The Fall of Venice.
Feebleness of the Venetian Oligarchy -- Its Overthrow --
Bonaparte's Duplicity -- Letters of Opposite Purport --
Montebello -- The Republican Court -- England's Proposition
for Peace -- Plans of the Directory -- General Clarke's
Diplomatic Career -- Conduct of Mme. Bonaparte --
Bonaparte's Jealous Tenderness -- His Wife's Social
Conquests -- Relations of the Powers.
[Sidenote: 1797.]
Since the days of Carthage no government like that of the Venetian
oligarchy had existed on the earth. At its best it was dark and
remorseless; with the disappearance of its vigor its despotism had
become somewhat milder, but even yet no common man might draw the veil
from its mysterious, irresponsible councils and live. A few hundred
families administered the country as they did their private estates.
All intelligence, all liberty, all personal independence, were
repressed by such a system. The more enlightened Venetians of the
mainland, many even in the city, feeling the influences of the time,
had long been uneasy under their government, smoothly as it seemed to
run in time of peace. Now that the earth was quaking under the march
of Bonaparte's troops, this government was not only helpless, but in
its panic it actually grew contemptible, displaying by its conduct how
urgent was the necessity for a change. The senate had a powerful
fleet, three thousand native troops, and eleven thousand mercenaries;
but they struck only a single futile blow on their own account,
permitting a rash captain to open fire from the gunboats against the
French vanguard when it appeared. But immediately, as if in fear of
their own temerity, they despatched an embassy to learn the will of
the approaching general. That his dealings might be merciful, they
tried the plan of Modena, and offered him a bribe of seven million
francs; but, as in the case of Modena, he refused. Next day the Great
Council having been summoned, it was determined by a nearly unanimous
vote of the patricians--six hundred and ninety to twenty-one--that
they would remodel their institutions on democratic lines. The pale
and terrified Doge thought that in such a surrender lay the last hope
of safety.
Not for a moment did Lallemant and Villetard, the two French agents,
intermit their revolutionary agitation in the town. Disorders grew
more frequent, while uncertainty both paralyzed and disintegrated the
patrician party. A week later the government virtually abdicated. Two
utter strangers appeared in a theatrical way at its doors, and
suggested in writing to the Great Council that to appease the spirit
of the times they should plant the liberty-tree on the Place of St.
Mark, and speedily accede to all the propositions for liberalizing
Venice which the popular temper seemed to demand. Such were the terror
and disorganization of the aristocracy that instead of punishing the
intrusion of the unknown reformers by death, according to the
traditions of their merciless procedure, they took measures to carry
out the suggestions made in a way as dark and significant as any of
their own. The fleet was dismantled, and the army disbanded. By the
end of the month the revolution was virtually accomplished; a rising
of their supporters having been mistaken by the Great Council, in its
pusillanimous terror, for a rebellion of their antagonists, they
decreed the abolition of all existing institutions, and, after hastily
organizing a provisional government, disbanded. Four thousand French
soldiers occupied the town, and an ostensible treaty was made between
the new republic of Venice and that of France.
This treaty was really nothing but a pronunciamento of Bonaparte. He
decreed a general amnesty to all offenders except the commander of
Fort Luco, who had recently fired on the French vessel. He also
guaranteed the public debt, and promised to occupy the city only as
long as the public order required it. By a series of secret articles,
vaguely expressed, Venice was bound to accept the stipulations of
Leoben in regard to territory, pay an indemnity of one million two
hundred thousand dollars, and furnish three ships of the line with two
frigates, while, in pursuance of the general policy of the French
republic, experts were to select twenty pictures from her galleries,
and five hundred manuscripts from her libraries. Whatever was the
understanding of those who signed these crushing conditions, the city
was never again treated by any European power as an independent state.
