General Bragg issued orders to his subordinates to resume the battle at
daybreak. On the Confederate right Breckinridge’s Division was to begin
the attack which would be taken up by successive divisions to the left.
Sunday morning came. Daylight began to creep over the battlefield. The
sun rose, but no attack came. Bragg waited impatiently. Finally, the
orders reached Hill at 7:30 a.m. Further delay followed as the troops
moved into position. About 9:30 a.m. Breckinridge advanced to attack,
followed by Cleburne. The extreme left of the Union line fell back, but
the fire from the Union breastworks halted further Confederate advance.
Reinforcements hurried to Thomas. In further fighting at this part of
the line neither side made any considerable gain, as Rosecrans sought to
hold his left against Polk’s furious attacks. Almost equally matched,
neither Thomas nor Polk could show any appreciable gains throughout the
morning. About 11 o’clock a lull occurred as Longstreet’s wing prepared
to move against the center in Bragg’s plan of attack.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA
SEPTEMBER 20, 1863]
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. James Longstreet._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
The Union center at which Longstreet pointed his attack was held by
Brig. Gen. Thomas J. Wood’s Division which had replaced Negley’s
Division in the line when the latter had reinforced Thomas early in the
morning. To the immediate left of Wood were the troops of Brannan’s
Division, and on Brannan’s left, Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds’ Division.
An hour before noon as the Confederate right wing poised to strike, an
irreparable blunder occurred on the Union side. A staff officer riding
from Thomas’ headquarters near Kelly Field reported to Rosecrans that he
had noticed Brannan’s Division was out of line and believed “General
Reynolds’ right was exposed.” Rosecrans, without further investigation,
immediately ordered Wood to “close up on Reynolds as fast as possible
and support him.” In order to do this, Wood had to pull his division out
of line and march behind Brannan’s Division toward Reynolds. Wood’s
division had left its place in the line, creating a true gap where none
had actually existed before, and had started to march northward behind
Brannan when Longstreet’s column of five divisions accidentally struck
into the gap.
Longstreet’s attack hit Wood’s and Brannan’s Divisions on their exposed
flank and drove them from the immediate field of battle. On the other
side of the gap the Confederates struck Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’
Division, which was marching up to take Wood’s place in the line, and
Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s Division in flank. In a very short time
the entire Union right flank was in disorder and driven from the field.
Wilder’s brigade on the extreme right made a valiant stand for a while,
employing to good effect the heavy fire power of the Spencer repeating
carbine with which it was armed. Nothing, however, seemed to daunt the
onrush of the Confederates, and Wilder withdrew for fear of being cut
off from escape.
The routed divisions from the Union right withdrew northwestward through
McFarland’s Gap to Rossville. Generals Rosecrans, Crittenden, and McCook
were caught in the breakthrough and fled the field. General Thomas was
now in command of the Union forces left there.
The altered conditions of the battlefield now dictated a change in
Confederate strategy. The original plan of enveloping the Union left
changed to a sweep from the Union right to the left. A pause in the
fighting enabled Thomas to form a new line quickly to his rear on
Snodgrass Hill, almost at a right angle with the Union left. From this
vantage point he met the onslaught of Longstreet’s troops with such
stubborn and determined resistance on that Sunday afternoon that he
earned the name “Rock of Chickamauga.”
The Union line on Snodgrass Hill was composed of Brannan’s Division with
fragments of Wood’s, Negley’s, and Van Cleve’s Divisions. Longstreet
vigorously assaulted the line again and again and nearly succeeded in
enveloping Brannan’s right. Confederate success seemed assured as
Thomas’ troops were hard hit and were short of ammunition, but at this
moment unexpected reinforcements reached General Thomas.
[Illustration: _The Battle of Chickamauga. Scene from diorama in the
Museum, Park Headquarters Building._]
General Granger, without orders and following the sound of battle, had
hastened to the aid of Thomas. He arrived at Snodgrass Hill at a very
opportune moment and just in time to stop the Confederates from
enveloping Brannan’s right. A fierce engagement took place as Brig. Gen.
