entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case.
But the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and
into these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is
divided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire
man, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all
separately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform
its functions, _i.e._, unless it be animated by a central soul; it is
not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs;
after death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There
are, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the
Form or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor
posterior but _simul_ to the entire animal (b. 25).
Man, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of
particular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given
Form and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to
compose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest
in the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that
Sokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b.
30).
Thus, there are parts of the Form or [Greek: t.ê.e.], parts of the
Matter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the
parts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational
explanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for
circle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul--are one and
the same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular
circle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a
particular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely
conceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular
circles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a.
6. [Greek: Noei=n] here means the equivalent of [Greek: a)phairei=n =
chôri/zein tê=| dianoi/a|]--"die Thätigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch
welche das Mathematische gewonnen wird"--Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p.
101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or
imagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or
not; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational
explanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: [Greek:
a)peltho/ntas d' e)k tê=s e)ntelechei/as ou) dê=lon po/tero/n pote/
ei)sin ê)\ ou)k ei)si/n, a)ll' a)ei\ le/gontai kai\ gnôri/zontai tô=|
katho/lou lo/gô|.] I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the
[Greek: ku/klos noêto/s] only, not of the [Greek: ku/klos
ai)sthêto/s] or [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos]. He had before told us
that, when the [Greek: chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek:
e)ntele/cheia] or [Greek: phthei/retai], it passes into [Greek:
chalko/s]. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the [Greek:
chalkou=s ku/klos] passes out of [Greek: e)ntele/cheia], we do not
clearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the [Greek:
ku/klos noêto/s] or mathematical circle, he might well say that we
did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the
circumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say [Greek:
ei)s o(\ phthei/retai]). Matter is unknowable _per se_ ([Greek: kath'
au(tê/n]--a. 9, _i.e._, if altogether without Form). One variety of
Matter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable
matter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in
the perceivable variety, but not _quâ_ perceivable--the mathematical
figures ([Greek: noêtê\ de\ ê( e)n toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s u(pa/rchousa
mê\ ê(=| ai)sthêta/, oi(=on ta\ mathêmatika/]--a. 12; _i.e._, making
abstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by
sense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving
behind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a
geometrical line).
We have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part,
Prius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle,
the circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is
divided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely
either Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying
what we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19).
If by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by
the circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or
Essence thereof,--then this Form is posterior in regard to the
notional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the
particular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the
entire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures
realized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these
is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a.
25).
Another reasonable doubt arises here ([Greek: a)porei=tai d'
ei)ko/tôs]--p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form
alone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we
can define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the
Form, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do
not, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30).
Now, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters
diverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one
sees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that
neither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of
the circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But,
if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would
have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass,
and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form
of circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical
ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for
the brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2).
This is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated
with flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form
of man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are
unable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it
in conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility,
and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some
theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and
apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists
contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by
figure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of
the Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of
the Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and
they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of
a line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad
[Greek: au)togrammê/] others call it the Form of a line; saying that
in some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same,
as the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about
line. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only
to differ in the phrase. [Greek: Au)togrammê/] means the same as
[Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s]: it seems to have been a peculiar
phrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred
to say [Greek: to\ ei)=dos tê=s grammê=s].) These reasonings have
already misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others
also: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same
Form in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead
us even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing
besides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real
Form. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things
as One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.
We see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the
theory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because
some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing
and in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include
Matter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, _i.e._,
this along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b.
22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make
about the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may
be without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass.
But this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by
sense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not
without bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand
is not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but
only when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated;
when not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the
first Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the
compound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are
as particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates
as soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these
words are very obscure).
Respecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the
**parts parts of the notion of the whole? _e.g._, why is not the
notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it
will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable
by sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things
even not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and
indeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not [Greek: t.ê.e.]
and Form [Greek: au)to\ kath' au(to/]. The semi-circles are not
included as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are
parts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable
and another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34.--Bonitz remarks that these
words from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper
place). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of
these Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form
and Essence for them--such as numbers, must be reserved for future
enquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters
about perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the
province of Second Philosophy--of the physical theorist ([Greek: tê=s
phusikê=s kai\ deute/ras philosophi/as e)/rgon]--p. 1037, a. 15). The
physical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or
notional Essence even more (a. 17).
We are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the
Analytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17,
a. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the
definition is One? We define man _animal bipes_: How is it that this
is One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not
belong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the
former, the two are One--white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they
are One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos]. But the parts included in the
definition are not One [Greek: kata\ pa/thos], nor are they one
[Greek: kata\ me/thexin]; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of
the Differentiæ. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake
of Opposita, for the Differentiæ are Opposita to each other. And,
even if we say that the Genus does partake of the Differentiæ, the
same difficulty recurs, when the Differentiæ are numerous. The Genus
must partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all
of them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them
belong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be
included in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why
or how those Differentiæ which are included in the definition
coalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the _definiend_
[Greek: e(/n ti kai\ to/de ti] (b. 27).
In answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition
which arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b.
28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the
Genus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two
coalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of
man--_animal bipes_--_animal_ is the Matter and _bipes_ the Form; so
that the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify
through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided
it be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and
appropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be
complied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding,
and will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You
divide the genus animal first into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun--zô=|on
a)pou=n]; you next divide [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] into [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun--zô=|on u(po/poun polu/poun]; or perhaps
into [Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun schizo/pun--zô=|on u(po/poun
a)/schiston]. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to
[Greek: zô=|on u(po/poun] should be founded upon some subordinate
differentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: [Greek:
au(=tai ga\r diaphorai\ podo/s; ê( ga\r schizopodi/a podo/tês tis]).
If it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new
attribute (_e. g._, [Greek: pterôto/n, a)/pteron]), the division will
be unphilosophical. The last differentia [Greek: zô=|on di/poun]
includes the preceding differentia [Greek: u(po/poun]: to say [Greek:
zô=|on u(po/poun di/poun] would be tautology. Where each differentia
is a differentia of the preceding differentiæ, the last differentia
includes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the
genus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation
arising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it
virtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: [Greek: o( o(rismo\s
lo/gos e)sti\n o( e)k tô=n diaphorô=n, kai\ tou/tôn tê=s teleutai/as
kata/ ge to\ o)rtho/n]).
In the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of
parts; no subordination of _prius_ and _posterius_; all are equally
essential and coordinate ([Greek: ta/xis d' ou)k e)/stin e)n tê=|
ou)si/a|]--p. 1038, a. 33).
As we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go
back to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four
varieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The
Subject--Substratum--Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two
different ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by
various accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter
implicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form--Essence--the
[Greek: t.ê.e.]; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two;
(4) The Universal ([Greek: to\ katho/lou]). Of these four, we have
already examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.
Some philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and
eminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems
impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be
Essence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to
nothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many
things. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all
or of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any
one, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the
Essence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the
Essence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the
Universal is always predicated of a subject.
Perhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not
identical with [Greek: t.ê.e.], but is Essence which is immanent in
or belongs to [Greek: t.ê.e.], as animal in man and horse. But this
cannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or
not, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of
something to which it belongs peculiarly, as _homo_ is the essence of
man peculiarly; but, if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of
man, it will be the essence of something to which it does not
peculiarly belong; and this contradicts the definition of Essence (p.
1038, b. 15-23. This passage is very obscure, even after Bonitz and
Schwegler's explanatory notes. I incline to Schwegler, and to his
remark, Comm. II. p. 115, that the text of b. 23 ought to be written
[Greek: e)n ô(=| _mê\_ ô(s i)/dion u(pa/rchei].).
Again, it is impossible that Essence, if composed of any elements,
can be composed of what is not Essence, as of Quality; for this would
make Quality _prius_ as regards Essence; which it cannot be, either
in reason ([Greek: lo/gô|]), or in time, or in generation. If this
were so, the affections would be separable from Essences (p. 1038, b.
28). Essence, if composed of any thing, must be composed of Essence.
Once more, if the individual man or horse are Essences, nothing which
is in the definition of these can be Essence; nor apart from that of
which it is Essence; nor in any thing else. There cannot be any man,
apart from individual men (p. 1038, b. 34).
Hence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are
Essence: none of them signify Hoc Aliquid, but Tale. To suppose
otherwise, would open the door to many inadmissible consequences,
especially to the argument of the 'Third Man' (p. 1039, a. 2).
Another argument to the same purpose:--It is impossible that Essence
can be composed of different Essences immanent in one Entelechy. Two
in the same Entelechy can never be One in Entelechy. If indeed they
be two _in potentiâ_, they may coalesce into one Entelechy, like one
double out of two potential halves. But Entelechy establishes a
separate and complete existence (p. 1039, a. 7); so that, if Essence
is One, it cannot be made up of distinct Essences immanent or
inherent. Demokritus, who recognized only the atoms as Essences, was
right in saying, that two of them could not be One, nor one of them
Two. The like is true about number, if number be, as some contend, a
synthesis of monads. For either the dyad is not One; or else the
monads included therein are not monads [Greek: e)ntelechei/a|] (a.
14).
Here however we stumble upon a difficulty. For, if no Essence can be
put together out of Universals, nor any compound Essence out of other
Essences existing as Entelechies, all Essence must necessarily be
simple and uncompounded, so that no definition can be given of it.
But this is opposed to every one's opinion, and to what has been said
long ago, that Essence alone could be defined; or at least Essence
most of all. It now appears that there can be no definition of
Essence, nor by consequence of any thing else. Perhaps, however this
may be only true in a certain sense: in one way, definition is
possible; in another way, not. We shall endeavour to clear up the
point presently (p. 1039, a. 22.--Schwegler says in his note upon
this passage: "Die von Aristoteles häufig berührte, doch nie zur
abschliessenden Lösung gebrachte, Grundaporie des aristotelischen
Systems"--Comm. II. p. 117).
