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REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY
[Illustration: JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY
35th President of the United States
May 29, 1917-November 22, 1963]
THE WARREN
COMMISSION
REPORT
Report of President’s Commission on the Assassination
of President John F. Kennedy
St. Martin’s Press
New York
Photo credits:
Page 66 & 67: Thomas C. Dillard/_Dallas Morning News_
Pages 100, 101, 102, 103, 108 & 114 (Zapruder stills): © 1963,
1967 LMH Company c/o James Silverberg, Esq., Washington, D.C.
Page 108 (Nix still): © 1963, 1964-1991 Nix c/o James
Silverberg, Esq., Washington, D.C.
Page 113: AP/Wide World
Page 126: Detroit Free Press
Page 177: Hill Exhibit B/National Archives
Pages 203, 205, 214, 218, 223: KRLD-TV/CBS
Pages 220, 232, 341: WBAP-TV/NBC
Page 356: AP/Wide World
All other photos and illustrations courtesy of the National
Archives
ISBN 0-312-08256-8 (hc.)
ISBN 0-312-08257-6 (pbk.)
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN, _Chairman_
SENATOR RICHARD B. RUSSELL
SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN COOPER
REPRESENTATIVE HALE BOGGS
REPRESENTATIVE GERALD R. FORD
MR. ALLEN W. DULLES
MR. JOHN J. McCLOY
J. LEE RANKIN, _General Counsel_
_Assistant Counsel_
FRANCIS W. H. ADAMS
JOSEPH A. BALL
DAVID W. BELIN
WILLIAM T. COLEMAN, Jr.
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG
BURT W. GRIFFIN
LEON D. HUBERT, Jr.
ALBERT E. JENNER, Jr.
WESLEY J. LIEBELER
NORMAN REDLICH
W. DAVID SLAWSON
ARLEN SPECTER
SAMUEL A. STERN
HOWARD P. WILLENS[A]
_Staff Members_
PHILLIP BARSON
EDWARD A. CONROY
JOHN HART ELY
ALFRED GOLDBERG
MURRAY J. LAULICHT
ARTHUR MARMOR
RICHARD M. MOSK
JOHN J. O’BRIEN
STUART POLLAK
ALFREDDA SCOBEY
CHARLES N. SHAFFER, Jr.
LLOYD L. WEINREB
[A] Mr. Willens also acted as liaison between the Commission
and the Department of Justice.
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION
ON THE
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY
200 Maryland Ave. N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002
Telephone 543-1400
EARL WARREN, Chairman
RICHARD B. RUSSELL
JOHN SHERMAN COOPER
HALE BOGGS
GERALD R. FORD
JOHN J. McCLOY
ALLEN W. DULLES
J. LEE RANKIN, General Counsel
September 24, 1964
The President The White House Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. President:
Your Commission to investigate the assassination of President Kennedy
on November 22, 1963, having completed its assignment in accordance
with Executive Order No. 11130 of November 29, 1963, herewith submits
its final report.
Respectfully,
Earl Warren, Chairman
Richard B. Russell
John Sherman Cooper
Hale Boggs
Gerald R. Ford
Allen W. Dulles
John J. McCloy
[Illustration]
Foreword
PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, by Executive Order No. 11130 dated
November 29, 1963,[F-1] created this Commission to investigate the
assassination on November 22, 1963, of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, the
35th President of the United States. The President directed the
Commission to evaluate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
assassination and the subsequent killing of the alleged assassin and to
report its findings and conclusions to him.[F-2]
The subject of the Commission’s inquiry was a chain of events which
saddened and shocked the people of the United States and of the world.
The assassination of President Kennedy and the simultaneous wounding
of John B. Connally, Jr., Governor of Texas, had been followed within
an hour by the slaying of Patrolman J. D. Tippit of the Dallas Police
Department. In the United States and abroad, these events evoked
universal demands for an explanation.
Immediately after the assassination, State and local officials in
Dallas devoted their resources to the apprehension of the assassin.
The U.S. Secret Service, which is responsible for the protection
of the President, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation began an
investigation at the direction of President Johnson. Within 35 minutes
of the killing of Patrolman Tippit, Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested
by the Dallas police as a suspect in that crime. Based on evidence
provided by Federal, State, and local agencies, the State of Texas
arraigned Oswald within 12 hours of his arrest, charging him with the
assassination of President Kennedy and the murder of Patrolman Tippit.
On November 24, 1963, less than 48 hours after his arrest, Oswald was
fatally shot in the basement of the Dallas Police Department by Jack
Ruby, a Dallas nightclub owner. This shooting took place in full view
of a national television audience.
The events of these 2 days were witnessed with shock and disbelief
by a Nation grieving the loss of its young leader. Throughout the
world, reports on these events were disseminated in massive detail.
Theories and speculations mounted regarding the assassination. In many
instances, the intense public demand for facts was met by partial
and frequently conflicting reports from Dallas and elsewhere. After
Oswald’s arrest and his denial of all guilt, public attention focused
both on the extent of the evidence against him and the possibility of
a conspiracy, domestic or foreign. His subsequent death heightened
public interest and stimulated additional suspicions and rumors.
THE COMMISSION AND ITS POWERS
After Lee Harvey Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby, it was no longer
possible to arrive at the complete story of the assassination through
normal judicial procedures during a trial of the alleged assassin.
Alternative means for instituting a complete investigation were widely
discussed. Federal and State officials conferred on the possibility of
initiating a court of inquiry before a State magistrate in Texas. An
investigation by the grand jury of Dallas County also was considered.
As speculation about the existence of a foreign or domestic conspiracy
became widespread, committees in both Houses of Congress weighed the
desirability of congressional hearings to discover all the facts
relating to the assassination.
By his order of November 29 establishing the Commission, President
Johnson sought to avoid parallel investigations and to concentrate
factfinding in a body having the broadest national mandate. As Chairman
of the Commission, President Johnson selected Earl Warren, Chief
Justice of the United States, former Governor and attorney general of
the State of California. From the U.S. Senate, he chose Richard B.
Russell, Democratic Senator from Georgia and chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, former Governor of, and county attorney in,
the State of Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican Senator
from Kentucky, former county and circuit judge, State of Kentucky,
and U.S. Ambassador to India. Two members of the Commission were
drawn from the U.S. House of Representatives: Hale Boggs, Democratic
U.S. Representative from Louisiana and majority whip, and Gerald R.
Ford, Republican, U.S. Representative from Michigan and chairman of
the House Republican Conference. From private life, President Johnson
selected two lawyers by profession, both of whom have served in the
administrations of Democratic and Republican Presidents: Allen W.
Dulles, former Director of Central Intelligence, and John J. McCloy,
former President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, and during
World War II, the Assistant Secretary of War.
From its first meeting on December 5, 1963, the Commission viewed the
Executive order as an unequivocal Presidential mandate to conduct a
thorough and independent investigation. Because of the numerous rumors
and theories, the Commission concluded that the public interest in
insuring that the truth was ascertained could not be met by merely
accepting the reports or the analyses of Federal or State agencies.
Not only were the premises and conclusions of those reports critically
reassessed, but all assertions or rumors relating to a possible
conspiracy, or the complicity of others than Oswald, which have come to
the attention of the Commission, were investigated.
On December 13, 1963, Congress enacted Senate Joint Resolution 137
(Public Law 88-202)[F-3] empowering the Commission to issue subpoenas
requiring the testimony of witnesses and the production of evidence
relating to any matter under its investigation. In addition, the
resolution authorized the Commission to compel testimony from witnesses
claiming the privilege against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing for the grant of
immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion. Immunity under
these provisions was not granted to any witness during the Commission’s
investigation.
The Commission took steps immediately to obtain the necessary staff
to fulfill its assignment. J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of
the United States, was sworn in as general counsel for the Commission
on December 16, 1963. Additional members of the legal staff were
selected during the next few weeks. The Commission has been aided by 14
assistant counsel with high professional qualifications, selected by it
from widely separated parts of the United States. This staff undertook
the work of the Commission with a wealth of legal and investigative
experience and a total dedication to the determination of the truth.
The Commission has been assisted also by highly qualified personnel
from several Federal agencies, assigned to the Commission at its
request. This group included lawyers from the Department of Justice,
agents of the Internal Revenue Service, a senior historian from the
Department of Defense, an editor from the Department of State, and
secretarial and administrative staff supplied by the General Services
Administration and other agencies.
In addition to the assistance afforded by Federal agencies,
the Commission throughout its inquiry had the cooperation of
representatives of the city of Dallas and the State of Texas. The
attorney general of Texas, Waggoner Carr, aided by two distinguished
lawyers of that State, Robert G. Storey of Dallas, retired dean of
the Southern Methodist University Law School and former president of
the American Bar Association, and Leon Jaworski of Houston, former
president of the Texas State Bar Association, has been fully informed
at all times as to the progress of the investigation, and has advanced
such suggestions as he and his special assistants considered helpful
to the accomplishment of the Commission’s assignment. Attorney General
Carr has promptly supplied the Commission with pertinent information
possessed by Texas officials. Dallas officials, particularly those from
the police department, have fully complied with all requests made by
the Commission.
THE INVESTIGATION
During December and early January the Commission received an increasing
volume of reports from Federal and State investigative agencies. Of
principal importance was the five-volume report of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, submitted on December 9, 1963, which summarized
the results of the investigation conducted by the Bureau immediately
after the assassination. After reviewing this report, the Commission
requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to furnish the underlying
investigative materials relied upon in the summary report. The first
investigative reports submitted in response to this request were
delivered to the Commission on December 20, 1963. On December 18, the
Secret Service submitted a detailed report on security precautions
taken before President Kennedy’s trip to Texas and a summary of the
events of November 22, as witnessed by Secret Service agents. A few
days later the Department of State submitted a report relating to
Oswald’s defection to the Soviet Union in 1959, and his return to the
United States in 1962. On January 7 and 11, 1964, the attorney general
of Texas submitted an extensive set of investigative materials, largely
Dallas police reports, on the assassination of President Kennedy and
the killing of Oswald.
As these investigative reports were received, the staff began
analyzing and summarizing them. The members of the legal staff,
divided into teams, proceeded to organize the facts revealed by
these investigations, determine the issues, sort out the unresolved
problems, and recommend additional investigation by the Commission.
Simultaneously, to insure that no relevant information would be
overlooked, the Commission directed requests to the 10 major
departments of the Federal Government, 14 of its independent agencies
or commissions, and 4 congressional committees for all information
relating to the assassination or the background and activities of Lee
Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby.
After reviewing the accumulating materials, the Commission directed
numerous additional requests to Federal and State investigative
agencies. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service
executed the detailed requests for statements of witnesses and
examinations of physical evidence with dispatch and thoroughness. All
these reports were reviewed and analyzed by the Commission. Additional
investigative requests, where appropriate, were handled by Internal
Revenue Service, Department of State, and the military intelligence
agencies with comparable skill. Investigative analyses of particular
significance and sensitivity in the foreign areas were contributed
by the Central Intelligence Agency. On occasion the Commission used
independent experts from State and city governments to supplement or
verify information. During the investigation the Commission on several
occasions visited the scene of the assassination and other places in
the Dallas area pertinent to the inquiry.
The scope and detail of the investigative effort by the Federal and
State agencies are suggested in part by statistics from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service. Immediately after the
assassination more than 80 additional FBI personnel were transferred to
the Dallas office on a temporary basis to assist in the investigation.
Beginning November 22, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
conducted approximately 25,000 interviews and reinterviews of persons
having information of possible relevance to the investigation and by
September 11, 1964, submitted over 2,300 reports totaling approximately
25,400 pages to the Commission. During the same period the Secret
Service conducted approximately 1,550 interviews and submitted 800
reports totaling some 4,600 pages.