James B. Steedman’s Division of Granger’s Corps forced the southern
troops from the crest of the hill.
Midafternoon found Longstreet once again attempting to wrest the hill
from Thomas’ troops, using McLaw’s, Hindman’s, and Bushrod Johnson’s
Divisions, and again he was repulsed. Later in the afternoon, Longstreet
asked Bragg for reinforcements but was told none were available and that
the right wing “had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no
service” to him. Longstreet determined to make one more effort. He
formed a column of such troops as were available and again assaulted the
hill. The fight was desperate and lasted until nightfall. The Union
troops repulsed some of the Confederate charges with the bayonet as
their ammunition was nearly exhausted. Finally, Longstreet pushed
Steedman back to the next ridge and occupied the ground to the right of
Brannan.
The left of the Union line around Kelly Field spent a relatively quiet
afternoon compared to their comrades on Snodgrass Hill. However, about 4
p.m., the divisions of Hill’s corps and part of Walker’s again assaulted
the Union positions there. By 6 p.m., Cheatham’s Division had joined the
attack. This attack succeeded in enveloping the Union left, and the road
to Rossville, through Rossville Gap, was cut off for the moment.
[Illustration: _Headquarters, Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger, Reserve
Corps, Army of the Cumberland, at Rossville Gap. The house was built
by John Ross, Cherokee Indian Chief, who lived in it until 1832.
Ross gave his name to the village in the gap._ From Elson, _The
Civil War Through the Camera_.]
In the meantime, Thomas received orders from Rosecrans to “Assume
command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong
position and assume a threatening attitude at Rossville.” Although
Thomas received these orders with little delay, it was late afternoon
before he sent instructions to Reynolds to begin the withdrawal and move
into position to cover the retirement of the other troops on the left.
In executing this movement, Reynolds was forced to drive off the
Confederate troops who had begun to envelop the Union left. The Union
army withdrew in relatively good order. The troops holding Kelly Field
moved out first, followed by those who had stubbornly resisted
Longstreet’s attacks upon Snodgrass Hill.
While the retreat from the battlelines may have been in “good order,”
General Beatty’s description of the march to Rossville amply describes
the scene: “The march to Rossville was a melancholy one. All along the
road, for miles, wounded men were lying. They had crawled or hobbled
slowly away from the fury of the battle, become exhausted, and lain down
by the roadside to die.” Beatty reached Rossville between “ten and
eleven” and reported, “At this hour of the night (eleven to twelve
o’clock) the army is simply a mob. There appears to be neither
organization nor discipline. The various commands are mixed up in what
seems to be inextricable confusion.”
Nevertheless, Thomas placed his forces at Rossville Gap and along
Missionary Ridge in preparation against further attacks. The morning of
the 21st found the Union Army of the Cumberland more or less
reorganized. With the exception of some skirmishing, the Union forces
were not molested.
The losses on both sides were appalling and the percentages surprisingly
equal. The following tabulation of casualties at the Battle of
Chickamauga is based on Thomas L. Livermore’s _Numbers and Losses in the
Civil War in America, 1861-65_:
Army Total Total Killed Wounded Missing Percent
Strength Casualties Casualties
Union 58,222 16,170 1,657 9,756 4,757 28
Confederate 66,326 18,454 2,312 14,674 1,468 28
_The Siege of Chattanooga_
Thomas remained in position at Rossville throughout the 21st, but it was
evident that the Confederates could turn his right flank and cut him off
from Chattanooga. He suggested to Rosecrans that the Union Army
concentrate at Chattanooga. In anticipation of receiving an order to
withdraw to the town, Thomas instructed his officers to prepare their
commands for the movement. Rosecrans adopted the suggestion and that
evening Thomas withdrew the Union forces to Chattanooga. All wagons,
ambulances, and surplus artillery had already departed for Chattanooga
during the day. By morning of September 22, all Union troops were in
position in the town.
