[Footnote 62: Ibid. b. 8-15. [Greek: dia\ to\ prophanê= ei)=nai,

ou)de\n u(pe\r au)tô=n a)/llo le/getai ê)\ o(/sa e)n a)rchê=|

e)rre/thê], &c.]

. . . . . .

No part of the Aristotelian doctrine has become more incorporated

with logical tradition, or elicited a greater amount of comment and

discussion,[63] than these Ten Categories or Predicaments. I have

endeavoured to give the exposition as near as may be in the words and

with the illustrations of Aristotle; because in many of the comments

new points of view are introduced, sometimes more just than those of

Aristotle, but not present to his mind. Modern logicians join the

Categories side by side with the five Predicables, which are

explained in the Eisagoge of Porphyry, more than five centuries after

Aristotle's death. As expositors of Logic they are right in doing

this; but my purpose is to illustrate rather the views of Aristotle.

The mind of Aristotle was not altogether exempt from that

fascination[64] which particular numbers exercised upon the

Pythagoreans and after them upon Plato. To the number Ten the

Pythagoreans ascribed peculiar virtue and perfection. The fundamental

Contraries, which they laid down as the Principles of the Universe,

were ten in number.[65] After them, also, Plato carried his ideal

numbers as far as the Dekad, but no farther. That Aristotle

considered Ten to be the suitable number for a complete list of

general heads--that he was satisfied with making up the list of ten,

and looked for nothing beyond--may be inferred from the different

manner in which he deals with the different items. At least, such was

his point of view when he composed this treatise. Though he

recognizes all the ten Categories as co-ordinate in so far that

(except _Quale_) each is a distinct Genus, not reducible under either

of the others, yet he devotes all his attention to the first four,

and gives explanations (copious for him) in regard to these. About

the fifth and sixth (_Agere_ and _Pati_)[66] he says a little, though

much less than we should expect, considering their extent and

importance. About the last four, next to nothing appears. There are

even passages in his writings where he seems to drop all mention of

the two last (_Jacere_ and _Habere_), and to recognize no more than

eight Predicaments. In the treatise Categoriæ where his attention is

fastened on Terms and their signification, and on the appropriate way

of combining these terms into propositions, he recites the ten

_seriatim_; but in other treatises, where his remarks bear more upon

the matter and less upon the terms by which it is signified, he

thinks himself warranted in leaving out the two or three whose

applications are most confined to special subjects. If he had thought

fit to carry the total number of Predicaments to twelve or fifteen

instead of ten,[67] he would probably have had little difficulty in

finding some other general heads not less entitled to admission than

_Jacere_ and _Habere_; the rather, as he himself allows, even in

regard to the principal Categories, that particulars comprised under

one of them may also be comprised under another, and that there is no

necessity for supposing each particular to be restricted to one

Category exclusively.

[Footnote 63: About the prodigious number of these comments, see the

Scholion of Dexippus, p. 39, a. 34, Br.; p. 5, ed. Spengel.]

[Footnote 64: See Simpl. in Categ. Schol. p. 78, b. 14, Br.; also the

two first chapters of the Aristotelian treatise De Coelo; compare

also, about the perfection of the [Greek: tri/tê su/stasis], De

Partibus Animalium, ii. p. 646, b. 9; De Generat. Animal. iii. p.

760, a. 34.]

[Footnote 65: Aristot. Metaph. A. p. 986, a. 8. There existed, in the

time of the later Peripatetics, a treatise in the Doric dialect by

Archytas--[Greek: Peri\ tou= Panto/s]--discriminating Ten Categories,

and apparently the same ten Categories as Aristotle. By several

Aristotelian critics this treatise was believed to have been composed

by Archytas the Tarentine, eminent both as a Pythagorean philosopher

and as the leading citizen of Tarentum--the contemporary and friend

of Plato, and, therefore, of course, earlier than Aristotle. Several

critics believed that Aristotle had borrowed his Ten Categories from

this work of Archytas; and we know that the latter preserved the

total number of Ten. See Schol. ad Categor. p. 79, b. 3, Br.

But other critics affirmed, apparently with better reason, that the

Archytas, author of this treatise, was a Peripatetic philosopher

later than Aristotle; and that the doctrine of Archytas on the

Categories was copied from Aristotle in the same manner as the Doric

treatise on the Kosmos, ascribed to the Lokrian Timæus, was copied

from the Timæus of Plato, being translated into a Doric dialect.

See Scholia of Simplikius and Boëthius, p. 33, a. 1, n.; p. 40, a.

43, Brandis. The fact that this treatise was ascribed to the

Tarentine Archytas, indicates how much the number Ten was consecrated

in men's minds as a Pythagorean canon.]

[Footnote 66: Trendelenburg thinks (Geschichte der Kategorienlehre,

p. 131) that Aristotle must have handled the Categories _Agere_, and

_Pati_ more copiously in other treatises; and there are some passages

in his works which render this probable. See De Animâ, ii. p. 416, b.

35; De Generat. Animal. iv. p. 768, b. 15. Moreover, in the list of

Aristotle's works given by Diogenes Laertius, one title appears--

[Greek: Peri\ tou= poiei=n kai\ peponthe/nai] (Diog. L. v. 22).]

[Footnote 67: Prantl expresses this view in his Geschichte der Logik

(p. 206), and I think it just.]

These remarks serve partly to meet the difficulties pointed out by

commentators in regard to the Ten Categories. From the century

immediately succeeding Aristotle, down to recent times, the question

has always been asked, why did Aristotle fix upon Ten Categories

rather than any other number? and why upon these Ten rather than

others? And ancient commentators[68] as well as modern have insisted,

that the classification is at once defective and redundant; leaving

out altogether some particulars, while it enumerates others twice

over or more than twice. (This last charge is, however, admitted by

Aristotle himself, who considers it no ground of objection that the

same particular may sometimes be ranked under two distinct heads.)

The replies made to the questions, and the attempts to shew cause for

the selection of these Ten classes, have not been satisfactory;

though it is certain that Aristotle himself treats the classification

as if it were real and exhaustive,[69] obtained by comparing many

propositions and drawing from them an induction. He tries to

determine, in regard to some particular enquiries, under which of the

Ten _Summa Genera_ the subject of the enquiry is to be ranged; he

indicates some predicate of extreme generality (_Unum_, _Bonum_,

&c.), which extend over all or several Categories, as equivocal or

analogous, representing no true _Genera_. But though Aristotle takes

this view of the completeness of his own classification, he never

assigns the grounds of it, and we are left to make them out in the

best way we can.

[Footnote 68: Schol. p. 47, b. 14, seq., 49, a. 10, seq. Br.; also

Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 15, 31 A, 33 E. ed. Basil., 1551.]

[Footnote 69 Scholia ad Analyt. Poster. (I. xxiii. p. 83, a. 21) p.

227, b. 40, Br. [Greek: O(/ti de\ tosau=tai mo/nai ai( katêgori/ai

ai( kata\ tô=n ou)siô=n lego/menai, e)k tê=s e)pagôgê=s lamba/nei.]

Brentano (in his treatise, Ueber die Bedeutung des Seienden in

Aristoteles, Sects. 12 and 13, pp. 148-177) attempts to draw out a

scheme of systematic deduction for the Categories. He quotes (pp.

181, 182) a passage from Thomas Aquinas, in which such a scheme is

set forth acutely and plausibly. But if Aristotle had had any such

system present to his mind, he would hardly have left it to be

divined by commentators.

Simplikius observes (Schol. ad Categ. p. 44, a. 30) that the last

nine Categories coincide in the main (excepting such portion of

_Quale_ as belongs to the Essence) with [Greek: to\ o)/n kata\

sumbebêko/s]: which latter, according to Aristotle's repeated

declarations, can never be the matter of any theorizing or scientific

treatment--[Greek: ou)demi/a e)sti\ peri\ au)to\ theôri/a], Metaphys.

E. p. 1026, b. 4; K. p. 1064, b. 17. This view of Aristotle

respecting [Greek: to\ sumbebêko/s], is hardly consistent with a

scheme of intentional deduction for the accidental predicates.]

We cannot safely presume, I think, that he followed out any deductive

principle or system; if he had done so, he would probably have

indicated it. The decuple indication of general heads arose rather

from comparison of propositions and induction therefrom. Under each

of these ten heads, some predicate or other may always be applied to

every concrete individual object, such as a man or animal. Aristotle

proceeded by comparing a variety of propositions, such as were

employed in common discourse or dialectic, and throwing the different

predicates into _genera_, according as they stood in different

logical relation to the Subject. The analysis applied is not

metaphysical but logical; it does not resolve the real individual

into metaphysical [Greek: a)rchai\] or Principles, such as Form and

Matter; it accepts the individual as he stands, with his full complex

array of predicates embodied in a proposition, and analyses that

proposition into its logical constituents.[70] The predicates derive

their existence from being attached to the First Subject, and have a

different manner of existence according as they are differently

related to the First Subject.[71] What is this individual, Sokrates?

He is an _animal_. What is his Species? _Man_. What is the

Differentia, limiting the Genus and constituting the Species?

_Rationality_, _two-footedness_. What is his height and bulk? He is

_six feet_ high, and is of _twelve stone_ weight. What manner of man

is he? He is _flat-nosed_, _virtuous_, _patient_, _brave_. In what

relation does he stand to others? He is a _father_, a _proprietor_, a

_citizen_, a _general_. What is he doing? He is _digging his garden_,

_ploughing his field_. What is being done to him? He is _being rubbed

with oil_, he is _having his hair cut_. Where is he? _In the city_,

_at home_, _in bed_. When do you speak of him? _As he is, at this

moment_, _as he was, yesterday_, _last year_. In what posture is he?

He is _lying down_, _sitting_, _standing up_, _kneeling_, _balancing

on one leg_. What is he wearing? He _has a tunic_, _armour_, _shoes_,

_gloves_.

[Footnote 70: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1038, b. 15. [Greek: dichô=s

u(pokei=tai, ê)\ to/de ti o)/n, ô(/sper to\ zô=|on toi=s pa/thesin,

ê)\ ô(s ê( u(/lê tê=| e)ntelechei/a|.] The first mode of [Greek:

u(pokei/menon] is what is in the Categories. For the second, which is

the metaphysical analysis, see Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1029, a. 23:

[Greek: ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\

tê=s u(/lês. ô(/ste to\ e)/schaton kath' au(to\ ou)/te ti\ ou)/te

poso\n ou)/te a)/llo ou)the/n e)sti.]

Porphyry and Dexippus tell us (Schol. ad Categ. p. 45, a. 6-30) that

both Aristotle and the Stoics distinguished [Greek: prô=ton

u(pokei/menon] and [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon]. The [Greek:

prô=ton u(pokei/menon] is [Greek: ê( a)/poios u(/lê--to\ duna/mei

sô=ma], which Aristotle insists upon in the Physica and Metaphysica,

the [Greek: deu/teron u(pokei/menon, o(\ koinô=s poio\n ê)\ i)di/ôs

u(phi/statai], coincides with the [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] of the

Categories, already implicated with [Greek: ei)=dos] and stopping

short of metaphysical analysis.

The remarks of Boêthus and Simplikius upon this point deserve

attention. Schol. pp. 50-54, Br.; p. 54, a. 2: [Greek: ou) peri\ tê=s

a)sche/tou u(/lês e)sti\n o( parô\n lo/gos, a)lla\ tê=s ê)/dê

sche/sin e)chou/sês pro\s to\ ei)=dos. to\ de\ su/ntheton dêlo/noti,

o(/per e)sti\ to\ a)/tomon, e)pide/chetai to\ to/de.] They point out

that the terms Form and Matter are not mentioned in the Categories,

nor do they serve to illustrate the Categories, which do not carry

analysis so far back, take their initial start from [Greek: to/de

ti], the [Greek: su/ntheton] of Form and Matter,--[Greek: ou)si/a

kuriô/tata kai\ prô/tôs kai\ ma/lista legome/nê].

Simplikius says (p. 50, a. 17):--[Greek: dunato\n de\ tou= mê\

mnêmoneu=sai tou= ei)/dous kai\ tê=s u(/lês ai)/tion le/gein, kai\

to\ tê\n tô=n Katêgoriô=n pragmatei/an _kata\ tê\n pro/cheiron kai\

koinê\n tou= lo/gou chrê=sin_ poiei=sthai; to\ de\ tê=s u(/lês kai\

tou= ei)/dous o)/noma kai\ ta\ u(po\ tou/tôn sêmaino/mena ou)k ê)=n

toi=s polloi=s sunê/thê], &c. Compare p. 47, a. 27. This what

Dexippus says also, that the Categories bear only upon [Greek: tê\n

prô/tên chrei/an tou= lo/gou kath' ê(\n ta\ pra/gmata dêlou=n

a)llêlois e)phie/metha] (p. 13, ed. Spengel; also p. 49).

Waitz, ad Categor. p. 284. "In Categoriis, non de ipsâ rerum naturâ

et veritate exponit, sed res tales capit, quales apparent in communi

vitâ homini philosophiâ non imbuto."

We may add, that Aristotle applies the metaphysical analysis--Form

and Matter--not only to the Category [Greek: ou)si/a] but also to

that of [Greek: poio\n] and [Greek: poso/n] (De Coelo, iv. 312, a.

14.)]

[Footnote 71: Aristot. Metaph. [Greek: D]. 1017, a. 23. [Greek:

o(sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai sêmai/nei].]

Confining ourselves (as I have already observed that Aristotle does

in the Categories) to those perceptible or physical subjects which

every one admits,[72] and keeping clear of metaphysical entities, we

shall see that respecting any one of these subjects the nine

questions here put may all be put and answered; that the two last are

most likely to be put in regard to some living being; and that the

last can seldom be put in regard to any other subject except a person

(including man, woman, or child). Every individual person falls

necessarily under each of the ten Categories; belongs to the Genus

animal, Species man; he is of a certain height and bulk; has certain

qualities; stands in certain relations to other persons or things; is

doing something and suffering something; is in a certain place; must

be described with reference to a certain moment of time; is in a

certain attitude or posture; is clothed or equipped in a certain

manner. Information of some kind may always be given respecting him

under each of these heads; he is always by necessity _quantus_, but

not always of any particular quantity. Until such information is

given, the concrete individual is not known under conditions

thoroughly determined.[73] Moreover each head is separate and

independent, not resolvable into any of the rest, with a reservation,

presently to be noticed, of Relation in its most comprehensive

meaning. When I say of a man, that he is at home, lying down, clothed

with a tunic, &c., I do not predicate of him any quality, action, or

passion. The information which I give belongs to three other heads

distinct from these last, and distinct also from each other. If you

suppress the two last of the ten Categories and leave only the

preceding eight, under which of these eight are you to rank the

predicates, Sokrates is _lying down_, Sokrates is _clothed with a

tunic_, &c.? The necessity for admitting the ninth and tenth

Categories (_Jacere_ and _Habere_) as separate general heads in the

list, is as great as the necessity for admitting most of the

Categories which precede. The ninth and tenth are of narrower

comprehension,[74] and include a smaller number of distinguishable

varieties, than the preceding; but they are not the less separate

heads of information. So, among the chemical elements enumerated by

modern science, some are very rarely found; yet they are not for that

reason the less entitled to a place in the list.

