bane of philosophy, and the obstacle to its advancement. Without the
meaning of important words be accurately defined, no general reasoning
can be established. On some occasions the term UNSOUND MIND
has been introduced, and considerable emphasis has been laid on it by
lawyers; as possessing an intrinsic meaning, and designating a peculiar
state of morbid intellect, not _precisely similar_ to insanity, but
of equivalent effect in depriving a person of the management of
himself and affairs. It is of the utmost importance that the term
_unsound mind_ should be fully and accurately considered. Had this
term originated from medical persons, it is most probable they would,
at least have endeavoured to explain it; but it is of higher descent,
and adopted by those luminaries of the law to whom we look up with
confidence and respect. The force and extent of the term unsound mind
are described in the luminous judgment of the present Chancellor on
a recent case. Of this learned exposition of the law, every medical
practitioner should be informed, as it will serve to guide him, when
he is called to give his deposition on the state of a patient’s
intellect. In the judgment adverted to, his Lordship observes, “I have
searched, and caused a most careful search to be made into all the
records and procedures on lunacy which are extant. I believe, and I
think I may venture to say, that originally commissions of this sort
were of two kinds, a commission aiming at, and enquiring, whether
the individual had been an ideot ex nativitate, or whether, on the
other hand, he was a lunatic. The question whether he was a lunatic,
being a question, admitting in the solution of it, of a decision
that imputed to him at one time, an extremely sound mind, but at
other times an occurrence of insanity, with reference to which, it
was necessary to guard his person and his property by a commission
issuing. It seems to have been a very long time before those who had
the administration of justice in this department, thought themselves
at liberty to issue a commission, when the person was represented as
not being ideot ex nativitate, as not being lunatic, but as being
of _unsound mind_, importing by those words, the notion, that the
party was in _some such state_, as was to be contradistinguished from
idiotcy, and as he was to be contradistinguished from lunacy, and yet
_such_ as made him a proper object of a commission _in the nature_
of a commission to enquire of idiotcy, or a commission to enquire
of lunacy. From the moment that that had been established, down to
this moment, it appears to me however to have been at the same time
established, that whatever may be the degree of weakness or imbecility
of the party—whatever may be the degree of incapacity of the party
to manage his own affairs, if the finding of the jury is only, that
he was of an extreme imbecility of mind, that he has an inability to
manage his own affairs; if they will not proceed to infer from that,
in their finding upon oath, that he is of _unsound mind_, they have
not established by the result of the enquiry, a case upon which the
Chancellor can make a grant, constituting a committee either of the
person or estate. All the cases decide that mere imbecility will not
do; that an inability to manage a man’s affairs will not do, unless
that inability and that incapacity to manage his affairs amount to
evidence that he is of unsound mind; and he must be found to be so.
Now there is a great difference between inability to manage a man’s
affairs, and imbecility of mind taken as evidence of unsoundness
of mind. The case of Charlton Palmer in which this was very much
discussed, was the case of a man stricken in years, and whose mind,
was the mind of a child, it was _therefore in that sense_, imbecility
and inability to manage his affairs which _constituted_ unsoundness of
mind.” This is the law, the principle established for the regulation
of medical opinion; and it will be immediately perceived, that the
burthen of this ponderous machine, turns on the explanation which
may be given to the term unsoundness of mind. As far as the term
unsound is employed and understood by medical persons, it signifies a
morbid condition of the human constitution, or a morbid state of some
particular organ, and this state of unsoundness is inferred to exist
from particular and well marked symptoms, which experience has detected
to indicate, constitutional or local morbid affections. If this term
be transferred to mind, it is equally incumbent on the person who
employs it, to point out the particular symptoms or mental phenomena
which characterize this unsoundness of the individual’s mind. It ought
to be well considered that our knowledge of the intellectual faculties,
and of their operations is very limited, and that the progress of the
philosophy of mind, has borne no proportion to the rapid advances
which have been made by Anatomy, Physiology and Pathology, in the
structure, offices and morbid alterations of the body. All that we
can know of the mind of an individual is from the communication of
his ideas in terms or signs which are conventional between us, in
order to be intelligible, or from his actions. Thus by discourse,
which is imparted to the ear, or by intelligible characters presented
to the eye, which convey his thoughts, and by his conduct, we are
enabled to estimate the character of his mind. The lawyer has been
accustomed to receive mental phenomena as the only evidences of the
state of an individual’s intellect: he would be dissatisfied, and in
my own opinion, properly, with any bodily symptoms, such as peculiar
conformation of the head, excessive determination of blood thereto,
protrusion or glistening of the eye, increased pulsation of the Carotid
arteries, &c.—these may be indications to medical persons in the
treatment of insanity, but they do not constitute any direct evidences
of mind. On the scale of intellectual capacity there is an extensive
range, some are eminently gifted, and others so sparingly supplied
that they are unfit for the common purposes of life, and require to
be protected. These are Ideots ex Nativitate. If it be attempted to
teach them, they are deficient of the capacity to acquire sufficient to
manage the property they may be possessed of, or to conduct themselves.