Because of the diligence, cooperation, and facilities of Federal
investigative agencies, it was unnecessary for the Commission to
employ investigators other than the members of the Commission’s legal
staff. The Commission recognized, however, that special measures were
required whenever the facts or rumors called for an appraisal of the
acts of the agencies themselves. The staff reviewed in detail the
actions of several Federal agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Central Intelligence Agency,
and the Department of State. Initially the Commission requested the
agencies to furnish all their reports relating to the assassination
and their relationships with Oswald or Ruby. On the basis of these
reports, the Commission submitted specific questions to the agency
involved. Members of the staff followed up the answers by reviewing
the relevant files of each agency for additional information. In some
instances, members of the Commission also reviewed the files in person.
Finally, the responsible officials of these agencies were called to
testify under oath. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State; C. Douglas Dillon,
Secretary of the Treasury; John A. McCone, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation; and James J. Rowley, Chief of the Secret Service,
appeared as witnesses and testified fully regarding their agencies’
participation in the matters under scrutiny by the Commission.
COMMISSION HEARINGS
In addition to the information resulting from these investigations, the
Commission has relied primarily on the facts disclosed by the sworn
testimony of the principal witnesses to the assassination and related
events. Beginning on February 3, 1964, the Commission and its staff
has taken the testimony of 552 witnesses. Of this number, 94 appeared
before members of the Commission; 395 were questioned by members of
the Commission’s legal staff; 61 supplied sworn affidavits; and 2
gave statements.[F-4] Under Commission procedures, all witnesses were
advised that they had the right to the presence and the advice of their
lawyer during the interrogation, with the corollary rights to raise
objections to any questions asked, to make any clarifying statement on
the record after the interrogation, and to purchase a copy of their
testimony.[F-5]
Commission hearings were closed to the public unless the witness
appearing before the Commission requested an open hearing. Under these
procedures, testimony of one witness was taken in a public hearing
on two occasions. No other witness requested a public hearing. The
Commission concluded that the premature publication by it of testimony
regarding the assassination or the subsequent killing of Oswald might
interfere with Ruby’s rights to a fair and impartial trial on the
charges filed against him by the State of Texas. The Commission also
recognized that testimony would be presented before it which would
be inadmissible in judicial proceedings and might prejudice innocent
parties if made public out of context. In addition to the witnesses
who appeared before the Commission, numerous others provided sworn
depositions, affidavits, and statements upon which the Commission
has relied. Since this testimony, as well as that taken before the
Commission, could not always be taken in logical sequence, the
Commission concluded that partial publication of testimony as the
investigation progressed was impractical and could be misleading.
THE COMMISSION’S FUNCTION
The Commission’s most difficult assignments have been to uncover
all the facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy and
to determine if it was in any way directed or encouraged by unknown
persons at home or abroad. In this process, its objective has been to
identify the person or persons responsible for both the assassination
of President Kennedy and the killing of Oswald through an examination
of the evidence. The task has demanded unceasing appraisal of the
evidence by the individual members of the Commission in their effort to
discover the whole truth.
The procedures followed by the Commission in developing and assessing
evidence necessarily differed from those of a court conducting a
criminal trial of a defendant present before it, since under our system
there is no provision for a posthumous trial. If Oswald had lived he
could have had a trial by American standards of justice where he would
have been able to exercise his full rights under the law. A judge and
jury would have presumed him innocent until proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. He might have furnished information which could have
affected the course of his trial. He could have participated in and
guided his defense. There could have been an examination to determine
whether he was sane under prevailing legal standards. All witnesses,
including possibly the defendant, could have been subjected to
searching examination under the adversary system of American trials.
The Commission has functioned neither as a court presiding over an
adversary proceeding nor as a prosecutor determined to prove a case,
but as a factfinding agency committed to the ascertainment of the
truth. In the course of the investigation of the facts and rumors
surrounding these matters, it was necessary to explore hearsay and
other sources of information not admissible in a court proceeding
obtained from persons who saw or heard and others in a position to
observe what occurred. In fairness to the alleged assassin and his
family, the Commission on February 25, 1964, requested Walter E.
Craig, president of the American Bar Association, to participate in
the investigation and to advise the Commission whether in his opinion
the proceedings conformed to the basic principles of American justice.
Mr. Craig accepted this assignment and participated fully and without
limitation. He attended Commission hearings in person or through his
appointed assistants. All working papers, reports, and other data in
Commission files were made available, and Mr. Craig and his associates
were given the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to recall any
witness heard prior to his appointment, and to suggest witnesses whose
testimony they would like to have the Commission hear. This procedure
was agreeable to counsel for Oswald’s widow.
THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
In this report the Commission submits the results of its investigation.
Each member of the Commission has given careful consideration to
the entire report and concurs in its findings and conclusions. The
report consists of an initial chapter summarizing the Commission’s
basic findings and conclusions, followed by a detailed analysis of
the facts and the issues raised by the events of November 22, 1963,
and the 2 following days. Individual chapters consider the trip to
Dallas, the shots from the Texas School Book Depository, the identity
of the assassin, the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald, the possibility
of a conspiracy, Oswald’s background and possible motive, and
arrangements for the protection of the President. In these chapters,
rather than rely on cross references, the Commission on occasion has
repeated certain testimony in order that the reader might have the
necessary information before him while examining the conclusions of the
Commission on each important issue.
With this report the Commission is submitting the complete testimony
of all the witnesses who appeared before the Commission or gave sworn
depositions or affidavits, the accompanying documentary exhibits, and
other investigative materials which are relied upon in this report. The
Commission is committing all of its reports and working papers to the
National Archives, where they can be permanently preserved under the
rules and regulations of the National Archives and applicable Federal
law.
Contents
Page
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL vii
FOREWORD ix
CHAPTER I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1
Narrative of Events 1
Conclusions 18
Recommendations 25
CHAPTER II. THE ASSASSINATION 28
Planning the Texas Trip 28
Advance Preparations for the Dallas Trip 29
Preventive Intelligence Activities 29
The Luncheon Site 30
The Motorcade Route 31
Dallas Before the Visit 40
Visits to Other Texas Cities 42
Arrival at Love Field 42
Organization of the Motorcade 43
The Drive Through Dallas 46
The Assassination 48
The Time 48
Speed of the Limousine 49
In the Presidential Limousine 49
Reaction by Secret Service Agents 50
Parkland Memorial Hospital 52
The Race to the Hospital 52
Treatment of President Kennedy 53
Treatment of Governor Connally 56
Vice President Johnson at Parkland 56
Secret Service Emergency Security Arrangements 57
Removal of the President’s Body 58
The End of the Trip 59
Swearing in of the New President 59
Return to Washington, D.C. 59
The Autopsy 59
CHAPTER III. THE SHOTS FROM THE TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK DEPOSITORY 61
The Witnesses 61
Near the Depository 63
On the Fifth Floor 68
At the Triple Underpass 71
The Presidential Automobile 76
Expert Examination of Rifle, Cartridge Cases, and Bullet
Fragments 79
Discovery of Cartridge Cases and Rifle 79
Discovery of Bullet at Parkland Hospital 79
Description of Rifle 81
Expert Testimony 84
The Bullet Wounds 85
The President’s Head Wounds 86
The President’s Neck Wounds 87
The Governor’s Wounds 92
The Trajectory 96
Films and Tests 96
The First Bullet That Hit 97
The Subsequent Bullet That Hit 109
Number of Shots 110
The Shot That Missed 111
The First Shot 111
The Second Shot 115
The Third Shot 115
Time Span of Shots 117
Conclusion 117
CHAPTER IV. THE ASSASSIN 118
Ownership and Possession of Assassination Weapon 118
Purchase of Rifle by Oswald 118
Oswald’s Palmprint on Rifle Barrel 122
Fibers on Rifle 124
Photograph of Oswald With Rifle 125
Rifle Among Oswald’s Possessions 128
Conclusion 129
The Rifle in the Building 129
The Curtain Rod Story 129
The Missing Rifle 130
The Long and Bulky Package 131
Location of Bag 134
Scientific Evidence Linking Rifle and Oswald to Paper Bag 135
Conclusion 137
Oswald at Window 137
Palmprints and Fingerprints on Cartons and Paper Bag 140
Oswald’s Presence on Sixth Floor Approximately 35 Minutes
Before the Assassination 143
Eyewitness Identification of Assassin 143
Oswald’s Actions in Building After Assassination 149
Conclusion 156
The Killing of Patrolman J. D. Tippit 156
Oswald’s Movements After Leaving Depository Building 157
Description of Shooting 165
Eyewitnesses 166
Murder Weapon 171
Ownership of Revolver 172
Oswald’s Jacket 175
Conclusion 176
Oswald’s Arrest 176
Statements of Oswald During Detention 180
Denial of Rifle Ownership 181
The Revolver 181
The Aliases “Hidell” and “O. H. Lee” 181
The Curtain Rod Story 182
Actions During and After Shooting 182
Prior Attempt To Kill 183
The Attempt on the Life of Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker 183
Richard M. Nixon Incident 187
Oswald’s Rifle Capability 189
The Nature of the Shots 189
Oswald’s Marine Training 191
Oswald’s Rifle Practice Outside the Marines 192
Accuracy of Weapon 193
Conclusion 195
Conclusion 195
CHAPTER V. DETENTION AND DEATH OF OSWALD 196
Treatment of Oswald in Custody 196
Chronology 198
Interrogation Sessions 199
Oswald’s Legal Rights 200
Activity of Newsmen 201
On the Third Floor 201
Oswald and the Press 206
The Abortive Transfer 208
Possible Assistance to Jack Ruby in Entering the Basement 216
Adequacy of Security Precautions 225
News Coverage and Police Policy 231
Responsibility of News Media 240
CHAPTER VI. INVESTIGATION OF POSSIBLE CONSPIRACY 243
Circumstances Surrounding the Assassination 245
Selection of Motorcade Route 245
Oswald’s Presence in the Depository Building 246
Bringing Rifle Into Building 247
Accomplices at the Scene of the Assassination 248
Oswald’s Escape 252
Background of Lee Harvey Oswald 254
Residence in the Soviet Union 254
Associations in the Dallas-Fort Worth Community 280
Political Activities Upon Return to the United States 287
Contacts With the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City
and the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. 299
Investigation of Other Activities 312
Oswald Was Not an Agent for the U.S. Government 325
Oswald’s Finances 328
Possible Conspiracy Involving Jack Ruby 333
Ruby’s Activities From November 21 to November 24, 1963 333
Ruby and Oswald Were Not Acquainted 359
Ruby’s Background and Associations 365
Conclusion 374
CHAPTER VII. LEE HARVEY OSWALD: BACKGROUND AND POSSIBLE MOTIVES 375
The Early Years 377
New York City 378
Return to New Orleans and Joining the Marine Corps 383
Interest in Marxism 388
Defection to the Soviet Union 390
Return to the United States 394
Personal Relations 400
Employment 402
Attack on General Walker 404
