CHAPTER XI.

FIRST CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN PORTUGAL. CONVENTION OF CINTRA.

♦1808.♦

♦STATE OF PUBLIC FEELING IN ENGLAND.♦

These transactions in Spain and Portugal excited the deepest interest

in the English people; not so much for the hope, which had thus

unexpectedly arisen, of advantages to England, and to the general

welfare of Europe, as for the nature of the contest, their detestation

of the unequalled iniquity by which it had been provoked, and their

sympathy in the instinct and principle by which it was carried on.

Every day seemed lost till an army of our own should be co-operating

with men engaged in a cause so sacred, so congenial to the feelings

of a Briton. Such was the eagerness to participate in the glorious

struggle, that the militia almost universally offered themselves for

foreign service, and the country with one voice called for an effort

equal to the occasion. But the Government was not prepared for such

exertions. Our military operations had never yet been carried on upon

a scale such as was now required, and since the peace of Amiens they

had been almost wholly suspended. Though great and most essential

improvements in the army had been steadily and unostentatiously carried

into effect by the Duke of York, much remained to be done; and it

wanted that efficiency which nothing but experience could give it.

That our troops were able to beat the enemy wherever they should meet

on equal terms, or even with considerable advantage of numbers on

the enemy’s side, no Englishman doubted, unless he wished the enemy

success; but the public confidence went no farther. The war had on

our part so long been almost exclusively maritime, that the army had

suffered something in reality and more in reputation. The French,

always fond of war, had become a military people; their military

establishment was supposed to be perfect in all its branches, their

troops experienced, their officers excellent, their commanders of the

highest celebrity: to oppose them we had generals very few of whom

had ever been tried in command, and officers of whom the far greater

number, like their men, had never seen an enemy in the field. A great

effort, however, was now called for by our new allies. The Spanish

Juntas with which the British Government had hitherto communicated,

preferred assistance in money and supplies to an auxiliary force; they

had a brave but undue confidence in their own strength, and perhaps

they foresaw that mutual ill will might probably arise between combined

armies whose habits and prejudices were widely dissimilar. What they

desired was, that a British expedition should be employed against the

French in Portugal; this would act as a powerful diversion in favour

of Spain; thither we were called by the wishes and groans of the

Portugueze people; and it was believed, that when the deliverance of

that kingdom should have been effected, a plan of co-operation with the

Spaniards might be arranged.

♦AN EXPEDITION ORDERED TO THE COAST OF PORTUGAL.♦

When the insurrection of the Spaniards began, an armament was preparing

at Cork, which, as different prospects opened upon us, had been

supposed to be intended at one time against Ceuta, at another for

South America. Its destination was now fixed for the Peninsula, and

the command was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley. His

instructions were, while the fleet proceeded off Cape Finisterre,

to make for Coruña himself, and consult there with the Provisional

Government of Galicia. He was authorized to give the most distinct

assurances to the Spanish and Portugueze people, that his Majesty, in

sending a force to their assistance, had no other object in view than

to afford them his most unqualified and disinterested support. In all

questions respecting their provisional government, should any such

arise, he was as far as possible to avoid taking any part; maintaining

only these principles, that no act done by Charles or Ferdinand could

be considered valid, unless they returned to their own country, and

were absolutely free agents there; and that the entire evacuation of

the Peninsula by the French was the only basis upon which the Spaniards

should be induced to treat. In any arrangements he was directed to

act with the utmost liberality and confidence, the object of Great

Britain being to assist the people of Spain and Portugal in restoring

and maintaining against France the independence and integrity of their

respective monarchies.

♦FORMER SERVICES OF SIR A. WELLESLEY.♦

Arthur Wellesley, fourth son of Viscount Wellesley, Earl of Mornington,

was born in the year 1769, at Dengan Castle, in Ireland, the seat of

his ancestors. After having been a short time at Eton, he was removed,

while very young, to the military academy at Angers; for there was not

at that time any institution in Great Britain wherein tactics were

taught, and the youth who meant to follow the military profession was

obliged to go to France if he wished to learn the elements of war.

He obtained his first commission about the age of eighteen, in the

41st regiment; and after a series of exchanges and promotions, his

elder brother, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, purchased for him the

lieutenant-colonelcy of the 33rd, in 1793. He conducted himself in

the disastrous retreat from Holland so as to obtain much praise from

military men. In 1795 he embarked for service in the West Indies,

but being providentially driven back by storms, his destination was

altered. In 1797 he went out to India with his brother Lord Mornington,

then Governor General; there he distinguished himself in the war

against Tippoo, and being appointed Governor of Seringapatam after the

capture of that city, and one of the commissioners for disposing of

the conquered territories, he discharged his arduous duties in such

manner as to deserve and obtain the gratitude of the conquered people.

In the subsequent war against the Mahrattas he commanded at the battle

of Assye, against an army exceeding his own number in the proportion

of ten to one; and whose disciplined troops, under French officers,

more than doubled the British force. The action was severe beyond all

former example in India: having won the enemy’s artillery, consisting

of an hundred pieces, which were served with perfect skill, he had to

take them a second time with the bayonet, when men who had feigned

death rose from the ground and turned them upon the conquerors as they

pressed forward in pursuit. The victory was decisive; the success was

followed up, and at the close of that triumphant war a monument in

honour of the battle was erected at Calcutta; the inhabitants of that

city presented him with a sword, and his own officers with a golden

vase; the thanks of parliament were voted him, and he was made a Knight

Companion of the Bath. He returned to England in 1805; took his seat

in the House of Commons the ensuing year, as member for Newport in the

Isle of Wight, and in 1807 was appointed Chief Secretary in Ireland.

But his military services were soon required; he accompanied Lord

Cathcart in the expedition against Copenhagen, and commanded in the

only affair of importance which took place. He was now to be tried

in more arduous undertakings; and such was the repute in which his

talents were held, that when the armament for the Peninsula was placed

under his command, the opinion both of the army and of the public

entirely accorded with the choice which Government had made.

♦SIR ARTHUR LANDS AT CORUÑA.♦

Sir Arthur Wellesley, having about ten thousand men under his command,

sailed from Cork on the 12th of July, and leaving the fleet as soon as

he had seen it clear of the coast, made sail in a frigate for Coruña,

and arrived there on the 20th. There the Junta of Galicia informed him

of the battle of Rio Seco; and that the French, being, in consequence,

masters of the course of the Douro, were enabled to cut off the

communication between that province and the country to the south and

east. The French in Portugal they estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000

were supposed to be at Lisbon; and he was told that the Portugueze

troops at Porto amounted to 10,000, and that a Spanish corps of 2000

had begun their march for that city on the 15th, and were expected to

arrive there about the 25th. Sir Arthur consulted with them concerning

the immediate employment of his army. They explicitly stated that

they were in no need of men, but wanted arms, ammunition, and money:

... this latter want was relieved by the arrival of £200,000 from

England that very day. They strongly recommended him to employ his

forces against the enemy in Portugal, because while that army remained

unbroken the Spaniards could never make any simultaneous effort to

drive the French out of the Peninsula; and they advised him to land

in the north, that he might bring forward and avail himself of the

Portugueze troops in that quarter.

♦HE PROCEEDS TO PORTO.♦

Accordingly Sir Arthur sailed for Porto, ordering the fleet to

follow him. He arrived there the 24th, and had a conference that

night with the Bishop and the general officers. From them, and from

Lieutenant-colonel Brown, who had previously joined them, he learnt

that the regular Portugueze troops who had been collected amounted

to 5000 men, and were posted at Coimbra; that there were about 1200

peasants in advance, and a corps of 2500 Portugueze and 300 Spanish

infantry at Porto, besides volunteers and peasants; but all were badly

equipped and armed, the peasantry having only pikes. It was concerted

that the 5000 should co-operate with him, and the remainder with the

Spanish corps, then, so the Spaniards had informed him, on its way

from Galicia; and that the peasantry should be employed, part in the

blockade of Almeida, part in the defence of Tras os Montes, which

province was supposed to be threatened by Bessieres, in consequence

of his victory at Rio Seco. Sir Arthur stated, that he should want

cattle for draught, and for the supply of his army; the Bishop took pen

and ink, wrote down the number which would be required, and replied

immediately that they were ready.