[Illustration: _Wartime view. Lee and Gordon’s Mills, Chickamauga
Battlefield._ Courtesy National Archives.]
The situation in which the men in blue found themselves in Chattanooga
was not pleasant. The Tennessee River walled them in on the north,
although a pontoon bridge and two ferries offered escape possibilities.
Lookout Mountain blocked the way on the west, and Missionary Ridge to
the east and south, now held by the Confederates, completed the circle.
[Illustration: _Wartime view of Chattanooga in 1863—Lookout Mountain
in distance._ Courtesy National Archives.]
Bragg issued orders for the pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, then
countermanded them. Instead, the Confederate troops began to take up
siege positions around Chattanooga. In these positions the Confederates
dominated the Union lines. Bragg’s men controlled all the railroads
leading into the town; Confederate batteries and sharpshooters commanded
the Tennessee River, and river traffic ceased; they controlled the roads
on the south side of the river and kept under fire the one road north of
the river leading to Bridgeport, the nearest Union supply base. Only the
road over Walden’s Ridge and down through the Sequatchie Valley to
Bridgeport was open to General Rosecrans.
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman._ Courtesy National
Archives.]
_Reinforcements for the Besieged Army_
As early as September 13, General in Chief Halleck ordered
reinforcements sent to Rosecrans. His dispatches on September 13, 14,
and 15 to Major Generals Hurlbut at Memphis and Grant and Sherman at
Vicksburg directed the troop movements. These dispatches, however, were
delayed for several days en route from Cairo to Memphis and, in the
meantime, the Battle of Chickamauga was fought. Grant received the
orders on the 22nd and immediately instructed four divisions under
Sherman to march to Chattanooga.
One division of the Seventeenth Corps, already in transit from Vicksburg
to Helena, Ark., was ordered to proceed on to Memphis. General Sherman
quickly brought three divisions of his Fifteenth Army Corps from the
vicinity of the Big Black River into Vicksburg, where they embarked as
fast as water transportation could be provided. By October 3, all of the
movement of 17,000 men was under way.
The route of travel was by boat to Memphis, then by railroad and
overland marches to Chattanooga. From Memphis the troops followed
closely the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which Sherman was ordered
to repair as he advanced. By November 15, the troops were at Bridgeport,
Ala., having traveled a distance of 675 miles.
When the War Department in Washington received word that the Army of the
Cumberland was besieged in Chattanooga, it considered the situation so
critical that President Lincoln was called out of bed late at night to
attend a council meeting. This meeting occurred on the night of
September 23, and is described by Nicolay and Hay:
Immediately on receipt of Rosecrans’ dispatch, Mr. Stanton sent one of
the President’s secretaries who was standing by to the Soldier’s Home,
where the President was sleeping. A little startled by the unwonted
summons,—for this was “the first time” he said, Stanton had ever sent
for him,—the President mounted his horse and rode in through the
moonlight to the War Department to preside over an improvised council
to consider the subject of reinforcing Rosecrans.
There were present General Halleck, Stanton, Seward and Chase of the
Cabinet; P. H. Watson and James A. Hardie of the War Department, and
General D. C. McCallum, Superintendent of Military Transportation.
After a brief debate, it was resolved to detach the Eleventh and
Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac, General Hooker to be
placed in command of both....
[Illustration: ROUTE OF UNION REINFORCEMENTS
MOVEMENTS, SEPT. 22-OCT. 15, 1863]
[Illustration: _Chattanooga headquarters of General Rosecrans during
the siege._ Courtesy National Archives.]
The movement of the Eleventh and Twelfth Army Corps from the Army of the
Potomac to Tennessee eclipsed all other such troop movements by rail up
to that time. It represented a high degree of cooperation between the
railroads and the government and was a singular triumph of skill and
planning. It also shows the great importance the War Department attached
to the Chattanooga campaign.
