[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,: March 3, 1849]
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Stewart L. Udall, _Secretary_
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
Conrad L. Wirth, _Director_
_HISTORICAL HANDBOOK NUMBER TWENTY-FIVE_
This publication is one of a series of handbooks describing the
historical and archeological areas in the National Park System
administered by the National Park Service of the United States
Department of the Interior. It is printed by the Government Printing
Office and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
Washington 25, D. C. Price 25 cents.
Chickamauga and Chattanooga Battlefields
CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA NATIONAL MILITARY PARK · GEORGIA—TENNESSEE
_by James R. Sullivan_
[Illustration: DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,: March 3, 1849]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE HISTORICAL HANDBOOK SERIES No. 25
Washington, D. C., 1956
(Reprint 1961)
_The National Park System, of which Chickamauga and Chattanooga
National Military Park is a unit, is dedicated to conserving the
scenic, scientific, and historic heritage of the United States for the
benefit and inspiration of its people._
[Illustration: NATIONAL PARK SERVICE · DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR]
_Contents_
_Page_
WARTIME IMPORTANCE OF CHATTANOOGA AND EAST TENNESSEE 2
WINTER, 1863 4
THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN 5
FROM TULLAHOMA TO CHICKAMAUGA 8
REINFORCEMENTS FOR GENERAL BRAGG 10
MANEUVER FOR POSITION 13
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA 14
September 18—Preliminaries 15
September 19—First Day 18
September 20—Second Day 19
THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA 24
REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE BESIEGED ARMY 27
LIFTING THE SIEGE—THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 33
Orchard Knob 33
Sherman Moves 35
The Battle Above the Clouds, November 24 35
Missionary Ridge, November 25 39
RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 42
EFFECTS OF THE BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 44
THE WAR AFTER CHATTANOOGA 44
GUIDE TO THE AREA 47
Chickamauga Battlefield 47
Missionary Ridge 52
Point Park 55
THE PARK 56
HOW TO REACH THE PARK 56
ABOUT YOUR VISIT 57
RELATED AREAS 59
ADMINISTRATION 59
SUGGESTED READINGS 60
TABLES
1. Union Army at Chickamauga 16
2. Confederate Army at Chickamauga 17
3. Union Army at Chattanooga 34
4. Confederate Army at Chattanooga 35
[Illustration: _Moccasin Bend of the Tennessee River from Point Park
on Lookout Mountain._]
[Illustration: Cannon and crew.]
In and around strategically important Chattanooga, Tenn., in the autumn
of 1863, there occurred some of the most complex maneuvers and hard
fighting of the Civil War. The Confederate victory at Chickamauga
(September 19-20) gave new hope to the South after the defeats at
Gettysburg and Vicksburg in July of that year. At Chattanooga (November
23-25) Union forces under Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant blasted this hope
and prepared the way for the capture of Atlanta and Sherman’s “March to
the Sea.” Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, oldest and
largest of the national military parks, commemorates the heroic soldiers
of both North and South in the battles for the control of Chattanooga.
The year 1863 proved to be one of victory for the Union forces. Three
great campaigns took place which shaped the destiny of the war. The
first, a decisive blow at Gettysburg, forced a Confederate army under
Gen. Robert E. Lee to abandon its attempt to invade Northern soil. Lee
began an orderly retreat to Virginia on July 4.
On the same day, but far removed from the fields of Gettysburg, Lt. Gen.
John C. Pemberton surrendered his army and the City of Vicksburg, Miss.,
to General Grant. The fall of Vicksburg, simultaneous with the victory
at Gettysburg, gave heart and strength to the North, while Confederate
morale dropped.
The third campaign, Murfreesboro to Chattanooga, slow and uncertain in
its first phases, and including later the great Confederate victory at
Chickamauga, culminated nearly 5 months after the other two in ultimate
victory for the North in the Battle of Chattanooga.