Is it here incumbent on the medical practitioner to state that this
natural deficiency of intellect arises from unsoundness of mind, or
that the unsoundness is the effect of such deficiency: in order that
the individual may experience the wise, politic, and humane protection
of the law?—It frequently occurs that those of extensive capacity and
high attainments are by an apoplectic or paralytic attack suddenly
deprived of their intellectual faculties, and reduced to the state of
an ideot ex nativitate. Is it in this case necessary, for the legal
protection of the party, to insist on the hypothesis of unsoundness?
Is it insufficient to detail the miserable remnants of his former
state, and exhibit to the jury the shocking spectacle? Must there be a
compulsion to infer, that this abolition of the faculties amounts to
evidence of the unsoundness of his mind? We are acquainted with the
mind from the phœnomena it displays; but the cause of these phœnomena
is to us inscrutable: by discourse and conduct we infer its soundness,
by the same evidences its unsoundness must be detected. This appears
however to militate against the dictum of law, which states, “Whatever
may be the degree of weakness or imbecility of the party—whatever may
be the degree of incapacity of the party to manage his own affairs, if
the finding of the jury is only that he was of an extreme imbecility
of mind, that he has an inability to manage his affairs: if they will
not proceed to infer from that, in their finding upon oath, that he
is of _unsound mind_, they have not established, by the result of
their enquiry, a case, upon which the Chancellor can make a grant
constituting a committee either of the person or estate.” Is not this
extreme imbecility of mind and inability to manage his affairs the only
evidence of his unsoundness of mind? if not, what further is required?
for it is not necessary, according to law, that he should be a lunatic.
If these be insufficient to constitute him of _unsound mind_, then the
inference is clear and warranted, that he may be of extreme imbecility,
and have an inability to manage his affairs, and, notwithstanding all
this, may be of _sound mind_: and if _unsoundness_, be _some such
state_, as may be contradistinguished from idiotcy and lunacy, then an
ideot and a lunatic may be of _sound mind_.
In the case referred to of Charlton Palmer, who was a man stricken
in years, and “whose mind was the mind of a child, it was _therefore
in that sense_ imbecility and inability to manage his affairs, which
_constituted_ unsoundness of mind.” Here the imbecility and inability
to manage, _did_ constitute the unsoundness: the words _therefore, in
that sense_, evidently refer to his mind being “the mind of a child,”
which is perhaps a mode of expression more familiar than accurate; as
no one could properly infer, that the mind of a child was necessarily
unsound.
If the word unsoundness be particularly examined, and for that purpose
we consult Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary, we shall find it employed in
three different senses, but no one in which it implies any particular
condition of mind:—the adjective unsound has a dozen different
meanings, but none in the sense of vitiated intellect. From authority
therefore we obtain no information. If we proceed to its derivation, we
shall find that our Anglosaxon ancestors by the word SUND (whence our
SOUND) meant precisely the Latin SANUS. UNSUND Anglosaxon, or unsound
English, would therefore be of equivalent meaning with the Latin
INSANUS.
