ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. OPERATIONS IN CATALONIA.
EMBARRASSMENTS AND MOVEMENTS OF THE SPANISH ARMIES. ESCAPE OF THE
SPANISH TROOPS FROM DENMARK.
♦1808.♦
♦NECESSITY OF A PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT.♦
When Castaños was informed of Sir Hew Dalrymple’s appointment to
the command of the British army, he declared that he regarded this
nomination as the most fortunate event of his own life; so much
advantage to the common cause did he anticipate from their confidence
in each other, and the cordial co-operation which would ensue. In
reality that influence which the confidence of a British commander
would have given him, might have been of the most essential benefit to
Spain at this momentous crisis.
Such was the national character, that when the struggle commenced every
man was ready to follow in the cause of his country; but so pitiable
had been the state of education, and so successfully had the double
despotism of the government and the inquisition shut out knowledge
from their empire, that no man was fit to lead. There were now as many
governments as there were Juntas, each acting with little regard to the
others; and as these were every where filled by persons chosen because
of their station, the government throughout Spain was delivered, or
rather fell into the hands of the provincial nobility and gentry, with
a few clergy; a set of men whom their general want of information,
their prejudices, and their previous way of life, in great measure
disqualified for the task to which they were called. Among them were
some persons who had formerly been in office at Madrid; but whatever
advantage they might have derived from habits of business, was more
than counterbalanced by the dilatory formalities acquired at the same
time, and their attachment to the old routine with all its defects and
evils. Wherever therefore such statesmen of the old school were found,
the Juntas were less efficient than they might have been without them.
The powers with which these bodies found themselves invested were
neither limited in extent or duration: the people in their confidence
(which at such times is as blind as their suspicion) never thought
of proposing restrictions: and the Juntas, when once in possession
of authority, thought only of making it as extensive, and retaining
it as long as they could. Some of them passed decrees bestowing upon
themselves the titles of Excellencies and Highnesses, and adopted
uniforms of the gaudiest fashion. This was mere vanity; but serious
injury was done, when, with as little decency as had been observed
under the old system, they conferred commissions and commands, not upon
those persons who had the fairest claim, but upon their own friends
and relations and dependents; and thus, as the enrolment was general,
the armies were filled with officers who had no other pretensions to
rank and promotion than what they derived from favour.
♦CASTAÑOS PREVENTS A CONTEST BETWEEN GRANADA AND SEVILLE.♦
After the great success in Andalusia, the provincial Juntas, instead
of exerting themselves to the utmost for completing the deliverance of
the country, became jealous of each other. Where the rival authorities
were far distant, this feeling impeded the public service; greater
evils were threatened when they bordered upon each other. Granada at
this time refused to acknowledge the supreme authority which the Junta
of Seville assumed, and had hitherto exercised with ability and good
fortune. A warm contention ensued; and Tilly, either from irritation,
or worse motives, proposed that a division of the Andalusian army
should be sent to enforce submission. Fortunately Castaños was present
at the meeting in which this proposition was made; he rose from his
seat, and, striking the table, said, he should like to see the man who
dared order a division of the troops under his command to march without
his authority! He knew no distinction of provinces; he had the honour
to command part of the army of Spain, and never would he suffer it to
be made the instrument of civil war.
♦PLANS FOR A GOVERNMENT.♦
The occasion required, and therefore justified, this prompt assumption
of a power, dangerous in its kind, and in nowise congenial to the
unambitious temper of Castaños, a man whose only desire was to do his
duty like a true Spaniard under any circumstances. It proved, however,
the necessity of establishing a more legitimate authority than as yet
existed. Lord Collingwood, in his first communications with Seville,
had advised that a general Council, Cortes, or Congress, should be
appointed, and invested with power from the several provincial Juntas
to preside over and act in the name of the whole. The necessity of some
such arrangement became every day more apparent. Some persons proposed
to establish a military form of government, in which that vigour which
the emergency required might be found; some were for assembling a
Cortes; others recommended that a viceroy or lieutenant of the kingdom
should be appointed, and to this Castaños was at one time inclined.
His first thought before the struggle began had been to invite the
Archduke Charles; but upon considering that the invitation could not
be accepted while Austria continued at peace with France, and that if
a war between those powers took place, the Archduke’s services would
be required at home, he then thought the Prince Royal of the house of
Naples would be the fittest person to hold the regency till the fate
of Ferdinand should be known; and this he proposed to the ♦ARRIVAL
OF A SICILIAN PRINCE AT GIBRALTAR.♦ Junta. The Sicilian court from
the commencement of the insurrection had directed their views to the
same object: their minister in London had sounded the disposition of
the British Government, and found it decidedly unfavourable to their
schemes; and they sent a plenipotentiary to reside at Gibraltar, for
the purpose of furthering the interests of the family. But Sir Hew
Dalrymple happened to be informed of what had passed in London, and
finding that the object of this mission was altogether disapproved by
the British Government, and that the agent had papers which he intended
to circulate without previously communicating their contents to him,
felt it necessary to let him know that his residence in the garrison,
under these circumstances, might be attended with inconvenience, and
therefore he must return to Palermo for new instructions. This was
about the middle of July; in the ensuing month, a few days before Sir
Hew left Gibraltar to take the command of the army, Prince Leopold,
second son of the King of the Two Sicilies, with the Duke of Orleans
and a large retinue, arrived there in a British man of war. A more
ill-judged step could hardly have been taken. Great Britain had
scrupulously avoided any thing which could have the appearance of
dictating to the Spaniards, or interfering with them in any other way
than that of giving the most prompt and liberal support; but what
a pretext would it afford those who were ever ready to malign the
measures of England, if at a time when the Spaniards were deliberating
concerning the settlement of their government, a Prince who claimed
the regency should be received with royal honours at Gibraltar, and at
the very juncture when a British army arrived upon the coast! Under
these embarrassing circumstances Sir Hew acted with great firmness and
discretion. Persisting in that upright and steady course of conduct
which had in so great a degree contributed to win the confidence of
the Spanish nation, he refused in any manner to support pretensions
which he had reason to believe were not approved by his government;
to that government he referred the Duke of Orleans, who accordingly
resolved to go to England, and make his representations in person; the
Prince was received into Gibraltar, and left there, when Sir Hew went
to the army; if he were chosen Regent, any deputation duly appointed to
announce that nomination was of course to be admitted, and considered
as attached to his retinue; but no such deputation from any local or
provisional government was to be received on such terms.
♦AMBITION OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
There was at this time a report that the Junta of Seville had declared
for a regency, and were hesitating between the Archbishop of Toledo, as
the only remaining member of the Bourbon family in Spain, a Prince of
the Neapolitan house, and the Conde de Montijo, the most intriguing,
and then one of the most popular persons in Spain. As this individual
had no pretensions to such a charge, except what his undeserved
popularity might give him, the report was probably raised by himself as
one means to bring about his elevation. Some members of that Junta were
intoxicated with success; a few others cared for nothing but their
own interest: the latter wished for a Regent of their own appointment,
under whose name they might possess the real power; the former were
for retaining the authority which hitherto they had administered well,
but which ceased to be legitimate when it became apparent that it was
retained for ambitious motives. A paper from the Junta of Murcia, which
expressed the opinion of Florida-Blanca, had forcibly pointed out the
necessity of a central government, and the inevitable ruin which a
polyarchy of independent Juntas would bring on. It advised that the
cities which had a seat in the Cortes should elect a council to govern
in the name of Ferdinand, and that the military affairs should be
entrusted to a council of generals. The Junta of Seville suppressed
this paper wherever their influence extended; but a like measure was
now recommended by an authority with which the Junta could not cope.
♦THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE ADVISE A CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Council of Castille had recovered some of its lost reputation
by the tardy resistance which it opposed to the Intruder, and by
exerting itself with authority to maintain order in the capital, after
the retreat of the French. It published a justification of its own
conduct, more elaborate than convincing, and dispatched a circular
address to the provincial Juntas, declaring ♦AUG. 4.♦ its readiness to
co-operate with them in any plans of defence. With respect to measures
of another kind, it said, which were necessary to save the country,
all that belonged to that Council was to excite the authority of the
nation, and assist it with its influence, advice, and knowledge. Under
circumstances so extraordinary it was not possible to adopt at once
the measures indicated by the laws and customs of Spain; the Council
therefore would confine itself to recommending that deputies should be
appointed by all the different Juntas, who should meet together, and,
in union with it, confer and determine upon this important object; so
that all provisions proceeding from this common centre might be as
expeditious as the end required.
♦PROJECT OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
The better spirits in the Junta of Seville prevailed on this occasion,
and that body, yielding with a good grace to the general opinion,
seemed at the same time to direct it. They published an address,
written with the ability which distinguished all their public papers.
Hitherto, they said, the cause of the Spaniards had been prosperous,
and nothing could frustrate their hopes of success, except a want of
union among themselves. Their enemies were anxious to foment divisions.
Human passions, personal interests ill understood, the ignorance,
the weakness, the blindness of men, might assist these evil designs,
destroy a beginning so glorious, and facilitate the ruin of Spain.
This they were endeavouring to guard against, protesting, before God
and man, that they wrote nothing but what was dictated by the love of
their country, being ready to hear the opinions of other provinces,
and to amend their own errors, whenever it should be shown that they
had committed any. The chief care should be to avoid whatever might
serve to sow disunion: of this nature were all discussions concerning
the royal house, and the order of succession in the different families
which derived a right from it. The laws upon this point were well
known; but are we, said they, in a situation to talk of this? Long live
King Ferdinand VII. and his august brothers, heirs of the crown after
his attested decease! Why anticipate inquiries which could only be
necessary in default of them?
The second question which agitated the people was of a different
nature: ... Was there a necessity for creating a supreme government,
which should unite the sovereign authority of all the provinces, till
the restitution of Ferdinand to his throne? From the beginning they
had been persuaded such a government was by all means necessary. Many
Juntas and many military commanders had expressed their conviction
of this truth, ... a conviction arising from the necessity in every
nation of a civil government, to which the military may be subordinate.
Spain, deriving wisdom from history, had never thought of appointing
a dictator. Her generals (and the fact was most honourable to the
Spanish name) had been the first to acknowledge a system of things as
ancient in Spain as the monarchy itself. The confidence of the people
in the Supreme Juntas, the abundance with which pecuniary resources
had been placed at their disposal, the heroic loyalty wherewith
the army had obeyed them, and the happy issue, thus far, of their
civil administration, and of the military enterprises which they had
directed, placed in the most conspicuous light, and established,
beyond all doubt, this fundamental truth, and most essential political
principle. But who was to create this supreme civil government? Who
were to compose it? Where should be its place of residence? What the
extent of its authority? How might it be established, without producing
disunion among the different provinces? These were the important
questions to be examined.
