PART I.

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KNOW THE TRUTH;

A CRITIQUE ON THE HAMILTONIAN THEORY OF LIMITATION,

INCLUDING

SOME STRICTURES UPON THE THEORIES OF REV. HENRY L. MANSEL AND

MR. HERBERT SPENCER

BY JESSE H. JONES

"Give me to see, that I may know where to strike."

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED FOR THE AUTHOR BY HURD AND HOUGHTON.

BOSTON: NICHOLS AND NOYES

1865.

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1865, by JESSE

H. JONES, in the Clerk's Office of the District Court for the

Southern District of New York.

RIVERSIDE, CAMBRIDGE:

STEREOTYPED AND PRINTED BY

H. O. HOUGHTON AND COMPANY.

Dedication.

TO MY FELLOW-STUDENTS AND FRIENDS OF ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL

SEMINARY WHO HAVE READ MANSEL AND REJECTED HIS TEACHINGS,

This Little Treatise

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED BY

_THE AUTHOR_.

PREFACE.

This book has been written simply in the interest of Truth. It was

because the doctrines of the Hamiltonian School were believed to be

dangerous errors, which this process of thought exposes, that it was

undertaken.

Logically, and in the final analysis, there can be but two systems of

philosophical theology in the world. The one will be Pantheism, or

Atheism,--both of which contain the same essential principle, but viewed

from different standpoints,--the other will be a pure Theism. In the

schools of Brahma and Buddh, or in the schools of Christ, the truth is

to be found. And this is so because every teacher is to be held

responsible for all which can be logically deduced from his system; and

every erroneous result which can be so deduced is decisive of the

presence of an error in principle in the foundation; and all schemes of

philosophy, by such a trial, are seen to be based on one of these two

classes of schools. Just here a quotation from Dr. Laurens Hickok's

"Rational Psychology" will be in point:

"Except as we determine the absolute to be personality wholly out of and

beyond all the conditions and modes of space and time, we can by no

possibility leave nature for the supernatural. The clear-sighted and

honest intellect, resting in this conclusion that the conditions of

space and time cannot be transcended, will be Atheistic; while the

deluded intellect, which has put the false play of the discursive

understanding in its abstract speculations for the decisions of an

all-embracing reason, and deems itself so fortunate as to have found a

deity within the modes of space and time, will be Pantheistic. The

Pantheism will be ideal and transcendent, when it reaches its

conclusions by a logical process in the abstract law of thought; and it

will be material and empiric, when it concludes from the fixed

connections of cause and effect in the generalized law of nature; but in

neither case is the Pantheism any other than Atheism, for the Deity,

circumscribed in the conditions of space and time with nature, is but

nature still, and, whether in abstract thought or generalized reality,

is no God."

The Hamiltonian system is logically Atheism. Perceiving that the Deity

cannot be found in Nature, it denies that he can be known at all. What

the mind cannot know at all, _it is irrational to believe_. If man

cannot _know that_ God is, and have a clear sight of his attributes as a

rational ground of confidence in what he says, it is the height of blind

credulity to believe in him. And more; if man cannot have such

knowledge, he has _no standard_ by which to measure teachings, and be

_sure_ he has the truth. Under such circumstances, faith is

_impossible_. Faith can only be based on _Reason_. If there is no

Reason, there can be no faith. Hence he who talks about faith, and

denies Reason, does not know what faith is. The logician rightfully held

that God could not be found in Nature; but he was just as wrong in

asserting that man is wholly in Nature and cannot know God, as he was

right in the former instance. The acceptance of his one truth, and one

error, compels man to be an Atheist; because then he has no faculty by

which to know aught of God; and few thorough men will accept blind

credulity as the basis of Religion.

The author's sense of obligation to President Hickok cannot be too

strongly stated. But for his works, it is believed that this little

treatise could never have been written. Indeed, the author looks for but

scanty credit on the score of originality, since most of what he has

written he has learned, directly or indirectly, from that profound

thinker. He has deemed it his chief work, to apply the principles

developed by others to the exposure of a great error. And if he shall be

judged to have accomplished this, his ambition will have been satisfied.

After the substance of this treatise had been thought out, and while the

author was committing it to paper, the essays on "Space and Time," and

on "The Philosophy of the Unconditioned," in the numbers of the "North

American Review" for July and October, 1864, happened to fall under his

notice. Some persons will appreciate the delight and avidity with which

he read them; and how grateful it was to an obscure student, almost

wholly isolated in the world, to find the views which he had wrought out

in his secluded chamber, so ably advocated in the leading review of his

country. Not that he had gone as far, or examined the subjects in hand

as thoroughly as has been there done. By no means. Rather what results

he had attained accord with some of those therein laid down. Of those

essays it is not too much to say, that, if they have not exhausted the

topics of which they treat, they have settled forever the conclusions to

be reached, and leave for other writers only illustration and comment.

