THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he
not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories,
which the Prosecution do not object to?
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President,
I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these
witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on
the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted
to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for
cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not
involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories
will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the
cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further
application, you can always do so.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it,
that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the
Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so
far, been the ruling of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit
is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any
general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought
here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the
matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that
there should be cross-interrogatories.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this
testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the
contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three
interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that
the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I
suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it
says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for
cross-examination?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion
is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would
save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the
questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann,
and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief
statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion?
General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring
to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this
regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government
reports are evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that
that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General
Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave
particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not
witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a
psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any
value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is
made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn
carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned
by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same
staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed
there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a
pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot
eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With
reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not
mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have
now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the
deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a
witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be
proved by hearing him.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German
commission?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained
from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been
carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he
was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military
commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part
in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I
know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a
regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument.
Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should
stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well
then, we will consider that.
Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in
answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent
the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach.
As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to
the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who
made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points
on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a
witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to
determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be
important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then
to decide whether to admit it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want
to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General
Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing
to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application
to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also
withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was
to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been
decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to
Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no
objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear
argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the
Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech
through the earphones.
DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when
Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you
felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.
JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern.
When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the
Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with
Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so
overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will
could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in
taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler.
When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the
command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish
Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with
him.
DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war?
JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war.
DR. EXNER: Did the Führer have confidence in you?
JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust
of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time
he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have
a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial
Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.”
The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the
end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then
his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the
great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and
unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved
and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943
had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp
altercations.
DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his
political intentions?
JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of
course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political
plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for
politics is part of strategy.
DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between
himself and you?
JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for
us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported
to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for
party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such
nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious
that generals do not understand politics.”
It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any
political discussions was slight.
DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly
separate?
JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or
not?
JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the
circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with
doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if
things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous
decision, all discussion came to an end.
DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed
here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?
JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this
Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning
of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war,
and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the
extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the
politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and
to the SS differently again.
The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in
the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a
masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked
photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about
the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and
Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly
humane establishments.
DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Führer’s headquarters from the
outside?
JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a
concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire
surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to
safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1.
Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my
staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each
officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only
very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of
holies.
DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports?
JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated
American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on
new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the
headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of
military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the
present situation were forbidden.
DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Führer take place?
JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on
the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I
took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000
conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the
military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the
basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what
orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an
adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and
orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation
were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval.
Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks?
JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did
not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the
situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a
similar manner.
DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of
the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a
political nature?
JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were
discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military
measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came
together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were
discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct
of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with
foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign
Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the
organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories,
for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to
take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I
really needed the time I then had left for my own work.
DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to
contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?
JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer.
Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were
moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections
I induced the Führer to desist from many things.
DR. EXNER: Can you give an example?
JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not
interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there
was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention.
I prevented that because I objected.
DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler?
JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something
which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was
still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of
passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a
psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again.
This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the
case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch
justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered
that himself.
The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said
that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.”
Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any
other way?
JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for
the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do?
JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In
view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was
particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents.
If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was
not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer
atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by
the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to
know about it?
On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the
Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give
examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He
testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General
Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed
by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten
minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately
ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the
American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American
prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an
investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the
result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi
company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer
immediately.
DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary
Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second
document book:
“The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company
because of atrocities committed against the civilian population
in Eastern Bosnia.”
I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi
company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on
the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police
arrested this Ustashi company.
“The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried
out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it
undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole
Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful
effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the
population caused by the atrocities.”
Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Have you another example?
JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy
violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be
certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases
of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be
quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this
respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back?
JODL: Unfortunately not.
DR. EXNER: I do not understand.
JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through
which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual
and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s
department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at
the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the
Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer
answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is
that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities,
but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to
the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous
attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which
brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A
tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had
been in a position to hold the Führer back.
DR. EXNER: What role did Canaris play in this connection?
JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to
him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far
more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational
conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to
me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of
terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with
Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that
they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators.
DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and
intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything
about such plans?
JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or
about any intentions to carry out a Putsch.
DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have
considered a revolt possible or promising?
JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands.
That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The
results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are
well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July
1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense
of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one
soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All
the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To
overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a
mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had
been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass
of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not
simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke.
But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and
at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything
positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived
in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German
officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers
struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary
deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year
1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power,
who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance
to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded
revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the
man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked.
DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler?
You have already intimated something in that connection.
JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief
answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting
moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a
martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it
was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to
be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing.
Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the
face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their
breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I
myself belonged.
DR. EXNER: Give us an example of such a crisis in your relations with
Hitler.
JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended
Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my
operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court.
Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any
human being. From that day on he never came to dinner.
DR. EXNER: To your mess?
JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The
report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the
Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an
SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and
from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake
hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This
situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field
Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be
replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from
the OKW?
JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to
see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with
the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing
happened.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces
of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of
that is true?
JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual
truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.
DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military
career. How about that?
JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I
was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general
in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was
appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of
lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger
general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the
Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said
to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly
before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to
general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am,
became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my
subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30.
DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of
the Führer, that is with regard to—
Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler?
JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January
1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the
only decoration I received from the Führer.
DR. EXNER: In the entire 5½ years of war?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the
Party?
JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the
fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the
Führer each Christmas.
DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by
us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?
JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to
the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied
territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and
I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer.
DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst.
How did you invest this money?
JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds...
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet
been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and
therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in
detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very
fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly
influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly?
What were the things you disliked?
JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and
his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in
every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent
logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination,
which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often
went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by
his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for
at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the
Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his
mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had
to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not
interested in that.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have
heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of
Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of
any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he
not get on with his own case?
DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Führer personally?
JODL: No; in no way at all.
DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official?
JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and
he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that
therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.
DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle?
JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its
developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries,
his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.
DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove
that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his
enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?
JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered
it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of
lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...
DR. EXNER: When was this speech?
JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was
the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally
necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely
unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same
time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme
leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation
of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could
obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an
officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver
this speech.
DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech?
JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of
the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the
introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay
behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the
strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the
operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify
myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a
General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it
was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The
question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there
were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I
shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover,
it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one
says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I
delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to
the senior officers of the reserve army.
DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of
the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that
in a purely objective military speech?
JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a
critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It
was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party
leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the
speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for
victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which
the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172...
DR. EXNER: Is that the Gauleiter speech?
JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech
which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket”
version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely
revised and altered because it contained many things which were not
important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about
the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means
at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things
contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech
which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these
notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff.
DR. EXNER: Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
JODL: It is in no way the manuscript; that looks entirely different.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the
Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until
the outbreak of the war?
JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was
with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed.
DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before
1939, or before the beginning of the war?
JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal,
Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one
else.
DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the
literature of National Socialism?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in Reich Party rallies?
JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last
3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht
were reviewed.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is,
every year on 9 November?
JODL: No. I really did not belong there.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the
semimilitary units of the Party?
JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after
the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete
power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch.
That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the
Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real
revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in
June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the
Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of
the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an
extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never
reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the
country.
DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your
diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the
document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned
himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19
April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there
is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief
of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning
development of the SS.”
In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of
course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings
concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands
for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this
correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that
I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French
document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this
connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this
large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression,
especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the
chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant
figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must
emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of
documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which
we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found
quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions.
You are making some long statements now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3
February, on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long
statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that
sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it;
but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the
translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations
now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring
to 3 February...
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or
misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if
necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts
from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing
further to say about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It says, on 3 February:
“General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry
of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of
Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all
means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the
wall in its present weak state.”
Then it says under the date of 10 February:
“Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the
Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.”
Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the
document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry
of 25 May 1940:
“The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally
suspicious.”
Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this
dualism that you just mentioned?
JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about
this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite
openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.
DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more
influence in military spheres?
JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the
feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of
the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an
inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he
believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods.
DR. EXNER: And what practical results came about through this?
JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied
tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the
operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police
Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the
SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than
before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and,
in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization.
DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by
the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau.
Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen?
JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and
I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all
the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary,
Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2
February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February
1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy:
“The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the
battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von
Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he
is in favor of Von Brauchitsch.
DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the
generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed?
JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as
Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have
subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau.
DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against
the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There
is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your
participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of
the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and
you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which
the Prosecution has accused you...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number
USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a
set of notes on a report.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all:
What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the
treatment of commissars?
JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned
with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time.
But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field
Marshal Keitel.
DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation
against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action
as retaliation.”
What do you mean by this statement?
JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was
rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place
about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance
ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand
that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they
follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to
Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still
circumvent this order which had been demanded.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this
order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military
authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war.
These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to
brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that?
JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to
Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the
commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and
gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism
for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that
we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of
what had been written in the literature of the entire world about
Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example,
the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that
first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would
actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions
were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I
meant by my notation in the margin.
DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the
war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war;
and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be
considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the
enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to
brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht
auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as...
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in
the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several
minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to
what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission,
that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner,
and I would ask him not to make another one now.
DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of
evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those
words.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when
counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of
the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is
perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by
his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the
question, and not to suggest the answer to him.
DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was
summarizing the main points of what the witness said.
There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to
overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man
zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best
therefore to brand” in English, and in French as _stigmatiser_. It seems
to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should
say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say
_traiter_.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Then what happened?
JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.”
The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has
been said that that was a typical military expression used by the
Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the
Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe
we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in
a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to
the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance,
“in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers
“aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to
arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.”
DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning
indicating deception?
JODL: No.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until 4 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH DAY
Tuesday, 4 June 1946
_Morning Session_
[_The Defendant Jodl resumed the stand._]
DR. EXNER: General, yesterday afternoon we started dealing with war
crimes, but today I should like first of all to put a few preliminary
questions to you. What position and what tasks were yours during the
period of the war?
JODL: I had to deal with the entire general staff work concerning the
strategic operational conduct of the war. Then, subordinate to me was
the military propaganda department, whose duty it was to co-operate with
the press; and thirdly, I was head of an office which, speaking broadly,
had to distribute means of communication to the various branches of the
Wehrmacht. The whole of this sphere of work took up my time to such an
extent that as a rule I worked night after night, until 3 o’clock in the
morning. I had no time at all to concern myself with other things. I
already had to delegate to my personal adjutant almost all my work with
the press, which had to receive daily information.