In those instances where the word unsound is used in our own
profession, it designates something cognizable by the senses. An
unsound tooth bears in its external character or internal feeling,
sufficient evidence of its unsoundness. A fistulous sore may appear
to be healed, but the skill of the surgeon can readily detect that it
is unsound at the bottom: and both the dentist and the surgeon can
give sufficient reasons, as the foundation of their opinion. Unsound
doctrine, differs from that which is orthodox in certain particulars or
essential points, which constitute its unsoundness.
Superadded to these, let the facts be examined as they are recorded
in nature and experience. Of the human intellect there can only be
three states: sound mind, insanity, and idiotcy. Of these states there
may be different degrees. The mind of one man may be relatively more
sound than another; his attention may be more fixed and enduring—his
memory more retentive; his judgment may be clearer, and possess
superior vigour; and his imagination shall exhibit a brighter flame.
Notwithstanding this exalted capacity, the individual who is removed
many degrees lower on the scale, may possess sufficient soundness for
the purposes of his nature:—he may be capable to conduct himself, and
likewise to manage his affairs. Insanity, is another condition of the
human mind, and of this state there are various forms and different
degrees; and when a morbid state of intellect prevails, under which a
man cannot conduct himself, which implies that he is not safe to be
trusted with his own life, nor with the life of another—that in his
motives to action he cannot discriminate between right and wrong, or
without motive is irresistibly impelled to act, and therefore becomes
a being, not responsible for his conduct, and is incapable of managing
his affairs—such state implies the necessity of being guarded by the
instrument of the law: and this state of insanity, which includes all
the various terms of madness, melancholy, lunacy, mental derangement,
&c. necessarily evinces the unsoundness of the individual’s mind.
Lastly, idiotcy, which, whether it be ex nativitate, or supervene at
any period of life, implies a deficiency of intellectual capacity, to
an extent which renders him incapable of the mental offices, which
enable a man to conduct himself, and manage his affairs, and which of
necessity infers the unsoundness of his mind, and the propriety of
legal protection.
Those are the states of the human intellect which have a distinct and
separate existence, and which are capable of being described from
their manifestations; there can be no intermediate state, and certainly
no abstract or independant unsoundness: which, when it is acknowledged,
must, on the one hand, be derived from insanity, or from idiotcy on
the other. But the law has established a different system, and it is
observed that “It seems to have been a very long time before those
who had the administration of justice in this department, thought
themselves at liberty to issue a commission, when the person was
represented as not being ideot ex nativitate, as not being lunatic, but
as being of unsound mind, importing by those words, the notion, that
the party was in _some such state_, as was to be contradistinguished
from idiotcy; and as he was to be contradistinguished from lunacy, and
yet _such_ as made him a proper object of a commission, _in the nature_
of a commission to enquire of idiotcy, or a commission to enquire of
lunacy.” Accepting this with great humility as the law, it is equally
dutiful to endeavour to discover on what facts or experience it was
established: and the only clue to this investigation is found in the
words “_in some such state_,” as was neither idiotcy nor lunacy, but
“such” as disqualified him from exercising the volition of an ordinary
man, by an instrument “in the nature” of a commission applicable to
ideot or lunatic.
If this undefined unsoundness of mind, can thus dispossess the
individual of his liberty, and of the use of his property, under
the issuing of a commission, it performs sufficient; but it may be
respectfully enquired, what would be the general opinion, or that
of the commissioners of the College of Physicians, if a medical
practitioner were to give a certificate to confine a person in a
madhouse, declaring he was neither an ideot nor a lunatic, but of
unsound mind?—And what attention would the judge and jury give to a
physician in a criminal court who came to prove that a man who had
committed murder was not responsible for the crime, because he was
neither an ideot nor a lunatic, but of unsound mind; importing by these
words that he was in _some such state_ as was to be contradistinguished
from idiotcy, and as he was to be contradistinguished from lunacy?
After having taken this view of the subject, which is the result of
extensive experience in this department of the profession, and of
diligent enquiry into the nature of the human mind; it appears to me,
that the medical practitioner may safely and conscientiously infer
unsoundness of mind, if such term be legally insisted on, whenever a
morbid condition of intellect prevails, to an extent which deprives the
mind of its natural and healthy offices, by producing an incapacity or
inability in the individual to conduct himself and manage his affairs.