Those who maintain that Ideas are self-existent are involved in
farther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the Species
is composed out of Genus and Differentia. For, suppose that these
Ideas are self-existent and that [Greek: au)tozô=|on] exists both in
man and horse: [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is, in these two, either the same
or different numerically. It is, of course, the same in definition or
notion ([Greek: lo/gô|]); of that there can be no doubt. If it be
numerically same ([Greek: ô(/sper su= sautô=|]) in man and in horse,
how can this same exist at once in separate beings, unless we suppose
the absurdity that it exists apart from itself (p. 1039, b. 1)?
Again, are we to imagine that this generic Ens, [Greek: au)tozô=|on],
partakes at the same time of contrary differentiæ--the dipod,
polypod, apod? If it does not, how can dipodic or polypodic animals
really exist? Nor is the difficulty at all lessened, if, instead of
saying that the generic Ens partakes of differentiæ, you say that it
is _mixed_ with them, or _compounded_ of them, or _in contact_ with
them. There is nothing but a tissue of absurdities ([Greek: pa/nta
a)/toma]--b. 6).
But take the contrary supposition and suppose that the [Greek:
au)tozô=|on] is numerically different in man, horse, &c. On this
admission, there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of
whom the [Greek: au)tozô=|on] is the Essence; man, for example, since
animal is not accidental, but essential, as a constituent of man (p.
1039, b. 8). [Greek: Au)tozô=|on] will thus be Many ("ein
Vielerlei"--Schwegler); for it will be the Essence of each particular
animal, of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally
([Greek: ou) ga\r ka/t' a)/llo le/getai]--_i.e._, this is not a case
where the predicate is something distinct from the subject). Moreover
all the constituents of man will be alike Ideas (_e.g._, not merely
[Greek: zô=|on], but [Greek: di/poun]): now the same cannot be Idea of
one thing and Essence of another; accordingly, [Greek: au)tozô=|on]
will be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals
([Greek: di/poun, polu/poun], b. 14).
Again, whence comes [Greek: au)tozô=|on] itself, and how do the
particular animals arise out of it? How can the [Greek: zô=|on] which
is Essence, exist apart from and alongside of [Greek: au)to\ to\
zô=|on]? (p. 1039, b. 15.)
These arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any
such Ideas as some philosophers affirm (p. 1039, b. 18).
We have already said that there are two varieties of Essence: (1) The
Form alone, (2) The Form embodied in Matter. The Form or Essence in
the first meaning, is neither generable nor destructible; in the
second meaning it is both. [Greek: To\ oi)ki/a| ei)=nai] is neither
generable nor destructible; [Greek: to\ tê=|de tê=| oi)ki/a| ei)=nai]
is both the one and the other (p. 1039, b. 25). Of these last,
therefore, the perceivable or concrete Essences, there can be no
definition nor demonstration, because they are implicated with
Matter, which is noway necessary, or unchangeable, but may exist or
not exist, change or not change. Demonstration belongs only to what
is necessary; Definition only to Science, which cannot be to-day
Science and to-morrow Ignorance. Neither Science, nor Demonstration,
nor Definition, applies to such things as may be otherwise: these
latter belong to Opinion ([Greek: tou= e)ndechome/nou a)/llôs
e)/chein]--p. 1040, a. 1). You cannot have Science or Demonstration
or Definition about particular or perceivable things, because they
are destroyed and pass out of perception, so that you do not know
what continues to be true about them; even though you preserve the
definition in your memory, you cannot tell how far it continues
applicable to them (a. 7). Any definition given is liable to be
overthrown.
Upon the same principle, there cannot be any definition of the
Platonic Ideas; each of which is announced as a particular, distinct,
separable, Ens (p. 1040, a. 8). The definition must be composed of
words--of the words of a language generally understood--and of words
which, being used by many persons, are applicable to other
particulars besides the definiend (you define Alexander as white,
thin, a philosopher, a native of Aphrodisias, &c., all of which are
characteristics applicable to many other persons besides). The
definer may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply
to many things, but that the aggregate of all together will apply to
none except the definiend. We reply however, that [Greek: zô=|on
di/poun] must have at least two subjects to which it applies--[Greek:
to\ zô=|on] and [Greek: to\ di/poun]. Of course this is all the more
evident about eternal Entia like the Platonic Ideas, which are prior
to the compound and parts thereof ([Greek: zô=|on] and [Greek:
di/poun] are each prior and both of them parts of [Greek:
au)toa/nthrôpos]), and separable, just as [Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos] is
separable (a. 14-20); for either neither of them is separable, or
both are so. If neither of them is separable, then the Genus is
nothing apart from the Species, and the Platonic assumption of
self-existent Ideas falls to the ground; if both are separable, then
the Differentia is self-existent as well as the Genus (a. 21): there
exist some Ideas prior to other Ideas. Moreover, the Genus and
Differentia, the component elements of the Species, are logically
prior to the Species: suppress the Species, and you do not suppress
its component elements; suppress these, and you _do_ suppress the
Species (a. 21). We reply farther that, if the more compound Ideas
arise out of the less compound, the component elements (like [Greek:
zô=|on di/poun]) must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects.