Political Activities 406
Interest in Cuba 412
Possible Influence of Anti-Kennedy Sentiment in Dallas 415
Relationship With Wife 416
The Unanswered Questions 421
Conclusion 423
CHAPTER VIII. THE PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT 425
The Nature of the Protective Assignment 426
Evaluation of Presidential Protection at the Time of the
Assassination of President Kennedy 428
Intelligence Functions Relating to Presidential Protection
at the Time of the Dallas Trip 429
Liaison With Other Government Agencies 444
Other Protective Measures and Aspects of Secret
Service Performance 444
Recommendations 454
Assassination a Federal Crime 454
Committee of Cabinet Officers 456
Responsibilities for Presidential Protection 457
General Supervision of the Secret Service 460
Preventive Intelligence 461
Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies 465
Inspection of Buildings 466
Secret Service Personnel and Facilities 466
Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies 467
Conclusion 468
APPENDIX I. EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11130 471
APPENDIX II. WHITE HOUSE RELEASE 472
APPENDIX III. SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 137 473
APPENDIX IV. BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 475
Members of Commission 475
General Counsel 476
Assistant Counsel 476
Staff Members 477
Acknowledgments 481
APPENDIX V. LIST OF WITNESSES 483
APPENDIX VI. COMMISSION PROCEDURES FOR THE TAKING OF TESTIMONY 501
Resolution Governing Questioning of Witnesses by Members of
the Commission Staff 501
APPENDIX VII. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL PROTECTION 504
Before the Civil War 504
Lincoln 505
The Need for Protection Further Demonstrated 507
Development of Presidential Protection 510
APPENDIX VIII. MEDICAL REPORTS FROM DOCTORS AT PARKLAND
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, DALLAS, TEX. 516
APPENDIX IX. AUTOPSY REPORT AND SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT 538
APPENDIX X. EXPERT TESTIMONY 547
Firearms and Firearms Identification 547
General Principles 547
The Rifle 553
Rifle Cartridge and Cartridge Cases 555
The Rifle Bullets 557
The Revolver 558
Revolver Cartridges and Cartridge Cases 559
Revolver Bullets 559
The Struggle for the Revolver 560
The Paraffin Test 560
The Walker Bullet 562
Fingerprints and Palmprints 563
General Principles 563
Objects in the Texas School Book Depository Building 556
Questioned Documents 566
The Mail Order for the C2766 Rifle, the Related Envelope,
and the Money Order 569
Mail Order for the V510210 Revolver 570
Post Office Box Applications and Change-of-Address Card 570
The Spurious Selective Service System Notice of
Classification and U.S. Marine Corps Certificate
of Service 571
The Hidell Notice of Classification 571
The Hidell Certificate of Service 576
The Vaccination Certificate 577
The Fair Play for Cuba Committee Card 578
The Unsigned Russian-Language Note 578
The Homemade Wrapping Paper Bag 579
Wound Ballistics Experiments 580
Purpose of the Tests 580
The Testers and Their Qualifications 580
General Testing Conditions 581
Tests on Penetration Power and Bullet Stability 581
Tests Simulating President Kennedy’s Neck Wound 582
Tests Simulating Governor Connally’s Chest Wounds 582
Tests Simulating Governor Connally’s Wrist Wounds 583
Conclusions From Simulating the Neck, Chest, and Wrist Wounds 584
Tests Simulating President Kennedy’s Head Wounds 585
Hairs and Fibers 586
General Principles 588
Photographs 592
APPENDIX XI. REPORTS RELATING TO THE INTERROGATION OF LEE HARVEY
OSWALD AT THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT 598
APPENDIX XII. SPECULATIONS AND RUMORS 637
The Source of the Shots 639
The Assassin 642
Oswald’s Movements Between 12:33 and 1:15 p.m. 648
Murder of Tippit 650
Oswald After His Arrest 654
Oswald in the Soviet Union 655
Oswald’s Trip to Mexico City 658
Oswald and U.S. Government Agencies 659
Conspiratorial Relationships 661
Other Rumors and Speculations 664
APPENDIX XIII. BIOGRAPHY OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD 669
Early Years 669
Marines 681
Soviet Union 689
Fort Worth, Dallas, New Orleans 713
Mexico City 730
Dallas 737
APPENDIX XIV. ANALYSIS OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD’S FINANCES FROM
JUNE 13, 1962, THROUGH NOVEMBER 22, 1963 741
APPENDIX XV. TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN LEE HARVEY OSWALD AND MARINA
OSWALD, AND THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 746
Issuance of Passport in 1959 746
Oswald’s Attempts To Renounce His U.S. Citizenship 747
Return and Renewal of Oswald’s 1959 Passport 752
Negotiations Between Oswald and the Embassy 752
Legal Justification for the Return and Reissue of Oswald’s
Passport 759
Authorization for Marina Oswald To Enter the United States 761
Negotiations Between Oswald and the Embassy 761
Legal Justification for the Decisions Affecting Marina Oswald 766
Oswald’s Letter to Senator Tower 769
The Loan From the State Department 770
Oswald’s Return to the United States and Repayment of His Loan 773
Issuance of a Passport in June 1963 773
Visit to the Russian Embassy in Mexico City 777
Conclusion 777
APPENDIX XVI. A BIOGRAPHY OF JACK RUBY 779
Family Background 779
Childhood and Youth (1911-33) 780
Psychiatric Report 781
Placement in Foster Homes 782
Subsequent Home Life 783
Education 784
Activities 784
Temperament 785
Young Manhood (1933-43) 786
San Francisco (1933-37) 786
Occupations and Activities 786
Chicago (1937-43) 787
Military Activities (1943-46) 790
Postwar Chicago (1946-47) 791
Dallas (1947-63) 792
The Move to Dallas 792
The Change of Name 793
Nightclub Operations 794
Employee Relationships 796
Financial Data and Tax Problems 797
Other Business Ventures 799
Arrests and Violations 800
Police Associations 800
Underworld Ties 801
Travels 801
Character and Interests 802
Family Relationships 802
Social Relationships 803
Affection for Dogs 804
Religious Interests 804
Physical Activities and Violence 804
Generosity to Friends and the Need for Recognition 806
APPENDIX XVII. POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION OF JACK RUBY 807
Preliminary Arrangements 807
Administration of the Test 809
Interpretation of the Test 813
APPENDIX XVIII. FOOTNOTES 817
INDEX 880
CHAPTER I
Summary and Conclusions
The assassination of John Fitzgerald Kennedy on November 22, 1963,
was a cruel and shocking act of violence directed against a man, a
family, a nation, and against all mankind. A young and vigorous leader
whose years of public and private life stretched before him was the
victim of the fourth Presidential assassination in the history of a
country dedicated to the concepts of reasoned argument and peaceful
political change. This Commission was created on November 29, 1963,
in recognition of the right of people everywhere to full and truthful
knowledge concerning these events. This report endeavors to fulfill
that right and to appraise this tragedy by the light of reason and the
standard of fairness. It has been prepared with a deep awareness of
the Commission’s responsibility to present to the American people an
objective report of the facts relating to the assassination.
NARRATIVE OF EVENTS
At 11:40 a.m., c.s.t., on Friday, November 22, 1963, President John
F. Kennedy, Mrs. Kennedy, and their party arrived at Love Field,
Dallas, Tex. Behind them was the first day of a Texas trip planned
5 months before by the President, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson,
and John B. Connally, Jr., Governor of Texas. After leaving the White
House on Thursday morning, the President had flown initially to San
Antonio where Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson joined the party and
the President dedicated new research facilities at the U.S. Air Force
School of Aerospace Medicine. Following a testimonial dinner in Houston
for U.S. Representative Albert Thomas, the President flew to Fort Worth
where he spent the night and spoke at a large breakfast gathering on
Friday.
Planned for later that day were a motorcade through downtown Dallas,
a luncheon speech at the Trade Mart, and a flight to Austin where
the President would attend a reception and speak at a Democratic
fundraising dinner. From Austin he would proceed to the Texas ranch of
the Vice President. Evident on this trip were the varied roles which
an American President performs--Head of State, Chief Executive, party
leader, and, in this instance, prospective candidate for reelection.
The Dallas motorcade, it was hoped, would evoke a demonstration of the
President’s personal popularity in a city which he had lost in the 1960
election. Once it had been decided that the trip to Texas would span 2
days, those responsible for planning, primarily Governor Connally and
Kenneth O’Donnell, a special assistant to the President, agreed that
a motorcade through Dallas would be desirable. The Secret Service was
told on November 8 that 45 minutes had been allotted to a motorcade
procession from Love Field to the site of a luncheon planned by Dallas
business and civic leaders in honor of the President. After considering
the facilities and security problems of several buildings, the Trade
Mart was chosen as the luncheon site. Given this selection, and in
accordance with the customary practice of affording the greatest number
of people an opportunity to see the President, the motorcade route
selected was a natural one. The route was approved by the local host
committee and White House representatives on November 18 and publicized
in the local papers starting on November 19. This advance publicity
made it clear that the motorcade would leave Main Street and pass the
intersection of Elm and Houston Streets as it proceeded to the Trade
Mart by way of the Stemmons Freeway.
By midmorning of November 22, clearing skies in Dallas dispelled the
threat of rain and the President greeted the crowds from his open
limousine without the “bubbletop,” which was at that time a plastic
shield furnishing protection only against inclement weather. To the
left of the President in the rear seat was Mrs. Kennedy. In the jump
seats were Governor Connally, who was in front of the President, and
Mrs. Connally at the Governor’s left. Agent William R. Greer of the
Secret Service was driving, and Agent Roy H. Kellerman was sitting to
his right.
Directly behind the Presidential limousine was an open “followup” car
with eight Secret Service agents, two in the front seat, two in the
rear, and two on each running board. These agents, in accordance with
normal Secret Service procedures, were instructed to scan the crowds,
the roofs, and windows of buildings, overpasses, and crossings for
signs of trouble. Behind the “followup” car was the Vice-Presidential
car carrying the Vice President and Mrs. Johnson and Senator Ralph W.
Yarborough. Next were a Vice-Presidential “followup” car and several
cars and buses for additional dignitaries, press representatives, and
others.
The motorcade left Love Field shortly after 11:50 a.m., and proceeded
through residential neighborhoods, stopping twice at the President’s
request to greet well-wishers among the friendly crowds. Each time
the President’s car halted, Secret Service agents from the “followup”
car moved forward to assume a protective stance near the President
and Mrs. Kennedy. As the motorcade reached Main Street, a principal
east-west artery in downtown Dallas, the welcome became tumultuous.
At the extreme west end of Main Street the motorcade turned right on
Houston Street and proceeded north for one block in order to make a
left turn on Elm Street, the most direct and convenient approach to the
Stemmons Freeway and the Trade Mart. As the President’s car approached
the intersection of Houston and Elm Streets, there loomed directly
ahead on the intersection’s northwest corner a seven-story, orange
brick warehouse and office building, the Texas School Book Depository.
Riding in the Vice President’s car, Agent Rufus W. Youngblood of the
Secret Service noticed that the clock atop the building indicated 12:30
p.m., the scheduled arrival time at the Trade Mart.
The President’s car which had been going north made a sharp turn
toward the southwest onto Elm Street. At a speed of about 11 miles per
hour, it started down the gradual descent toward a railroad overpass
under which the motorcade would proceed before reaching the Stemmons
Freeway. The front of the Texas School Book Depository was now on the
President’s right, and he waved to the crowd assembled there as he
passed the building. Dealey Plaza--an open, landscaped area marking the
western end of downtown Dallas--stretched out to the President’s left.
A Secret Service agent riding in the motorcade radioed the Trade Mart
that the President would arrive in 5 minutes.