It had been said that the Cortes ought to assemble, that the Council
of Castille should convoke them, and the whole proceedings be executed
under the authority of that tribunal. But the Council of Castille never
possessed the right of convoking the Cortes, ... why then should they
give it that authority? Was it because it had lent the whole weight of
its influence to the usurpation? Because it had acted in opposition
to those fundamental laws which it was established to preserve and
defend? Because it had afforded the enemy every facility to usurp the
sovereignty of Spain, to destroy the hereditary succession of the
crown, and the dynasty legally in possession? Because it had recognized
and seated on the throne a foreigner, destitute even of the shadow of
a title to it? What confidence could the Spanish nation place in a
government convoked by an authority incompetent, illegal, and guilty
of acts which might justly be ranked with the most atrocious crimes
against their country? But the Council of Castille being thus excluded
from all consideration, who was to convoke the Cortes? It was the
peculiar and exclusive prerogative of the King to summon them; the
provinces would not submit to any other authority; they would not
unite: thus, therefore, there would be no Cortes, or, if a few deputies
were to assemble, that very circumstance would occasion divisions, the
very evil which all were anxious to avoid. The kingdom found itself
suddenly without a king and without a government, ... a situation
unknown in its history, and to its laws. The people legally resumed
the power of appointing a government. They created Juntas without any
regard to the cities which had votes in the Cortes. The legitimate
power was therefore deposited with the Juntas: in virtue of that power
they had governed, and still were governing, and had been, and still
were, universally acknowledged and obeyed. Their situation had not
changed; the danger still existed; no new authority had supervened: the
lawful authority resided entire in the Juntas to which the people had
confided it. It was therefore incontestable that the sole and exclusive
right of electing those who were to compose the supreme government
was vested in the supreme Juntas. And whom should they elect? Most
certainly individuals of their own body; for they alone derived their
power from the people, and in them the nation had reposed entire
confidence. Hence, if there were any province in which the military
power subsisted alone, it was absolutely necessary that a supreme Junta
should be constituted there, by which the people might act; this being
indispensable, in order to concentrate the legitimate power of the
people; for, under present circumstances, the government could not be
legitimate, unless it originated in their free consent.
The Junta of Seville was therefore of opinion that the supreme
Juntas, meeting on the same day, should each elect, from its own
members, two deputies; and the persons so elected, from that moment,
be acknowledged as governors-general of the kingdom. The supreme
Juntas ought nevertheless to be continued till the termination of the
present state of things, being invested with the internal management
of their respective provinces, but under due subordination to the
general government. They ought to give instructions to their deputies
constituting that government, and it would be the duty of those
deputies to observe them, and to represent and support the claims
of their provinces, as far as was consistent with the public weal.
If there were one of the Royal Family capable of presiding in the
supreme government, he, and no other, ought to be appointed to that
office; but if there were no person of the royal blood, then it must
elect a president from its own body; and, to obviate all danger, the
presidency should be only for such limited time as might seem best.
The Juntas would appoint a place for the seat of government, which the
government might afterwards change, if it should see cause. It ought to
be at a distance from the dangers of war, and to possess other local
advantages. Seville possessed those advantages, but had no anxiety to
be selected, and willingly sacrificed her claims. The Junta of that
city would, however, frankly state, that, in their opinion, La Mancha
was most convenient for the seat of government, and, especially, either
the city of Ciudad-Real, or Almagro. But this point was to be decided
by the free choice of the supreme Juntas. The paper concluded with a
brief and dignified recapitulation of what the Junta of Seville had
done for their country, disclaiming, on their part, any affectation or
desire of superiority, and declaring, that whatever they had done was
no more than their indispensable duty.
♦THE PROVINCIAL JUNTAS ASSENT TO IT.♦
The general opinion was undoubtedly in favour of the plan of government
thus recommended; and it is no light proof of its fitness, that
schemes the same in principle and effect should have been suggested
by persons who had no communication with each other, and whose views
were in other respects so different. There were many in England who
thought it would have been better to have at once convoked the Cortes,
in the supposition that there was more resemblance between the Cortes
and the English parliament than had ever really existed, and in the
generous but mistaken hope that vigorous measures might be expected
from a free legislative assembly. The best and wisest of the Spaniards
wished also for a Cortes, and looked to it for such judicious reforms
as were conformable to the constitutional principles of the monarchy,
and suited to the habits and feelings of the nation. But they saw that
many points must be determined before the manner of assembling the
Cortes could be adjusted, and that the necessity of forming a central
government was immediate and urgent. The plan therefore which the
Junta of Seville proposed was assented to without opposition. Still
it was a great object with many of the provincial Juntas to retain
their power. That of Valencia drew up secret rules for its deputies,
declaring that they were to follow the direction of their constituents,
remain subject and obedient to them, communicate regularly with them,
and in no instance depart from their instructions; and they reserved
to themselves the power of displacing their deputies at pleasure. This
paper was made public; and it was known that other Juntas, that of
Seville in particular, had pursued the same mischievous course.
♦UNWORTHY CHOICE OF THE JUNTA OF SEVILLE.♦
The Junta of Seville, however, did worse than this. In electing its
deputies it chose two persons so notoriously unworthy of such a trust,
that the only motives which could be assigned for the choice were a
desire of being rid of them, or an opinion that they would submit to
any terms for the sake of the appointment. D. Vicente Hore was the
one; he had been a creature of Godoy’s, and was so sensible of the
estimation in which he was held, that he declined the charge, knowing
his life would be in danger if he appeared in Madrid, where it was of
course expected that the Central Junta would assemble. D. Juan de Vera
y Delgado, titular Archbishop of Laodicea, the coadjutor of Seville,
was then chosen in his place; and this was an unexceptionable choice.
It was hoped and expected that Tilly, the other member, would follow
Hore’s example, in declining an appointment for which he was equally
disqualified; but Tilly was of a bolder stamp. A blasted character had
not prevented him from obtaining great popularity at Seville; and being
utterly regardless of the means by which he brought about his ends, he
was ready to venture for the highest stake in the game of revolution.
Foul facts had been proved against him, and fouler were, upon no light
grounds, imputed. He had found it necessary to fly from Madrid before
the troubles, because he was implicated in the robbery of a jeweller.
The murder of the Conde de Aguila was attributed to him, because
it was certain that he might have saved the Count by the slightest
interference in his behalf. A wretch who was notoriously his creature
had been one of the most active instruments in Solano’s death; and
Reding would have been made away with by his means before the battle of
Baylen, if the intention had not been disclosed to Castaños, and by him
prevented.
This appointment was not perhaps what Tilly would have chosen; for it
was believed that he had no inclination to show himself at Madrid; but
he trusted to his talents for intrigue, obtained a monthly allowance
of 500 dollars, and looked ♦THE OTHER MEMBERS UNEXCEPTIONABLE.♦ for
those opportunities which revolutionary times offer to insane and
desperate ambition. It is to the honour of the Spaniards, that this
was the only exceptionable person elected for the central Junta:
perhaps in no country could an equal number of men, under similar
circumstances, have been chosen more worthy of the trust reposed in
them. To be elected to a situation of so great responsibility, in
a time of unexampled difficulties, was no object of desire; in no
instance was the appointment solicited, and in most it was reluctantly
accepted. The persons deputed were thirty-five[32] in number; of
whom Florida-Blanca and Jovellanos were the most remarkable, for the
offices which they had formerly filled, and the rank which they held
in public opinion. Both were scholars as well as statesmen, both men
of business, both high-minded and honourable Spaniards. Florida-Blanca
had more of the spirit of his country, Jovellanos was more influenced
by that of the age. The former had been an ambitious politician; the
latter was always a philosopher, in the true and virtuous meaning
of that polluted word. As the despotic minister of an absolute king,
Florida-Blanca had used his power vigorously to uphold the dignity of
the kingdom, and improve its internal condition; most of his measures
were wise, and all were well-intended; but if he had ever conceived
a wish to correct the abuses of the state, it had never appeared in
his actions: Jovellanos had unwillingly accepted office, because it
placed him in a sphere uncongenial to his modest habits and better
mind, and withdrew him from the task to which he had devoted himself,
of improving his native province. Jovellanos’s desire was to meliorate
the government and the nation by recurring to the free principles of
the old constitution; Florida-Blanca thought that if governments were
administered as they ought to be, the strongest must be the best.
Both, without hesitation[33], obeyed the call of their country, though
Florida-Blanca, who was in extreme old age, would more willingly have
passed the short remainder of his days in preparing and waiting for
death; and Jovellanos, broken down, more by the infirmities which
an unjust and cruel imprisonment had aggravated or induced, than
by the weight of sixty-five years, desired for himself nothing in
this world but tranquillity. The former brought with him little more
than a venerable name; but Jovellanos was in full possession of his
intellectual powers.
♦JOVELLANOS REFUSES ALL OFFERS OF THE INTRUSIVE GOVERNMENT.♦
Every effort had been made by Azanza, O’Farril, Urquijo, Mazarredo,
and Cabarrus, to engage this excellent man in the Intruder’s service.
He had lived in habits of friendship with all these persons, more
especially with the two last. Knowing how inaccessible he would be to
all unworthy inducements, they endeavoured to deceive him, as they
would fain have deceived themselves, by representing that theirs was
the only course which could secure the welfare of Spain; and that by
no other means could the calamities with which it was threatened be
averted; for they thought it absurd to imagine any effectual resistance
could be opposed to the determined ambition of Buonaparte. His reply
was, that if the cause of their country were as desperate as they
supposed it to be, still it was the cause of honour and loyalty, and
that which a good Spaniard ought to follow at all hazards. Jovellanos
held with his favourite author Cicero that friendship was to be
preferred to every thing except honour and virtue; he had given proof
of this by his former conduct toward some of these friends, and they
found now, as they had then, that no considerations could ever prevail
in him over the sense of duty. It gave him no little pain that his name
should be published in the Madrid gazette as one of Joseph’s ministers;
thus to appear a traitor even for a few days to those who knew him
not, or knew not how decidedly he had refused the appointment, was an
injury which he felt severely. This was one of Buonaparte’s insolent
acts; fallen as Urquijo and his colleagues were, they would not have
thus outraged the feelings of a man whom it was not possible that
they could ever cease to respect and admire. At length, the Intrusive
Government having ascertained that he was really suffering under severe
bodily infirmities, forbore to molest him with further solicitations.
He was gradually recovering when news of the battle of Baylen refreshed
his heart, and seemed to give him new life as well as hope. And when
his appointment to the Central Junta was announced, though his first
thought was of the ravages which age and affliction had made upon his
debilitated frame, the sense of duty ♦JOVELLANOS A SUS COMPATRIOTAS,
P. II. ART. I. 18–25.♦ overcame all personal considerations, and he
notified his acceptation without delay, at the same time declining a
salary of 4000 ducats which had been assigned him.
♦ARANJUEZ CHOSEN FOR THE PLACE OF MEETING.♦
In little more than a week he joined the deputies for Aragon,
Catalonia, and Valencia, at Madrid; and then two difficulties,
which had not been anticipated, occurred. The first related to the
instructions with which the Junta of Seville had fettered their
members; instructions wholly repugnant to the principle upon which
the provisional government was formed. The inconsistency and the
evils of this measure were represented to Castaños, who was then in
Madrid with his army; that General’s influence was never exercised
unworthily, nor withheld when it might be useful; and in consequence
of his remonstrance the obnoxious instructions were withdrawn, though
it appeared afterwards that secret ones to the same tenour had been
substituted. The other difficulty was concerning the place of meeting.
Jovellanos thought that no place could be so proper as the metropolis:
there, in the palace of their kings, the Central Junta would derive
consequence and respect from the place; they would appear at the head
of the first tribunals and chief magistracy; the public documents were
upon the spot, and any advice or assistance which they might require at
hand. The members who were at Madrid agreed in this opinion, which was
supported also by Castaños: but the Junta of Seville were averse to any
measure which might lessen their authority, and in this instance they
were well served by Tilly for reasons which nearly concerned himself.
He had stopped at Aranjuez, and succeeded in persuading Florida-Blanca,
who was decidedly for fixing the government at Madrid, that it would be
convenient to hold their first sittings where they were, and determine
there upon the forms which they should observe in the capital. He
gained time by this ... always a great object for one who trusts to
intrigue and fortune. So fully persuaded however were Jovellanos and
his colleagues when they went to Aranjuez that they should speedily
adjourn to Madrid, that they left orders for forming an establishment
there.