DR. EXNER: These tasks, which you have just named, were all tasks
connected with your office, and that was the Armed Forces Operations
Staff, of which you were chief, is that not so?
JODL: Yes, of which I was chief.
DR. EXNER: And one department of the Operations Staff, the main and most
important one, was the operations department?
JODL: Yes, operations.
DR. EXNER: And most of your tasks were concerned with this department.
The Prosecution say you were Chief of Staff to Field Marshal Keitel. Do
you agree?
JODL: That is not correct as has already been shown by the organization
which was explained here during Field Marshal Keitel’s case. There is a
great difference. As Chief of Staff, I would have been Field Marshal
Keitel’s assistant, concerned with all of his duties. I was, however,
only the chief of one of the many departments subordinate to Field
Marshal Keitel.
Beginning with the year 1941 it became the practice for me and my
operational branch to report to the Führer direct on all matters
concerned with strategics, while Field Marshal Keitel, using my
quartermaster department as a sort of personal working staff, took over
all other tasks.
DR. EXNER: Did you, as Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, have
authority to issue orders?
JODL: No—or rather only through my working staff. I was subordinate to
Field Marshal Keitel, and even Keitel himself was not a commander but
only the chief of a staff. But in the course of this war I naturally
decided many operational details myself and signed them myself. There
was no disagreement of any sort in these matters with the
commanders-in-chief for I had their confidence, and I worked on the best
possible terms with them.
DR. EXNER: For someone on the outside it is not quite easy to understand
that even though you had no authority to issue orders, so many orders
have been submitted here which were, in fact, signed by you, and signed
in different ways—sometimes with your full name, sometimes with a “J,”
the first letter of your name. Please explain these differences.
JODL: One must differentiate as follows: The decrees which the Führer
himself signed, if they were of an operational nature, bear my initial
at the end, on the lower right; and that means that I at least assisted
in the formulation of that order. Then there were orders which also came
from the Führer, though they were not signed by him personally, but were
signed “by order, Jodl”; but they always had at the beginning the
sentence, “The Führer has decreed,” or that sentence was found somewhere
in the course of the order. There would be a preamble, usually giving
reasons for the order, and then, it would read: “The Führer has
therefore decreed.”
DR. EXNER: And what was the difference between these two groups of
orders? Why was one group of orders signed by the Führer, and the other
only by you?
JODL: The difference was merely that the orders signed by me were of
less importance.
DR. EXNER: Now, there were other orders which did not begin with “The
Führer has decreed,” but were signed by you nevertheless. What about
these?
JODL: These orders were as a rule signed: “The Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces, by order, Jodl.” These were orders which emanated
from me, that is, I or my staff formulated them. The Führer himself and
Field Marshal Keitel had perhaps been informed of these orders, but not
in every case.
Then there were other orders, which bear my initial on the first page,
in the upper right-hand corner. Those were orders issued by other
departments. My initial “J” on the first page was merely an office
notation to show that the order had been submitted to me. But it did not
mean that I had read it for if, on perusing the first page, I saw that
the decree dealt with a matter not connected with my sphere of work,
then I initialed it and put it aside, because I had to save time.
DR. EXNER: Now, there is another large volume of documents, of which
some are being used as very incriminating evidence against you; they are
not orders but summarized notes. Can you comment on these?
JODL: These summarized notes were an arrangement used on higher staff
levels for the convenience of people who had not time to study enormous
files. The summarized notes contained, in a short condensed form, a
description of some matter or other, frequently the views taken by other
departments and sometimes even a proposal. The important point, however,
is that it was not an order; it was not a draft of an order, but it
formed the basis for an order.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps the situation will best be clarified if you can
explain this to the Tribunal in connection with the draft notes
concerning the commissars, which were touched on yesterday. It is
884-PS, Exhibit USSR-351; Volume II of my document book, Page 152.
Before you start I should like to call the attention of the Tribunal to
an error in the translation. On Page 152, under Figure I, it says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding
political officials _et cetera_ ... regarding commissars...”
The English translation says: “The Army High Command presents a
statement...”; but it is a draft. And I cannot quite follow the French;
it says: _Confirmation des instructions_. It should obviously be
_projet_.
In any case the German original says:
“The OKH has presented a draft for instructions regarding
treatment of political officials _et cetera_, for the uniform
application of the order issued on 31 March 1941.”
And these are the commissars. The whole of this is a condensed draft.
Will you please explain what it means?
JODL: This document is a typical example. First of all it contains the
draft by another department of the Army High Command, not verbatim, but
in a brief, condensed form. Then, secondly, under Figure II, on Page
153, the views of another department—that of Reichsleiter
Rosenberg’s—are set forth. Then, under Figure III, it contains a
proposal of my own staff.
The whole matter, therefore, is far from being an order; it is to become
one. And on a summarized draft like that, I naturally made very many, I
might say, cursory marginal notes to serve as a guide for the further
treatment and discussion or disposal of the whole question. Therefore
one cannot apply to this the same criteria as would be applied to the
well-considered words contained in an actual order.
DR. EXNER: All right. So much for the summarized draft and your notes.
Now we turn to the very delicate topic of the Commando Order. This
matter has been dealt with here on various occasions; and indeed, it
goes beyond this Court in its importance and its repercussions, as we
know from the newspapers.