Here Sir Arthur received a letter from Sir Charles Cotton, advising

him to leave the troops either at Porto or at the mouth of the Mondego,

and proceed to communicate with him off Lisbon. ♦HE GOES TO THE TAGUS

TO CONFER WITH SIR C. COTTON.♦ The fleet accordingly was ordered to

Mondego Bay, and the general proceeded to confer with Sir Charles.

There he found dispatches from General Spencer, stating that he had

landed his corps in Andalusia, at the request of the Junta of Seville;

but that he had resisted the applications made to him to join Castaños,

thinking it advisable to preserve his force unbroken, for the purpose

of acting with Sir Arthur. He had, however, consented to take up a

position at Xeres, where he might serve as a point of support for

Castaños, in case of defeat, and from whence he could re-embark in

eight-and-forty hours: and he supposed that Sir Arthur would begin

his campaign at Cadiz, implying an opinion that Dupont could not

be defeated without English assistance. Sir Arthur, however, being

convinced by the Junta of Galicia that his army would be employed with

more advantage to the common cause against Junot, ordered General

Spencer to join him off the coast of Portugal, unless he should be

actually engaged in operations which he could not relinquish without

injury to the Spaniards.

♦THE MONDEGO THE ONLY PLACE WHERE A LANDING COULD BE EFFECTED.♦

General Spencer represented Junot’s force as exceeding 20,000 men:

the admiral, according to the reports of the Portugueze, estimated

them at less: Sir Arthur concluded that they were from 16,000 to

18,000, of whom about 12,000 were at Lisbon, and in its vicinity, and

2400 at Alcobaça. Any attempt at landing in the Tagus was considered

impracticable: it would be equally so at Cascaes: it was at all times

difficult to land an army in the small bays near the rock, and would

be now especially dangerous because of the neighbourhood of the enemy:

Peniche was garrisoned by the French. There was therefore no choice but

to disembark in the Mondego. Thither Sir Arthur returned. He rejoined

the fleet there on the 30th, and there he found intelligence of the

defeat of Dupont, and advice from his own government, that he would be

reinforced immediately with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Acland,

and afterwards with 10,000 who had been under Sir John Moore in Sweden,

the command being vested in Sir Hew Dalrymple; but he was directed

to carry into execution without delay the instructions which he had

received, if he thought himself sufficiently strong. He also received

accounts that Loison had been detached from Lisbon, to open the

communication with Elvas, the patriots in Alem-Tejo having been joined

by about a thousand men from the Spanish army of Estremadura, and being

now formidable.

♦TROOPS LANDED IN THE MONDEGO.♦

♦1808. AUGUST.♦

This latter account made him conclude that there was no danger of

being attacked by superior numbers before his reinforcements reached

him; and he determined to land, both for the sake of the troops, and

because he knew that the Portugueze, who were much discouraged at

seeing the men remain so long on board after their arrival in Mondego

Bay, would suspect either the inclination of the English to contend

with the French, or their ability, if the landing were still deferred.

It was now found that the Coimbra students had performed a service of

real importance in winning Figueira from the enemy; the landing in the

Mondego being so difficult, that with all the zeal and ability of the

navy, it would have been impossible to effect it without the cordial

assistance of the Portugueze. They began to disembark on the first of

August. The weather was so little favourable, and the surf so high,

that the whole of the troops were not landed till the 5th, and on that

day General Spencer arrived, his corps following him the next. He had

embarked immediately upon learning the surrender of Dupont, not waiting

for instructions. This corps was disembarked on the 7th and 8th, on

which night the whole army were in readiness to advance: the march of

the main body was, however, delayed till the 10th, at the desire of the

Portugueze general officers. Sir Arthur conferred with them at Montemor

o Velho, and arranged the plan of operations: he armed and inspected

their troops, recommended and superintended their organization, and

offered as large a sum as his military funds could afford, to defray

the expenses of their equipment: this, however, was declined by their

officers. While the troops were landing, a party of the police cavalry

arrived at Coimbra, having effected their escape from Lisbon. This

hazardous attempt was planned and conducted by Eliziario de Carvalho.

A serjeant, by name Gamboa, as soon as their flight was discovered,

was dispatched to the French commander at Santarem, with orders to

intercept and make an example of them, according to the system of the

French tyranny. Gamboa, however, with the party under his command,

followed and joined his countrymen; and they accomplished their

dangerous march in safety.

♦THEY ADVANCE TO LEIRIA.♦

Sir Arthur determined to march along the road nearest the sea, for the

sake of communicating with the store-ships; but as this communication

must needs be very precarious, both as depending upon the state of

the surf, and also because the army might find it expedient to strike

more into the country, arrangements were made for taking with them

sufficient stores to last till they should reach the Tagus. The

advanced guard marched on the 9th, supported by the brigades under

Generals Hill and Ferguson. Laborde and Thomieres had collected their

corps, to the amount of from 5000 to 6000 men, in the neighbourhood

of Leiria; they threatened the magazines formed in that city for the

Portugueze army; and Sir Arthur was urged to advance as speedily as

possible, for the sake of preserving them. The main body followed

on the 10th: on that day Sir Arthur received advices from Coruña,

informing him that neither Blake nor Cuesta was in a condition to

act offensively against Bessieres, nor to follow him, if he should

enter Portugal. But at the same time news arrived of the flight of the

Intruder from Madrid; and Sir Arthur perceived that Bessieres would

be more solicitous to cover his retreat towards the French frontier,

than to attempt a diversion in favour of Junot. At all events, there

was time enough for his operations against the latter before Bessieres

could arrive; and it was to be expected that General Acland, or

Sir John Moore, would land before he could come up. These advices,

therefore, only determined him to follow up with the utmost celerity

the plan which he had concerted. On the 11th the main body joined

the advanced guard at Leiria, and the next day the Portugueze force,

consisting of 6000 men, including 600 cavalry, arrived, the whole force

being now collected there. When the English advanced guard entered that

city, they found in one of the convents the dead bodies of several

monks who had been murdered by the French; ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS OF THE DUKE

OF WELLINGTON, P. 8.♦ the murderers had amused themselves with dipping

their hands in the blood of these victims, and printing the red mark

upon the wall.

♦JOY OF THE PORTUGUEZE IN LISBON.♦

The arrival of the British troops in Portugal had the immediate

effect of putting an end to that anarchy which had already produced

so much evil in the northern provinces. Meantime the wildest reports

were afloat at Lisbon. The miserable people looking every where for

deliverance, believed that an army from Morocco was coming to their

aid. The trick of the egg was repeated, not as before, with mysterious

initials, referring to King Sebastian, but with a distinct annunciation

that the French were speedily to be destroyed. The egg thus inscribed

was found ♦NEVES, V. 67.♦ upon the high altars of the Patriarchal

Church: but the former instance had led the French to discover the

easy process by which an inscription in relief may be produced, and

on the following morning eggs with a counter prophecy, in the same

fashion, were to be seen upon the ♦THIEBAULT, 170.♦ high altar in every

church in Lisbon: at the same time a paper was fixed up, explaining

the trick. This was fair matter of mirth for the day; but Junot and

his officers well knew that the hostile prediction was not made now

without a reasonable and near prospect of its fulfilment; and very

soon intelligence came that the only foe of which ♦NEVES, V. 62, 65.♦

he stood in fear had actually disembarked. The Portugueze commanders

at Coimbra and Pombal used their utmost endeavours that no information

of the British movements might reach the enemy, and in this they were

assisted by the disposition of the people. But entire concealment

was not possible; ... the news came to Lisbon at the same time from

General Thomieres, from the agents of the police, by private letters,

and by public report; and if Junot could have doubted the accuracy of

his dispatches, all doubt ♦THIEBAULT, 172.♦ would have been removed by

the altered appearance of the Lisbonians, who now knew that of a truth

their deliverance was at hand.

Loison was immediately recalled from Alem-Tejo, and Laborde, who was

supposed to be the ablest of the French generals, was sent with the two

brigades of Generals Brenier and Thomieres to manœuvre and delay the

enemy till Loison ♦MEASURES OF THE FRENCH.♦ could arrive, Travot being

appointed to the command at Lisbon in Laborde’s stead; ... this general

♦THIEBAULT, 175.♦ was chosen because having demeaned himself as a man

of honour and humanity, he had deserved and obtained the respect and

good opinion of the Portugueze. The castle at Lisbon, which had now

been strongly fortified, was supplied with more ammunition and stores.