[Footnote 72: Ibid. Z. p. 1028, b. 8, seq.: p. 1042, a. 25. [Greek:

ai( ai)sthêtai\ ou)si/ai--ai( o(mologou/menai ou)si/ai].]

[Footnote 73: Prantl observes, Geschichte der Logik, p. 208:--"Fragen

wir, wie Aristoteles überhaupt dazu gekommen sei, von Kategorien zu

sprechen, und welche Geltung dieselben bei ihm haben, so ist unsere

Antwort hierauf folgende: Aristoteles geht, im Gegensatze gegen

Platon, davon aus, dass die Allgemeinheit in der Concretion des

Seienden sich verwirkliche und in dieser Realität von dem

menschlichen Denken und Sprechen ergriffen werde; der

Verwirklichungsprocess des concret Seienden ist der Uebergang vom

Unbestimmten, jeder Bestimmung aber fähigen, zum allseitig

Bestimmten, welchem demnach die Bestimmtheit überhaupt als eine

selbst concret gewordene einwohnt und ebenso in des Menschen Rede von

ihm ausgesagt wird. Das grundwesentliche Ergebniss der Verwirklichung

ist sonach: die zeitlich-räumlich concret auftretende und hiemit

individuell gewordene Substanzialität, in einer dem Zustande der

Concretion entsprechenden Erscheinungsweise; diese letztere umfasst

das ganze habituelle Dasein und Wirken der concreten Substanz, welche

in der Welt der räumlichen Ausdehnung numerären Vielheit erscheint.

Die ontologische Basis demnach der Kategorien ist der in die

Concretion führende Verwirklichungsprocess der Bestimmtheit

überhaupt."]

[Footnote 74: Plotinus, among his various grounds of exception to the

ten Aristotelian Categories, objects to the ninth and tenth on the

ground of their narrow comprehension (Ennead. vi. 1, 23, 24).

Boêthus expressly vindicated the title of [Greek: e)/chein] to be

recognized as a separate Category, against the Stoic

objectors.--Schol. ad Categ. p. 81, a. 5.]

If we seek not to appreciate the value of the Ten Categories as a

philosophical classification, but to understand what was in the mind

of Aristotle when he framed it, we shall attend, not much to the

greater features, which it presents in common with every other scheme

of classification, as to the minor features which constitute its

peculiarity. In this point of view the two last Categories are more

significant than the first four, and the tenth is the most

significant of all; for every one is astonished when he finds

_Habere_ enrolled as a tenth _Summum Genus_, co-ordinate with

_Quantum_ and _Quale_. Now what is remarkable about the ninth and

tenth Categories is, that individual persons or animals are the only

Subjects respecting whom they are ever predicated, and are at the

same time Subjects respecting whom they are constantly (or at least

frequently) predicated. An individual person is habitually clothed in

some particular way in all or part of his body; he (and perhaps his

horse also) are the only Subjects that are ever so clothed. Moreover

animals are the only Subjects, and among them man is the principal

Subject, whose changes of posture are frequent, various, determined

by internal impulses, and at the same time interesting to others to

know. Hence we may infer that when Aristotle lays down the Ten

Categories, as _Summa Genera_ for all predications which can be made

about any given Subject, the Subject which he has wholly, or at least

principally, in his mind is an individual Man. We understand, then,

how it is that he declares _Habere_ and _Jacere_ to be so plain as to

need no farther explanation. What is a man's posture? What is his

clothing or equipment? are questions understood by every one.[75] But

when Aristotle treats of _Habere_ elsewhere, he is far from

recognizing it as narrow and plain _per se_. Even in the

Post-Predicamenta (an appendix tacked on to the Categoriæ, either by

himself afterwards, or by some follower) he declares _Habere_ to be a

predicate of vague and equivocal signification; including portions of

_Quale_, _Quantum_, and _Relata_. And he specifies the personal

equipment of an individual as only one among these many varieties of

signification. He takes the same view in the fourth book ([Greek:

D].) of the Metaphysica, which book is a sort of lexicon of

philosophical terms.[76] This enlargement of the meaning of the word

_Habere_ seems to indicate an alteration of Aristotle's point of

view, dropping that special reference to an individual man as

Subject, which was present to him when he drew up the list of Ten

Categories. The like alteration carried him still farther, so as to

omit the ninth and tenth almost entirely, when he discusses the more

extensive topics of philosophy. Some of his followers, on the

contrary, instead of omitting _Habere_ out of the list of Categories,

tried to procure recognition for it in the larger sense which it

bears in the Metaphysica. Archytas ranked it fifth in the series,

immediately after _Relata_.[77]

[Footnote 75: In the thirteenth and fourteenth chapters of Mr. James

Harris's Philosophical Arrangements, there is a learned and valuable

illustration of these two last Aristotelian Categories. I think,

however, that he gives to the Predicament [Greek: Kei=sthai]

(_Jacere_) a larger and more comprehensive meaning than it bears in

the treatise Categoriæ; and that neither he, nor the commentators

whom he cites (p. 317), take sufficient notice of the marked

distinction drawn in that treatise between [Greek: kei=sthai] and

[Greek: the/sis] (Cat. p. 6, b. 12). Mr. Harris ranks the arrangement

of words in an orderly discourse, and of propositions in a valid

syllogism, as cases coming under the Predicament [Greek Kei=sthai];

which is travelling far beyond the meaning of that word in the

Aristotelian Categories. At the same time he brings out strongly the

fact, that living beings, and especially _men_, are the true and

special subjects of predicates belonging to [Greek: Kei=sthai] and

[Greek: E)/chein]. The more we attend to this, the nearer approach

shall we make to the state of Aristotle's mind when he drew up the

list of Categories; as indeed Harris himself seems to recognize

(chap. ii. p. 29).]

[Footnote 76: Aristot. Categor. p. 15, b. 17; Metaphys. [Greek: D].

p. 1023, a. 8.]

[Footnote 77: See the Scholia of Simplikius, p. 80, b. 7, seq.; p.

92, b. 41, Brand.; where the different views of Archytas, Plotinus,

and Boêthus, are given; also p. 59, b. 43: [Greek: proêgei=tai ga\r

ê( sumphuê\s tô=n pro/s ti sche/sis tô=n e)piktê/tôn sche/seôn, ô(s

kai\ tô\| A)rchu/ta| dokei=.] In the language of Archytas, [Greek:

ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] were the equivalent of the Aristotelian

[Greek: e)/chein].]

The narrow manner in which Aristotle conceives the Predicament

_Habere_ in the treatise Categoriæ, and the enlarged sense given to

that term both in the Post-Predicaments and in the Metaphysica, lead

to a suspicion that the Categoriæ is comparatively early, in point of

date, among his compositions. It seems more likely that he should

begin with the narrower view, and pass from thence to the larger,

rather than _vice versâ_. Probably the predicates specially

applicable to Man would be among his early conceptions, but would by

later thought be tacitly dropped,[78] so as to retain those only

which had a wider philosophical application.

[Footnote 78: Respecting the paragraph (at the close of the

Categoriæ) about [Greek: to\ e)/chein], see the Scholion in Waitz's

ed. of the Organon, p. 38.

The fact that Archytas in his treatise presented the Aristotelian

Category [Greek: e)/chein] under the more general phrase of [Greek:

ai( e)pi/ktêtoi sche/seis] (see the preceding note), is among the

reasons for believing that treatise to be later than Aristotle.]

I have already remarked that Aristotle, while enrolling all the Ten

Predicaments as independent heads, each the _Generalissimum_ of a

separate descending line of predicates, admitted at the same time

that various predicates did not of necessity belong to one of these

lines exclusively, but might take rank in more than one line. There

are some which he enumerates under all the different heads of

Quality, Relation, Action, Passion. The classification is evidently

recognized as one to which we may apply a remark which he makes

especially in regard to Quality and Relation, under both of which

heads (he says) the same predicates may sometimes be counted.[79] And

the observation is much more extensively true than he was aware; for

he both conceives and defines the Category of Relation or Relativity

(_Ad Aliquid_) in a way much narrower than really belongs to it. If

he had assigned to this Category its full and true comprehension, he

would have found it implicated with all the other nine. None of them

can be isolated from it in predication.

[Footnote 79: Aristot. Categ. p. 11, a. 37.

Simplikius says that what Aristotle admits about [Greek: poio/tês],

is true about all the other Categories also, viz.: that it is not a

strict and proper [Greek: ge/nos]. Each of the ten Categories is

(what Aristotle says about [Greek: to\ o(\n]) [Greek: me/son tô=n te

sunôno/môn kai\ o(mônu/môn.--ou)de\ ga\r e)kei=na kuri/ôs e)sti\

ge/nê, ou)de\ ô(s ge/nê tô=n u(p' au)ta\ katêgorei=tai, _ta/xeôs

ou)/sês pantachou= prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn_.] (Scholia ad Categor. p.

69, b. 30, Br.) This is a remarkable observation, which has been

sufficiently adverted to, I think, by Brentano in his treatise on

Aristotle's Ontology.]

That _Agere_ and _Pati_ (with the illustrations which he himself

gives thereof--_urit_, _uritur_) may be ranked as varieties under the

generic Category of Relation or Relativity, can hardly be overlooked.

The like is seen to be true about _Ubi_ and _Quando_, when we advert

to any one of the predicates belonging to either; such as, _in the

market-place_, _yesterday_.[80] Moreover, not merely the last six of

the ten Categories, but also the second and fourth (_Quantum_ and

_Quale_) are implicated with and subordinated to Relation. If we look

at _Quantum_, we shall find that the example which Aristotle gives of

it is [Greek: tripê=chus], tricubital, or three cubits long; a term

quite as clearly relative as the term [Greek: dipla/sios] or double,

which he afterwards produces as instance of the Category _Ad

Aliquid_.[81] When we are asked the questions, How much is the

height? How large is the field? we cannot give the information

required except by a relative predicate--_it is three feet_--_it is

four acres_; we thereby carry back the mind of the questioner to some

unit of length or superficies already known to him, and we convey our

meaning by comparison with such unit. Again, if we turn from

_Quantum_ to _Quale_, we find the like Relativity implied in all the

predicates whereby answer is made to the question [Greek: Poio\s ti/s

e)sti?] _Qualis est_? What manner of man is he? _He is such as A, B,

C_--persons whom we have previously seen, or heard, or read of.[82]

[Footnote 80: The remarks of Plotinus upon these four last-mentioned

Categories are prolix and vague, but many of them go to shew how much

[Greek: to\ pro/s ti] is involved in all of the four (Ennead. vi. 1,

14-18).]

[Footnote 81: Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 184) admits a

certain degree of interference and confusion between the Categories

of _Quantum_ and _Ad Aliquid_; but in very scanty measure, and much

beneath the reality.]

[Footnote 82: The following passages from Mr. James Mill (Analysis of

the Phenomena of the Human Mind, vol. ii. ch. xiv. sect. ii. pp. 48,

49, 56, 1st ed.) state very clearly the Relativity of the predicates

of Quantity and Quality:--

"It seems necessary that I should say something of the word

_Quantus_, from which the word Quantity is derived. _Quantus_ is the

correlate of _Tantus_. _Tantus_, _Quantus_, are relative terms,

applicable to all the objects to which we apply the terms Great,

Little."--"Of two lines, we call the one _tantus_, the other

_quantus_. The occasions on which we do so, are when the one is as

long as the other."--"When we say that one thing is _tantus_,

_quantus_ another, or one so great, as the other is great; the first

is referred to the last, the _tantus_ to the _quantus_. The first is

distinguished and named by the last. The _Quantus_ is the

standard."--"On what account, then, is it that we give to any thing

the name _Quantus_? As a standard by which to name another thing,

_Tantus_. The thing called _Quantus_ is the previously known thing,

the ascertained amount, by which we can mark and define the other

amount."

"_Talis_, _Qualis_, are applied to objects in the same way, on one

account, as _Tantus_, _Quantus_, on another; and the explanation we

gave of _Tantus_, _Quantus_, may be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to

the pair of relatives which we have now named. _Tantus_, _Quantus_,

are names applied to objects on account of dimension. _Talis_,

_Qualis_, are names applied to objects on account of all other

sensations. We apply _Tantus_, _Quantus_, to a pair of objects when

they are equal; we apply _Talis_, _Qualis_, to a pair of objects when

they are alike. One of the objects is then the standard. The object

_Qualis_ is that to which the reference is made."

Compare the same work, vol. i. ch. ix. p. 225:--"The word _Such_ is a

relative term, and always connotes so much of the meaning of some

other term. When we call a thing _such_, it is always understood that

it is such _as_ some other thing. Corresponding with our words _such

as_, the Latins had _Talis_, _Qualis_."]

We thus see that all the predicates, not only under the Category

which Aristotle terms _Ad Aliquid_, but also under all the last nine

Categories, are relative. Indeed the work of predication is always

relative. The express purpose, as well as the practical usefulness,

of a significant predicate is, to carry the mind of the hearer either

to a comparison or to a general notion which is the result of past

comparisons. But though each predicate connotes Relation, each

connotes a certain _fundamentum_ besides, which gives to the Relation

its peculiar character. Relations of Quantity are not the same as

relations of Quality; the predicates of the former connote a

_fundamentum_ different from the predicates of the latter, though in

both the meaning conveyed is relative. In fact, every predicate or

concrete general name is relative, or connotes a Relation to

something else, actual or potential, beyond the thing named. The only

name not relative is the Proper name, which connotes no attributes,

and cannot properly be used as a predicate (so Aristotle remarks),

but only as a Subject.[83] Sokrates, Kallias, Bukephalus &c., denotes

the _Hoc Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which, when pronounced alone,

indicates some concrete aggregate (as yet unknown) which may manifest

itself to my senses, but does not, so far as the name is concerned,

involve necessary reference to anything besides; though even these

names, when one and the same name continues to be applied to the same

object, may be held to connote a real or supposed continuity of past

or future existence, and become thus to a certain extent relative.

[Footnote 83: You may make Sokrates a predicate, in the proposition,

[Greek: to\ leuko\n e)kei=no Sôkra/tês e)sti/n], but Aristotle

dismisses this as an irregular or perverse manner of speaking (see

Analytic. Priora, i. p. 43, a. 35; Analyt. Poster. i. p. 83,

a. 2-16).

Alexander calls these propositions [Greek: ai( para\ phu/sin

prota/seis] (see Schol. ad Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 23).

Mr. James Harris observes (Philosophical Arrangements, ch. x. p. 214;

also 317, 348):--"Hence too we may see why Relation stands next to

Quantity; for in strictness the Predicaments which follow are but

different modes of Relation, marked by some peculiar character over

their own, over and above the relative character, which is common to

them all." To which I would add, that the first two Categories,

Substance and Quantity, are no less relative or correlative than the

eight later Categories; as indeed Harris himself thinks; see the same

work, pp. 90, 473: "Matter and Attribute are essentially distinct,

yet, like _convex_ and _concave_, they are by nature inseparable. We

have already spoken as to the inseparability of attributes; we now

speak as to that of matter. [Greek: Ê(mei=s de\ phame\n me\n ei)=nai/

tina u(/lên tô=n sôma/tôn tô=n ai)sthêtô=n, a)lla\ tau/tên ou)

chôristê\n a)ll' a)ei\ met' e)nantiô/seôs--u(/lên tê\n a)chô/riston

me\n, u(pokeime/nên de\ toi=s e)nanti/ois (Aristot. De Gen. et Corr.

p. 329, a. 24). By contraries, Aristotle means here the several

attributes of matter, hot, cold, &c.; from some one or other of which

matter is always inseparable."]