If the author shall seem to differ from them on a minor question,--that

of quantitative infinity,--the difference will, it is believed, be found

to be one of the form of expression only. And the difference is

maintained from the conviction that no term in science should have more

than one signification. It is better to adopt illimitable and

indivisible, as the technical epithets of Space, in place of the

commonly used terms infinite and absolute.

A metaphysical distinction has been incidentally touched upon in the

following discussion, which deserves a more extensive consideration than

the scope and plan of this work would permit to it here; and which, so

far as the author's limited reading goes, has received very little

attention from modern writers on metaphysics. He refers to the

distinction between the animal nature and spiritual person, so

repeatedly enounced by that profound metaphysical theologian, the

apostle Paul, and by that pure spiritual pastor, the apostle John, in

the terms "flesh" and "spirit." The thinkers of the world, even the best

Christian philosophers, seem to have esteemed this a moral and religious

distinction, and no more, when in fact it cleaves down through the whole

human being, and forms the first great radical division in any proper

analysis of man's soul, and classification of his constituent elements.

_This is a purely natural division._ It is organic in man. It belonged

as much to Adam in his purity, as it does to the most degraded wretch on

the globe now. It is of such a character that, had it been properly

understood and developed, the Hamiltonian system of philosophy could

never have been constructed.

An adequate statement of the truth would be conducted as follows. First,

the animal nature should be carefully analyzed, its province accurately

defined, and both the laws and forms of its activity exactly stated.

Second, a like examination of the spiritual person should follow; and

third, the relations, interactions, and influences of the two parts upon

each other should be, as extensively as possible, presented. But it is

to be remarked, that, while the analysis, by the human intellect, of

these two great departments of man's soul, may be exhaustive, it is

doubtful if any but the All-seeing Eye can read all their relations and

inter-communications. The development of the third point, by any one

mind, must needs, therefore, be partial. Whether any portion of the

above designated labor shall be hereafter entered upon, will depend upon

circumstances beyond control of the writer.

As will appear, it is believed, in the development of the subject, the

great, the _vital_ point upon which the whole controversy with the

Hamiltonian school must turn, is a question of _fact_; viz., whether man

has a Reason, as the faculty giving _a priori_ principles, or not. If he

has such a Reason, then by it the questions now at issue can be settled,

and that finally. If he has no Reason, then he can have no knowledge,

except of appearances and events, as perceived by the Sense and judged

by the Understanding. Until, then, the question of fact is decided, it

would be a gain if public attention was confined wholly to it. Establish

first a well ascertained and sure foundation before erecting a

superstructure.

The method adopted in constructing this treatise does not admit the

presentation of the matter in a symmetrical form. On the contrary, it

involves some, perhaps many, repetitions. What has been said at one

point respecting one author must be said again in reply to another. Yet

the main object for which the work was undertaken could, it seemed, be

thoroughly accomplished in no other way.

The author has in each case used American editions of the works named.

KNOW THE TRUTH.

PART I.

THE SEEKING AND THE FINDING.

In April, 1859, there was republished in Boston, from an English print,

a volume entitled "The Limits of Religious Thought Examined," &c., "by

Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D."

The high position occupied by the publishers,--a firm of Christian

gentlemen, who, through a long career in the publication of books either

devoutly religious, or, at least, having a high moral tone, and being

marked by deep, earnest thought, have obtained the confidence of the

religious community; the recommendations with which its advent was

heralded, but most of all the intrinsic importance of the theme

announced, and its consonance with many of the currents of mental

activity in our midst,--gave the book an immediate and extensive

circulation. Its subject lay at the foundation of all religious, and

especially of all theological thinking. The author, basing his teaching

on certain metaphysical tenets, claimed to have circumscribed the

boundary to all positive, and so valid effort of the human intellect in

its upward surging towards the Deity, and to have been able to say,

"Thus far canst thou come, and no farther, and here must thy proud waves

be stayed." And this effort was declaredly made in the interest of

religion. It was asserted that from such a ground only, as was therein

sought to be established, could infidelity be successfully assailed and

destroyed. Moreover, the writer was a learned and able divine in the

Anglican Church, orthodox in his views; and his volume was composed of

lectures delivered upon what is known as "The Bampton Foundation;"--a

bequest of a clergyman, the income of which, under certain rules, he

directed should be employed forever, in furthering the cause of Christ,

by Divinity Lecture Sermons in Oxford. Such a book, on such a theme, by

such a man, and composed under such auspices, would necessarily receive

the almost universal attention of religious thinkers, and would mark an

era in human thought. Such was the fact in this country. New England,

the birthplace and home of American Theology, gave it her most careful

and studious examination. And the West alike with the East pored over

its pages, and wrought upon its knotty questions. Clergymen especially,

and theological students, perused it with the earnestness of those who

search for hid treasures. And what was the result? We do not hesitate to

say that it was unqualified rejection. The book now takes its place

among religious productions, not as a contribution to our positive

knowledge, not as a practicable new road, surveyed out through the

Unknown Regions of Thought, but rather as possessing only a negative

value, as a monument of warning, erected at that point on the roadside

where the writer branched off in his explorations, and on which is

inscribed, "In this direction the truth cannot be found."