The fowling-pieces and other weapons, which had been delivered up in

obedience to a former edict, were broken, or rendered useless, ... the

bars of silver into which the church plate had been cast, and the other

portable plunder, packed for removal, and deposited on board one of the

Portugueze ships of war. Whole piles of rich hangings and vestments,

the spoils of palaces and churches, were burnt in a building erected

for the purpose near head-quarters, and in the sight of the people,

for the sake of the gold and silver wherewith they were embroidered.

In order to counteract the excitement of hope in the citizens, it was

confidently asserted, that 20,000 French had entered Portugal on the

side of Braganza; and for the chance, vain as it was, of provoking

their bigotry, they were reproached as having brought a stain upon

their country by inviting heretics and Mahometans to fight against the

French, who, like themselves, professed the true religion. It was

indeed actually believed by the Portugueze that the British had brought

with them a Moorish force: the Portugueze Consul in Barbary had in fact

obtained from the Emperor of Morocco a promise of 200,000 _cruzados_

for the service of Portugal; and this may have given occasion to a

belief which was confirmed by the appearance of the Highlanders: ...

♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 402. NEVES, V. 65, 118.♦ their dress was

immediately pronounced not to be Christian, and for a time no doubt was

entertained but that these were the Moorish auxiliaries.

♦MOVEMENTS OF LABORDE AND LOISON.♦

The French apprehended that Sir Arthur would move upon the Zezere and

the Tagus, for the purpose of interposing between Loison’s detachment

and their main force. Laborde therefore proceeded by Villa Franca and

Rio-Maior to Candieiros, where he encamped; from Rio-Maior he might

either take the direction of Alcobaça, Leiria, or Thomar, and, it

was hoped, co-operate with Loison, in case any attempt were made to

prevent their junction. Learning, however, that the British army kept

the line of the coast, and that Loison had crossed the Tagus without

opposition, and was in no danger of being impeded in his march, he

proceeded to Alcobaça, ♦THIEBAULT, 175.♦ where he found Thomieres.

Junot had instructed him to reconnoitre the position of Batalha; ...

the last ground, it might have been thought, on which an invader would

have risked a battle; for there it was where Portugal, (and then also

with English aid,) had achieved her own deliverance in the battle of

Aljubarrota, one of the most signal and important victories in the age

of chivalry. The country was too open for his force, and he therefore

remained at Alcobaça, watching the movements of the enemy, and hoping

to be joined by Loison. That general, meantime, had suffered much on

his march through Alem-Tejo, from the excessive heat and the want of

water. Though there were none to oppose them in the field or harass

them, the French felt what it was to be in a country where every

inhabitant regarded them with a deadly hatred. Wherever they went the

towns and villages were deserted; ... meat, wine, and even bread, were

wanting; and the persons who fell into their hands, or perhaps remained

in their line for the purpose of deceiving them, sent them out of

their way in search of springs or rivulets, which when they reached

them were dry; ... or ♦THIEBAULT, 172.♦ of stagnant waters, wherein

hemp was steeped, and of which, nauseous and noisome as it was, the

men could not be prevented from drinking greedily. Many died of heat

and exhaustion on the way; and they who from fatigue or sickness fell

behind, were killed by the peasantry.

♦G. FREIRE SEPARATES FROM THE ENGLISH.♦

Loison reached Abrantes on the 9th, crossing the Tagus by the bridge

of boats at that city. He rested there one day, and, leaving 200 men

in garrison, proceeded on the next across the Zezere to Thomar, where

he arrived on the same day that the main body of the English reached

Leiria, the two cities being about thirty miles from each other.

Laborde was at Alcobaça, six leagues from the latter city, on the road

to Lisbon. Their object had been to join at Leiria, but in this the

British army had anticipated them; and as there was no practicable road

for carriages between Thomar and Alcobaça, Loison could only effect

a junction with Laborde by a circuitous route to the southward, and

thus the latter general was exposed to be attacked alone. Bernardim de

Freire, the Portugueze commander, in his former conferences with Sir

Arthur, had expressed a wish that the British commissariat would supply

his troops with British stores during the campaign. The impossibility

of complying with so unreasonable a demand was pointed out; and Sir

Arthur observed, that it was a new thing to require any army landing

from its ships to supply not only its own consumption of meal, but also

that of the native army which it was come to assist. He added, however,

that he did not expect to have occasion to call upon the country for

bread during his march towards Lisbon; but that beef, wine, and forage

would be required, all of which the Bishop of Porto had engaged should

be supplied. Notwithstanding this explanation, General Freire renewed

the subject on his arrival at Leiria; and, instead of pursuing his

march, the following morning, at the hour appointed, he sent a message

to the British commander, saying, that unless the Portugueze were to

be fed by the English commissariat, he would separate them from the

English army, and march for Santarem by way of Thomar; urging as his

reason, that supplies would be scarce on the straight road, but here

there was great plenty, and he should also be in a situation to cut

off the retreat of the French from Lisbon. Freire had voluntarily

placed himself and his troops under Sir Arthur’s command only the day

preceding.

♦MOTIVES FOR HIS SEPARATION.♦

There was another reason for this conduct, which he did not communicate

to the British General. A fear had come upon the Portugueze officers

during the night, that Loison, whose arrival at Abrantes they knew,

would turn upon the northern provinces; the fate of Beja and Evora was

before their eyes, and they trembled for Coimbra. Their apprehensions

were confirmed by the arrival that night of dispatches from the

Governor of Coimbra, communicating to General Freire, as information

of the utmost importance, that Laborde’s orders were to amuse the

Portugueze army, in order that Loison might pass in their rear and

destroy that city; thus, the Governor added, it had been determined in

a council of war at Lisbon, and the advice was sent to him by a person

upon whom he had entire reliance. It is very possible that the advice

came from the French themselves, for the purpose of deceiving him.

General Freire began now to fear not only for his own retreat, but even

that the English, if they met with a repulse, would be cut off from

the Mondego, and unable to retire to their ships. The truth is, that

he was unequal to his situation, and having persons about him of as

little experience as himself, they confused one another. Concealing

from Sir Arthur this, which was the real cause of ♦NEVES, V. 79–81.♦

his vacillation, he chose to separate upon the question of supplies.

The danger of the plan was pointed out to him, but in vain: Sir Arthur

urged him, equally in vain, to co-operate with the British army in the

deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own honour, to

the honour of his country, or of his Prince: he then requested him to

send him 1000 infantry, with his cavalry, 250 in number, and his 400

light troops, engaging to feed them; and this was done. He advised

him, at all events, to remain at Leiria, or Alcobaça, or any where in

the rear of the English, that his troops might not be unnecessarily

exposed to destruction; but notwithstanding he was now assured that the

English General had found resources in the country fully adequate to

their subsistence, he said he should persist in his plan. Sir Arthur,

considering it of importance, on political grounds, that the Portugueze

troops should accompany his march, would have undertaken to feed them,

if he could have relied upon his commissariat; but this, he complained,

was so ill [23]composed, as to be incapable of distributing, even to

the British troops, the ample supplies which had been procured for

them. Freire’s conduct was imputed to an opinion that the English were

too weak for the service upon which they were advancing; it was not

suspected that he had received intelligence which alarmed him, and

which he had withheld from the British commander. He was, however, wise

enough to follow the advice which he had at first refused, and remained

at Leiria.

♦SKIRMISH NEAR CALDAS.♦

On the 14th, Sir Arthur reached Alcobaça, from which the French fell

back the preceding night: the next day he arrived at Caldas. Laborde

and Thomieres were now at Roliça, about ten miles off, and their

advanced posts were within a league of the Caldas. Four companies

of riflemen were ordered to drive them back; they were tempted to

an incautious pursuit; a superior body of the enemy endeavoured to

cut them off, and would have succeeded, had not General Spencer come

to their support. A trifling loss was sustained in this affair,

but the village was won, and the French retired entirely from the

neighbourhood; their picquets having been driven from Obidos.