I should like to hear from you something about the factors that led to
this order. This order is Document 498-PS, Exhibit Number USA-501. I do
not have it in my document book, but I asked the General Secretary to
have it put at the disposal of the Tribunal in the various languages. I
hope this has been done.
Then there is an explanatory decree in addition to the main order; both
are signed by the Führer. That is Document 503-PS, Exhibit Number
USA-542.
MR. ROBERTS: It is 498-PS. It is in the Keitel and Jodl Document Book,
Number 7, Page 64.
DR. EXNER: The first order is addressed to the troops; the second is an
explanatory order addressed to the commanders-in-chief. The first order
threatens enemy soldiers with death if they engage in bandit-like
warfare; and it refers to the Wehrmacht communiqué in this connection.
Can you first explain the connection between the Commando Order and the
Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October ’42?
JODL: May I ask the Tribunal to permit me, as an exception, to go into
greater detail. Very much depends on this order; not my person, my own
person does not matter in this Trial, but the honor of German soldiers
and German officers whom I represent here is in question.
The Commando Order is inseparably linked with the announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942, for this announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué heralded the actual Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: And who was responsible for this announcement in the
Wehrmacht communiqué? Who wrote it?
JODL: This Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942—it was really a
supplement to the communiqué—emanated in the main from me. It deals
with the denial of a report by the British Ministry of War, a matter
which I will not discuss further, for it is a very delicate point. The
Prosecution especially does not wish it to be brought up.
DR. EXNER: But this supplement...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, we do not know—at least I have not seen the
document of 7 October 1942, and the Prosecution has made no objection to
any answer to any English documents as far as we know.
DR. EXNER: I wished to submit this document but objections were raised.
THE PRESIDENT: What does the defendant mean by saying that the
Prosecution does not wish him to present it or to answer it?
DR. EXNER: He probably refers to the fact that we were not allowed to
present this Wehrmacht communiqué; but he can give us the contents of it
briefly.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it may be a question of translation, but if he
means simply that no evidence has been given by the Prosecution on the
subject, of course, there is no objection to his saying that; but when
he says that the Prosecution does not want him to put forward or does
not want him to answer the document, that is a most improper statement
to make.
DR. EXNER: Yes, I understand.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Perhaps you can tell us briefly the
contents of this Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942. I believe you
have it in your own document book.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but, Dr. Exner, that is not quite what I mean. What
the defendant has said was that the Prosecution does not want him to
deal with this subject.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: Now, if that is the remark that is made, that is an
improper remark to make. The Prosecution have no communication with the
Defense upon this subject, presumably, except that they have put it
forward in the evidence in this case.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] Did you understand? You must
not say that you are not allowed to touch upon this subject. Perhaps you
will give us an explanation of what you meant?
JODL: This communiqué is in direct connection with the Commando Order.
Only the last paragraph of this Wehrmacht communiqué is important. It
was written by the Führer himself, as Field Marshal Keitel has already
stated, and Professor Jahrreiss read it here before the Tribunal. It is
the sentence which reads:
“...in future all terror and sabotage troops of the British and
their accomplices who do not act like soldiers but like bandits
will be treated as such by the German troops and will be
ruthlessly eliminated in battle wherever they appear.”
This sentence was written, word for word, by the Führer himself.
DR. EXNER: And then you were instructed to issue a detailed order to
that effect...
THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. Wait a minute.
Defendant, what the Tribunal wants to know is this: You said that the
Commando Order appeared originally in a Wehrmacht report of the 7th of
October 1942 which, in the main, emanated from you, and that that report
refuted an English statement by the Ministry of War which the
Prosecution did not want you to deal with. What do you mean by that?
JODL: By that I meant that my defense counsel intended to submit the
entire Wehrmacht communiqué of 7 October 1942 as a document in evidence.
But he refrained from doing so when the Prosecution objected to the
document.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I have certainly never objected to this
document. I have asked Mr. Roberts and he tells me that he has never
objected to it; and, as far as we know, no one on behalf of the
Prosecution has ever objected to it. I certainly have no objection to it
at all myself; as a member of the English Government at the time when
this matter was issued, I have never heard anything about it before; but
I have no objection to it at all.
DR. EXNER: May I say something?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
DR. EXNER: If there has been a misunderstanding here, we shall be all
the more pleased, and we shall submit this Wehrmacht communiqué either
this afternoon or tomorrow.
I should like to clarify one point regarding the question which Mr.
President put to the defendant. The defendant said that the Wehrmacht
communiqué, in the main, emanated from him, but that the Führer wrote
the supplementary sentence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, if you want to correct anything that I have
said you must do it through the witness and not through yourself. You
are not entitled to give evidence. You only give evidence through the
witness.
DR. EXNER: Yes.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please, state once more which part of the
Wehrmacht communiqué you wrote and which part was added by the Führer.
JODL: The entire first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué has nothing
whatever to do with Commando troops, but is concerned with the
well-known affair of the shackling of German prisoners of war on the
beach of Dieppe. I shall refer to that again later.
THE PRESIDENT: You mean that I was correct in saying that in the main it
emanated from you?
JODL: Yes, absolutely. The first part of this Wehrmacht communiqué was
formulated by me and contains an authentic refutation of a statement of
the British Ministry of War broadcast by the British radio.
