THE PRESIDENT: You have not printed the whole of 503 in your document
book. Is that it?
DR. EXNER: Unfortunately, 503-PS is not in it, but only the secrecy
order, Page 102. I expressly requested, however, that it should be
submitted to the Tribunal.
JODL: May I add that this sentence became the source of all trouble. The
troops made use of that sentence and on principle, or as a rule, did not
kill Commandos but took them prisoner.
DR. EXNER: You said this last sentence made you indignant. Were you also
convinced that it was against international law?
JODL: One might have doubts in that respect too. But I found it
distasteful from a human point of view, for if one does shoot a man, I
think it is base to extort all information out of him first.
DR. EXNER: I want to ask one more question concerning what you mentioned
before the recess. You said that you did not report everything to the
Führer; you did not report all Commando raids to him. That is quite
clear. But you said you also did not report information which you
obtained from the enemy—killings, and so on. What did you mean by that?
JODL: I reported the results of Dieppe and, should we say, the
violations of international law which we considered had been committed
there—the shackling of German prisoners, and so on. There was only one
thing which I did not report, namely, the shackling of some men
belonging to the Todt Organization in such a manner that they strangled
themselves. I did not report that, and it did not appear in any order or
Wehrmacht communiqué.
THE PRESIDENT: The defendant has already told us about this, so why you
should ask him again I don’t know.
DR. EXNER: I thought it was not quite clear.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now pass to another subject, the order
regarding Leningrad and Moscow. How did Hitler’s order about the fate of
Leningrad and Moscow come into being? It is C-123, second volume, Page
145 of my document book; it was submitted under the number USSR-114.
This is the order stating that surrender was not to be accepted. How did
this order come into being?
JODL: At the beginning of the second paragraph appears the sentence:
“The moral justification for this measure is clear to the whole world.”
I shall now explain that. The first reason was a report from Field
Marshal Von Leeb, the Commander of Army Group North at Leningrad. He
reported that the population of Leningrad had already begun to flock out
toward his lines in the south and west. He pointed out that it would be
absolutely impossible for him to keep these millions of Leningrad people
fed and supplied if they were to fall into his hands, because the supply
situation of the army group was deplorable at that time. That was the
first reason. But shortly beforehand Kiev had been abandoned by the
Russian armies, and hardly had we occupied the city when tremendous
explosions occurred one after another. The major part of the inner city
was destroyed by fire; 50,000 people were made homeless; German soldiers
were used to fight the flames and suffered considerable losses, because
further large masses of explosives went off during the fire. At first
the local commander at Kiev thought that it was sabotage on the part of
the population, until we found a demolition chart, listing 50 or 60
objectives in Kiev which had already been prepared for destruction some
time before; and this chart was in fact correct, as investigation by
engineers proved at once. At least 40 more objectives were ready to be
blown up, and for most of them a remote-control was to set off the
explosion by means of wireless waves. I myself had the original of this
demolition chart in my hands. That proved...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the details of Kiev. This
deals with Leningrad. The defendant might briefly state in substance
what he says happened at Kiev; but we cannot investigate details of it.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, the defendant wanted to show that it was
feared these happenings in Kiev might repeat themselves in Leningrad.
THE PRESIDENT: I quite understand that; but if he said that he had plans
of the blowing up of Leningrad, it would be a different matter, and he
could give that in more detail. But what I am saying is we cannot go
into the details about Kiev.
DR. EXNER: No. I only want to refer without quoting to my Exhibit AJ-15
(Document Jodl-50), on Page 149 of my second volume. That is a report on
these explosions in Kiev. We will not delay over this matter any more
now. I just wanted to bring it to the notice of the Tribunal.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.
JODL: Then I only need to say in conclusion that the Führer always
expected that what had happened in Kiev, in Kharkov, and in Odessa would
happen also in Leningrad, and possibly in Moscow. That was the decisive
reason why this order, which already had been put into writing, was
given by him orally to the High Command of the Army. And the order was
given added weight because the Russian radio reported that Leningrad had
been undermined and would be defended to the last man.
The purpose of the order was exclusively that of protecting German
troops against such catastrophes as had already occurred; for entire
staffs had been blown into the air in Kharkov and Kiev. For this reason
the Führer issued this order, which I in turn, at his express request,
put into writing. Therefore the order began with the words, “The Führer
has again decided”—that means “once more,” “for the second time.”
DR. EXNER: What was the reason for the order to leave openings to the
east in the encirclement of Leningrad and Moscow?
JODL: We did not want these masses of the population. We had had our
experiences in Paris. There it had even been necessary to use the
transport space of four divisions and the whole relief train “Bavaria,”
which could supply tens of thousands of people, to save the population
from starvation. In Leningrad that would have been quite impossible,
because in the first place the railways had been destroyed; the rails
had not yet been adjusted to our gauge, and the supply situation was
very difficult. It would have been impossible to help these millions of
people in any way; there would have been a real catastrophe. Hence the
idea of pressing them back to the east, into the Russian areas; an idea,
incidentally, not in conformity with the assertion which has been made
here that we wanted to exterminate the Slavs.
DR. EXNER: I now come to another subject. The French prosecutor has
accused you of ordering in Document UK-56—which is Exhibit RF-335 in my
document book, the second volume, Page 153—of ordering the deportation
of Jews, thereby giving, as chief of a military staff, a political
order.
Will you explain how this order came into being?
THE PRESIDENT: I think the translation must have come through wrong. You
said—at least, I took it down—Page 153.
DR. EXNER: Page 155. I beg your pardon, it is on Page 155 of the second
volume of my document book. The actual order is on Page 156.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please reply.
JODL: I must explain in connection with this document that the
deportation of Jews from Denmark was discussed during a conference at
which I did not participate. Himmler suggested it to the Führer; and the
Führer approved or ordered it. I was informed of it either through
General Schmundt or Ambassador Hewel.
Then on instructions conveyed to me by Schmundt, I transmitted to the
military commander in Denmark the details of this order. The heading, or
rather, the address of this teleprint message shows that it was directed
to two offices, namely to the Foreign Office and to the commander of the
German troops in Denmark. These are the two principal offices for which
it was destined. The Reichsführer SS received the letter only for
information purposes, as is noted on it in accordance with our office
practice. He did not have to act upon it; it was not an order for him,
but it was merely for information. He already knew the Führer’s
decision.
I did not in any way order the deportation of the Jews, but I wrote,
“The deportation of Jews will be carried out by the Reichsführer SS...”
DR. EXNER: That is under Figure 2?
JODL: Figure 2. Had this been an order, it would have had to be
addressed to the Reichsführer SS; and it would have had to be worded
like this: “Reichsführer SS is to deport Jews from Denmark.” But it is
exactly the other way about. This Figure 2 informs General Von Hannecken
in Denmark that he has nothing to do with this affair, but that it is
being handled by the Reichsführer SS. But General Von Hannecken had to
be told of this, because at that time a state of military emergency
existed. He had executive power in Denmark, and if anything like that
had been done without his knowledge he might immediately have objected
to it and forbidden it.
The matter appeared to me so urgent that, in order to avoid incidents, I
informed the military commander in Denmark about it over the telephone,
quite openly and without regard to its secrecy. The French Prosecution
mentioned an indiscretion which enabled most Jews to escape from Denmark
into Sweden; presumably it was this telephone call which made that
possible.
Finally, therefore, I repeat that I was far from ordering the
deportation of Jews; I merely informed the military commander in
question that he was to have nothing to do with the matter. Besides, as
I heard afterwards on making inquiries, these Jews were taken to
Theresienstadt, where they were cared for and visited by the Red Cross;
and even the Danish minister declared himself satisfied with their
treatment.
DR. EXNER: May I draw the attention of the Tribunal to what I consider
is an inadequate translation into English and French. Under Figure 1 on
Page 156 of the second volume the word “volunteers” does not appear in
the translation. It says here, “The Reichsführer SS has permission to
recruit volunteers from the former members of the Danish forces who are
to be released...” The word “volunteers” is missing in the English
translation; the French, merely says _hommes_—“men.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] You actually had no dealings with matters
in occupied territories; they were outside your jurisdiction. How then
did you come to sign this order?
JODL: Actually this affair did not concern me at all. I signed the order
because Field Marshal Keitel was away on that day.
DR. EXNER: As we are just talking of the Jews, will you tell the Court
what you knew about the extermination of Jews? I remind you that you are
under oath.
JODL: I know just how improbable these explanations sound, but very
often the improbable is true and the probable untrue. I can only say,
fully conscious of my responsibility, that I never heard, either by hint
or by written or spoken word, of an extermination of Jews. On one single
occasion I had doubts, and that was when Himmler spoke about the revolt
in the Jewish Ghetto. I did not quite believe in this heroic fight; but
Himmler immediately supplied photographs showing the concrete dugouts
which had been built there, and he said, “Not only the Jews but also
Polish Nationalists have taken refuge there and they are offering bitter
resistance.” And with that he removed my suspicions.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you speaking of Warsaw?
JODL: I am speaking of the uprising in the Warsaw Ghetto of which I
heard through a personal report from Himmler given in our presence, in
the presence of soldiers at the Führer’s headquarters. Himmler spoke
only of an uprising and of bitter fighting. As far as the activities of
the Police are concerned, of the so-called action groups, Einsatzgruppen
and Einsatzkommandos—a conception, incidentally, of which I first heard
here in detail—there was never any explanation through the Führer
himself other than that these police units were necessary to quell
uprisings, rebellions, and partisan actions before they grew into a
menace. This was not a task for the Armed Forces, but for the Police,
and for that reason the Police had to enter the operational areas of the
Army. I have never had any private information on the extermination of
the Jews; and on my word, as sure as I am sitting here, I heard all
these things for the first time after the end of the war.
DR. EXNER: What did you know about concentration camps...
THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it is necessary to point out to you that
you cannot speak about there having been no explanation to the Führer;
you can only speak about there having been no explanation to yourself.
The translation I heard was, as to these Einsatzgruppen, that there had
been no explanation to the Führer.
THE INTERPRETER: From the Führer.
THE PRESIDENT: From the Führer?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes, My Lord.
JODL: I said that the Führer had never given us any other reason for the
presence of police forces than his statement that police measures were
necessary.
THE PRESIDENT: I misheard the translation.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about concentration camps, or what did
you know about them? Please be brief.
JODL: I can briefly say that I knew there were concentration camps at
Dachau and Oranienburg. Some divisional officers visited Oranienburg
once in 1937 and gave me very enthusiastic accounts of it. I heard the
name of Buchenwald for the first time in the spring of 1945. When the
name was mentioned, I thought it was a new troop training camp; and I
made inquiries. The inmates were always described as German habitual
criminals and certain inveterate political opponents, who however, like
Schuschnigg or Niemöller, were held there in a kind of honorable
detention. I never heard a single word about tortures, deported persons,
or prisoners of war, crematoriums or gas vans, torments reminiscent of
the Inquisition, and medical experiments. I can only say that, even if I
had heard of these things, I would not have believed them until I had
seen them with my own eyes.
DR. EXNER: The French prosecutor read a statement by the German Police
General Panke, according to which you were present at a conference with
Hitler on 30 December 1942, when terror and counterterror and so on, and
reprisal murders in Denmark were said to have been discussed. What do
you say to that?
JODL: I think it was on 30 December 1943.
DR. EXNER: Was it?
JODL: In some points that statement is correct; in others it is
incorrect. During that conference, at least as long as I was present,
the word “murder” was never mentioned. The Führer said:
“I want to fight the terror of sabotage and attacks, now
beginning in Norway, with exactly the same weapons. That is to
say, if a Danish factory working for Germany is blown up, which
has happened, then a factory working solely for the Danes will
be blown up also. If some of our strong points are attacked by
terrorists, which has also happened, these terrorists will be
hunted, surrounded, and wiped out in fighting; and I do not want
courts martial, which only create martyrs.”
He did not say or suggest, however, that innocent Danes should now be
murdered as a reprisal. I can only say that, in my presence and in the
presence of Field Marshal Keitel, that and nothing else was said. Again,
it is a very debatable question from the point of view of international
law whether an army is not entitled to adopt the fighting methods of its
opponents in its countermeasures, particularly in such _franc-tireur_
warfare and in rebellions like these. It seems to me a very moot point.