♦LABORDE TAKES A POSITION AT ROLIÇA.♦

The country between the Caldas and Obidos is a sandy level, with an

open pine wood. Obidos itself stands finely upon an insulated hill,

and a little beyond a mountainous or hilly region begins, the ascent

from the low country being abrupt and difficult. Laborde had retired

thither, knowing the strength of the ground, and expecting to be joined

there by Loison, who, he knew, would make every exertion to effect his

junction in time. That junction had once already been prevented by the

timely arrival of the British at Leiria, and Sir Arthur now advanced

for the ♦AUGUST 17.♦ purpose of a second time preventing it. The enemy

were drawn up at the foot of the hill, in front of their position;

they retired to the heights, and Sir Arthur, having reconnoitred the

ground, and seen how difficult the attack in front would be, determined

to attack both flanks. He therefore directed Major-General Ferguson,

with 3000 men, to turn the enemy’s right, and Major-General Hill to

attack the left, while the Portugueze troops, under Colonel Trant, by a

wider movement on that side, were to penetrate to his rear. Meanwhile

columns under Major-Generals Crawford, Nightingale, and Fane, were

to assemble in the plain, ready to force their way up the passes as

soon as it should be seen that the enemy were shaken. This plan, which

would have ensured success with the least possible loss, was frustrated

by some mistake in the delivery of an order. Ferguson’s brigade was,

in consequence of this error, brought into the plain to support the

central movement; and the attack was made in front, upon the strength

of the position, before the enemy apprehended any danger on the flanks

or in the rear, and consequently while they were able to apply their

whole force and undivided attention where they were strongest.

Roliça was at that time a large and beautiful village, with more

appearance of comfort and welfare about it than was usual in Portugueze

villages. The place, with its five dependent hamlets, contained about

three hundred families, the larger half of the population being in

Roliça itself. Most of the houses had an inclosed garden or orchard,

and the country is full of olive grounds, vineyards, and gardens, with

stone inclosures. A little beyond Roliça is the hamlet of N. Senhora

de Misericordia, a place of fewer houses, but of the same description:

just without this village the British artillery was well placed, on a

rising ground, where there stood some of those strong and well-built

windmills which are common in Portugal; below were olive grounds, and

an open grove of ilex or cork, under cover of which our troops were

enabled to approach and deploy with little loss, though the French kept

up a constant fire from the heights. Laborde had planted his eagle on

the highest point of Monte S. Anna, near a wooden cross, which marked

the spot of some murder or accidental death. The view from those

heights is singularly beautiful, presenting just such objects as Gaspar

Poussin delighted in painting, and in such combination as he would

have placed them; rocks and hills rising in the valley, open groves,

churches with their old galilees, and houses with all the picturesque

varandas and porticos which bespeak a genial climate; Obidos with its

walls and towers upon an eminence in middle distance, and its aqueduct

stretching across the country as far as the eye could follow it; Monte

Junto far to the east, and on the west the Atlantic. And till the

iniquitous invasion of the country by France, there had been something

in the condition of the people here which accorded with the loveliness

of the scene wherein they were placed. Such as their lot was, they were

contented with it; three and even four generations were found under

the same roof: like plants, they grew, and seeded, and decayed, and

returned to earth upon the spot where they had sprung up. If this state

of things be not favourable to commercial prosperity and the wealth of

nations, it is far more conducive to individual virtue and happiness

than the stage by which it is succeeded.

♦BATTLE OF ROLIÇA.♦

Upon this beautiful ground it was that the British troops were first

to be tried against the soldiers of Buonaparte in the Peninsula.

The strength of the enemy’s position fully compensated for their

inferiority in numbers. The way by which the assailants had to ascend

was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men,

so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal,

in some parts overgrown with briars, and in others impeded by fragments

of rock. Three of these dry water-courses, which appeared the least

difficult, were attempted; that in the centre was the most promising,

and this the 9th and 29th regiments attacked. They were protected in

their advance by the fire of our artillery. The way would not admit

more than three or four men abreast, in no place more than six. Near

the top there was a small opening, in the form of a wedge, overgrown

at the point with a thick coppice of myrtle, arbutus, arborescent

heath, and those other shrubs which in this part of Portugal render

the wild country so beautiful. An ambush of riflemen had been posted

here, and here Colonel Lake, of the 29th, fell, with many of his men.

When they had reached the summit, they were exposed to a fire from

the vineyards, while they could not form a front to return it. The

grenadier company, by a brave charge upon that part of the enemy who

were in the open ground, won for them time to form; and though Laborde,

with great promptitude, rallied the French as soon as they gave way,

and brought them thrice to the charge, they kept their ground. This

severe contention had continued two hours, when Brigadier-General Fane,

with the light troops, appeared on the right, and Major-General Hill

on the left. Laborde then deemed it necessary to abandon his first

line and retire into the hamlet of Azambugeira, which was in the rear.

Throughout the action this General had shown that the high military

reputation which he enjoyed was well founded; all his movements were

judiciously planned, and rapidly and well executed, men and officers

giving good proof of skill and courage. The superiority of the British

troops was therefore finely shown; for, from the nature of the ground,

and from unavoidable circumstances, the force which on our side was

actually engaged was by no means equal to that of the enemy. A gallant

charge, under Major-General Spencer, drove them from this last position

in the hamlet; the advantage could not be followed up for want of

cavalry, and also because of the difficulty of bringing up cannon and

more troops in time. Laborde therefore, making his last stand upon a

height beyond Azambugeira, collected his troops on the plain ground

behind, formed them into lines, and then retired toward Torres Vedras,

leaving his guns upon the field.

♦ABRANTES OCCUPIED BY THE PORTUGUEZE.♦

The loss of the British, in killed, wounded, and missing, was nearly

500. The French[24] acknowledge to have lost nearly 600. Laborde was

slightly wounded at the beginning of the action. Even during the action

he was in hopes that Loison might arrive; but Loison, finding that the

English were before him at Leiria, found it necessary to take the line

of Torres Novas and Santarem, and so for Torres Vedras. The Portugueze

had anxiously watched his movements, and no sooner was it ascertained

that he had left Thomar, than they prepared to cut off the small

garrison which he had left in Abrantes. Freire had ordered Bacellar

to get possession of that city, with the aid of some Spanish troops

under the Marques de Valadares, who had arrived at Castello Branco.

Captain Manoel de Castro Correa de Lacerda had been sent forward to

obtain certain intelligence of the enemy; and he finding circumstances

favourable, and adventurers enough to join him, determined, with three

priests militant, by name Captain-Father P. Manoel Domingos Crespo,

Lieutenant-Father Lourenço Pires, and Ensign-Father José Nicolao Beja,

to make the attempt without waiting for the Spaniards. They collected

at Villa de Rei some three hundred men, armed with hunting-spears, and

a few with firelocks; a considerable number of the _Ordenanças_ joined

them during the night on the heights of Abrançalha, which was the place

appointed for their meeting; and early on the morning of that day on

which the battle of Roliça was fought, they entered Abrantes, leaving

Ensign-Father Beja with a party of spearmen in ambush to cut off the

enemy if they should attempt to fly. The French, upon the first

appearance of danger, retired into the old castle, and fired from the

windows, ... for there was no artillery there. Upon this Father Crespo

stationed some sharp-shooters upon the roof of S. Vicente’s church,

which was opposite. The enemy, then knowing how impossible it was to

hold out in their unprovided state, resolved to sally, and make for the

river side, where they had four vessels laden with stores, about to

fall down the stream for Lisbon; but before they could reach the shore,

they were surrounded by such numbers, and lost so many men, that they

laid down their arms. They who were on board the vessels, seeing their

danger, leaped into the river; some perished in attempting to cross it,

they who reached the opposite shore were pursued and hunted down like

wild beasts; fifty-two were killed that day, and 117 taken prisoners;

the few who escaped for the time had no place of safety near, and fell

into the hands of the peasantry. The Corregedor-Mor at this time met

with a miserable fate. Because of the office which he unfortunately

held, the French had made him the instrument of their exactions: the

same constitutional timidity which prevented him from resigning his

post rather than obey their tyrannical orders, induced him now to fly,

in the unworthy hope of securing himself under their protection. He

therefore forded the river, and hid himself in a vineyard; there a

peasant discovered him, to whom he immediately offered 200 milreis if

he would conduct him to the French army; the villain took the money,

led him to a solitary place, stabbed him in five places, then robbed

him, and left him to expire. On the third day he was found by some

women, still alive, and was carried to Abrantes; no care availed to

save his life, and he died rather of inanition and loss of blood, than

from the nature ♦NEVES, V. 95–105.♦ of his wounds; but he was able

to relate what had passed, so that the murderer was apprehended and

brought to justice.