Seconds later shots resounded in rapid succession. The President’s
hands moved to his neck. He appeared to stiffen momentarily and lurch
slightly forward in his seat. A bullet had entered the base of the back
of his neck slightly to the right of the spine. It traveled downward
and exited from the front of the neck, causing a nick in the left lower
portion of the knot in the President’s necktie. Before the shooting
started, Governor Connally had been facing toward the crowd on the
right. He started to turn toward the left and suddenly felt a blow on
his back. The Governor had been hit by a bullet which entered at the
extreme right side of his back at a point below his right armpit. The
bullet traveled through his chest in a downward and forward direction,
exited below his right nipple, passed through his right wrist which had
been in his lap, and then caused a wound to his left thigh. The force
of the bullet’s impact appeared to spin the Governor to his right, and
Mrs. Connally pulled him down into her lap. Another bullet then struck
President Kennedy in the rear portion of his head, causing a massive
and fatal wound. The President fell to the left into Mrs. Kennedy’s lap.
Secret Service Agent Clinton J. Hill, riding on the left running board
of the “followup” car, heard a noise which sounded like a firecracker
and saw the President suddenly lean forward and to the left. Hill
jumped off the car and raced toward the President’s limousine. In the
front seat of the Vice-Presidential car, Agent Youngblood heard an
explosion and noticed unusual movements in the crowd. He vaulted into
the rear seat and sat on the Vice President in order to protect him.
At the same time Agent Kellerman in the front seat of the Presidential
limousine turned to observe the President. Seeing that the President
was struck, Kellerman instructed the driver, “Let’s get out of here;
we are hit.” He radioed ahead to the lead car, “Get us to the hospital
immediately.” Agent Greer immediately accelerated the Presidential car.
As it gained speed, Agent Hill managed to pull himself onto the back of
the car where Mrs. Kennedy had climbed. Hill pushed her back into the
rear seat and shielded the stricken President and Mrs. Kennedy as the
President’s car proceeded at high speed to Parkland Memorial Hospital,
4 miles away.
At Parkland, the President was immediately treated by a team of
physicians who had been alerted for the President’s arrival by the
Dallas Police Department as the result of a radio message from the
motorcade after the shooting. The doctors noted irregular breathing
movements and a possible heartbeat, although they could not detect a
pulsebeat. They observed the extensive wound in the President’s head
and a small wound approximately one-fourth inch in diameter in the
lower third of his neck. In an effort to facilitate breathing, the
physicians performed a tracheotomy by enlarging the throat wound and
inserting a tube. Totally absorbed in the immediate task of trying to
preserve the President’s life, the attending doctors never turned the
President over for an examination of his back. At 1 p.m., after all
heart activity ceased and the Last Rites were administered by a priest,
President Kennedy was pronounced dead. Governor Connally underwent
surgery and ultimately recovered from his serious wounds.
Upon learning of the President’s death, Vice President Johnson left
Parkland Hospital under close guard and proceeded to the Presidential
plane at Love Field. Mrs. Kennedy, accompanying her husband’s body,
boarded the plane shortly thereafter. At 2:38 p.m., in the central
compartment of the plane, Lyndon B. Johnson was sworn in as the 36th
President of the United States by Federal District Court Judge Sarah T.
Hughes. The plane left immediately for Washington, D.C., arriving at
Andrews AFB, Md., at 5:58 p.m., e.s.t. The President’s body was taken
to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Md., where it was given
a complete pathological examination. The autopsy disclosed the large
head wound observed at Parkland and the wound in the front of the neck
which had been enlarged by the Parkland doctors when they performed the
tracheotomy. Both of these wounds were described in the autopsy report
as being “presumably of exit.” In addition the autopsy revealed a small
wound of entry in the rear of the President’s skull and another wound
of entry near the base of the back of the neck. The autopsy report
stated the cause of death as “Gunshot wound, head,” and the bullets
which struck the President were described as having been fired “from a
point behind and somewhat above the level of the deceased.”
At the scene of the shooting, there was evident confusion at the
outset concerning the point of origin of the shots. Witnesses differed
in their accounts of the direction from which the sound of the shots
emanated. Within a few minutes, however, attention centered on the
Texas School Book Depository Building as the source of the shots.
The building was occupied by a private corporation, the Texas School
Book Depository Co., which distributed school textbooks of several
publishers and leased space to representatives of the publishers. Most
of the employees in the building worked for these publishers. The
balance, including a 15-man warehousing crew, were employees of the
Texas School Book Depository Co. itself.
Several eyewitnesses in front of the building reported that they saw a
rifle being fired from the southeast corner window on the sixth floor
of the Texas School Book Depository. One eyewitness, Howard L. Brennan,
had been watching the parade from a point on Elm Street directly
opposite and facing the building. He promptly told a policeman that he
had seen a slender man, about 5 feet 10 inches, in his early thirties,
take deliberate aim from the sixth-floor corner window and fire a rifle
in the direction of the President’s car. Brennan thought he might be
able to identify the man since he had noticed him in the window a few
minutes before the motorcade made the turn onto Elm Street. At 12:34
p.m., the Dallas police radio mentioned the Depository Building as
a possible source of the shots, and at 12:45 p.m., the police radio
broadcast a description of the suspected assassin based primarily on
Brennan’s observations.
When the shots were fired, a Dallas motorcycle patrolman, Marrion L.
Baker, was riding in the motorcade at a point several cars behind the
President. He had turned right from Main Street onto Houston Street
and was about 200 feet south of Elm Street when he heard a shot.
Baker, having recently returned from a week of deer hunting, was
certain the shot came from a high-powered rifle. He looked up and saw
pigeons scattering in the air from their perches on the Texas School
Book Depository Building. He raced his motorcycle to the building,
dismounted, scanned the area to the west and pushed his way through the
spectators toward the entrance. There he encountered Roy Truly, the
building superintendent, who offered Baker his help. They entered the
building, and ran toward the two elevators in the rear. Finding that
both elevators were on an upper floor, they dashed up the stairs. Not
more than 2 minutes had elapsed since the shooting.
When they reached the second-floor landing on their way up to the top
of the building, Patrolman Baker thought he caught a glimpse of someone
through the small glass window in the door separating the hall area
near the stairs from the small vestibule leading into the lunchroom.
Gun in hand, he rushed to the door and saw a man about 20 feet away
walking toward the other end of the lunchroom. The man was emptyhanded.
At Baker’s command, the man turned and approached him. Truly, who had
started up the stairs to the third floor ahead of Baker, returned
to see what had delayed the patrolman. Baker asked Truly whether he
knew the man in the lunchroom. Truly replied that the man worked in
the building, whereupon Baker turned from the man and proceeded, with
Truly, up the stairs. The man they encountered had started working
in the Texas School Book Depository Building on October 16, 1963. His
fellow workers described him as very quiet--a “loner.” His name was Lee
Harvey Oswald.
Within about 1 minute after his encounter with Baker and Truly, Oswald
was seen passing through the second-floor offices. In his hand was a
full “Coke” bottle which he had purchased from a vending machine in
the lunchroom. He was walking toward the front of the building where
a passenger elevator and a short flight of stairs provided access to
the main entrance of the building on the first floor. Approximately 7
minutes later, at about 12:40 p.m., Oswald boarded a bus at a point on
Elm Street seven short blocks east of the Depository Building. The bus
was traveling west toward the very building from which Oswald had come.
Its route lay through the Oak Cliff section in southwest Dallas, where
it would pass seven blocks east of the roominghouse in which Oswald was
living, at 1026 North Beckley Avenue. On the bus was Mrs. Mary Bledsoe,
one of Oswald’s former landladies who immediately recognized him.
Oswald stayed on the bus approximately 3 or 4 minutes, during which
time it proceeded only two blocks because of the traffic jam created by
the motorcade and the assassination. Oswald then left the bus.
A few minutes later he entered a vacant taxi four blocks away and asked
the driver to take him to a point on North Beckley Avenue several
blocks beyond his roominghouse. The trip required 5 or 6 minutes. At
about 1 p.m. Oswald arrived at the roominghouse. The housekeeper, Mrs.
Earlene Roberts, was surprised to see Oswald at midday and remarked
to him that he seemed to be in quite a hurry. He made no reply. A few
minutes later Oswald emerged from his room zipping up his jacket and
rushed out of the house.
Approximately 14 minutes later, and just 45 minutes after the
assassination, another violent shooting occurred in Dallas. The victim
was Patrolman J. D. Tippit of the Dallas police, an officer with a
good record during his more than 11 years with the police force. He
was shot near the intersection of 10th Street and Patton Avenue, about
nine-tenths of a mile from Oswald’s roominghouse. At the time of the
assassination, Tippit was alone in his patrol car, the routine practice
for most police patrol cars at this time of day. He had been ordered by
radio at 12:45 p.m. to proceed to the central Oak Cliff area as part of
a concentration of patrol car activity around the center of the city
following the assassination. At 12:54 Tippit radioed that he had moved
as directed and would be available for any emergency. By this time the
police radio had broadcast several messages alerting the police to
the suspect described by Brennan at the scene of the assassination--a
slender white male, about 30 years old, 5 feet 10 inches and weighing
about 165 pounds.
At approximately 1:15 p.m., Tippit was driving slowly in an easterly
direction on East 10th Street in Oak Cliff. About 100 feet past the
intersection of 10th Street and Patton Avenue, Tippit pulled up
alongside a man walking in the same direction. The man met the general
description of the suspect wanted in connection with the assassination.
He walked over to Tippit’s car, rested his arms on the door on the
right-hand side of the car, and apparently exchanged words with Tippit
through the window. Tippit opened the door on the left side and started
to walk around the front of his car. As he reached the front wheel on
the driver’s side, the man on the sidewalk drew a revolver and fired
several shots in rapid succession, hitting Tippit four times and
killing him instantly. An automobile repairman, Domingo Benavides,
heard the shots and stopped his pickup truck on the opposite side of
the street about 25 feet in front of Tippit’s car. He observed the
gunman start back toward Patton Avenue, removing the empty cartridge
cases from the gun as he went. Benavides rushed to Tippit’s side. The
patrolman, apparently dead, was lying on his revolver, which was out
of its holster. Benavides promptly reported the shooting to police
headquarters over the radio in Tippit’s car. The message was received
shortly after 1:16 p.m.
As the gunman left the scene, he walked hurriedly back toward Patton
Avenue and turned left, heading south. Standing on the northwest corner
of 10th Street and Patton Avenue was Helen Markham, who had been
walking south on Patton Avenue and had seen both the killer and Tippit
cross the intersection in front of her as she waited on the curb for
traffic to pass. She witnessed the shooting and then saw the man with a
gun in his hand walk back toward the corner and cut across the lawn of
the corner house as he started south on Patton Avenue.
In the corner house itself, Mrs. Barbara Jeanette Davis and her
sister-in-law, Mrs. Virginia Davis, heard the shots and rushed to the
door in time to see the man walk rapidly across the lawn shaking a
revolver as if he were emptying it of cartridge cases. Later that day
each woman found a cartridge case near the house. As the gunman turned
the corner he passed alongside a taxicab which was parked on Patton
Avenue, a few feet from 10th Street. The driver, William W. Scoggins,
had seen the slaying and was now crouched behind his cab on the street
side. As the gunman cut through the shrubbery on the lawn, Scoggins
looked up and saw the man approximately 12 feet away. In his hand was a
pistol and he muttered words which sounded to Scoggins like “poor dumb
cop” or “poor damn cop.”
After passing Scoggins, the gunman crossed to the west side of Patton
Avenue and ran south toward Jefferson Boulevard, a main Oak Cliff
thoroughfare. On the east side of Patton, between 10th Street and
Jefferson Boulevard, Ted Callaway, a used car salesman, heard the shots
and ran to the sidewalk. As the man with the gun rushed past, Callaway
shouted “What’s going on?” The man merely shrugged, ran on to Jefferson
Boulevard and turned right. On the next corner was a gas station with a
parking lot in the rear. The assailant ran into the lot, discarded his
jacket and then continued his flight west on Jefferson.