DR. EXNER: You just said, “as long as I was present.” Were you not
present during the entire conference? Can you remember?
JODL: I do not think that even in my absence any other statements were
made. Once during the conference I went out to telephone and was away
for a short time, perhaps 15 minutes.
DR. EXNER: We now come to the partisan fighting. Partisan fighting and
partisans have been mentioned frequently here. Can you say briefly what
these partisans were?
JODL: It is not easy to define that clearly, considering all the types
of fighting adopted in this world war; but there are five
characteristics:
1) A partisan group is a fighting unit formed behind one’s own front; 2)
it is not or is only partly in uniform; 3) it is not an organic part of
the Armed Forces even though it receives its orders from them; 4) it
must be in a position, or it generally is in a position to...
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t require a lecture about this matter.
DR. EXNER: Well, then we know approximately what partisans are. I now
want to ask you about the fighting against partisan groups. First of all
I must read what we have heard here about partisans, Document L-180,
USA-276, which is contained in the second volume of my document book,
Page 121. That is a complete report of an Einsatzgruppe in action
against partisans; it is Appendix Number 9. What is found on Page 122
is, I think, of importance. First of all under Roman Numeral I, Figure
5, I quote:
“In the larger cities, especially those with industrial works,
so-called _istrebitelni_ battalions (i. e. destruction
battalions) were formed by the Soviets before the entry of the
German troops....”
Then, under Roman Numeral III:
“...the tasks and fighting methods of the various partisan
groups have become known ... partly from the captured combat
directives of the partisans themselves. This statement of a
captured partisan ... is significant: ‘A partisan must destroy
everything that he can reach...’”
And then, in one of the “Combat Directives for Partisan Groups” received
by us from the commander of the army, rear area North, we find stated:
“Unbearable conditions are to be created for the enemy and his
allies in territories occupied by him. All the measures of the
enemy are to be opposed.”
And then instructions are given to blow up bridges, to destroy roads,
_et cetera_. I shall not read it all. In the last paragraph, which I
have on Page 123, it expressly states that partisans are to disguise
themselves cleverly; that they will sometimes appear as farmers or will
work in the fields as soon as German forces appear in the vicinity. The
witness Von dem Bach-Zelewski stated here that the fight against
partisans was carried out in a chaotic manner. He meant by that that it
was not directed from higher quarters. You must be informed about that.
Is that correct?
JODL: No, that is not correct. This expert on partisan fighting
obviously has a bad memory. I draw attention to Document F-665, in
Document Book 2, Page 126. Here the first page is given of a directive
for partisan warfare. It is called “Instructions for Partisan Warfare,”
and was signed by me personally on 6 May 1944. The Tribunal will see
that in the second sentence it says that...
DR. EXNER: Page 126.
JODL: ...the instructional pamphlet number so-and-so, “Instructions for
Partisan Warfare in the East,” issued by the OKW, Armed Forces
Operations Staff, dated 11 November 1942, is canceled. That proves that
at least since 11 November 1942, the troops had in their possession
instructions issued by the Armed Forces Operations Staff as to how the
battle against partisans should be conducted.
DR. EXNER: May I now draw attention to my Document AJ-1, Page 133. It is
an affidavit of a Pastor Wettberg; I do not want to read it. Pastor
Wettberg contacted me because he himself had been engaged in the warfare
against partisans, and he confirmed that the fighting was perfectly well
directed even before the new instructions were issued, that is, from
1942 onwards. In 1944 you issued this new directive without Hitler’s
permission; is that correct?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: What made you do that? Was it not an unusual step?
JODL: I want to state that I did not submit this directive either to
Field Marshal Keitel or to the Führer, because it was a contradiction of
all existing orders. I shall prove in detail later that it gives
instructions for all so-called partisans in France and
Yugoslavia—partisan areas in Russia were now in front of our lines—to
be treated immediately as regular fighting troops, and thus as prisoners
of war.
I took this unusual step because I became convinced, after the shooting
of the English Air Force officers at Sagan, that the Führer no longer
concerned himself with the idea of human rights; and also because after
1 May 1944 I myself felt responsible for questions of international law,
as the “Canaris” department had been dissolved on that day and the
foreign section, together with the international law department, had
come under my command. I was resolved not to tolerate and not to
participate in any such violations of international law on our part, and
I acted accordingly from that day up to the end of the war.
In this order I declared all partisans and those supporting them, and
even those wearing civilian clothes, to be regular troops and prisoners
of war, long before Eisenhower—on 7 July 1944 only—demanded that
terrorists in France should be given that status.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution asserts that the fight against partisans was
only a code name under which Jews and Slavs were killed; is that true?
JODL: The fight against partisans was a horrible reality. In July 1943,
to quote some figures, 1,560 instances of railway sabotage occurred in
Russia. There were 2,600 in September; that is 90 per day. A book by
Ponomarenko was published from which an American paper quoted 500,000
Germans as having been killed by the partisans. If a nought is crossed
off from that figure, it is still quite a considerable achievement for a
peaceful Soviet population. But the book is also said to have stated
that the population became increasingly hostile; that murder and terror
became more frequent; and that the peaceful Quisling mayors were being
killed. At any rate it was a tremendous fight which was taking place in
the East.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I would like to draw the Tribunal’s
attention to an entry in Jodl’s Diary, Document 1807-PS. It is on Page
119 of the second volume of my document book. Under 25 May it says,
“Colonel General Halder draws the attention of the Führer to increasing
partisan activity...”
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. The defendant stated, I think, that in
this directive of his on the 6th of May 1944 there was an order that
guerrillas should be treated as prisoners of war. Will you refer us to
the passage?
DR. EXNER: Will you name the passage, Defendant?
JODL: It is under Figure 163, on Page 131.
DR. EXNER: Page 131 of the second volume.
JODL: May I read it?
DR. EXNER: Yes.
JODL: “All partisans captured in enemy uniform or civilian
clothing or surrendering during combat are to be treated in
principle as prisoners of war. The same applies to all persons
encountered in the immediate fighting area who may be considered
as supporting the partisans, even when no combat action can be
proved against them. Partisans in German uniform, or in the
uniform of an allied army, are to be shot after careful
interrogation if captured in combat. Deserters, no matter how
they are dressed”—and, may I add, even if dressed in German
uniform—“are, on principle, to be well treated. The partisans
must hear of this.”
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Well, perhaps—it is 1 o’clock—we might
break off now.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. EXNER: I have one further question concerning the partisan
regulations. The Prosecution brings the charge that you, through Number
161 of the partisan regulations—that, Your Honors, is in the document
we used last, F-665, Page 130 of Volume II—were responsible for the
destruction of whole villages, and even of the total population of
villages in France. Will you please comment on this?
JODL: I believe the opposite is true. Through Number 161, I reduced the
collective measures and collective punishments that the Führer had
decreed without restraint, to what was permitted by Article 50 of the
Hague Rules of Land Warfare. In this article collective punishment is
prohibited unless the entire population is equally guilty in terror
activities of any kind. Therefore, with this Number 161 I did not order
the burning down of villages, not even in exceptional cases, but on the
contrary I said that such collective measures might be used only in very
exceptional cases, and then only with the approval of a divisional
commander, for he would have a tribunal and could make a judicial
investigation.
I do not wish to trouble the Tribunal with any other merits of mine,
which may be read in this document. I discussed the good treatment of
the population; the necessity of leaving them the necessaries of life,
_et cetera_. I believe, at any rate, that this document actually serves
as a model of how this sort of war may be brought within the scope of
international law. I did this as I was convinced that at that time the
French Maquis movement, and also the Tito revolt had gradually begun to
develop into a regular war.
Now the case of the 2d SS Panzer Division is cited as an example of
things that I caused through this Number 161. I can say only that the
behavior of the SS Panzer Division is the responsibility of its
commander. I learned about it only months afterwards. I am grateful to
the French Prosecution for having submitted this document, and I am
grateful also for the statement that the Maquis movement in the
beginning was nothing else than _franc-tireur_ warfare, the heroism of
which I do not dispute.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different problem, the low-level
fliers. From Document 731-PS, Page 139 of the second document book, and
Page 144 of Volume II of my document book—from these documents it can
be seen that from various sources proposals had been made as to the
treatment of enemy airmen who had made emergency landings. Can you tell
us, first of all, the reason for this, and what your attitude was toward
these proposals?
JODL: I shall try to be as brief as possible. The reason was that
numerous reports had been received of people being attacked by
individual enemy aircraft contrary to international law. The Führer
demanded countermeasures, and that is the origin of the memorandum
731-PS, Exhibit RF-1407. It is not a draft for an order, still less an
order. It is a note containing proposals made by the Luftwaffe in that
connection. There was no talk as yet about lynching. The fact that I
concerned myself with this problem at all may find its explanation in
the responsibility which, as I have previously mentioned, I believed had
rested with me since 1 May with regard to questions of international
law. The note which I wrote on the document has already been read. I
objected to one paragraph—a case which I nevertheless considered
entirely admissible according to international law. This was later
crossed out and replaced by a statement that it was to be considered
murder if one of our soldiers landing by parachute was shot. I wrote
this objection on Document 735-PS. The concept of lynching...
DR. EXNER: I should like to state, for the assistance of the Tribunal,
where this passage is. The remark made by Jodl in his handwriting is
found on Page 144 of the document book. Various proposals are made in
this memorandum, and then Jodl adds “To Number 3...”; and then there is
a notation.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please comment on this.
JODL: My notation was: “Is the Foreign Office in agreement with Number
3b?”—namely, that the shooting of our own airmen who have been shot
down and are parachuting to earth is to be considered a mean terrorist
act.
DR. EXNER: This Number 3b is on the same page, at the top.
JODL: I just wanted to add that lynching was suggested in an article by
Goebbels, published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_. The more I concerned
myself with this problem, the more it was obvious that nothing at all
could be achieved with measures of this kind, for one could never
capture a guilty low-flying airman, for he would either escape or he
would be dashed to pieces on the ground. This would only lead to a
general murder of airmen. Therefore, I decided—and I was in complete
agreement with Field Marshal Keitel on this point—to cause this entire
action to fail. The Court can see that between Document 731-PS, which
was compiled on 21 May, and Document 735-PS, 16 days had elapsed wherein
nothing had been done. When on 6 June I received a rather lengthy
report, I noted on it, “This is not sufficient; we have to start all
over again; how can we be certain that other enemy airmen will not be
treated in the same way? Should some legal procedure be arranged or
not?” If I wrote that, then, Your Honors, it is absolute proof, if you
consider my general method of work, that I had no other intention than
to delay and drag things out until the matter had solved itself. And I
succeeded in this case. No military authority issued an order. We did
not even go so far as to make a draft of an order. The only thing we had
were these scraps of paper. It has been proved, and it will be proved
further, that many months afterwards the Führer brought the gravest
charges against us, and against the Luftwaffe in particular, of having
torpedoed his order.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to something entirely different. The Chief
of the OKW, in a letter written in 1941, called you and Warlimont his
representatives for collaborating with Rosenberg’s Ministry for the
Occupied Eastern Territories. That is Document 865-PS, Exhibit USA-143.
How did that work out in practice?
JODL: Not at all. Apart from one conference in 1943 dealing with an
appeal to the peoples of the East, I had no connection with Rosenberg’s
Ministry whatsoever. The only collaboration which took place constantly
was carried on by my propaganda division, for all pamphlets which it
compiled and which were dropped over Russia were discussed first with
the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern Territories.
DR. EXNER: Then why were you appointed at all? Why was that necessary?
JODL: That was purely a matter of form, because Minister Dr. Lammers
wrote to each of the higher Reich authorities in general asking that a
deputy be designated; and so Field Marshal Keitel also designated a
deputy.
DR. EXNER: We shall now turn to something new. You have been shown the
rather strange Document C-2, Exhibit USA-90. It is not contained in my
document book, but the Court will remember it at once. It is a
compilation in tabular form in which certain incidents of significance
in international law are cited in the first column. In the second column
there are examples; in the third and fourth...
MR. ROBERTS: It is Page 163 in the big document book.