♦MOVEMENTS IN ALEM-TEJO AND ALGARVE.♦

Among the French effects which were taken at Abrantes were about 200

hides and 1000 bags of cotton, which the state of the intermediate

country had prevented them from sending into France: they had carried

on a gainful trade while the communication was open. But now they

began to feel that the amount of their gains and of their plunder

was in danger. In spite of all prohibitions and precautions, some

intelligence still found its way to Lisbon. The British squadron and

the transports had been seen from the heights, and though the French

abated nothing of their high tone, the inhabitants were now well

assured that their deliverance was at hand. As the only course which

offered any hope of extricating himself, Junot resolved to collect

the whole of his disposable force, and give the English battle before

their reinforcements arrived, and before they should be ready to act on

the offensive. The only places in which he left garrisons were Elvas,

Almeida, and Peniche. Setubal had hitherto been occupied by a force

under General Graindorge, who had succeeded Kellermann in the command

there. His situation had not been tranquil, while Mestre had taken

possession of Alcacere do Sal, and an English frigate was off the port.

But Mestre was recalled in all haste to Beja, when that city, after the

fate of Evora, apprehended a second visitation with fire and sword.

The men whom he commanded gave on this occasion proof of that patient

and uncomplaining spirit with which the Spaniards and Portugueze

endure privations. They started fasting and without provisions, and

after a long day’s march reached the little town of Odivella, where

no rations had been provided for them. Mestre and his adjutant then

went from door to door, to beg bread, and with the bread which was

thus obtained they were contented and cheerful. Aware of the alarm

which Loison’s operations had excited, Graindorge resolved to clear

the neighbourhood, and the Juntas of Alcacere, Santiago de Cacem, and

Grandola, fled at his approach. But when Beja was relieved from danger

by Loison’s movements to the north, Mestre, who had been dispatched

toward Evora, ♦ALCACERE DO SAL AND SETUBAL ABANDONED BY THE FRENCH.♦

was ordered to return upon Alcacere, and the same direction was taken

by one body of men from Algarve, and by another under Lopes from Beja.

Graindorge had now received orders to retire with his troops to Almada;

Alcacere therefore was abandoned when the Portugueze arrived there,

and Setubal also. Setubal had been singularly fortunate during a time

of general rapacity. Perfect order had been maintained there while

Solano and the Spaniards possessed it; and when Graindorge succeeded

Kellermann, a Portugueze woman, who lived with him as his mistress, had

influence enough to prevent him from delivering up that beautiful town

to pillage, which his men required, and which, it is said, they had

been ♦NEVES, IV. 173–179. OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 291.♦ promised. The

Portugueze writers ought not to have passed over in silence the name

of one who averted so much evil, and who, it may well be believed, was

more to be pitied than condemned for her frailty.

♦MEASURES AT LISBON.♦

About 300 men were left at Palmella. Graindorge had two regiments

under his command at Almada and other places on the left bank of the

Tagus. The forts at the Bugio, Trafaria, and St. Julien, were occupied

by the French, and they had troops also at Cascaes and Ericeyra.

Sufficient force was to be left in and near Lisbon, to keep down

the inhabitants, by the presumed aid of the Russian squadron, whose

presence in the river was of great importance to Junot at this time.

The enemy had recourse also to their usual policy of circulating

fabricated intelligence. They affirmed, that 20,000 French had arrived

at Braganza, and they produced Badajoz Gazettes which must have been

forged for the purpose, relating the defeat and consternation of the

Spaniards, and the rejoicings with which Joseph had been received on

his triumphant entrance into Madrid. Few persons were deceived by these

artifices. On the 15th the Emperor Napoleon’s birthday was celebrated;

the guns from the ships and fortresses were fired, Junot gave a grand

entertainment to his officers, and appeared afterwards at the Opera

in state; but meantime every thing was made ready for his departure.

The night was passed in giving orders, and at daybreak the reserve was

in motion, with the staff, the military chest, containing a million

francs, and the most precious and portable part of their plunder. The

Comte de Bourmont, and some other French emigrant officers who had

found an asylum in Lisbon during the horrors of the Revolution, on this

occasion joined the French army, the Count at his own solicitation

being placed upon the staff, to fight against a government by whose

bounty they had been supported, and a people who had hospitably

received them in their distress: and for this moral treason ♦OBSERVADOR

PORTUGUEZ, 406. THIEBAULT, 187–8.♦ they have been extolled

in their own country, with that perversion of principle and utter

insensibility to honour, which equally characterise the schools of the

Revolution, and of Buonaparte.

♦PROCLAMATION TO THE PEOPLE OF LISBON.♦

It had been proposed to form a national guard at Lisbon at this time,

composed of all who had any property to protect; but this was rejected,

less as being impracticable than as dangerous. The Lisbonians had too

much reason to execrate their oppressors. Their sufferings, though not

of that kind which give a splendour to history, and consecrate the

memory of the sufferers, had been more pitiable, for they had been long

continued and obscure. The French themselves confessed, that they

knew not how the people of Lisbon subsisted during the three months

preceding the harvest; ♦THIEBAULT, 95.♦ for it was known that the

consumption of food in that great city was only one-third of what it

used to be, and the numbers who had been expelled, who had emigrated

with the court, or had found means of following it, were not greater

than that of the foreign troops who had been introduced. Impossible as

it was to conciliate a people upon whom they had inflicted such deep

and irreparable injuries, the French deemed it politic at this time

to take the most conciliatory measures in their power; if the popular

feeling could be repressed or allayed only for a few days, by that time

they should either have obtained a victory over the English, or have

placed themselves by treaty under the safeguard of British honour.

With these views Junot left a decree, that the heads of the tribunals,

and the chief persons among the nobility and clergy, should be invited

to assist at the council of government during his absence. He left

also a proclamation to the inhabitants of Lisbon, saying, that he was

departing from them for three or four days, to give battle to the

English, and whatever might be the event, he should return. “I leave,”

said he, “to govern Lisbon, a general who, by the mildness and firmness

of his character, has obtained the friendship of the Portugueze at

Cascaes and Oeyras; General Travot will, by these same virtues, obtain

that of the inhabitants of Lisbon. Hitherto you have been tranquil;

it is your interest to continue so! do not stain yourselves with a

horrible crime at the moment when, without any danger of your own, the

lot of arms is about to determine by what power you are to be governed.

Reflect for an instant upon the interests of the three nations who are

contending for the possession of Lisbon. What the French desire is the

glory and the prosperity of the city and of the kingdom, for this is

the interest and the policy of France. Spain wishes to invade Portugal

and reduce it to a province, that she may again make herself mistress

of the Peninsula. And England would domineer over you for the purpose

of destroying your port and your navy, and impeding the progress of

industry among you. The English regard the magnificence of your port

with envy; they will not suffer it to exist so near them, and they have

no hope of preserving it. They know that a new French army has already

passed your frontiers, and that if this should not be sufficient,

another will come after it; but they will have destroyed your naval

establishments, they will have caused the destruction of Lisbon, and

this is what they aim at, and what they desire: they know that they

cannot maintain themselves upon the Continent; but if they can destroy

the ports and the navy of any other power, they are content. I depart

full of confidence in you. I reckon upon all the citizens who are

interested in the preservation of public order; and I am persuaded that

it will be preserved. Call to mind the miseries which must necessarily

follow, if this beautiful city should compel my troops to enter it by

force! The exasperated soldiers would not be then to be controlled; ...

fire, sword, all the horrors of war which are practised in a city taken

by assault, ... pillage, ... death, ... behold what you would draw

♦OBSERVADOR PORTUGUEZ, 408.♦ upon yourselves! The thought alone makes

me shudder. Inhabitants of Lisbon, avert from yourselves these terrible

calamities!”

♦PREPARATIONS ON BOARD THE RUSSIAN SQUADRON.♦

The tone of the French was somewhat altered in their menaces. There had

been no shuddering when the fate of Beja and Evora was announced to

the people of Lisbon, nor when the massacre at Leiria was perpetrated.