In a shoe store a few blocks farther west on Jefferson, the manager,
Johnny Calvin Brewer, heard the siren of a police car moments after
the radio in his store announced the shooting of the police officer in
Oak Cliff. Brewer saw a man step quickly into the entranceway of the
store and stand there with his back toward the street. When the police
car made a =U=-turn and headed back in the direction of the Tippit
shooting, the man left and Brewer followed him. He saw the man enter
the Texas Theatre, a motion picture house about 60 feet away, without
buying a ticket. Brewer pointed this out to the cashier, Mrs. Julia
Postal, who called the police. The time was shortly after 1:40 p.m.
At 1:29 p.m., the police radio had noted the similarity in the
descriptions of the suspects in the Tippit shooting and the
assassination. At 1:45 p.m., in response to Mrs. Postal’s call, the
police radio sounded the alarm: “Have information a suspect just went
in the Texas Theatre on West Jefferson.” Within minutes the theater
was surrounded. The house lights were then turned up. Patrolman M. N.
McDonald and several other policemen approached the man, who had been
pointed out to them by Brewer.
McDonald ordered the man to his feet and heard him say, “Well, it’s all
over now.” The man drew a gun from his waist with one hand and struck
the officer with the other. McDonald struck out with his right hand and
grabbed the gun with his left hand. After a brief struggle McDonald and
several other police officers disarmed and handcuffed the suspect and
drove him to police headquarters, arriving at approximately 2 p.m.
Following the assassination, police cars had rushed to the Texas School
Book Depository in response to the many radio messages reporting that
the shots had been fired from the Depository Building. Inspector J.
Herbert Sawyer of the Dallas Police Department arrived at the scene
shortly after hearing the first of these police radio messages at 12:34
p.m. Some of the officers who had been assigned to the area of Elm
and Houston Streets for the motorcade were talking to witnesses and
watching the building when Sawyer arrived. Sawyer entered the building
and rode a passenger elevator to the fourth floor, which was the top
floor for this elevator. He conducted a quick search, returned to the
main floor and, between approximately 12:37 and 12:40 p.m., ordered
that no one be permitted to leave the building.
Shortly before 1 p.m. Capt. J. Will Fritz, chief of the homicide and
robbery bureau of the Dallas Police Department, arrived to take charge
of the investigation. Searching the sixth floor, Deputy Sheriff Luke
Mooney noticed a pile of cartons in the southeast corner. He squeezed
through the boxes and realized immediately that he had discovered the
point from which the shots had been fired. On the floor were three
empty cartridge cases. A carton had apparently been placed on the floor
at the side of the window so that a person sitting on the carton could
look down Elm Street toward the overpass and scarcely be noticed from
the outside. Between this carton and the half-open window were three
additional cartons arranged at such an angle that a rifle resting on
the top carton would be aimed directly at the motorcade as it moved
away from the building. The high stack of boxes, which first attracted
Mooney’s attention, effectively screened a person at the window from
the view of anyone else on the floor.
Mooney’s discovery intensified the search for additional evidence on
the sixth floor, and at 1:22 p.m., approximately 10 minutes after the
cartridge cases were found, Deputy Sheriff Eugene Boone turned his
flashlight in the direction of two rows of boxes in the northwest
corner near the staircase. Stuffed between the two rows was a
bolt-action rifle with a telescopic sight. The rifle was not touched
until it could be photographed. When Lt. J. C. Day of the police
identification bureau decided that the wooden stock and the metal knob
at the end of the bolt contained no prints, he held the rifle by the
stock while Captain Fritz ejected a live shell by operating the bolt.
Lieutenant Day promptly noted that stamped on the rifle itself was the
serial number “C2766” as well as the markings “1940” “MADE ITALY” and
“CAL. 6.5.” The rifle was about 40 inches long and when disassembled it
could fit into a handmade paper sack which, after the assassination,
was found in the southeast corner of the building within a few feet of
the cartridge cases.
As Fritz and Day were completing their examination of this rifle on the
sixth floor, Roy Truly, the building superintendent, approached with
information which he felt should be brought to the attention of the
police. Earlier, while the police were questioning the employees, Truly
had observed that Lee Harvey Oswald, 1 of the 15 men who worked in the
warehouse, was missing. After Truly provided Oswald’s name, address,
and general description, Fritz left for police headquarters. He arrived
at headquarters shortly after 2 p.m. and asked two detectives to pick
up the employee who was missing from the Texas School Book Depository.
Standing nearby were the police officers who had just arrived with
the man arrested in the Texas Theatre. When Fritz mentioned the name
of the missing employee, he learned that the man was already in the
interrogation room. The missing School Book Depository employee and the
suspect who had been apprehended in the Texas Theatre were one and the
same--Lee Harvey Oswald.
The suspect Fritz was about to question in connection with the
assassination of the President and the murder of a policeman was born
in New Orleans on October 18, 1939, 2 months after the death of his
father. His mother, Marguerite Claverie Oswald, had two older children.
One, John Pic, was a half-brother to Lee from an earlier marriage which
had ended in divorce. The other was Robert Oswald, a full brother to
Lee and 5 years older. When Lee Oswald was 3, Mrs. Oswald placed him in
an orphanage where his brother and half-brother were already living,
primarily because she had to work.
In January 1944, when Lee was 4, he was taken out of the orphanage, and
shortly thereafter his mother moved with him to Dallas, Tex., where
the older boys joined them at the end of the school year. In May of
1945 Marguerite Oswald married her third husband, Edwin A. Ekdahl.
While the two older boys attended a military boarding school, Lee
lived at home and developed a warm attachment to Ekdahl, occasionally
accompanying his mother and stepfather on business trips around the
country. Lee started school in Benbrook, Tex., but in the fall of
1946, after a separation from Ekdahl, Marguerite Oswald reentered Lee
in the first grade in Covington, La. In January 1947, while Lee was
still in the first grade, the family moved to Fort Worth, Tex., as the
result of an attempted reconciliation between Ekdahl and Lee’s mother.
A year and a half later, before Lee was 9, his mother was divorced
from her third husband as the result of a divorce action instituted by
Ekdahl. Lee’s school record during the next 5½ years in Fort Worth was
average, although generally it grew poorer each year. The comments of
teachers and others who knew him at that time do not reveal any unusual
personality traits or characteristics.
Another change for Lee Oswald occurred in August 1952, a few months
after he completed the sixth grade. Marguerite Oswald and her
12-year-old son moved to New York City where Marguerite’s oldest
son, John Pic, was stationed with the Coast Guard. The ensuing year
and one-half in New York was marked by Lee’s refusals to attend
school and by emotional and psychological problems of a seemingly
serious nature. Because he had become a chronic school truant, Lee
underwent psychiatric study at Youth House, an institution in New
York for juveniles who have had truancy problems or difficulties
with the law, and who appear to require psychiatric observation,
or other types of guidance. The social worker assigned to his case
described him as “seriously detached” and “withdrawn” and noted “a
rather pleasant, appealing quality about this emotionally starved,
affectionless youngster.” Lee expressed the feeling to the social
worker that his mother did not care for him and regarded him as a
burden. He experienced fantasies about being all powerful and hurting
people, but during his stay at Youth House he was apparently not
a behavior problem. He appeared withdrawn and evasive, a boy who
preferred to spend his time alone, reading and watching television.
His tests indicated that he was above average in intelligence for
his age group. The chief psychiatrist of Youth House diagnosed Lee’s
problem as a “personality pattern disturbance with schizoid features
and passive-aggressive tendencies.” He concluded that the boy was “an
emotionally, quite disturbed youngster” and recommended psychiatric
treatment.
In May 1953, after having been at Youth House for 3 weeks, Lee Oswald
returned to school where his attendance and grades temporarily
improved. By the following fall, however, the probation officer
reported that virtually every teacher complained about the boy’s
behavior. His mother insisted that he did not need psychiatric
assistance. Although there was apparently some improvement in Lee’s
behavior during the next few months, the court recommended further
treatment. In January 1954, while Lee’s case was still pending,
Marguerite and Lee left for New Orleans, the city of Lee’s birth.
Upon his return to New Orleans, Lee maintained mediocre grades but
had no obvious behavior problems. Neighbors and others who knew him
outside of school remembered him as a quiet, solitary and introverted
boy who read a great deal and whose vocabulary made him quite
articulate. About 1 month after he started the 10th grade and 11 days
before his 16th birthday in October 1955, he brought to school a note
purportedly written by his mother, stating that the family was moving
to California. The note was written by Lee. A few days later he dropped
out of school and almost immediately tried to join the Marine Corps.
Because he was only 16, he was rejected.
After leaving school Lee worked for the next 10 months at several jobs
in New Orleans as an office messenger or clerk. It was during this
period that he started to read communist literature. Occasionally,
in conversations with others, he praised communism and expressed to
his fellow employees a desire to join the Communist Party. At about
this time, when he was not yet 17, he wrote to the Socialist Party of
America, professing his belief in Marxism.
Another move followed in July 1956 when Lee and his mother returned
to Fort Worth. He reentered high school but again dropped out after
a few weeks and enlisted in the Marine Corps on October 24, 1956, 6
days after his 17th birthday. On December 21, 1956, during boot camp
in San Diego, Oswald fired a score of 212 for record with the M-1
rifle--2 points over the minimum for a rating of “sharpshooter” on a
marksman/sharpshooter/expert scale. After his basic training, Oswald
received training in aviation fundamentals and then in radar scanning.
Most people who knew Oswald in the Marines described him as a “loner”
who resented the exercise of authority by others. He spent much of
his free time reading. He was court-martialed once for possessing an
unregistered privately owned weapon and, on another occasion, for using
provocative language to a noncommissioned officer. He was, however,
generally able to comply with Marine discipline, even though his
experiences in the Marine Corps did not live up to his expectations.
Oswald served 15 months overseas until November 1958, most of it in
Japan. During his final year in the Marine Corps he was stationed for
the most part in Santa Ana, Calif., where he showed a marked interest
in the Soviet Union and sometimes expressed politically radical views
with dogmatic conviction. Oswald again fired the M-1 rifle for record
on May 6, 1959, and this time he shot a score of 191 on a shorter
course than before, only 1 point over the minimum required to be a
“marksman.” According to one of his fellow marines, Oswald was not
particularly interested in his rifle performance, and his unit was not
expected to exhibit the usual rifle proficiency. During this period
he expressed strong admiration for Fidel Castro and an interest in
joining the Cuban army. He tried to impress those around him as an
intellectual, but his thinking appeared to some as shallow and rigid.
Oswald’s Marine service terminated on September 11, 1959, when at his
own request he was released from active service a few months ahead
of his scheduled release. He offered as the reason for his release
the ill health and economic plight of his mother. He returned to Fort
Worth, remained with his mother only 3 days and left for New Orleans,
telling his mother he planned to get work there in the shipping or
import-export business. In New Orleans he booked passage on the
freighter SS _Marion Lykes_, which sailed from New Orleans to Le Havre,
France, on September 20, 1959.
Lee Harvey Oswald had presumably planned this step in his life for
quite some time. In March of 1959 he had applied to the Albert
Schweitzer College in Switzerland for admission to the spring 1960
term. His letter of application contained many blatant falsehoods
concerning his qualifications and background. A few weeks before his
discharge he had applied for and obtained a passport, listing the
Soviet Union as one of the countries which he planned to visit. During
his service in the Marines he had saved a comparatively large sum of
money, possibly as much as $1,500, which would appear to have been
accomplished by considerable frugality and apparently for a specific
purpose.