_Wartime Importance of Chattanooga and East Tennessee_
Chattanooga had only 2,545 inhabitants in 1860, but its importance was
out of all proportion to its size. Situated where the Tennessee River
passes through the Cumberland Mountains, forming gaps, it was called the
“Key to East Tennessee” and “Gateway to the deep South.” The possession
of Chattanooga was vital to the Confederacy, and a coveted goal of the
Northern armies.
Chattanooga’s principal importance during the Civil War was its position
as a railroad center. Four lines radiated in the four principal
directions—to the North and Middle West via Nashville, to the western
States via Memphis, to the South and southern seaboard via Atlanta, and
to Richmond and the North Atlantic States via Knoxville.
By 1863 both sides were aware of the great advantages of strategic
railroad lines. Lt. Gen. Braxton Bragg had made skillful use of the
railroads in 1862, when he suddenly shifted his army from Mississippi to
Chattanooga to begin his drive across Tennessee and into Kentucky.
President Lincoln had long recognized the importance of railroads in
this area. In the same year Lincoln said, “To take and hold the railroad
at or east of Cleveland, in East Tennessee, I think fully as important
as the taking and holding of Richmond.” And in 1863 Lincoln wrote Maj.
Gen. William S. Rosecrans, “If we can hold Chattanooga and East
Tennessee, I think the rebellion must dwindle and die. I think you and
[General] Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object.”
The armies that traversed this region found it a fertile farming area.
East Tennessee’s rich grain fields supplied not only wheat, corn, and
hay, but beef, pork, bacon, horses, and mules. It was a vital region for
the armies of the Confederacy. It not only supported the troops that
occupied that region, but large quantities of provisions were shipped to
other armies.
In addition to the military and economic reasons, a political factor had
to be considered in the struggle for control of East Tennessee. The
people there, living in a mountainous area unlike the rest of the State,
wished to adhere to the Union. The people maintained their allegiance to
the Old Whig party, and there was an attitude of suspicion and distrust
toward the Democrats. They were mostly small farmers with little cash
income, who had a dislike for the wealthy plantation- and slave-owning
class.
After fighting broke out at Fort Sumter, neighbors began to take sides.
An uneasy truce prevailed until November 1861 when small groups of Union
men struck blows at widely dispersed railroad bridges. The cancellation
of a projected northern campaign into East Tennessee left the Unionists
there without support, and the Confederates took retaliatory measures.
Many of the Unionists in East Tennessee fled to Kentucky to enlist in
the Union Army; others hid in the mountains. While relief to this
section of Tennessee by the Union Army was not to come until 1863, it
was not forgotten by President Lincoln.
[Illustration: _Wartime view of Chattanooga from north bank of the
Tennessee River._ From _Harper’s Pictorial History of the Great
Rebellion_.]
[Illustration: _Gen. Braxton Bragg, Commander Army of Tennessee._
Courtesy National Archives.]
[Illustration: _Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, Commander Army of
the Cumberland._ Courtesy National Archives.]
_Winter 1863_
After the battle of Stones River, or Murfreesboro, Tenn., December 31,
1862, to January 2, 1863, the Union Army of the Cumberland, under Maj.
Gen. William Rosecrans, and the Confederate Army of Tennessee, commanded
by Gen. Braxton Bragg, remained relatively inactive for several months.
During this time the Union forces entrenched themselves at Murfreesboro.
General Bragg withdrew his forces southward and established his
headquarters at Tullahoma. He placed his army in a defensive position to
cover the routes, both rail and road, to Chattanooga.
Impatient at the inaction, the War Department in Washington urged
Rosecrans to move against Bragg’s army. Grant, conducting his Vicksburg
campaign, wanted pressure applied against Bragg’s army to prevent all or
part of it from reinforcing the Confederates in Mississippi. At the same
time Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee, reminded the
authorities in Washington of the plight of the East Tennesseans. During
this period, Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside gathered a Union force and
made plans to invade East Tennessee.