If this be not so always, how are we to distinguish the cases in
which it is true from those in which it is not? You must assume the
existence of some Idea which can only be predicated of some one
subject, and no others. But this seems impossible. Every Idea is
participable (a. 27).
These philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of
eternal Essences (which the Platonic Ideas are), especially in cases
where the objects are essentially unique, as Sun, or Moon, or Earth
(p. 1040, a. 29). When they try to define Sun, they are forced to use
phrases which are applicable to many in common; but Sun, (and each
Idea) is particular and individual, like Kleon or Sokrates. Why does
none of them produce a definition of an Idea? If any one tried, he
would soon see the pertinence of the above remarks (b. 3).
(Alexander, Bonitz, and Schwegler, all observe incidentally that the
reasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical.
Bonitz, p. 352, gives a good summary of the chapter, concluding: "Hoc
capite non id ipsum demonstrat, res singulas non esse substantias,
sed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam; nimirum
quum substantiæ vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem
demonstratum sit, c. 4, hoc si comprobat, illud simul est
comprobatum.")
It is farther evident that many apparent Essences are not strictly
and truly Essences; for example, the parts of animals; since not one
of them is separated from the whole ([Greek: ou)the\n ga\r
kechôrisme/non au)tô=n e)sti/n]--p. 1040, b. 6; Alexander says _ad
loc._: [Greek: ou)si/as e)kei=na/ phamen o(/sa kath' au(ta\ o)/nta
du/natai to\ oi)kei=on e)/rgon a)potelei=n; ou)si/a ga\r ou)de\n
a)/llo e)sti\n ê)\ to\ a)ph' ou(= to\ e(ka/stou e)/rgon
e)kplêrou=tai; ou)si/a ga\r kai\ ei)=dos Sôkra/tous ê( tou=
Sôkra/tous psuchê/, a)ph' ê(=s au)tô=| to\ tou= a)nthrô/pou ê(=|
a)/nthrôpos e)/rgon e)kplêrou=n]). When any one of them is separated,
it exists only in the character of Matter--earth, fire, air; none of
them, in this separate condition, being an unity, but only like a
heap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined
into one. We might suppose, indeed, that the parts of the body, and
the parts of the soul, of animated beings, come near to Essence, both
one and the other, alike potentially and actually (b. 12), because
they have principles of motion in their turnings ([Greek: kampai=s]),
so that in some cases they continue separately alive after division.
Still the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as
nothing more than potential, wherever the oneness and continuity of
the whole is the work of Nature (b. 15), and not a mere case of
contact or forcible conjunction.
Nevertheless the being One, or Unity (p. 1040, b. 16), is not itself
the Essence of things. Unum is predicated in the same manner as Ens;
the two may always be predicated together: the Essence of Unum is
One; and things of which the Essence is Unum Numero, are themselves
numerically one. Neither Unum nor Ens is the Essence of things any
more than the being an Element, or the being a Principle, can be the
Essence thereof: we have farther to enquire what the Principle is, in
order to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape (b. 20). Unum
and Ens are more near to Essence than either Element, Principle, or
Cause; nevertheless neither Unum nor Ens is Essence; for nothing
which is common to many things is Essence. Essence belongs only to
itself and to that which has itself. Farther, Unum cannot be in many
places at once; but that which is common is in many places at once.
It is thus plain that nothing Universal exists apart or separate from
particulars (b. 27).
The advocates of the (Platonic) Ideas are right in affirming them to
be separate, if they be Essences; but they are wrong in calling that
which is predicable of many things (the Universal) an Idea (p. 1040,
b. 29). When asked, What are these indestructible Essences of which
you speak, as apart from the visible individual objects?--they had no
intelligible answer to give. Accordingly they were forced to make
these Essences the same specifically with the destructible
(individual) objects; for _these_ we do know (b. 33). They simply
prefixed the word [Greek: au)to/] to the names of sensible
objects--[Greek: au)toa/nthrôpos, au)toi+/ppos]. But these Ideas
might still exist, even though we knew not what they were; just as
eternal Essences like the stars would still exist, even though we
had never seen them (p. 1041, a. 2).
Let us again examine what we call Essence, and what sort of thing it
is; and let us take another point of departure, which may perhaps
help us to understand what that Essence is which is apart and
separate from perceivable Essences (p. 1041, a. 9). We know that
Essence is a certain variety of Principle or Cause; and from this
premiss we will reason (a. 10). Now the enquiry into Cause, or the
Why, always comes in this shape: Why does one thing belong to
another? The enquiry, Why a thing is itself? is idle. The fact--the
[Greek: o(/ti]--must be assumed to be clear and known in the first
instance. You know that the moon is eclipsed, as matter of fact; you
proceed to enquire into the cause thereof (a. 11-24). Why does it
thunder? or, to enunciate the same question more fully, Why is there
noise in the clouds? The _quæsitum_ is always one thing predicated of
another (a. 26). Why are these materials, bricks and stones, a house?