We must observe that what the proper name denotes is any certain

concrete One and individual,[84] with his attributes essential and

non-essential, whatever they may be, though as yet undeclared, and

with his capacity of receiving other attributes different and even

opposite. This is what Aristotle indicates as the most special

characteristic of Substance or Essence, that while it is _Unum et

Idem Numero_, it is capable of receiving contraries. This

potentiality of contraries, described as characterizing the _Unum et

Idem Numero_,[85] is relative to something about to come; the First

Essence is doubtless logically First, but it is just as much relative

to the Second, as the Second to the First. We know it only by two

negations and one affirmation, all of which are relative to

predications _in futuro_. It is neither in a Subject, nor predicable

of a Subject. It is itself the ultimate Subject of all predications

and all inherencies. Plainly, therefore, we know it only relatively

to these predications and inherencies. Aristotle says truly, that if

you take; away the First Essences, everything else, Second Essences

as well as Accidents, disappears along with them. But he might have

added with equal truth, that if you take away all Second Essences and

all Accidents, the First Essences will disappear equally. The

correlation and interdependence is reciprocal.[86] It may be

suitable, with a view to clear and retainable philosophical

explanation, to state the Subject first and the predicates

afterwards; so that the Subject may thus be considered as logically

_prius_. But in truth the Subject is only a _substratum_ for

predicates,[87] as much as the predicates are _superstrata_ upon the

Subject. The term _substratum_ designates not an absolute or a _per

se_, but a _Correlatum_ to certain _superstrata_, determined or

undetermined: now the _Correlatum_ is one of the pair implicated

directly or indirectly in all Relation; and it is in fact specified

by Aristotle as one variety of the Category _Ad Aliquid_.[88] We see

therefore that the idea of Relativity attaches to the first of the

ten Categories, as well as to the nine others. The inference from

these observations is, that Relation or Relativity, understood in the

large sense which really belongs to it, ought to be considered rather

as an Universal, comprehending and pervading all the Categories, than

as a separate Category in itself, co-ordinate with the other nine. It

is the condition and characteristic of the work of predication

generally; the last analysis of which is into Subject and Predicate,

in reciprocal implication with each other. I remark that this was the

view taken of it by some well-known Peripatetic commentators of

antiquity;[89] by Andronikus, for example, and by Ammonius after him.

Plato, though he makes no attempt to draw up a list of Categories,

has an incidental passage respecting Relativity;[90] conceiving it in

a very extended sense, apparently as belonging more or less to all

predicates. Aristotle, though in the Categoriæ he gives a narrower

explanation of it, founded upon grammatical rather than real

considerations, yet intimates in other places that predicates ranked

under the heads of _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, _Jacere_, &c., may

also be looked at as belonging to the head of _Ad Aliquid_.[91] This

latter, moreover, he himself declares elsewhere to be _Ens_ in the

lowest degree, farther removed from the _Prima Essentia_ than any of

the other Categories; to be more in the nature of an appendage to

some of them, especially to _Quantum_ and _Quale_;[92] and to

presuppose, not only the _Prima Essentia_ (which all the nine later

Categories presuppose), but also one or more of the others,

indicating the particular mode of comparison or Relativity in each

case affirmed. Thus, under one aspect, Relation or Relativity may be

said to stand _prius naturâ_, and to come first in order before all

the Categories, inasmuch as it is implicated with the whole business

of predication (which those Categories are intended to resolve into

its elements), and belongs not less to the mode of conceiving what we

call the Subject, than to the mode of conceiving what we call its

Predicates, each and all. Under another aspect, Relativity may be

said to stand last in order among the Categories--even to come after

the adverbial Categories _Ubi et Quando_; because its _locus standi_

is dim and doubtful, and because every one of the subordinate

predicates belonging to it may be seen to belong to one or other of

the remaining Categories also. Aristotle remarks that the Category

_Ad Aliquid_ has no peculiar and definite mode of generation

corresponding to it, in the manner that Increase and Diminution

belong to _Quantum_, Change to _Quale_, Generation, simple and

absolute, to Essence or Substance.[93] New relations may become

predicable of a thing, without any change in the thing itself, but

simply by changes in other things.[94]

[Footnote 84: Simplikius ap. Schol. p. 52, a. 42: [Greek: pro\s o(/

phasin oi( spoudaio/teroi tô=n e)xêgêtô=n, o(/ti ê( ai)sthêtê\

ou)si/a sumpho/rêsi/s ti/s e)sti poiotê/tôn kai\ u(/lês, kai\ o(mou=

me\n pa/nta sumpage/nta mi/an poiei= tê\n ai)sthêtê\n ousi/an,

chôri\s de\ e(/kaston lambano/menon to\ me\n poio\n to\ de\ poso/n

e)sti lambano/menon, ê)/ ti a)/llo.]]

[Footnote 85: Aristot. Categ. p. 4, a. 10: [Greek: Ma/lista de\

I)/dion tou=to tê=s ou)si/as dokei= ei)=nai, to\ tau)to\n kai\ e(\n

a)rithmô=| o)\n tô=n e)nanti/ôn ei)=nai dektiko/n.] See Waitz, note,

p. 290: [Greek: dektiko\n] dicitur [Greek: to\ e)n ô(=| pe/phuken

u(pa/rchein ti].

Dexippus, and after him Simplikius, observe justly, that the

characteristic mark of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] is this very

circumstance of being _unum numero_, which belongs in common to all

[Greek: prô=|tai ou)si/ai], and is indicated by the Proper name:

[Greek: lu/sis de\ touo/tou, o(/ti au)to\ to\ mi/an ei)=nai

a)rithmô=|, koino/s e)sti lo/gos]. (Simpl. in Categor., fol. 22

[Greek: D]].; Dexippus, book ii. sect. 18, p. 57, ed. Spengel.)]

[Footnote 86: Aristot. Categ. p. 2, b. 5. [Greek: mê\ ou)sô=n ou)=n

tô=n prô/tôn ou)siô=n a)du/naton tô=n a)/llôn ti ei)=nai.]

Mr. John Stuart Mill observes: "As to the self-existence of

Substance, it is very true that a substance may be conceived to exist

without any other substance; but so also may an attribute without any

other attributes. And we can no more imagine a substance without

attributes, than we can imagine attributes without a substance."

(System of Logic, bk. i. ch. iii. p. 61, 6th ed.)]

[Footnote 87: Aristot. Physic. ii. p. 194, b. 8. [Greek: e)/ti tô=n

pro/s ti ê( u(/lê; a)/llô| ga\r ei)/dei a)/llê u(/lê.]

Plotinus puts this correctly, in his criticisms on the Stoic

Categories; criticisms which on this point equally apply to the

Aristotelian: [Greek: pro/s ti ga\r to\ u(pokei/menon, ou) pro\s to\

e)n au)tô=|, a)lla\ pro\s to\ poiou=n ei)s au)to/, kei/menon. Kai\

to\ u(pokei/menon u(pokei=tai pro\s to\ ou)ch u(pokei/menon; ei)

tou=to, pro\s ta\ to\ e)/xô], &c. Also Dexippus in the Scholia ad

Categor. p. 45, a. 26: [Greek: to\ ga\r u(pokei/menon kata\ pro/s ti

le/gesthai e)do/kei, tini\ ga\r u(pokei/menon.]]

[Footnote 88: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 31, p. 1021,

a. 27, seq.]

[Footnote 89: Schol. p. 60, a. 38, Br.; p. 47, b. 26. Xenokrates and

Andronikus included all things under the two heads [Greek: to\ kath'

au(to\] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]. [Greek: A)ndro/nikos me\n ga\r o(

R(o/dios teleutai/an a)pone/mei toi=s pros ti ta/xin, le/gôn ai)ti/an

toiau/tên. ta\ pro/s ti oi)kei/an u(/lê ou)k e)/chei; _paraphua/di

ga\r e)/oiken oi)kei/an phu/sin mê\ e)chou/sê| a)lla\ periplekome/nê|

toi=s e)/chousin oi)kei/an r(i/zan; ai( de\ e)/nnea katêgori/ai

oi)kei/an u(/lên e)/chousin_; ei)ko/tôs ou)=n teleutai/an ô)/pheilon

e)/chein ta/xin.] Again, Schol. p. 60, a. 24 (Ammonius): [Greek:

kalô=s de/ tines a)peika/zousi ta\ pro/s ti paraphua/sin], &c. Also

p. 59, b. 41; p. 49, a. 47; p. 61, b. 29: [Greek: i)/sôs de\ kai\

o(/ti ta\ pro/s ti e)n toi=s a)/llois ge/nesin u(phe/stêke, dia\

tou=to su\n au)toi=s theôrei=tai, ka)\n mê\ proêgoume/nês e)/tuche

mnê/mês (and the Scholia ad p. 6, a. 36, prefixed to Waitz's edition,

p. 33). Also p. 62, a. 37: [Greek: dia\ tau=ta de\ ô(s paraphuome/nên

tai=s a)/llais katêgori/ais tê\n tou= pro/s ti e)peisodiô/dê

nomi/zousi, kai/toi proêgoume/nên ou)=san kai\ kata\ diaphora\n

oi)kei/an theôroume/nên.] Boêthus had written an entire book upon

[Greek: ta\ pro/s ti], Schol. p. 61, b. 9.]

[Footnote 90: Plato, Republic, iv. 437 C. to 439 B. (compare also

Sophistes, p. 255 C., and Politicus, p. 285). [Greek: Kai\ ta\ plei/ô

dê\ pro\s ta\ e)la/ttô kai\ ta\ dipla/sia pro\s ta\ ê(mi/sea kai\

pa/nta ta\ toiau=ta, kai\ au)= baru/tera pro\s koupho/tera kai\

tha/ttô pro\s bradu/tera, _kai\ e)/ti ge ta\ therma\ pro\s ta\

psuchra\_ kai\ pa/nta ta\ tou/tois o(/moia, a)=r' ou)ch ou(/tôs

e)/chei?] (438 C.)]

[Footnote 91: See Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 26, p. 1021, b.

10. Trendelenburg observes (Gesch. der Kategorienlehre, pp. 118-122,

seq.) how much more the description given of [Greek: pro/s ti] in the

Categoriæ is determined by verbal or grammatical considerations, than

in the Metaphysica and other treatises of Aristotle.]

[Footnote 92: See Ethic. Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 20: [Greek: to\ de\

kath' au(to\ kai\ ê( ou)si/a pro/teron tê=| phu/sei tou= pro/s ti;

paraphua/di ga\r tou=t' e)/oike kai\ sumbebêko/ti tou= o)/ntos,

ô(/ste ou)k a)\n ei)/ê koinê/ tis e)pi\ tou/tôn i)de/a.] (The

expression [Greek: paraphua/di] was copied by Andronikus; see a note

on the preceding page.) Metaphys. N. p. 1088, a. 22-26: [Greek: to\

de\ pro/s ti pa/ntôn ê(/kista phu/sis tis ê)\ ou)si/a tô=n katêgoriôn

e)sti/, kai\ u(ste/ra tou= poiou= kai\ posou=; kai\ _pa/thos ti tou=

posou= to\ pro/s ti_, ô(/sper e)le/chthê, a)ll' ou)ch u(/lê, ei)/ ti

e(/teron kai\ tô=| o(/lôs koinô=| pro/s ti kai\ toi=s me/resin

au)tou= kai\ ei)/desin.] Compare Bonitz in his note on p. 1070, a.

33.

The general doctrine laid down by Aristotle, Metaphys. N. p. 1087, b.

34, seq., about the universality of [Greek: me/tron] as pervading all

the Categories, is analogous to the passage above referred to in the

Politicus of Plato, and implies the Relativity involved more or less

in all predicates.]

[Footnote 93: Aristot. Metaph. N. p. 1088, a. 29: [Greek: sêmei=on

de\ o(/ti ê(/kista ou)si/a tis kai\ o)/n ti _to\ pro\/s ti_ to\

mo/non mê\ ei)=nai ge/nesin au)tou= mêde\ phthora\n mêde\ ki/nêsin,

ô(/sper kata\ to\ poso\n au)/xêsis kai\ phthi/sis, kata\ to\ poio\n

a)lloi/ôsis, kata\ to/pon phora/, kata\ tê\n ou)si/an ê( a(plê=

ge/nesis kai\ phthora/.] Compare K. p. 1068, a. 9: [Greek: a)na/gkê

trei=s ei)=nai kinê/seis, poiou=, posou=, to/pou. kat' ou)si/an d'

ou)/, dia\ to\ mêthe\n ei)=nai ou)si/a| e)nanti/on, ou)de\ tou= pro/s

ti.] Also Physica, v. p. 225, b. 11: [Greek: e)nde/chetai ga\r

thate/rou metaba/llontos a)lêtheu/esthai tha/teron mêde\n

meta/ballon.] See about this passage Bonitz and Schwegler's notes on

Metaphys. p. 1068.]

[Footnote 94: Hobbes observes (First Philosophy, part ii. ch. xi. 6):

"But we must not so think of Relation as if it were an accident

differing from all the other accidents of the relative; but one of

them, namely, that by which the comparison is made. For example, the

likeness of one white to another white, or its unlikeness to black,

is the same accident with its whiteness." This may be true about the

relations Like and Unlike (see Mr. John Stuart Mill, Logic, ch. iii.

p. 80, 6th ed.) But, in Relations generally, the _fundamentum_ may be

logically distinguished from the Relation itself.

Aristotle makes the same remarks upon [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] as

upon [Greek: to\ pro/s ti]:--That it verges upon Non-ens; and that it

has no special mode of being generated or destroyed. [Greek:

phai/netai ga\r to\ sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos; tô=n

me\n ga\r a)/llon tro/pon o)/ntôn e)/sti ge/nesis kai\ phthora/, tô=n

de\ kata\ sumbebêko\s ou)k e)/stin.] (Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 21.)]

