Transcriber's Note: Italic text is denoted by _underscores_.
* * * * *
[Illustration: NICHOLAS II., THE TSAR OF RUSSIA AND THE TSAREVITCH]
McCLURE'S MAGAZINE
VOL. XXXI SEPTEMBER, 1908 No. 5
THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF GENERAL KUROPATKIN
MINISTER OF WAR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES
TRANSLATED BY GEORGE KENNAN
ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS
[TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.] The suppressed memoirs of General Kuropatkin are
in four bulky volumes and contain, in the aggregate, about 600,000
words. The first three volumes are devoted, mainly, to a detailed
review of the three great battles of the Russo-Japanese war--Liao-yang,
the Sha-ho, and Mukden--from the standpoint of modern military science.
The fourth volume, which is entitled "Summing up of the War," covers a
very wide field, dealing partly with Russia's national problems, her
military history, and her policy in Asia, and partly with the causes of
the late war, the rise of Japan as a military power, and the reasons
for the overwhelming defeat of Russia's armies in the Far East.
_Copyright, 1908, by The S. S. McClure Co. All rights reserved_
[Illustration: STATE COUNCILLOR ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH BEZOBRAZOFF
WHO ACQUIRED HIS EXTRAORDINARY POWER IN THE FAR EAST BY MEANS OF HIS
KOREAN TIMBER COMPANY, AN ENTERPRISE IN WHICH HE INTERESTED THE TSAR
OF RUSSIA TO THE EXTENT OF 2,000,000 RUBLES. RATHER THAN SACRIFICE THE
FAMILY INVESTMENT IN THIS ENTERPRISE, THE TSAR ALLOWED RUSSIA TO BE
DRAGGED INTO A WAR WITH JAPAN]
I have chosen, as the subject for this article, General Kuropatkin's
narrative of the events which preceded the rupture with Japan, in
February, 1904, and which may be regarded, historically, as the causes
of the war that ensued. It contains many new facts, and throws a flood
of light upon Russian governmental methods, upon Russia's Asiatic
policy, and upon the character of the monarch who now sits on the
Russian throne.
Kuropatkin begins this part of his work with a review of Russia's
policy and territorial acquisitions in the Far East, which may be
briefly summarized as follows: The question of obtaining an outlet on
the Pacific Ocean was theoretically considered in Russia long ago;
and the conclusion reached was that, in view of the sparseness of
Russia's population east of Lake Baikal, and the insignificance of her
commerce, foreign and domestic, in that part of the world, the task of
getting access to the Pacific, which might involve a serious struggle,
ought not to be imposed upon the existing generation. An outlet was
not needed at that time, and it is not needed yet. The Russian War
Department, moreover, has always regarded with apprehension, and as far
as possible combatted, the opinion that "Russia is the most western of
Asiatic states, not the most eastern of European," and that all her
future lies beyond the Urals.
[Illustration: ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF
WHO SECRETLY SUPPORTED BEZOBRAZOFF IN HIS EFFORTS TO DELAY THE
EVACUATION OF SOUTHERN MANCHURIA AND TO BRING THE RUSSIAN ARMS INTO
KOREA FOR THE EXPLOITATION OF HIS TIMBER ENTERPRISE. IN RETURN FOR
ALEXEIEFF'S SERVICES, BEZOBRAZOFF USED HIS INFLUENCE WITH THE TSAR TO
GET ALEXEIEFF APPOINTED VICEROY]
Prior to the Japanese-Chinese war, nobody questioned that the
trans-Siberian railway should follow a route inside of Russian
territory; but the weakness shown by China in 1894-5 suggested a new
project, namely, to carry the road through Manchuria and thus shorten
it by five hundred versts. General Dukhovski, governor-general of
the Pri-Amur and commander of the forces in that territory, opposed
this project, and pointed out that a line crossing the boundaries of
China would not connect the Pri-Amur with European Russia securely,
and would benefit the Chinese rather than the Russian population. His
opinion was not approved, and this railroad, which had for Russia
such immense importance, was carried through a foreign country. This
change of route, which proved to be so unfortunate, was the first
striking proof of the fact that Russia, in the Far East, had begun
a policy of energetic action. The occupation of Port Arthur, the
foundation of Dalny, the construction of the southern branch of the
railway, the formation of a commercial fleet on the Pacific, and the
timber enterprise of State Councillor Bezobrazoff on the Yalu River in
northern Korea, were all links of one and the same chain, which was to
unite permanently the destinies of Russia and the destinies of the Far
East--and thus bring gain to Russia.
"There is a prevalent opinion," says Kuropatkin, "that if we had
confined ourselves to the construction of the main trans-Siberian road,
even though we built a part of it through northern Manchuria, there
would have been no war; that the war was caused by our occupation of
Port Arthur and Mukden, and, more particularly, by the Bezobrazoff
timber enterprise in Korea. There is also an opinion, held by others,
that the building of the main line through northern Manchuria should be
regarded not merely as the first of our active enterprises in the Far
East, but as the basis and foundation of them all, because if we had
carried the road along the Amur, through our own territory, we should
never have thought of occupying the southern part of Manchuria and the
province of Kwang-tung."