To this dismemberment the Directory made itself an accessory after the
fact, having issued a declaration of war on Venice which only reached
Milan to be suppressed, when already Venice was no more. Whether the
oligarchy or its assassin was the more loathsome still remains an
academic question, debatable only in an idle hour. Soon afterward a
French expedition was despatched to occupy her island possessions in
the Levant. The arrangements had been carefully prepared during the
very time when the provisional government believed itself to be paying
the price of its new liberties. And earlier still, on May
twenty-seventh, three days before the abdication of the aristocracy,
Bonaparte had already offered to Austria the entire republic in its
proposed form as an exchange for the German lands on the left bank of
the Rhine.
Writing to the Directory on that day, he declared that Venice, which
had been in a decline ever since the discovery of the Cape of Good
Hope and the rise of Triest and Ancona, could with difficulty survive
the blows just given her. "This miserable, cowardly people, unfit for
liberty, and without land or water--it seems natural to me that we
should hand them over to those who have received their mainland from
us. We shall take all their ships, we shall despoil their arsenal, we
shall remove all their cannon, we shall wreck their rank, we shall
keep Corfu and Ancona for ourselves." On the twenty-sixth, only the
day previous, a letter to his "friends" of the Venetian provisional
government had assured them that he would do all in his power to
confirm their liberties, and that he earnestly desired that Italy,
"now covered with glory, and free from every foreign influence, should
again appear on the world's stage, and assert among the great powers
that station to which by nature, position, and destiny it was
entitled." Ordinary minds cannot grasp the guile and daring which seem
to have foreseen and prearranged all the conditions necessary to plans
which for double-dealing transcended the conceptions of men even in
that age of duplicity and selfishness.
Not far from Milan, on a gentle rise, stands the famous villa, or
country-seat, of Montebello. Its windows command a scene of rare
beauty: on one side, in the distance, the mighty Alps, with their
peaks of never-melting ice and snow; on the other three, the almost
voluptuous beauty of the fertile plains; while in the near foreground
lies the great capital of Lombardy, with its splendid industries, its
stores of art, and its crowded spires hoary with antiquity. Within
easy reach are the exquisite scenes of an enchanted region--that of
the Italian lakes. To this lordly residence Bonaparte withdrew. His
summer's task was to be the pacification of Europe, and the
consolidation of his own power in Italy, in France, and northward
beyond the Alps. The two objects went hand in hand. From Austria, from
Rome, from Naples, from Turin, from Parma, from Switzerland, and even
from the minor German principalities whose fate hung on the
rearrangement of German lands to be made by the Diet of the Empire,
agents of every kind, both military and diplomatic, both secret and
accredited, flocked to the seat of power. Expresses came and went in
all directions, while humble suitors vied with one another in homage
to the risen sun.
The uses of rigid etiquette were well understood by Bonaparte. He
appreciated the dazzling power of ceremony, the fascination of
condescension, and the influence of woman in the conduct of affairs.
All such influences he lavished with a profusion which could have been
conceived only by an Oriental imagination. As if to overpower the
senses by an impressive contrast, and symbolize the triumph of that
dominant Third Estate of which he claimed to be the champion against
aristocrats, princes, kings, and emperors, the simplicity of the
Revolution was personified and emphasized in his own person. His
ostentatious frugality, his disdain for dress, his contempt for
personal wealth and its outward signs, were all heightened by the
setting which inclosed them, as a frame of brilliants often heightens
the character in the portrait of a homely face.
Meantime England, grimly determined to save herself and the Europe
essential to her well-being, was not a passive spectator of events in
Italy. To understand the political situation certain facts must be
reiterated in orderly connection. At the close of 1796, Pitt's
administration was still in great straits, for the Tories who
supported him were angered by his lack of success, while the Whig
opposition was correspondingly jubilant and daily growing stronger.
The navy had been able barely to preserve appearances, but that was
all. There was urgent need for reform in tactics, in administration,
and in equipment. France had made some progress in all these
directions, and, in spite of English assistance, both the Vendean and
the Chouan insurrections had, to all appearance, been utterly crushed.