The purpose of the accumulated fund soon became known. On October 16,
1959, Oswald arrived in Moscow by train after crossing the border
from Finland, where he had secured a visa for a 6-day stay in the
Soviet Union. He immediately applied for Soviet citizenship. On the
afternoon of October 21, 1959, Oswald was ordered to leave the Soviet
Union by 8 p.m. that evening. That same afternoon in his hotel room
Oswald, in an apparent suicide attempt, slashed his left wrist. He
was hospitalized immediately. On October 31, 3 days after his release
from the hospital, Oswald appeared at the American Embassy, announced
that he wished to renounce his U.S. citizenship and become a Russian
citizen, and handed the Embassy officer a written statement he had
prepared for the occasion. When asked his reasons, Oswald replied, “I
am a Marxist.” Oswald never formally complied with the legal steps
necessary to renounce his American citizenship. The Soviet Government
did not grant his request for citizenship, but in January 1960 he was
given permission to remain in the Soviet Union on a year-to-year basis.
At the same time Oswald was sent to Minsk where he worked in a radio
factory as an unskilled laborer. In January 1961 his permission to
remain in the Soviet Union was extended for another year. A few weeks
later, in February 1961, he wrote to the American Embassy in Moscow
expressing a desire to return to the United States.
The following month Oswald met a 19-year-old Russian girl, Marina
Nikolaevna Prusakova, a pharmacist, who had been brought up in
Leningrad but was then living with an aunt and uncle in Minsk. They
were married on April 30, 1961. Throughout the following year he
carried on a correspondence with American and Soviet authorities
seeking approval for the departure of himself and his wife to the
United States. In the course of this effort, Oswald and his wife
visited the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in July of 1961. Primarily on the
basis of an interview and questionnaire completed there, the Embassy
concluded that Oswald had not lost his citizenship, a decision
subsequently ratified by the Department of State in Washington, D.C.
Upon their return to Minsk, Oswald and his wife filed with the Soviet
authorities for permission to leave together. Their formal application
was made in July 1961, and on December 25, 1961, Marina Oswald was
advised it would be granted.
A daughter was born to the Oswalds in February 1962. In the months that
followed they prepared for their return to the United States. On May 9,
1962, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, at the request
of the Department of State, agreed to waive a restriction under the
law which would have prevented the issuance of a United States visa to
Oswald’s Russian wife until she had left the Soviet Union. They finally
left Moscow on June 1, 1962, and were assisted in meeting their travel
expenses by a loan of $435.71 from the U.S. Department of State. Two
weeks later they arrived in Fort Worth, Tex.
For a few weeks Oswald, his wife and child lived with Oswald’s brother
Robert. After a similar stay with Oswald’s mother, they moved into
their own apartment in early August. Oswald obtained a job on July
16 as a sheet metal worker. During this period in Fort Worth, Oswald
was interviewed twice by agents of the FBI. The report of the first
interview, which occurred on June 26, described him as arrogant and
unwilling to discuss the reasons why he had gone to the Soviet Union.
Oswald denied that he was involved in Soviet intelligence activities
and promised to advise the FBI if Soviet representatives ever
communicated with him. He was interviewed again on August 16, when he
displayed a less belligerent attitude and once again agreed to inform
the FBI of any attempt to enlist him in intelligence activities.
In early October 1962 Oswald quit his job at the sheet metal plant
and moved to Dallas. While living in Forth Worth the Oswalds had been
introduced to a group of Russian-speaking people in the Dallas-Fort
Worth area. Many of them assisted the Oswalds by providing small
amounts of food, clothing, and household items. Oswald himself was
disliked by almost all of this group whose help to the family was
prompted primarily by sympathy for Marina Oswald and the child.
Despite the fact that he had left the Soviet Union, disillusioned
with its Government, Oswald seemed more firmly committed than ever to
his concepts of Marxism. He showed disdain for democracy, capitalism,
and American society in general. He was highly critical of the
Russian-speaking group because they seemed devoted to American concepts
of democracy and capitalism and were ambitious to improve themselves
economically.
In February 1963 the Oswalds met Ruth Paine at a social gathering. Ruth
Paine was temporarily separated from her husband and living with her
two children in their home in Irving, Tex., a suburb of Dallas. Because
of an interest in the Russian language and sympathy for Marina Oswald,
who spoke no English and had little funds, Ruth Paine befriended Marina
and, during the next 2 months, visited her on several occasions.
On April 6, 1963, Oswald lost his job with a photography firm. A few
days later, on April 10, he attempted to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker
(Resigned, U.S. Army), using a rifle which he had ordered by mail 1
month previously under an assumed name. Marina Oswald learned of her
husband’s act when she confronted him with a note which he had left,
giving her instructions in the event he did not return. That incident
and their general economic difficulties impelled Marina Oswald to
suggest that her husband leave Dallas and go to New Orleans to look for
work.
Oswald left for New Orleans on April 24, 1963. Ruth Paine, who knew
nothing of the Walker shooting, invited Marina Oswald and the baby to
stay with her in the Paines’ modest home while Oswald sought work in
New Orleans. Early in May, upon receiving word from Oswald that he had
found a job, Ruth Paine drove Marina Oswald and the baby to New Orleans
to rejoin Oswald.
During the stay in New Orleans, Oswald formed a fictitious New Orleans
Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. He posed as secretary of
this organization and represented that the president was A. J. Hidell.
In reality, Hidell was a completely fictitious person created by
Oswald, the organization’s only member. Oswald was arrested on August 9
in connection with a scuffle which occurred while he was distributing
pro-Castro leaflets. The next day, while at the police station, he
was interviewed by an FBI agent after Oswald requested the police to
arrange such an interview. Oswald gave the agent false information
about his own background and was evasive in his replies concerning Fair
Play for Cuba activities. During the next 2 weeks Oswald appeared on
radio programs twice, claiming to be the spokesman for the Fair Play
for Cuba Committee in New Orleans.
On July 19, 1963, Oswald lost his job as a greaser of coffee processing
machinery. In September, after an exchange of correspondence with
Marina Oswald, Ruth Paine drove to New Orleans and on September 23,
transported Marina, the child, and the family belongings to Irving,
Tex. Ruth Paine suggested that Marina Oswald, who was expecting her
second child in October, live at the Paine house until after the baby
was born. Oswald remained behind, ostensibly to find work either in
Houston or some other city. Instead, he departed by bus for Mexico,
arriving in Mexico City on September 27, where he promptly visited
the Cuban and Russian Embassies. His stated objective was to obtain
official permission to visit Cuba, on his way to the Soviet Union. The
Cuban Government would not grant his visa unless the Soviet Government
would also issue a visa permitting his entry into Russia. Oswald’s
efforts to secure these visas failed, and he left for Dallas, where he
arrived on October 3, 1963.
When he saw his wife the next day, it was decided that Oswald would
rent a room in Dallas and visit his family on weekends. For 1 week he
rented a room from Mrs. Bledsoe, the woman who later saw him on the bus
shortly after the assassination. On October 14, 1963, he rented the
Beckley Avenue room and listed his name as O. H. Lee. On the same day,
at the suggestion of a neighbor, Mrs. Paine phoned the Texas School
Book Depository and was told that there was a job opening. She informed
Oswald who was interviewed the following day at the Depository and
started to work there on October 16, 1963.
On October 20 the Oswalds’ second daughter was born. During October
and November Oswald established a general pattern of weekend visits to
Irving, arriving on Friday afternoon and returning to Dallas Monday
morning with a fellow employee, Buell Wesley Frazier, who lived near
the Paines. On Friday, November 15, Oswald remained in Dallas at the
suggestion of his wife who told him that the house would be crowded
because of a birthday party for Ruth Paine’s daughter. On Monday,
November 18, Oswald and his wife quarreled bitterly during a telephone
conversation, because she learned for the first time that he was living
at the roominghouse under an assumed name. On Thursday, November 21,
Oswald told Frazier that he would like to drive to Irving to pick up
some curtain rods for an apartment in Dallas. His wife and Mrs. Paine
were quite surprised to see him since it was a Thursday night. They
thought he had returned to make up after Monday’s quarrel. He was
conciliatory, but Marina Oswald was still angry.
Later that evening, when Mrs. Paine had finished cleaning the kitchen,
she went into the garage and noticed that the light was burning. She
was certain that she had not left it on, although the incident appeared
unimportant at the time. In the garage were most of the Oswalds’
personal possessions. The following morning Oswald left while his wife
was still in bed feeding the baby. She did not see him leave the house,
nor did Ruth Paine. On the dresser in their room he left his wedding
ring which he had never done before. His wallet containing $170 was
left intact in a dresser-drawer.
Oswald walked to Frazier’s house about half a block away and placed a
long bulky package, made out of wrapping paper and tape, into the rear
seat of the car. He told Frazier that the package contained curtain
rods. When they reached the Depository parking lot, Oswald walked
quickly ahead. Frazier followed and saw Oswald enter the Depository
Building carrying the long bulky package with him.
During the morning of November 22, Marina Oswald followed President
Kennedy’s activities on television. She and Ruth Paine cried when they
heard that the President had been shot. Ruth Paine translated the news
of the shooting to Marina Oswald as it came over television, including
the report that the shots were probably fired from the building where
Oswald worked. When Marina Oswald heard this, she recalled the Walker
episode and the fact that her husband still owned the rifle. She went
quietly to the Paine’s garage where the rifle had been concealed in a
blanket among their other belongings. It appeared to her that the rifle
was still there, although she did not actually open the blanket.
At about 3 p.m. the police arrived at the Paine house and asked Marina
Oswald whether her husband owned a rifle. She said that he did and then
led them into the garage and pointed to the rolled up blanket. As a
police officer lifted it, the blanket hung limply over either side of
his arm. The rifle was not there.
Meanwhile, at police headquarters, Captain Fritz had begun questioning
Oswald. Soon after the start of the first interrogation, agents of
the FBI and the U.S. Secret Service arrived and participated in the
questioning. Oswald denied having anything to do with the assassination
of President Kennedy or the murder of Patrolman Tippit. He claimed that
he was eating lunch at the time of the assassination, and that he then
spoke with his foreman for 5 to 10 minutes before going home. He denied
that he owned a rifle and when confronted, in a subsequent interview,
with a picture showing him holding a rifle and pistol, he claimed that
his face had been superimposed on someone else’s body. He refused to
answer any questions about the presence in his wallet of a selective
service card with his picture and the name “Alek J. Hidell.”
During the questioning of Oswald on the third floor of the police
department, more than 100 representatives of the press, radio, and
television were crowded into the hallway through which Oswald had
to pass when being taken from his cell to Captain Fritz’ office for
interrogation. Reporters tried to interview Oswald during these
trips. Between Friday afternoon and Sunday morning he appeared in the
hallway at least 16 times. The generally confused conditions outside
and inside Captain Fritz’ office increased the difficulty of police
questioning. Advised by the police that he could communicate with an
attorney, Oswald made several telephone calls on Saturday in an effort
to procure representation of his own choice and discussed the matter
with the president of the local bar association, who offered to obtain
counsel. Oswald declined the offer saying that he would first try to
obtain counsel by himself. By Sunday morning he had not yet engaged an
attorney.
At 7:10 p.m. on November 22, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald was formally
advised that he had been charged with the murder of Patrolman J.D.
Tippit. Several witnesses to the Tippit slaying and to the subsequent
flight of the gunman had positively identified Oswald in police
lineups. While positive firearm identification evidence was not
available at the time, the revolver in Oswald’s possession at the time
of his arrest was of a type which could have fired the shots that
killed Tippit.