After reviewing the Boxer uprising, the occupation of Manchuria by
Russian troops for the protection of the railway, and the treaty
agreement with China to evacuate southern Manchuria by April 8,
1903, and northern Manchuria within six months thereafter, General
Kuropatkin, who was at that time Minister of War, begins his narrative
of later events as follows:
THE SECRET CAUSES OF THE WAR WITH JAPAN
BY
GENERAL KUROPATKIN
Prior to the conclusion of the treaty with China, in April, 1902,
there was a difference of opinion between the commander of Kwang-tung
(Admiral Alexeieff) and myself, as to the expediency of evacuating
Manchuria, and the importance to us of the southern part of that
country. I believed that occupation of southern Manchuria would bring
us no profit, but, on the contrary, would involve us in trouble with
Japan on one side, through our nearness to Korea, and with China on
the other, through our possession of Mukden. I therefore regarded
the speedy evacuation of southern Manchuria and Mukden as a matter
of extreme necessity. Admiral Alexeieff, on the other hand, as the
commander of Kwang-tung, had reason to contend that occupation of
southern Manchuria was important because it insured the safety of
railroad communication between Kwang-tung and Russia.
This difference of opinion, however, ended with the ratification of the
Russo-Chinese treaty of March 26, 1902 (April 8, N. S.). By the terms
of that convention, our troops--with the exception of those guarding
the railway--were to be removed, within specified periods, from all
parts of Manchuria, southern as well as northern. This settlement of
the question, was a great relief to the War Department, because it held
out the hope of a "return to the West" in our military affairs. In the
first period of six months, we were to evacuate the western part of
southern Manchuria, from Shan-hai-kuan to the river Liao; and this we
punctually did. In the second period of six months, we were to remove
our troops from the rest of the province of Mukden, including the
cities of Mukden and Yinkow (New Chwang).
[Illustration: SERGIUS DE WITTE
FORMER RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FINANCE, WHO BUILT UP EXTENSIVE RUSSIAN
INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA, AND CREATED THE PORT OF DALNY, AN ACT WHICH
KUROPATKIN CLAIMS TO HAVE WEAKENED THE STRENGTH OF PORT ARTHUR]
The War Department regarded the agreement to evacuate the province of
Mukden with approval, and made energetic preparations to carry it into
effect. Barracks for the soldiers to be withdrawn were hastily erected
between Blagovestchensk and Vladivostok, in the Pri-Amur country; plans
of transportation were drawn up and approved; the movement of troops
had begun; and Mukden had actually been evacuated; when, suddenly,
everything was stopped by order of Admiral Alexeieff, the commander
of Kwang-tung, whose reasons for taking such action have not, to this
day, been sufficiently cleared up.[1] It is definitely known, however,
that the change in policy which stopped the withdrawal of troops from
southern Manchuria corresponded in time with the first visit to the
Far East of State Councillor Bezobrazoff, retired. Mukden, which we
had already evacuated, was reoccupied, as was also the city of Yinkow
(New Chwang). The Yalu timber enterprise assumed more importance than
ever, and in order to give support to it, and to our other undertakings
in northern Korea, Admiral Alexeieff, commander of Kwang-tung, sent a
force of cavalry with field guns to Feng-wang-cheng.[2] Thus, instead
of completing the evacuation of southern Manchuria, we moved into parts
of it that we had never before occupied. At the same time, we allowed
operations in connection with the Korean timber enterprise to go on,
despite the fact that the promoters of this enterprise, contrary to
instructions from St. Petersburg, were striving to give it a political
and military character.
There is good reason to affirm that the unexpected change of policy
that put a stop to the evacuation of the province of Mukden was an
event of immense importance. So long as we held to our intention of
withdrawing all our troops from Manchuria (except the railway guard and
a small force at Kharbin), and so long as we refrained from invading
Korea with our enterprises, there was little danger of a break with
Japan; but we were brought alarmingly nearer to a rupture with that
Power when, contrary to our agreement with China, we left our troops
in southern Manchuria, and when, in the promotion of our timber
enterprise, we entered northern Korea. The uncertainty, moreover, with
regard to our intentions, alarmed not only China and Japan, but even
England, America, and other Powers.
[Illustration: COUNT LAMSDORFF
FORMER RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO COÖPERATED WITH WITTE
AND KUROPATKIN IN TRYING TO PREVENT WAR WITH JAPAN]
_Witte Creates the Port of Dalny_
In the early part of 1903, our situation in the Far East became
very much involved. The interests of the Pri-Amur were thrown
completely into the background, and General Dukhovski, the military
commander and governor-general of that territory, was wholly
ignored in the consideration and decision of the most important
questions of Far Eastern policy. Meanwhile, in Manchuria--on
Chinese territory--enterprises involving many millions of rubles
were undertaken and carried on by virtue of authority that was
wholly special. The Minister of Finance (M. Witte) was building
and managing there a railroad about two thousand versts in length;
he had the direction of a whole army corps of railway guards; he
was trying to increase the economic importance of the railway by
running in connection with it a fleet of sea-going steamers; he had
on the Manchurian rivers a flotilla of smaller vessels, some of
which carried guns and gunners; and in military matters he was so
independent of the War Department that, without consulting the latter,
he even selected and purchased abroad the artillery for the railway
guard. Vladivostok, as a terminus, no longer seemed to satisfy the
requirements of an international transit line, so, regardless of the
fact that the province of Kwang-tung was subject to the authority of
the provincial commander, M. Witte, without consulting either the
latter or the Minister of War, located and created therein the spacious
port of Dalny. The enormous sums of money spent there only lessened
the importance and weakened the strength of Port Arthur, because it
was necessary either to fortify Dalny, or prepare to have it seized
by an enemy and used as a base of operations against us--a thing that
afterward happened. Finally, the Minister of Finance managed the
affairs of the Russo-Chinese Bank, and had at Peking, Seoul, and other
points, his own agents (in Peking, Pokotiloff).