Subsequently the powerful expedition under Hoche, equipped and held in
readiness to sail for Ireland, there to organize rebellion, and give
England a draught from her own cup, though destined to disaster,
wrought powerfully on the British imagination. It was clear that the
Whigs would score a triumph at the coming elections if something were
not done. Accordingly, as has been told, Pitt determined to open
negotiations for peace with the Directory. As his agent he unwisely
chose a representative aristocrat, who had distinguished himself as a
diplomatist in Holland by organizing the Orange party to sustain the
Prussian arms against the rising democracy of that country. Moreover,
the envoy was an ultra-conservative in his views of the French
Revolution, and, believing that there was no room in western Europe
for his own country and her great rival, thought there could be no
peace until France was destroyed. Burke sneered that he had gone to
Paris on his knees. He had been received with suspicion and distrust,
many believing his real errand to be the reorganization of a royalist
party in France. Then, too, Delacroix, minister of foreign affairs,
was a narrow, shallow, and conceited man, unable either to meet an
adroit and experienced negotiator on his own ground, or to prepare new
forms of diplomatic combat, as Bonaparte had done. The English
proposition, it is well to recall, was that Great Britain would give
up all the French colonial possessions she had seized during the war,
provided the French republic would abandon Belgium. It is essential to
an understanding of Bonaparte's attitude in 1797, to recall also in
this connection that the navigation of the Scheldt has ever been an
object of the highest importance to England: the establishment of a
strong, hostile maritime power in harbors like those of the
Netherlands would menace, if not destroy, the British carrying-trade
with central and northern Europe. The reply of the Directory had been
that their fundamental law forbade the consideration of such a point;
and when Malmesbury persisted in his offer, he was allowed forty-eight
hours to leave the country. The negotiation was a fiasco as far as
Austria was concerned, although useful in consolidating British
patriotism. Hoche, having been despatched to Ireland, found wind and
waves adverse, and then returned to replace Jourdan in command of one
of the Rhine armies, the latter having been displaced for his failures
in Germany and relegated to the career of politics. Bonaparte's
victories left his most conspicuous rival nothing to do and he
gracefully congratulated his Italian colleague on having forestalled
him. His sad and suspicious death in September had no influence on the
terms of Bonaparte's treaty, but emphasized the need of its
ratification.
The Directory, with an eye single to the consolidation of the
republic, cared little for Lombardy, and much for Belgium; for the
prestige of the government, even for its stability, Belgium with the
Rhine frontier must be secured. The Austrian minister cared little for
the distant provinces of the empire, and everything for a compact
territorial consolidation. The successes of 1796 had secured to France
treaties with Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and the two circles
of Swabia and Franconia, whereby these powers consented to abandon
the control of all lands on the left bank of the Rhine hitherto
belonging to them or to the Germanic body. As a consequence the goal
of the Directory could be reached by Austria's consent, and Austria
appeared to be willing. The only question was, Would France restore
the Milanese? Carnot was emphatic in the expression of his opinion
that for the sake of peace with honor, a speedy, enduring peace, she
must, and his colleagues assented. Accordingly, Bonaparte was warned
that no expectations of emancipation must be awakened in the Italian
peoples. But such a warning was absurd. The directors, having been
able neither to support their general with adequate reinforcements,
nor to pay his troops, it had been only in the rôle of a liberator
that Bonaparte was successful in cajoling and conquering Italy, in
sustaining and arming his men, and in pouring treasures into Paris. It
was for this reason that, enormous and outrageous as was the ruin and
spoliation of a neutral state, he saw himself compelled to overthrow
Venice, and hold it as a substitute for Lombardy in the coming trade
with Austria. But the directors either could not or would not at that
time enter into his plans, and refused to comprehend the situation.
