Bassano and Arcola.
The Austrian System -- The Austrian Strategy -- Castiglione
-- French Gains -- Bassano -- The French in the Tyrol -- The
French Defeated in Germany -- Bonaparte and Alvinczy --
Austrian Successes -- Caldiero -- First Battle of Arcola --
Second Battle of Arcola.
[Sidenote: 1796.]
Meantime the end of July had come. The Emperor Francis had decided. At
the risk of defeat on the Rhine he must retain his Italian possessions
and prestige. He was still the Roman emperor, inheritor of an
immemorial dignity, overlord of the fairest lands in the peninsula.
Wurmser, considered by Austria her greatest general, had therefore
been recalled to Vienna from the west, and sent at the head of
twenty-five thousand fresh troops to collect the columns of Beaulieu's
army, which was scattered in the Tyrol. This done, he was to assume
the chief command, and advance to the relief of Mantua. The first part
of his task was successfully completed, and already, according to the
direction of the Aulic Council of the empire, and in pursuance of the
same hitherto universal but vicious system of cabinet campaigning
which Bonaparte had just repudiated, he was moving down from the Alps
in three columns with a total force of about forty-seven thousand men.
There were about fifteen thousand in the garrison of Mantua. Bonaparte
was much weaker, having only forty-two thousand, and of these some
eight thousand were occupied in the siege of that place. Wurmser was a
master of the old school, working like an automaton under the hand of
his government, and commanding according to well-worn precept his
well-equipped battalions, every soldier of which was a recruit so
costly that destructive battles were made as infrequent as possible,
because to fight many meant financial ruin. In consequence, like all
the best generals of his class, he made war as far as possible a
series of manoeuvers. Opposed to him was an emancipated genius with
neither directors nor public council to hamper him. In the tradition
of the Revolution, as in the mind of Frederick the Great, war was no
game, but a bloody decision, and the quicker the conclusion was tried
the better. The national conscription, under the hands of Dubois de
Crancé, had secured men in unlimited numbers at the least expense;
while Carnot's organization had made possible the quick handling of
troops in large mass by simplifying the machinery. Bonaparte was about
to show what could be done in the way of using the weapon which had
been put into his hands.
The possession of Mantua was decisive of Italian destiny, for its
holder could command a kind of overlordship in every little Italian
state. If Bonaparte should take and keep it, Austria would be
virtually banished from Italy, and her prestige destroyed. She must,
therefore, relieve it, or lose not only her power in the peninsula,
but her rank in Europe. To this end, and according to the established
rules of strategy, the Austrians advanced from the mountains in three
divisions against the French line, which stretched from Brescia past
Peschiera, at the head of the Mincio, and through Verona to Legnago on
the Adige. Two of these armies were to march respectively down the
east and west banks of Lake Garda, and, flanking the inferior forces
of the French on both sides, surround and capture them. The other
division was on the Adige in front of Verona, ready to relieve
Mantua. Between that river and the lake rises the stately mass of
Monte Baldo, abrupt on its eastern, more gentle on its western slope.
This latter, as affording some space for manoeuvers, was really the
key to the passage. Such was the first onset of the Austrians down
this line that the French outposts at Lonato and Rivoli were driven
in, and for a time it seemed as if there would be a general rout. But
the French stood firm, and checked any further advance. For a day
Bonaparte and Wurmser stood confronting each other. In the mean time,
however, the left Austrian column was pouring down toward Verona,
while the right, under Quasdanowich, had already captured Brescia,
seized the highway to Milan, and cut off the French retreat. This move
in Wurmser's plan was so far entirely successful, and for a moment it
seemed as if the sequel would be equally so. The situation of his
opponents was desperate.
In this crisis occurred the first of those curious scenes which recur
at intervals in Bonaparte's life. Some, and those eye-witnesses, have
attributed them to genuine panic. His first measure was to despatch
flying adjutants, ten in number, to concentrate his scattered forces
at the critical point, south of Lake Garda. His genius decided that
victory on the field was far more fruitful than the holding in check
of a garrison. Accordingly he ordered Sérurier to raise the siege of
Mantua, and his siege-guns to be spiked and withdrawn. The division
thus rendered available he at once despatched for field operations
toward Brescia. But its numbers were so few as scarcely to relieve the
situation. Accordingly a council of war was summoned to decide whether
the army should stand and fight, or retreat for further concentration.