This statement of the British Ministry of War was false, and I
established the reasons why it was false on the basis of records,
photographs, and affidavits which we possessed. Initially this affair
had nothing to do with Commandos and reprisals. That was only introduced
into the Wehrmacht communiqué through the supplement by the Führer,
which begins with the sentence: “The High Command of the Wehrmacht is
therefore compelled to decree the following.”
DR. EXNER: And it was considered necessary to make this announcement
known in the Wehrmacht communiqué in an executive order. Did the Führer
demand from you drafts for an executive order?
JODL: When the Führer had written this last supplementary sentence, he
turned to Field Marshal Keitel and to me and demanded an executive order
to follow this general announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué. And he
added: “But I do not want any military courts.”
DR. EXNER: Did you make a draft?
JODL: I had very many doubts which a careful study of the Hague rules of
warfare could not dispel. Neither Field Marshal Keitel nor I prepared
such a draft; but members of my staff, on their own initiative, asked
for drafts and for the views of various departments. Thus Document
1263-PS came into being, to which I shall return later.
THE PRESIDENT: That is Document 1263-PS?
DR. EXNER: 1263. It is Page 104, Volume II of my document book, 1263-PS,
RF-365; but we shall deal with that later.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say Page 204?
DR. EXNER: No, Page 104, Volume II.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Please continue.
JODL: My wish was an entirely different one. It was my intention to
avoid an order altogether, and I rather expected that as a result of the
announcement in the Wehrmacht communiqué—an announcement which was
certainly not kept secret but which was broadcast over the air to the
entire world—the British Ministry of War would approach us again,
either directly or via Geneva, as it had done on several previous
occasions. And I hoped that in this way the whole matter would be
shifted to the sphere of the Foreign Office. However, that did not
happen. The British War Ministry remained silent.
In the meantime 10 days had passed and nothing had been done. Then on 17
October General Schmundt, the Chief Adjutant of the Führer, came to me
and said that the Führer was demanding an executive order. I gave him
the following answer, word for word:
“Please give him my best regards, but I will not issue an order
like that.” Schmundt laughed and said, “Well, I cannot tell him
that,” and my reply was, “Very well, then, tell the Führer that
I do not see how a decree like that could be justified under
international law.”
And with that he left. I hoped now that I would be asked to come to the
Führer, so that at last, after many months, I should again be able to
speak to him personally.
DR. EXNER: And this coincided with the Vinnitza crisis?
JODL: Yes. I wanted an opportunity either of telling him my misgivings
or else being thrown out altogether. Either eventuality would have
helped me but neither occurred. A few minutes later Schmundt called me
on the telephone and informed me that the Führer was going to draw up
the orders himself. On 18 October Schmundt again came in person and
brought with him these two orders of the Führer—the order to the
troops, and an explanation for the commanders.
THE PRESIDENT: Are you referring to two documents which are before us?
JODL: These are the two documents, 498-PS and 503-PS. The papers
submitted to the Tribunal as documents are not the originals of the
Führer; I personally handed over the originals at Flensburg. The
documents which are in the hands of the Tribunal are copies of the
originals, or mimeographed copies of my staff.
DR. EXNER: Now, I should like to interpolate a question. You mentioned
that your staff worked out something in detail, and you referred to
1263-PS, which has been submitted to the Tribunal—Page 104 of Volume
II. In this document you wrote two remarks on Page 106. The first remark
on that page is “No.” In the French translation this non is missing, and
should be added. On the same page a little further down, it says in your
own handwriting, “That will not do either,” and your initial “J” for
Jodl.
Can you explain in general what this means?
JODL: As I have already said, the members of my staff—as may be seen
under the first figure on Page 104—on their own initiative asked for
proposals, firstly, from the foreign intelligence department, Canaris,
because he had a group of experts on international law and, secondly,
from the Wehrmacht legal department, since, after all, we were concerned
with a legal problem.
On Page 106, under paragraph “a,” there is the proposal which the
foreign division of the intelligence department made:
“Members of terrorist and sabotage troops who are found ...
without uniform, or in German uniform, will be treated as
bandits ... or if they fall into German hands outside battle
operations, they are to be taken at once to an officer for
interrogation. Thereafter they are to be dealt with by summary
court martial.”
That was quite impossible, for if one came across a soldier in civilian
clothing, without uniform, no one could know just who he was. He might
be a spy or an escaped prisoner-of-war or an enemy airman who had saved
his life by jumping from his plane and now hoped to escape in civilian
clothing. That had to be determined by an experienced interrogating
officer and not by a summary court martial consisting of a lieutenant,
two noncommissioned officers, and two soldiers. In paragraph “b”...
DR. EXNER: And for that reason you wrote “No”?
JODL: For that reason I wrote “No.”
In paragraph “b” it was suggested that if such sabotage groups were
captured wearing uniforms, a report should be made to the Armed Forces
Operations Staff, which should then decide what should be done. But in
that case the Armed Forces Operations Staff would have assumed the
function of a military court, and that it could never be.
I really must claim for myself that, thanks to my wider experience, I
saw these problems a little more clearly than some of my subordinates.
DR. EXNER: And so you rejected this proposal. You said that you also had
grave misgivings about the Führer Order. Will you tell the Court now
what misgivings you had?
JODL: First of all I had a number of doubts as to its legality.