♦INSTALLATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA. SEPT. 26.♦
The greater part of the deputies having arrived, their installation was
performed with as much ceremony as the place and circumstances would
permit. The Archbishop of Laodicea performed mass, and administered
an oath to his colleagues, first taking it himself, that they would
preserve and extend the holy, Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman religion,
defend their Sovereign Ferdinand, their rights, privileges, laws, and
usages, and especially those relating to the succession in the reigning
family, promote every thing conducive to the welfare and improvement of
the kingdom, keep secret every thing which ought not to be divulged,
maintain the laws, and resist the enemies of the country at all
hazards. The oath having been taken, Te Deum was sung by the barefooted
friars of St. Pasqual, and the assembly then adjourned to the hall
chosen for their sittings. Florida-Blanca was appointed president, and
his first act was to proclaim King Ferdinand from the great gallery of
the principal front of the palace. The gates of the palace had not been
opened till now since the departure of Charles for Bayonne; and the
ceremony of thus proclaiming Ferdinand in the favourite residence of
his ancestors, ... the scene of his own childhood, ... the spot where,
six months ago, he had been acclaimed King, ... he who was now prisoner
in a foreign land, and in the power of the perfidious tyrant who had
ensnared him, ... moved the venerable statesman to tears when he
pronounced his name, and excited feelings of grief and indignation in
the multitude, which heightened and hallowed the enthusiasm wherewith
they repeated it.
♦CONDUCT OF THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE.♦
The Junta dispatched copies of the act and oath of installation to the
different councils and tribunals, requiring their members to take the
same oath, and issue orders to all the subordinate Juntas, provinces,
magistrates, governors, and viceroys, for obeying the new government,
as holding in deposit the sovereign authority for Ferdinand, the
councils continuing in the exercise of their ordinary functions, but
referring to the Central Junta all matters exceeding their powers,
and upon which the Sovereign ought to be consulted. Other tribunals
immediately signified their prompt and unreserved obedience; the
Council of Castille alone delayed their answer. The mortification which
they felt at not being incorporated with the provisional government,
as they had proposed, was embittered by a consciousness that they had
forfeited all claim to the confidence of the nation. Having, however,
almost by accident, recovered so much authority, they strove to extend
it, and after five days returned an answer, saying that, having given
the subject their most serious consideration, they had resolved to take
the oath, and circulate the necessary orders that the Central Junta
should be obeyed in whatever was for the service of the King and of the
public cause. But they added, that in discharge of their indispensable
duty, they would hereafter communicate to the Junta the result of
their consultations for the observance and maintenance of the laws.
The reservation implied in this reply offended the Junta, and more
especially the President Florida-Blanca, who had not been accustomed
to tolerate delay or demur under his administration; and an answer was
returned conveying reproof in the form of admonition, which reduced the
Council of Castille to a quiet but malevolent submission.
♦THE LEONESE DEPUTIES ARRESTED BY CUESTA.♦
The Leonese deputies had been seized by General Cuesta on their way.
One of them, the Bayley Valdes, notified his arrest to Florida-Blanca,
who instantly perceiving what fatal consequences must arise from any
serious dispute between the civil and military authorities, wrote
mildly to Cuesta, requesting that he would release the deputies,
prefer his charges against them to the Junta, and leave the decision
to that body. At the same time Castaños, to whom the judicious part
of the people in Madrid looked for some interference in their fear
at this unexpected act of military violence, addressed a letter to
the Castillian general, representing to him calmly, but forcibly, the
surprise and alarm which this arrest had occasioned, at a time when
the great object of forming a provisional government was on the point
of being happily effected; and asking what offence the deputies had
committed, men as they were of high character, and the Bayley Valdes
distinguished for the services which he had performed? what authority
was competent to arrest and detain them? why, if they were delinquents,
they had not been denounced to the Juntas of their respective
provinces? why their crimes were not published in the face of the
nation, and themselves accused before the Central Junta, then about to
assemble?
♦CUESTA’S VINDICATION OF HIS CONDUCT.♦
In his answer to Castaños, Cuesta declared, that as principal and
sole chief of the provinces of Castille and Leon, he was not bound
to give an account of his conduct to any other provincial authority,
being independent of all till a general government or regency should
be established; nevertheless, as his Excellency apprehended some
uneasiness in the people of Madrid, and in the whole nation, concerning
this transaction, he deemed it proper to satisfy his doubts. The
Junta of Castille having been dissolved by the entrance of the enemy
into Valladolid, he had increased the Junta of Leon by adding to it a
deputy for every intendency or province of Castille, and had confirmed
Valdes as their president, Valdes having promised to obey his orders
in all things, without consideration of his own rank. But after the
battle of Rio Seco, a few members of this Junta, seeing him pursued by
the French, and forsaken by the Galician army, retired to Ponferrada,
instead of Astorga, whither he had directed them to repair: and there,
under the influence of Valdes, treated clandestinely with the Junta
of Coruña, to unite with them at Lugo, and from thence govern both
Castille and Leon, independently of the captain-general, who, indeed,
was to become subordinate to them. The Bayley had notified this to him,
and at the same time ordered him to deliver up his cavalry to General
Blake. Instead of obeying such orders, he had immediately annulled this
fugitive Junta, and commanded the inferior Juntas to break off all
communication with it, which they had accordingly done, except in those
parts of Leon which were under the immediate power of the Galician
general. The fugitive Junta persisted in its pretensions, and had
elected Valdes and the Vizconde de Quintanilla as its representatives
in the Central Junta. Let any impartial person then say whether he
had not good reason to arrest them for insubordination! Not having
been elected by any competent authority, they were not members of the
Central Junta, and therefore no offence had been offered to that body
in arresting them. Whenever that body should be assembled, he would be
the first person to obey it, and submit to its high consideration the
cause of Valdes and his accomplices: till then neither the rank of the
Bayley, nor his assumed quality of member of the Central Junta, for the
provinces of Castille and Leon, shall suffice, said the old General,
to exempt him from my jurisdiction. The same answer he returned
to Florida-Blanca, and sent back the letter which that nobleman
had addressed to Valdes, saying that the prisoner was in strict
confinement, deprived of all communication.
♦THE COUNCIL OF CASTILLE INTERFERE.♦
Castaños, not receiving a reply as soon as he had expected, called upon
the Council of Castille to interfere; and that tribunal, well pleased
that its authority should be appealed to on so important an occasion
in such times, wrote in consequence to Cuesta, remonstrating on the
dangerous tendency of his conduct. But he returned for answer, that the
imprisonment of these persons was the best means of preventing danger,
as it would effectually preclude the contentions which might arise if
a double set of representatives for Castille and Leon should present
themselves; that neither prudence nor justice permitted him to overlook
the infidelity, insurrection, and insubordination of a Junta which he
had created; and that for these offences, as Valdes was a general, he
would deliver him over to be tried by a council of war, composed of
generals, unless a sovereign regency should first be established; in
which case he would submit the whole proceeding to their judgement,
and his own powers also, ... powers which till then he considered
independent of any other authority.
♦CUESTA IS SUMMONED BEFORE THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
Upon this principle, and an assumption that the Juntas in Castille
and Leon derived their authority from him and not from the people,
Cuesta made the Junta of Valladolid, who had assembled in Leon, send
a representative to the Central Junta. The assembly refused to admit
him, and ordering Cuesta to set his prisoners at liberty, summoned
him also to Aranjuez, that all parties might be heard. This was in
effect removing him from the command of his army. Such an assertion
of their power was well-timed, for Cuesta, making no secret of his
hostile intentions against them, had declared to the British agent,
Mr. Stuart, that two measures were necessary for the public good;
first, the restoration of the authority of the Captains General and of
the Royal Audiences, (which would have ensured to him the continuance
of his command); and, secondly, the exercise of military influence
over the Junta, to make them elect an Executive Council, of three or
five members, each of whom should be placed at the head of one branch
of the government, and responsible to the nation only. But Cuesta,
intemperate as he was, sincerely desired to serve his country; and he
obeyed the summons without hesitation. Mutual accusations were made.
The Junta of Leon reproached the General with his attempts to maintain
order at the commencement of the insurrection, and thereby serving
the Intrusive Government. They injured themselves more than Cuesta by
this disingenuous attack; for his defence upon that point was full and
satisfactory: what persons in authority were there throughout Spain, he
asked, who had not endeavoured to suppress the first popular movement,
knowing how great a force the enemy had in the heart of the country,
ready to act any where, and not knowing that the spirit of resistance
was universal? As soon as that spirit was fairly manifested, he had
taken the national side, had brought armies into the field, and had
done his duty faithfully, if not fortunately. It was base indeed in
the Junta to bring against him this accusation, which, if it had been
taken up by the populace, or his own soldiers, might so easily have
occasioned his murder. On the other hand, it was found, that in the
affair of the deputies Cuesta’s conduct had not been distinguished by
that honest obstinacy which appeared in his own account, and which
characterised his general conduct. He had not disapproved of the
Junta’s measures till they ordered him to send his cavalry to Blake, a
measure which all the military men in Madrid considered of the utmost
importance at the time. His opinion of the Bayley Valdes had been so
favourable, that he had made known his intention to have him elected as
his own colleague; and the immediate cause of this rash and intemperate
proceeding was anger that he himself had not been chosen. So completely
had this feeling mastered him, that instead of advancing with his
army to Burgo del Osma, (as had been resolved in a council of war at
Madrid at which he was present,) he had actually fallen back to Segovia
to gratify his resentment by seizing Valdes. Valdes would now have
terminated the dispute by giving in his resignation: this it was not
thought proper to accept; the validity of his election was admitted,
and the other points were referred to a competent tribunal, but the
course of events soon put an end to all further proceedings.
♦DECLARATION OF THE CENTRAL JUNTA.♦
The Central Junta, thus peaceably established, and unanimously
recognized by the nation, began their administration with the fairest
promises. They acknowledged the national debt, and took upon themselves
the obligations contracted by the crown, which formed the patrimony
of many families; and which they pledged themselves punctually to
pay. That portion of the revenue which had formerly been swallowed up
in the enormous expenses of the royal household, or engrossed by the
favourite, would, they trusted, enable them to diminish the imposts
laid upon the towns and villages; and great resources would be found
in the property forfeited by those who had betrayed their country. The
sum total of the funds arising from these sources, from the regular
revenues, and from the donatives and contributions of Spain and the
Indies, they promised annually to publish, with an account of its
expenditure. They would simplify, as far as possible, the revenue
system, gradually suppress useless offices, establish economy in
all the branches of financial administration, and remove the abuses
introduced into it by the old government.
The duties which they proposed to themselves, and the benefits which
they promised the people, were farther explained in an address to
the nation; for they affirmed, it became them to inform the people
of their situation, with a dignity becoming the Spanish character;
and to establish, in a frank and generous manner, those relations of
reciprocal confidence which ought to be the basis of every just and
wise administration. A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the most
incapable hands, had brought them to the very brink of perdition:
the nation was alienated from its government by hatred or contempt:
every thing favoured the perfidious plot which Buonaparte had formed
against them, when they rose to vindicate their rights, and became at
once the admiration of Europe. Their situation was unexampled in their
history, unforeseen by their laws, and, as it were, opposed to their
habits. Great and wonderful things they had accomplished; but all their
enthusiasm and all their virtue were required for what remained to be
done. Their armies were naked and unprovided with every thing. The
French, collected behind the Ebro, were expecting reinforcements, and
ravaging Upper Castille, Rioja, and the provinces of Biscay; Navarre
and Catalonia were almost wholly in their power: they possessed the
passes, and had made themselves, by what treachery was well known,
masters of the strong frontier fortresses, and of Barcelona. The despot
of France, deceiving, by the grossest impostures, the slaves who
obeyed him, was striving to keep all other states in inactivity, that
he might bring the whole enormous weight of his military force upon
Spain. The continental powers were watching the issue of this first
struggle, desiring to declare themselves against the common enemy, but
proceeding with the timid circumspection which they had learnt from
past misfortunes. A confederacy against the tyrant was evidently their
only means of preservation: for what state could now hold relations of
amity with him? who could now give credit to the words and promises of
Buonaparte, or trust to his good faith? The fate of Spain was at once
a lesson and a warning to Europe, ... her resolution would serve as
an example, her victories as an incentive; and the reprobate, who had
trampled under foot the principles of justice, had placed himself in
that fearful situation, that he must either become master of all, or
perish in the struggle which he had so wantonly provoked.