The commander-in-chief was apparently much excited, and according to
Augereau's account advised the latter course. The enemy being between
the French and the Adda, no other line was open but that southward
through the low country, over the Po; and to follow that implied
something akin to a disorderly rout. Nevertheless, all the generals
were in favor of this suggestion except one, the fiery hotspur who
tells the tale, who disdained the notion of retreat on any line, and
flung out of the room in scorn. Bonaparte walked the floor until late
in the small hours; finally he appeared to have accepted Augereau's
advice, and gave orders for battle. But the opening movements were
badly executed. Bonaparte seemed to feel that the omens were
unfavorable, and again the generals were summoned. Augereau opened the
meeting with a theatrical and declamatory but earnest speech,
encouraging his comrades and urging the expediency of a battle. This
time it was Bonaparte who fled, apparently in despair, leaving the
chief command, and with it the responsibility, to the daring Augereau,
by whose enthusiasm, as he no doubt saw, the other generals had been
affected. The hazardous enterprise succeeded, and on the very plan
already adopted. Augereau gave the orders, and with swift
concentration every available man was hurled against the Austrian
column under Quasdanowich at Lonato. This much may be true; casting
aside Augereau's inconsistencies and braggadocio, it is possible but
unlikely.
The result was an easy victory, the enemy was driven back to a safe
distance, and Brescia was evacuated on August fourth, the defeated
columns retreating behind Lake Garda to join Wurmser on the other
side. Like the regular return of the pendulum, the French moved back
again, and confronted the Austrian center that very night, but now
with every company in line and Bonaparte at their head. A portion of
the enemy, about twenty-five thousand in number, had reached Lonato,
hastening to the support of Quasdanowich. Wurmser had lost a day
before Mantua. A second time the hurrying French engaged their foe
almost on the same field. A second time they were easily victorious.
In fact, so terrible was this second defeat that the scattered bands
of Austrians wandered aimlessly about in ignorance of their way. One
of them, four thousand strong, reaching Lonato, found it almost
abandoned by the French, Bonaparte and his staff with but twelve
hundred men being left behind. A herald, blindfolded, as was then the
custom, was at once despatched to summon the French commander to
surrender to the superior Austrian force. The available remnant of the
victorious army quickly gathered, and the messenger was introduced in
the midst of them. As the bandage was taken from his eyes, dazzled by
the light falling on hundreds of brilliant uniforms, the imperious
voice of his great enemy was heard commanding him to return and say to
his leader that it was a personal insult to speak of surrender to the
French army, and that it was he who must immediately yield himself and
his division. The bold scheme was successful, and to the ten thousand
previously killed, wounded, and captured by the conquerors four
thousand prisoners were added. Next morning Wurmser advanced, and with
his right resting on Lake Garda offered battle. The decisive fight
occurred in the center of his long, weak line at Castiglione, where
some fifteen thousand Austrians had happened to make a stand, without
orders and so without assurance of support. Again the French position
was so weak as apparently to throw Bonaparte into a panic, and again,
according to the memoirs of General Landrieux, Augereau's fire and
dash prevailed to have the battle joined, while Bonaparte withdrew in
a sulky pet. Whatever the truth, the attack was made. Before evening
the sharp struggle was over. This affair of August fifth was always
referred to by Napoleon as the true battle of Castiglione. Two days
later Wurmser, who had fondly hoped that Mantua was his and the French
in full retreat, brought up a straggling line of twenty-five thousand
men. These were easily routed by Bonaparte in a series of clever
manoeuvers on the seventh and without much bloodshed. That night saw
the utter rout of Wurmser and the Austrians in full retreat towards
the Tyrol. Had the great risk of these few days been determined
against the French, who would have been to blame but the madcap
Augereau? As things turned out, whose was the glory but Bonaparte's?
This panic, at least, appears to have been carefully calculated and
cleverly feigned. A week later the French lines were again closed
before Mantua, which, though not invested, was at least blockaded. The
fortress had been revictualed and regarrisoned, while the besiegers
had been compelled to destroy their own train to prevent its capture
by the enemy. But France was mistress of the Mincio and the Adige,
with a total loss of about ten thousand men; while Austria had lost
about twenty thousand, and was standing by a forlorn hope. Both armies
were exhausted, as yet the great stake was not won. If Austrian
warfare was utterly discredited, the irregular, disjointed, uncertain
French warfare of the past week had not enhanced French glory.