Secondly, the order was ambiguous, and also it was not sufficiently
clear for practical application. Particularly in this case I considered
military courts absolutely necessary. I know well that even judges may
on occasion, consciously or not, be under coercion and may pass judgment
not strictly in accordance with the law; but at least they provide some
safeguard against a miscarriage of justice.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, if I understand you rightly, you wanted to install
some legal procedure. What did you mean by unclear and ambiguous?
JODL: The theory was that soldiers, who by their actions put themselves
outside the laws of war, cannot claim to be treated in accordance with
the laws of war. This is a basic principle definitely recognized in
international law, for instance in the case of a spy or a
_franc-tireur_.
The aim of this order was to intimidate British Commando troops who were
using such methods of warfare. But the order of the Führer went further
and said that all Commando troops were to be massacred. This was the
point on which I had grave misgivings.
DR. EXNER: What legal doubts did you have?
JODL: Just this doubt—that on the basis of this order, soldiers also
would be massacred...
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, it is not necessary to speak so slowly, if you
can speak a little bit more fast.
JODL: I was afraid that not only enemy soldiers who, to use the Führer’s
expression, really behaved like bandits, but also decent enemy soldiers,
would be wiped out. In addition—and this was especially repugnant to
me—at the very end of Document 503-PS it was ordered that soldiers were
to be shot after they had been captured and had been interrogated. What
was totally unclear to me was the general legal position, namely,
whether a soldier who had acted like a bandit would upon capture enjoy
the legal status of a prisoner-of-war, or whether on account of his
earlier behavior he had already placed himself outside this legal
status.
DR. EXNER: By that you mean the Geneva Convention?
JODL: Yes, I mean the Geneva Convention.
DR. EXNER: Could you understand the idea that enemy soldiers who had
acted in an unsoldierly manner should not be treated as soldiers?
JODL: Yes, I could quite understand that, and so could others, for the
Führer had received very bitter reports. We had captured all the orders
of the Canadian brigade which had landed at Dieppe, and these orders
were put before me in the original. These orders said that, wherever
possible, German prisoners were to have their hands shackled. But after
some time, through the Commander, West, I received authentic reports and
testimony of witnesses, with photographs, which definitely convinced me
that numerous men of the Todt Organization, fathers of families,
unarmed, old people, who were wearing an arm band with a swastika—that
was their badge—had been shackled with a loop around their necks and
the end of the rope fastened around their bent-back legs in such a way
that they had strangled themselves.
I may add that I kept these photographs from the Führer, and I did not
tell him of these aggravating incidents which to me had been proved. I
concealed them from the German people and from the Propaganda Ministry.
Then came the English radio report denying emphatically that any German
soldier had been shackled at Dieppe.
Some time later, a Commando troop made an attack on the island of
Saercq. Again we received official reports that German prisoners had
been shackled.
Finally we captured the so-called British order for close combat. That
was the last straw for the Führer; I also studied it very carefully.
These close-combat instructions showed by pictures how men could be
shackled in such a way that they would strangle themselves through the
shackling, and it was stated exactly within what time death would occur.
DR. EXNER: Therefore, the reasons which Hitler gave for his Order 498
were actually based on reliably reported facts. I remark that Hitler
referred to prisoners who had been shackled, prisoners who had been
killed, and that criminals, as Commandos...
THE PRESIDENT: You are paraphrasing the evidence in a way that is
inaccurate, because the defendant has just said that he kept these
things from Hitler. You are now saying that Hitler knew about them. That
is not what the witness said.
DR. EXNER: Then, I must ask you whether the facts upon which this order
is based were reported to you.
JODL: I believe the Tribunal has Document 498-PS. In it the Führer first
makes the general statement that for some time our opponents in their
conduct of the war have been using methods which violate the
international Geneva Convention. I must support this statement as true
on the basis of reports which, regrettably, we had been receiving since
the summer of 1941. I do not wish to go into individual cases. There was
an outrageous incident with a British U-boat in the Aegean Sea. There
was the order in North Africa that German prisoners of war should not be
given water before they were interrogated. There were a large number of
such reports.
THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, the Tribunal thinks that it is very difficult
to go into individual incidents which occurred long before this order
was drafted, and you have told us what you said the order was drafted in
respect of, namely the shackling; and you are now referring to other
things which you allege happened long before that. It does not seem that
it is possible for the Tribunal to investigate all those matters which
happened long before.
JODL: And I do not want to speak about these matters any longer. I only
want to point out, as I think I must, that generally speaking the
reasons given by the Führer for this order did not spring from a
diseased imagination but were based on actual proof in his and in our
possession. For it is certainly very different whether I, in my own
mind, had to admit there was some justification for this order or
whether I considered the whole order an open scandal. That is a vital
point for my own conduct. But I shall try to be very brief. The fact
that many previously convicted persons and criminals were included in
the Commandos, who were of course reckless people, was proved by the
testimony of prisoners; and the fact that prisoners were shackled was
obvious from captured orders and the testimony of witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: You have told us that already. We have heard that more
than once—that you had evidence before you that prisoners were shackled
and that you had the Canadian orders before you.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can just say a few words on the subject of
killing prisoners.