_Incredible Schemes of Promoter Bezobrazoff_
It thus appears that in 1903 M. Witte controlled or directed in the Far
East not only railroads, but corps of troops, a fleet of commercial
steamers, armed river boats, the port of Dalny, and the Russo-Chinese
Bank. At the same time, Bezobrazoff and his company were developing
their enterprises in Manchuria and Korea, and promoting, by every
possible means, their timber speculation on the Yalu. One incredible
scheme of Bezobrazoff followed another; and in the summer of 1903 there
was submitted to me for examination a project of his which provided
for the immediate concentration in southern Manchuria of an army of
70,000 men. His aim was to utilize the timber company as a means of
creating a sort of "screen," or barrier against a possible attack
upon us by the Japanese, and in 1902-1903 his activity, and that of
his adherents, assumed a very alarming form. Among the requests that
he made of Admiral Alexeieff were, to send into Korean territory six
hundred soldiers in civilian dress; to organize for service in the
same locality a force of three thousand Khunkhuzes[3]; to give the
agents of the timber company the support of four companies of chasseurs
(six hundred mounted riflemen) to be stationed at Shakhedze, on the
Yalu; and to occupy Feng-wang-cheng with a body of troops capable of
acting independently. Admiral Alexeieff denied some of these requests,
but, unfortunately, he consented to station one company of chasseurs
(one hundred and fifty mounted riflemen) at Shakhedze, and to send a
regiment of Cossack cavalry, with field guns, to Feng-wang-cheng. These
measures were particularly serious and injurious to us, for the reason
that they were taken at the very time when we were under obligations to
evacuate the province of Mukden altogether.
The Ministers of Finance, Foreign Affairs, and War (Witte, Lamsdorff
and Kuropatkin) all recognized the danger that would threaten us if we
continued to defer fulfilment of our promise to evacuate Manchuria,
and, more especially, if we failed to put an end to Bezobrazoff's
activity in Korea. These three Ministers, therefore, procured the
appointment of a special council, which assembled in St. Petersburg on
the 5th of April, 1903 (April 18, N. S.), and took into consideration
certain propositions which Bezobrazoff had made to its members
separately in writing. These propositions had for their object the
strengthening of Russia's strategic position in the basin of the Yalu.
All three of the Ministers above designated expressed themselves
firmly and definitely in opposition to Bezobrazoff's proposals, and
all agreed that if his enterprise on the Yalu were to be sustained,
it must be upon a strictly commercial basis. The Minister of Finance
showed conclusively that, for the next five or ten years, Russia's
task in the Far East must be to tranquilize the country and bring to
completion the work already undertaken there. He said, furthermore,
that although the views of the different departments of the Government
were not always precisely the same, there had never been--so far as
the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs, and Finance were concerned--any
conflict of action. The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out,
particularly, the danger involved in Bezobrazoff's proposal to stop the
withdrawal of troops from Manchuria.
[Illustration: _Copyright, 1905, by Underwood & Underwood_
TWO VIEWS OF PORT ARTHUR
LOOKING ACROSS THE OLD TOWN OF PORT ARTHUR AND ACROSS THE NAVAL BASIS,
FROM A HIGH HILL TO THE NORTH OF THE CITY]
[Illustration: _Copyright, 1904, by Underwood & Underwood_
TAKEN AT THE TIME OF THE WAR
ON THE TERRACE JUST ABOVE THE WHARVES. THE HIGH PROMONTORY AT THE
LEFT IS PART OF THE GOLDEN HILL, WHERE THERE ARE IMMENSELY STRONG
FORTIFICATIONS, AND WHERE THE RUSSIANS MAINTAINED AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL
STATION UNTIL STOESSEL's SURRENDER]
_The Tsar Takes Action_
It pleased His Imperial Majesty to say, after he had listened to
these expressions of opinion, that war with Japan was extremely
undesirable, and that we must endeavor to restore in Manchuria a state
of tranquillity. The company formed for the purpose of exploiting the
timber on the river Yalu must be a strictly commercial organization,
must admit foreigners who desired to participate, and must exclude
all ranks of the army. I was then ordered to proceed to the Far East,
for the purpose of acquainting myself, on the ground, with our needs,
and ascertaining what the state of mind was in Japan. In the latter
country, where I met with the most cordial and kind-hearted reception,
I became convinced that the Government desired to avoid a rupture with
Russia, but that it would be necessary for us to act in a perfectly
definite way in Manchuria, and to refrain from interference in the
affairs of Korea. If we should go on with the adventure of Bezobrazoff
& Co., we should be threatened with conflict. These conclusions I
telegraphed to St. Petersburg. After my departure from that city,
however, the danger of a rupture with Japan, on account of Korea, had
increased considerably--especially when, on the 7th of May, 1903 (May
20, N. S.), the Minister of Finance announced that "after having had
an explanation from State Councillor Bezobrazoff, he (the Minister) was
not in disagreement with him, so far as the essence of the matter was
concerned."