Those among the Aristotelian commentators who denied the title of _Ad

Aliquid_ to a place among the Categories or _Summa Genera_ of

predicates, might support their views from passages where Aristotle

ranks the Genus as a _Relatum_, though he at the same time declares

that the Species under it are not _Relata_. Thus _scientia_ is

declared by him to be a _Relatum_; because it must be _of

something--alicujus scibilis_; while the _something_ thus implied is

not specified.[95] But (_scientia_) _musica_, _grammatica_, _medica_,

&c., are declared not to be _Relata_; the indeterminate _something_

being there determined, and bound up in one word with the predication

of Relativity. Now the truth is that both are alike _Relata_, though

both also belong to the Category of Quality; a man is called _Talis_

from being _sciens_, as well as from being _grammaticus_. Again, he

gives as illustrative examples of the Category _Ad Aliquid_, the

adjectives double, triple. But he ranks in a different Category (that

of _Quantum_) the adjectives bicubital, tricubital ([Greek:

dipê=chus, tripê=chus]. It is plain that the two last of these

predicates are species under the two first, and that all four

predicates are alike relative, under any real definition that can be

given of Relativity, though all four belong also to the Category of

_Quantum_. Yet Aristotle does not recognize any predicates as

belonging to _Ad Aliquid_, except such as are logically and

grammatically elliptical; that is, such as do not include in

themselves the specification of the Correlate, but require to be

supplemented by an additional word in the genitive or dative case,

specifying the latter. As we have already seen, he lays it down

generally, that all _Relata_ (or _Ad Aliquid_) imply a _Correlatum_;

and he prescribes that when the _Correlatum_ is indicated, care shall

be taken to designate it by a precise and specific term, not of wider

import than the _Relatum_,[96] but specially reciprocating therewith:

thus he regards _ala_ (a wing) as _Ad Aliquid_, but when you specify

its correlate in order to speak with propriety ([Greek: oi)kei/ôs]),

you must describe it as _ala alati_ (not as _ala avis_), in order

that the _Correlatum_ may be strictly co-extensive and reciprocating

with the _Relatum_. Wing, head, hand, &c., are thus _Ad Aliquid_,

though there may be no received word in the language to express their

exact _Correlata_; and though you may find it necessary to coin a new

word expressly for the purpose.[97] In specifying the _Correlatum_ of

servant, you must say, servant _of a master_, not servant of a man or

of a biped; both of which are in this case accompaniments or

accidents of the master, being still accidents, though they may be in

fact constantly conjoined. Unless you say master, the terms will not

reciprocate; take away master, the servant is no longer to be found,

though the man who was called _servant_ is still there; but take away

man or biped, and the servant may still continue.[98] You cannot know

the _Relatum_ determinately or accurately, unless you know the

_Correlatum_ also; without the knowledge of the latter, you can only

know the former in a vague and indefinite manner.[99] Aristotle

raises, also, the question whether any Essence or Substance can be

described as _Ad Aliquid_.[100] He inclines to the negative, though

not decisively pronouncing. He seems to think that Simo and Davus,

when called men, are Essences or Substances; but that when called

master and slave, they are not so; this, however, is surprising, when

he had just before spoken of the connotation of man as accidents

([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]) belonging to the connotation of master. He

speaks of the members of an organized body (wing, head, foot) as

examples of _Ad Aliquid_; while in other treatises, he determines

very clearly that these members presuppose, as a _prius naturâ_, the

complete organism whereof they are parts, and that the name of each

member connotes the performance of, or aptitude to perform, a certain

special function: now, such aptitude cannot exist unless the whole

organism be held together in co-operative agency, so that if this

last condition be wanting, the names, head, eye, foot, can no longer

be applied to the separate members, or at least can only be applied

equivocally or metaphorically.[101] It would seem therefore that the

functioning _something_ is here the Essence, and that all its

material properties are accidents ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]).

[Footnote 95: Categor. p. 6, b. 12, p. 11, a. 24; Topic. iv. p. 124,

b. 16. Compare also Topica, iv. p. 121, a. 1, and the Scholia

thereupon, p. 278, b. 12-16, Br.; in which Scholia Alexander feels

the difficulty of enrolling a generic term as [Greek: pro/s ti],

while the specific terms comprised under it are not [Greek: pro/s

ti]; and removes the difficulty by suggesting that [Greek:

e)pistê/mê] may be at once both [Greek: poio/tês] and [Greek: pro/s

ti]; and that as [Greek: poio/tês] (not as [Greek: pro/s ti]) it may

be the genus including [Greek: mousikê\] and [Greek: geômetri/a],

which are not [Greek: pro/s ti], but [Greek: poio/têtes].]

[Footnote 96: Categor. p. 6, b. 30, p. 7, b. 12.]

[Footnote 97: Categor. p. 7, a. 5. [Greek: e)ni/ote de\

o)nomatopoiei=n I)/sôs a)nagkai=on, e)a\n mê\ kei/menon ê)=| o)/noma

pro\s o(\ _oi)kei/ôs_ a)\n a)podothei/ê.]]

[Footnote 98: Categor. p. 7, a. 31. [Greek: e)/ti d' e)a\n me/n ti

oi)kei/ôs a)podido/menon ê)=| pro\s o(\ le/getai, pa/ntôn

periairoume/nôn tô=n a)/llôn o(/sa _sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti/,

kataleipome/nou de\ mo/nou tou/tou pro\s o(\ a)pedo/thê oi)kei/ôs,

a)ei\ pro\s au)to\ r(êthê/setai, oi(=on o( dou=los e)a\n pro\s

despo/tên le/gêtai, periairoume/nôn tô=n _a)/llôn a(pa/ntôn o(/sa

sumbebêko/ta_ e)sti\ _tô=| despo/tê|_ oi(=on to\ di/podi ei)=nai kai\

to\ e)pistê/mês dektikô=| kai\ _to\ a)nthrô/pô|_, kataleipome/nou de\

mo/nou tou= despo/tên ei)=nai, a)ei\ o( dou=los pro\s au)to\

r(êthêsetai.]

This is not only just and useful in regard to accuracy of

predication, but deserves attention also in another point of view. In

general, it would be said that _man_ and _biped_ belonged to the

Essence ([Greek: ou)si/a]); and the being a master to the Accidents

or Accompaniments ([Greek: sumbebêko/ta]). Here the case is reversed;

man and biped are the accidents or accompaniments; master is the

Essence. What is connoted by the term _master_ is here the essential

idea, that which is bound up with the idea connoted by _servant_;

while the connotation of _man_ or _biped_ sinks into the character of

an accessory or accompaniment. The master might possibly not be a

man, but a god; the Delphian Apollo (Euripid. Ion, 132), and the

Corinthian Aphrodité, had each many slaves belonging to them.

Moreover, even if every master were a man, the qualities connoted by

_man_ are here accidental, as not being included in those connoted by

the term master. Compare Metaphysica, [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 32;

Topica, i. p. 102, a. 18.]

[Footnote 99: That Plato was fully sensible to the necessity of

precision and appropriateness in designating the _Correlatum_

belonging to each _Relatum_, may be seen by the ingenious reasoning

in the Platonic Parmenides, pp. 133-134, where [Greek: despo/tês] and

[Greek: dou=los] are also the illustrative examples employed.]

[Footnote 100: Categor. p. 8, a. 35, b. 20.]]

[Footnote 101: See Politica, i. p. 1253, a. 18: [Greek: kai\ pro/tero

dê\ tê=| phu/sei po/lis ê)\ oi)ki/a kai\ e(/kastos ê(mô=n e)sti/n;

to\ ga\r o(/lon pro/teron a)nagkai=on ei)=nai tou= me/rous;

a)nairoume/nou ga\r tou= o(/lou ou)k e)/stai pou=s ou)de\ chei\r, ei)

mê\ o(mônu/môs, ô(/sper ei)/ tis le/gei **tê\n lithi/nên;

diaphtharei=sa ga\r e)/stai toiau/tê. pa/nta de\tô=| e)/rgô|

ô(/ristai kai\ tê=| duna/mei, ô/ste _mêke/ti toiau=ta o)/nta ou)

lekte/on ta\ au)ta ei)=nai_ a)ll' o(mô/numa]; also p. 1254, a. 9:

[Greek: to/ te ga\r mo/rion ou) mo/non a)/llou e)sti\ mo/rion, a)lla\

kai\ a)/llou].

Compare De Animâ, ii. 1, p. 412, b. 20; Meteorologic. iv. p. 390, a.

12.

The doctrine enunciated in these passages is a very important one, in

the Aristotelian philosophy.

Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, p. 182) touches upon this confusion

of the Categories, but faintly and partially.]

In the fourth book of the Metaphysica, Aristotle gives an explanation

of _Ad Aliquid_ different from, and superior to, that which we read

in the Categoriæ; treating it, not as one among many distinct

Categories, but as implicated with all the Categories, and taking a

different character according as it is blended with one or the

other--_Essentia_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Actio_, _Passio_, &c.[102] He

there, also, enumerates as one of the varieties of _Relata_, what

seems to go beyond the limit, or at least beyond the direct

denotation, of the Categories; for, having specified, as one variety,

_Relata Numero_, and, as another, _Relata secundum actionem et

passionem ([Greek: to\ thermantiko\n pro\s to\ thermanto/n], &c.), he

proceeds to a third variety, such as the _mensurabile_ with reference

to _mensura_, the _scibile_ with reference to _scientia_, the

_cogitabile_ with reference to _cogitatio_; and in regard to this

third variety, he draws a nice distinction. He says that _mensura_

and _cogitatio_ are _Ad Aliquid_, not because they are themselves

related to _mensurabile_ and _cogitabile_, but because _mensurabile_

and _cogitabile_ are related to them.[103] You cannot say (he thinks)

that mensura is referable to the _mensurabile_, or _cogitatio_ to the

_cogitabile_, because that would be repeating the same word twice

over--_mensura est illius cujus est mensura_--_cogitatio est illius

cujus est cogitatio._ So that he regards _mensura_ and _cogitatio_ as

_Correlata_, rather than as _Relata_; while _mensurabile_ and

_cogitabile_ are the _Relata_ to them. But in point of fact, the

distinction is not important; of the relative pair there may be one

which is more properly called the _Correlatum_; yet both are alike

relative.

[Footnote 102: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 27-32. At the same

time we must remark, that while Aristotle enumerates [Greek: to\

u(pe/rechon] and [Greek: to\ u(perecho/menon] under [Greek: Pro/s

ti], he had just before (a. 25) ranked [Greek: to\ me/ga kai\ to\

mikro/n, to\ mei=zon kai\ to\ e(/latton], under the general head

[Greek: Poso/n]--as [Greek: posou= pa/thê kath' au(ta/].]

[Footnote 103: Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1021, a. 26, b. 3; also I. p.

1056, b. 34. Bonitz in his note (p. 262) remarks that the distinction

here drawn by Aristotle is not tenable; and I agree with him that it

is not. But it coincides with what Aristotle asserts in other words

in the Categoriæ; viz., that to be _simul naturâ_ is not true of

_all_ Relata, but only of the greater part of them; that [Greek: to\

ai)sthêto\n] is [Greek: pro/teron tê=s ai)sthê/seôs], and [Greek: to\

e)pistêto\n pro/teron tê=s e)pistê/mês] (Categor. p. 7, b. 23; p. 8,

a. 10). As I have mentioned before (p. 71 n.), Simplikius, in the

Scholia (p. 65, b. 14), points out that Aristotle has not been

careful here to observe his own precept of selecting [Greek:

oi)kei/ôs] the correlative term. He ought to have stated the

potential as correlating with the potential, the actual with the

actual. If he had done this, the [Greek: sunu/parxis tô=n pro/s ti]

would have been seen to be true in all cases. Eudorus noticed a

similar inadvertence of Aristotle in the case of [Greek: pte/ron] and

[Greek: pterôto/n] (Schol. 63, a. 43). See 'Plato and the Other

Companions of Sokrates,' vol. ii. p. 330, note x.

I transcribe a curious passage of Leibnitz, bearing on the same

question:--"On réplique maintenant, que la vérité du mouvement est

indépendante de l'observation: et qu'un vaisseau peut avancer, sans

que celui qui est dedans s'en aperçoive. Je réponds, que le mouvement

est indépendant de l'observation: mais qu'il _n'est point indépendant

de l'observabilité_. Il n'y a point de mouvement, quand il n'y a

point de changement _observable_. Et même quand il n'y a point de

changement observable, il n'y a point de changement du tout. Le

contraire est fondé sur la supposition d'un Espace réel absolu, que

j'ai réfuté demonstrativement par le principe du besoin d'une Raison

suffisante des choses." (Correspondence with Clarke, p. 770.

Erdmann's edition.)]

If we compare together the various passages in which Aristotle cites

and applies the Ten Categories (not merely in the treatise before us,

but also in the Metaphysica, Physica, and elsewhere), we shall see

that he cannot keep them apart steadily and constantly; that the same

predicate is referred to one head in one place, and to another head

in another: what is here spoken of as belonging to _Actio_ or

_Passio_, will be treated in another place as an instance of _Quale_

or _Ad Aliquid_; even the derivative noun [Greek: e(/xis] (_habitus_)

does not belong to the Category [Greek: e)/chein] (_Habere_), but

sometimes to _Quale_, sometimes to _Ad Aliquid_.[104] This is

inevitable; for the predicates thus differently referred have really

several different aspects, and may be classified in one way or

another, according as you take them in this or that aspect. Moreover,

this same difficulty of finding impassable lines of demarcation would

still be felt, even if the Categories, instead of the full list of

Ten, were reduced to the smaller list of the four principal

Categories--Substance, Quantity, Quality, and Relation; a reduction

which has been recommended by commentators on Aristotle as well as by

acute logicians of modern times. Even these four cannot be kept

clearly apart: the predicates which declare Quantity or Quality must

at the same time declare or imply Relation; while the predicates

which declare Relation must also imply the _fundamentum_ either of

Quantity or of Quality.[105]

[Footnote 104: Aristot. Categor. p. 6, b. 2; p. 8, b. 27.]

[Footnote 105: See Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, p. 117, seq. The

remarks made by Mr. John Stuart Mill (in his System of Logic, book i.

ch. iii.) upon the Aristotelian Categories, and the enlarged

philosophical arrangement which he introduces in their place, well

deserve to be studied. After enumerating the ten Predicaments, Mr.

Mill says:--"It is a mere catalogue of the distinctions rudely marked

out by the language of familiar life, with little or no attempt to

penetrate, by philosophic analysis, to the _rationale_ even of these

common distinctions. Such an analysis would have shewn the

enumeration to be both redundant and defective. Some objects are

omitted, and others repeated several times under different heads."

(Compare the remarks of the Stoic commentators, and Porphyry, Schol.

p. 48, b. 10 Br.: [Greek: a)thetou=ntes tê\n diai/resin ô(s polla\

pariei=san kai\ mê\ perilamba/nousan, ê)\ kai\ pa/lin pleona/zousan.]

And Aristotle himself observes that the same predicates might be

ranked often under more than one head.) "That could not be a very

comprehensive view of the nature of Relation, which could exclude

action, passivity, and local situation from that category. The same

objection applies to the categories Quando (or position in time), and

Ubi (or position in space); _while the distinction between the latter

and Situs ([Greek: Kei=sthai]) is merely verbal_. The incongruity of

erecting into a _summum genus_ the tenth Category is manifest. On the

other hand, the enumeration takes no notice of any thing but

Substances and Attributes. In what Category are we to place

sensations, or any other feelings and states of mind? as hope, joy,

fear; sound, smell, taste; pain, pleasure; thought, judgment,

conception, and the like? Probably all these would have been placed

by the Aristotelian school in the Categories of Actio and Passio; and

the relation of such of them as are active, to their objects, and of

such of them as are passive, to their causes, would have been rightly

so placed; but the things themselves, the feelings or states of mind,

wrongly. Feelings, or states of consciousness, are assuredly to be

counted among realities; but they cannot be reckoned either among

substances or among attributes." Among the many deficiencies of the

Aristotelian Categories, as a complete catalogue, there is none more

glaring than the imperfect conception of [Greek: Pro/s ti] (the

Relative), which Mr. Mill here points out. But the Category [Greek:

Kei=sthai] (badly translated by commentators _Situs_, from which

Aristotle expressly distinguishes it, Categor. p. 6, b. 12: [Greek:

to\ de\ a)nakei=sthai ê)\ e(sta/nai ê)\ kathê=sthai au)ta\ me\n ou)k

ei)si\ the/seis]) appears to be hardly open to Mr. Mill's remark,

that it is only verbally distinguished from [Greek: Pou=], _Ubi_.