Rosecrans hesitated to move. His lack of cavalry was a disadvantage in
gathering intelligence and prevented him from countering the Confederate
cavalry which harassed him constantly. In June, Maj. Gen. Henry W.
Halleck, general in chief, U. S. Army, wired Rosecrans asking him, “Is
it your intention to make an immediate movement forward? A definite
answer, yes or no, is required.” Rosecrans telegraphed: “In reply to
your inquiry, if immediate means tonight or tomorrow, no. If it means as
soon as all things are ready, say five days, yes.” On June 24, General
Rosecrans put his army of some 60,000 men in motion.
_The Tullahoma Campaign_
The Army of the Cumberland—the Union force—had undergone a
reorganization since the Battle of Stones River. It now comprised three
corps: The Fourteenth, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas in command; the
Twentieth, Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook in command; and the
Twenty-first, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden in command. Maj. Gen. David
S. Stanley commanded the Cavalry Corps. Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger
commanded the Reserve Corps.
The left wing of General Bragg’s defense line was at Shelbyville under
Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk and its right wing at Wartrace and Fairfield
under Lt. Gen. William Hardee—a line nearly 13 miles long. Two
Confederate cavalry corps occupied positions on either flank—that on the
right at McMinnville under Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler, the other on the
left at Columbia under Brig. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest. The total strength
of the Army of Tennessee was approximately 43,000 men at this time.
The Confederate position was good. The terrain favored a defensive
fight. To traverse the Cumberland Plateau the Union Army would have to
move along roads that pierced the mountains by way of Hoover’s, Liberty,
and Guy’s Gaps. The railroad to Chattanooga and another road passed
through Bellbuckle Gap. This latter route and the road by way of
Shelbyville were well fortified. Rosecrans resolved to make a feint
toward Shelbyville with Granger’s Reserve Corps and most of the cavalry
while the rest of his army moved toward the Confederate right. After
stubborn fights at Hoover’s and Liberty Gaps the Confederates withdrew
toward Tullahoma. So successful was Rosecrans’ flanking movement that
Col. John T. Wilder’s mounted infantry brigade reached Decherd, on the
main line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and destroyed the
depot and a few hundred yards of track. Although Wilder withdrew when
superior Confederate forces appeared, his raid against the railroad was
of great importance in forcing Bragg to evacuate Tullahoma.
[Illustration: UNION ADVANCE
MURFREESBORO TO CHATTANOOGA]
Rough terrain and bad weather were the worst enemies of the Union Army.
Brig. Gen. John Beatty records in his diary that “The road was
exceedingly rough, and the rebels had made it impassable, for artillery,
by rolling great rocks into it and felling trees across it.” He
frequently mentions the rain which fell incessantly during the campaign.
His entry of July 5 states that “Since we left Murfreesboro (June 24)
rain has been falling almost constantly; today it has been coming down
in torrents, and the low grounds around us are overflowed.” Yet, in
spite of mountains and rain and the Confederate Army, Rosecrans, by this
series of brilliant flanking maneuvers, forced Bragg to evacuate
Tullahoma on July 1 and withdraw toward Chattanooga.
_From Tullahoma to Chickamauga_
After the Tullahoma campaign, the two armies adopted their previous
policy of remaining stationary. Each began to gather forces and
equipment for a future struggle. The Union Army occupied a line from
Winchester to McMinnville—the same territory the Confederates had
occupied previously—while the Confederate General Bragg established his
headquarters at Chattanooga. There the Army of Tennessee strengthened
its defensive position and prepared to close the “gate” to further
advances of the Army of the Cumberland.
During July and August, Halleck again urged Rosecrans to move against
Bragg’s forces, but Rosecrans failed to budge. In the latter’s judgment,
three things were needed to insure a successful campaign. The first was
ripe corn which would not be ready until August; the second was the
repair of the railroad to the Tennessee River; and the third was support
for his flanks. In spite of the constant flow of dispatches from Halleck
to Rosecrans, it was not until August 16 that he began his movement
southward to cross the river.