DR. EXNER: This is a diagramatic compilation which sets down on one side
a certain incident, and on the other enumerates the consequences of this
incident: its appraisal in the light of international law, its use for
propaganda, and so forth.
Will you explain how this came about? It is really a very strange
document. Twelve infringements of international law by our side are set
down, and, I believe, 13 infringements by the enemy.
JODL: I do not think this document is so remarkable after all. It was
compiled at the end of September 1938, shortly before the Munich
Conference. As I, in my department, did not know for certain whether we
would have an armed conflict or not, and as at that time the
stipulations of international law were not clear to us, I wanted, by
taking various examples, to find out from the experts on international
law what the present attitude was towards such infractions. Every
officer in my division then racked his brain to find an example, and we
tried to cover every branch of international law through some specific
instance. I consider it worthy of note that even then we concerned
ourselves with the conception of international law. There can be no
doubt whatsoever that I alone carry responsibility for having thought
out these examples. But if one were to take exception to the reply to
these examples, that is to the judgment on the lines of international
law or to justification according to the rules of warfare, I can only
say that this did not come from me; it emanated from the office of
Canaris. Apart from that, it shows a very careful and noteworthy
attitude toward international law, especially concerning air warfare. At
any rate, it was on a much higher level than what took place in actual
practice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, was it the intention to commit these infractions
of international law?
JODL: Not at all, but as one conversant with the history of warfare, I
knew that there has never yet been in this world a war in which
infractions of international law did not occur.
If, perhaps, objection should be raised that quite at the end of the
paragraph there appears: “Explanation by the Propaganda Ministry,” I
should like to say that that comes at the end, after the justification
according to the laws of war and the judgment from the standpoint of
international law, and that Admiral Bürckner, who gave the reply,
himself referred to it—that propaganda could be put into practice only
after the aspects of international law had been clarified. Moreover the
whole answer was only a preliminary one, as first the Foreign Office and
the various branch chiefs of the Wehrmacht would have had to be heard on
the subject.
DR. EXNER: I asked for Admiral Bürckner as a witness on this question,
but it really seems to be too unimportant a matter, and I shall
therefore forego the calling of this witness.
[_Turning to the defendant._] I want to ask you the following question
in this connection: What was your attitude in general as to the
limitations placed on the conduct of war by international law?
JODL: I recognized and valued international law with which I was well
acquainted, as a prerequisite for the decent and humane conduct of war.
Copies of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare and the Geneva Convention were
always lying on my desk. I believe that by my attitude toward the
Commissar Order, toward lynching, and toward the intention to repudiate
the Geneva Convention—bluntly rejected by all Commanders-in-Chief and
all branches of the Wehrmacht, and by the Foreign Office—I have proved
that I tried, as far as it was possible for me, to observe international
law.
Of course, there is a wealth of positive proof available. The pertinent
documents will probably be submitted by my defense counsel. I will refer
only to the behavior of the German Wehrmacht in Norway, a matter in
which I collaborated. I refer to the partisan regulations...
DR. EXNER: I submit Document AJ-14, Pages 99 and 100 in my document
book, Volume I. These are special directives for conduct during the
occupation of Norway and Denmark, directives which, therefore, were
issued when those countries were occupied. There are some very
characteristic sentences contained in this document, sentences which I
should like to read. You will find on Page 98, Figure I:
“The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place
for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries.
The aim must be to carry this out in a peaceful way.”
Then on Page 99, at the top it says:
“Directives for conduct in personal intercourse with the
Norwegian population.
“Every member of the Armed Forces must remember that he is not
entering enemy country, but that the troops are moving into
Norway for the protection of the country and for the safety of
its inhabitants.
“Therefore, the following is to be observed:
“I. The Norwegian has a strongly developed national
consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves
closely related to other Nordic peoples.
“Therefore avoid anything that might wound national honor.”
Figure 2 is also very characteristic. Then I shall turn to Figure 4:
“The home of the Norwegian is sacred according to the old
Germanic conception. Hospitality is offered generously. Property
is inviolable. The house remains...”
THE PRESIDENT: It is not necessary to read all of this. One paragraph is
enough to show the nature of the document, isn’t it?
DR. EXNER: Then I will make mention of the remainder of the document
which I shall not read, and ask that the Tribunal take official notice
of this document.
Then there is a directive here, Document AJ-16...
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, that last document does not appear to
have been signed by the defendant, does it?
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] What had you to do with this
document? Did you...
JODL: It is signed by Von Falkenhorst, but it is well known that we—the
Armed Forces Operations Staff and the staff of Von
Falkenhorst—comprised one unit for the Norwegian enterprise. I
participated in the drawing up of this document, and I submitted it to
the Führer and the Führer approved of it. There is even an entry to that
effect in my diary.
DR. EXNER: Then comes Document AJ-16, which I submit herewith.
“Special directives for the administration and pacification of the
occupied areas of Holland, Belgium, and Luxembourg.” This is Page 161,
Volume II of my document book. I will quote only from Page 162 in order
to save time. I will read perhaps the last sentence: “International law
must be strictly observed in every case.” But I request the Tribunal to
take judicial notice of the other regulations.
In this connection I should like to mention Document 440-PS, Exhibit
GB-107, in my Document Book 2, Page 164—Directive Number 8 regarding
the conduct of war, dated 20 November 1939. It says in respect to the
tasks of the Air Force—I will read the last paragraph:
“Localities, especially large open cities, and industries are
not to be attacked without a compelling military reason, neither
in the Dutch nor in the Belgian-Luxembourg areas.—Signed
Keitel.”
Did you also draft that?
JODL: I drafted that order.
DR. EXNER: Then we might refer to the regulations for fighting
partisans, a matter which has been discussed here also.
JODL: And I should like to refer to something I believe I have stated
already, that I ordered an immediate investigation of the Malmédy
incident.
DR. EXNER: Did you constantly bear in mind the aspects of international
law where your orders were concerned?
JODL: I believe I have already stated that. I studied international law
very carefully in its bearing on my orders. I do not wish to detain the
Court with the knowledge I gathered from these regulations, for it is
only incomplete, but I should like to conclude by saying that owing to
the fact that there were no regulations governing air warfare,
deplorable confusion in definition arose—for instance between rebellion
and legal war force; between _franc-tireur_, bandit, and scout; between
spy and scout; demolition crews and saboteurs. Any time with the help of
aircraft a rebellion might be converted into a legal war; and a legal
war, on the other hand, might become a state of rebellion. That is the
effect that parachute troops and the furnishing of supplies by air have
had on international law.
DR. EXNER: In this connection, I should like to submit the affidavit of
Lehmann, Exhibit AJ-10 (Document Number Jodl-63). This document has not
been submitted to the Court because it was only yesterday that the
Prosecution declared itself in agreement with the use of this affidavit.
I believe it is the affidavit of the Judge Advocate General, Dr.
Lehmann. If the Tribunal will declare this affidavit admissible, I can
perhaps merely refer to it...
THE PRESIDENT: Where is it?
DR. EXNER: I submit it herewith but it has not been translated yet, as
we received permission for it only yesterday in Court.
MR. ROBERTS: As Sir David said yesterday there is no objection to the
affidavit, although there was no actual order granting the affidavit of
Lehmann. My Lord, it is very short, especially the copy I had, and I
think there is no reason to object to it.
DR. EXNER: Then, in order to save time, I shall just refer to it; and I
beg the Tribunal to read these statements of Dr. Lehmann. They seem to
me to be significant, as after all it is the highest jurist in the
German Wehrmacht, Judge Advocate General Lehmann, who is giving
information here.
THE PRESIDENT: You had better give it an exhibit number.
DR. EXNER: Yes, AJ-10 was the exhibit number I gave it, Your Honor.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: This gentleman mentions legal discussions, which he had
occasion to carry on with Jodl, and he gives us Jodl’s attitude toward
legal questions.
And now, General, in connection with crimes against the laws of war
there is one last question which comes to our attention. Numerous
entries in the war diary, orders, _et cetera_, are the subject of
serious charges against you. Did you have the possibility, before you
were captured, of destroying all this material?
JODL: Yes, between 3 May and 23 May I had time and leisure to burn every
piece of paper, but I gave instructions to my staff not to destroy a
single file, for I felt I had nothing to conceal. I handed the complete
files, and above all the especially important ones, all the original
Führer directives since 1940, to the American officer when I was
captured.
DR. EXNER: And now I shall turn to the alleged Crimes against Peace.
First of all we have to make it clear what posts you held during this
critical period. Tell us, please, what posts you held from 1933.
JODL: From 1932 to 1935 I was in the division which was later called the
Operations Division of the Army. From the middle of 1935 until October
1938 I was Chief of the Department for National Defense in the
Wehrmachtsamt, which was later called the OKW.
DR. EXNER: That means the Wehrmachtsamt was actually the OKW?
JODL: Yes, later on. From October 1938 until shortly before the Polish
campaign I was artillery commander at Vienna and at Brünn, in Moravia;
and from 27 October 1939...
DR. EXNER: Just a moment please. 27 September?
JODL: No—August, rather. On 27 August 1939 I took over the office and
the tasks of Chief of the General Staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, let us take that period. Did you concern yourself with
war plans in the years 1932-35 when you were in the so-called
Truppenamt?
JODL: At that time there were no preparations in the Operations
Division, except for combat directives for the improvised Grenzschutz
Ost (frontier guard East). This was a militia-like organization, and
preparations were made to evacuate the whole German border in case of
enemy occupation. That was all.
DR. EXNER: Had you anything to do with the proclamation of general
conscription?
JODL: No, I had nothing to do with that. I believe I heard about it the
day before.
DR. EXNER: What were your duties as chief of the Department for National
Defense from June 1935 to October 1938?
JODL: In this position I had to work out the operational strategic
directives according to the instructions of my chiefs, Keitel and
Blomberg. I had to study and to clarify the problem of the leadership of
the Wehrmacht; to prepare studies and exercises for the big Wehrmacht
maneuvers in 1937. I had to supervise the Wehrmacht Academy; I had to
work out drafts for laws in connection with the general conscription
order and with the unified preparation for mobilization in the civilian
sector, that is, of state and people. The so-called Secretariat of the
Reich Defense Committee came under me.
DR. EXNER: Tell us, please, what were you at that time? What was your
military rank?
JODL: I acquired that position while I was lieutenant colonel; and in
1936—I believe—I became a colonel.
DR. EXNER: Did you take any part in the Reich Defense Law?
JODL: No, that law originated before I entered my office in the
Wehrmachtsamt.
DR. EXNER: But the Prosecution is accusing you of participation in it on
the grounds of a supplement which you made to the Document 2261-PS,
Exhibit USA-24, which is to be found in Volume I, Page 9. In this
document it says, “Attached a copy of the Reich Defense Law of 21 May
1935...” The signature is Blomberg’s and it is dated 24 June. Then comes
a supplementary paragraph: “Berlin, 3 September 1935. To the Defense
Economic Group la, copy transmitted, Signed Jodl.” What can you tell us
about that?
JODL: Indisputably that is a valid Reich law of which I had to transmit
a copy to one of the other offices. I need not say more than that.
DR. EXNER: You yourself did not participate in the drawing up of the law
itself?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Council?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Were you a member of the Reich Defense Committee?
JODL: I was that automatically from the moment I took over the direction
of the National Defense Department. At the tenth session of this meeting
of experts, on 26 June 1935, General Von Reichenau designated me as his
deputy.
DR. EXNER: What was the purpose of this committee? This has already been
discussed, I believe, so please be as brief as possible.
JODL: In a few words: With this committee a unified mobilization, not of
the Army, but the mobilization of the State and people, corresponding to
military mobilization, was prepared. These plans were laid down in the
mobilization books giving final figures and various stages of tension.
DR. EXNER: What were these various stages of tension?
JODL: We had learned about this from France and had adopted it. The
French had a system by which mobilization was carried out in five stages
according to the degree of tension existing.
THE PRESIDENT: Do we need the detail about this? Is it not sufficient to
say it was copied from France?
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us what this meant;
why we adopted this system of stages of tension? What was the reason?
JODL: The purpose was to have some means at our disposal—as was
customary all over Europe at that time—that would achieve an
intensified readiness for war before the public order for mobilization
was issued.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with armament?