From the observations which have been detailed concerning unsoundness
of mind there is, according to legal construction, an evident
connection between unsoundness and imbecility. My object, however, is
not the interpretation of law, but the exposition of nature and fact.
It alone interests me to describe the phœnomena of mind—to compare the
performance of its offices in a sound and morbid state—and to measure
by the accredited standard of common sense and intelligible reasoning,
the degree of imbecility, inability, or incapacity, which disqualifies
an individual to conduct himself and manage his affairs.
The necessity of legal interference and protection in cases of
insanity, having been sufficiently adverted to; it now remains to
shew that a person from imbecility of mind may be equally incompetent
to the management of himself and affairs. The mind may be weak from
birth, or it may at any period of life become enfeebled by disease.
Like the body it has its regular periods of growth and development,
of maturity and declension: but they are not periodically connected.
An unusual precocity of mental vigour has been occasionally remarked;
and in advanced age the wisdom of the man frequently survives the
infirmities of the body. Men are relatively competent, wise or foolish,
learned or ignorant, compared with others. On the scale of intellectual
being, we may place the philosopher at the summit, at the bottom the
degraded ideot: and in the population of this world the intermediate
range is adequately filled up. There are many considerations which
demand attention on this important subject. To state that certain
acquirements were to be attained as the proof of competency, would be
an imperfect criterion. Much might be acquired _memoriter_, which the
learner would not understand: a very feeble intellect, insufficient for
the purposes of human affairs, might be trained to answer correctly
a string of known questions, without being able to comprehend or
adapt them to any useful purposes. It should likewise be considered
that the different departments of employment require very different
degrees of mental capacity. A person might be able to manage duly a
small income, who would be inadequate to the distribution of a large
revenue: a man might be competent to keep a shop, who would become
overwhelmed and distracted in the learned professions: a country
squire might gallop hospitably through life, without being able to
discharge his duty as a magistrate. It is not the want of acquirement
that should disqualify an individual; many persons from distaste,
indolence, from neglect of parents and guardians, remain lamentably
ignorant in the current acceptation of the words—they are unable to
write or read, they are unacquainted with the symbols which represent
numbers: yet with these deficiencies they are enabled to conduct
themselves in the world. Speech itself is not absolutely necessary;
because a person born deaf, and consequently dumb, if he understood the
signification of characters, called letters, and their composition,
termed words: if he comprehended that such words were significant of
such things, so that when the object was presented he could select the
appropriate word, and alternately when he saw the word could point to
the thing:—moreover, if he had learned to form these characters, he
would possess a sufficient substitute for speech, and become capable
of intelligible communication—as a correspondent he would be on a
level with him who enjoyed the utmost fluency of speech. So bountiful
has the author of nature been in the construction of the human frame,
that when one avenue to knowledge has been impervious, it has been
transmitted through the medium of another; sufficiently to constitute
the person an intelligent being and a moral agent. It is the _capacity_
of acquirement to which we are to direct our investigations. If a
scale were constructed, and a certain degree fixed as the point of
competency, the circumstance of his not having arrived at such point,
ought not to disqualify the person. It ought to be _determined_ that
he is unable to acquire so much. It is true a man may be ignorant as
far as certain acquirements, which we term learning, are concerned,
and which form the basis of ordinary education; he may know nothing
of what has passed in the world, which we denominate the history of
our species; but he may be an attentive observer of the objects in
nature, and know fully the purposes to which they are applied. Such
a man, although ignorant, does not want the capacity to acquire, and
therefore ought not to be disqualified. It has occurred to me in many
instances, to be consulted concerning persons whose minds have been
naturally weak, or enfeebled by disease; and it always appeared that
by patient enquiry, a satisfactory estimate of their capacity might
be instituted. It would extend far beyond the limits of the present
work to detail the whole of the circumstances connected with this
subject; but it may be briefly stated that the person exercising his
judgment ought particularly to ascertain the power of his attention; as
his knowledge of objects, and his memory of them, will depend on the
duration of his attention; and it will be indispensably necessary to
investigate his comprehension of numbers, without which the nature of
property cannot be understood. If a person were capable of enumerating
progressively to the number ten, and knew the force and value of the
separate units, he would be fully competent to the management of
property. If he could comprehend that twice two composed four, he
could find no difficulty in understanding that twice, or twain ten,
constituted twenty. This _numeration_ also presumes he comprehended
that so many taken from ten, or substracted which is the converse,
would leave so many as the remainder—without such capacity, no man,
in my own opinion, could understand the nature of property, which is
represented by numbers of pounds, shillings, and pence. Indeed the
capacity to acquire this knowledge seems to constitute the preeminence
of man in the creation, as an intellectual being. The same imbecility
of mind is often produced in adults, and in those of advanced age,
by paralytic or epileptic attacks, and from various affections of the
brain, and requires the same accurate investigation, to determine on
the competency of such persons, to be entrusted with the management of
themselves and affairs.