As Rosecrans moved toward the Tennessee River and Chattanooga, another
Union army under command of General Burnside entered east Tennessee to
threaten Knoxville. General Bragg, supposing that the two armies would
join forces to attack him, made urgent appeals for help. Though the
shortage of manpower at this time was a major problem of the
Confederacy, troops were sent hurrying to Bragg from several directions.
Rosecrans’ strategy, after viewing several possibilities, was to cross
the river below Chattanooga, turn the Confederate left and interrupt his
opponent’s communications and supply line from Atlanta. This movement if
successful would effectively cut all railroad lines to Chattanooga, and
Bragg would find himself shut in between Burnside on the north and east
and Rosecrans on the west and south. To deceive Bragg as to the point of
crossing the Tennessee River, Rosecrans sent Hazen’s and Wagner’s
infantry brigades, Wilder’s mounted infantry, and Minty’s cavalry, all
under the command of Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen, to make a feint at the
river north of the town and to annoy the enemy as much as possible.
[Illustration: _Union troops constructing a pontoon bridge across
the Tennessee River at Bridgeport, Ala. Ruins of Nashville and
Chattanooga Railroad bridge shown._ Courtesy Library of Congress.]
The ruse was successful, and so thoroughly was Bragg deceived into
thinking the attack would come from upstream on the north side of the
Tennessee, he left the crossings below Chattanooga practically
unguarded. Rosecrans with the bulk of his army then crossed the river in
the vicinity of Bridgeport and Caperton’s Ferry, Ala., and Shellmound,
Tenn. By September 4, the Army of the Cumberland, thus meeting little
opposition, was safely across a great barrier and was threatening Bragg
from new positions.
When Bragg learned that the Union Army had crossed the Tennessee below
Chattanooga and was threatening his supply lines, he decided after much
deliberation to abandon his position and retreat southward.
Once the Union Army had crossed the river, Thomas’ corps marched toward
Trenton, Ga.; McCook’s took the road to Alpine, Ga.; and Crittenden
moved toward Chattanooga. On the 9th of September, Rosecrans, believing
the Confederates to be in full retreat, ordered McCook to press forward
toward Alpine, covered by the cavalry, and make attempts to cut Bragg
off; Crittenden to garrison Chattanooga with one brigade and pursue
Bragg by way of the Ringgold Road with the rest of his force; and Thomas
to continue toward Trenton.
In order to understand the importance of the movements of both
commanding generals, the geography of the country must be considered.
When the Union commanders climbed to the top of the Lookout Mountain
range and viewed the country, they began to have misgivings about their
divided army. Thomas and McCook, 20 and 40 miles southwest of
Chattanooga, respectively, found themselves on a mountain ribbed by
ridges and hills, more than 1,000 feet above the valley floor. The few
roads which ran over the mountain were narrow, rough, stony, and
unusually steep.
Thomas, looking to the east, saw Pigeon Mountain, a spur that juts off
Lookout Mountain and veers in a northeastwardly direction. The acute
angle of these diverging mountains forms McLemore’s Cove. Running into
this cove from the northeast and ending there is the southern extremity
of Missionary Ridge which begins immediately east of Chattanooga. Here,
also, originates Chickamauga Creek which gave the ensuing battle its
name.
As the two Union corps moved eastward they found the country sparsely
populated. There were a few farms, but most of the land was covered with
cedar thickets and tangled undergrowth. The roads connecting farm and
village were dry and dusty.
The Union Army was now split into three distinct columns with its flanks
more than 40 miles apart. In mountainous terrain, this made it
impossible for them to support one another. In the period September
10-12, corps commanders began to receive reports that a large
Confederate force was at LaFayette, Ga. It was Bragg’s army. He had not
retreated as far south as Rosecrans had thought—he had stopped at
LaFayette behind Pigeon Mountain. There he concentrated his army and
awaited reinforcements.