In the council that was held at Port Arthur, when I arrived there,
Admiral Alexeieff, Lessar,[4] Pavloff,[5] and I cordially agreed that
the Yalu enterprise should have a purely commercial character, and
I said, furthermore, that, in my opinion, it ought to be abandoned
altogether. I brought about the recall of several army officers who
were taking part in it, and suggested to Lieutenant Colonel Madritoff,
who was managing the military and political side of it, that he either
resign his commission or give up employment which, in my judgment, was
not suitable for an officer wearing the uniform of the General Staff.
He chose the former alternative.
In view of the repeated assurances given me by Admiral Alexeieff that
he was wholly opposed to Bezobrazoff's schemes; that he was holding
them back with all his strength; and that he was a convinced advocate
of a peaceful Russo-Japanese agreement, I left Port Arthur for St.
Petersburg, in July, 1903 (O. S.), fully believing that the avoidance
of a rupture with Japan was a matter entirely within our control. The
results of my visit to the Far East were embodied in a special report
to the Emperor, submitted July 24th, 1903 (August 6, N. S.), in which,
with absolute frankness, I expressed the opinion that if we did not
put an end to the uncertain state of affairs in Manchuria, and to the
adventurous activity of Bezobrazoff in Korea, we must expect a rupture
with Japan. Copies of this report were sent to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and the Minister of Finance, and met with their approval.
_Kuropatkin's Protest Criticised_
By some means unknown to me, this report was given publicity; and on
the 11th of June, 1905 (June 24, N. S.), the newspaper _Razsvet_
printed an article, by one Roslavleff, entitled "Which is the Greater?"
the object of which was to prove that I must be included among the
persons responsible for the rupture with Japan, because, through fear
of Bezobrazoff, I signed the minutes of the Port Arthur council which
put the Yalu enterprise under the protection of Russian troops and thus
stopped the evacuation of Manchuria.[6] This article has been reprinted
by many Russian and foreign journals, and there has never been any
refutation of the misstatements that it contains with regard to my
alleged action in signing certain fantastic minutes. M. Roslavleff
quotes from my report to the Emperor the following sentences and
paragraphs:
"Our actions in the basin of the Yalu and our behavior in Manchuria
have excited in Japan a feeling of hostility to us, which, upon our
taking any incautious step, may lead to war.... State Secretary
Bezobrazoff's plan of operations, if carried out, will inevitably lead
to a violation of the agreement that we made with China on the 26th
of March, 1902 (April 8, N. S.), and will also cause, inevitably,
complications with Japan.... The activity of State Secretary
Bezobrazoff, toward the end of last year and at the beginning of
this, has practically brought about already a violation of the treaty
with China and a breach with Japan.... At the request of Bezobrazoff,
Admiral Alexeieff sent a force of chasseurs to Shakhedze (on the Yalu)
and kept a body of troops in Feng-wang-cheng. These measures put a
stop to the evacuation of the province of Mukden.... Among other
participants in the Yalu enterprise who have given trouble to Admiral
Alexeieff is Actual State Councillor Balasheff, who has a disposition
quite as warlike as that of Bezobrazoff. If Admiral Alexeieff had not
succeeded in intercepting a dispatch from Balasheff to Captain Bodisco,
with regard to 'catching all the Japanese,' 'punishing them publicly,'
and 'taking action with volleys,' there would have been a bloody
episode on the Yalu before this time.[7] Unfortunately, it is liable
to happen any day, even now.... During my stay in Japan, I had an
opportunity to see with what nervous apprehension the people regarded
our activity on the Yalu, how they exaggerated our intentions, and how
they were preparing to defend, with arms, their Korean interests. Our
active operations there have convinced them that Russia is now about
to proceed to the second part of her Far Eastern program--that, having
swallowed Manchuria, she is getting ready to gulp down Korea. The
excitement in Japan is such that if Admiral Alexeieff had not shown
wise caution--if he had allowed all the proposals of Bezobrazoff to
go through--we should probably be at war with Japan now. There is no
reason whatever to suppose that a few officers and soldiers, cutting
timber on the Yalu, will be of any use in a war with Japan. Their value
is trifling in comparison with the danger that the timber enterprise
creates by keeping up the excitement among the Japanese people....
Suffice it to say that, in the opinion of Admiral Alexeieff, and of our
ministers in Peking, Seoul, and Tokio, the timber enterprise may be the
cause of war; and in this opinion I fully concur."
After quoting the above sentences and paragraphs from my report, M.