JODL: In conclusion, I want to say that I did not see any order, any
captured order, which decreed death for German prisoners of war, though
this was also contained as a reason in the Führer Order. But I must
explain that the British Ministry of War advised us—I cannot recall
exactly whether it was via Geneva or through the radio—that situations
might very well arise in which prisoners of war would have to be
killed—no, rather, in which prisoners of war would have to be shackled
because otherwise one would be forced to kill them. And so, if at the
end here the Führer says orders have been found according to which the
Commandos were on principle to kill prisoners, then I think he is
referring to the British close-combat instructions which described a
method of shackling which would cause death.
DR. EXNER: And that was your own part in this Commando Order?
JODL: My part consisted only in distributing this order, or having it
distributed, in accordance with express instructions.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution said once that you also signed this
order—one of these two orders, I do not know which one. That is not
correct?
JODL: No, I signed only a general decree to have one of the orders kept
secret.
DR. EXNER: Yes, we will deal with that in a moment. Could you have
refused to transmit this order?
JODL: No, if I had refused to transmit an order of the Führer, I would
have been arrested immediately; and I must say, with justification. But
as I said, I was not at all sure whether this decree, either in its
entirety or in part, actually violated the law; and I still do not know
that today. I am convinced that if one were to convene here a conference
of experts on international law, each one of them would probably have a
different opinion on the subject.
DR. EXNER: General, you can speak a little faster.
Could you have made counterproposals?
JODL: At any other time, probably yes. At that time, however—a time of
conflict with the Führer—it was not possible for me to speak to him
personally at all. To broach the subject during the general conference
on the situation was quite out of the question. Therefore I intended in
the execution of this order to adopt a very magnanimous attitude, and I
was certain that the commanders-in-chief would do the same.
DR. EXNER: And what do you mean by magnanimous? Could this order have
been interpreted in different ways?
JODL: Yes. The order offered two ways of avoiding the treatment of
really decent soldiers like criminals. If a Commando troop, mostly
encountered in fights at night, was not wiped out but captured, as was
the rule in almost all cases, that was already certain proof that our
troops did not consider these men as bandits. It was then the task of
the commanders-in-chief to make an investigation. If it was purely a
reconnaissance operation, the entire action did not fall within the
sphere of the Commando Order at all and would not be reported as a
Commando raid. However, if the operation was really carried out by a
sabotage and demolition unit, its equipment had to be examined. It had
to be investigated whether the men were wearing civilian clothing under
their uniforms; whether they were carrying the famous armpit guns, which
go off automatically when the arms are lifted in the act of surrender;
or whether they used other despicable methods during the fighting. The
commanders-in-chief could then act in accordance with the outcome of
such an investigation. I believe that in that way it was quite
possible—and in fact it happened many times, I might almost say in the
bulk of cases—that the shooting of brave, decent soldiers was avoided.
DR. EXNER: Could you yourself exert any influence on the practices
followed by the troops?
JODL: I tried to exert my influence on various occasions. When it was
reported to me that a Commando unit had been captured—which according
to the Führer decree was not allowed—then I raised no questions or
objections. I made no report at all to the Führer on Commando operations
which met with only minor success. And finally, I often dissuaded him
from taking too drastic views, as in the Pescara case, which Field
Marshal Kesselring has already described here, when I succeeded in
convincing the Führer that only a reconnaissance unit was involved.
DR. EXNER: Were many units actually wiped out?
JODL: Commando operations decreased considerably as a result of the
public announcements in the Wehrmacht communiqué. I believe that not
more than 8 or 10 cases occurred in all.
For a time, during the months of July and August 1944, increasingly
large numbers of terrorists were reported killed in the Wehrmacht
communiqué; these, however, were not Commando troops, but insurgents who
were killed in the fighting in France. That may be proved if the
Tribunal will read Document 551-PS, Figure 4. There the order is
given—it is USA-551, on Page 117.
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is Page 70 of Book 7.
JODL: Or Page 117 of our Volume II. There it is ordered...
DR. EXNER: What is ordered? I should like to deal now with another
document, Document 532-PS.
THE PRESIDENT: It is time to break off.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. EXNER: With reference to the Commando Order, I want to mention
Document 532-PS, Exhibit Number RF-368, which is in our Document Book 2,
Page 113.
This document was offered on a previous occasion, and I objected to it
because it was not signed, or rather because it was crossed out.
Will you explain why you crossed out the draft order which is contained
in this document?
JODL: Immediately before this draft order was written, the Commander,
West requested that now, after the invasion, the Commando Order should
be rescinded altogether. I approved that proposal. A draft was submitted
to me here which rescinded the order only partially, namely in regard to
the immediate area of the beachhead and that part of Brittany, a little
further from the beachhead, where landings by parachutists were taking
place daily at that time.
THE PRESIDENT: At the time of your objection was this document not
rejected? You told us that you objected to the document. What I am
asking you is, what did the Tribunal do upon your objection? Did they
maintain it, or did they deny it?
DR. EXNER: The objection was allowed, and I think the document was
struck off. I do not think that I am mistaken.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, why are you putting it in now?
DR. EXNER: I did not ask at the time to have the document struck off. I
merely raised the objection that no mention was made of the facts that
the draft order in the document was crossed out, and that it clearly
bore a handwritten marginal note by Jodl rejecting it.
THE PRESIDENT: Just a minute. Either the document was offered in
evidence or it was not; and either it has got an exhibit number or it
has not; and, as I understand, your objection was rejected.