Here the answer sought is, the Cause; and that is the [Greek:
t.ê.e.], speaking in logical or analytical phraseology ([Greek:
_logikô=s_]--_i.e._, that which belongs to the [Greek: _lo/gos_ tê=s
ou)si/as]). In some cases, this _quæsitum_ is a Final Cause, as in
the case of a bed or a house; in others, an Efficient or Movent
Cause; for that also is a variety of Cause, generally sought for in
regard to things generated or destroyed; but the other (viz., [Greek:
to\ t.ê.e.], "ipsa rei forma ac notio, aut concepta in animo
artificis, aut inclusa [Greek: duna/mei] in ipsâ naturâ ac semine
rei"--Bonitz, Comm. p. 359) is sought for in regard to [Greek:
ei)=nai].
The true nature of the _quæsitum_ is often unperceived, when the
problem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and
predicate in their mutual relations ([Greek: e)n toi=s mê\
katallê/lôs legome/nois], p. 1041, a. 33). For example, [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin?] is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation.
As it stands, it might be supposed to be intended as [Greek:
a)/nthrôpos dia\ ti/ e)stin a)/nthrôpos?] which would be a question
idle or null. To make it clear, you ought to distinguish the two
members to which the real _quæsitum_ refers (b. 2), and say [Greek:
dia\ ti/ ta/de ê)\ to/de e)sti\n a)/nthrôpos?] your real enquiry is
about the [Greek: u(/lê] or Matter, why it exists in this or that
manner. Why are these materials a house? Because the Essence of a
house belongs to them (b. 6). Some [Greek: t.ê.e.], some sort of
[Greek: ei)=nai], must belong to the Matter (b. 4). Why is this
Matter a man? or why is the body disposed in this particular way a
man? Here we enquire as to the Cause which acts upon a certain
Matter; and that is the Form whereby the thing is; which again is the
Essence (b. 8).
Hence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the Simple
and the Compound. The enquiry above described, and the teaching above
described, cannot apply to the Simple, which must be investigated in
another way (p. 1041, b. 9). Compounds are of two sorts--aggregates
like a _heap_ (mechanical), and aggregates like a _syllable_ (organic
or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent
elements, but something else besides (b. 16). The syllable _ba_ is
something more than the letters _b_ and _a_; flesh is something more
than fire and earth, its constituent elements. Now this _something
more_ cannot be itself a constituent element; for, if that were so,
flesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two,
and we should still have to search for the _something beyond_, and
this ulterior process might be repeated _ad infinitum_ (b. 22). Nor
can the _something beyond_ be itself a compound of several elements,
for we should still have to find the independent something which
binds these into a compound. It is plain that this _something beyond_
must be in its nature quite distinct from an element, and must be the
cause why one compound is flesh, another compound a syllable, and so
about all the remaining compounds. Now this is the Essence of each
compound--the First Cause of existence to each (b. 25). The Element
([Greek: stoichei=on]) is that into which the compound is separated,
as included Matter ([Greek: e)nupa/rchon ô(s u(/lên]): _b_ and _a_,
in the syllable _ba_ (b. 32). There are some things which are not the
Essences of objects (white, for example, is not of the Essence of
man, but an attribute); but, in all cases where compounds have come
together according to Nature and by natural process, that Nature also
which is not Element but Principle is the Essence (b. 28: [Greek:
e)pei\ d' e)/nia ou)k ou)si/ai tô=n pragma/tôn, a)ll' o(/sai ou)si/ai
kata\ phu/sin kai\ phu/sei sunestê/kasi, phanei/ê a)\n kai\ au(/tê ê(
phu/sis ou)si/a, ê(/ e)stin ou) stoichei=on a)ll' a)rchê/.] Schwegler
in his note, p. 135, proposes to correct this passage by striking out
[Greek: kai/] before the words [Greek: au(tê\ ê( phu/sis ou)si/a].
But, if this were done, it would make the passage mean that [Greek:
u(/lê] or [Greek: stoichei=on] is not [Greek: ou)si/a], and that the
other [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: stoichei=on], is to be
regarded exclusively as [Greek: ou)si/a]. Now this is certainly not
the doctrine of Aristotle, who expressly declares [Greek: u(/lê] to
be [Greek: ou)si/a]; see H, p. 1042, a. 32. Retaining the [Greek:
kai/], the passage will then mean that not merely [Greek: u(/lê], but
_also_ [Greek: phu/sis] which is not [Greek: u(/lê], is [Greek:
ou)si/a]).
. . . . . .
Book [Greek: Ê].
In this Book, Aristotle begins by recapitulating the doctrines and
discussions of the preceding. His purpose had been declared to be the
investigation of the Causes, Principles, and Elements of Essences.