Roslavleff says: "Thus warmly, eloquently, and shrewdly did Kuropatkin
condemn the Yalu adventure, and thus clearly did he see, on the
political horizon, the ruinous consequences that it would have for
Russia. But why did not this bold and clear-sighted accuser protest
against the decision of the Port Arthur council? Why, after making a
few caustic remarks about Bezobrazoff, did he sign the minutes of the
council which put the Yalu adventure under the protection of Russian
troops, and thus stopped the evacuation of Manchuria? Why? Simply
because, at that time, everybody was afraid of Bezobrazoff."
Such accusations, which have had wide publicity, require an explanation.
The council held at Port Arthur, in June, 1903, was called for the
purpose of finding, if possible, some means of settling the Manchurian
question without lowering the dignity of Russia. There were present at
this council, in addition to Admiral Alexeieff and myself, Actual State
Councillor Lessar, Russian minister in China; Chamberlain Pavloff,
Russian minister in Seoul; Major General Vogak; State Councillor
Bezobrazoff; and M. Plançon, an officer of the diplomatic service. We
were all acquainted with the will of the Emperor that our enterprises
in the Far East should not lead to war, and we had to devise means of
carrying the Imperial will into effect. With regard to such means there
were differences of opinion; but upon fundamental questions there was
complete agreement. Among such fundamental questions were:
1. The Manchurian question.
On the 20th of June (July 3, N. S.) the council expressed its judgment
with regard to this question as follows: "In view of the extraordinary
difficulties and enormous administrative expenses that the annexation
of Manchuria would involve, all the members of the council agree that
it is, in principle, undesirable; and this conclusion applies not only
to Manchuria as a whole, but also to its northern part."
2. The Korean question.
On the 19th of June (July 2, N. S.) the council decided that the
occupation of the whole of Korea, or even of the northern part, would
be unprofitable to Russia, and therefore undesirable. Our activity
in the basin of the Yalu, moreover, might give Japan reason to fear
a seizure by us of the northern part of the peninsula. On the 24th
of June (July 7, N. S.) the council invited Actual State Councillor
Balasheff and Lieutenant Colonel Madritoff, of the General Staff, to
appear before it, and explain the status of the Yalu enterprise. From
their testimony it appeared that the business was legally organized,
the company holding permits from the Chinese authorities to cut timber
on the northern side of the Yalu, and a concession from the Korean
Government covering the southern side. Although the enterprise lost,
to some extent, its provocative character, after the conclusions of
the St. Petersburg council of April 5, 1903 (April 18, N. S.) became
known in the province of Kwang-tung, its operations could not yet be
regarded as purely commercial. Its affairs were managed by Lieutenant
Colonel Madritoff, of the General Staff, although that officer was not
officially in service.
After consideration of all the facts presented, the members of the
council came to the conclusion that "although the Russian Timber
Company really appears to be a commercial organization, its employment
of officers of the active military service to do work that has military
importance undoubtedly gives to it a politico-military aspect." The
council, therefore, acknowledged the necessity of "taking measures,
at once, to give the enterprise an exclusively commercial character,
to exclude from it officers of the regular army, and to commit the
management of the timber business to persons not employed in the
service of the Empire." On the 24th of June (July 7, N. S.) these
conclusions were signed by all the members of the council, including
State Councillor Bezobrazoff.
It is evident, from the facts above set forth, that the statement in
which M. Roslavleff charges the members of the council with signing
minutes of proceedings that gave the Bezobrazoff adventure a place
among useful imperial enterprises is fiction. Upon what it was based
we do not know. The duty of immediately carrying into effect the
conclusions of the council rested upon Admiral Alexeieff, by virtue
of the authority given to him. The thing that he had to do, first of
all, and that he was fully empowered to do, was to recall our force
from Feng-wang-cheng and the company of chasseurs from the Yalu. Why
this was not done I do not know. Personally, I did not allow Lieutenant
Colonel Madritoff to continue his connection with the timber company
as an officer of the General Staff, and I may add that he and other
officers who associated themselves with the enterprise did so without
consulting me.
But no matter how effective might be the measures taken by Admiral
Alexeieff to give the Yalu enterprise a purely commercial character,
I still feared that this undertaking, which had obtained world-wide
notoriety, would continue to have important political significance.
In my report of July 24, 1903 (August 6, N. S.), which was presented
to the Emperor upon my return from Japan, I therefore expressed the
opinion that an end should be put to the operations of the timber
company, and that the whole enterprise should be sold to foreigners.