With doubtful good sense they had therefore determined in November,
1796, to send Clarke, their own chosen agent, to Vienna. It was for
this that they selected a man of polished manners and honest purpose,
but, contrary to their estimate, of very moderate ability. He must of
course have a previous understanding with Bonaparte, and to that end
he had journeyed by way of Italy. Being kindly welcomed, he was
entirely befooled by his subtle host, who detained him with idle
suggestions until after the fall of Mantua, when to his amazement he
received the instructions from Paris already stated: to make no
proposition of any kind without Bonaparte's consent. Then followed
the death of the Czarina Catherine, which left Austria with no ally,
and all the subsequent events to the eve of Leoben. Thugut, of course,
wanted no Jacobin agitator at Vienna, such as he supposed Clarke to
be, and informed him that he must not come thither, but might reach a
diplomatic understanding with the Austrian minister at Turin, if he
could. He was thus comfortably banished from the seat of war during
the closing scenes of the campaign, and to Bonaparte's satisfaction
could not of course reach Leoben in time to conclude the preliminaries
as the accredited agent of the republic. But, to save the self-respect
of the Directory, he was henceforth to be associated with Bonaparte in
arranging the final terms of peace; and to that end he came of course
to Milan. Representing as he did the conviction of the government that
the Rhine frontier must be a condition of peace, and necessarily
emphasizing its scheme of territorial compensations, he had to be
either managed or disregarded. It was the versatility of the envoy at
Montebello which assured him his subsequent career under the consulate
and empire.
The court at Montebello was not a mere levee of men. There was as well
an assemblage of brilliant women, of whom the presiding genius was
Mme. Bonaparte. Love, doubt, decision, marriage, separation, had been
the rapidly succeeding incidents of her connection with Bonaparte in
Paris. Though she had made ardent professions of devotion to her
husband, the marriage vow sat but lightly on her in the early days of
their separation. Her husband appears to have been for a short time
more constant, but, convinced of her fickleness, to have become as
unfaithful as she. And yet the complexity of emotions--ambition,
self-interest, and physical attraction--which seems to have been
present in both, although in widely different degree, sustained
something like genuine ardor in him, and an affection sincere enough
often to awaken jealousy in her. The news of Bonaparte's successive
victories in Italy made his wife a heroine in Paris. In all the salons
of the capital, from that of the directors at the Luxembourg downward
through those of her more aristocratic but less powerful
acquaintances, she was fêted and caressed. As early as April, 1796,
came the first summons of her husband to join him in Italy. Friends
explained to her willing ears that it was not a French custom for the
wives of generals to join the camp-train, and she refused. Resistance
but served to rouse the passions of the young conqueror, and his fiery
love-letters reached Paris by every courier. Josephine, however,
remained unmoved; for the traditions of her admirers, to whom she
showed them, made light of a conjugal affection such as that. She was
flattered, but, during the courtship, slightly frightened by such
addresses.
In due time there were symptoms which appeared to be those of
pregnancy. On receipt of this news the prospective father could not
contain himself for joy. The letter which he sent has been preserved.
It was written from Tortona, on June fifteenth, 1796. Life is but a
vain show because at such an hour he is absent from her. His passion
had clouded his faculties, but if she is in pain he will leave at any
hazard for her side. Without appetite, and sleepless; without thought
of friends, glory, or country, all the world is annihilated for him
except herself. "I care for honor because you do, for victory because
it gratifies you, otherwise I would have left all else to throw myself
at your feet. Dear friend, be sure and say you are persuaded that I
love you above all that can be imagined--persuaded that every moment
of my time is consecrated to you; that never an hour passes without
thought of you; that it never occurred to me to think of another
woman; that they are all in my eyes without grace, without beauty,
without wit; that you--you alone as I see you, as you are--could
please and absorb all the faculties of my soul; that you have fathomed
all its depths; that my heart has no fold unopened to you, no thoughts
which are not attendant upon you; that my strength, my arms, my mind,
are all yours; that my soul is in your form, and that the day you
change, or the day you cease to live, will be that of my death; that
nature, the earth, is lovely in my eyes, only because you dwell within
it. If you do not believe all this, if your soul is not persuaded,
saturated, you distress me, you do not love me. Between those who love
is a magnetic bond. You know that I could never see you with a lover,
much less endure your having one: to see him and to tear out his heart
would for me be one and the same thing; and then, could I, I would lay
violent hands on your sacred person.... No, I would never dare, but I
would leave a world where that which is most virtuous had deceived me.