In the shortest possible period new troops were under way both from
Vienna and from Paris. With those from the Austrian capital came
positive instructions to Wurmser that in any case he should again
advance toward Mantua. In obedience to this command of the Emperor, a
division of the army, twenty thousand strong, under Davidowich, was
left in the Austrian Tyrol at Roveredo, near Trent, to stop the
advance of the French, who, with their reinforcements, were pressing
forward through the pass as if to join Moreau, who had successfully
advanced and would be in Munich. The main Austrian army, under
Wurmser, moved over into the valley of the Brenta, and pushed on
toward Mantua. If he should decide to turn westward against the
French, the reserve could descend the valley of the Adige to his
assistance. But Bonaparte did not intend either to pass by and leave
open the way southward, or to be shut up in the valleys of the Tyrol.
With a quick surge, Davidowich was first defeated at Roveredo, and
then driven far behind Trent into the higher valleys. The victor
delayed only to issue a proclamation giving autonomy to the Tyrolese,
under French protection; but the ungrateful peasantry preferred the
autonomy they already enjoyed, and fortified their precipitous passes
for resistance. Turning quickly into the Brenta valley, Bonaparte, by
a forced march of two days, overtook Wurmser's advance-guard unawares
at Primolano, and captured it; the next day, September eighth, Masséna
cut in two and completely defeated the main army at Bassano. Part of
those who escaped retreated into Friuli, toward Vienna. There was
nothing left for the men under Wurmser's personal command but to throw
themselves, if possible, into Mantua. With these, some sixteen
thousand men in all, the veteran general forced a way, by a series of
most brilliant movements, past the flank of the blockading French
lines, where he made a gallant stand first at St. Georges and then at
Favorita. But he was driven from both positions and forced to find a
refuge in the famous fortress.
The lightning-like rapidity of these operations completed the
demoralization of the Austrian troops. The fortified defiles and
cliffs of the Tyrol fell before the French attacks as easily as their
breastworks in the plains. Wurmser had twenty-six thousand men in
Mantua; but from fear and fever half of them were in the hospitals.
Meanwhile, disaster had overtaken the French arms in the North.
Jourdan had crossed the Rhine at Düsseldorf, as Moreau had at Kehl.
They had each about seventy-five thousand men, while the army of the
Austrian archduke Charles had been reduced by Wurmser's departure for
Italy to a number far less. According to the plan of the Directory,
these two French armies were to advance on parallel lines south of the
neutral zone through Germany, and to join Bonaparte across the Tyrol
for the advance to Vienna. Moreau defeated the Austrians, and reached
Munich without a check. Würtemberg and Baden made peace with the
French republic on its own terms, and Saxony, recalling its forces
from the coalition, declared itself neutral, as Prussia had done. But
Jourdan, having seized Würzburg and won the battle of Altenkirchen,
was met on his way to Ratisbon and Neumarkt, and thoroughly beaten, by
the same young Archduke Charles, who had acquired experience and
learned wisdom in his defeat by Moreau. Both French armies were thus
thrown back upon the Rhine, and there could be no further hope of
carrying out the original plan. In this way the attention of the world
was concentrated on the victorious Army of Italy and its young
commander, whose importance was further enhanced by the fulfilment of
his own prophecy that the fate of Europe hung on the decision of his
campaign in Italy.
This was not an empty boast. The stubborn determination of Francis to
reconquer Italy had given new courage to the conservatives of central
and southern Italy, who did not conceal their resolve nor their
preparations to annihilate French power and influence within the
borders of Modena, Rome, and Naples. Bonaparte was thus enabled to
take another momentous step in emancipating himself from the
Directory. So far he had asserted and confirmed his military and
diplomatic independence: he now boldly assumed political supremacy.
Though at times he expressed a low opinion of the Italians, yet he
recognized their higher qualities. In Modena, Reggio, Bologna, and
Ferrara were thousands who understood the significance of the dawning
epoch. To these he paid visits and to their leaders he gave, during
the short interval at his command, hearty approbation for their
resistance to the reactionaries. Forestalling the Directory, he
declared Modena and Reggio to be under French protection. This daring
procedure assured his ascendancy with all Italian liberals and
rendered sure and certain the prosecution of his campaign to the
bitter end. Bologna and Ferrara, having surrendered to French
protection on June twenty-third, were soon in open revolt against the
papal influences which were reviving: and even in distant Naples the
liberals took heart once more.