Now Essences are diverse: some universally admitted, as the natural
elements and simple bodies, also plants, animals, and the parts of
each, lastly, the heaven and the parts thereof; others not
universally admitted, but advocated by some philosophers, as the
Ideas and Mathematical Entia; others, again, which we arrive at by
dialectical discussion, as [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.], the Substratum
(Logical Entia--[Greek: e)k tô=n lo/gôn], p. 1042, a. 12), the Genus
more Essence than the Species, the Universal more Essence than
Particulars. The (Platonic) Ideas make a near approach to the Genus
and the Universal; they are vindicated as Essences upon similar
grounds. Next, since [Greek: to\ t.ê.e.] is Essence, and since the
Definition is the rational explanation of [Greek: t.ê.e.], we found
it necessary to discuss Definition; and, since the Definition is a
sentence having parts, we were called upon to examine these parts,
and to explain what parts belonged both to Essence and to Definition.
We decided farther, after discussion, that the Universal and the
Genus were not Essence; the Platonic Ideas and the Mathematical Entia
we postponed for the moment, and we confined ourselves to the
perceivable Essences, recognized by all (a. 25).
Now all these perceivable Essentiæ include Matter. The
Substratum--Matter in one way--is Essence; while, in another way, the
Form and the [Greek: lo/gos] is Essence; and finally the Compound of
the two is Essence. Matter is Hoc Aliquid, not [Greek: e)nergei/a|]
but only [Greek: duna/mei]. Form is an Hoc Aliquid separable by reason
([Greek: tô=| lo/gô| chôristo/n], p. 1042, a. 29). The Compound of
the two, the complete Hoc Aliquid, is capable of existing separably,
in an absolute sense (which is true also of some Forms), and is
liable alone to generation and destruction (a. 30).
It is clear that Matter also, not less than Form, is Essence; for in
all changes from opposite to opposite, there is a certain substratum
to such changes. Thus, in changes of Place, there is a substratum
which is now here, presently there; in changes of Quantity, what is
now of such and such a size, is presently greater or less; in changes
of Quality, what is now healthy is presently sick; in changes of
Essence, what is now in course of generation is presently in course
of destruction, or what is now the substratum of some given Form (and
is thus Hoc Aliquid) is presently the substratum of Privation, and
thus no longer Hoc Aliquid. Among these four varieties of change
([Greek: kat' ou)si/an, kata\ poso/n, kata\ poio/n, kata\ to/pon])
the three last are consequent upon the first, but the first is not
consequent upon all the three last; for we cannot maintain that,
because a thing has Matter capable of local movement, it must
therefore have generable and destructible Matter (p. 1042, b. 6).
Having discussed the Essence of perceivable things so far forth as
_potential_, we now proceed to the same Essence so far forth as
_actual_ ([Greek: ê( duna/mei ou)si/a--ê( ô(s e)ne/rgeia ou)si/a tô=n
ai)sthêtô=n]--p. 1042, b. 10). What is this last? Demokritus
recognizes a primordial body one and the same as to Matter, but
having three differences--in figure, in position, in arrangement. But
it is plain that this enumeration is not sufficient and that there
are many other differences, to each of which corresponds a special
acceptation of [Greek: e)/sti] ([Greek: to\ e)/sti tosautachô=s
le/getai]--b. 26). Some differences depend upon the mode of putting
together constituent materials ([Greek: sunthe/sei tê=s u(/lês]--b.
16), as mixture, tying, gluing, pegging, &c.; some upon position, as
threshold, coping, &c.; some upon time; some upon place; some upon
affections of perceivable things, such as hardness, softness,
dryness, moisture, density, rarity, &c.; some upon combinations of
the foregoing; some again simply upon excess or defect in quantity.
To one or other of these, [Greek: e)/stin] has reference in each
particular case. We say--This _is_ a threshold, because it lies in a
particular manner: _Is_ (or _To be_--[Greek: to\ ei)=nai]) signifies
in this case that particular manner of lying. To be ice, is to have
become solidified in this particular manner (b. 28). We must
therefore look for the summa genera of the differences; in some cases
[Greek: to\ ei)=nai] will be defined by all these differences: thus
more or less dense, more or less rare, belong to the genus excess and
defect; differences of figure, smoothness, roughness, &c., belong to
the genus straight and curve; in other cases, to be, or not to be,
will depend upon mixture, as the genus (p. 1043, a. 1).
If then the Essence is the cause why each thing is what it is, we
must seek in these differences the cause why each thing is what it is
(p. 1043, a. 3). None of these differences indeed is itself
Essence,--not even when it is embodied or combined with Matter; but
it is in each the analogue of Essence, and must be employed in
defining, just as in real and true Essence we define by predicating
of Matter the Actuality or Formality ([Greek: ô(s e)n tai=s ou)si/ais
to\ tê=s u(/lês katêgorou/menon au)tê\ ê( e)ne/rgeia]--a. 6). Thus,
if we define a threshold, we say--a piece of wood or stone lying in
this particular way; if we define ice, we say--water frozen or
solidified in this particular way, &c. The Form or Actuality of one
Matter is different from that of another; so also is the rational
explanation or Definition; in some cases it is composition, in others
mixture, &c., and so forth. If any one defines a house by saying that
it is stone or brick, he indicates only the potential house, for these
are the Matter (a. 15); if he defines it--a vessel protecting bodies
or property, he then assigns the Actuality ([Greek: e)ne/rgeian]); if
he includes both of the above in his definition, he then gives the
third Essence completed out of the two together ([Greek: tê\n tri/tên
kai\ tê\n e)k tou/tôn ou)si/an]--a. 18). To define from the
differences, is to define from the side of the Actuality or Form; to
define from the included elements ([Greek: e)k tô=n e)nuparcho/ntôn])
is to define from the side of the Matter (a. 20).