Care was taken to manifest that the French were prepared to execute

their threats if needful. The Russian squadron, which lay at anchor

in a line from Junqueira to Boa Vista, was made ready for action, the

men being stationed at their quarters with lighted matches; they, no

doubt, apprehended an attack from the English fleet, but ♦OBSERVADOR

PORTUGUEZ, 410.♦ La Garde intimated that they would fire upon the city

in case an insurrection were attempted. Justly apprehensive, however,

for his personal safety, this Intendant, whom, because perhaps of his

office, the people regarded with peculiar hatred, went sometimes to

pass the night on board the Vasco da Gama, and General Travot, though

he was evidently esteemed by the people for his mild and honourable

conduct (so much is a good name worth even in the worst times) thought

it prudent not to sleep out of the Castle. ♦JUNCTION OF LOISON,

LABORDE, AND JUNOT.♦

Junot went by water to Villa Franca, and leaving Thiebault there to

command the reserve, joined Loison at Alcoentre. That General had

reached Santarem on the 13th, in a deplorable condition. The weather

was intensely hot, without a cloud in the sky, or a breath of air

stirring. Whole companies lay down upon the way; many died of thirst,

and more would have perished if the officers of the staff, as soon as

they arrived at that city, had not gone out with a great number of the

inhabitants carrying water to meet them; brandy also was sent out,

and carts to convey those who were unable to proceed farther on foot.

Each of Loison’s long marches at this time is said to have cost him

not less than an hundred men. The troops were so dreadfully exhausted,

that he was compelled to remain two days at Santarem. On the 16th he

proceeded to Alcoentre, where Junot joined him the next day; they then

moved to Cercal, and on the day after the action at Roliça the British

army distinctly ♦EARLY CAMPAIGNS, 18.♦ saw their columns in the line

of Torres Vedras. To that place Laborde was now recalled, who had

retreated beyond it to Montachique; he effected his junction on the

19th, and ♦THIEBAULT, 190–193.♦ when General Thiebault arrived with the

reserve on the 20th, the whole force which Junot could bring into the

field was collected there, in number about 12,000 infantry, and 1200 or

1500 horse.

♦THE BRITISH ADVANCE TO VIMEIRO.♦

Sir Arthur had not pursued Laborde after the battle of Roliça; the

line by which the enemy ♦AUGUST 18.♦ retired would have led him from

the sea. He was beginning his march for Torres Vedras on the morrow,

when he received advice that General Anstruther was arrived on the

coast. His original intention had been to employ this General’s

brigade, and that of General Acland, in besieging Peniche, if that

should be necessary; otherwise to land them in some of the bays near

the rock, in the rear of the enemy, while he pressed upon their

front. But the resistance which he had experienced at Roliça, and

his disappointment of any co-operation from Freire, induced him now

to land General Anstruther’s troops, and join them to the army. He

proceeded therefore to the village of Vimeiro, that being the position

best calculated to effect his junction, and, at the same time, a march

in advance. Calms prevented the fleet, which was anchored off the

Berlings, from standing in, till the evening of the 19th. The brigade

was then landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach, at the foot of a

cliff almost perpendicular, the ascent of which is exceedingly steep

and difficult. The landing was a measure of extreme difficulty and

♦GENERAL ANSTRUTHER’S BRIGADE LANDS.♦ hazard. The boats were almost

always filled in going-in by the surf, many were swamped, and a few

men perished; the disembarkation, however, by the great exertions and

skill of the navy, was effected with less loss than might have been

expected. The French could not oppose the landing, but, profiting by

their superiority in cavalry, they sent a body of dragoons, in the

hope of attacking the brigade on its march. Against this danger due

precautions had been taken. The troops, when they had marched about

three leagues, found a detachment under General Spencer waiting at

Lourinham to receive them, and took their place in the advanced guard.

♦ARRIVAL OF SIR HARRY BURRARD IN THE ROADS.♦

The French cavalry were active during this and the preceding day; they

scoured the country, and Sir Arthur could obtain no information of the

enemy, except that their position was very strong, and occupied by

their whole force. On the 20th, at noon, it was announced that General

Acland was in the offing; and on the evening of the same day Sir Harry

Burrard, the second in command, arrived in Maceira Roads. Sir Arthur

immediately went on board, informed him of what had been done, and of

the present state of things, and laid before him the plan of operations

upon which he had intended to proceed. His purpose was to march on the

following morning, push his advanced guard to Mafra, and halt the main

body about four or five miles from that place, thus turning the enemy’s

position at Torres Vedras. He possessed as much knowledge of the ground

as good maps and scientific descriptions could impart; Sir Charles

Stuart (a man whose great military talents had never been allowed a

field whereon to display themselves) had carefully surveyed this part

of the country when he commanded the British troops in Portugal; it had

not escaped him, that upon this ground, in case of serious invasion,

the kingdom must be saved or lost; and his maps and papers were in

Sir Arthur’s hands. The battle would thus be fought in a country of

which he had adequate knowledge, and he hoped to enter Lisbon with the

retreating or flying enemy. Such was the plan which he had formed, and

orders for marching on the morrow had actually been issued, before Sir

Harry’s arrival.

♦HE ALTERS THE PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.♦

To Sir Arthur, who had a well-founded confidence in himself and in

his troops, no prospect could have been more encouraging; but the new

commander did not behold it hopefully. The objections to a forward

movement preponderated in his mind; he learnt that the artillery[25]

horses were inefficient, that our men, for want of cavalry, were kept

close to their encampments by the enemy’s horse; and that it would

not be possible to go far into the country, because they depended

upon the ships for bread. Weighing these things, he was not convinced

that Sir Arthur’s intentions were expedient; the decision which he

was now to make appeared to him most serious in its consequences; he

thought it was impossible to calculate the disasters to which a check

might expose the army, and therefore he deemed it necessary to wait

for Sir John Moore’s division. Sir Arthur had recommended that that

division, when it arrived in the Mondego, should march upon Santarem,

a position from whence it might intercept the enemy’s retreat, whether

they attempted to make their way to Almeida or to Elvas; but the new

commander hearing on his way of the action at Roliça, and disapproving

this arrangement, had immediately dispatched instructions by which Sir

John Moore was directed to proceed from the Mondego, and join him as

speedily as possible in Maceira Roads. In vain did Sir Arthur represent

the precious time that would be lost before this division could be

landed and become serviceable at Vimeiro; the far greater utility which

might be expected from its presence at Santarem; the evil of at once

changing their operations from an offensive to a defensive course; and

of allowing the enemy to choose their time and ground. For, situated

as the two armies now were, it was impossible to avoid an action. If

the British troops advanced, they would have the advantage of acting on

the offensive; it was his opinion that they might reach Mafra before

the French could bring on a general engagement; and in that case

they should turn the French position. But these representations were

unavailing; an inauspicious spirit of caution prevailed. The whole plan

of the campaign was changed; and with the enemy collected within three

leagues, the army was ordered to remain stationary, till a corps should

arrive, of which no tidings had yet been received. In a general who

commands good troops the want of confidence is as great a fault as the

excess of it in the commander of an ill-disciplined army.

♦THE BATTLE OF VIMEIRO.♦

It was soon seen how well Sir Arthur had judged of the enemy’s

intentions. Junot was ill supplied with provisions; he could not

venture long to be absent from Lisbon: situated as he was, it appeared

to him that there would be less evil in an immediate defeat, than must

arise from prolonged operations, though they should lead ♦THIEBAULT,

194.♦ to a victory. His business, therefore, was to bring on an action

as soon as possible, and to make the attack; and at the moment when Sir

Harry Burrard, resolving upon delay, had countermanded the orders for

advancing on the morrow, the French were in motion.

Vimeiro, a name which was now to become memorable in British and

Portugueze history, is a village situated nearly at the bottom of a

lovely valley, about three miles from the sea, and screened from the

sea breeze by mountainous heights, through which the little river

Maceira winds its way. The village stands at the eastern extremity of

these heights; and on the opposite side, separated from them by a deep

ravine, are other heights, over which the road to Lourinham passes,

a little town in the _Termo_ or district of which the parishes of

Vimeiro and Maceira are included. The western termination reaches the

sea-shore. As the army had halted here only for the night, meaning to

proceed early on the morrow, they were disposed of, not as expecting an

attack, but as most convenient for the troops. Six brigades bivouacked

on the height to the westward. The advanced guard was posted on a hill

south-east of Vimeiro, to cover the commissariat and stores which were

in the village: this height was entirely commanded by higher ground

to the westward. The cavalry and the reserve of artillery were in the

valley, between the hills on which the infantry were placed; and there

were picquets of observation on the hills to the eastward.