JODL: No. It did not concern itself with armament at all.
DR. EXNER: Did the Reich Defense Committee concern itself with political
plans or intentions?
JODL: It had nothing to do in any way with political problems.
DR. EXNER: But how about war?
JODL: It was concerned only with mobilization.
DR. EXNER: That means, a certain particular war...
JODL: Mobilization is a necessity for every possible war.
DR. EXNER: In this committee you concerned yourself with mobilization
books. Is that correct?
JODL: Yes. I believe I have already explained that. In these books the
details of all the chief Reich authorities were set down and indexed
according to degrees of tension.
DR. EXNER: What do you mean by chief Reich authorities?
JODL: I mean all the ministries.
DR. EXNER: You mean the civil authorities?
JODL: Yes, the civil authorities. And the preparations made by them had
to be brought into line with the preparations by the military.
DR. EXNER: What were the preparations in the demilitarized zone?
JODL: The preparations in the demilitarized zones were connected solely
with evacuation, that is the surrendering of the areas west of the Rhine
in case of a French occupation.
DR. EXNER: I believe we have discussed that at length already, and in
this connection I should like to refer to Document EC-405, Exhibit
GB-160, Page 11 of my document book, the first volume, where the tenth
session is mentioned. You are accused of having decreed the utmost
secrecy concerning all these preparations, which, according to your
description, were of a purely defensive nature. Why all this secrecy?
JODL: Keeping measures of this kind secret is taken for granted all over
the world. For us in Germany it was especially important, as for years
the civil authorities had no longer been accustomed to concern
themselves with military matters, and it seemed to me of particular
importance that in foreign countries no misunderstanding should arise
by, let us say, the capture of an order of this nature—a very
characteristic misunderstanding such as occurred in these proceedings in
connection with the “Freimachung” of the Rhine.
DR. EXNER: And why did you decree secrecy? So that foreign countries
would not be disquieted?
JODL: At that time we were even weaker than during the period when we
had an army of only 100,000 men. This army of 100,000 men had been
broken up into hundreds of small groups. It was the time of our very
greatest impotence, and at that period we had to be extremely careful to
avoid any and all tension with foreign countries.
DR. EXNER: What were the military plans of those days?
JODL: I have already said that there were the combat directives for the
Grenzschutz Ost. I had also worked out instructions for the commander in
East Prussia in case he were cut off from the Reich through a sudden
attack by Poland.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of any German intentions of attack at that time?
JODL: There was no thought or talk of that whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Well, I should like to quote one sentence from the twelfth
session of the Reich Defense Council. It is on Page 14 of Volume I of my
document book, Document EC-407, Exhibit GB-247. At that meeting
Lieutenant Colonel Wagner of the OKH said—who was he, by the way?
JODL: He later became Quartermaster General.
DR. EXNER: Lieutenant Colonel Wagner said:
“The outcome of the war”—that is, the last war—“has resulted
in a completely changed military and political situation in the
case of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in
one’s own country.”
He said that on 14 May 1936. What would you gather from this sentence?
JODL: Of course, one can perhaps say...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, surely it is a statement by somebody else, and
this statement speaks for itself. It is not a matter that this witness
can interpret to us.
DR. EXNER: Very well.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, were you concerned with armament in
the Truppenamt, and later in the Department for National Defense?
JODL: I personally had nothing at all to do with armament in the real
sense. That was a matter for the various branches of the Wehrmacht—the
Army, the Navy, the Air Force—and it was dealt with and handled by
their organizational staffs. The Commanders-in-Chief discussed these
matters with the Führer direct. But I hope, and I will not deny, that my
work in the General Staff contributed to the reconstruction of the
German Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Your diary, 1780-PS, does not contain a word about armament,
and it seems obvious that at that time you did not concern yourself with
this problem. What were your thoughts and ideas on the question of
armament? Were you in favor of it?
JODL: At that time I was of the same opinion as my superiors; and it was
characteristic that on the day before the statement was made that 36
divisions were to be formed, Blomberg as well as Fritsch suggested to
the Führer that only 24 divisions should be formed. They feared a
thinning down of the entire army. Perhaps they also feared too stormy a
foreign policy, based on forces existing only on paper.
DR. EXNER: Please answer a question which appears to be important to me:
What were the deadlines in connection with the armament in 1935?
JODL: Various stages were provided for. The first deadline set was
1942-43. Most of the West Wall was to be completed by 1945. The Navy’s
plan of construction ran on to 1944-45.
DR. EXNER: At that time what did you consider the objective of the
armament?
JODL: Since it was not possible to achieve general disarmament, the
objective was to establish military parity between Germany and the
neighboring countries.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I should like to refer to a document which
has already been submitted—the 2-year report of General George
Marshall. This has already been submitted as Raeder-19. I have a part of
it here before me, a part which I submitted under Exhibit AJ-3,
(Document Jodl-56) Page 168. Regarding the problem of rearmament, some
sentences seem to hit the nail right on the head.
In the second paragraph on Page 6, or rather the last sentence there, we
see:
“The world does not seriously consider the wishes of the weak.
Weakness is too great a temptation to the strong, particularly
to the brutal who scheme for wealth and power.”
Then on the next page there is another sentence:
“Above all we must, I think, correct the tragic misunderstanding
that a security policy is a war policy...”
Can you tell us, please, what the ratio of our military strength to that
of foreign countries was at that time?
JODL: In 1935, when we set up 36 divisions, France, Poland, and
Czechoslovakia possessed 90 divisions for times of peace, and 190
divisions for war. We had hardly any heavy artillery, and tank
construction was in its earliest stages. The conception of defensive and
offensive armament has been discussed here on various occasions. It
would lead us too far afield to go into that in detail. But I should
like to say only that as far as Germany was concerned, with her
geographical position this conception did not apply. The disarmament
conference too, after months of discussion, failed because a proper
definition for this conception could not be formed.
DR. EXNER: I should like to quote from an expert, George Marshall again,
on Page 168 of my document book, from which I have just quoted; and
again just one sentence. It is in the first paragraph: “The only
effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack...”
Now, however, the Prosecution asserts that you should have known that
such a tremendous rearmament as the German rearmament could serve only
for an aggressive war. Will you comment on this, please?
JODL: I believe this can only be explained as an expression of military
ignorance. Up to the year 1939 we were, of course, in a position to
destroy Poland alone. But we were never, either in 1938 or 1939,
actually in a position to withstand a concentrated attack by these
states together. And if we did not collapse already in the year 1939
that was due only to the fact that during the Polish campaign, the
approximately 110 French and British divisions in the West were held
completely inactive against the 23 German divisions.
DR. EXNER: But tell us, when did intensive rearmament actually begin?
JODL: Real rearmament was only begun after the war had already started.
We entered into this world war with some 75 divisions. Sixty percent of
our total able-bodied population had not been trained. The peacetime
army amounted to perhaps 400,000 men, as against 800,000 men in 1914.
Our supplies of ammunition and bombs, as the witness Milch has already
testified, were ridiculously low.
DR. EXNER: In that connection I should like to read a diary entry of
yours, Page 16 of Volume I of my document book, which is 1780-PS,
USA-72. On 13 December you said:
“After completion of project for L”—that is the
Landesverteidigung, National Defense—“Field Marshal reports on
state of war potential of Wehrmacht, indicating chief bottleneck
is inadequate stocks of ammunition for Army—10 to 15 days of
combat equals 6 weeks’ supply.”
JODL: That is right, we had ammunition for 10 to 15 days of combat.
DR. EXNER: Now I shall turn to the question of the occupation of the
Rhineland.
THE PRESIDENT: Let us break off now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: General, when did you first hear of the plans to occupy the
Rhineland?
JODL: On 1 or 2 March 1936; that is to say about 6 days before the
actual occupation. I could not have heard of them any earlier because
before that the Führer had not yet made the decision himself.
DR. EXNER: Did you and the generals have military objections to that
occupation?
JODL: I must confess that we had the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose
entire fortune is at stake.
DR. EXNER: Did you have legal objections?
JODL: No; I was neither an expert on international law nor a politician.
Politically speaking it had been stated that the agreement between
Czechoslovakia, Russia, and France had made the Locarno Pact void, which
I accepted as a fact at the time.
DR. EXNER: How strong were our forces in the Rhineland after the
occupation?
JODL: We occupied the Rhineland with approximately one division, but
only three battalions of that went into the territory west of the Rhine;
one battalion went to Aachen, one to Trier, and one to Saarbrücken.
DR. EXNER: Three battalions. That is really only a symbolic occupation,
is it not?
JODL: Yes, and they acted only symbolically.
DR. EXNER: Did you do anything to avoid a military conflict because of
that occupation?
JODL: There were serious reports which came from our military attachés
in Paris and London at the time. I could not fail to be impressed by
them. We suggested to Field Marshal Von Blomberg then that perhaps he
ought to discuss withdrawing these three battalions west of the Rhine on
condition that the French would withdraw four to five times as many men
from their borders.
DR. EXNER: Was that suggestion ever made?
JODL: Yes, it was made to the Führer, but he turned it down. He rejected
very bluntly General Beck’s suggestion that we should declare that we
would not fortify the area west of the Rhine. That was a suggestion of
General Beck’s, which the Führer turned down very bluntly.
DR. EXNER: Did you think at the time that that action was connected with
any aggressive intention?
JODL: No, there could not be any question of aggressive intentions.
DR. EXNER: Why not?
JODL: I can only say that, considering the situation we were in, the
French covering army alone could have blown us to pieces.
DR. EXNER: Do you think that the leading men had aggressive intentions
then?
JODL: No, nobody had aggressive intentions; but it is of course possible
that in the brain of the Führer there was already an idea that the
occupation was a prerequisite for actions to be taken later in the East.
That is possible; but I do not know, because I could not see into the
Führer’s brain.
DR. EXNER: But you did not see any outward signs of it?
JODL: No, none whatsoever.
DR. EXNER: Did you know of the so-called testament of Hitler dated 5
November 1937 which has been presented here?
JODL: The first time I heard it read was here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What did you learn about it at the time?
JODL: Field Marshal Von Blomberg informed Keitel and Keitel informed me
that there had been a discussion with the Führer. When I asked for the
minutes I was told that no minutes had been taken. I refer to my diary,
Document 1780-PS, as proof of this. What I was told was not at all
sensational and hardly different in any way from anything contained in
general directives for the preparation of a war. I can only assume that
Field Marshal Von Blomberg at that time kept these things to himself
because he may not have believed that they would ever be carried out.
DR. EXNER: Was there an operational plan against Austria?
JODL: There was no operational plan against Austria. I state that most
emphatically.
DR. EXNER: Now we come to Document C-175, a directive which has the
Exhibit Number USA-69. It is in Volume I; Page 18 and the following
pages. It is a directive for the unified preparation of the armed forces
for war of the year 1937. The Prosecution quoted Case Otto only from
this directive, so that the impression was bound to be created that the
whole was a plan for a campaign against Austria. Please explain what
this directive means.
JODL: It was one of those typical standard preparations for war, for
every conceivable eventuality. Such directives had come out every year
in Germany ever since there was a General Staff and general
conscription. These theoretical military studies made a distinction
between two cases, namely cases of war which because of their nature
were politically probable or might be probable, and cases which were
improbable. As far as the former were concerned, a plan of operations
was to be drafted by the Army and the Air Force. For the latter
appropriate suggestions only were to be brought forward. If the Tribunal
would turn to Page 21 of the document, there appears at the end of the
page, Part 3, a sentence as follows: “The following ‘special cases’ are
to be considered by the High Command in general without participation by
regional authorities...” and among such cases, on Page 22, is the
special “Case Otto.”
DR. EXNER: On Page 18 of this document is a directive valid from 1 July
1937 until, probably, 30 September 1938, that is a little more than a
year. That, in turn, replaces another similar directive which is
referred to in the first paragraph, which had been drawn up for the same
problems previously. Did you participate in discussions on the Austrian
case?
JODL: No, I did not participate in any discussions.
DR. EXNER: It is said in the trial brief that on 12 February 1938 you
had been at Obersalzberg. Keitel has already rectified that. Your entry
in the diary under 12 March 1938 is, therefore, based only on an account
which you received through Keitel; is that right?