_"Must We Break the Russian Empire?"_
The thought that our interests in Korea, which were of trifling
importance, might bring us into conflict with Japan, caused me
incessant anxiety during my stay in the latter country. On the 13th of
June, 1903 (June 26, N. S.), when I was passing through the Inland
Sea, on my way to Nagasaki, I wrote in my diary:
"If I were asked to express an opinion, from a military point of view,
with regard to the comparative importance of Russian interests in
different parts of the Empire, and upon different frontiers, I should
put my judgment into the form of a pyramidal diagram, placing the least
important of our interests at the top and the most important at the
bottom, as follows
[Illustration:
Our interests in Korea
Our interests in Manchuria
Military district of the Pri-Amur. Safe-guarding of this territory for
Russia. Defence against China and Japan
Securing the safety of Russia against Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan,
Great Britain, and China. Military districts of the Caucasus,
Turkestan, and Siberia
Maintenance of domestic peace and order, by the forces of all military
districts
Maintenance of the territorial integrity of Russia against the Powers
of the Triple Alliance. The foundation of Russia's safety is her
western boundary]
"This diagram shows clearly where the principal energies of the
Ministry of War should hereafter be concentrated, and what direction,
in future, should be given to Russia's main powers and resources. The
interests that lie at the foundation of our position as a nation are:
(1) the defence of the territorial integrity of the Empire against the
Powers of the Triple Alliance; and (2) employment of the forces of
all our military districts for the preservation of internal peace and
order. These are our principal tasks, and in comparison with them all
the others have secondary importance. The diagram shows, furthermore,
that our interests in the Pri-Amur region must be regarded as more
important than our interests in Manchuria, and that the latter must
take precedence of our interests in Korea. I am afraid, however, that,
for a time at least, our national activity will be based on affairs
in the Far East, and, if so, the pyramid will have to be turned
bottom side up and made to stand on its narrow Korean top. But such a
structure on such a foundation will fall. Columbus solved the problem
of making an egg stand on its end by breaking the egg. Must we, in
order to make our pyramid stand on its narrow Korean end, break the
Russian Empire?"
Upon my return from Japan, I showed the above diagram to M. Witte, who
agreed that it was correct.
_Kuropatkin Asks to be Relieved_
The establishment of the Viceroyalty in the Far East was for me a
complete surprise. On the 2nd of August, 1903 (August 15, N. S.) I
asked the Emperor to relieve me from duty as Minister of War, and after
the great manoeuvers I was granted an indefinite leave of absence,
of which I availed myself with the expectation that my place would be
filled by the appointment of some other person.
In September, 1903 (O. S.) the state of affairs in the Far East began
to be alarming, and Admiral Alexeieff was definitely ordered to take
all necessary measures to avoid war. The Emperor expressed his will
to this effect with firmness, and did not limit or restrict in any
way the concessions that should be made in order to avert a rupture
with Japan. All that had to be done was to find a method of making
such concessions that should be as little injurious as possible to
Russian interests. During my stay in Japan, I became satisfied that
the Japanese Government was disposed to consider Japanese and Korean
affairs calmly, with a view to arriving at an agreement upon the basis
of mutual concessions.
In view of the alarming situation in the Far East, I cut short my leave
of absence, and, in reporting to the Emperor for duty, I gave this
threatening state of affairs as my reason for returning. The Emperor,
on the 10th of October, 1903 (October 23, N. S.), made the following
marginal note upon my letter: "The alarm in the Far East is apparently
beginning to subside." In October I recommended that the garrison of
Vladivostok be strengthened, but permission to reinforce it was not
given. Meanwhile, there was really no reëstablishment of tranquillity
in the Far East, and our relations with Japan and China were becoming
more and more involved.
[Illustration: MAP SHOWING FIELD OF THE OPERATIONS THAT LED TO THE WAR
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND JAPAN]
On the 15th of October, 1903 (October 28, N. S.) I presented to
the Emperor a special report on the Manchurian question, in which I
showed that, in order to avoid complications with China and a rupture
with Japan, we must put an end to our military occupation of southern
Manchuria, and confine our activity and our administrative supervision
to the northern part of that territory. My report was, in part, as
follows:
_The Great Advisability of Evacuation_
"If we do not touch the boundary of Korea, and do not place garrisons
between that boundary and the railway, we shall really convince the
Japanese that we have no intention of first taking Manchuria and then
seizing Korea. In all probability, they will then confine themselves to
the peaceful promotion of their interests in the peninsula, and will
neither take possession of it with troops, nor greatly increase the
strength of their army at home. This will relieve us of the necessity
of strengthening our forces in the Far East, and of supporting the
heavy burden of an armed peace--even should there be no war. If, on
the other hand, we annex southern Manchuria, all the questions that
now trouble two nations and threaten to bring about an armed conflict
will assume a still more critical aspect. Our temporary occupation of
certain points between the railway and Korea will become permanent; our
attention will be more and more attracted to the Korean frontier; and
our attitude will confirm the suspicion of the Japanese that Russia
intends to seize the peninsula.
"That our occupation of southern Manchuria will lead to Japanese
occupation of southern Korea there can be no doubt. Beyond that, all
is dark. One thing, however, is certain, and that is that if Japan
takes this step, she will be compelled to increase rapidly her military
strength, and we, in turn, shall respond by enlarging our Far Eastern
force. Thus two nations whose interests are so different that they
would seem destined to live in peace will begin a contest in which each
will try to surpass the other in military resources and power. And we
Russians shall do this at the expense of our fighting readiness in the
West; at the sacrifice of the interest of our native population; and
for the sake of portions of Korea which, so far as Russia is concerned,
have no serious importance. If, moreover, other Powers take part in
this rivalry, the struggle for military supremacy is liable to change,
at any moment, into a deadly conflict, which may not only retard, for a
long time, the peaceful development of our Far Eastern possessions, but
check the growth and progress of the whole Empire.