[Illustration: _Wooden railroad trestle at Cumberland Ravine, Ga.,
erected by Union Army to replace bridge destroyed by Confederates._
Courtesy National Archives.]
_Reinforcements for General Bragg_
General Bragg had purposely given the impression that his army was
disorganized and in full flight before Rosecrans. Actually, however, he
was not running away but was quietly preparing for battle and gathering
strength as reinforcements began to reach him. Realizing that Maj. Gen.
Simon Bolivar Buckner’s Corps could not defend Knoxville from Burnside,
and having no troops to spare for reinforcements, Bragg ordered Buckner
to rejoin the Army of Tennessee. Buckner’s Corps of 8,000 men joined
Bragg about the time the latter evacuated Chattanooga. Gen. Joseph E.
Johnston from his army in Mississippi sent two divisions (about 9,000
men), under command of Major Generals John C. Breckinridge and W. H. T.
Walker. A little later at Bragg’s insistence Johnston sent two brigades,
under command of Brigadier Generals John Gregg and Evander McNair. These
brigades added 2,500 more troops to Bragg’s Army.
[Illustration: ROUTE OF REINFORCEMENTS _FOR_ GENERAL BRAGG _AT_
CHICKAMAUGA]
About this same time preparations were under way to reinforce General
Bragg further with Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s corps from the Army of
Northern Virginia.
The movement of Longstreet’s troops from Virginia to reinforce General
Bragg in Georgia was an outstanding logistical achievement for the
Confederacy. Even though by this time railroads had become an important
factor in the strategy of war, no major troop movement involving so many
lines over such a long distance had yet been attempted. It also shows
the great concern the Southern War Department felt for the approaching
battle.
From the Army of Northern Virginia to General Bragg’s forces in Georgia
was a distance of some 900 miles by railroad lines through Virginia,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. It was necessary for the
troops to take this longer and roundabout route of reaching General
Bragg because General Burnside had cut the railroad line by way of
Knoxville.
By the summer of 1863 the railroads in the Confederacy were in very poor
condition, for it had been extremely difficult to replace rails and
rolling stock as the war continued. For the most part, the lines were
comparatively short; were not connected at many points; lacked bridges
across some of the major rivers; and like railroads everywhere, had
different gauges. Sixteen different railroad lines were involved in the
transfer as all parallel routes and all types of rolling stock were
pressed into service.
In spite of all these difficulties, however, the movement was attended
with dispatch and secrecy. Leaving the vicinity of Orange Courthouse,
Va., on or about September 9, the advance brigades of Longstreet’s Corps
were joining General Bragg 9 days later. Mrs. Mary B. Chestnut recorded
in her diary what she saw of this troop movement:
At Kingsville (S. C.) on my way to Camden, I caught a glimpse of
Longstreet’s Corps going past.... It was a strange sight. What seemed
miles of platform cars, and soldiers rolled in their blankets lying in
rows with their heads all covered, fast asleep. In their grey blankets
packed in regular order, they looked like swathed mummies. One man
nearby was writing on his knee. He used his cap for a desk, and he was
seated on a rail.
Information on the details of the movement, of the delays, the hazards
encountered, as well as the number of men, animals, and artillery
transported is difficult to find. A fair estimate of the number of
troops is 15,000.
[Illustration: _Longstreet’s soldiers detraining below Ringgold,
Ga., September 18, 1863. From there they marched into battle at
Chickamauga._ A. R. Waud wartime sketch. From _Battlefields in Dixie
Land and Chickamauga National Military Park_.]
Only part of the infantry troops, and none of the artillery, arrived in
time to participate in the Battle of Chickamauga; Longstreet himself was
not present for the first day’s fighting but three of his brigades were.
The five brigades (about 9,000 men) which took part in the second day of
battle became heroes along with their commander when they broke through
the Union line.