But this co-operation would not be obtained till the Spaniards had
given such earnest of success as rendered victory certain: they must
therefore call forth all their means, as if they were singly to contend
against the whole power of France. The Junta believed it would be
necessary to maintain 500,000 men in arms, besides 50,000 cavalry, ...
a force which, however disproportionate to their present situation, and
to all former exigencies, was not more than the present times required.
The power of their adversary was colossal, his ambition even greater
than his power, and his existence incompatible with their liberty. His
exertions were to be estimated by the barbarity of his character and
the extremity of his danger; but they were the exertions of a tyrant,
and would be confounded, when opposed to the constancy of a great and
free people.
The last government ... if that might be called government which
was one continued and monstrous dilapidation, had exhausted all the
sources of prosperity. The resources which arose from the revenues
of the royal household, from the enormous sums formerly devoured by
the insatiable avarice of Godoy, from his collected rapine, and the
confiscated estates, from a free trade, a well-arranged administration
of the revenue, and regularly distributed contributions, had already
been indicated. The succours already given so generously by England,
and still to be expected from that nation, were to be added to these
means. “But,” said the Central Junta, “it is incumbent on us that these
succours, which have been so opportunely given, and so gratefully
received, and the effects of which have been so beneficial, should
be hereafter recognized and recompensed with the reciprocity and
decorum which become a great and powerful nation. The Spanish monarchy
must not, in this respect, be placed in a state of inequality and
dependence on its allies. The produce of these various means would be
great but slow, and therefore insufficient for the urgent necessities
of the state. Would they be sufficient to furnish for a time the
ordinary supplies, discharge the great debt which must be incurred,
and maintain the formidable army which must be kept up? If not, the
government would at once have recourse to the nation, certain, from
the fidelity with which its accounts would regularly be published, from
the necessity and notoriety of the public wants, and the patriotism
of the nation, that although to evils so extraordinary as the present
remedies as extraordinary must be applied, its demands would neither be
disregarded through distrust, nor detested as arbitrary.
“The defence of the kingdom, and the means of providing for it, must
necessarily be the first duty of the government; but it would fulfil
only half its duties if it attended to this alone: other duties
remained, to be the great reward of the virtue of the Spaniards and of
their sacrifices. A little time only had passed since, oppressed and
degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection
against these evils, neither in the institutions nor in the laws, they
had even regarded foreign dominion as less hateful than the wasting
tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious,
and most often unjust, had lasted too long: their patience, their love
of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused: it was time
that law, founded on general utility, should commence its reign. This
was the desire of their good and unfortunate King Ferdinand; this was
what he pointed out, even from the captivity to which a perfidious
traitor had reduced him. The name of their country ought no longer
to be a vague and idle word to the Spaniards; henceforward it was
to import to their ears and to their hearts the sanctuary of laws,
the theatre for talents, the reward of virtue. Such a country the
Junta solemnly promised they should possess; and till the military
operations, which must at first be slow, in order better to insure
success, should furnish the leisure necessary for this great and solemn
reform, the government would privately prepare for it. Instead of
rejecting the advice of enlightened men, they desired and requested
it. The knowledge and illustration of their ancient and constitutional
laws; the changes which change of circumstances rendered necessary in
their re-establishment; the reform which might be necessary in the
civil, criminal, and commercial codes; projects for improving public
education, which was in Spain so greatly on the decline; a system of
regulated economy for the distribution and collection of the public
revenue, ... these were subjects for the investigation of wise and
thoughtful men, and on which the opinions of such men were solicited.
The Junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a
particular department, to whom all writings on matters of government
and administration might be addressed: so that each contributing by his
exertions to give a just direction to the public mind, the government
might be enabled to establish the internal happiness of Spain.”
♦JOVELLANOS PROPOSES A REGENCY, AND THAT A CORTES BE SUMMONED.♦
These were fair professions; nor were the intentions of the Central
Junta less laudable than their language. Tilly alone excepted, the
members were upright and honourable men, worthy to represent a nation
distinguished for its high sense of honour. But they were unacquainted
with each other, and except the President, Jovellanos, and Garay,
wholly unused to business: for a national assembly too few, and for
an executive government too many. Jovellanos was of opinion that they
ought immediately to appoint a regency of five persons, one of them
being a dignitary of the church, to be installed on the first day of
the ensuing year: that the Central Junta should then be reduced to half
its original number, retaining one member only of each deputation,
for the purpose of watching over the observance of the constitution
entrusted to the regency, and corresponding with the provincial Juntas,
which should thenceforward consist of four members each: these were
to exist as long as the Council of Regency; and the Central Junta of
Correspondence, as it was then to be called, only till the meeting
of the Cortes, which Jovellanos maintained ought immediately to be
announced as to assemble as soon as the enemy should have been driven
out of Spain, or, at all events, in two years from the present time,
if the delivery of the country should not be accomplished before. He
proposed also that the Junta, before it resigned its powers, should
appoint persons qualified for such a task to prepare plans of reform in
the constitution, laws, finance, system of public instruction, army,
and marine; ... these plans were to be formed under the inspection and
approbation of the Council of Regency and the Junta of Correspondence,
and finally submitted to the Cortes. ♦1808. OCTOBER.♦ In delivering
this advice, Jovellanos, to remove all suspicion of any interested
views, repeated in writing the solemn declaration which he had before
made by word of mouth, that he never would accept of any office or
employment himself; the natural and invincible repugnance which he had
ever felt for such preferment, the bitter price which he had paid for
having once accepted it, in deference to a brother whom he respected
like a parent, and the sad sense of decay both in his physical and
moral powers, determined him to this resolution. The only duty which
he would undertake to perform was ♦JOVELLANOS MEMORIA, P. II. § 33,
34. APPENDICES, NO. 5.♦ the noble one of simply delivering those
opinions which he thought most conducive to the good of his country, in
discharge of the high trust wherewith his own province had honoured him.
♦EXPECTATIONS FROM A CORTES.♦
Jovellanos expected the greatest benefit from a Cortes; but he
apprehended great evil if it were hastily convoked, and without due
preparation. That party who have since assumed the appellation of
_Liberales_ censured him for proposing to postpone it so long. They
were then a very small, but active, minority, consisting chiefly of
physicians, lawyers, and unbelieving priests, whose little knowledge,
exclusively derived from prohibited French books, was worse than
ignorance. These persons were for hurrying on to a jacobinical
revolution, and were impatient for a Cortes as the first great means
of embodying that democracy which they expected to govern. But there
were also many of the best of the Spaniards who looked to the Cortes
as the surest means of delivering their country, and restoring it to
its former dignity and power; and the same views were very generally
entertained in England, and by the British Government itself. In fact,
the assembling of a Cortes had been proposed by our first authorized
agent, Mr. Stuart, to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias. Some of the
difficulties which would attend it were then perceived; the Asturians
proposed that it should assemble at Oviedo, the Galicians at Villa
Franca in the Bierzo, each Junta wishing that it should be convoked
near their own place of abode; and for the purpose of retaining their
power, they wished to enlarge the deputation, so that all their own
members might be included. Though it was thus seen that the measure
was not so easily accomplished as had been supposed, still the opinion
prevailed in England, that if a free legislative assembly were
established in Spain, the same blessings would ensue as the British
people enjoy under the well-tempered constitution which has grown
with their growth, and adapted itself to their circumstances. There
are errors from which it is painful to be undeceived. Those persons
were wiser in their generation, who, having the recent example of
France before their eyes, believed that legislative assemblies, in
countries unaccustomed to such modes of legislation, are more to be
dreaded than desired; that the reformation which is thus begun tends
to certain anarchy; and that where great and extensive improvements in
the existing system are necessary, the only means whereby they can be
effected, without inducing worse evils than those which are removed,
is by an upright and far-sighted minister, under a strong government.
Upon ♦FLORIDA-BLANCO AVERSE TO IT.♦ this point Florida-Blanca judged
more truly than Jovellanos. Such, however, was the respect with which
the opinions of that admirable man were at this time heard, that his
proposal would have been carried, if the Junta had come ♦JOVELLANOS
MEMORIA, P. II. § 35.♦ to an immediate decision upon it; and it
was only by deferring the final discussion till Nov. 7, being that
day month, that the minority averted a measure which shocked their
prejudices as much as it alarmed their fears.
♦State of Catalonia.♦
The Junta were at this time full of hope; they had just confidence
in the national character; and they were elated by the enthusiastic
spirit which had manifested itself, the splendid successes which had
been obtained, the apparent inactivity of the enemy, and the promised
co-operation of Great Britain, which had already effected the delivery
of Portugal. They had also encouraging advices from Catalonia. After
relieving Figueras, the French dispatched a force from that fortress
to get possession of Rosas, but failed in the attempt. ♦JULY 16.♦ Ill
armed, and worse disciplined as they were, the Catalans displayed that
unconquerable spirit which in all ages has distinguished them. ♦1808.
JULY.♦ In no other province were such great and continued exertions
made against the invaders: and in no other province were the people
left so entirely to their own resources. They made the most urgent
solicitations to the Junta of Seville for a supply of artillery, which
could have been spared in abundance from the arsenals of Seville and
Cadiz, and which Lord Collingwood offered them the means of conveying;
but they could obtain none, and were fain, therefore, to use the
trunks of trees, bored, and hooped with iron. The want of cavalry was
even more severely felt in all the level part of the country; ... no
substitute could be found for this, nor was it possible that their
volunteers and newly-raised levies could resist the well-disciplined
horse-soldiers upon plain ground. They had, however, been eminently
successful where the ground favoured them; and confiding in their
numbers, they occupied the right bank of the Llobregat from San Boy to
Martorell, in order to distress the enemy in Barcelona. From thence
they were dislodged by General Lechi, who, marching out by night with
2500 men, forded the river in several places at daybreak, drove them
from their batteries, sacked the towns and villages along the line, set
fire to them, and returned in triumph, bearing as trophies the banners
of the churches which had been plundered. ♦DUHESME RESOLVES TO BESIEGE
GERONA.♦ Duhesme then resolved to undertake the siege of Gerona, having
concerted it with Reille, who was to co-operate with him from Figueras.
It was an object of great importance; for while Gerona and Hostalrich
were in possession of the Spaniards, they would be able greatly to
molest, if not wholly to interrupt, the communication by land between
Barcelona and France. Materials of every kind were found in the
well-stored arsenals and magazines of Barcelona, and the horses, mules,
and carriages of the inhabitants of that city were put in requisition
for conveying them. So sure of success was Duhesme, and so exasperated
by his former failure, that he is ♦CABAÑES, P. I. 80–85.♦ said to have
declared he would arrive before the city on one day, attack it the
next, take it on the third day, and on the fourth destroy it.
♦DIFFICULTIES ON THE MARCH.♦
He began his march on the 10th of July, with about 6000 men. From
Barcelona to Gerona is a journey of twenty hours; but Duhesme had not
calculated upon the obstacles which he was to encounter on the way.