JODL: Yes. It is merely a note on a brief account given to me by General
Keitel about that day, probably related a bit colorfully.
DR. EXNER: But then it says, evening of 11 February: “General Keitel
with Generals Von Reichenau and Sperrle at Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg and
G. Schmidt are being subjected to very great political and military
pressure.” In the English and French translations it says that
Schuschnigg and Schmidt are “again subjected to very great political and
military pressure.” This word “again” does not appear in my German
original.
Now, did you suggest deceptive maneuvers against Austria? That is being
held against you.
JODL: I did not suggest any deceptive maneuvers. The Führer ordered
them; and I do not think that they are illegal, because I believe that
in the gambling of world history, in politics and in war, false cards
have always been played. But the Führer ordered it and that is stated in
the entry in my diary. I supplied military information and documents to
Canaris as to where our garrisons were situated, what maneuvers were
taking place. Canaris elaborated them and then released them in Munich.
DR. EXNER: What did you think was the purpose of...
JODL: I had been told that the purpose was to exert a certain amount of
pressure so that Schuschnigg, when he had returned home, would adhere to
the agreement made at Obersalzberg.
DR. EXNER: How long before the actual entry into Austria did you know of
such intentions?
JODL: On 10 March in the morning just before 11 o’clock I heard of it
for the first time.
DR. EXNER: And the entry took place when?
JODL: On the 12th. It was when General Keitel and General Viehbahn, who
was then temporarily Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, were
suddenly ordered to the Reich Chancellery that I heard of the intention
for the first time.
DR. EXNER: Then did you have a plan made, or what?
JODL: The Führer surprised them by stating that the question involved
was the Austrian problem; and then they remembered, that there was a
General Staff plan called “Otto.” They sent for me and for the
directive, and learned from me that such a directive actually did exist,
but that in practice nothing at all had been prepared. As it had only
been a theoretical plan and drafted solely in the event of an Austrian
restoration, and as such a restoration was not expected for the moment,
the High Command of the Army had virtually done nothing about it.
DR. EXNER: How did you yourself understand the entire Austrian action?
JODL: It appeared to me to be a family squabble which Austria herself
would solve through her domestic politics in a very short time.
DR. EXNER: And what made you think that?
JODL: My own extensive knowledge of Austria. Through relatives and
acquaintances, through the German-Austrian Alpine Club to which I
belonged, as one who knew the Austrian mountains, I had been in closer
contact with Austria than with northern Germany, and I knew that in that
country there had been a government against the will of the people for a
long time. The peasant uprising in Styria was a characteristic example.
DR. EXNER: Was the march into Austria the carrying out of the
suggestion, C-175?
JODL: No, it was completely improvised within a few hours with the
corresponding result. Seventy percent of all the armored vehicles and
lorries were stranded on the road from Salzburg and Passau to Vienna,
because the drivers had been taken from their recruitment training to be
given this task.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you said just now, didn’t you, that the Führer
told them it was the problem of Austria? You said that, didn’t you?
JODL: I said that the Führer had informed General Keitel and General
Viehbahn about that on 10 March, in the morning. He did not talk to me,
and until that day I had not talked to the Führer either.
THE PRESIDENT: I only wanted to know the date. You said it was 10 March?
JODL: Yes, on 10 March, in the morning.
DR. EXNER: Is it correct that only peacetime formations marched into the
frontier districts, into Austrian territory?
JODL: Yes; it is a fact that only peacetime units which were intended
for the parade in Vienna actually marched in. All units which might have
been necessary for a military conflict, say, with Czechoslovakia or
Italy, were stopped at the last moment and did not cross the border.
DR. EXNER: Ammunition columns, for instance?
JODL: No, everything remained behind.
DR. EXNER: Was there any hesitation among the political leaders at the
last moment?
JODL: On 11 March, in the afternoon, I had news from the Reich
Chancellery that the Wehrmacht was not to move in, but that the Police
would pass through the Wehrmacht and move in alone. In the evening,
however, on 11 March, at 2030 hours, the final decision reached me,
which was that the Wehrmacht was to move in after all. I was unable to
find out the reason for that hesitation.
DR. EXNER: So that altogether there was not really an invasion by force?
JODL: No, it was a purely peaceful occupation. It was characterized by
my suggestion to the chief of the operations department of the Army that
he should have bands marching at the head of the columns and that all
drivers should be sure to wear goggles, otherwise they might be blinded
by the flowers thrown at them.
DR. EXNER: What was the significance of the order you signed regarding
the march into Austria? It has been put before you under Document Number
C-182, Exhibit USA-77. You remember it, do you not?
JODL: Yes, I remember. That is nothing other than the written record of
something which had previously been ordered orally and which was already
being carried out. That written order, you see, would have come much too
late.
DR. EXNER: And what is the significance of Document C-103, Exhibit
USA-75, referring to a possible clash with Czech troops or Italian
troops on Austrian territory? How did you come to that?
JODL: That was based on an inquiry from the General Staff of the Army.
They wanted to know, even in the case of the remotest eventuality, how
the troops were to comport themselves. I clarified the matter over the
telephone, through General Schmundt, with the Führer, and I then put his
decision down in writing, by his order.
DR. EXNER: And how did the operation come off?
JODL: It came off exactly as expected. There was jubilation and a
triumphal march, such as the world probably has seldom seen—even though
no one likes to acknowledge it today. The population came to meet us
during the night already; the custom barriers were removed, and all the
German troops called that march just a battle of flowers.
DR. EXNER: We now turn to the question of Czechoslovakia. Did you
participate in the conferences on 21 April 1938, and 28 May 1938, which
the Prosecution have described as conspirators’ conferences?
JODL: I did not participate in any of these conferences.
DR. EXNER: What type of General Staff work were you carrying out for
“Case Green”—which is, of course, the Czechoslovakia operation?
JODL: I must refer again to Document C-175, which is on Page 17 of the
first volume of my document book. In that general directive for the
unified preparation for war two important cases were dealt with, or were
to be dealt with: A defensive deployment against France if she opened
hostilities—“Case Red” and an offensive deployment—Case Green—against
Czechoslovakia. That would have been worked out in just the same way,
even if we had not had an acute conflict with Czechoslovakia, because a
war on two fronts—which was the problem we always faced—could never be
conducted or won in any other way than by means of an attack against the
weaker. This directive, as far as the Case Green is concerned, had to be
drawn up afresh the very moment that Austria automatically became a new
assembly zone. Thus, on 20 May 1938, a new draft was made by me for Case
Green which began with the customary words: “I do not intend to attack
Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without
provocation...”
DR. EXNER: Just wait a minute. That quotation is Document 388-PS,
Exhibit USA-26. It is the document dated 20 May 1938. “I do not intend
to attack Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future without
provocation...” Now, please continue.
JODL: That was 20 May. On the 21st, the day after, a monstrous incident
occurred. Czechoslovakia not only mobilized but even marched up to our
borders. The Czechoslovakian Chief of General Staff explained this to
Toussaint by saying that 12 German divisions had been assembled in
Saxony. I can only state—and my diary entries prove it—that not a
single German soldier had been moved. Nothing, absolutely nothing had
happened.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I think I ought to draw the attention of
the Tribunal to a questionnaire—Exhibit AJ-9 (Document Jodl-62). It is
a questionnaire submitted to General Toussaint who at that time was the
German military attaché in Prague. He confirms the mobilization of that
time. Third volume, 199—Page 201 of the document, at the bottom, there
is the following question: “What was the reason for the Czechoslovakian
mobilization in May 1938?”
And he answered:
“It is my personal opinion that the Czechoslovakian Government
wished to force her political allies to take up a definite
position. Krejci, the Czechoslovak Chief of General Staff,
informed me, as the reason for the mobilization, that he had
exact information that 10 to 12 German divisions had assembled
in the Dresden area, and that he could no longer bear the
responsibility of not taking countermeasures.”
On the other hand a diary note from Jodl, Volume I, Page 26 should be
mentioned:
“The Führer’s intention not to touch on the Czech problem yet is
altered by the Czech deployment on 21 May, which took place
without any German threat and without even any apparent cause.
Germany’s silence thereto would lead to a loss of prestige for
the Führer, to which he is not willing to submit again. Hence
the issuing on 30 May of the new directive for Case Green.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] That is from Jodl’s diary, Page 26, first
volume. Now continue, please.
JODL: That was the information which I received, partly through General
Keitel and partly through the then Major Schmundt, regarding the
impression made on the Führer. The result was that he personally changed
my draft of 20 May and put at the beginning the following words:
“It is my unalterable decision that Czechoslovakia must be
destroyed within a reasonable period of time by military action.
To decide upon the militarily and politically opportune moment
is a matter for the political leadership.”
DR. EXNER: These words appear in the Document 388-PS, which I have
already referred to, which is Exhibit USA-26. It is the order of 30 May
1939.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please tell us briefly what the contents
of these directives were.
JODL: In that order of 30 May three possibilities were mentioned by the
Führer as to how a conflict with Czechoslovakia might arise: 1) Without
particular cause—politically impossible and out of the question; 2)
after a prolonged period of tension—most undesirable, because of the
lack of the element of surprise; 3) the best solution, after an
incident, such as were happening nearly daily at that time, and which
would justify us morally before the world if we decided to intervene.
Furthermore, there was the command that on the first day the Army should
break through the fortifications in order to clear the way for the free
operation of the mobile forces, the armored divisions, so that after 4
days such a situation would be created that the military position of
Czechoslovakia would become untenable.
DR. EXNER: Why was the entire directive redrafted in June?
JODL: The entire directive C-175 was thoroughly revised in June. This
was done because on 1 October a new mobilization year began, and because
this directive C-175 was in any case planned to be valid only until 30
September 1938. The old directive was, of course, still in force until 1
October, but became invalid on 1 October through that directive which
had been drafted by me on 24 June, or 18 June. In that directive the
Case Green was mentioned in the sense of the Führer’s intention—namely,
that it was the immediate aim of his policy that from 1 October
1938—not on, but from 1 October 1938—every favorable opportunity was
to be utilized to solve the problem of Czechoslovakia, but only if
France did not interfere or march, or Great Britain either.
I confirm that no date existed in any of the orders for the starting of
a war against Czechoslovakia. In the directive of 30 May the date was
left open altogether; and the new instructions, C-175, of 18 June stated
only from 1 October, on the first favorable occasion.
DR. EXNER: That is on Page 29 of our document book, second paragraph: “I
have decided, from 1 October...”
JODL: May I perhaps conclude this whole question by saying, in order to
be explicit, that actually before 14 September, as far as the military
forces were concerned, nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: I once again refer to an entry in Jodl’s Diary Volume I, Page
32. It is an extract from Document 1780-PS, Exhibit USA-72, and is the
entry under 14 September 1938:
“At noon it was announced that the general order for
mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.... This,
however, did not take place, although approximately eight age
groups were called up at short notice. As the Sudeten Germans
are crossing the border en masse, we request at about 1730
hours, at the suggestion of the OKH, Department 2, the calling
up of the strengthened frontier guard (GAD) along the Czech
border in military districts VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The
Führer gives his authorization from Munich.”
THE PRESIDENT: What was it that you were reading from then?
DR. EXNER: I have read from Page 32 of my document book; Volume I, Page
32, and it is an excerpt from Jodl’s diary of 14 September, therefore an
entry made in the midst of that critical period.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Just what were these military measures
which were being introduced?
JODL: On 13 or 14 September the eight age groups were called up in
Czechoslovakia. We used the strengthened frontier guard so that the many
escaping Sudeten Germans could be taken over.
On 17 September the Führer formed the Freikorps Henlein, contrary to the
previous agreement and without telling us beforehand. Previously it had
been agreed that these Sudeten Germans of military age were to join the
Reserve Army.
Around that time the political discussions started. The first one at the
Berghof had already taken place. Beneš ordered mobilization in
Czechoslovakia on 23 September and only now, and in accordance with the
political discussions, did the military deployment against
Czechoslovakia commence.
I had no doubt that it was going to be used in the event of
Czechoslovakia not submitting to any agreement we had made with the
Western Powers; for the Führer had clearly stated that he would
negotiate only if France and England did not intervene politically or
militarily.