The formal charge against Oswald for the assassination of President
Kennedy was lodged shortly after 1:30 a.m., on Saturday, November 23.
By 10 p.m. of the day of the assassination, the FBI had traced the
rifle found on the sixth floor of the Texas School Book Depository to
a mailorder house in Chicago which had purchased it from a distributor
in New York. Approximately 6 hours later the Chicago firm advised
that this rifle had been ordered in March 1963 by an A. Hidel for
shipment to post office box 2915, in Dallas, Tex., a box rented by
Oswald. Payment for the rifle was remitted by a money order signed by
A. Hidell. By 6:45 p.m. on November 23, the FBI was able to advise
the Dallas police that, as a result of handwriting analysis of the
documents used to purchase the rifle, it had concluded that the rifle
had been ordered by Lee Harvey Oswald.
Throughout Friday and Saturday, the Dallas police released to the
public many of the details concerning the alleged evidence against
Oswald. Police officials discussed important aspects of the case,
usually in the course of impromptu and confused press conferences
in the third-floor corridor. Some of the information divulged was
erroneous. Efforts by the news media representatives to reconstruct the
crime and promptly report details frequently led to erroneous and often
conflicting reports. At the urgings of the newsmen, Chief of Police
Jesse E. Curry, brought Oswald to a press conference in the police
assembly room shortly after midnight of the day Oswald was arrested.
The assembly room was crowded with newsmen who had come to Dallas from
all over the country. They shouted questions at Oswald and flashed
cameras at him. Among this group was a 52-year-old Dallas nightclub
operator--Jack Ruby.
On Sunday morning, November 24, arrangements were made for Oswald’s
transfer from the city jail to the Dallas County jail, about 1 mile
away. The news media had been informed on Saturday night that the
transfer of Oswald would not take place until after 10 a.m. on Sunday.
Earlier on Sunday, between 2:30 and 3 a.m., anonymous telephone calls
threatening Oswald’s life had been received by the Dallas office of the
FBI and by the office of the county sheriff. Nevertheless, on Sunday
morning, television, radio, and newspaper representatives crowded into
the basement to record the transfer. As viewed through television
cameras, Oswald would emerge from a door in front of the cameras and
proceed to the transfer vehicle. To the right of the cameras was a
“down” ramp from Main Street on the north. To the left was an “up” ramp
leading to Commerce Street on the south.
The armored truck in which Oswald was to be transferred arrived shortly
after 11 a.m. Police officials then decided, however, that an unmarked
police car would be preferable for the trip because of its greater
speed and maneuverability. At approximately 11:20 a.m. Oswald emerged
from the basement jail office flanked by detectives on either side and
at his rear. He took a few steps toward the car and was in the glaring
light of the television cameras when a man suddenly darted out from
an area on the right of the cameras where newsmen had been assembled.
The man was carrying a Colt .38 revolver in his right hand and, while
millions watched on television, he moved quickly to within a few feet
of Oswald and fired one shot into Oswald’s abdomen. Oswald groaned with
pain as he fell to the ground and quickly lost consciousness. Within 7
minutes Oswald was at Parkland Hospital where, without having regained
consciousness, he was pronounced dead at 1:07 p.m.
The man who killed Oswald was Jack Ruby. He was instantly arrested and,
minutes later, confined in a cell on the fifth floor of the Dallas
police jail. Under interrogation, he denied that the killing of Oswald
was in any way connected with a conspiracy involving the assassination
of President Kennedy. He maintained that he had killed Oswald in a
temporary fit of depression and rage over the President’s death. Ruby
was transferred the following day to the county jail without notice to
the press or to police officers not directly involved in the transfer.
Indicted for the murder of Oswald by the State of Texas on November 26,
1963, Ruby was found guilty on March 14, 1964, and sentenced to death.
As of September 1964, his case was pending on appeal.
CONCLUSIONS
This Commission was created to ascertain the facts relating to the
preceding summary of events and to consider the important questions
which they raised. The Commission has addressed itself to this task and
has reached certain conclusions based on all the available evidence.
No limitations have been placed on the Commission’s inquiry; it has
conducted its own investigation, and all Government agencies have fully
discharged their responsibility to cooperate with the Commission in its
investigation. These conclusions represent the reasoned judgment of
all members of the Commission and are presented after an investigation
which has satisfied the Commission that it has ascertained the truth
concerning the assassination of President Kennedy to the extent that a
prolonged and thorough search makes this possible.
1. The shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor
Connally were fired from the sixth floor window at the southeast corner
of the Texas School Book Depository. This determination is based upon
the following:
(_a_) Witnesses at the scene of the assassination saw a rifle
being fired from the sixth floor window of the Depository
Building, and some witnesses saw a rifle in the window
immediately after the shots were fired.
(_b_) The nearly whole bullet found on Governor Connally’s
stretcher at Parkland Memorial Hospital and the two bullet
fragments found in the front seat of the Presidential limousine
were fired from the 6.5-millimeter Mannlicher-Carcano rifle
found on the sixth floor of the Depository Building to the
exclusion of all other weapons.
(_c_) The three used cartridge cases found near the window on
the sixth floor at the southeast corner of the building were
fired from the same rifle which fired the above-described
bullet and fragments, to the exclusion of all other weapons.
(_d_) The windshield in the Presidential limousine was struck
by a bullet fragment on the inside surface of the glass, but
was not penetrated.
(_e_) The nature of the bullet wounds suffered by President
Kennedy and Governor Connally and the location of the car at
the time of the shots establish that the bullets were fired
from above and behind the Presidential limousine, striking the
President and the Governor as follows:
(1) President Kennedy was first struck by a bullet which
entered at the back of his neck and exited through the lower
front portion of his neck, causing a wound which would not
necessarily have been lethal. The President was struck a second
time by a bullet which entered the right-rear portion of his
head, causing a massive and fatal wound.
(2) Governor Connally was struck by a bullet which entered on
the right side of his back and traveled downward through the
right side of his chest, exiting below his right nipple. This
bullet then passed through his right wrist and entered his left
thigh where it caused a superficial wound.
(_f_) There is no credible evidence that the shots were fired
from the Triple Underpass, ahead of the motorcade, or from any
other location.
2. The weight of the evidence indicates that there were three shots
fired.
3. Although it is not necessary to any essential findings of the
Commission to determine just which shot hit Governor Connally, there
is very persuasive evidence from the experts to indicate that the
same bullet which pierced the President’s throat also caused Governor
Connally’s wounds. However, Governor Connally’s testimony and certain
other factors have given rise to some difference of opinion as to this
probability but there is no question in the mind of any member of the
Commission that all the shots which caused the President’s and Governor
Connally’s wounds were fired from the sixth floor window of the Texas
School Book Depository.
4. The shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor
Connally were fired by Lee Harvey Oswald. This conclusion is based upon
the following:
(_a_) The Mannlicher-Carcano 6.5-millimeter Italian rifle from
which the shots were fired was owned by and in the possession
of Oswald.
(_b_) Oswald carried this rifle into the Depository Building on
the morning of November 22, 1963.
(_c_) Oswald, at the time of the assassination, was present at
the window from which the shots were fired.
(_d_) Shortly after the assassination, the Mannlicher-Carcano
rifle belonging to Oswald was found partially hidden between
some cartons on the sixth floor and the improvised paper bag
in which Oswald brought the rifle to the Depository was found
close by the window from which the shots were fired.
(_e_) Based on testimony of the experts and their analysis of
films of the assassination, the Commission has concluded that a
rifleman of Lee Harvey Oswald’s capabilities could have fired
the shots from the rifle used in the assassination within the
elapsed time of the shooting. The Commission has concluded
further that Oswald possessed the capability with a rifle
which enabled him to commit the assassination.
(_f_) Oswald lied to the police after his arrest concerning
important substantive matters.
(_g_) Oswald had attempted to kill Maj. Gen. Edwin A. Walker
(Resigned, U. S. Army) on April 10, 1963, thereby demonstrating
his disposition to take human life.
5. Oswald killed Dallas Police Patrolman J. D. Tippit approximately 45
minutes after the assassination. This conclusion upholds the finding
that Oswald fired the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded
Governor Connally and is supported by the following:
(_a_) Two eyewitnesses saw the Tippit shooting and seven
eyewitnesses heard the shots and saw the gunman leave the scene
with revolver in hand. These nine eyewitnesses positively
identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the man they saw.
(_b_) The cartridge cases found at the scene of the shooting
were fired from the revolver in the possession of Oswald at the
time of his arrest to the exclusion of all other weapons.
(_c_) The revolver in Oswald’s possession at the time of his
arrest was purchased by and belonged to Oswald.
(_d_) Oswald’s jacket was found along the path of flight taken
by the gunman as he fled from the scene of the killing.
6. Within 80 minutes of the assassination and 35 minutes of the Tippit
killing Oswald resisted arrest at the theatre by attempting to shoot
another Dallas police officer.
7. The Commission has reached the following conclusions concerning
Oswald’s interrogation and detention by the Dallas police:
(_a_) Except for the force required to effect his arrest,
Oswald was not subjected to any physical coercion by any law
enforcement officials. He was advised that he could not be
compelled to give any information and that any statements made
by him might be used against him in court. He was advised of
his right to counsel. He was given the opportunity to obtain
counsel of his own choice and was offered legal assistance by
the Dallas Bar Association, which he rejected at that time.
(_b_) Newspaper, radio, and television reporters were allowed
uninhibited access to the area through which Oswald had to
pass when he was moved from his cell to the interrogation room
and other sections of the building, thereby subjecting Oswald
to harassment and creating chaotic conditions which were not
conducive to orderly interrogation or the protection of the
rights of the prisoner.
(_c_) The numerous statements, sometimes erroneous, made to
the press by various local law enforcement officials, during
this period of confusion and disorder in the police station,
would have presented serious obstacles to the obtaining of
a fair trial for Oswald. To the extent that the information
was erroneous or misleading, it helped to create doubts,
speculations, and fears in the mind of the public which might
otherwise not have arisen.
8. The Commission has reached the following conclusions concerning the
killing of Oswald by Jack Ruby on November 24, 1963:
(_a_) Ruby entered the basement of the Dallas Police Department
shortly after 11:17 a.m. and killed Lee Harvey Oswald at 11:21
a.m.
(_b_) Although the evidence on Ruby’s means of entry is not
conclusive, the weight of the evidence indicates that he walked
down the ramp leading from Main Street to the basement of the
police department.
(_c_) There is no evidence to support the rumor that Ruby
may have been assisted by any members of the Dallas Police
Department in the killing of Oswald.
(_d_) The Dallas Police Department’s decision to transfer
Oswald to the county jail in full public view was unsound.
The arrangements made by the police department on Sunday
morning, only a few hours before the attempted transfer, were
inadequate. Of critical importance was the fact that news media
representatives and others were not excluded from the basement
even after the police were notified of threats to Oswald’s
life. These deficiencies contributed to the death of Lee Harvey
Oswald.
9. The Commission has found no evidence that either Lee Harvey Oswald
or Jack Ruby was part of any conspiracy, domestic or foreign, to
assassinate President Kennedy. The reasons for this conclusion are:
(_a_) The Commission has found no evidence that anyone assisted
Oswald in planning or carrying out the assassination. In this
connection it has thoroughly investigated, among other factors,
the circumstances surrounding the planning of the motorcade
route through Dallas, the hiring of Oswald by the Texas School
Book Depository Co. on October 15, 1963, the method by which
the rifle was brought into the building, the placing of cartons
of books at the window, Oswald’s escape from the building, and
the testimony of eyewitnesses to the shooting.