_Maneuver for Position_
Bragg was aware of the isolated positions of the Union Army, and he saw
an opportunity to strike his opponent in detail, one corps at a time,
while they were not in supporting distance of each other. He issued
orders to Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman and Lt. Gen. D. H. Hill to strike Maj.
Gen. James S. Negley’s division of Thomas’ corps, which was in an
advanced position at McLemore’s Cove, but Hill failed to carry out his
order. Bragg ordered Buckner to join Hindman which he did on September
10. Instead of attacking Negley, the two Confederate commanders decided
that a different plan was needed for the situation and sent their
recommendation to Bragg. While this correspondence passed back and
forth, Negley withdrew and rejoined the rest of Thomas’ corps. The
Confederates had now lost their opportunity to strike and possibly
destroy this division.
Two days later a similar situation arose with the same result—loss of
the opportunity to strike another corps in detail. This time Bragg
ordered Polk to move his and Walker’s corps to Lee and Gordon’s Mills to
strike Union General Crittenden’s divided force. Two of Crittenden’s
divisions had marched toward Ringgold; one had moved to Lee and Gordon’s
Mills. Polk, instead of attacking, went on the defensive and asked for
reinforcements. For the second time in 3 days, subordinate Confederate
commanders allowed a Union corps to regroup.
Rosecrans now realized Bragg had concentrated and reinforced his army,
and that his own force was in danger of annihilation in its divided
condition. Accordingly he ordered General Granger, commanding the
Reserve Corps in the vicinity of Bridgeport, Ala., to Chattanooga;
General Crittenden to position at Lee and Gordon’s Mills on Chickamauga
Creek, some 12 miles south of Chattanooga; and General Thomas to move
northward toward Crittenden as soon as he was joined by General McCook’s
Corps, which had been commanded to make haste in joining the other
corps.
In the hurried concentration of the Army of the Cumberland, McCook
withdrew from Alpine and chose to retrace his way by crossing over
Lookout Mountain, thence up Lookout Valley where he had to recross the
mountain to join General Thomas. It took McCook approximately 5 days
(September 13 to 17) to complete this movement, greatly to the
consternation of Rosecrans who had expected McCook to follow the shorter
route on top of Lookout Mountain or roads through McLemore’s Cove. Some
of the troops, however, such as the Second Division, did forced marches
in some instances of 25 miles in a day.
Bragg made no effort to prevent this concentration of the Union forces,
and during the night of September 17 the three corps were within
supporting distance of each other. The Union left was at Lee and
Gordon’s Mills, and from there the line extended west and south through
McLemore’s Cove to Stevens Gap through Lookout Mountain.
_The Battle of Chickamauga_
Chafing over the failure of his subordinate commanders to strike the
divided units of Rosecrans’ army and wishing to seize the initiative,
General Bragg had his troops do an “about face.” Turning northward, he
planned an all-out attack on General Crittenden who had been following
in his rear since the evacuation of Chattanooga and was now at Lee and
Gordon’s Mills. General Bragg moved his troops northward on the east
side of the Chickamauga Creek. His plan was to cross the Chickamauga
north of Lee and Gordon’s Mills, seize the roads leading to Chattanooga,
bear down on Crittenden, and crush this corps or drive it back into the
Union center in McLemore’s Cove. By turning the Union left in this
manner, he hoped to force Rosecrans back into the mountains and to
reoccupy Chattanooga.
Maj. Gen. John B. Hood (Longstreet’s Corps) and Brig. Gen. Bushrod
Johnson’s troops were to cross at Reeds Bridge and turn left; Walker’s
Corps to cross at Alexander’s Bridge; Buckner to cross at Tedford’s
Ford; Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s Corps to cross at Lee and Gordon’s Mills;
and Hill’s Corps to cover the Confederate left.
Bragg did not seem to suspect that Rosecrans had guessed his intentions,
and was hurriedly moving to support Crittenden and deploying his troops
so as to protect the roads to Chattanooga.