I am confident and proud of your love. Misfortunes are trials which
mutually develop the strength of our passion. A child lovely as its
mother is to see the light in your arms. Wretched man that I am, a
single day would satisfy me! A thousand kisses on your eyes, on your
lips. Adorable woman! what a power you have! I am sick with your
disease: besides, I have a burning fever. Keep the courier but six
hours, and let him return at once, bringing to me the darling letter
of my queen."
At length, in June, when the first great victories had been won, when
the symptoms of motherhood proved to be spurious and disappeared, when
honors like those of a sovereign were awaiting her in Italy, Mme.
Bonaparte decided to tear herself away from the circle of her friends
in Paris, and to yield to the ever more urgent pleadings of her
husband. Traveling under Junot's care, she reached Milan early in
July, to find the general no longer an adventurer, but the successful
dictator of a people, courted by princes and kings, adored by the
masses, and the arbiter of nations. Rising, apparently without an
effort, to the height of the occasion, she began and continued
throughout the year to rival in her social conquests the victories of
her husband in the field. Where he was Caius, she was Caia. High-born
dames sought her favor, and nobles bowed low to win her support. At
times she actually braved the dangers of insurrection and the
battle-field. Her presence in their capital was used to soothe the
exasperated Venetians. To gratify her spouse's ardor, she journeyed to
many cities, and by a show of mild sympathy moderated somewhat the
wild ambitions which the scenes and character of his successes
awakened in his mind. The heroes and poets of Rome had moved upon that
same stage. To his consort the new Cæsar unveiled the visions of his
heated imagination, explained the sensations aroused in him by their
shadowy presence, and unfolded his schemes of emulation. Of such
purposes the court held during the summer at Montebello was but the
natural outcome. Its historic influence was incalculable: on one hand,
by the prestige it gave in negotiation to the central figure, and by
the chance it afforded to fix and crystallize the indefinite visions
of the hour; on the other, by rendering memorable the celebration of
the national fête on July fourteenth, 1797, an event arranged for
political purposes, and so dazzling as to fix in the army the intense
and complete devotion to their leader which made possible the next
epoch in his career.
The summer was a season of enforced idleness, outwardly and as far as
international relations were concerned, but in reality Bonaparte was
never more active nor more successful. In February the Bank of England
had suspended specie payments, and in March the price of English
consols was fifty-one, the lowest it ever reached. The battle of Cape
St. Vincent, fought on February fourteenth, destroyed the Spanish
naval power, and freed Great Britain from the fear of a combination
between the French and Spanish fleets for an invasion. But, on the
other hand, sedition was wide-spread in the navy; the British sailors
were mutinous to the danger-point, hoisting the red flag and
threatening piracy. The risings, though numerous, were eventually
quelled, but the effect on the English people was magical. Left
without an ally by the death of Catherine, the temporizing of Paul,
and his leaning to the Prussian policy of neutrality, facts mirrored
in the preliminaries of Leoben, their government made overtures for
peace. There was a crisis in the affairs of the Directory and, as a
sort of shelter from the stormy menace of popular disapproval,
Delacroix consented to receive Malmesbury again and renew negotiations
at Lille. As expected, the arrangement was a second theatrical
fencing-bout from the beginning. Canning feared his country would meet
with an accident in the sword-play, for the terms proposed were a weak
yielding to French pride by laying the Netherlands at her feet.
Probably the offer was not serious in any case, the farce was quickly
ended, and when their feint was met the British nation had recuperated
and was not dismayed. It required the utmost diligence in the use of
personal influence, on the part both of the French general and of his
wife, to thwart among the European diplomats assembled at Montebello
the prestige of English naval victory and the swift adaptations of
their policy to changing conditions. But they succeeded, and the
evidence was ultimately given not merely in great matters like the
success of Fructidor or the peace of Campo Formio, but in small
ones--such, for example, as the speedy liberation of Lafayette from
his Austrian prison.
END OF VOLUME I