The troops began to entrain at Manassas Junction and Bealton Station,
Va., on September 25, and 5 days later on September 30 the first trains
arrived at Bridgeport, Ala. The route traveled was by way of Washington,
D. C.; Baltimore, Md.; Bellaire and Columbus, Ohio; Indianapolis, Ind.;
Louisville, Ky.; Nashville, Tenn.; and Bridgeport, Ala. Several major
railroad lines, including the Baltimore and Ohio, Central Ohio,
Louisville and Nashville, and Nashville and Chattanooga were involved.
Not all of the troops, however, made such good time as the first trains,
and for the majority of the infantry the trip consumed about 9 days. The
movement of the artillery, horses, mules, baggage, and impedimenta was
somewhat slower, but by the middle of October, all were in the vicinity
of Bridgeport ready to help break the siege.
These two corps under Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker, comprising 20,000 troops
and more than 3,000 horses and mules, traveled 1,157 miles. Differences
in the railroad gauges hampered the movement, but most of the changes in
gauge occurred at river crossings which had no bridges and the troops
had to detrain at these points anyway.
Confederate cavalry raids, bent on destroying the railroad bridges and
otherwise interfering with the reinforcing effort, imposed a more
serious difficulty, but, except for delaying the latter part of the
movement a few days, the raids were ineffective.
At the beginning of the siege, the Union Army had large supply trains in
good condition and transporting supplies seemed feasible. But early in
October rain began to fall and the roads became almost impassable. To
make the situation more critical Bragg sent Wheeler to harass and
destroy the Union supply trains as they moved over Walden’s Ridge on
their trips to and from Bridgeport. Wheeler destroyed hundreds of wagons
and animals and it was not long before the Union soldier received less
and less food. Wagon horses and mules and artillery horses were on a
starvation diet and many died each day.
Command of the two hostile armies had undergone a considerable change
during the siege period. Grant received orders to meet “an officer of
the War Department” at Louisville, Ky. He proceeded by rail to
Indianapolis, Ind., and just as his train left the depot there, en route
to Louisville, it was stopped. A message informed Grant that Secretary
of War Stanton was coming into the station and wished to see him. This
was the “officer” from the War Department who gave Grant command of the
newly organized Military Division of the Mississippi. Thomas replaced
Rosecrans. McCook and Crittenden had previously been relieved of their
commands and their corps consolidated into the Fourth Corps under
command of Granger. Stanton accompanied Grant to Louisville and there
the two spent a day reviewing the situation.
In Bragg’s camp, Polk was relieved of his command, and Lt. Gen. William
J. Hardee rejoined the army. Bragg’s army was reorganized into three
corps commanded by Longstreet, Hardee, and Breckinridge.
[Illustration: _Entrenchments of Thomas’ Corps, Army of the
Cumberland in front of Chattanooga. Lookout Mountain in distance._
From _Battles and Leaders of the Civil War_.]
When Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23 he found a plan already
drawn up to open a new supply line for the besieged army. This plan of
necessity was conditioned upon the terrain and the configuration of the
river between Bridgeport, the railhead and base of supplies for the
Union Army, and Chattanooga. (After the Tennessee River passes the city
it flows southward for some 2 miles until it strikes Lookout Mountain
where, after a short westerly course, it curves northward. This
elongated loop of the river is called Moccasin Bend.)
The plan called for 1,500 men on pontoons to float down the river from
Chattanooga during the night of October 26-27 while another force
marched across Moccasin Point to support the landings of the river-borne
troops. Grant ordered the plan executed. The pontoon-borne troops
quickly disembarked upon striking the west bank at Brown’s Ferry, drove
off the Confederate pickets, and threw up breastworks. The troops
marching across the neck of land came up to the east side of the ferry,
joined this group, and constructed a pontoon bridge.
Hooker’s advance from Bridgeport coincided with this action. He marched
by the road along Raccoon Mountain into Lookout Valley. There he met the
advance post of a Confederate brigade and drove it back. Maj. Gen. O. O.