[Greek: Kei=sthai] is intended to mean _posture_, _attitude_, &c. It

is a reply to the question, In what posture is Sokrates? Answer.--He

is lying down, standing upright, kneeling, [Greek: pu\x protei/nôn],

&c. This is quite different from the question, Where is Sokrates? In

the market-place, in the palæstra, &c. [Greek: Kei=sthai] (as

Aristotle himself admits, Categ. p. 6, b. 12) is not easily

distinguished from [Greek: Pro/s ti]: for the abstract and general

word [Greek: _the/sis_] (_position_) is reckoned by Aristotle under

Greek: Pro/s ti], though the _paronyma_ [Greek: a)nakei=sthai,

e(sta/nai, kathê=sthai] are affirmed not to be [Greek: the/seis], but

to come under the separate Category [Greek: _Kei=sthai_]. But [Greek:

Kei=sthai] is clearly distinguishable from [Greek: Pou=] _Ubi_.

Again, to Mr. Mill's question, "In what Category are we to place

sensations or other states of mind--hope, fear, sound, smell, pain,

pleasure, thought, judgment," &c.? Aristotle would have replied (I

apprehend) that they come under the Category either of _Quale_ or of

_Pati_--[Greek: Poio/têtes] or [Greek: Pa/thê]. They are attributes

or modifications of Man, Kallias, Sokrates, &c. If the condition of

which we speak be temporary or transitory, it is a [Greek: pa/thos],

and we speak of Kallias as [Greek: pa/schôn ti]; if it be a durable

disposition or capacity likely to pass into repeated manifestations,

it is [Greek: poio/tês], and we describe Kallias as [Greek: poio/s

tis] (Categ. p. 9, a. 28-p. 10 a. 9). This equally applies to mental

and bodily conditions ([Greek: o(moi/ôs de\ tou/tois kai\ kata\ tê\n

psuchê\n pathêtikai\ poio/têtes kai\ pa/thê le/getai.]--p. 9, b. 33).

The line is dubious and difficult between [Greek: pa/thos] and

[Greek: poio/tês], but one or other of the two will comprehend all

the mental states indicated by Mr. Mill. Aristotle would not have

admitted that "feelings are to be counted among realities," except as

they are now or may be the feelings of Kallias, Sokrates, or some

other _Hic Aliquis_--one or many. He would consider feelings as

attributes belonging to these [Greek: Prô=tai Ou)si/ai]; and so in

fact Mr. Mill himself considers them (p. 83), after having specified

the Mind (distinguished from Body or external object) as the

Substance to which they belong.

Mr. Mill's classification of Nameable Things is much better and more

complete than the Aristotelian Categories, inasmuch as it brings into

full prominence the distinction between the subjective and objective

points of view, and, likewise, the all-pervading principle of

Relativity, which implicates the two; whereas, Aristotle either

confuses the one with the other, or conceives them narrowly and

inadequately. But we cannot say, I think, that Aristotle, in the

Categories, assigns no room for the mental states or elements. He has

a place for them, though he treats them altogether objectively. He

takes account of _himself_ only as an object--as one among the

[Greek: prô=tai ou)si/ai], or individuals, along with Sokrates and

Kallias.]

The most capital distinction, however, which is to be found among the

Categories is that of Essence or Substance from all the rest. This is

sometimes announced as having a standing _per se_; as not only

logically distinguishable, but really separable from the other nine,

if we preserve the Aristotelian list of ten,[106] or from the other

three, if we prefer the reduced list of four. But such real

separation cannot be maintained. The _Prima Essentia_ (we are told)

is indispensable as a Subject, but cannot appear as Predicate; while

all the rest can and do so appear. Now we see that this definition is

founded upon the function enacted by each of them in predication, and

therefore presupposes the fact of predication, which is in itself a

Relation. The Category of Relation is thus implied, in declaring what

the First Essence is, together with some _predicabilia_ as

correlates, though it is not yet specified what the _predicabilia_

are. But besides this, the distinction drawn by Aristotle, between

First and Second Essence or Substance, abolishes the marked line of

separation between Substance and Quality, making the former shade

down into the latter. The distinction recognizes a more or less in

Substance, which graduation Aristotle expressly points out, stating

that the Species is _more_ Substance or Essence, and that Genus

_less_ so. We see thus that he did not conceive Substance (apart from

attributes) according to the modern view, as that which exists

_without_ the mind (excluding _within_ the mind or _relation_ to the

mind); for in that there can be no graduation. That which is without

the mind, must also be within; and that which is within must also be

without; the subject and the object correlating. This implication of

within and without understood, there is then room for graduation,

according as the one or the other aspect may be more or less

prominent. Aristotle, in point of fact, confines himself to the

mental or logical work of predication, to the conditions thereof, and

to the component terms whereby the mind accomplishes that act. When

he speaks of the First Essence or Substance, without the Second, all

that he can say about it positively is to call it _Unum numero_ and

indivisible:[107] even thus, he is compelled to introduce unity,

measure, and number, all of which belong to the two Categories of

Quantity and Relation; and yet still the First Essence or Substance

remains indeterminate. We only begin to determine it when we call it

by the name of the Second Substance or Essence; which name connotes

certain attributes, the attributes thus connoted being of the essence

of the Species; that is, unless they be present, no individual would

be considered as belonging to the Species, or would be called by the

specific name.[108] When we thus, however, introduce attributes, we

find ourselves not merely in the Category of _Substantia_

(_Secunda_), but also in that of _Qualitas_. The boundary between

_Substantia_ and _Qualitas_ disappears; the latter being partially

contained in the former. The Second Substance or Essence includes

attributes or Qualities belonging to the Essence. In fact, the Second

Substance or Essence, when distinguished from the First, is both here

and elsewhere characterized by Aristotle, as being not Substance at

all, but Quality,[109] though when considered as being in implication

with the First, it takes on the nature of Substance and becomes

substantial or essential Quality. The Differentia belongs thus both

to Substance and to Quality (_quale quid_), making up as complement

that which is designated by the specific name.[110]

[Footnote 106: Aristotle sometimes speaks of it as [Greek:

chôristo/n], the other Categories being not [Greek: chôrista/]

(Metaphys. Z. p. 1028, a. 34). It is not easy, however, always to

distinguish whether he means by the term [Greek: chôrista\]

"_sejuncta re_", or "_sejuncta notione solâ_." See Bonitz ad

Metaphysic. ([Greek: D]. p. 1017), p. 244.]

[Footnote 107: Categor. p. 3, b. 12: [Greek: a)/tomon ga\r kai\ e(\n

a)rithmô=| to\ dêlou/meno/n e)stin.] Compare Metaphysic. N. p. 1087,

b. 33; p. 1088, a. 10.]

[Footnote 108: Hobbes says:--"Now that accident (_i.e._ attribute)

for which we give a certain name to any body, or the accident which

denominates its Subject, is commonly called the Essence thereof; as

rationality is the essence of a man, whiteness of any white thing,

and extension the essence of a body" (Hobbes, Philosophy, ch. viii.

s. 23). This topic will be found discussed, most completely and

philosophically, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's System of Logic, Book I.

ch. vi. ss. 2-3; ch. vii. s. 5.]

[Footnote 109: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn

ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as

to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=on, ou) mê\n

a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon _poio/n ti sêmai/nei--poia\n ga/r tina

ou)si/an_ sêmai/nei] (b. 20).

Metaphysic. Z. p. 1038, b. 35: [Greek: phanero\n o(/ti ou)the\n tô=n

katho/lou u(parcho/ntôn ou)si/a e)sti/, kai\ o(/ti ou)the\n sêmai/nei

tô=n koinê=| katêgoroume/nôn to/de ti, a)lla\ toio/nde.] Compare

Metaphys. M. p. 1087, a. 1; Sophistic. Elench. p. 178, b. 37; 179, a.

9.

That which is called [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a] in the Categoriæ is

called [Greek: tri/tê ou)si/a] in Metaphys. [Greek: Ê]. p. 1043, a.

18. In Ethic. Nikom. Z. p. 1143, a. 32, seq., the _generalissima_ are

called [Greek: prô=ta], and particulars are called [Greek:

e)/schata]. Zell observes in his commentary (p. 224), "[Greek: ta\

e)/schata] sunt res singulæ, quæ et ipsæ sunt extremæ, ratione mentis

nostræ, ab universis ad singula delabentis." Patricius remarks upon

the different sense of the terms [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a] in the

Categoriæ and in the De Interpretatione (Discuss. Peripatetic. p.

21).]

[Footnote 110: Metaphysic. [Greek: D]. p. 1020, b. 13: [Greek:

schedo\n dê\ kata\ du/o tro/pous le/goit' a)\n to\ poio/n, kai\

tou/tôn e(/na to\n kuriô/taton; prô/tê me\n ga\r poiotê\s ê( tê=s

ou)si/as diaphora/.] Compare Physic. v. p. 226, a. 27. See

Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 56, 93.

The remarks of the different expositors (contained in Scholia, pp.

52, 53, 54, Brand.), are interesting upon the ambiguous position of

Differentia, in regard to Substance and Quality. It comes out to be

Neither and Both--[Greek: ou)de/tera kai\ a)mpho/tera] (Plato,

Euthydemus, p. 300 C.). Dexippus and Porphyry called it something

intermediate between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: poio/tês], or

between [Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: sumbebêko/s].]

We see, accordingly, that neither is the line of demarcation between

the Category of Substance or Essence and the other Categories so

impassable, nor the separability of it from the others so marked as

some thinkers contend. Substance is represented by Aristotle as

admitting of more and less, and as graduating by successive steps

down to the other Categories; moreover, neither in its complete

manifestation (as First Substance), nor in its incomplete

manifestation (as Second Substance), can it be explained or

understood without calling in the other Categories of Quantity,

Quality, and Relation. It does not correspond to the definition of

_Substantia_ given by Spinoza--"_quod in se est et per se

concipitur_." It can no more be conceived or described without some

of the other Categories, than they can be conceived or described

without it. Aristotle defines it by four characteristics, two

negative, and two positive. It cannot be predicated of a Subject: it

cannot inhere in a Subject: it is, at bottom, the **Subject of all

Predicates: it is _Unum numero_ and indivisible.[111] Not one of

these four determinations can be conceived or understood, unless we

have in our minds the idea of other Categories and its relation to

them. Substance is known only as the Subject of predicates, that is,

relatively to them; as they also are known relatively to it. Without

the Category of Relation, we can no more understand what is meant by

a Subject than what is meant by a Predicate. The Category of

Substance, as laid out by Aristotle, neither exists by itself, nor

can be conceived by itself, without that of Relation and the generic

notion of Predicate.[112] All three lie together at the bottom of the

analytical process, as the last findings and residuum.

[Footnote 111: Categor. p. 2, a. 14, b. 4; p. 3, b. 12.]

[Footnote 112: Aristotle gives an explanation of what he means by

[Greek: kath' au(to/--kath' au(ta/], in the Analytic. Post. I. iv. p.

73, a. 34, b. 13. According to that explanation it will be necessary

to include in [Greek: to\ kath' au(to\] of the Category [Greek:

Ou)si/a], all that is necessary to make the definition or explanation

of that Category understood.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, in the valuable Preface introducing his

translation of the Organon, gives what I think a just view of the

Categories generally, and especially of [Greek: prô/tê ou)si/a], as

simply naming (_i.e._ giving a proper name), and doing nothing more.

I transcribe the passage, merely noting that the terms _anterior_ and

_posterior_ can mean nothing more than _logical_ anteriority and

posteriority.

"Mais comment classer les mots?--C'est à la réalité seule qu'il faut

le demander; à la réalité dont le langage n'est que le réflet, dont

les mots ne sont que le symbole. Que nous présente la réalité? Des

individus, rien que des individus, existant par eux-mêmes, et se

groupant, par leurs ressemblances et leurs différences, sous des

espèces et sous des genres. Ainsi donc, en étudiant l'individu,

l'être individuel, et en analysant avec exactitude tout ce qu'il est

possible d'en dire en tant qu'être, on aura les classes les plus

générales des mots; les catégories, ou pour prendre le terme

français, les attributions, qu'il est possible de lui appliquer.

Voilà tout le fondement des Catégories.--Ce n'est pas du reste, une

classification des choses à la manière de celles de l'histoire

naturelle, qu'il s'agit de faire en logique: c'est une simple

énumération de tous les points de vue, d'**où l'esprit peut

considérer les choses, non pas, il est vrai, par rapport à l'esprit

lui-même, mais par rapport à leur réalité et à leurs

appellations.--Aristote distingue ici dix points de vue, dix

significations principales des mots.--La Catégorie de la Substance

est à la tête de toutes les autres, précisément parceque la première,

la plus essentielle, marque d'un être, c'est d'être. Cela revient à

dire qu'avant tout, l'être est, l'être existe. Par suite les mots qui

expriment la substance sont antérieurs à tous les autres et sont les

plus importants. Il faut ajouter que ces mots là participeront en

quelque sorte à cet isolement que les individus nous offrent dans la

nature. Mais de même que, dans la réalité, les individus subsistant

par eux seuls forment des espèces et des genres, qui ont bien aussi

une existence substantielle, la substance se divisera de même en

substance première et substance seconde.--Les espèces et les genres,

s'ils expriment la substance, ne l'expriment pas dans toute sa

pureté; c'est **déjà de la substance qualifié, comme le dit

Aristote.--Il n'y a bien dans la réalité que des individus et des

espèces ou genres. Mais ces individus en soi et pour soi n'existent

pas seulement; ils existent sous certaines conditions; leur existence

se produit sous certaines modifications, que les mots expriment aussi,

tout comme ils expriment l'existence absolue. Ces nouvelles classes

de mots formeront les autres Catégories.--Ces modifications, ces

accidents, de l'individu sont au nombre de neuf: Aristote n'en

reconnaît pas davantage.--**Voilà donc les dix Catégories: les dix

seules attributions possibles. _Par la première, on nomme les

individus, sans faire plus que les nommer: par les autres, on les

qualifie._ On dit d'abord ce qu'est l'individu, et ensuite quel il

est." Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Logique d'Aristote, Preface, pp.

lxxii.-lxxvii.]