♦AUG. 21.♦

The enemy, who had marched all night, and whom some accidents had

impeded on their way, first appeared at eight in the morning, forming

in strong bodies upon the heights toward Lourinham, thus threatening

the advanced guard and the left, which was the weak part of the

British position. Sir Arthur had visited the advanced posts early in

the day, and had returned to his quarters before the first shots were

exchanged with the enemy’s advance. He now moved the brigades of

Generals Ferguson, Nightingale, Acland, and Bowes, successively across

the ravine to the heights on the Lourinham road. General Anstruther’s

brigade took post on the right of the advanced guard, and Major-General

Hill was moved nearer, as a support to these troops, and as a reserve,

in addition to which our small cavalry force was in the rear of their

right. The French army was in two divisions, ... the right, of about

6000 men, under General Loison; the left, about 5000, under Laborde.

Kellermann had the reserve, which was intended to connect the two

wings, but they were too distant from each other. General Margaron

commanded the cavalry.

Laborde came along the valley to attack the advanced guard on the

eminence or table hill; he had a column of infantry and cavalry to

cover his left flank, and on his right one regiment marched in column

to turn the defenders, and penetrate the village by the church; but

this purpose had been foreseen, and part of the 43rd had been ordered

into the churchyard to prevent it. The French advanced with perfect

steadiness, though exposed to a severe fire of riflemen posted behind

the trees and banks, and of seven pieces of artillery well directed.

They advanced like men accustomed to action and to victory; but

suffering more severely as they drew nearer, and especially from the

Shrapnell shells, (then first brought into use,) they faltered, and

opened a confused fire. Still they advanced, and arrived within a few

paces of the brow of the hill, where the 50th regiment, under Colonel

Walker, with a single company of the rifle corps on its left, stood

opposed to them. That regiment poured upon them a destructive volley,

and instantly charged with the bayonet, and penetrated the angle

of the column, which then broke and turned. The regiment which was

entering the village by the church, was attacked in flank by General

Acland’s brigade, then advancing to its position on the heights;

and our cavalry, poor in number as it was, charged with effect. The

discomfiture of this column was then complete; they fled, leaving about

1000 men on the ground, 350 prisoners, and seven pieces of artillery;

and they were pursued for nearly two miles to the plain beyond the

woody ground, where they were supported by a reserve of horse, and

where Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, of the 20th light dragoons, who

particularly distinguished himself that day, fell, with many of his

men, overpowered by a much superior force of cavalry. The secondary

column, under General Brenier, which was to have supported Laborde in

his attack, made a side movement to the left, in order to cross the

ravine, and thus it was separately engaged by General Anstruther’s

brigade; and being charged with the bayonet, was repulsed with great

loss. An aide-de-camp of Sir Arthur’s coming up to tell this General

that a corps should be sent to his assistance, he replied, “Sir, I am

not pressed, and I want no assistance; I am beating the French, and am

able to beat them wherever I find them.”

Loison’s attack was made nearly at the same time as Laborde’s: it was

supported by a large body of cavalry, and made with the characteristic

and imposing impetuosity of French troops. They drove in our light

troops, but they were checked by General Ferguson’s brigade, consisting

of the 36th, 40th, and 71st, which formed the first line; after some

close and heavy firing of musketry, the 82d and 29th came up, and the

brigades of Generals Bowes and Acland. The enemy were then charged

with the bayonet; this weapon is of French invention, but it was made

for British hands. They came to the charge bravely, and stood it for

a moment; ... in that moment their foremost rank fell “like a line of

grass before the mowers.” This is not the flourish of an historian,

seeking artfully to embellish details which no art can render

interesting to any but military readers; it is the language of an actor

in the scene, who could not call it to mind in after-hours without

shuddering; for the very men whose superiority was thus decidedly

proved, could not speak without involuntary awe, of so complete and

instantaneous a destruction, produced as it was, not by artillery or

explosions, but by their own act and deed, and the strength of their

own hearts and hands. The bodies of about 300 French grenadiers were

counted upon the field, who had fallen in this charge. The enemy were

pursued to a considerable distance, and six pieces of cannon were taken

in the pursuit. General Kellermann made a vigorous attempt, late in

the action, to recover these from the 71st and 82d, which were halted

in a valley where the guns had been captured. These regiments retired

a little way to some advantageous ground, then faced about, fired, and

advancing with the bayonet, drove the French back with great loss.

Thus were they every where repulsed, though their whole force had been

engaged, while not more than half the British army had been brought

into action.

♦SIR HARRY BURRARD TAKES THE COMMAND.♦

Before the action began Sir Harry Burrard and his staff left the

ship; they soon heard the firing after they were on shore, and by

the time they reached Vimeiro, which is about three miles from the

landing-place, the armies were hotly engaged. They found Sir Arthur on

the heights, and he explained in few words to the new Commander the

position of the army, and the measures which he had taken for beating

the enemy. Sir Harry was perfectly satisfied, and directed him to go

on with an operation which he had so happily and so well begun. This

he did not as giving up his command for the time, but as fulfilling

one of the functions of a commander, by directing Sir Arthur to pursue

measures which he approved, and holding himself as responsible for

the event as if the plan had been originally his own. So far all was

well. Toward the close of the action, when the French were beaten on

the left, and it was evident that they must be every where defeated,

Sir Arthur went to him, and represented that this was the moment for

advancing; that he ought to move the right wing to Torres Vedras, and

pursue the beaten enemy with the left. By this movement upon Torres

Vedras, the French would be cut off from the nearest road to Lisbon, or

if they attempted it, they would find themselves between two bodies of

our troops; there remained for them, as the alternative, the circuitous

route by Alenquer and Villa Franca; ... they were dispirited, beaten,

and in confusion, absolutely, in his opinion, incapable of forming

or of appearing again in the shape of an army, if they were followed

even at a slower rate by a victorious enemy; and this he said, giving

them full credit for discipline and great facility in forming after

having been broken. There was plenty of ammunition in the camp for

another battle, and provisions for twelve days. But neither these

representations, urged as they were with natural and fitting warmth,

nor the victory which was before his eyes, could induce the new

Commander to deviate from his former opinion. He replied, that he

saw no reason to change his purpose, and that the same motives which

induced him yesterday to wait for reinforcements, had still the same

weight. At this moment the enemy were retiring in great disorder, and

most completely disheartened by their defeat. Sir Arthur, grieved at

seeing the irrecoverable opportunity go by, made a second attempt

to convince the Commander that victory was in his hands. General

Ferguson had sent his aide-de-camp to represent the great advantage of

advancing, ... he himself could, in fact, have cut off a considerable

body of the enemy. Sir Arthur took the aide-de-camp to the Commander.

But this second representation was as ineffectual as the first. His

Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General Clinton, and Colonel Murray, his

Quarter-Master-General, who had coincided in opinion with him the

preceding evening, agreed with him now also. He had just heard from an

officer who had passed through General Freire’s troops, such an account

of them and their proceedings, as precluded any hope of rendering

them useful; the artillery horses seemed to him inefficient; but more

especially the want of cavalry, he thought, incapacitated the army

from following up its success. The 260 Portugueze horse which were

with us had shown themselves nearly useless; the British were only 210

in number, and they had suffered severely in the action, ... this was

known, though the extent of their loss had not yet been ascertained.

These difficulties preponderated with him; he adhered still to his

determination; and Sir Arthur, whose sense of military duty would not

allow him to act in disregard of orders, as Nelson was accustomed to

do, turned to one of his officers, and concealing the bitterness of

disappointment under a semblance of levity, said, “Well, then, we have

nothing to do, but to go and shoot red-legged partridges,” ... the

game with which that country abounds. From that moment he gave up all

hope of cutting the French off from Lisbon, inclosing them there, or

preventing them, if they thought proper to attempt it, from protracting

the campaign by retreating upon Elvas and Almeida.