The road for two-thirds of the distance lies always within sight of
the sea, and in great part along the coast; the Catalans, under D.
Francisco Milans, had broken it up, and annoyed him with great activity
on his left, while an English frigate, and some smaller vessels,
brought their guns to bear upon him from the sea; these impediments
delayed him five days between Caldetas and San Pol. On the 19th he
divided his troops; one part crossed the wild mountains of Vallgorguina
to S. Celoni, and endeavoured by a sudden attack to get possession of
Hostalrich. Twice they attempted to escalade it, and were repulsed with
loss by the acting governor D. Manuel O’Sulivan. The other division
continued the coast road, losing many guns and much of its ammunition
there. They rejoined on the way to Gerona, and arrived before that
city on the 22nd, where they were met on the following day by Reille
♦CABAÑES, I. 85–87.♦ with 2000 men from Figueras; but Duhesme had
suffered so much on the march, that he was in no condition for active
operations, and the remainder of the month was employed in preparing
for the siege.
♦TROOPS FROM MINORCA LAND AT TARRAGONA.♦
On the very day that the French General appeared for the second time
before Gerona, the Marques del Palacio, with 4600 regular troops from
Minorca, landed at Tarragona. Many officers, who had hitherto remained
in Barcelona, and several magistrates, escaped now from that city to
join it. The first measure of the Marques was to strengthen the line of
the Llobregat, which the Somatenes and Miquelets, undismayed by their
late defeat, had again occupied. The Conde de Caldagues was sent with
a detachment upon this service, and the garrison, who made a vigorous
attempt to dislodge him immediately on his arrival, were repulsed. The
Catalans were now in high spirits, and with the assistance of Lord
Cochrane, in the Imperieuse frigate, made a successful attack upon the
Castle of Mongat, a small fort on the coast, about nine miles from
Barcelona, which the French had strengthened, as a point of support for
their plundering incursions to the eastward. About an hundred prisoners
were taken there, seven pieces of cannon, and a considerable quantity
or ammunition ♦1808. AUGUST.♦ and stores. The enemy could no longer
maraud in that direction, and feeling great present inconvenience,
began to apprehend serious consequences ♦BARCELONA BLOCKADED.♦ from the
blockade of Barcelona: the British cruisers watched it effectually by
sea, and in the only part of the land now open to them, which was the
mountainous country in their immediate vicinity, between the Llobregat
and the Besos, they had to contend with an ♦CABAÑES, P. II. 3–25.♦
armed and exasperated peasantry; for even those persons who would have
remained quiet were driven to despair by the system of fire and sword
which Duhesme pursued.
♦BARCELONA.♦
Barcelona, with its fort Monjuich, is one of the strongest places in
Europe. It is remarked by Swinburne, that the citadel was calculated
to overawe the inhabitants at least as much as to protect them from a
foreign enemy. For this in fact it was built, when six hundred houses
were demolished for its site; and to the same purpose it was now
applied against the family which built it, when Buonaparte’s perfidy
had made the Bourbons as popular in Catalonia as they had been hated
there during the war of the succession. Every house in Barcelona lies
exposed to Monjuich, which stands singly on the south-west. A new
fortress had been erected there early in Charles the Third’s reign, and
it had that completeness and magnificence which characterised public
works in Spain. On the sea side it was considered impregnable, so
admirably had the natural strength of the situation been improved by
art; and toward the land the glacis had been sloped at an incredible
expense in such a manner that no approaches could be made under
shelter. The population of Barcelona in 1797 was 130,000, and if
the increase since had been in proportion to that of the ten years
preceding, it must have amounted to 150,000 at this time. Yet this
population, than which a braver and nobler-minded people were no where
to be found, was kept under control by 4000 French, Lechi having been
left with no greater force. The city was so completely at the mercy of
the citadel and Monjuich, that the invaders had nothing to fear from
open attacks. Their only danger was from stratagems or famine. Against
the former they were always on their guard; and it was to open the
communication for supplies and reinforcements from France that Duhesme
had undertaken the expedition against Gerona.
♦THE JUNTA OF CATALONIA REMOVE TO THE HEAD-QUARTERS.♦
The Marques del Palacio arrived in Catalonia without treasure or
provisions, and there was no government to which he could look for
either. The contributions which had been raised had already been
expended, and nothing was to be obtained by way of loan. A temporary
resource was found in the confiscation of French property; for in these
calamitous times the numerous French families who were settled in Spain
bore their full share in the general misery and ruin. These funds,
however, could not long suffice; and for the better establishment
of some permanent system, it was agreed that the Supreme Junta of
Catalonia, which had hitherto resided at Lerida, should remove from
that inconvenient situation, and accompany in future the head-quarters.
The Junta was newly constituted accordingly, and the Commander-in-chief
was chosen president. The Marques would now have marched to raise the
siege of Gerona; but such means as he would have deemed adequate were
wanting; he had no cavalry, the little which there was in Lerida and
Tarragona was unfit for action, and perhaps he reasonably distrusted
his troops if they were led against a well-disciplined ♦CALDAGUES
SENT TO INTERRUPT THE SIEGE OF GERONA.♦ army. Caldagues, however, was
sent to harass the enemy and interrupt the siege, with four companies
of regular troops, 2000 Miquelets and Somatens, and three pieces of
artillery. He was joined at Hostalrich by more of these new levies,
making his whole number 4300 men, and he received two cannon from that
fortress. They advanced to Castella, passing within sight of the French
encampment; some officers came out of ♦CABAÑES, II. 30–32, 52–55.♦ the
city to confer with the Count, and a joint attack upon the enemy’s
batteries was concerted for the following morning.
♦HE ATTACKS THE ENEMY’S BATTERIES WITH SUCCESS.♦
This was on the night of the 15th; Duhesme had been so harassed in his
operations, and so slow in them, that though he arrived before Gerona
on the 19th of July, it was not till the morning of August 13 that
his batteries began their fire. It was directed chiefly against the
Castle, which, like that at Barcelona, bears the name of Monjuich,
and which, with all the other forts around Gerona, had been neglected,
and was in a state of great dilapidation. On the 15th a considerable
breach had been made. The garrison was then strengthened with 900 men,
who were ordered to be ready at daybreak, and to sally as soon as the
relieving troops should be ascending the hill of Monjuich; but instead
of waiting for this, they sallied as soon as they saw them marching
down the distant heights of St. Miguel and Los Angeles. The execution
therefore was as rash as the plan, and certainly few attempts in war
have ever been made in which there was so little reasonable prospect of
success. The besieging army consisted of 11,000 men, of which 1000 were
cavalry, all disciplined soldiers, upon whom their officers could rely.
There were 4700 regular troops in Gerona, who, for want of discipline,
were not to be relied on in the field; and of the force which Caldagues
had now collected, amounting to 6000, there were but 300 regulars. But
Duhesme was at this time too much dispirited by the general prospect of
affairs in Spain, and the reverses which he himself had suffered, to
be sensible of his own superiority, or to profit by the errors of his
opponents. One battery was taken at the point of the bayonet in this
premature sally, and presently set on fire. A second also was stormed;
the French, who had been driven from it, recovered it, being reinforced
by a Swiss battalion; but a column of the Spaniards arrived in time to
assist their countrymen, and it was again taken, and the carriages
burnt. D. Henrique O’Donell, who held the rank of _Sargento Mayor_ in
the regiment of Ultonia, distinguished himself greatly in this part of
the action. The destruction of these batteries was the object for which
Caldagues had hazarded an attack upon an enemy so greatly superior in
strength. His own troops, meantime, drove the French from the heights
of S. Miguel to the village of Camp-Dura; from thence they, in their
turn, were driven back to the heights, and being ♦CABAÑES, II. 55–62.♦
there reinforced, made the enemy again give way before them, dislodged
them from Camp-Dura, and pursued them till they crossed the river Ter
to Sarria.
♦DUHESME RAISES THE SIEGE.♦
Caldagues dispatched news of his victory from the field of battle to
Tarragona, saying that the enemy’s batteries were demolished, and
all the artillery taken with which they had battered Monjuich in
breach. All that he had hoped, and more than he could reasonably have
expected, had been obtained; and when his troops, flushed with success,
would have exposed themselves in the plain to the French cavalry, he
restrained them, ordered them to fortify themselves upon the heights,
and exerted himself to repair the breach in Monjuich, lest it should
be attacked in the morning. Duhesme indeed might have recovered in
the night the positions which he had lost, so little discipline was
there among the Spaniards, and so little watch or order was observed,
notwithstanding the strict injunctions of the Commander. But Duhesme
appears to have been one of those men who lose their powers of mind
when good fortune forsakes them; and Caldagues, when day broke, and he
was expecting a formidable attack, discovered, to his astonishment,
that the enemy had disappeared. They had fled, rather than retreated,
in the night, and in such haste, that they left several hundred barrels
of powder which they might with ease have rolled into the river. Reille
returned to Figueras with little loss, there being no impediment in
that direction; but Duhesme, who did not venture a second time upon
the coast road, when he reached Calella took a line between the high
♦MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYR, PIECES JUSTIF. NO. 3. CABAÑES, II. 62–81.♦
mountains and the sea, throwing his artillery down the precipices, and
abandoning great part of the baggage and stores, and even leaving the
sick and wounded who were not able to sit on horseback. The retreat was
made with such precipitation, that Milans, who pursued, did not come
up with them till they were within seven miles of Barcelona, on the
heights of Mongat. But Lechi being, fortunately for them, apprised by a
spy of their approach, met them there with part of the garrison, at a
time when a small Spanish force might have completed their destruction.
♦UNPOPULARITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CATALONIA.♦
An outcry was raised against Palacio because he had not intercepted the
enemy in their retreat, nor was he ever forgiven by the unreasonable
people for not having done what it was impossible to do. When the
account from the field of battle reached him at Tarragona, the French
were half way to Barcelona; and before he was apprised that they had
broken up the siege, they were already in that city. The command which
he had ♦CABAÑES, II. 101.♦ undertaken was no enviable one. The repulse
of the enemy at Valencia, their losses in Andalusia, and the heroic
defence of Zaragoza, had ♦DIFFICULTIES OF THE SERVICE.♦ raised hopes
which nothing but the most brilliant success could satisfy; the service
in which he was engaged required great steadiness and military skill;
the best of his troops were wanting in both, and the great body of them
fit only for irregular war. The Junta of Catalonia had decreed that an
army of 40,000 men should be raised; and because there were no officers
to command, and no time for disciplining them, they determined that the
whole force should consist ♦D. FR. MANOEL HIST. DE CATALAÑA, L. IV. P.