_Japan a Dangerous and Warlike Enemy_
"Even if we should defeat Japan on the mainland (in Korea and
Manchuria) we could not destroy her, nor obtain decisive results,
without carrying the war into her territory. That, of course,
would not be impossible, but to invade a country where there is
a warlike population of forty-seven millions, and where even the
women participate in wars of national defence, would be a serious
undertaking, even for a Power as mighty as Russia. And if we do not
destroy Japan utterly--if we do not deprive her of the right and the
power to maintain a navy--she will wait until we are engaged in war in
the West, and will then avail herself of the opportunity to attack us,
either alone, or in coöperation with our Western enemies.
"It must not be forgotten that Japan can not only put quickly into
the field, in Korea or Manchuria, a well organized and well trained
army of from 150,000 to 180,000 men, but can do this without drawing
at all heavily upon her population. If we take the German ratio of
regular troops to population, namely, one per cent, we shall see that
Japan, with her forty-seven millions of people, can maintain a force of
400,000 soldiers in time of peace, and 1,000,000 in time of war. And we
must bear in mind the fact that, even if we reduce this estimate by two
thirds, Japan, in a comparatively short time, will be able to oppose us
in Korea, and march into Manchuria, with a regular army of from 300,000
to 350,000 men. If we make it our aim to annex Manchuria, we shall be
compelled to increase our military strength to such an extent that,
with our Far Eastern force alone, we can withstand the Japanese attack
in the annexed territory."
From the above lines it will be seen how seriously the War Department
regarded such an antagonist as Japan, and how much anxiety it felt
concerning possible complications with that Power on account of Korea.
At the time when this report was presented, and later, in November,
the negotiations that Admiral Alexeieff was carrying on with Japan not
only made no progress, but became more critical, the Admiral still
believing that to show a yielding disposition would only make matters
worse.
_Insignificance of Russia's Eastern Interests_
Bearing in mind the clearly expressed will of the Emperor that all
necessary measures should be taken to avoid war, and not expecting
favorable results from Alexeieff's negotiations, I presented to His
Majesty, on the 26th of November, 1903 (December 9, N. S.) a second
report on the Manchurian question, in which I proposed that we return
Port Arthur and the province of Kwang-tung to China, securing, in lieu
thereof, certain special rights in the northern part of Manchuria. In
substance, this proposition was that we admit the untimeliness of our
attempt to get an outlet on the Pacific and abandon it altogether.
The sacrifice might seem a grievous one to make, but I showed the
necessity for it by presenting two important considerations. In the
first place, by surrendering Port Arthur (which had been taken away
from the Japanese) and by giving up southern Manchuria (with the Yalu
enterprise), we should escape the danger of a rupture with Japan and
China. In the second place, we should avoid the possibility of internal
disturbances in European Russia. A war with Japan would be extremely
unpopular, and would increase the feeling of dissatisfaction with the
ruling authorities. My report was, in part, as follows:
"The economic interests of Russia in the Far East are extremely
insignificant. We have as yet, thank God, no over-production in
manufactures, because even our domestic markets are not yet glutted.
There may be some export of articles from our factories and foundries,
but it is largely due to artificial encouragement and will cease--or
nearly cease--when such encouragement is withheld. Russia, therefore,
has not yet grown up to the melancholy necessity of waging war in order
to get markets for her products. As for our other interests in the Far
East, the success or failure of a few coal or timber enterprises in
Manchuria and Korea is not a matter of sufficient importance to make it
worth while for Russia to run the risk of war on their account.
"The railway lines that we have built through Manchuria do not change
the situation, and the hope that these lines will have world-wide
importance, as avenues of international commerce, is not likely,
in the near future, to be realized. Travelers, the mails, tea, and
possibly some other merchandise, will go over them, but the great
masses of heavy international freight which, alone, can give world-wide
importance to a railway, will go by sea, simply because they cannot
bear railway charges. Such is not the case, however, with local freight
to supply local needs. This the roads--and especially the southern
branch--will carry more and more, deriving from it most of their
revenue, and, at the same time, stimulating the growth of the country,
and, in southern Manchuria particularly, benefiting the Chinese
population. But if we do not take special measures to direct even local
freight to Dalny, that port is likely to suffer from the competition
of Yinkow (New Chwang). Port Arthur has no value for Russia as the
defence and terminus of a railway, unless that railway is part of an
international transit route. The southern branch of the Eastern Chinese
road has only--or chiefly--local importance, and, from an economic
point of view, Russia does not need to protect it by means so costly as
the fortifications of Port Arthur, a fleet of warships, and a garrison
of 30,000 soldiers.
"It thus appears that the retention of a position of an aggressive
character in Kwang-tung is no more supported by economic than it is by
political and military considerations. What, then, are the aims that
may involve us in war with Japan and China? Are such aims important
enough to justify the great sacrifices that war will demand? The
Russian people are powerful, and their faith in Divine Providence, as
well as their devotion to their Tsar and their country, is unshaken.
We may trust, therefore, that if Russia is destined to undergo the
trial of war at the beginning of the twentieth century, she will come
out of it with victory and glory. But she will have to make terrible
sacrifices--sacrifices that may long retard the natural growth of the
Empire.