Aristotle, taking his departure from an analysis of the complete

sentence or of the act of predication, appears to have regarded the

Subject as having a natural priority over the Predicate. The

noun-substantive (which to him represents the Subject), even when

pronounced alone, carries to the hearer a more complete conception

than either the adjective or the verb when pronounced alone; these

make themselves felt much more as elliptical and needing

complementary adjuncts. But this is only true in so far as the

conception, raised by the substantive named alone ([Greek: a)/neu

sumplokê=s]), includes by anticipation what would be included, if we

added to it some or all of its predicates. If we could deduct from

this conception the meaning of all the applicable predicates, it

would seem essentially barren or incomplete, awaiting something to

come; a mere point of commencement or departure,[113] known only by

the various lines which may be drawn from it; a _substratum_ for

various attributes to lie upon or to inhere in. That which is known

only as a _substratum_, is known only relatively to a superstructure

to come; the one is _Relatum_, the other _Correlatum_, and the

mention of either involves an implied assumption of the other. There

may be a logical priority, founded upon expository convenience,

belonging to the _substratum_, because it remains numerically one and

the same, while the superstructure is variable. But the priority is

nothing more than logical and notional; it does not amount to an

ability of prior independent existence. On the contrary, there is

simultaneity _by nature_ (according to Aristotle's own definition of

the phrase) between Subject, Relation, and Predicate; since they all

imply each other as reciprocating correlates, while no one of them is

the cause of the others.[114]

[Footnote 113: Plato would not admit the point as as anything more

than [Greek: a)rchê\n grammê=s] (Aristot. Metaphys. A. p. 992, a.

21).]

[Footnote 114: Aristot. Categor. p. 14, b. 27: [Greek: phu/sei de\

a(/ma, o(/sa a)ntistre/phei kata\ tê\n tou= ei)=nai a)kolou/thêsin,

mêdamô=s de\ ai)/tion tha/teron thate/rô| tou= ei)=nai e)stin, oi(=on

e)pi\ tou= diplasi/ou kai\ tou= ê(mi/seos;] &c.]

When Aristotle says, very truly, that if the First Substances were

non-existent, none of the other Predicaments could exist, we must

understand what he means by the term _first_. That term bears, in

this treatise, a sense different from what it bears elsewhere: here

it means the extreme concrete and individual; elsewhere it means the

extreme abstract and universal. The First Substance or First Essence,

in the Categories, is a _Hoc Aliquid_ ([Greek: to/de ti]),

illustrated by the examples _hic homo_, _hic equus_. Now, as thus

explained and illustrated, it includes not merely the Second

Substance, but various accidental attributes besides. When we talk of

This man, Sokrates, Kallias, &c., the hearer conceives not only the

attributes for which he is called a man, but also various accidental

attributes, ranking under one or more of the other Predicaments. The

First Substance thus (as explained by Aristotle) is not conceived as

a mere _substratum_ without Second Substance and without any

Accidents, but as already including both of them, though as yet

indeterminately; it waits for specializing words, to determine what

its Substance or Essence is, and what its accompanying Accidents are.

Being an individual (_Unum numero_), it unites in itself both the

essential attributes of its species, and the unessential attributes

peculiar to itself.[115] It is already understood as including

attributes of both kinds; but we wait for predicates to declare

([Greek: dêlou=n--a)podido/nai][116]) what these attributes are. The

First or Complete _Ens_ embodies in itself all the Predicaments,

though as yet potential and indeterminate, until the predicating

adjuncts are specified. There is no priority, in the order of

existence, belonging to Substance over Relation or Quality; take away

either one of the three, and the First _Ens_ disappears. But in

regard to the order of exposition, there is a natural priority,

founded on convenience and facility of understanding. The _Hoc

Aliquid_ or _Unum Numero_, which intimates in general outline a

certain concretion or co-existence of attributes, though we do not

yet know what they are--being as it were a skeleton--comes naturally

as Subject before the predicates, whose function is declaratory and

specifying as to those attributes: moreover, the essential

attributes, which are declared and connoted when we first bestow a

specific name on the subject, come naturally before the unessential

attributes, which are predicated of the subject already called by a

specific name connoting other attributes.[117] The essential

characters are native and at home; the accidental attributes are

domiciliated foreigners.[118]

[Footnote 115: Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24; p. 1034, a. 8.

[Greek: To\ d' a)/pan to/de Kalli/as ê)\ Sôkra/tês e)sti\n ô(/sper ê(

sphai=ra ê( chalkê= ê(di/, o( d' a)/nthrôpos kai\ to\ zô=|on ô(/sper

sphai=ra chalkê= o(lôs.--to\ d' a(/pan ê)/dê to\ toio/nde ei)=dos e)n

tai=sde tai=s sarxi\ kai\ o)stoi=s Kalli/as kai\ Sôkra/tês; kai\

e(/teron me\n dia\ tê\n u(/lên, e(/tera ga/r, tau)to\ de\ tô=|

ei)/dei; a)/tomon ga\r to\ ei)=dos.]]

[Footnote 116: Categor. p. 2, b. 29, seq. [Greek: ei)ko/tôs de\ meta\

ta\s prô/tas ou)si/as mo/na tô=n a)/llôn ta\ ei)/dê kai\ ta\ ge/nê

deu/terai ou)si/ai le/gontai; mo/na _ga\r dêloi=_ tê\n prô/tên

ou)si/an tô=n katêgoroume/nôn.] &c.

[Footnote 117: Analyt. Poster. i. p. 73, b. 6: [Greek: oi(=on to\

badi/zon e(/tero/n ti o(\n badi/zon e)sti\ kai\ leuko/n, ê( d'

ou)si/a, kai\ o(/sa to/de ti sêmai/nei, ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o)/nta

o(/per e)sti/n.] Also p. 83, a. 31. [Greek: kai\ mê\ ei)=nai/ ti

leuko/n, o(\ ou)ch e(/tero/n ti o(\n leuko/n e)stin]: also p. 83, b.

22.]

[Footnote 118: Categor. p. 2, b. 31: [Greek: to\n ga/r tina

a)nthrôpon e)a\n a)podidô=| tis ti/ e)sti, to\ me\n ei)=dos ê)\ to\

ge/nos a)podidou\s _oi)kei/ôs_ a)podô/sei--tô=n d' a)/llôn o(/ ti

a)\n a)podidô=| tis, _a)llotri/ôs_ e)stai a)podedôkô/s], &c.]

It is thus that Aristotle has dealt with Ontology, in one of the four

distinct aspects thereof, which he distinguishes from each other;

that is, in the distribution of _Entia_ according to their logical

order, and the reciprocal interdependence, in predication. _Ens_ is a

multivocal word, neither strictly univocal nor altogether equivocal.

It denotes (as has been stated above) not a generic aggregate,

divisible into species, but an analogical aggregate, starting from

one common terminus and ramifying into many derivatives, having no

other community except that of relationship to the same

terminus.[119] The different modes of _Ens_ are distinguished by the

degree or variety of such relationship. The _Ens Primum_, _Proprium_,

_Completum_, is (in Aristotle's view) the concrete individual; with a

defined essence or essential constituent attributes ([Greek: ti/ ê(/n

ei)=nai]), and with unessential accessories or accidents also--all

embodied and implicated in the One _Hoc Aliquid_. In the Categoriæ

Aristotle analyses this _Ens Completum_ (not metaphysically, into

Form and Matter, as we shall find him doing elsewhere, but) logically

into Subject and Predicates. In this logical analysis, the Subject

which can never be a Predicate stands first; next, come the near

kinsmen, Genus and Species (expressed by substantive names, as the

First Substance is), which are sometimes Predicates--as applied to

_Substantia Prima_, sometimes Subjects--in regard to the extrinsic

accompaniments or accidents;[120] in the third rank, come the more

remote kinsmen, Predicates pure and simple. These are the logical

factors or constituents into which the _Ens Completum_ may be

analysed, and which together make it up as a logical sum-total. But

no one of these logical constituents has an absolute or independent

_locus standi_, apart from the others. Each is relative to the

others; the Subject to its Predicates, not less than the Predicates

to their Subject. It is a mistake to describe the Subject as having a

real standing separately and alone, and the Predicates as something

afterwards tacked on to it. The Subject _per se_ is nothing but a

general potentiality or receptivity for Predicates to come; a

relative general conception, in which the two, Predicate and Subject,

are jointly implicated as _Relatum_ and _Correlatum_.[121]

[Footnote 119: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1017, a. 22. [Greek:

kath' au(ta\ de\ ei)=nai le/getai o(/saper sêmai/nei ta\ schê/mata

tê=s katêgori/as; o)sachô=s ga\r le/getai, tosautachô=s to\ ei)=nai

sêmai/nei.]]

[Footnote 120: Categor. p. 3, a. 1: [Greek: ô(s de/ ge ai( prô=tai

ou)si/ai pro\s ta\ a)/lla pa/nta e)/chousin, ou(/tô ta\ ei)/dê kai\

ta\ ge/nê pro\s ta\ loipa\ pa/nta e)/chei; kata\ tou/tôn ga\r pa/nta

ta\ loipa\ katêgorei=tai.]]

[Footnote 121: Bonitz has an instructive note upon Form and Matter,

the _metaphysical_ constituents of _Prima Substantia_, _Hoc Aliquid_,

Sokrates, Kallias (see Aristot. Metaphys. Z. p. 1033, b. 24), which

illustrates pertinently the relation between Predicate and Subject,

the _logical_ constituents of the same [Greek: su/nolon]. He observes

(not. p. 327, **ad Aristot. Metaph. Z. p. 1033, b. 19). "Quoniam ex

duabus substantiis, quæ quidem actu sint, nunquam una existit

substantia, si et formam et materiem utrumque per se esse poneremus,

nunquam ex utroque existeret res definita ac sensibilis, [Greek:

to/de ti]. Ponendum potius, si recte assequor Aristotelis sententiam,

utrumque (Form and Matter) ita ut alterum exspectet, materia ut formæ

definitionem, forma ut materiam definiendam, exspectet, neutra vero

per se et absolute sit." What Bonitz says here about Matter and Form

is no less true about Subject and Predicate: each is relative to the

other--neither of them is absolute or independent of the other. In

fact, the explanation given by Aristotle of _Materia_ (Metaph. Z. p.

1028, b. 36) coincides very much with the _Prima Essentia_ of the

Categories, if abstracted from the _Secunda Essentia_. _Materia_ is

called there by Aristotle [Greek: to\ u(pokei/menon, kath' ou(= ta\

a)/lla le/getai. e)kei=no d' au)to\ mêke/ti kat' a)/llo--le/gô d'

u(/lên ê(\ kath' au(tê\n mê/te ti\ mê/te poso\n mê/te a)/llo mêthe\n

le/getai oi(=s ô(/ristai to\ o)/n] (p. 1029, a. 20). [Greek: e)/sti

ga/r ti kath' ou(= katêgorei=tai tou/tôn e(/kaston, ô(=| _to\ ei)=nai

e(/teron_ kai\ tô=n katêgoriô=n e(ka/stê|; ta\ me\n ga\r a)/lla tê=s

ou)si/as katêgorei=tai, au(/tê de\ tê=s u(/lês.]

Aristotle proceeds to say that this Subject--the Subject for all

Predicates, but never itself a Predicate--cannot be the genuine

[Greek: ou)si/a], which must essentially be [Greek: chôristo\n kai\

to\ to/de ti] (p. 1029, a. 28), and which must have a [Greek: ti/

ê)=n ei)=nai] (1029, b. 2). The Subject is in fact not true [Greek:

ou)si/a], but is one of the constituent elements thereof, being

relative to the Predicates as _Correlata_: it is the potentiality for

Predicates generally, as _Materia_ is the potentiality for Forms.]

The logical aspect of Ontology, analysing _Ens_ into a common Subject

with its various classes of Predicates, appears to begin with

Aristotle. He was, as far as we can see, original, in taking as the

point of departure for his theory, the individual man, horse, or

other perceivable object; in laying down this Concrete Particular

with all its outfit of details, as the type of _Ens_ proper, complete

and primary; and in arranging into classes the various secondary

modes of _Ens_, according to their different relations to the primary

type and the mode in which they contributed to make up its

completeness. He thus stood opposed to the Pythagoreans and

Platonists, who took their departure from the Universal, as the type

of full and true Entity;[122] while he also dissented from

Demokritus, who recognized no true _Ens_ except the underlying,

imperceptible, eternal atoms and vacuum. Moreover Aristotle seems to

have been the first to draw up a logical analysis of Entity in its

widest sense, as distinguished from that metaphysical analysis which

we read in his other works; the two not being contradictory, but

distinct and tending to different purposes. Both in the one and in

the other, his principal controversy seems to have been with the

Platonists, who disregarded both individual objects and accidental

attributes; dwelling upon Universals, Genera and Species, as the only

real _Entia_ capable of being known. With the Sophists, Aristotle

contends on a different ground, accusing them of neglecting

altogether the essential attributes, and confining themselves to the

region of accidents, in which no certainty was to be found;[123] in

Plato, he points out the opposite mistake, of confining himself to

the essentials, and ascribing undue importance to the process of

generic and specific subdivision.[124] His own logical analysis takes

account both of the essential and accidental, and puts them in what

he thinks their proper relation. The Accidental ([Greek:

sumbebêko/s]), concomitant, _i.e._ of the essence) is _per se_ not

knowable at all (he contends), nor is ever the object of study

pursued in any science; it is little better than a name, designating

the lowest degree of _Ens_, bordering on _Non-Ens_.[125] It is a term

comprehending all that he includes under his nine last Categories;

yet it is not a term connoting either generic communion, or even so

much as analogical relation.[126] In the treatise now before us, he

does not recognize either that or any other general term as common to

all those nine Categories; each of the nine is here treated as a

_Summum Genus_, having its own mode of relationship, and clinging by

its own separate thread to the Subject. He acknowledges the Accidents

in his classification, not as a class by themselves, but as

subordinated to the Essence, and, as so many threads of distinct,

variable, and irregular accompaniments, attaching themselves to this

constant root, without uniformity or steadiness.[127]

[Footnote 122: Simplikius ad Categ. p. 2, b. 5; Schol. p. 52, a. 1,

Br: [Greek: A)rchu/tas o( Puthagorei=os ou) prosi/etai tê\n nuni\

prokeime/nên tô=n ou)si/ôn diai/resin, a)ll' a)/llên a)nti\ tau/tês

e)kei=nos e)gkri/nei--tô=n me/ntoi Puthagorei/ôn ou)dei\s a)\n

pro/soito tau/tên tê\n diai/resin tô=n prô/tôn kai\ deute/rôn

ou)siô=n, o(/ti toi=s katho/lou to\ prô/tôs u(pa/rchein marturou=si,

to\ de\ e)/schaton e)n toi=s meristoi=s a)polei/pousi, kai\ dio/ti

e)n toi=s a(plousta/tois tê\n prô/tên kai\ kuriôta/tên ou)si/an

a)poti/thentai, a)ll' ou)ch ô(s nu=n le/getai e)n toi=s sunthe/tois

kai\ ai)sthêtoi=s, kai\ dio/ti ta\ ge/nê kai\ ta\ ei)/dê o)/nta

nomi/zousin, a)ll' ou)chi\ sugkephalaiou/mena tai=s chôristai=s

e)pinoi/ais.]]

[Footnote 123: Metaphys. E. p. 1026, b. 15: [Greek: ei)si\ ga\r oi(

tô=n sophistô=n lo/goi peri\ to\ sumbebêko\s ô(s ei)pei=n ma/lista

pa/ntôn], &c.; also K. p. 1061, b. 8; Analytic. Poster. i. p. 71, b.

10.]

[Footnote 124: Analytic. Priora, i. p. 46, a. 31.]

[Footnote 125: Aristot. Metaph. E. p. 1026, b. 13-21. [Greek: ô(/sper

ga\r o)no/mati mo/non to\ sumbebêko/s--phai/netai ga\r to\

sumbebêko\s e)ggu/s ti tou= mê\ o)/ntos.]]