90.♦ of Miquelets. This class of irregular troops was originally called
[34]Almogavares; but when they began to alter their savage appearance
and barbarous mode of warfare, they took their present name from one
of their favourite commanders, Miquelot de Prats, a notable partizan
who attached himself to Cæsar Borgia. The name was popular among the
Catalans, the Miquelets having distinguished themselves whenever the
country was invaded, and especially in the succession war. It was
intended to raise forty _tercios_ of a thousand men each, and this
might have been done in a few days, such was the national spirit, if
equipments of every kind had not been wanting. A great bounty was given
to these Miquelets, but this prevented recruiting for the line, and
the regular troops were disgusted at seeing that men received larger
pay for engaging in a service where they had more ♦CABAÑES, I. 90–93.♦
liberty, and were subject to less discipline. On the other hand, the
Miquelet officers received less pay than those of the army, and were
less esteemed, their rank being only during the war. The force which
was thus defective in its constitution, was also ill armed. Sir Hew
Dalrymple, upon whom pressing demands for arms were made from all
that side of the peninsula, could allot but few to Catalonia; and the
abundant supplies which had been sent out by England were dispatched
to other parts, where they were neither so much wanted nor so well
bestowed; for Barcelona was the great arsenal of the province: 50,000
firelocks had there fallen into the enemy’s hands, whereas the
manufactory at Ripoll could furnish the Catalans with not more than
150 per week. Palacio therefore ordered pikes or partisans to be made,
with which he armed the two foremost ranks of the Miquelets, who,
as upon the old system, were drawn up three deep. In hands that can
be trusted with the bayonet the pike would be a weapon hardly less
efficient; but for these raw troops the want of fire-arms lessened
the little confidence which they felt in themselves when they were
brought to encounter soldiers as well disciplined as armed. ♦CABAÑES,
II. 130–132.♦ Even the regular troops knew their own inferiority in the
art of war. They were incapable of manœuvring in the face of an enemy;
for so greatly had their discipline been neglected while no danger was
apprehended, that they had gone through none of the rehearsals by which
soldiers ♦CABAÑES, I. 78.♦ are prepared for real action; mere drilling
seems to have been all the instruction they had received.
♦THE MARQUIS APPROACHES BARCELONA. SEPT. 1.♦
With this force, as ill officered as it was ill provided in all other
respects, the Marques removed his head-quarters to Villa-franca,
to maintain the line of the Llobregat, and take advantage of any
opportunity for recovering Barcelona while the blockade was kept up.
An expectation that something would be attempted by the inhabitants
seems to have influenced the Spaniards to this measure, otherwise ill
judged. The recovery of Barcelona was indeed an object of the greatest
importance; but weakened as Duhesme then was, a few thousand Miquelets,
with the armed population, would have sufficed to prevent the
incursions of the garrison, and the Spaniards should have taken their
post on the Pluvia instead of the Llobregat, with the Ter for their
second position, and Gerona and Hostalrich to ♦MARSHAL GOUVION ST. CYR,
280.♦ support them, ... there they could best have impeded the efforts
which the French would make for relieving and securing to themselves
the strongest place in Spain. A British force might here have rendered
the most essential service. Deputies from the Junta of Catalonia were
sent to Madrid, to consult with the Council of Generals there upon
the affairs of the province; and in the hope of obtaining British aid
one of them proceeded to Lisbon to confer with Sir Hew Dalrymple. All
that could be done in that quarter was effected; the Spanish troops
in Lisbon were embarked for Catalonia; and the British Government,
sensible of what might be effected there by timely measures, ordered
thither 10,000 men from the army at that time stationed ♦BRITISH TROOPS
ORDERED FROM SICILY, BUT DETAINED THERE BY THE COMMANDER.♦ in Sicily.
But a feint of invading Sicily was made by Murat, who had succeeded
Joseph Buonaparte as Intrusive King of Naples; and the troops were
detained in an inactive and unworthy service, when they ought to have
been co-operating for the most important ends with one of the finest
and bravest people in the world. At no other time or place during the
whole war could such a body of English troops have been employed to so
much effect as at this time in Catalonia. Some petty jealousies or idle
forms had hitherto deprived the Catalans also of cavalry when it might
have been most useful. There was a regiment of hussars in Majorca,
for which the Junta repeatedly applied, and its applications were
earnestly enforced by the British officers who were in communication
with that island; but it was ♦CABAÑES, II. 129.♦ not till after a
series of frivolous and vexatious delays that they were embarked at
length in the beginning of October; and a detachment of them had not
reached the Llobregat more than twenty-four hours before they were led
to intercept the enemy at S. Culgat, on their return to Barcelona from
a marauding expedition. Not expecting to be attacked by cavalry, the
French were taken by surprise; they suffered a considerable loss, and
from that time confined their incursions within narrower bounds. The
troops from Portugal soon afterwards arrived; reinforcements also came
from Valencia and Majorca; Palacio ♦CABAÑES, II. 161.♦ was removed from
the command, because of the unpopularity which he had incurred, and was
succeeded by D. Juan Miguel de Vives.
♦BILBAO OCCUPIED BY THE FRENCH.♦
The want of military knowledge and military talent was never more
severely felt in any country than in Spain at this momentous crisis.
It could not be doubted that Buonaparte was preparing to bring against
the Spaniards that tremendous force which none of the continental
powers had hitherto been able to withstand. If he seemed to delay, it
was only that the preparations might be more complete; sure, meantime,
that neither Spain nor England knew at that time how to profit by
the interval, and that very probably disunion might arise among the
Spaniards themselves, of which he might take advantage. The French
had paid dearly for the error of dividing their forces, and advancing
where they had no point of support; they were now in strong positions,
receiving reinforcements from time to time, and waiting in security
till Buonaparte should come in person to complete the subjugation of
Spain, which they, as well as the tyrant himself, believed could not be
averted by any human interference. About the middle of August they sent
a detachment to take possession of Bilbao, a beautiful but defenceless
city, commanded on every side by its hanging gardens. The inhabitants,
inferior in number, ill armed, and without any works to protect them,
made a brave resistance, in revenge for which the French committed
great enormities when they entered the town: had they arrived a few
hours later, they would have got possession of arms, ammunition, and
money from England, which were just entering the harbour.
♦DIFFICULTIES IN BRINGING THE SPANISH ARMIES INTO THE FIELD.♦
A full sense of their danger, when the whole wrong which was intended
them was avowed, had roused the Spaniards to their first great and
successful exertions. After their victorious troops had entered
Madrid, they were less alive to the danger, and more sensible of the
embarrassments of their situation. Sudden efforts, directed by the
emergency which called them forth, would no longer avail. Foresight
and combination were required for extensive operations; and these were
thwarted by selfish views, and still more by capricious or obstinate
tempers, which in this state of general insubordination there was
nothing to restrain. The Galician army under Blake, having the plains
of Castille before them, could not advance without cavalry in the face
of an enemy who had from three to five thousand dragoons; and Cuesta
would not send his cavalry to act under Blake, because of his quarrel
with that General and with the Junta of Galicia. The Extremaduran
army, from a similar feeling of pride, was kept vapouring before
Elvas, while it was called for by all the authorities at Madrid. A
more vexatious impediment was interposed by the Junta of Seville. That
Board had thought proper, when the army in Andalusia was first raised,
for one of its members to accompany the Commander-in-chief, that no
injury might arise from delay in consulting the civil authority, and
perhaps also to rid themselves of Tilly, who was the person appointed.
When, to their disgrace, they elected this man to the Central Junta,
D. Andres Miñano was deputed to the army in his stead, with a salary
of a thousand dollars per month; but public opinion at Seville was so
strongly expressed against this misapplication of the public money,
and supported by so many members, especially by the Archbishop, that
the allowance was reduced one half. The whole was a needless expense,
for the Junta was still so tenacious of their authority, that this
representative was a mere agent to execute their pleasure, and not
to determine upon his own judgement. They sent positive orders that
the army of Andalusia should not advance beyond Madrid; and knowing
that Castaños had delivered his opinion strongly upon the impropriety
of regarding any army as belonging to its own province instead of
the kingdom at large, they let him know, that if these instructions
were disobeyed he should not be supplied with money. At this time the
French had driven the Spaniards from Tudela, and pushed forward to
Borja; the troops which were opposed to them in that quarter falling
back upon Zaragoza. Pressing demands for support came from Palafox:
the Generals who were at Madrid saw that the Andalusian army ought
to advance without delay, and this it could not do without money.
This matter was taken up warmly by the British agents at Madrid and
Seville; and as the Junta of that city had received two millions
of dollars from the British Government, a strong remonstrance was
presented to them upon their present conduct, and they were called
upon to apply it to the public service without delay. Their reply,
which, like all their papers, was written with great ability, would
have been satisfactory, if they had not passed over in silence their
orders that Castaños should not advance. They argued, that after all
that Andalusia had done, it was to be expected that La Mancha and the
other provinces which the Andalusian army was gone to protect, would
provide for it while it was employed in their service. The sums which
they had received from Great Britain had been sent expressly to them,
as other sums had to the Juntas of Galicia and Asturias, who had
neither incurred such expenses, nor contributed such aid to other parts
of Spain. But upon this matter they waived all discussion; ... they
answered the bills which an English agent at Madrid had negotiated for
the use of their army, authorized Castaños to draw on them according
to his wants, and immediately sent forward 200,000 dollars. This was
just before the meeting of the Central Junta: the Andalusian army was
then advanced to Soria, the Valencian under General Llamas moved to
Zaragoza, and Blake toward Miranda upon the Ebro.
♦THE MARQUES DE LA ROMANA.♦
One of the first things which Castaños had requested after he had
opened a communication with Gibraltar was, that dispatches might be
forwarded to Romana, who commanded the Spanish troops in the Baltic.
He expressed the greatest anxiety concerning him and his army, who had
been thus treacherously removed to so great a distance from their own
country, but at the same time the fullest confidence in them and their
Commander. He judged of the men as Spaniards, of the General by his
individual character. D. Pedro Caro y Sureda, Marques de la Romana, was
a man whose happy nature had resisted all the evil and debilitating
influences of the age and country and rank in which he was born. His
public career was begun in the navy; but having attained the rank of
_Capitan de Fragata_, he quitted that profession for the land service,
a change not unfrequent in Spain. During the French revolutionary
war he served under his uncle, D. Ventura Caro, who commanded on the
Biscayan frontier; and having distinguished himself there, was made
General of division in the army of Catalonia, under Urrutia, where he
continued to be conspicuous for his good conduct. When that miserably
misconducted war was concluded by a scandalous peace, Romana devoted
part of his leisure to the theory of his profession, which he was
the better able to study as having received an excellent education,
and made the best use of it. And so evenly did he steer his course,
that without in the slightest degree courting the favour of Godoy, or
sullying himself by any condescension, he never became an object of his
persecution; a singular instance of good fortune in those disgraceful
times, or rather of what may be effected by undeviating rectitude and
good sense. For he possessed a rare union of frankness and perfect
prudence; and while his own breast wore no disguise, and needed none,
could read with unerring intuition the characters of others. There
was in his manners that simplicity which is the sure indication of
generosity and goodness, and which wins confidence while it commands
respect. Spain, where honour is the characteristic virtue of the
nation, where so many heroic and illustrious men have arisen, has never
produced a man more excellently brave, more dutifully devoted to his
country, more free from all taint of selfishness, more truly noble than
Romana.
♦DISTRIBUTION OF HIS TROOPS IN THE BALTIC.♦
The force under his command consisted of about 14,000 men. They were
marched to Hamburgh in Aug. 1807, and quartered there, along the Elbe
and at Lubeck, as part of the army under Marshal Bernadotte, then
Prince of Ponte Corvo. It was reported that this army was to invade
Sweden, in conjunction with the Danes, and the Spanish division was
put in motion accordingly about the middle of March. But when the
van-guard, having safely crossed the Little Belt to the Isle of Funen,
was preparing for the passage of the Great Belt, they were prevented
by the appearance of an English frigate and brig between Nyeborg and
Corsoer, at a season when it was thought no enemy’s vessels would
venture into those seas. The remainder of the troops therefore were of
necessity ordered to halt, and were quartered in Sleswic, till they
should be able to effect the passage. The Prince Christian Frederick,
of seventy-four guns, was sent to clear the Great Belt of these
enemies, but falling in with the Stately and the Nassau, was captured,
after a severe action, close to the shore of Zeeland. Bernadotte,
who had crossed to that island a few hours only before the English
cruisers appeared, was now, in order to return to his head-quarters
at Odensee, obliged to go round the Isles of Falster and Laland, land
in Sleswic, travel to Kolding, and from thence cross the Little Belt.