"In the wars that we waged in the early years of the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the enemy invaded our territory,
and we fought for the existence of Russia--marched forth in defence
of our country and died for faith, Tsar, and Fatherland. If, in the
early years of the twentieth century, war breaks out as the result of
controverted questions arising in the Far East, the Russian people
and the Russian army will execute the will of their Monarch with as
much devotion and self-sacrifice as ever, and will give up their lives
and their property for the sake of attaining complete victory; but
they will have no intelligent comprehension of the objects for which
the war is waged. For that reason there will be no such exaltation of
spirit--no such outburst of patriotism--as that which accompanied the
wars that we fought either in self-defence or for objects dear to the
hearts of the people.
"We are now living through a critical period. Internal enemies,
aiming at the destruction of the dearest and most sacred foundations
of our life, are invading even the ranks of our army. Large groups
of the population have become dissatisfied, or mentally unsettled,
and disorders of various sorts--mostly created by a revolutionary
propaganda--are increasing in frequency. Cases in which troops have to
be called out to deal with such disorders are much more common than
they were even a short time ago. We must hope, however, that this evil
has not yet taken deep root in Russian soil, and that by strict and
wise measures it may be eradicated.
"If Russia were attacked from without, the people, with patriotic
fervor, would undoubtedly repudiate the false teaching of the
revolutionary propaganda, and show themselves as ready to answer the
call of their revered Monarch, and to defend their Tsar and country,
as they were in the early years of the eighteenth and particularly
in the nineteenth century. If, however, they are asked to make great
sacrifices in order to carry on a war whose objects are not clearly
understood by them, the leaders of the anti-Government party will take
advantage of the opportunity to spread sedition. Thus there will be
introduced a new factor which, if we decide on war in the Far East, we
must take into account.
"The sacrifices and dangers that we have experienced, or that we
anticipate, as results of the position we have taken in the Far East,
ought to be a warning to us when we dream of getting an outlet on
the unfreezing waters of the Indian Ocean at Chahbar. It is already
evident that the English are preparing to meet us there. The building
of a railroad across the whole of Persia, and the establishment of a
port at Chahbar, with fortifications, a fleet, etc., will simply be a
repetition of our experience with the Eastern Chinese Railway and Port
Arthur. In the place of Port Arthur, we shall have Chahbar, and instead
of war with Japan, we shall have a still more unnecessary and still
more terrible war with Great Britain.
"In view of the considerations above set forth, the questions arise:
Ought we not to avoid the present danger at Port Arthur, as well
as the future danger in Persia? Ought we not to return Kwang-tung,
Port Arthur, and Dalny to China, give up the southern branch of the
Eastern Chinese Railway, and get from China, in place of it, certain
rights in northern Manchuria and a sum of, say, 250,000,000 rubles
as reimbursement for expenses incurred by us in connection with the
railway and Port Arthur?"
Further on in my report I considered fully the advantages and
disadvantages of such a decision, and set forth the principal
advantages as follows: "(1) We shall escape the necessity of fighting
Japan on account of Korea, and China on account of Mukden. (2) We shall
be able to reëstablish friendly relations with both Japan and China.
(3) We shall give peace and tranquillity, not only to Russia, but to
the whole world."
_Russia's Fatal Unpreparedness_
Copies of this report were sent to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the
Minister of Finance, and Admiral Alexeieff. Unfortunately, my views
were not approved, and meanwhile the negotiations with Japan dragged
along and became more and more involved. The future historian, who will
have access to all the documents, may be able, from study of them, to
determine why the will of the Russian Monarch to avoid war with Japan
was not carried into effect by his principal co-workers. At present,
it is only possible to say, unconditionally, that although neither the
Emperor nor Russia desired war, we did not succeed in escaping it. The
reason for the failure of the negotiations is evidently to be found
in our ignorance of Japan's readiness for war, and her determination
to support her contentions with armed force. We ourselves were not
ready to fight, and resolved that it should not come to fighting. We
made demands, but we had no intention of using weapons to enforce
them--and, it may be added, they were not worth going to war about.
We always thought, moreover, that the question whether there should
be war or peace depended upon us, and we wholly overlooked Japan's
stubborn determination to enforce demands that had for her such vital
importance, and also her reliance upon our military unreadiness. Thus
the negotiations were carried on by the respective parties under
unequal conditions.
Then, too, our position was made worse by the form that Admiral
Alexeieff gave to the negotiations intrusted to him. References were
made that offended Japanese pride, and the whole correspondence became
strained and difficult as a result of the Admiral's unfamiliarity
with diplomatic procedure and his lack of competent staff assistance.
He proceeded, moreover, upon the mistaken assumption that, in such a
negotiation, it was necessary to display inflexibility and tenacity.
His idea was that one concession, if made, would inevitably lead to
another, and that a yielding policy would be more likely, in the end,
to bring about a rupture with Japan than a policy of firmness. On the
25th of January, 1904 (February 6, N. S.) diplomatic relations were
broken off by the Japanese, and a few days later war began.
My opinions with regard to the relative importance of the tasks set
before the War Department of Russia made me a convinced opponent of an
active Asiatic policy.