DR. EXNER: You made two more entries in your diary, on 22 and 26
September, which prove that you were worried at the time. Statement made
by Captain Bürckner, in the first volume of my document book, on Page
34; again an excerpt from 1780-PS, dated 22 September:
“Captain Bürckner, chief of the foreign section, reports that
according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation
between Prague and the local Czech Legation Counsellor, the
German Embassy in Prague has just been stormed. I am immediately
having connection made by telephone and wireless with Prague
through Colonel Juppe.
“1050 hours: Bürckner reports that the incident has not been
confirmed. The Foreign Office has spoken with our Embassy.
“1055 hours: I establish liaison with Prague and with Toussaint.
To my question as to how he is getting along, he replies,
‘Thanks, excellently.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces,
who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion
that he should think over what measures would have to be taken
if the Führer should wish for an immediate bombardment of
Prague, is informed through Ic about the false report which may
have had the purpose of provoking us to a military action.”
Then, on 26 September, it says:
“It is important that false reports do not induce us to military
actions before Prague replies.”
The Prosecution have stated that 1 October had long before been decided
on as the date for aggression. Will you tell me what significance that
date, 1 October 1938, had for Case Green?
JODL: I have already said that, I believe. I explained that the new
mobilization year had started, and that no order contained a fixed date
for the beginning of the campaign against Czechoslovakia.
DR. EXNER: Did you believe that the conflict might be localized?
JODL: I was certainly convinced of that, because I could not imagine
that the Führer, in the position we were in, would start a conflict with
France and Britain which had to lead to our immediate collapse.
DR. EXNER: And the entries in your diary probably show your concern
about incidents?
JODL: Yes. In my diary on 8 September there is reference to a
conversation with General Stülpnagel. According to that, Stülpnagel was
at the moment very worried lest the Führer should depart from his
oft-defined attitude and allow himself to be dragged into military
action, in spite of the danger of France’s intervention.
According to the entry in my diary I replied that actually at the moment
I shared his worries to some extent.
DR. EXNER: This is an entry which the Tribunal will find on Page 26 of
the first volume of my document book. Once again it is an extract from
Document 1780-PS, and it is the entry of 8 September 1938.
[_Turning to the defendant._] You have already said, have you not, what
your worries were? Our weakness?
JODL: It was out of the question with five fighting divisions and seven
reserve divisions in the western fortifications, which were nothing but
a large construction site, to hold out against 100 French divisions.
That was militarily impossible.
DR. EXNER: On 24 August, in a letter addressed to Schmundt, you referred
to the importance of an incident for the tasks of the Wehrmacht in this
case. You have been gravely accused of that, and I want you to tell me
what the significance of that statement is.
Your Honor, it is 388-PS, and it is on Page 35 of the first volume. It
is an extract from the often quoted Document 388-PS: It is a report made
at the time of the “X” Order and the preliminary measures.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, will you state what you intended
in this work of the General Staff?
JODL: The Führer’s order of 30 May which I have already explained,
assuming that it ever came to this action, left no other choice than to
attack on a previously decided date. This could only follow as the
result of an incident, because without provocation the operation was out
of the question; and it was not to be attempted if too long a time had
passed.
The Army, in order to be ready for such a surprise break-through of the
Czech fortifications, required 4 days of preparation. If nothing
happened after those 4 days, the military preparations could no longer
be kept secret and the surprise element would disappear. Therefore,
nothing else remained but either a spontaneous incident in
Czechoslovakia, which would then 4 days later have resulted in military
action, or a date which had to be decided on previously. In that case an
incident had to happen during those 4 days which the Army required for
deployment.
The Führer’s demands could, in fact, not be solved in any other way from
the point of view of the General Staff. My letter to Major Schmundt was
meant to explain that difficult situation to the Führer.
At that time incidents occurred every day. May I remind you that since
the first partial mobilization in Czechoslovakia the Sudeten Germans
liable to be called for military service had mostly evaded the order.
They escaped over the border into Germany, and the Czechoslovakian
border police shot at them. Bullets were shot over daily into Germany.
All together, more than 200,000 Sudeten Germans crossed the border in
that manner.
From that point of view the conception of an incident was not so mean
and criminal as it might have been, for instance, if peaceful
Switzerland had been involved. If I said, therefore, how keenly
interested we would be in such an incident, that was meant to express
that if one resorted to military action at all—all this is, of course,
purely theoretical—one might use just such an incident as a _casus
belli_.
DR. EXNER: And how do you explain this remark of yours: “...unless the
intelligence department is ordered to organize this incident in any
case”?
That is at the end of Page 38 in the second paragraph. It is an extract
from 388-PS.
JODL: Yes, I had too much knowledge of European military history not to
know that the question of the first shot—the apparent cause of war, not
the inner cause of war—has played an important part in each war and on
each side.
The responsibility for the outbreak of war is always attributed to the
enemy; it is not characteristic of Germany alone, but of all European
nations who have ever been at war with one another. In the case of
Czechoslovakia the deeper cause of the war was quite apparent. I need
not describe the condition in which 3½ million Germans found themselves
who were supposed to fight against their own people. I myself was able
to watch that tragedy in my own house. In this case, the deeper cause of
the war, was firmly established, and Lord Runciman, who came on that
mission from London, left no doubt about it whatsoever. In such a
situation I certainly had no moral scruples about exaggerating one of
these incidents, and, by means of a counteraction in vigorous reply to
the Czech doings and activities, extending and enlarging such an
incident in order that if the political situation allowed it, and
England and France did not interfere—as the Führer believed—we might
find a really obvious reason for taking action.
DR. EXNER: Gentlemen of the Tribunal, there is one point to which I wish
to draw your attention. In my opinion it is once more a mistake in
translation. I refer to the second paragraph from the bottom on Page 36.
It is the report about the incident. The second but last paragraph on
Page 36 states: “...that Case Green may be set in motion as a result of
an incident in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation
(Anlass) for military intervention.” The translation in English of these
last words is a “provocation”; “Anlass” is translated as “provocation.”
THE PRESIDENT: What are you saying? What is the alteration?
DR. EXNER: I believe that the translation is not correct. I am not
absolutely certain but I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention to
it. “Anlass” means “_prétexte_” in French—which as far as we know is
“pretext.”
THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Exner, there is no difference in the meaning of
the words, whether it is “provocation,” or whether it is “cause.”
DR. EXNER: “Provocation” sounds a bit more aggressive, does it not? I
just want to call your attention to it. In the German it is “cause” and
not “provocation.”
[_Turning to the defendant._] Now the Prosecution calls these
considerations, which we have just talked about, criminal ideas and
connects them with the supposedly planned murder of the German
Ambassador in Prague. We are said to have planned that murder so as to
have a cause for marching into Czechoslovakia. What do you have to say
to that?
JODL: This, of course, is grotesque. The example that the Führer
allegedly mentioned in his talks with Field Marshal Keitel, that the
German Ambassador had been murdered by the people of Prague, was not
even known to me. General Keitel did not tell me; I only heard of it
here. Apart from that, I think it is useless to go on discussing it as
we did exactly the opposite. We gave the order to General Toussaint to
protect the German Embassy in Prague and to protect the lives of the
people in it, because, in fact, at one stage it had been seriously
threatened.
DR. EXNER: This is proved by Exhibit AJ-9, Document Jodl-62, third
volume of the document book, Page 200. That again is the interrogatory
of General Toussaint, who was a military attaché in Prague at that time.
The third question is as follows:
“Is it true or not that in the summer of 1938 you received the
order to defend the German Embassy at Prague and to protect the
lives of all the Germans in the Embassy?”
And his answer is:
“Yes, it is true. I remember this order was given to me by
telephone probably in September 1938...”—and so on and so
forth.
Then in Question 4...
“It is true that the German Embassy...”
THE PRESIDENT: The witness has already said once it was so.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Then I shall only refer to the
testimony of Toussaint. In addition it has been said that the incident
had been staged by us. We need not go into that in detail. Did the
incident really happen?
JODL: No, there was neither a preparation for the incident, nor was it
necessary. Incidents kept multiplying day after day, and the solution
was a political one and entirely different.
DR. EXNER: So that this note, which we have often read, remained purely
theoretical, did it?
JODL: It was merely work on paper, an idea, which was not really
necessary at all.
But it has already been made clear that as soon as the political
discussions started I made continuous efforts to prevent the
provocations, apparently desired on the part of the Czechs, from leading
to any military measures on our part.
DR. EXNER: Did the signatory powers in Munich at the end of September
know of Germany’s military preparations? Did the statesmen there know
that we were militarily prepared?
JODL: The Prosecution gave me the distinct impression that that had
become known only today, and that it was unknown in the autumn of 1938
at Munich. But that is quite impossible. All the world knew of the
calling up of the eight age groups in Czechoslovakia in September. The
whole world knew of the total mobilization on 23 September. A political
correspondent of _The Times_ wrote an article on 28 September against
this Czechoslovakian mobilization. Nobody was surprised that immediately
after the signing of the Munich Pact, on 1 October, we marched into...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner...
DR. EXNER: Well, that ends this subject.
Is it true that in August 1938 you prepared a new operational plan of
which you had already spoken on 7 July? A new plan based on the previous
one?
JODL: Yes. Already before the solution brought about by the Munich Pact,
I, on my own initiative, drew up a secret operational plan for the
protection of all the German borders. It was so arranged that the
borders only were to be protected while the bulk of the Army was to be
kept in reserve in the center of Germany. That complete plan was
available here during my interrogation. It is now no longer contained in
Document 388-PS, but there is a reference made to it.
DR. EXNER: On Page 40, Volume I of our document book, I again read an
extract from 388-PS. At the very end the following is stated:
“...after the conclusion of Green, it must be made possible to
put a provisional deployment into action soon.”
And then:
“...first the Wehrmacht will guarantee the protection of the
German frontiers, including those of the newly acquired lands,
while the bulk of the Army and of the Air Force will remain at
our disposal. Such a future ‘frontier protection’ deployment
should be executed separately on the various fronts.”
Why did you prepare this “frontier protection” deployment? What was the
cause of it?
JODL: The reason was that once the necessity for an operation against
Czechoslovakia had become superfluous, through the problem being solved
in some way, we would no longer have had any deployment plan at all. And
as no other intention of the Führer was known to me, I on my own
initiative drew up a plan for this operation which would be suitable for
any eventuality.
DR. EXNER: Did you know anything about the intentions of the Führer,
after the Munich Agreement, to go even further and occupy Bohemia and
Moravia?
JODL: No, I had no idea of that. I knew of his speech of 26 September
where he said: “Now we are facing the last problem to be solved.”
I believed in that assurance, and this is proved by the fact that during
those days—it was about 10 or 11 September—I suggested to Field
Marshal Keitel, than General Keitel, that he should ask the British
Delegation, whose arrival had been announced, to come to Iglau in
Moravia, because many Germans who were living there had been threatened
by armed Czechoslovakian Communists. This of course was a suggestion
which I would never have made if I had had any idea that the Führer
nourished any further intentions concerning Bohemia and Moravia.
DR. EXNER: These further intentions of the Führer were recorded on 21
October 1938 in a directive. Did you know about that in the OKW, or what
was the position?
JODL: No, I did not know about it. I did not see it. I only saw it here
in this courtroom during my preliminary interrogation.
DR. EXNER: Then were you transferred to...
JODL: I was transferred to Vienna as Artillery Commander of the 44th
Division stationed there.
DR. EXNER: That was the end of October, was it not?
JODL: The end of October.
DR. EXNER: How did you imagine further military developments would be?
But, of course, you have already answered that.
JODL: Actually, I expected an easing of the political tension and a
period of peace. I can certainly say that.
DR. EXNER: And what happened to you then?
JODL: As I knew of no other plans, I transferred my home to Vienna
taking all my furniture with me. Naturally I would never have done that
if I had had the faintest idea that war was pending, because I knew that
in the event of war I was to become the Chief of the Armed Forces
Operations Staff and so would have to return to Berlin. I asked General
Keitel to help me to become the Commander of the 4th Mountain Division
in Reichenhall, from 1 October 1939, a request which again it would
never have entered my mind to make if I had any idea of what was going
to come.