From the foregoing remarks, it appears indispensably necessary that
some criterion should be fixed as the test of sufficient capacity. In
the case even of an ideot ex nativitate, it must be ascertained that
he is really an ideot; and the same process of investigation, which
enables us to determine this fact, will apply to the intermediate
gradations of human capacity. All ideots are not of the same degree
of intellectual depravity; some possess more memory than others, and
display a talent for imitation;—they will whistle tunes correctly, and
repeat passages from books, which they have been taught by ear; but
they are incapable of comprehending what they repeat.
There is a degree of intellect, although mean, when compared with
superior minds, which will enable a human being to take charge of
himself, and transact his affairs; and there is also an inferior
degree, which incapacitates him from the performance of those offices:
and patient examinations at repeated interviews will enable the
observer to ascertain his competency, and to afford a satisfactory
evidence of the state of his mind: for the mind of every man may be
gauged, both as to its acquirements and capacity. By imbecility,
therefore, which may be either natural, or induced by a variety of
causes, it will be seen, that I mean a state or degree of mental
incapacity equivalent to ideotcy, a degree, which renders him
incompetent to the management of himself and affairs:—and which
degree, by observation and enquiry, may always be ascertained. This
degree, satisfactorily measured, does, in my own opinion, amount to
unsoundness of the individual’s mind: as it includes all the mental
evidences which constitute unsoundness.
Connected with these subjects, there is a point of considerable
importance, and of frequent occurrence, which yet remains to be
examined, and with which the present essay will conclude: namely,
the state of mind, under which, a person may legally dispose of his
property by will. Medical practitioners are often called upon to
attest the competence or incapacity of particular persons to the
performance of this act, which requires a state of disposing mind. In
many instances it is deferred to that extremity of bodily disease when
recovery is hopeless. To urge its propriety or necessity at an earlier
period, often excites alarm or despondency, and such state of feeling,
the medical attendant, in many disorders, is unwilling to excite. As a
person of liberal education, and from the enquiries he has made during
his attendance on the patient, he is justly presumed a proper judge
of his competence to dispose. This instrument is termed a will, which
does not simply imply an act of volition, but the volition of a sound
or sane mind; because a lunatic, of all men, is most the creature of
volition. The same conditions of intellect which have been heretofore
enumerated, as exempting him from punishment, and disqualifying him
from the management of his affairs, would, as far as a medical opinion
may prevail, equally disable him from disposing of his property: such
disposal involving the most important part of its management.
There is great, perhaps insuperable, difficulty in considering this
subject in a general point of view. It is presumed, that no person,
actually under a commission of lunacy, could legally dispose of his
property by will, because such instrument confides the management of
his affairs to others. But in the judgment before cited, and where
the law is expounded by the highest and most competent authority, it
appears, that the legal definition of a lunatic, implies a person
interchangeably visited by insanity and reason. “The question whether
he was a lunatic, being a question, admitting in the solution of it
of a decision, that imputed to him at one time an _extremely sound
mind_, but at other times an occurrence of _insanity_, with reference
to _which_, it was necessary to guard his person and his property by a
commission issuing.”