[Footnote 126: Physica, iii. 1, p. 200, b. 34. [Greek: koino\n d'

e)pi\ tou/tôn ou)de/n e)sti labei=n], &c.]

[Footnote 127: See the explanation given of [Greek: to\ o)\n kata\

sumbebêko\s] in Metaphys. E. pp. 1026 b., 1027 a. This is the sense

in which Aristotle most frequently and usually talks of [Greek:

sumbebêko/s], though he sometimes uses it to include also a constant

and inseparable accompaniment or Accident, if it be not included in

the Essence (_i. e._ not connoted by the specific name); thus, to

have the three angles equal to two right angles is a [Greek:

sumbebêko\s] of the triangle, Metaph. [Greek: D]. p. 1025, a. 80. The

proper sense in which he understands [Greek: to\ sumbebêko\s] is as

opposed to [Greek: to\ a)ei\ e)x a)na/gkês], as well as [Greek: to\

ô(s e)pi\ to\ polu/]. See Metaphys. K. p. 1065, a. 2; Analyt. Poster.

i. p. 74, b. 12, p. 75, a. 18.

It is that which is by its nature irregular and unpredictable. See

the valuable chapter (ii) in Brentano, Von der Bedeutung des Seienden

nach Aristoteles (pp. 8-21), in which the meaning of [Greek: to\

sumbebêko\s] in Aristotle is clearly set forth.]

In discriminating and arranging the Ten Categories, Trendelenburg

supposes that Aristotle was guided, consciously or unconsciously, by

grammatical considerations, or by a distinction among the parts of

speech. It should be remembered that what are now familiarly known as

the eight parts of speech, had not yet been distinguished or named in

the time of Aristotle, nor did the distinction come into vogue before

the time of the Stoic and Alexandrine grammarians, more than a

century after him. _Essentia_ or _Substantia_, the first Category,

answers (so Trendelenburg thinks[128]) to the Substantive; _Quantum_

and _Quale_ represent the Adjective; _Ad Aliquid_, the comparative

Adjective, of which _Quantum_ and _Quale_ are the positive degree;

_Ubi_ and _Quando_ the Adverb; _Jacere_, _Habere_, _Agere_, _Pati_

the Verb. Of the last four, _Agere_ and _Pati_ correspond to the

active and passive voices of the Verb; _Jacere_ to the neuter or

intransitive Verb; and _Habere_ to the peculiar meaning of the Greek

perfect--the present result of a past action.

[Footnote 128: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre, pp. 23, 211.]

This general view, which Trendelenburg himself conceives as having

been only guiding and not decisive or peremptory in the mind of

Aristotle,[129] appears to me likely and plausible, though Bonitz and

others have strongly opposed it. We see from Aristotle's own

language, that the grammatical point of view had great effect upon

his mind; that the form (_e.g._) of a substantive implied in his view

a mode of signification belonging to itself, which was to be taken

into account in arranging and explaining the Categories.[130] I

apprehend that Aristotle was induced to distinguish and set out his

Categories by analysing various complete sentences, which would of

course include substantives, adjectives, verbs, and adverbs. It is

also remarkable that Aristotle should have designated his four last

Categories by the indication of verbs, the two immediately preceding

by adverbs, the second and third by adjectives, and the first by a

substantive. There remains the important Category _Ad Aliquid_, which

has no part of speech corresponding to it specially. Even this

Category, though not represented by any part of speech, is

nevertheless conceived and defined by Aristotle in a very narrow way,

with close reference to the form of expression, and to the

requirement of a noun immediately following, in the genitive or

dative case. And thus, where there is no special part of speech, the

mind of Aristotle still seems to receive its guidance from

grammatical and syntactic forms.

[Footnote 129: Ibid. p. 209: "Gesichtspunkte der Sprache leiteten den

erfindenden Geist, um sie (die Kategorien) zu bestimmen. Aber die

grammatischen Beziehungen leiten nur und entscheiden nicht." P. 216:

"der grammatische Leitfaden der Satzzergliederung wird anerkannt."]

[Footnote 130: Categor. p. 3, b. 13: [Greek: e)pi\ de\ tô=n deute/rôn

ou)siô=n phai/netai me\n o(moi/ôs tô=| _schê/mati tê=s prosêgori/as_

to/de ti sêmai/nein, o(/tan ei)/pê| a)/nthrôpon ê)\ zô=|on, ou) mê\n

a)lêthe/s ge, a)lla\ ma=llon poio/n ti sêmai/nei.] &c.]

We may illustrate the ten Categories of Aristotle by comparing them

with the four Categories of the Stoics. During the century succeeding

Aristotle's death, the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus (principally the

latter), having before them what he had done, proposed a new

arrangement for the complete distribution of Subject and Predicates.

Their distribution was quadruple instead of decuple. Their first

Category was [Greek: ti/], _Aliquid_ or _Quiddam_--[Greek: to\

u(pokei/menon], the _Substratum_ or Subject. Their second was [Greek:

poio/n], _Quale_ or Quality. Their third was [Greek: pô\s e)/chon],

_certo Modo se habens_. Their fourth was, [Greek: pro/s ti pô\s

e)/chon], _Ad Aliquid certo Modo se habens_.[131]

[Footnote 131: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1, 25; vi. 1, 30: [Greek: ta\

pô\s e)/chonta tri/ta ti/thesthai]. Simplikius ad Categor. f. 7, p.

48, a. 13, Brand. Schol.: [Greek: Oi( Stôi+koi\ ei)s e)la/ttona

suste/llein a)xiou=si to\n tô=n prô/tôn genô=n a)rithmo/n kai/ tina

e)n toi=s a)la/ttosin u(pêllagme/na paralamba/nousi. poiou=ntai ga\r

tê\n tomê\n ei)s te/ssara, ei)s u(pokei/mena, kai\ poia\, kai\ pô\s

e)/chonta, kai\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chonta.]

It would seem from the adverse criticisms of Plotinus, that the

Stoics recognized one grand [Greek: **ge/nos] comprehending all the

above four as distinct species: see Plotinus, Ennead., vi. 2, 1; vi.

1, 25. He charges them with inconsistency and error for doing so. He

admits, however, that Aristotle did not recognize any one supreme

[Greek: ge/nos] comprehending all the ten Categories (vi. 1, 1), but

treated all the ten as [Greek: prô=ta ge/nê], under an analogous

aggregate. I cannot but think that the **Stoics looked upon their

four [Greek: ge/nê] in the same manner; for I do not see what they

could find more comprehensive to rank generically above [Greek:

ti/].]

We do not possess the advantage (which we have in the case of

Aristotle) of knowing this quadruple scheme as stated and enforced by

its authors. We know it only through the abridgment of Diogenes

Laertius, together with incidental remarks and criticisms, chiefly

adverse, by Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plotinus, and some

Aristotelian commentators. As far as we can make out upon this

evidence, it appears that the first Stoic Category corresponded with

the [Greek: Prô/tê Ou)si/a], First Essence or Substance of Aristotle.

It was exclusively Subject, and could never become Predicate; but it

was indispensable as Subject, to the three other Predicates. Its

meaning was concrete and particular; for we are told that all general

notions or conceptions were excluded by the Stoics from this

Category,[132] and were designated as [Greek: Ou)/tina],

Non-Individuals, or Non-Particulars. _Homo_ was counted by them, not

under the Category [Greek: ti/], _Quid_, but under the Category

[Greek: _poio/n_], _Quale_; in its character of predicate determining

the Subject [Greek: ti/s] or [Greek: ti/]. The Stoic Category _Quale_

thus included the Aristotelian Second Essences or Substances, and

also the Aristotelian _differentia_. _Quale_ was a _species_-making

Category ([Greek: ei)dopoio/s]).[133] It declared what was the

Essence of the Subject [Greek: ti/]--the essential qualities or

attributes, but also the derivative manifestations thereof,

coinciding with what is called the _proprium_ in Porphyry's Eisagoge.

It therefore came next in order immediately after [Greek: ti/]: since

the Essence of the Subject must be declared, before you proceed to

declare its Accidents.

[Footnote 132: Simpl. ad Categ., p. 54, a. 12, Schol. Brand.: [Greek:

sumparalêpte/on de\ kai\ tê\n sunê/theian tô=n Stôi+kô=n peri\ tô=n

genikô=n poiô=n, pô=s ai( ptô/seis kat' au)tou\s prophe/rontai, kai\

pô=s _ou)/tina_ ta\ koina\ par' au)toi=s le/getai, kai\ o(/pôs para\

tê\n a)/gnoian tou= mê\ pa=san ou)si/an to/de ti sêmai/nein kai\ to\

_para\ to\n ou)/tina_ so/phisma gi/netai para\ to\ schê=ma tê=s

le/xeôs; oi(=on ei)/ ti/s e)stin e)n A)thê/nais, ou)k e)/stin e)n

Mega/rois; _ o( ga\r a)/nthrôpos ou)/tis e)sti/n, ou) ga/r e)sti/ tis

o( koino/s_, ô(s tina\ de\ au)to\n e)la/bomen e)n tô=| lo/gô|, kai\

para\ tou=to to\ o)/noma tou=to e)/schen o( lo/gos ou)/tis

klêthei/s.]

Compare Schol. p. 45**, a. 7, where Porphyry says that the Stoics, as

well as Aristotle, in arranging Categories, took as their point of

departure [Greek: to\ **deu/teron u(pokei/menon], not [Greek: to\

prô=ton u(pokei/menon ( = tê\n a)/poion u(/lên)].]

[Footnote 133: Trendelenburg, Kategorienlehre p. 222; Plutarch, De

Stoicor. Repugnantiis, p. 1054 a.; Simpl. ad Categor. Schol. p. 67.

Br. [Greek: Poia\] were distributed by the Stoics into three

varieties; and the abstract word [Greek: Poio/tês], in the Stoic

sense, corresponded only to the highest and most complete of these

three varieties, not to the second or third variety, so that [Geek:

poio/tês] had a narrower extension than [Greek: poio/n]: there were

[Greek: poia\] without any [Greek: poiotê\s] corresponding to them.

To the third Category, [Greek: Pô\s e)/chonta], which was larger and

more varied than the second, they had no abstract term corresponding;

nor to the fourth Category, [Greek: Pro/s ti]. Hence, we may see one

reason why the Stoics, confining the abstract term [Greek:

poio/têtes] to durable attributes, were disposed to maintain that the

[Greek: poio/têtes tô=n sôma/tôn] were themselves [Greek: sô/mata] or

[Greek: sômatika/]: which Galen takes much pains to refute (vol. xix.

p. 463, seq. ed. Kühn). The Stoics considered these qualities as

[Greek: a)e/ras tina/s], or [Greek: pneu/mata], &c., spiritual or

gaseous agents pervading and holding together the solid substance.

It is difficult to make out these Stoic theories clearly from the

evidence before us. From the statements of Simplikius in Scholia, pp.

67-69, I cannot understand the line of distinction between [Greek:

poia\] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta]. The Stoics considered [Greek:

poio/tês] to be [Greek: du/namis plei/stôn e)poistikê\ sumptôma/tôn,

ô(s ê( phro/nêsis tou= te phroni/môs peripatei=n kai\ tou= phron/môs

diale/gesthai] (p. 69, b. 2); and if all these [Greek: sumptô/mata]

were included under [Greek: poio/n], so that [Greek: o( phroni/môs

peripatô=n, o( pu\x protei/nôn] and [Greek: o( tre/chôn], were

[Greek: poioi/ tines] (p. 67, b. 34). I hardly see what was left for

the third Category [Greek: pô\s e)/chonta] to comprehend; although,

according to the indications of Plotinus, it would be the most

comprehensive. The Stoic writers seem both to have differed among

themselves and to have written inconsistently.

Neither Trendelenburg (Kategorienlehre, pp. 223-226), nor even

Prantl, in his more elaborate account (Gesch. der Logik,

pp. 429-437), clears up this obscurity.]

The Third Stoic Category ([Greek: pô\s e)/chon]) comprised a portion

of what Aristotle ranked under _Quale_, and all that he ranked under

_Quantum_, _Ubi_, _Quando_, _Agere_, _Pati_, _Jacere_, _Habere_. The

fourth Stoic Category coincided with the Aristotelian _Ad Aliquid_.

The third was thus intended to cover what were understood as absolute

or non-relative Accidents; the fourth included what were understood

as Relative Accidents.

The order of arrangement among the four was considered as fixed and

peremptory. They were not co-ordinate species under one and the same

genus, but superordinate and subordinate,[134] the second

presupposing and attaching to the first; the third, presupposing and

attaching to the first, _plus_ the second; the fourth, presupposing

and attaching to the first, _plus_ the second and third. The first

proposition to be made is, in answer to the question _Quale Quid_?

You answer _Tale Aliquid_, declaring the essential attributes. Upon

this, the next question is put, _Quali Modo se habens_? You answer by

a term of the third Category, declaring one or more of the accidental

attributes non-relative, _Tale Aliquid, tali Modo se habens_. Upon

this, the fourth and last question follows, _Quali Modo se habens ad

alia_? Answer is made by the predicate of the fourth Category, _i.e._

a Relative. _Hic Aliquis--homo_ (1), _niger_ (2), _servus_ (3).

[Footnote 134: Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, vol. i. pp. 428, 429;

Simplikius ad Categor. fol. 43, A: [Greek: ka)kei=no a)/topon to\

su/ntheta poiei=n ta\ ge/nê e)k prote/rôn tinô=n kai\ deute/rôn ô(s

to\ pro/s ti e)k poiou= kai\ pro/s ti.] Cf. Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 1,

25-29.

Porphyry appears to include all [Greek: sumbebêko/ta] under [Greek:

poio\n] and [Greek: pô\s e)/chon]: he gives as examples of the

latter, what Aristotle would have assigned to the Category [Greek:

kei=sthai] (Eisagoge, cc. 2, 10; Schol. Br. p. 1, b. 32, p. 5, a.

30).]

In comparing the ten Aristotelian with the four Stoic Categories we

see that the first great difference is in the extent and

comprehension of _Quale_, which Aristotle restricts on one side (by

distinguishing from it _Essentia Secunda_), and enlarges on the other

(by including in it many attributes accidental and foreign to the

Essence). The second difference is, that the Stoics did not subdivide

their third Category, but included therein all the matter of six

Aristotelian Categories,[135] and much of the matter of the

Aristotelian _Quale_. Both schemes agree on two points:--1. In taking

as the point of departure the concrete, particular, individual,

Substance. 2. In the narrow, restricted, inadequate conception formed

of the Relative--_Ad Aliquid_.

[Footnote 135: Plotinus (Ennead. vi. 1. 80) disapproves greatly the

number of disparates ranked under [Greek: to\ pô\s e)/chon], which

has (he contends) no discoverable unity as a generic term. It is

curious to see how he cites the Aristotelian Categories, as if the

decuple distinction which they marked out were indefeasible.

Simplikius says that the Stoics distinguished between [Greek: to\

pro/s ti] and [Greek: to\ pro/s ti pô\s e)/chon]; and Trendelenburg,

(pp. 228, 229) explains and illustrate this distinction, which,

however, appears to be very obscure.]