DR. EXNER: Did you as Artillery Commander in Vienna remain in contact
with the OKW?
JODL: No, hardly at all. I had no connections with the OKW. I received
no military documents from the OKW during all that period.
DR. EXNER: And who informed you then about the situation during that
time?
JODL: Nobody. During that time I knew no more about what was going on or
what was intended than any lieutenant in my artillery.
DR. EXNER: Did you have private correspondence with Keitel?
JODL: I received one letter from General Keitel. It was, I think, at the
end of July 1939. He personally gave me the good news that quite
probably I would become Commander of the 4th Mountain Division in
Reichenhall on 1 October, and that General Von Sodenstern would become
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, now on peacetime footing, on
1 October.
DR. EXNER: Did you help to draw up the plan for the occupation of the
remaining parts of Czechoslovakia?
JODL: No, I did not. During this occupation I remained in Vienna for the
time being and temporarily became Chief of Staff of the 18th Army Corps
at Vienna. Then, later on, I was transferred to Brünn in Czechoslovakia
together with the entire 44th Division.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear about the whole thing?
JODL: It was through the orders of my divisional staff that I heard of
that operation in March of 1939, some 2 or 3 days beforehand.
DR. EXNER: Was this move into Czechoslovakia the carrying out of Case
Green which you had originally drafted?
JODL; No; it had no longer anything to do with that. There were
completely different troop units, and not even half of the troops
provided for in 1938 were actually used for the march into
Czechoslovakia in 1939.
DR. EXNER: Now, during that period when you were in Vienna there was a
conference with the Führer on 23 May 1939, which has often been
mentioned here, concerning the disregarding of neutrality, _et cetera_.
It has often been stated that Warlimont was present there as your
representative. What was the position? Was he your representative?
JODL: With great persistence it has been said again and again that
General Warlimont took part in the conference as the representative of
Jodl, or even, it was once said, as his assistant. There is no question
of that. He was my successor but not my representative. And even if it
is repeated again and again, it still does not make it true. He was my
successor.
DR. EXNER: You had left the OKW, had you not?
JODL: Yes, I had completely left the OKW. The fact that quite
accidentally Warlimont became my deputy later on has nothing whatsoever
to do with the events of May 1939.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear for the first time of this meeting in May
1939?
JODL: Here in Nuremberg in 1946.
DR. EXNER: Did you have any contact with Party leaders meanwhile, or
with Austrian National Socialists?
JODL: No, not at all; with nobody.
DR. EXNER: Or with these defendants here?
JODL: No, not with them either.
DR. EXNER: Once during that time the Führer went to Vienna with Keitel.
I think they were there 2 days or so. Did you have to report to him on
that occasion?
JODL: Yes, coming from Prague he visited Vienna quite unobtrusively, and
on that occasion I spoke a few words to General Keitel, but I did not
talk to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: You were not presented to him?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: What was your war appointment to be?
JODL: As I have already said, in the event of a war I was to become
Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff.
DR. EXNER: What about your private personal plans for that summer?
JODL: For that summer I already had tickets for a cruise in the eastern
Mediterranean on 23 September 1939.
DR. EXNER: On 23 September 1939 the voyage...
JODL: The voyage was to start at Hamburg; I had already paid for the
tickets.
DR. EXNER: When did you buy the tickets? Do you remember?
JODL: I bought them about the second half of July.
DR. EXNER: When did you return to Berlin?
JODL: I am not absolutely certain about the exact date, but I imagine
that it was on 23 or 24 August—according to a telegram which reached me
unexpectedly in Brünn.
DR. EXNER: If you had not received that telegram, when would you have
had to go to Berlin?
JODL: In case of a general mobilization I would have had to go to Berlin
anyway.
DR. EXNER: And did you now have to report to the Führer in Berlin?
JODL: No, I did not report to him, either. I only reported, of course,
to General Keitel and to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and
the Air Force and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I have now completed that subject, and I
thought that this would be a convenient time to adjourn.
THE PRESIDENT: Can you tell us how long you are likely to be?
DR. EXNER: I very much hope—certainly it will be in the course of
tomorrow morning; but shall we say until noon?
DR. GUSTAV STEINBAUER (Counsel for Defendant Seyss-Inquart): Mr.
President, as Counsel for Dr. Seyss-Inquart, I have to ask on behalf of
my client that he may be permitted to be absent from the session for 2
days, to prepare his defense.
THE PRESIDENT: Certainly.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 5 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH DAY
Wednesday, 5 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
THE MARSHAL: If it please the Tribunal, the report is made that
Defendant Seyss-Inquart is absent.
PROFESSOR DR. HERBERT KRAUS (Counsel for Defendant Schacht): Mr.
President, in agreement with the Prosecution I ask permission to submit
a memorandum by Hitler, concerning the Four Year Plan of 1936. It is a
certified copy, certified by a British officer in Dustbin Camp. I have
numbered it Exhibit Schacht-48. In the afternoon session of 1 May my
friend Dr. Dix referred to this memorandum, which could not at that time
be incorporated into the record. Dr. Schacht then quoted a few passages
from this memorandum. The President stated that we could submit the
memorandum at a later date on condition, of course, that the Prosecution
agreed. The Prosecution has acquiesced and I therefore trust that I may
now be permitted to submit it.
Furthermore I am handing in a number of English translations. I regret I
have not yet been able to have translations made in the other languages,
and I ask permission to supply those translations later on.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kraus, until the other translations are actually
made, the documents will not become part of the record.
DR. KRAUS: No. The English translations are available, and the others
are not yet ready. May I submit them later?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly. And they will then become part of the
record.
DR. KRAUS: Yes, as a supplement to the document book.
DR. EXNER: Generaloberst, you told us yesterday that you were the Chief
of the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war and that your main
task consisted in the preparation of military operational plans. That is
correct, is it not?
JODL: That is correct.
DR. EXNER: Then, where did you get the plans? Who decided what plans you
had to make?
JODL: It was the same as in any other military staff. The
Commander-in-Chief—in this case the Führer personally—received data
for the decisions to be made: maps, strength returns of both our own and
enemy forces, and information about the enemy. He then made his own
decisions, and thereupon I would set my general staff to work, giving
these decisions the military form necessary for the entire machinery of
the Wehrmacht.
DR. EXNER: Now, in the course of these tasks and studies you also had to
work on operations which were never actually carried out?
JODL: I have prepared a great number of such operations. Of the total
number of operations for which I prepared orders and instructions there
was only one which I definitely knew would be carried out; that was the
operation against Yugoslavia. In the case of all the other operational
plans, the decision as to whether it would be carried out or not
remained undecided for a long time.
As an example of operational plans which had been drafted in every
detail but which were never carried out, I mention the invasion of
England, the march into Spain, the seizure of Gibraltar, the seizure of
Malta, the capture of the Fischer Peninsula near Petsamo, and a winter
attack on Kandalakscha on the Murmansk Railway.
DR. EXNER: Then, did these tasks of yours cover all the theaters of the
war?
JODL: At the beginning of the war the work of my general staff did not
apply to theaters of war at all, but the Führer’s instructions went only
to the branches of the Wehrmacht—that is to the Army, the Navy and the
Air Force; and it was only in the Norwegian campaign that circumstances
developed for the first time so that the Armed Forces Operations Staff
was made responsible for a theater of war. And this condition changed
completely when in the beginning of 1942 the Führer himself assumed
supreme command in the Army. Kesselring has already been asked about
this, but did not answer. However, it stands to reason that the Führer,
as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, could not issue orders through
Jodl to himself in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and
then have them carried out through Generaloberst Zeitzler. Consequently
a separation came about. From that moment on he, with the General Staff
of the Army, directed the entire Eastern Front, while the Armed Forces
Operations Staff became responsible for the general staff work of all
the other theaters of war.
DR. EXNER: Now, the witness Field Marshal Paulus stated before the
Tribunal that the OKW was responsible for the order to hold Stalingrad;
and, as a matter of fact, both Keitel and Jodl have been repeatedly
accused by the foreign press of having given that disastrous order. Is
that true?
JODL: No, that is not true. The witness, for whom I feel the deepest
sympathy and with whom I have worked in the most comradely fashion
possible, could not have known anything at all about it. The facts are
as follows: The moment danger threatened, the decision that Stalingrad
must be held was made by the Führer during a private conversation with
Generaloberst Zeitzler and contrary to the latter’s advice. Zeitzler
told me so himself on his return from this interview. At a later stage,
when blizzards were already raging across the steppes of the Don, the
question of a break-through by the Stalingrad garrison was discussed
again. Field Marshal Keitel, Generaloberst Zeitzler, and I were present
on this occasion.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, I do not quite see how that is relevant,
although Field Marshal Paulus may have said something about it. I mean,
he may have given some evidence on the fighting at Stalingrad, and he
undoubtedly did; but I do not see how it bears upon the case before us,
or how it bears upon the case for Jodl.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, this has already settled the matter. It was
necessary to clear up Field Marshal Paulus’ error. But this has already
settled the matter.
[_Turning to the defendant._] We now come to the time when you were
recalled from Vienna to Berlin in 1939. What state of affairs did you
find in Berlin on your arrival?
JODL: I found a completely incomprehensible state of affairs in
Berlin—at least it was incomprehensible to me. Nobody knew what was
really true or what was bluff. The pact with Russia sustained all our
hopes for the preservation of peace, hopes which were immensely
increased and strengthened by the surprise cancellation of the attack
ordered for 26 August. None of the soldiers to whom I spoke expected a
war with the Western Powers at that time. Nothing had been prepared
except the operations for the attack on Poland.
There was only a defensive deployment of troops on the West Wall. The
forces stationed there were so weak that we could not even man all the
pillboxes. The actual efforts for the preservation of peace, however,
efforts I have heard about here from the Reich Marshal, the name of
Dahlerus—all these negotiations remained unknown to me insofar as they
were not published in the press. But there is one thing I can say in
conclusion. When the declaration of war was received from England and
France it was like a blow from a cudgel for us soldiers who had fought
in the first World War. And I heard in confidence from General
Stapf—today the matter is no longer confidential—that the Reich
Marshal reacted in exactly the same way.
DR. EXNER: Do you know when Poland mobilized?
JODL: That I cannot say. I only know that at the moment when I arrived
in Berlin and was being informed by General Von Stülpnagel for the very
first time about the situation and our own strength, a Polish deployment
was already in progress along the frontier, as well as the German one.
DR. EXNER: That in itself already answers the accusation brought against
you in the trial brief, namely “planning against Poland.”
Had you prepared a plan against Poland?
JODL: No. Not by a single stroke of the pen did I participate in the
preparations for the Polish war.
DR. EXNER: Then I am right in saying, to sum up, that when you left
Berlin there was not yet a plan of operations against Poland?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: And when you returned to Berlin the plan was ready?
JODL: Yes. The plan of attack was completely worked out.
DR. EXNER: Did you hear the Führer’s speech of 22 August 1939 which has
been so often quoted here?
JODL: No; on that day I was still in Vienna.
DR. EXNER: When did you hear of that speech?
JODL: For the first time here in Nuremberg.
DR. EXNER: Do you remember the meeting in the Führer’s special train on
9 September 1939, described here by General Lahousen? Can you remember
that?
JODL: Yes, I remember that meeting perfectly.
DR. EXNER: What was the subject of conversation during that meeting
while you were on the Führer’s train?
JODL: I met the Führer in the so-called command car, in the chartroom,
where Field Marshal Keitel, Canaris, and Lahousen were; and then Canaris
made a brief report on the information he had received from the West and
expressed the opinion that a French attack in the Saarbrücken sector was
imminent. The Führer contradicted this, and so did I. Apart from that
nothing else was discussed.
DR. EXNER: Then Lahousen’s statement is correct that you were only
present during that particular part of the discussion?
JODL: As far as I am concerned I have not a word of objection to raise
against Lahousen’s statement. Absolutely correct.
DR. EXNER: Frequent mention has been made during this Trial of the
artillery and air bombardment of Warsaw. Did you participate in the
giving of the orders for this?
JODL: Yes, I participated insofar as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
had applied to the Führer for permission for the artillery to bombard
Warsaw as soon as the deployment of artillery units had been completed.