The loss of the enemy in this action was about 3000[26] killed and

wounded, thirteen pieces of artillery, and twenty-three ammunition

waggons; that of the English little more than 700 killed, wounded, and

missing. The British numbers in the field were 16,000, of which only

half had been engaged; the French were about 14,000, including 1300

cavalry, and the whole of this force was brought into action. General

Solignac was severely wounded; General Brenier wounded, and left on the

field. He was in danger of being put to death by those into whose hands

he had fallen, when a Highlander, by name Mackay, who was a corporal in

the 71st, came up and rescued him. The French General, in gratitude for

his preservation, offered him his watch and purse; but Mackay refused

to accept them. When he had delivered his prisoner in safety to Colonel

Pack, the French General could not help saying, “What sort of man is

this? He has done me the greatest service, and yet refuses to take

the only reward which I can at present offer him!” Brenier no doubt

contrasted this with the conduct of his countrymen, in whose rapacities

and cruelties, it appears by the testimony of the Portugueze, that he

had no share; when, therefore, Colonel Pack replied, “We are British

soldiers, sir, and not plunderers,” he must have deeply felt the

disgrace which had been brought upon the French character. Mackay

was immediately made a serjeant by Sir Arthur Wellesley’s express

desire; and the Highland Society, at their next meeting, voted him

a gold medal, with a suitable device and inscription. The piper to

the grenadier company of the same regiment, Stewart was his name,

received early in the action a dangerous wound in the thigh: he would

not, however, be carried off the field, but, sitting down[27] where

his comrades might hear him, he continued playing warlike airs till

the end of the engagement. A handsome stand of Highland pipes, with

an inscription commemorating the manner in which he had deserved the

donation, was voted him by the Highland Society.

Most of the wounded French who fell into the conqueror’s hands were

young, and of delicate appearance, ... apparently men whose lot would

not have fallen in the army, under any other system than that of the

conscription, though, having been forced into it, they had acquired

the worst vices which have ever disgraced and degraded the profession

of arms. They were dressed in long white linen coats and trowsers,

their firelocks were about six inches longer in the barrel than ours,

their bayonets about three shorter, the locks of their pieces much

better finished, and the pans so constructed, that the powder was not

liable to fall out, ... an accident which at that time often happened

to ours. A chaplain of the British army, as he was endeavouring to

render assistance to some of them, while under the surgeon’s hands,

addressed himself to one in the language of commiseration, and uttered,

at the same time, a natural expression of regret at the horrors of

war: but the Frenchman fiercely answered him, with a mixture of pride

and indignation, that he gloried in his wounds, and that war was the

greatest happiness of life. During the whole day the armed peasantry

prowled about the field, taking vengeance upon every wounded or

straggling Frenchman whom they could find, for the manifold wrongs of

their country, and the aggravated injuries which they had endured. So

conscious indeed were the prisoners of the little mercy which they

deserved at their hands, that they dreaded lest these men should break

in upon them, and massacre them all; and a guard was stationed to

protect them. The peasantry, however, passed the night in the field,

carousing round a large fire, recounting to each other what they had

done, and rejoicing over the day’s work.

♦THE FRENCH RESOLVE TO PROPOSE TERMS.♦

In withholding the army from following up the great advantage which it

had gained, Sir Harry Burrard knew how unpopular such a determination

must be, and sacrificed his own feelings to his judgement. He thought

it not allowable to risk much when the reinforcements which were at

hand would make the British force so superior, that any further efforts

of the enemy must be vain, and success would be obtained without

hazard and with less loss. He erred in judgement; but this honourable

testimony was borne to him by Sir Arthur Wellesley, the person of

all others by whom that error must have been felt most keenly, that

he decided upon fair military grounds in the manner which he thought

most conducive to the interests of the country. The French failed not

to profit by the respite which was thus allowed them; they formed a

rear-guard of four regiments of cavalry, and retired[28] at leisure,

no attempt being made to harass their retreat. Junot, who is said

to have exposed himself at the close of the action so as hardly to

have been saved from the British cavalry, summoned Generals Laborde,

Loison, Kellermann, and Thiebault, upon the field, and demanded their

opinions, whether the army ought again to try the lot of arms, and if

not, what course it should pursue. They agreed that they were neither

in a condition to give battle, nor to stand one. Their troops were

harassed, discontented, and discouraged; their ammunition would not

last three hours longer; their provisions were failing, their horses

already sinking for want of forage. Their losses were irreparable,

whereas the enemy were looking for strong reinforcements; and, in fine,

the slightest reverse would now leave them at the mercy of the English

and Portugueze. Nothing remained but to preserve the best attitude they

could, and retire to Lisbon, the possession of which was now their

only safeguard. They retreated accordingly to Torres Vedras. A second

council was held there on the morrow; and upon a full view of the

difficulties and dangers[29] of their situation, and the impossibility

of effecting a retreat through so large a part of Spain as must be

traversed before they could effect a junction with their countrymen,

they resolved to try what could be done by negotiation. General

Kellermann, therefore, was dispatched with a flag of truce to propose a

convention for the evacuation of Portugal. Meantime Sir Hew Dalrymple

had arrived and taken the command of the British army, which thus had

three commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours.

♦ARRIVAL OF SIR HEW DALRYMPLE.♦

Sir Hew Dalrymple had been expressly chosen for this command because of

the zeal and judgement which he had displayed during the whole of those

important transactions in the south of Spain on which so much depended,

and in which he had acted upon his own responsibility. In a private

letter from Lord Castlereagh, then minister for the war department,

Sir Arthur Wellesley was recommended to his particular confidence, and

a full persuasion expressed that that officer’s high reputation would

alone dispose Sir Hew to select him for any service which required

great prudence and temper, combined with much military experience; but,

above all, that the habits of communication in which Sir Arthur had

for a length of time been with his majesty’s ministers, concerning the

affairs of Spain, would point him out as an officer of whom it would

be desirable for the commander-in-chief, on all accounts, to make the

most prominent use which the rules of the service would permit. Sir

Hew embarked at Gibraltar on the 13th; and learnt that night from Lord

Collingwood, who was off Cadiz, that Sir Arthur’s corps had either

landed, or was about to land, in Mondego Bay. Arriving off the Tagus

on the 19th, he was informed by Sir Charles Cotton, that Sir Arthur

was proceeding along the coast. It was not Sir Hew’s wish to supersede

that General in a detached command for which he had been particularly

chosen, especially when he was now completely engaged in an enterprise

from which it was impossible to recede, and which required all

his ability to accomplish. Under these feelings, therefore, the

Commander-in-chief resolved to proceed to Mondego Bay, and there join

the expected reinforcements when they should land, leaving Sir Arthur

meantime to pursue and complete his own plan. Seeing, however, on the

way a number of ships under the land, and receiving a vague account

of the action at Roliça from a sloop of war, he sent an aide-de-camp

on shore for intelligence, ordering him to inform Sir Arthur, if he

chanced to see him, that he was proceeding to fall in with Sir Harry

Burrard and the main body, and that though he wished to be informed

of his proceedings, he did not mean to interfere with his command.

This was on the evening of the 21st; about midnight the boat returned,

bringing intelligence of the battle, and that Sir Harry Burrard was in

command. There was now no room for that delicacy toward Sir Arthur, as

honourable as it was judicious, which he had resolved to observe. His

determination was immediately taken, and in the morning the frigate

stood in for the shore.

♦HE ORDERS THE ARMY TO ADVANCE. AUG. 22.♦

None of the official accounts which Sir Arthur had addressed to him

had been received; he landed therefore with no other information than

what had been thus gathered upon the way, and entirely unacquainted

with the actual state of the French army. When he reached the beach

they were embarking the wounded for Porto; during the whole night the

sailors had been thus employed, wading nearly up to the middle in the

sea, and displaying as much humanity as skill. Arriving at Vimeiro,

he found the army on the ground which it had occupied the day before,

the dead lying on the field, and the carts still busy in removing the

wounded. That ground had not been chosen as a military position, but

merely as a halting-place, and it was now necessary to remove from it,

because of the late action. Sir Hew therefore gave orders for marching

the next morning at daybreak toward Lisbon by way of Mafra. Like his

predecessor, he thought that Sir Arthur had entered upon a hazardous

operation, which, unless it obtained complete success, must end in

complete ruin, the British having no prospect of support, nor any thing

upon which to fall back in case of disaster, so that on their part

the battle would be fought for existence, while the enemy, in case of

defeat, would lose only what were killed or taken. But he differed from

Sir Harry Burrard in this, that he deemed it imprudent to wait for Sir

John Moore’s division, the arrival of which was extremely uncertain,

and that he saw the necessity of pursuing active measures. The French,

he knew, must either give him battle, for the sake of defending Lisbon,

(a chance which he was willing to take, though they were superior in

cavalry, and, as he thought, in numbers, and though they would have

the great advantage of choosing their ground;) or they would cross the

Tagus.

♦KELLERMANN ARRIVES TO PROPOSE AN ARMISTICE.♦