We see herefrom what perceivable Essence is, and how it is: partly,
of the nature of Matter; partly, of Form and Actuality or Energy:
again, the third or Concrete, out of both combined (p. 1043, a. 28).
Sometimes, it is not clear whether the name signifies this third
Concrete, or the Form and Energy. Thus, when you say a house, do you
mean a protective receptacle built of bricks? or do you mean simply a
protective receptacle--the Form simply, without specifying the
Matter? When you say a line, do you mean a dyad in length--Form in
Matter? or simply a dyad--Form alone? When you talk of an animal, do
you mean soul in body? or simply soul, which is the Essence and
Actuality of a certain body? The word animal may be applied to both,
not indeed univocally, as implying generic resemblance, but
(quasi-univocally, or semi-univocally) by analogical relationship to
a common term ([Greek: ou)ch ô(s e(ni\ lo/gô| lego/menon, a)ll' ô(s
pro\s e(\n]--a. 36). This distinction however, though important in
some respects, is unimportant so far as regards the investigation
about perceivable Essence; for the [Greek: t.ê.e.] belongs to the
Form and the Actuality (a. 38). Soul, and the being soul, are
identical; but man, and the being man, are not identical; unless the
soul be called man. Thus this identity exists in some cases, but not
in others (b. 4). A syllable is not composed merely of letters and
synthesis, nor is a house simply of bricks and synthesis; for the
synthesis or the mixture does not proceed out of the elements which
are put together or mixed (b. 8). The like is true in other cases;
_e.g._, if the threshold is a threshold by position, the position
does not proceed out of the threshold, but rather the threshold out
of the position. Nor again is man simply animal and biped. If these
two are the Matter, there must be something apart from and beyond
them, something not itself an element nor proceeding out of an
element--the Essence; which is indicated by abstracting from the
Matter (b. 13). This, as being the Cause of Existence and of Essence
([Greek: ai)/tion tou= ei)=nai kai\ tê=s ou)si/as]--b. 14) is what is
meant when Essence is spoken of.
This Essence or Form must be eternal; or at least, if destructible,
it has never been destroyed; if generable, it has never been
generated. For we have shown already that no one either constructs or
generates Form: the Hoc Aliquid is constructed; the product of Form
and Matter is generated (p. 1043, b. 18). As yet it has not been made
clear whether the Essences of destructible things are separable or
not: in some cases at least, they certainly are not--in those cases,
namely, where there can exist nothing beyond the particular things,
as a house or an implement (b. 21). Perhaps, indeed, these are not
truly Essences--neither these particular things nor any other things
which have come together not by natural process; for we might
indicate Nature alone as the Essence in destructible things ([Greek:
tê\n ga\r phu/sin mo/nên a)/n tis thei/ê tê\n e)n toi=s phthartoi=s
ou)si/an])--b. 23. Aristotle seems to say in what precedes, that
there is no [Greek: ge/nesis] or [Greek: phthora/] of [Greek:
ou)si/a]; see Z. p. 1033, b. 17. But how is this to be reconciled
with K. p. 1060, b. 18: [Greek: ou)si/as me\n ga\r pa/sês
ge/nesi/s e)stin, stigmê=s d' ou)k e)/stin]? See Schwegler's Comm.
explaining [Greek: gigno/menon] and [Greek: phtheiro/menon], Pt. II.
pp. 82, 83).
Hence we see that the difficulty started by Antisthenes and others
equally unschooled ([Greek: a)pai/deutoi]) is not without pertinence.
They say that, as a definition is a sentence of many words,
predicating something of something, so you cannot define _Quid est_:
you can only define and inform persons _Quale Quid est_: you can only
tell people what the definiend is like, not what it is in itself: you
can tell them that silver is like tin, but you cannot tell what
silver is. Upon this theory, definition may be given of Compound
Essence, whether perceivable or cogitable; but not of the _primordia_
of which the compound consists. The definition must predicate a
something, which is of the nature of Form, of another something,
which is of the nature of Matter (p. 1043, b. 31).
If Essences are (as the Platonists say) in a certain sense Numbers,
they are so in _this_ sense; not (as these philosophers affirm) in
the character of assemblages of Monads. For the definition is a sort
of number, divisible into indivisible units; and the number is so
likewise. If you add any thing to, or deduct any thing from, a number
(let the thing added or deducted be never so small), it will be no
longer the same number; in like manner, neither the definition nor
the [Greek: t.ê.e.], will be the same, if any thing be added or
subtracted (p. 1044, a. 1). Each number must have something which
makes its component units coalesce into one number, though the
Platonic philosophers cannot tell what that something is; either the
units are a mere (uncemented) heap, or else you must say what is that
something which makes them _one_ out of many (a. 5). The definition
also is one; yet these philosophers cannot explain what makes it one.