Plotinus himself recognizes five _Summa_ or _Prima Genera_,[136] (he

does not call them Categories) _Ens_, _Motus_, _Quies_, _Idem_,

_Diversum_; the same as those enumerated in the Platonic Sophistes.

He does not admit _Quantum_, _Quale_, or _Ad Aliquid_, to be _Prima

Genera_; still less the other Aristotelian Categories. Moreover, he

insists emphatically on the distinction between the intelligible and

the sensible world, which distinction he censures Aristotle for

neglecting. His five _Genera_ he applies directly and principally to

the intelligible world. For the sensible world he admits ultimately

five Catgories; _Substantia_ or _Essentia_ (though he conceives this

as fluctuating between Form, Matter, and the Compound of the two),

_Ad Aliquid_, _Quantum_, _Quale_, _Motus_. But he doubts whether

_Quantum_, _Quale_, and _Motus_, are not comprehended in _Ad

Aliquid_.[137] He considers, moreover, that Sensible Substance is not

Substance, properly speaking, but only an imitation thereof; a

congeries of non-substantial elements, qualities and matter.[138]

Dexippus,[139] in answering the objections of Plotinus, insists much

on the difference between Aristotle's point of view in the Categoriæ,

in the Physica, and in the Metaphysica. In the Categoriæ, Aristotle

dwells mainly on sensible substances (such as the vulgar understand)

and the modes of naming and describing them.

[Footnote 136: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 2, 8, 14, 16.]

[Footnote 137: Plotinus, Ennead. vi. 3. 3. [Greek: ê)\ kai\ tau=ta

ei)s ta\ pro/s ti; periektiko\n ga\r ma=llon.] His idea of Relation

is more comprehensive than that of Aristotle, for he declares that

terms, propositions, discourse, &c., are [Greek: pro/s ti; kath' o(\

sêmantika/] (vi. 3. 19).]

[Footnote 138: Ibid. vi. 3. 8-15.]

[Footnote 139: The second and third books of Dexippus's Dialogue

contain his answers to many of the objections urged by Plotinus.

Aristotle, in the Categoriæ (Dexippus says), accommodates himself

both to the received manner of speaking and to the simple or ordinary

conception of [Greek: ou)si/a] entertained by youth or

unphilosophical men--[Greek: ou)/te ga\r peri\ tô=n o)/ntôn, ou)/te

peri\ tô=n genô=n tê=s prô/tês ou)si/as nu=n au)tô=| pro/keitai

le/gein; stocha/zetai ga\r tô=n ne/ôn toi=s a(plouste/rois

e)pakolouthei=n duname/nôn] (p. 49). Compare also pp. 50-54, where

Dexippus contrasts the more abstruse handling which we read in the

Physica and Metaphysica, with the more obvious and unpretending

thoughts worked out by Aristotle in the Categoriæ. Dexippus gives an

interesting piece of advice to his pupil, that he should vary his

mode of discussing these topics, according as his companions are

philosophical or otherwise--[Greek: e)gô\ me\n ou)=n, ô)= kale\

ka)gathe\ Se/leuke, dogmatikô/teron pro\s Plôti=non a)pantô=, su\

de/, e)pei\ bathu/terai/ pôs ei)si\n ai( lu/seis au(=tai, pro\s me\n

tou=s e)k philosophi/as o(rmôme/nous tai=s toiau/tais a)pantê/sesi

chrô=, pro\s de\ tou\s o)li/ga e)pistame/nous tô=n dogma/tôn tai=s

prochei/rois chrô= dialu/sesin, e)kei=no le/gôn, _o(/ti peri\ po/da

poiei=sthai e)/thos ta\s a)kroa/seis A)ristote/lei;_ dio\ kai\ nu=n

ou)de\n e)/xôthen e)peisa/gei tô=n a)nôte/rô keime/nôn

philosophêma/tôn], &c. (pp. 50, 51).]

Galen also recognizes five Categories; but not the same five as

Plotinus. He makes a new list, formed partly out of the Aristotelian

ten, partly out of the Stoic four:--[Greek: Ou)si/a, poso/n, poio/n,

_pro/s ti_, pro/ ti pô\s e)/chon].[140]

[Footnote 140: Schol. ad Categor. p. 49 a. 30.]

. . . . . .

The latter portion of this Aristotelian treatise, on the Categories

or Predicaments, consists of an Appendix, usually known under the

title of 'Post-Predicamenta;'[141] wherein the following terms or

notions are analysed and explained--_Opposita_, _Prius_, _Simul_,

_Motus_, _Habere_.

[Footnote 141: Andronikus and other commentators supposed the

Post-Predicamenta to have been appended to the Categoriæ by some

later hand. Most of the commentators dissented from this view. The

distinctions and explanations seem all Aristotelian.]

Of _Opposita_, Aristotle reckons four modes, analogous to each other,

yet not different species under the same genus:[142]--1.

_Relative-Opposita_--_Relatum_ and _Correlatum_. 2. _Contraria_.

3. _Habitus_ and _Privatio_. 4. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_.

[Footnote 142: Categ. p. 11, b. 16: [Greek: peri\ de\ tô=n

a)ntikeime/nôn, posachô=s ei)/ôthen a)ntikei=sthai r(ête/on.] See

Simpl. in Schol. p. 81, a. 37-b. 24. Whether Aristotle reckoned

[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] a true genus or not, was debated among the

commentators. The word [Greek: posachô=s] implies that he did not;

and he treats even the term [Greek: e)nanti/a] as a [Greek:

pollachô=s lego/menon], though it is less wide in its application

than [Greek: a)ntikei/mena], which includes _Relata_ (Metaphys. I. p.

1055, a. 17). He even treats [Greek: ste/rêsis] as a [Greek:

pollachô=s lego/menon] (p. 1055, a. 34).

[Greek: Ai( a)ntithe/seis te/ssares], the four distinct varieties of

[Greek: ta\ a)ntikei/mena] are enumerated by Aristotle in various

other places:--Topic. ii. p. 109, b. 17; p. 113, b. 15; Metaphys. I.

p. 1055, a. 38. In Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, a. 20, two other

varieties are added. Bonitz observes (ad Metaph. p. 247) that

Aristotle seems to treat this quadripartite distribution of

_Opposita_, "tanquam certum et exploratum, pariter ac causarum

numerum," &c.]

These four modes of opposition have passed from the Categoriæ of

Aristotle into all or most of the modern treatises on Logic. The

three last of the four are usefully classed together, and illustrated

by their contrasts with each other. But as to the first of the four,

I cannot think that Aristotle has been happy in the place which he

has assigned to it. To treat _Relativa_ as a variety of _Opposita_,

appears to me an inversion of the true order of classification;

placing the more comprehensive term in subordination to the less

comprehensive. Instead of saying that Relatives are a variety of the

Opposite, we ought rather to say that Opposites are varieties of the

Relative. We have here another proof of what has been remarked a few

pages above; the narrow and inadequate conception which Aristotle

formed of his _Ad Aliquid_ or the Relative; restricting it to cases

in which the describing phrase is grammatically elliptical.[143] The

three classes last-mentioned by Aristotle (1. _Contraria_, 2.

_Habitus_ and _Privatio_, 3. _Affirmatio_ and _Negatio_) are truly

_Opposita_; in each there is a different mode of opposition, which it

is good to distinguish from the others. But the _Relatum_ and its

_Correlatum_, as such, are not necessarily _Opposite_ at all; they

are compared or conceived in conjunction with each other; while a

name, called relative, which connotes such comparison, &c., is

bestowed upon each. _Opposita_ fall under this general description,

as parts (together with other parts not _Opposita_) of a larger

whole. They ought properly to be called _Opposite-Relativa_: the

phrase _Relative-Opposita_, as applied to Relatives generally, being

discontinued as incorrect.[144]

[Footnote 143: Categ. p. 11, b. 24.

Ammonius and Simplikius inform us that there was much debate among

the commentators about these four alleged varieties of [Greek:

a)ntikei/mena]; also, that even Aristotle himself had composed a

special treatise (not now extant), [Greek: Peri\ tô=n

A)ntikeime/nôn], full of perplexing [Greek: a)pori/ai], which the

Stoics afterwards discussed without solving (Schol. p. 83, a. 15-48).

Herminus and others seem to have felt the difficulty of calling all

Relatives [Greek: a)ntikei/mena]; for they admitted that the

antithesis between the Relative and its Correlate was of gentler

character, not conflicting, but reciprocally sustaining. Alexander

ingeniously compared _Relatum_ and its _Correlatum_ to the opposite

rafters of a roof, each supporting the other ([Greek: malakô/tera

kai\ ê(=tton macho/mena e)n toi=s a)ntikeime/nois, ô(s _ kai\

a)mphiba/lesthai ei) ei)si\n a)ntikei/mena sô/zonta a)/llêla;_ a)lla\

tou=to me\n dei/knusin A)le/xandros o(/ti a)ntikei/mena, o(\s kai\

ta\ labdoeidê= xu/la paradei=gma lamba/nei], &c., Schol. p. 81, b.

32; p. 82, a. 15, b. 20). This is an undue enlargement of the meaning

of _Opposita_, by taking in the literal material sense as an adjunct

to the logical. On the contrary, the Stoics are alleged to have

worked out the views of Aristotle about [Greek: e)nanti/a], but to

have restricted the meaning of [Greek: **a)ntikei/mena] to

contradictory opposition, _i. e._ to Affirmative and Negative

Propositions with the same subject and predicate (Schol. p. 83, b.

11; p. 87, a. 29). In Metaphysica, A. 983, a. 31, Aristotle calls the

final cause ([Greek: to\ ou(= e(/neka kai\ ta)gatho/n) tê\n

a)ntikeime/nên ai)ti/an] to the cause (among his four), [Greek: to\

**o(/then ê( ki/nêsis]. This is a misleading phrase; the two

are not opposed, but mutually implicated and correlative.]

[Footnote 144: See the just and comprehensive definition of Relative

Names given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his System of Logic, Book I.

chap. ii. § 7, p. 46.

After reading that definition, the inconvenience of ranking Relatives

as a species or variety of Opposites, will be seen at once.]

From _Opposita_ Aristotle passes to _Prius_ and _Simul_; with the

different modes of each.[145] _Successive_ and _Synchronous_, are the

two most general classes under which facts or events can be cast.

They include between them all that is meant by Order in Time. They

admit of no definition, and can be explained only by appeal to

immediate consciousness in particular cases. Priority and

Simultaneity, in this direct and primary sense, are among the

clearest and most impressive notions of the human mind. But Aristotle

recognizes four additional meanings of these same words, which he

distinguishes from the primary, in the same way as he distinguishes

(in the ten Categories) the different meanings of _Essentia_, in a

gradually descending scale of analogy. The secondary _Prius_ is that

which does not reciprocate according to the order of existence with

its _Posterius_; where the _Posterius_ presupposes the _Prius_, while

the _Prius_ does not presuppose the _Posterius_: for example, given

two, the existence of one is necessarily implied; but given one, the

existence of two is not implied.[146] The tertiary _Prius_ is that

which comes first in the arrangements of science or discourse: as, in

geometry, point and line are prior as compared with the diagrams and

demonstrations; in writing, letters are prior as compared with

syllables; in speeches, the proem is prior as compared with the

exposition. A fourth mode of _Prius_ (which is the most remote and

far-fetched) is, that the better and more honourable is _prius

naturâ_. Still a fifth mode is, when, of two Relatives which

reciprocate with each other as to existence, one is cause and the

other effect: in such a case, the cause is said to be prior by nature

to the effect.[147] For example, if it be a fact that Caius exists,

the proposition "Caius exists," is a true proposition; and _vice

versâ_, if the proposition "Caius exists" is a true proposition, it

is a fact that Caius exists. But though from either **of these you

can infer the other, the truth of the proposition is the effect, and

not the cause, of the reality of the fact. Hence it is correct to say

that the latter is _prius naturâ_, and the former _posterius naturâ_.

[Footnote 145: Categ. p. 14, a. 26, seq.]

[Footnote 146: Ibid. p. 14, a. 29, seq. This second mode of _Prius_

is entitled by Alexander (see Schol. (ad Metaphys. [Greek: D].) p.

707, b. 7, Brandis) [Greek: pro/teron tê=| phu/sei]. But Aristotle

does not so call it here; he reserves that title for the fourth and

fifth modes.

It appears that debates, [Greek: Peri\ Prote/rou kai\ U(ste/rou] were

frequent in the dialectic schools of Aristotle's day as well as

debates, [Greek: Peri\ Tau)tou= kai\ E(te/rou, Peri\ O(moi/ou kai\

A)nomoi/ou, Peri\ Tau)to/têtos kai\ E)nantio/têtos] (Arist. Metaph.

B. p. 995, b. 20).]

[Footnote 147: Aristot. Categ. p. 14, b. 10.]

This is a sort of article in a Philosophical Dictionary, tracing the

various derivative senses of two very usual correlative phrases; and

there is another article in the fourth book of the Metaphysica, where

the derivations of the same terms are again traced out, though by

roads considerably different.[148] The two terms are relatives;

_Prius_ implies a _Posterius_, as _Simul_ implies another _Simul_;

and it is an useful process to discriminate clearly the various

meanings assigned to each. Aristotle has done this, not indeed

clearly nor consistently with himself, but with an earnest desire to

elucidate what he felt to be confused and perplexing. Yet there are

few terms in his philosophy which are more misleading. Though he sets

out, plainly and repeatedly the primary and literal sense of

Priority, (the temporal or real), as discriminated from the various

secondary and metaphorical senses, nevertheless when he comes to

employ the term _Prius_ in the course of his reasonings, he often

does so without specifying in which sense he intends it to be

understood. And as the literal sense (temporal or real priority) is

the most present and familial to every man's mind, so the term is

often construed in this sense when it properly bears only the

metaphorical sense. The confusion of logical or emotional priority

(priority either in logical order of conception, or in esteem and

respect) with priority in the order of time, involving separability

of existence, is a frequent source of misunderstanding in the

Aristotelian Physics and Metaphysics. The order of logical

antecedence and sequence, or the fact of logical coexistence, is of

great importance to be understood, with a view to the proof of truth,

to the disproof of error, or to the systematization of our processes

of thought; but we must keep in mind that what is prior in the

logical order is not for that reason prior in temporal order, orf

separable in real existence, or fit to be appealed to as a real Cause

or Agent.[149]

[Footnote 148: Aristot. Metaphys. [Greek: D]. p. 1018, b. 11-p. 1019,

a. 12. The article in the Metaphysica is better and fuller than that

in the Categoriæ. In this last, _Order in Place_ receives no special

recognition, while we find such recognition in the Metaphysica, and

we find also fuller development of the varieties of the logical or

intellectual _Prius_.]

[Footnote 149: In the language of Porphyry, [Greek: prou+phe/stêke]

(priority in real existence) means nothing more than [Greek:

proe+pinoei=tai] (priority in the order of conception), Eisagoge, cc.

xv., xvi.; Schol. Br. p. 6, a. 7-21.]

CHAPTER IV.

DE INTERPRETATIONE.

In the preceding chapter I enumerated and discussed what Aristotle

calls the Categories. We shall now proceed to the work which stands

second in the aggregate called the Organon--the treatise De

Interpretatione.