Watching their opportunity, as they could during the months of April,
May, and June, some of these troops got to the Isle of Langeland; and
some succeeded in effecting by night the passage of the Great Belt from
Funen to Zeeland, the greater number still remaining in Funen, or upon
the coast of Jutland.
♦THEIR CONDUCT WHEN THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO JOSEPH WAS PROPOSED.♦
The French journals affirmed that these troops had taken the oath of
allegiance to the Intruder with unanimous enthusiasm. No man who knew
the Spanish character believed this falsehood. They were in a situation
where they were cut off from all communication with their own country,
and where no intelligence could reach them but what came through the
French press, or other channels equally under the control of the French
government. Nevertheless in these garbled and falsified accounts they
saw enough to convince them that their countrymen were not submitting
to a foreign dominion so easily as the tyrant endeavoured to represent.
This opinion was confirmed when a dispatch arrived from Urquijo to
Romana, requiring the army to take the oath to the Intrusive King,
that dispatch being the only paper which the courier brought; ... it
was plain, therefore, that private letters were intercepted, and that
something must have occurred of which it was important that they should
be kept in ignorance. When the oath was proposed, it was taken without
much demur by the troops in Jutland under D. Juan Kindelan, the second
in command. Those in Funen, with the Commander, refused it vehemently
at first, but took it at length conditionally, that is to say, with a
protestation that it was to be null if the changes which had occurred
in Spain were not confirmed by the general consent of the nation. The
regiments of Asturias and Guadalaxara, which were in Zeeland, were less
placable; being under the immediate command of a Frenchman, General
Frerion, they attacked his house, killed one of his aids-de-camp, and
wounded another, and he himself only escaped with life by disguising
himself, and flying to Copenhagen. The men then planted their colours,
knelt round them, and swore to be faithful to their country.
♦AN AGENT SENT TO COMMUNICATE WITH HIM.♦
The British Government meantime had not been inactive. The first
difficulty was how to communicate with the Spanish Commander. A
Roman-catholic priest, by name Robertson, was found willing to
undertake this dangerous service, and qualified for it by his skill as
a linguist. One Spanish verse was given him; to have taken any other
credentials might probably have proved fatal, and there was an anecdote
connected with this which would sufficiently authenticate his mission.
During Mr. Frere’s residence as ambassador in Spain, Romana, who was
an accomplished scholar, had recommended to his perusal the Gests of
the Cid, as the most animated and highly poetical, as well as the
most ancient and curious poem in the language. One day he happened to
call when Mr. Frere was reading it, and had just made a conjectural
emendation in one of the [35]lines; Romana instantly perceived the
propriety of the proposed reading, and this line, therefore, when he
was reminded of it, would prove that Mr. Robertson had communicated
with his friend the British Ambassador. Mr. Mackenzie was sent with
Robertson to Heligoland, there to provide means for landing him on the
continent, and to make farther arrangements as circumstances might
direct.
♦HE ASKS FOR A FORCE TO COVER HIS RETREAT.♦
The war with the Northern powers, and the interdict against British
goods, had given the miserable island of Heligoland an importance at
this time which it had never before possessed. Upon Mr. Mackenzie’s
arrival, an embargo was placed on the shipping there, and Robertson
was dispatched in a boat to land on the nearest shore; but so vigilant
a watch was kept wherever this might have been possible, that after
three days he returned to the island, convinced there was no hope of
accomplishing his errand unless he were provided with a passport.
Fortunately a vessel belonging to the port of Bremen had recently been
captured, and carried into Heligoland. Mr. Mackenzie sent for the
master, and proposed to liberate him and his ship if he would engage to
procure a passport for Robertson at Bremen. It happened to be in the
man’s power to redeem himself and his property upon these easy terms,
for he had a near relation in office in that city. The engagement was
faithfully performed; and Robertson, whose appearance was quite German,
and who assumed the character of a schoolmaster, found his way to
Romana. That noble Spaniard was greatly agitated at learning the real
situation of his country; the success in Andalusia, the deliverance
of Zaragoza, and the retreat of the Intruder from Madrid, were not
known in England at the time of Robertson’s departure; but he did not
hesitate a moment. Their conversation was in Latin; and Robertson was
sent back with a request that Mackenzie would proceed to the Baltic,
and procure the assistance of as many troops as might be necessary
to cover the retreat and embarkation of the Spaniards. Ten thousand
British troops, under Sir J. Moore, had been sent to Gottenburg in
the month of May, to co-operate with the Swedes. It was this aid that
Romana required.
♦SIR RICHARD KEATS GOES UPON THIS SERVICE.♦
This information was immediately communicated to the British
Government, and within a week Mr. Mackenzie received letters for Sir
John Moore, directing him to employ the troops in this service. Instead
of sending these dispatches, he thought it better to carry them, and
confer with that Commander in person, but when he reached Gottenburg
the expedition had sailed for England. Having left Heligoland without
permission, he now attempted to return thither, and for that purpose
embarked in the packet. A gale of wind drove it on the Danish coast. A
privateer, carrying sixteen guns, and well manned, came out, expecting
an easy capture; inferior as the English were, both in men and guns, a
fight of four hours was supported, till the Dane put his ship about,
and the packet returned to Gottenburgh in a shattered state. Baffled
in this intent, he thought his better course would be to make for the
fleet in the Baltic, and acquaint the Admiral with the disposition of
the Spaniards. Travelling therefore with all speed to Ystad, he there
found a Swedish vessel, which conveyed him to Sir James Saumarez’s ship
the Victory; and upon his representations Sir James, without waiting
for instructions, ordered Admiral Sir Richard Keats, with part of his
squadron, to the Great Belt, there to act in concert with Romana.
While they were preparing, orders for the performance of this service
arrived. A Spaniard attached to the embassy in London came out with
the dispatches, bringing letters from the Junta of Galicia, and from
individuals to Romana and the second in command.
♦PLAN FOR COLLECTING THE SPANISH TROOPS.♦
It was of great importance that Romana’s determination should be kept
secret as long as possible, lest the French and the Danes, who were
but too ready to have acted with them, should overpower his dispersed
forces. A young Spanish officer crossing from Zeeland to Langeland
was taken by this squadron; the letters were intrusted to him, he was
secretly put on shore in Langeland, and from thence crossed to Funen.
Such a messenger, it was thought, would not excite suspicion. Admiral
Keats proposed that the troops in Funen should secure themselves in a
peninsula on the north side of that island, from whence, if necessary,
they might be removed to the small island of Romsoe. The Danish
gun-boats would be rendered inactive if Romana was able, and should
think proper, to seize on the town and port of Nyborg; but this the
Admiral thought would endanger the troops in Zeeland ♦1808. AUGUST.♦
and Jutland, by provoking the Danes to act as enemies, when otherwise
it might be hoped they would be disposed secretly to favour the quiet
removal of the Spaniards, or at least to make no serious efforts for
impeding it. There was little probability that any negotiation for
their peaceable departure would be successful, subservient as the
court of Denmark was to the policy of France; but after the movement
should have commenced, a declaration of the honourable and unoffending
object in view might be advantageous. The two regiments in Zeeland,
it was proposed, should attempt to force their way to the peninsula
near Corsoer; if they succeeded in this, they might probably defend
the isthmus there, till they could be removed to the little island of
Sproe, half way between Corsoer and Nyborg. There were four regiments
in Jutland, distributed at Aarhuus, Ebeltoft, Greenaae, Randers,
Hobroe, Mariager, and some as high as Aalborg on the Gulf of Limefiord.
Orders were sent to these that they should take possession of such
vessels as they could find at Randers, Aarhuus, Fredericia, and Snogoe,
and make their way to Funen.
♦ROMANA TAKES POSSESSION OF NYBORG.♦
It was scarcely possible that these movements could be concerted
without exciting suspicion, prepared as the French officers and the
Danish Government were to expect some such attempt, and especially
after the manner in which the regiments in Zeeland had expressed their
national feeling. The French Commandant in Langeland discovered that
the officer who had passed from thence to Funen had communicated with
the English ships. When Romana understood this, he doubted not but
that the French in Holstein and Sleswic would be brought up by forced
marches; and as there were more than 3000 Danish troops in Funen,
he thought it necessary to take possession of Nyborg without delay.
The garrison were too weak to resist, and no violence ♦AUG. 9.♦ or
incivility was offered: the concerted signal was then made to Admiral
Keats, who had hoisted his flag the preceding day in the Superb off
that town; and he dispatched a letter to the Governor, assuring him,
that notwithstanding the state of war between England and Denmark, it
was his wish to abstain from every hostile and offensive act, provided
no opposition were made to the embarkation of the Spaniards. While this
was going on, he must co-operate with those troops, and consequently
often communicate with the town of Nyborg; but the strictest orders
had been given that all under his command should observe the utmost
civility toward the inhabitants. If, however, the Spaniards were
opposed, he must, however reluctantly, take measures which might
occasion the destruction of the town.
♦THE ENTRANCE OF THE BRITISH SQUADRON IS RESISTED.♦
The Danish garrison had yielded to circumstances; but an armed brig and
cutter, which were moored across the harbour, rejected all the pacific
offers both of the Spaniards and English, and even the remonstrances
of their own countrymen; such small vessels and boats as could be
collected were sent against them, and they were captured after half
an hour’s resistance and some waste of lives. Romana had been careful
that no act of hostility should be committed by his people, except
what was absolutely necessary for securing their embarkation; but some
of them, now irritated at the obstinacy with which their friends and
deliverers were opposed, fired a few shots at the Danish ships from the
batteries before they struck. Admiral Keats then wrote a second time to
the Governor, saying, that as his entrance into the harbour had been
resisted, he was bound by no law or usage to respect the property of
the inhabitants. The Spaniards had occasion for some of the vessels in
that port, and unless the masters and crews would assist in equipping
and navigating them, he could not secure them from injury; if they
would, he pledged himself to do so, and to grant them passports to
return in safety, after the short service for which they were required
should be ended.
♦ARRIVAL OF SOME OF THE REGIMENTS FROM JUTLAND.♦
On the same day that Nyborg was thus taken possession of, the
Spaniards, who were at Svendborg, which is at the southern extremity
of Funen, got possession of some gun-boats, that might otherwise have
prevented their passage, and crossed to Langeland. The regiment of
Zamora on the same day also arrived from Ebeltoft and Greenaae at
Middlefahrt; and starting from that place at ten on the same night,
performed the march to Nyborg in twenty-one hours, a distance of more
than fifty English miles. The regiment which made this prodigious
exertion for the sake of returning to assist in the deliverance of
Spain, was one of those which the French papers described as having
displayed the greatest satisfaction at the accession of the Intruder!
The troops which were at Hobroe and Mariager, and those at Aarhuus,
succeeded also in embarking, and arrived safely in the port of Nyborg.
The two regiments in Zeeland were unable to escape; three of the
battalions had previously been disarmed for their conduct when the oath
was proposed to them, and the others were now surrounded by Danish
troops: and there still remained three cavalry regiments and one of
infantry, in Jutland, of which, and of the officers sent to them, no
account had been received. While the troops were embarking on board
such vessels as were in the port of Nyborg, one of these regiments
arrived.
♦THEY LEAVE THE ISLE OF FUNEN.♦
The British Admiral had been at first of opinion, that if the troops
in Langeland felt themselves safe, it would be better to land all
the others there, from whence they might be removed at leisure. The
possession of Langeland had now been secured, but Nyborg was an
insecure position; it was reported that some thousand French had
collected upon the shores of the Little Belt; and these, with the
Danes in Funen, and the garrison of Nyborg, might seriously impede
the embarkation from that town, or perhaps succeed in cutting off
the rear-guard. It was judged expedient, therefore, to spike the guns
there, and remove the troops to a neck of land called Slipshavn, about
a league distant; and from thence they were shipped with as much
expedition as the unfavourable weather permitted.