The units of the number and that of the definition, is to be
explained in the same way, and that of the Essence also; not as a
monad or a point, but in each case like an Entelechy and a peculiar
nature ([Greek: ou)ch, ô(s le/gousi/ tines, oi(=on mona/s tis ou)=sa
ê)\ stigmê/, a)ll' e)ntele/cheia kai\ phu/sis tis e(ka/stê]--a. 9). A
given number admits of no degrees, more or less: neither does a given
Essence, unless it be taken embodied in Matter (a. 10).
Respecting the Material Essence ([Greek: peri\ de\ tê=s u(likê=s
ou)si/as]--p. 1044, a. 15), we must not forget that, if there be one
and the same First Matter common as a principle to all Generata or
Fientia, there is nevertheless a certain Matter special or peculiar
(proximate) to each ([Greek: o(/môs e)/sti tis oi)kei/a
e(ka/stou]--a. 18; [Greek: oi)kei/a kai\ prosechê/s]--Alexander).
Thus the Materia Prima of phlegm is, sweet or fat things; that of bile
is, bitter things and such like. Perhaps these two come both from the
same Matter; and there are several different Matters of the same
product, in cases where one Matter proceeds from another. Thus phlegm
proceeds from fat and sweet, if fat proceeds from sweet; and even
from bile, if bile be analysed into its First Matter from whence
phlegm may proceed by a different road (a. 23). One thing may proceed
from another in two different ways: either D may proceed from C,
because C is its immediate Matter, already preformed up to a certain
point, and thus on the way to a perfectly formed state; or D may
proceed from C, after the destruction of C and the resolution of C
into its Materia Prima ([Greek: dichô=s ga\r to/d' e)k tou=de, ê)\
o(/ti pro\ o(dou= e)/stai ê)\ o(/ti a)naluthe/ntos ei)s tê\n
a)rchê/n]--a. 24). From one and the same Matter different products
may proceed, if the moving cause be different: from the same wood
there may proceed a box or a bed. What product shall emerge does not,
however, depend only upon the Moving Cause, but often upon the Matter
also; thus a saw cannot be made out of wool or wood. If the same
product can proceed out of different Matter, this is evidently
because the Art or Moving Cause is the same: if this last be
different, and the Matter different also, the product will of course
be different (p. 1044, a. 32).
When a man asks us, What is the Cause? we ought to reply, since the
word has many senses, by specifying all the causes which can have a
bearing on the case (p. 1044, a. 34). Thus, What is the Cause of man,
as Matter? Perhaps the katamenia. What, as Movent? Perhaps the seed.
What, as Form? The [Greek: t.ê.e.] What, as [Greek: ou(= e(/neka]?
The End. These two last are perhaps both the same (a. 36). Moreover
we ought to make answer by specifying the proximate causes (not the
remote and ultimate). Thus, What is the Matter of man? We must answer
by specifying the proximate matter; not fire and earth, the ultimate
and elemental (b. 2).
This is the only right way of proceeding in regard to Essences
natural and generable; since the Causes are many, and are what we
seek to know. But the case is different in regard to Essences
natural, yet eternal. Some of these last perhaps have no Matter at
all; or at least a different Matter, having no attribute except local
movability (b. 8. Alexander says in explanation: [Greek: le/gei de\
tê\n xu/mpasan tô=n o)ktô\ sphairô=n e(na/da--u(/lên ou) gennêtê\n
kai\ phthartê\n a)lla\ mo/non kata\ to/pon kinêtê/n]--p. 527, 20-25,
Bon.).
Again, in regard to circumstances which occur by Nature, but not in
the way of Essence, there is no Matter at all: the subject itself is
the Essence. Thus in regard to an eclipse: What is its Cause? What is
its Matter? There is no Matter, except the moon which is affected in
a certain way. What is the Cause, as Movent--here light-destroying?
The earth. Perhaps there is no [Greek: ou(= e(/neka] in the case. But
the Cause in the way of Form is the rational explanation or
definition; and this must include a specification of the Movent
Cause, otherwise it will be obscure. Thus, the eclipse is, privation
of light; and, when you add--by the earth intervening, you then
specify the Movent, and make your definition satisfactory (b. 15).
In defining sleep we ought to say what part of the system is first
affected thereby; but this is not clear. Shall we indicate only the
animal (as substratum)? But this is not enough. We shall be asked,
What part of the animal? Which part first? The heart, or what other
part? Next, by what Cause? Lastly, how is the heart affected, apart
from the rest of the system? To say--Sleep is a certain sort of
immobility, will not be a sufficient definition. We must specify from
what primary affection such immobility arises (p. 1044, b. 20).