The glory of the imperial arms having been brilliantly vindicated in
the north, the government at Vienna naturally thought it not
impossible to relieve Mantua, and restore Austrian prestige in the
south. Every effort was to be made. The Tyrolese sharp-shooters were
called out, large numbers of raw recruits were gathered in Illyria and
Croatia, while a few veterans were taken from the forces of the
Archduke Charles. When these were collected, Quasdanowich found
himself in Friuli with upward of thirty-five thousand men, while
Davidowich in the Tyrol had eighteen thousand. The chief command of
both armies was assigned to Alvinczy, an experienced but aged general,
one of the same stock as that to which Wurmser belonged. About
October first, the two forces moved simultaneously, one down the
Adige, the other down the Piave, to unite before Vicenza, and proceed
to the relief of Mantua. For the fourth time Bonaparte was to fight
the same battle, on the same field, for the same object, with the same
inferiority of numbers. His situation, however was a trifle better
than it had been, for several veteran battalions which were no longer
needed in Vendée had arrived from the Army of the West; his own
soldiers were also well equipped and enthusiastic. He wrote to the
Directory, on October first, that he had thirty thousand effectives;
but he probably had more, for it is scarcely possible that, as he
said, eighteen thousand were in the hospitals. The populations around
and behind him were, moreover, losing faith in Austria, and growing
well disposed toward France. Many of his garrisons were, therefore,
called in; and deducting eight thousand men destined for the siege of
Mantua, he still had an army of nearly forty thousand men wherewith to
meet the Austrians. There was, of course, some disaffection among his
generals. Augereau was vainglorious and bitter, Masséna felt that he
had not received his due meed of praise for Bassano, and both had
sympathizers even in the ranks. This was inevitable, considering
Bonaparte's policy and system, and somewhat interfered with the
efficiency of his work.
While the balance was thus on the whole in favor of the French, yet
this fourth division of the campaign opened with disaster to them. In
order to prevent the union of his enemy's two armies, Bonaparte
ordered Vaubois, who had been left above Trent to guard the French
conquests in the Tyrol, to attack Davidowich. The result was a rout,
and Vaubois was compelled to abandon one strong position after
another,--first Trent, then Roveredo,--until finally he felt able to
make a stand on the right bank of the Adige at Rivoli, which commands
the southern slopes of Monte Baldo. The other bank was in Austrian
hands, and Davidowich could have debouched safely into the plain. This
result was largely due to the clever mountain warfare of the Tyrolese
militia. Meantime Masséna had moved from Bassano up the Piave to
observe Alvinczy. Augereau was at Verona. On November fourth, Alvinczy
advanced and occupied Bassano, compelling Masséna to retreat before
his superior force. Bonaparte, determined not to permit a junction of
the two Austrian armies, moved with Augereau's division to reinforce
Masséna and drive Alvinczy back into the valley of the Piave. Augereau
fought all day on the sixth at Bassano, Masséna at Citadella. This
first encounter was indecisive; but news of Vaubois's defeat having
arrived, the French thought it best to retreat on the following day.
There was not now a single obstacle to the union of the two Austrian
armies; and on November ninth, Alvinczy started for Verona, where the
French had halted on the eighth. It looked as if Bonaparte would be
attacked on both flanks at once, and thus overwhelmed.
Verona lies on both banks of the river Adige, which is spanned by
several bridges; but the heart of the town is on the right. The
remains of Vaubois's army having been rallied at Rivoli, some miles
further up on that bank, Bonaparte made all possible use of the stream
as a natural fortification, and concentrated the remainder of his
forces on the same side. Alvinczy came up and occupied Caldiero,
situated on a gentle rise of the other shore to the south of east; but
the French division at Rivoli, which, by Bonaparte's drastic methods,
had been thoroughly shamed, and was now thirsty for revenge, held
Davidowich in check. He had remained some distance farther back to the
north, where it was expected he would cross and come down on the left
bank. To prevent this a fierce onslaught was made against Alvinczy's
position on November twelfth, by Masséna's corps. It was entirely
unsuccessful, and the French were repulsed with the serious loss of
three thousand men. Bonaparte's position was now even more critical
than it had been at Castiglione; he had to contend with two new
Austrian armies, one on each flank, and Wurmser with a third stood
ready to sally out of Mantua in his rear. If there should be even
partial coöperation between the Austrian leaders, he must retreat. But
he felt sure there would be no coöperation whatsoever. From the force
in Verona and that before Mantua twenty thousand men were gathered to
descend the course of the Adige into the swampy lands about Ronco,
where a crossing was to be made and Alvinczy caught, if possible, at
Villanova, on his left flank. This turning manoeuver, though highly
dangerous, was fairly successful, and is considered by critics among
the finest in this or any other of Bonaparte's campaigns. Amid these
swamps, ditches, and dikes the methodical Austrians, aiming to carry
strong positions by one fierce onset, were brought into the greatest
disadvantage before the new tactics of swift movement in open columns,
which were difficult to assail. By a feint of retreat to the westward
the French army had left Verona without attracting attention, but by a
swift countermarch it reached Ronco on the morning of November
fifteenth, crossed in safety, and turned back to flank the Austrian
position.