MR. ROBERTS: It was in fact objected to by Dr. Exner, after having been
given the French Exhibit Number RF-368; and after discussing it, it was
then stricken from the record, the English shorthand note reference
being Page 3631 (Volume VI, Page 360). My Lord, I think in fact both the
Prosecution and the Defense agreed it has Jodl’s writing upon it; and,
therefore, I feel certain that there can be no question as to its
admissibility, either on behalf of the Prosecution or the Defense. My
Lord, I certainly intend, with the permission of the Tribunal, to
cross-examine him about it; and I have not the slightest objection to my
friend Dr. Exner putting it in.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. It may, therefore, be left in as RF-368.
DR. EXNER: Will you continue?
JODL: At that time it was my intention to get rid of the Commando Order
entirely. For that reason I wrote, next to the sentence under Figure 4:
“That is just what they should not”—the entire first page. That was of
no use, however, because on that very day the Führer made a different
decision with regard to the request of the Commander, West, and his
decision is contained in Document 551-PS.
DR. EXNER: 551-PS, Exhibit Number USA-551. That is contained in the
second volume on Page 115; it is an order on the treatment of men
belonging to Commandos. This order contains the following handwritten
remark of yours: “Similar action should be taken in the Italian theater
of war.” This is on Page 117.
Will you briefly explain the contents of that order and the reason for
your remark.
JODL: That can be quickly explained. In that order territorial limits
were set restricting the use of the Commando Order, which henceforth was
to apply only to enemy operations behind the corps command posts but not
to the battle area of the beachhead. These were territorial limitations
which had not so far been fixed or ordered; and I immediately accepted
this order for the Italian theater of war, because in Italy also there
existed a fighting front on land. If this order were put into practice
in Italy, it would mean that no Commando operation which began with a
landing on the coast need be regarded as a Commando operation, because
all these landings took place in front of the lines of the corps command
posts. Therefore I was very anxious to have the same lighter conditions
applied to the whole Italian theater of war.
DR. EXNER: I just want to read one paragraph on Page 116. It is the
second paragraph under Number 1. In the first paragraph it says: “...the
order remains in force....” But the second paragraph reads:
“Excepted are enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate battle
area of the beachhead—that is in the area of the divisions
fighting in the front line—as well as reserve troops up to and
including corps commands, in accordance with Figure 5 of the
basic order....”
The word “Generalkommando” means “corps command,” and it has not been
quite correctly translated into English and French. This limitation of
the order to certain areas was, on the basis of Jodi’s comment, also to
apply to the Italian theater.
Now finally—but before that I have another important question...
THE PRESIDENT: What is it you are saying about this translation?
DR. EXNER: Yes; the word “Generalkommando” has been translated into the
French, _Région Militaire_. _Région Militaire_ is not quite clear.
THE PRESIDENT: Is that in the English?
DR. EXNER: And in the English it says, “corps command.” That is correct.
The English is correct: “corps command.” That is the same as
“Generalkommando.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal would prefer that you should draw
the attention of the Tribunal to anything which you say is a
mistranslation, rather than stating that it is a mistranslation. I call
it a question of opinion whether it is a mistranslation or not. It is
not for you to tell us that it is a mistranslation. You may draw our
attention to it and say that you submit it as a mistranslation. But now,
will you tell us this also: In one copy of this Document 551-PS, it
appears to be signed by, or initialed by Warlimont. In the other, in
your version of the translation, it appears to be signed by the
Defendant Keitel. What is the explanation of that?
MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, might I make a suggestion? I think the Court
should get the original from the Exhibit Room. 551-PS in fact consists
of three documents. The first is a draft altered in pencil; and the
second is a draft initialed “W”—that is Warlimont, with Jodi’s penciled
note at the end extending it to Italy; and the third is the final order
in which the penciled note of Jodl and the alteration of distribution to
Italy is incorporated. So, there are really three documents, and the
last is a mimeographed document with the mimeographed signature of
Keitel. That appears from the original draft.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Exner.
DR. EXNER: [_Turning to the defendant._] The Prosecution has been
emphasizing that you gave strict instructions to have this order kept
secret, and that you ordered its distribution only down to the level of
commanding officers to avoid its falling into enemy hands at all costs.
You gave these instructions for the second order, the explanatory order,
503-PS. Will you explain why you ordered such strict secrecy?
JODL: These instructions for secrecy refer actually only to Document
503-PS.
DR. EXNER: That, I may add, is in the second volume of my document book,
on Page 102. That is the order for secrecy, signed by Jodl.
[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you continue?
JODL: Particular secrecy for this order was quite inevitable. First of
all, it was directed only to the commanders. Secondly, the order
contained in great detail information on the considerable damage which
the German Wehrmacht had already suffered through these Commando
operations, and the damage which might still be caused under certain
circumstances. If the order were to fall into enemy hands, it would
certainly be an incentive for the enemy to continue that particular type
of warfare in increased measure. Thirdly, the order, 498-PS, could be
considered as a reprisal. But the last sentence in Document 503-PS, a
sentence which can easily be recognized as a later addition—as the
order seems to end before it—that sentence, I must say, made me
indignant and was one of the reasons why I insisted on such particularly
strict secrecy for this order.
THE PRESIDENT: Which sentence are you referring to?
JODL: I refer to the last sentence of document 503-PS, which says:
“If it should serve some useful purpose to save one or two men
temporarily to interrogate them, they are to be shot immediately
after interrogation.”