♦FATE OF THE HORSES.♦
Two of the regiments which had been quartered in Funen were cavalry,
mounted on the fine, black, long-tailed Andalusian horses. It was
impracticable to bring off these horses, about 1100 in number; and
Romana was not a man who could order them to be destroyed lest they
should fall into the hands of the French: he was fond of horses
himself, and knew that every man was attached to the beast which had
carried him so far, and so faithfully. Their bridles, therefore, were
taken off, and they were turned loose upon the beach. As they moved
off, they passed some of the country horses and mares, which were
feeding at a little distance. A scene ensued such as probably never
before was witnessed. The Spanish horses are not mutilated, and these
were sensible that they were no longer under any restraint of human
power. A general conflict ensued, in which, retaining the discipline
that they had learnt, they charged each other in squadrons of ten or
twenty together; then closely engaged, striking with their fore-feet,
and biting and tearing each other with the most ferocious rage, and
trampling over those which were beaten down, till the shore, in the
course of a quarter of an hour, was strewn with the dead and disabled.
Part of them had been set free on a rising ground at some distance; and
they no sooner heard the roar of the battle than they came thundering
down over the intermediate hedges, and catching the contagious madness,
plunged into the fight with equal fury. Sublime as the scene was, it
was too horrible to be long contemplated, and Romana, in mercy, gave
orders for destroying them; but it was found too dangerous to attempt
this; and after the last boats quitted the beach, the few horses that
remained were seen still engaged in the dreadful work of mutual[36]
destruction.
♦AUG. 11. THE SPANIARDS ARE LANDED IN THE ISLE OF
LANGELAND.♦
On the second morning all were safely on board, but the wind detained
them in the harbour; and there, on the evening of that day, the
regiment from Aarhuus joined them, in four vessels, which they had
seized. The one at Randers did not succeed in making its escape. The
south part of Langeland was in possession of the Spaniards. As soon as
the wind permitted, their fellow-soldiers were landed there. The whole
number was about 9000 men, with some 230 ♦AUG. 13.♦ women and children.
Stores and water were to be laid in for their voyage to Gottenburg.
The Danish Governor, General Ahlefeldt, agreed not to molest them, and
withdrew his troops to the northern part of the island, promising, that
if any French were known to arrive in Funen, he would then deliver
up their arms. It was thought necessary to demand them the ensuing
day, upon a rumour that this had occurred; and also because a body of
Danish cavalry had appeared as if observing the Spaniards for some
military view; and because the escape of the French Commandant had
been facilitated by the General. Some of the troops refused to obey,
a detachment was therefore marched against them to enforce obedience,
and this demonstration of force was sufficient. They took the horses
also, having only about 200 of their own, which had been brought from
Svendborg; but they voluntarily promised that these arms and horses,
and whatever else belonged to the Danes, should be left upon the beach
at their departure. Some robberies, which a few of the men committed,
were instantly punished, and restitution made; and a just price was
fixed for the provisions which were demanded: they were supplied,
therefore, without reluctance. Meat was in abundance, but there was a
difficulty in obtaining bread; and the water lay at a distance from
the shore, ... a thousand men, and all the carriages that could be
procured, were employed in conveying it. Their situation was still an
anxious one: an attack was to be apprehended from the opposite port
of Svendborg; it was known that the Danes could collect as many as
four-and-twenty gun-boats there, and the channel would not admit of
frigates to defend it: a flotilla, indeed, came out from thence one
night, and kept up an idle cannonade upon the Spanish encampment.
It was reported that French troops had arrived there, and of this no
certain information could be obtained, for not a peasant in Langeland
could be induced by the offer of any reward to go and ascertain the
fact; an instance of national honour which may more than counterbalance
the unworthy conduct of the Danish Government at this time. That the
French were not inactive was certain. Proclamations from Bernadotte
were introduced into the camp, endeavouring to deceive the Spaniards
with regard to the state of affairs in their own country, to excite
suspicion of the English, and to make them arrest their leaders; but
these papers provoked only the contempt which they deserved.
♦THEY SAIL FOR GOTTENBURG, AND THERE EMBARK FOR SPAIN. AUG. 18.♦
On the sixth day after their landing Admiral Saumarez arrived,
and in three days more, every thing being ready, the troops were
re-embarked. The arms and horses which they had taken from the Danes
were left in the batteries. Before they departed a flag of truce was
sent to Copenhagen, requiring, on the part of their Commander, that
the regiments which were detained should be allowed to depart. The
vessels from Aarhuus, being manned by Danes, were supplied by the
British Admiral with stores for eight days, and released. Those from
Nyborg were manned from the fleet, and an offer was made to send them
back from Gottenburg with the crews of two Danish vessels which had
been captured, provided the Danes would release an equal number of
British prisoners in exchange. But these measures were not met with
a corresponding temper by the Danish Government, and the convoy was
fired at as it passed the battery of Slipshavn. They reached Gottenburg
in safety; and the Spaniards there received the first intelligence of
the successes which their countrymen had obtained. They were landed,
for the sake of health and comfort, upon the islands in the harbour;
transports from England arrived in a few days, and this little army
then sailed for their own country, full of ardour, ... to lay down
their lives in its defence.
♦1808. SEPTEMBER.♦
♦ROMANA LANDS IN ENGLAND.♦
While the convoy proceeded on its voyage to Coruña, Romana landed in
England, for the purpose of consulting with the British Government. It
was there determined that his force should be disembarked at Santander,
to be incorporated with the Galician army; and to avoid all immediate
difficulty concerning its support, the existing armies in the present
disorganized state of Spain being raised and subsisted by their
respective provinces. Great Britain undertook to pay and feed it for
two months, by which time it was supposed the Central Junta would be
ready to perform this part of its duties. These were troops on whose
discipline and courage entire reliance might be placed; and Romana’s
intention was to triple the infantry, by forming upon each battalion a
regiment of three. And as it was designed that a British army should
advance to bear its part in the first brunt of the great contest, the
intention was, that, if possible, it should act with Romana on the
left flank, and Castaños on its right. With both these officers it
was justly thought the service might proceed in the true spirit of
confidence and good will; the reputation of both stood deservedly high,
and their disposition was even of more importance, when operations were
to be carried on by concert between the generals, not by a paramount
and controlling command. For, ♦ERROR OF THE SPANIARDS IN NOT APPOINTING
A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.♦ by a strange error, the Spanish Government
had resolved to make the commands independent of each other. This
error seems to have been committed less from want of judgement than
in deference to the provincial Juntas, and in fear of offending them;
yet at that time public opinion would have supported them had they
appointed Castaños commander-in-chief.
♦DIFFICULTY OF FEEDING THEIR ARMIES.♦
It was not, however, the abilities of any single general, however
pre-eminent, which could have saved the Spanish armies, constituted
as they then were, from inevitable defeat, unless a strong British
force had been ready to have acted with them. Preparations upon
an adequate scale had been promised and intended by the Central
Government; but when they had raised men and embodied them, the
difficulty of maintaining them occurred, a difficulty which has at all
times been greater in Spain than in any other civilized country. Our
own commissariat was then far from effective; for great experience,
as well as great activity and talents, are required in the business
of providing an army: it is not then to be wondered at that the
Spaniards, under their complicated embarrassments, should have been
grievously defective in this main branch of the military art; but
this was one cause why the number of their armies fell far short of
their computed force, many young recruits returning to their homes,
when they saw how miserably they fared in the camp. It would have been
most desirable to have followed up the first successes with vigour,
and have attacked the enemy while the impression made upon them by so
many humiliating failures was fresh, and before farther reinforcements
should enable them to resume the offensive. But this had not been
possible. The French were strongly posted, and well provided with all
the means of war; and their cavalry gave them complete command of the
plains of Castille. They had ravaged the land from Burgos to Astorga,
and driven in contributions from the very gates of the latter city.
Blake could oppose no resistance to them in that open country without
cavalry, and for want of that essential arm was obliged to alter his
intended plan of operations, and pursue, at considerable risk, a
different course. He resolved to take a position between Bilbao and
Vitoria, and menace the right flank and rear of the French, while the
army of Aragon should act on their left.
♦BILBAO TAKEN AND RETAKEN. SEPT. 20.♦
Bilbao had remained a month in possession of the enemy; it was then
retaken by the Marques de Portazgo, and if his advanced posts had not
♦1808. OCTOBER.♦ begun to fire too soon, the garrison might have been
surprised and made prisoners. After an action of three or four hours
they effected their retreat, losing some 400 men. But considerable
bodies of French had now passed the Pyrenees; and Marshal Ney, who came
at this time to take the chief command till Buonaparte himself should
arrive, feigning to retreat upon Vitoria for the purpose of deceiving
Portazgo, suddenly marched with the centre of his army upon Bilbao.
The Marquis drew off in time, without losing a man or a gun, and took
up a position at Valmaseda. There he was joined by a detachment of the
Galician army, and Blake immediately made preparations to recover the
city; but General Merlin, whom Ney had left to command there, knew that
the place was not tenable against a superior force, and evacuated it on
the night of Oct. 11.
♦POSITION OF THE ARMIES IN OCTOBER.♦
The French force at that time amounted to about 60,000; and the
Spanish Generals knew, by an intercepted dispatch, that 72,000 more
would enter Spain before the middle of November. The Spaniards were
nominally 130,000, but the effective number was very far short of this.
With the left or western army Blake occupied a line from Burgos to
Bilbao. The eastern army, that of Aragon and Valencia, under Palafox,
was stationed, part near Zaragoza, and part was as far advanced as
Sanguessa, on the left of the enemy, outflanking them on that side, as
Blake did on the west. The head-quarters of the central army, under
Castaños, were at Soria; ... so that the whole formed a crescent. The
Spaniards now began to experience the ruinous effects of that false
policy which had exaggerated their successes and their strength, and
had represented the final deliverance of the country as an event soon
and certainly to be looked for. This delusion made the people clamorous
for the accomplishment of their expectations, and the government itself
either partook or yielded to this impatience. The wise precautions
with which the Junta of Seville began the war were disregarded, and
the Central Junta called upon the Generals to hasten their operations.
However strong, they said, might have been the reasons for delay,
loss of time had already proved injurious, and must be more so if the
enemy should receive their expected reinforcements. An end therefore
must be put ♦COMMISSIONERS SENT TO THE SPANISH ARMIES.♦ to this
inactivity. And, as if dissatisfied with their generals, they appointed
D. Francisco Palafox to go as their representative to the armies, with
the Marques de Coupigni and the Conde de Montijo under him. He was to
be received with the same honours as a Captain-General of the army, to
confer with the Commanders, concert operations with them, and himself
decide upon the plan of attack. Another reason for this mission was,
that Castaños and Palafox differed totally in opinion concerning the
measures which ought to be pursued. The latter was eager for action,
because he believed that every thing might be accomplished by zeal
and courage; the former understood the art of war better, and knew
how little these qualities alone were to be trusted in the open field
against an enemy strong in cavalry, equal in numbers, and superior in
discipline. The commissioners were sent to determine between them.
Of all the measures of the Central Junta this was the worst. It was
taken a few days before Romana arrived in Spain. Had he been present,
his authority, coming in aid of the opinion of Castaños, which was
decidedly but warily expressed, might have prevented so preposterous a
mission, and averted the evils which were thus precipitated.