(_b_) The Commission has found no evidence that Oswald
was involved with any person or group in a conspiracy to
assassinate the President, although it has thoroughly
investigated, in addition to other possible leads, all facets
of Oswald’s associations, finances, and personal habits,
particularly during the period following his return from the
Soviet Union in June 1962.
(_c_) The Commission has found no evidence to show that
Oswald was employed, persuaded, or encouraged by any foreign
government to assassinate President Kennedy or that he was an
agent of any foreign government, although the Commission has
reviewed the circumstances surrounding Oswald’s defection to
the Soviet Union, his life there from October of 1959 to June
of 1962 so far as it can be reconstructed, his known contacts
with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and his visits to the
Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City during his trip to
Mexico from September 26 to October 3, 1963, and his known
contacts with the Soviet Embassy in the United States.
(_d_) The Commission has explored all attempts of Oswald to
identify himself with various political groups, including the
Communist Party, U. S. A., the Fair Play for Cuba Committee,
and the Socialist Workers Party, and has been unable to find
any evidence that the contacts which he initiated were related
to Oswald’s subsequent assassination of the President.
(_e_) All of the evidence before the Commission established
that there was nothing to support the speculation that Oswald
was an agent, employee, or informant of the FBI, the CIA, or
any other governmental agency. It has thoroughly investigated
Oswald’s relationships prior to the assassination with all
agencies of the U. S. Government. All contacts with Oswald by
any of these agencies were made in the regular exercise of
their different responsibilities.
(_f_) No direct or indirect relationship between Lee Harvey
Oswald and Jack Ruby has been discovered by the Commission, nor
has it been able to find any credible evidence that either knew
the other, although a thorough investigation was made of the
many rumors and speculations of such a relationship.
(_g_) The Commission has found no evidence that Jack Ruby acted
with any other person in the killing of Lee Harvey Oswald.
(_h_) After careful investigation the Commission has found no
credible evidence either that Ruby and Officer Tippit, who was
killed by Oswald, knew each other or that Oswald and Tippit
knew each other.
Because of the difficulty of proving negatives to a certainty
the possibility of others being involved with either Oswald
or Ruby cannot be established categorically, but if there is
any such evidence it has been beyond the reach of all the
investigative agencies and resources of the United States and
has not come to the attention of this Commission.
10. In its entire investigation the Commission has found no evidence of
conspiracy, subversion, or disloyalty to the U. S. Government by any
Federal, State, or local official.
11. On the basis of the evidence before the Commission it concludes
that Oswald acted alone. Therefore, to determine the motives for the
assassination of President Kennedy, one must look to the assassin
himself. Clues to Oswald’s motives can be found in his family
history, his education or lack of it, his acts, his writings, and the
recollections of those who had close contacts with him throughout
his life. The Commission has presented with this report all of the
background information bearing on motivation which it could discover.
Thus, others may study Lee Oswald’s life and arrive at their own
conclusions as to his possible motives.
The Commission could not make any definitive determination of Oswald’s
motives. It has endeavored to isolate factors which contributed to his
character and which might have influenced his decision to assassinate
President Kennedy. These factors were:
(_a_) His deep-rooted resentment of all authority which was
expressed in a hostility toward every society in which he lived;
(_b_) His inability to enter into meaningful relationships with
people, and a continuous pattern of rejecting his environment
in favor of new surroundings;
(_c_) His urge to try to find a place in history and despair at
times over failures in his various undertakings;
(_d_) His capacity for violence as evidenced by his attempt to
kill General Walker;
(_e_) His avowed commitment to Marxism and communism, as he
understood the terms and developed his own interpretation of
them; this was expressed by his antagonism toward the United
States, by his defection to the Soviet Union, by his failure
to be reconciled with life in the United States even after
his disenchantment with the Soviet Union, and by his efforts,
though frustrated, to go to Cuba.
Each of these contributed to his capacity to risk all in cruel and
irresponsible actions.
12. The Commission recognizes that the varied responsibilities of the
President require that he make frequent trips to all parts of the
United States and abroad. Consistent with their high responsibilities
Presidents can never be protected from every potential threat. The
Secret Service’s difficulty in meeting its protective responsibility
varies with the activities and the nature of the occupant of the
Office of President and his willingness to conform to plans for his
safety. In appraising the performance of the Secret Service it should
be understood that it has to do its work within such limitations.
Nevertheless, the Commission believes that recommendations for
improvements in Presidential protection are compelled by the facts
disclosed in this investigation.
(_a_) The complexities of the Presidency have increased so
rapidly in recent years that the Secret Service has not been
able to develop or to secure adequate resources of personnel
and facilities to fulfill its important assignment. This
situation should be promptly remedied.
(_b_) The Commission has concluded that the criteria and
procedures of the Secret Service designed to identify and
protect against persons considered threats to the president,
were not adequate prior to the assassination.
(1) The Protective Research Section of the Secret Service,
which is responsible for its preventive work, lacked sufficient
trained personnel and the mechanical and technical assistance
needed to fulfill its responsibility.
(2) Prior to the assassination the Secret Service’s criteria
dealt with direct threats against the President. Although the
Secret Service treated the direct threats against the President
adequately, it failed to recognize the necessity of identifying
other potential sources of danger to his security. The Secret
Service did not develop adequate and specific criteria defining
those persons or groups who might present a danger to the
President. In effect, the Secret Service largely relied upon
other Federal or State agencies to supply the information
necessary for it to fulfill its preventive responsibilities,
although it did ask for information about direct threats to the
President.
(_c_) The Commission has concluded that there was insufficient
liaison and coordination of information between the Secret
Service and other Federal agencies necessarily concerned with
Presidential protection. Although the FBI, in the normal
exercise of its responsibility, had secured considerable
information about Lee Harvey Oswald, it had no official
responsibility, under the Secret Service criteria existing
at the time of the President’s trip to Dallas, to refer to
the Secret Service the information it had about Oswald. The
Commission has concluded, however, that the FBI took an unduly
restrictive view of its role in preventive intelligence work
prior to the assassination. A more carefully coordinated
treatment of the Oswald case by the FBI might well have
resulted in bringing Oswald’s activities to the attention of
the Secret Service.
(_d_) The Commission has concluded that some of the advance
preparations in Dallas made by the Secret Service, such as the
detailed security measures taken at Love Field and the Trade
Mart, were thorough and well executed. In other respects,
however, the Commission has concluded that the advance
preparations for the President’s trip were deficient.
(1) Although the Secret Service is compelled to rely to a great
extent on local law enforcement officials, its procedures at
the time of the Dallas trip did not call for well-defined
instructions as to the respective responsibilities of the
police officials and others assisting in the protection of the
President.
(2) The procedures relied upon by the Secret Service for
detecting the presence of an assassin located in a building
along a motorcade route were inadequate. At the time of the
trip to Dallas, the Secret Service as a matter of practice did
not investigate, or cause to be checked, any building located
along the motorcade route to be taken by the President. The
responsibility for observing windows in these buildings during
the motorcade was divided between local police personnel
stationed on the streets to regulate crowds and Secret Service
agents riding in the motorcade. Based on its investigation the
Commission has concluded that these arrangements during the
trip to Dallas were clearly not sufficient.
(_e_) The configuration of the Presidential car and the seating
arrangements of the Secret Service agents in the car did not
afford the Secret Service agents the opportunity they should
have had to be of immediate assistance to the President at the
first sign of danger.
(_f_) Within these limitations, however, the Commission
finds that the agents most immediately responsible for the
President’s safety reacted promptly at the time the shots were
fired from the Texas School Book Depository Building.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Prompted by the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service
has initiated a comprehensive and critical review of its total
operations. As a result of studies conducted during the past several
months, and in cooperation with this Commission, the Secret Service has
prepared a planning document dated August 27, 1964, which recommends
various programs considered necessary by the Service to improve its
techniques and enlarge its resources. The Commission is encouraged by
the efforts taken by the Secret Service since the assassination and
suggests the following recommendations.
1. A committee of Cabinet members including the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, or the National Security Council,
should be assigned the responsibility of reviewing and overseeing the
protective activities of the Secret Service and the other Federal
agencies that assist in safeguarding the President. Once given this
responsibility, such a committee would insure that the maximum
resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged in the task of
protecting the President, and would provide guidance in defining the
general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential security.
2. Suggestions have been advanced to the Commission for the transfer
of all or parts of the Presidential protective responsibilities of
the Secret Service to some other department or agency. The Commission
believes that if there is to be any determination of whether or not to
relocate these responsibilities and functions, it ought to be made by
the Executive and the Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on
studies by the previously suggested committee.
3. Meanwhile, in order to improve daily supervision of the Secret
Service within the Department of the Treasury, the Commission
recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint a special
assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Secret Service.
This special assistant should have sufficient stature and experience in
law enforcement, intelligence, and allied fields to provide effective
continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary fully informed
regarding the performance of the Secret Service. One of the initial
assignments of this special assistant should be the supervision of the
current effort by the Secret Service to revise and modernize its basic
operating procedures.
4. The Commission recommends that the Secret Service completely
overhaul its facilities devoted to the advance detection of potential
threats against the President. The Commission suggests the following
measures.
(_a_) The Secret Service should develop as quickly as possible
more useful and precise criteria defining those potential
threats to the President which should be brought to its
attention by other agencies. The criteria should, among other
additions, provide for prompt notice to the Secret Service of
all returned defectors.
(_b_) The Secret Service should expedite its current plans to
utilize the most efficient data-processing techniques.
(_c_) Once the Secret Service has formulated new criteria
delineating the information it desires, it should enter into
agreements with each Federal agency to insure its receipt of
such information.
5. The Commission recommends that the Secret Service improve the
protective measures followed in the planning, and conducting of
Presidential motorcades. In particular, the Secret Service should
continue its current efforts to increase the precautionary attention
given to buildings along the motorcade route.
6. The Commission recommends that the Secret Service continue its
recent efforts to improve and formalize its relationships with local
police departments in areas to be visited by the President.
7. The Commission believes that when the new criteria and procedures
are established, the Secret Service will not have sufficient personnel
or adequate facilities. The Commission recommends that the Secret
Service be provided with the personnel and resources which the Service
and the Department of the Treasury may be able to demonstrate are
needed to fulfill its important mission.
8. Even with an increase in Secret Service personnel, the protection of
the President will continue to require the resources and cooperation of
many Federal agencies. The Commission recommends that these agencies,
specifically the FBI, continue the practice as it has developed,
particularly since the assassination, of assisting the Secret Service
upon request by providing personnel or other aid, and that there be
a closer association and liaison between the Secret Service and all
Federal agencies.
9. The Commission recommends that the President’s physician always
accompany him during his travels and occupy a position near the
President where he can be immediately available in case of any
emergency.
10. The Commission recommends to Congress that it adopt legislation
which would make the assassination of the President and Vice President
a Federal crime. A state of affairs where U.S. authorities have no
clearly defined jurisdiction to investigate the assassination of a
President is anomalous.
11. The Commission has examined the Department of State’s handling
of the Oswald matters and finds that it followed the law throughout.
However, the Commission believes that the Department in accordance
with its own regulations should in all cases exercise great care in
the return to this country of defectors who have evidenced disloyalty
or hostility to this country or who have expressed a desire to
renounce their American citizenship and that when such persons are so
returned, procedures should be adopted for the better dissemination
of information concerning them to the intelligence agencies of the
Government.
12. The Commission recommends that the representatives of the bar, law
enforcement associations, and the news media work together to establish
ethical standards concerning the collection and presentation of
information to the public so that there will be no interference with
pending criminal investigations, court proceedings, or the right of
individuals to a fair trial.