The Führer refused this. He said, “What is happening here because of the
Poles is madness.” He ordered me to draft new leaflets—which I did
personally and immediately—and have them dropped again over the city of
Warsaw. It was only when this renewed demand to cease the hopeless
resistance had proved absolutely unsuccessful that he sanctioned
artillery bombardment and air attacks on the fortress of Warsaw—and I
emphasize the word “fortress.”
DR. EXNER: When issuing orders, did you have anything to do with the
co-ordination of German and Soviet Russian operations?
JODL: Yes. When we were still 3 days’ march away from the Vistula, I was
informed to my great surprise—by, I believe, the representative of the
Foreign Office—while I was entering the Führer’s headquarters, that
Soviet Russia would occupy the Polish territories...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, if it is convenient to you, I think you might
speak a little faster.
JODL: ...that the Polish territories east of an agreed demarcation line
would be occupied by Soviet Russian troops at the appointed time. When
we were approaching this agreed demarcation line, which was shown to me
on a map—the line was the East Prussian Lithuanian border, Narew,
Vistula, San—I telephoned to our military attaché in Moscow and
informed him that we could probably reach individual points of this
demarcation line in the course of the following day. Shortly afterwards
I was informed over the telephone that the Russian divisions were not
yet ready.
When, the day after the next, we reached the demarcation line and had to
cross it in pursuit of the Poles, I once again received news from
Moscow, at 0200 hours, that the Soviet Russian divisions would take up
their position along the entire front at 0400 hours. This maneuver was
punctually carried out, and I then drafted an order to our German troops
that wherever they had contacted the troops of the Soviet Union, and in
agreement with them, they were to withdraw behind the demarcation line.
DR. EXNER: Do you know on what day all this happened?
JODL: I cannot tell you exactly when the troops reached the line, but I
would say it was about 14 or 15 September.
DR. EXNER: We shall now deal with aggressive wars against the neutral
countries...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, now all that the defendant has just been
telling us seems to be to me a simple waste of our time, with absolutely
no relevance to this case at all; and why you let him do it, I do not
know.
DR. EXNER: You have been accused of having used your personal influence
and your close relations with the Führer to attack a whole series of
neutral countries. Tell me, is that true?
JODL: No, it is untrue. I remember that a witness here spoke of a
sinister influence, of a key position of a sinister kind—at any rate,
something sinister. But my influence on the Führer was unfortunately not
in the least as great as it might, or perhaps even ought to have been in
view of the position I held. The reason lay in the powerful personality
of this despot who never suffered advisers gladly.
DR. EXNER: When did you first hear of a plan for a possible occupation
of Norway?
JODL: The Führer first spoke to me—I think it was in mid-November
1939—at any rate, a fairly long time after Grossadmiral Raeder had
first spoken to him. At that first conference, which I believe took
place on 10 October, I had not yet heard of anything nor did the Führer
give me any information. But in the middle of November he spoke to me
about it. I first learned the details during the oral report made by the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, which took place on 12 November and at
which I was present.
DR. EXNER: In this connection I would draw your attention to Document
C-64, Exhibit GB-86, Page 46 of the document book. But I do not need to
read it aloud. Volume I, Page 46.
What was the Führer’s point of view?
JODL: The general attitude of the Führer at that time was—it is also
established in writing: “I am not at all interested in extending the
theaters of war, but if the danger of an occupation of Norway by England
really exists and if that is true, then the situation would be quite
different.”
DR. EXNER: Was anything ordered at that time?
JODL: Nothing was ordered at that time, but he merely instructed me to
think this problem over generally. The preliminary work, as has been
proved by documents, began on 27 January 1940.
DR. EXNER: That may be seen from Document C-63, Exhibit GB-87.
Were you at that time of the opinion that the assurance given by Hitler
in December and October 1939 that Norwegian neutrality would be
respected—were you of the opinion that this assurance was given for the
purpose of lulling Norway into a state of security, as has been alleged
by the Prosecution?
JODL: That allegation can be definitely refuted, and by means of a few
dates which I shall now enumerate. These assurances, these political
assurances, were given by the Führer—or by the Reich Government, I do
not know which—on 2 September and 6 October. On 9 October the Führer
read and signed the famous memorandum known as Document L-52. I do not
know whether the Tribunal is aware of the fact that it is a personal
memorandum by the Führer.
DR. EXNER: That is Document L-52, Exhibit USA-540. It is printed on Page
48, Volume I, of my document book.
In this memorandum—for whom was the memorandum prepared?
JODL: This memorandum, as I think is obvious from the document, went out
to the three Commanders-in-Chief and to the Chief of the High Command of
the Armed Forces. It was dictated word for word by the Führer himself
and was completed in 2 nights.
DR. EXNER: I shall read Paragraph 2, printed on Page 48 of my document
book:
“The Nordic States.
“Their neutrality, provided no completely unforeseen
circumstances arise, may be assumed also for the future. The
continuation of German trade with these countries appears
possible, even if the war is of long duration.”
JODL: It is quite out of the question that the Führer, in this extremely
secret memorandum, could have mentioned anything but his true purpose at
that particular time. That, however, is all the more comprehensible
since it was not until 1 day later, namely 10 October, that Grossadmiral
Raeder first mentioned these fears to the Führer.
DR. EXNER: Was the occupation of Norway a very weighty decision for the
leadership?
JODL: It was a terribly weighty decision. To put it shortly—it meant
gambling with the entire German fleet. The result of it was that we had
to defend a coastline of over 3,000 kilometers, and that meant that
nearly 300,000 men were lying idle there. The decision, therefore,
depended on really reliable information that Norway was threatened by
actual danger. That is the reason why no definite date was fixed for
this operation “Weserübung,” and the reason why I at a later date
suggested that the forces for the Norway operation, in case it became
necessary, and for an attack in the West, should be completely separate
from each other.
DR. EXNER: What were the reasons why the occupation had to be prepared
in every detail?
JODL: The reasons are quite openly and definitely stated in the order of
1 March 1940 which is Document C-174...
DR. EXNER: That is Exhibit GB-89.
JODL: Yes; we had to be prepared in any case.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that Document 174-PS, or what?
DR. EXNER: It is not printed in my document book. It refers to a
document which the British Prosecution has submitted under Exhibit
GB-89.
THE PRESIDENT: But 174 must mean something, must it not? The document
said Document 174.
DR. EXNER: Document C-174.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is C-174.
THE PRESIDENT: C-174. Very well.
MR. ROBERTS: And it was put in by Mr. Elwyn Jones, in Document Book 3.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Now, you say in your diary that the Führer was searching for
a justification. The meaning has already been explained here; but you
yourself should know best what the meaning is, since you wrote it
yourself. What does it mean?
JODL: The Führer said in those days, when I wrote it—not in a diary,
but in my notebook, my memorandum book—he said: “To carry out a
decision of this kind I need absolutely reliable information with which
I can really justify this decision before the world and prove that it
was necessary. I cannot tell, I only heard the following from Herr
Quisling...” And for this reason he kept the Intelligence Service in
particular very busy at this time, in order to get even more precise
information for the Führer about these many reports which we received...
DR. EXNER: Now, Grossadmiral Raeder has explained the facts from which
England’s plans could be deduced. Have you anything to add to that, or
is the question settled?
JODL: On the whole, Grossadmiral Raeder has already submitted all the
information. There is one thing which remains in my memory and which is
also written in my notebook. That is the special insistence, quite
openly advocated in the French press, that under all circumstances
Germany must be cut off from the Swedish ore supplies. Then came the
mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters; and then came the _Altmark_
case which, according to my study of international law, was a flagrant
breach of the agreement ruling the rights and duties of neutral states
in naval warfare, and Articles 1 and 2...
DR. EXNER: Regarding the first two points which the witness has
mentioned, I should like to draw attention to Document 1809-PS—that is,
his diary, Exhibit GB-88, Page 53 of Volume I of my collection. There is
an entry on 10 March:
“The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations is very
gratifying from a political point of view. The French press is
furious about it, because it considers it necessary to cut
Germany off from Swedish ore.”
And then the entry of 25 March:
“The English have begun to molest or to fire on our merchantmen
in Danish and Norwegian territorial waters.”
Now, please tell us what gave rise to the decision to attack?
JODL: The Führer’s final decision was made on 2 April and was made on
the basis of two pieces of information. First, the reports from the Navy
regarding repeated firing on German merchant ships both in Norwegian and
Danish territorial waters. Second, a report from Canaris that British
troops and transports were lying in a state of readiness in the northern
part of the English east coast.
DR. EXNER: What would have been the consequences for us if England had
got there first?
JODL: As to that I can refer to Grossadmiral Raeder’s testimony, and can
only say that once Norway was in British hands the war would have been
half lost for us. We would have been strategically encircled on the
northern flank and because of the weakness of our fleet we would have
been incapable of ever rectifying this again.
DR. EXNER: Was indisputable proof found later that the British plan
really existed?
JODL: We captured the entire records of the British brigade which landed
in Namsos and in other places. We surprised and captured the British war
correspondent Romilly in Narvik, where he expected anything rather than
the arrival of German ships, otherwise he could have escaped capture. To
the question what he wanted to report about the war in peaceful Narvik
he could not give us any information at all.
Later on we captured all the records of the French General Staff, a part
of which have already been presented by Admiral Raeder’s counsel.
Particularly instructive, and of great interest to me, were the diaries
carried by the English officers and some of the noncommissioned officers
whom we captured in Norway. At least they proved one thing, namely, that
all these troops had already been embarked and had been put ashore again
the moment our German fleet advanced towards Norway.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer again to two entries in the diary,
Page 54, Volume I of my document book, the entry of 24 April and the
entry of 26 April. There it says:
“Major Soltmann reports on the interrogation of the Englishmen
and submits additional important documents, among them the
secret Army list. At noon the first prisoners arrived in Berlin.
They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks and
confirm the authenticity of the orders. All the material is
being handed over to the Foreign Office.”
In conclusion, I also draw your attention again to Soltmann’s
interrogatory. It is Document AJ, Number 4, Exhibit Jodl-57, which I now
present; Page 173 of Volume II. I need not read it aloud; I merely draw
your attention to Soltmann’s answers to questions 4 and 5.
Now, one last question about this Norwegian affair. The English
representative of the Prosecution has said that this shows how honorable
the soldiers were who attacked Norway and then made use of lies and
excuses. What do you say about this?
JODL: The Prosecution has thereby placed a purely operational problem on
the level of soldierly or human honor. Until now that has never been the
custom in this world. I can only say that I neither attacked Norwegians,
nor did I resort to lies or excuses. But I did use all my strength to
contribute to the success of an operation which I considered absolutely
necessary in order to forestall a similar action on the part of the
English. If the seals of the archives are ever broken, the rightness of
my attitude will then be clearly shown. But even if it were wrong, the
honesty of my own subjective opinion at that time cannot for that reason
be changed in any way.
DR. EXNER: We will now talk about the war in the West. After the end of
the Polish campaign, was there already an operational plan for attacks
in the West?
JODL: No. To begin with, there was no plan of attack in the West; but,
on the contrary, there was, particularly in the Army, a widespread
opinion that the war would die a natural death if only we kept quiet in
the West. That went so far that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army
transformed even mobile infantry divisions into fortress divisions, and
took away all their mobile equipment from them.
DR. EXNER: Did you already know during the Polish campaign what the
Führer’s intentions were concerning the West?
JODL: The Führer himself had his doubts during the Polish campaign. He
too could find no plausible explanation for the complete inactivity of
the French and English forces in France, who only staged a kind of a
sham war with the help of their war communiqués. In reality not a single
shot was fired at the front. But by the end of September, if I remember
rightly, the Führer did realize that once England enters a war she
fights it out to the bitter end.
DR. EXNER: As an officer of the General Staff you should be able to
answer the following questions better than anybody else. Could we, from
a purely strategical viewpoint, have remained purely on the defensive as
far as the West was concerned?
JODL: I shall be very brief since such problems are not directly
connected with the Trial. I will only say that it would have been the
greatest possible error of strategy, because the superiority we
possessed at that time would necessarily have diminished in proportion
to our delay in making aggressive use of it; for England was continually
bringing further divisions over to France, just as the French were from
their colonial empire.