Howard’s Eleventh Corps moved to within 2 miles of Brown’s Ferry, while
Brig. Gen. John W. Geary of the Twelfth Corps remained at Wauhatchie to
guard the road to Kelley’s Ferry.
The Confederates made a night attack against Geary which the latter
repulsed, but both sides lost heavily. After this action, the short line
of communication with Bridgeport by way of Brown’s and Kelley’s Ferries
was held by Hooker without further trouble.
With the successful seizure of Brown’s Ferry and construction of a
pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River there, and Hooker’s equally
successful advance from Bridgeport and seizure of the south side of the
river at Raccoon Mountain and in Lookout Valley, the way was finally
clear for the Union Army to reopen a short line of supply and
communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, the rail end of its
supply line. This “Cracker Line” ran by boat up the Tennessee River from
Bridgeport to Kelley’s Ferry. Above Kelley’s Ferry, the swift current
made the stream unnavigable at certain points to boats then available.
Accordingly, at Kelley’s Ferry, the “Cracker Line” left the river and
crossed Raccoon Mountain by road to Brown’s Ferry. There it crossed the
river on the pontoon bridge, thence across Moccasin Point, and finally
across the river once more into Chattanooga.
Early in November, Bragg ordered Longstreet to march against Burnside in
East Tennessee with Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaw’s and Maj. Gen. John B.
Hood’s Divisions of infantry, Col. E. Porter Alexander’s and Maj. A.
Leyden’s battalions of artillery, and five brigades of cavalry under
Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler—about 15,000 men in all. This movement caused
great anxiety in Washington and the authorities urged Grant to act
promptly to assist Burnside. Grant felt that the quickest way to aid him
was to attack Bragg and force the latter to recall Longstreet. On
November 7, Thomas received Grant’s order to attack Bragg’s right.
Thomas replied that he was unable to move a single piece of artillery
because of the poor condition of the horses and mules. They were not
strong enough to pull artillery pieces. In these circumstances, Grant
could only answer Washington dispatches, urge Sherman forward, and
encourage Burnside to hold on.
_Lifting the Siege—The Battle of Chattanooga_
(See map on pages 36-37.)
With the Confederate Army in front of Chattanooga divided into two
corps, Hardee on the right and Breckinridge on the left on Missionary
Ridge, and General Stevenson with a small force occupying Lookout
Mountain, Bragg waited.
Grant’s plan of battle was for Sherman with his four divisions to cross
the Tennessee River at Brown’s Ferry and march behind Stringer’s Ridge,
concealed from the eyes of the Confederates, and take a position near
the North Chickamauga Creek. He was to recross the river by pontoon
bridge at the mouth of the South Chickamauga Creek, strike the north end
of Missionary Ridge and capture it as far as the railroad tunnel. Thomas
was to move his Army of the Cumberland to the left, and connect with
Sherman. This united force was to sweep the Confederates southward off
Missionary Ridge and away from their base of supplies at Chickamauga
Station. Howard’s Corps was to act as a general reserve for this force.
Hooker, with the Twelfth Corps and Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft’s Division
(Fourth Corps), was to hold Lookout Valley. Col. Eli Long’s Cavalry was
to cover Sherman’s left and when no longer needed for this task was to
strike Bragg’s communications. This original plan, however, was changed
several times to fit the situation.
The rains that hampered movement of Union supplies also delayed
Sherman’s movement across the Tennessee. High water broke the bridge at
Brown’s Ferry and Osterhaus’ Division could not cross the river.
Subsequently it received orders to join Hooker in Lookout Valley.
On November 22, Grant received word that Bragg was withdrawing his army;
actually the movement reported was Buckner leaving to reinforce
Longstreet. To “test the truth” of the report, Grant changed his plans
and ordered Thomas to make a demonstration to his front on the 23rd.
This began the battles of Chattanooga.