The first stand of the enemy was made at Arcola, where a short, narrow
bridge connects the high dikes which regulate the sluggish stream of
the little river Alpon, a tributary of the Adige on its left bank.
This bridge was defended by two battalions of Croatian recruits,
whose commander, Colonel Brigido, had placed a pair of field-pieces so
as to enfilade it. The French had been advancing in three columns by
as many causeways, the central one of which led to the bridge. The
first attempt to cross was repulsed by the deadly fire which the
Croats poured in from their sheltered position. Augereau, with his
picked corps, fared no better in a second charge led by himself
bearing the standard; and, in a third disastrous rush, Bonaparte, who
had caught up the standard and planted it on the bridge with his own
hand, was himself swept back into a quagmire, where he would have
perished but for a fourth return of the grenadiers, who drove back the
pursuing Austrians, and pulled their commander from the swamp. Fired
by his undaunted courage, the gallant lines were formed once more. At
that moment another French corps passed over lower down by pontoons,
and the Austrians becoming disorganized, in spite of the large
reinforcements which had come up under Alvinczy, the last charge on
the bridge was successful. With the capture of Arcola the French
turned their enemy's rear, and cut off not only his artillery, but his
reserves in the valley of the Brenta. The advantage, however, was
completely destroyed by the masterly retreat of Alvinczy from his
position at Caldiero, effected by other causeways and another bridge
further north, which the French had not been able to secure in time.
Bonaparte quickly withdrew to Ronco, and recrossed the Adige to meet
an attack which he supposed Davidowich, having possibly forced
Vaubois's position, would then certainly make. But that general was
still in his old place, and gave no signs of activity. This movement
misled Alvinczy, who, thinking the French had started from Mantua,
returned by way of Arcola to pursue them. Again the French commander
led his forces across the Adige into the swampy lowlands. His enemy
had not forgotten the desperate fight at the bridge, and was timid;
and besides, in his close formation, he was on such ground no match
for the open ranks of the French. Retiring without any real resistance
as far as Arcola, the Austrians made their stand a second time in that
red-walled burg. Bonaparte could not well afford another direct
attack, with its attendant losses, and strove to turn the position by
fording the Alpon where it flows into the Adige. He failed, and
withdrew once more to Ronco, the second day remaining indecisive. On
the morning of the seventeenth, however, with undiminished fertility
of resource, a new plan was adopted and successfully carried out. One
of the pontoons on the Adige sank, and a body of Austrians charged the
small division stationed on the left bank to guard it, in the hope of
destroying the remainder of the bridge. They were repulsed and driven
back toward the marshes with which they meant to cover their flank.
The garrisons of both Arcola and Porcil, a neighboring hamlet, were
seriously weakened by the detention of this force. Two French
divisions were promptly despatched to make use of that advantage,
while at the same time an ambuscade was laid among the pollard willows
which lined the ditches beyond the retreating Austrians. At an
opportune moment the ambuscade unmasked, and by a terrible fire drove
three thousand of the Croatian recruits into the marsh, where most of
them were drowned or shot. Advancing then beyond the Alpon by a bridge
built during the previous night, Bonaparte gave battle on the high
ground to an enemy whose numbers were now, as he calculated, reduced
to a comparative equality with his own. The Austrians made a vigorous
resistance; but such was their credulity as to anything their enemy
might do, that a simple stratagem of the French made them believe that
their left was turned by a division, when in reality but twenty-five
men had been sent to ride around behind the swamps and blow their
bugles. Being simultaneously attacked on the front of the same wing by
Augereau, they drew off at last in good order toward Montebello.
Thence Alvinczy slowly retreated into the valley of the Brenta. The
French returned to Verona. Davidowich, ignorant of all that had
occurred, now finally dislodged Vaubois; but, finding before him
Masséna with his division where he had expected Alvinczy and a great
Austrian army, he discreetly withdrew into the Tyrol. It was not until
November twenty-third, long after the departure of both his
colleagues, that Wurmser made a brilliant but of course ineffectual
sally from Mantua. The French were so exhausted, and the Austrians so
decimated and scattered, that by tacit consent hostilities were
intermitted for nearly two months.