The stir which this book produced, naturally brought prominently to

public attention a writer heretofore not extensively read in this

country, Sir William Hamilton, upon whose metaphysical teachings the

lecturer avowedly based his whole scheme. The doctrines of the

metaphysician were subjected to the same scrutinizing analysis, which

dissolved the enunciations of the divine; and they, like these, were

pronounced "wanting." This decision was not reached or expressed in any

extensive and exhaustive criticism of these writers; in which the errors

of their principles and the revolting nature of the results they

attained, were presented; but it rather was a shoot from the spontaneous

and deep-seated conviction, that the whole scheme, of both teacher and

pupil, was utterly insufficient to satisfy the craving of man's highest

nature. It was rejected because it _could_ not be received.

Something more than a year ago, and while the American theological mind,

resting in the above-stated conviction, was absorbed in the tremendous

interests connected with the Great Rebellion, a new aspirant for honors

appeared upon the stage. A book was published entitled "The Philosophy

of Herbert Spencer: First Principles." This was announced as the

foundation of a new system of Philosophy, which would command the

confidence of the present, and extort the wonder of all succeeding ages.

Avowing the same general principles with Mansel and Hamilton, this

writer professed to have found a radical defect in their system, which

being corrected, rendered that system complete and final; so that, from

it as a base, he sets out to construct a new scheme of Universal

Science. This man, too, has been read, not so extensively as his

predecessors; because when one has seen a geometrical absurdity

demonstrated, he does not care, unless from professional motives, to

examine and disprove further attempts to bolster up the folly; but still

so widely read, as to be generally associated with the other writers

above mentioned, and, like them, rejected. Upon being examined, he is

found to be a man of less scope and mental muscle than either of his

teachers; yet going over the same ground and expressing the same ideas,

scarcely in new language even; and it further appears that his discovery

is made at the expense of his logic and consistency, and involves an

unpardonable contradiction. Previous to the publication of the books

just mentioned, an American writer had submitted to the world a system

of thought upon the questions of which they treat, which certainly

seems worthy of some notice from their authors. Yet it has received

none. To introduce him we must retrace our steps for a little.

In 1848, Laurens P. Hickok, then a Professor in Auburn Theological

Seminary, published a work entitled "Rational Psychology," in which he

professed to establish, by _a priori_ processes, positions which, if

true, afford a ground for the answer, at once and forever, of all the

difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his school. Being

comparatively a new writer, his work attracted only a moiety of the

attention it should have done. It was too much like Analytical Geometry

and Calculus for the popular mind, or even for any but a few patient

thinkers. For them it was marrow and fatness.

Since the followers of Sir William Hamilton, whom we will hereafter term

Limitists, have neglected to take the great truths enunciated by the

American metaphysician, and apply them to their own system, and so be

convinced by their own study of the worthlessness of that system, it

becomes their opponents, in the interest of truth, to perform this work

in their stead; viz., upon the basis of immutable truth, to unravel each

of their well-knit sophistries, to show to the world that it may "_know

the truth_;" and thus to destroy a system which, if allowed undisputed

sway, would sap the very foundations of Christian faith.

The philosophical system of the Limitists is built upon a single

fundamental proposition, which carries all their deductions with it. He

who would strike these effectually, must aim his blow, and give it with

all his might, straight at that one object; sure that if he destroys

that, the destruction of the whole fabric is involved therein. But, as

the Limitists are determined not to confess the dissolution of their

scheme, by the simple establishment of principles, which they cannot

prove false, and which, if true, involve the absurdity of their own

tenets, it is further necessary to go through their writings, and

examine them passage by passage, and show the fallacy of each. In the

former direction we can but re-utter some of the principles of the great

American teacher. In the latter there is room for new effort; and this

shall be our especial province.

The proposition upon which the whole scheme of the Limitists is founded,

was originally enunciated by Sir William Hamilton, in the following

terms. "The Unconditioned is incognizable and inconceivable; its notion

being only negative of the conditioned, which last can alone be

positively known or conceived." "In our opinion, the mind can conceive,

and consequently can know, only the _limited and the conditionally

limited_. The unconditionally unlimited, or the Infinite, the

unconditionally limited, or the Absolute, cannot positively be construed

to the mind; they can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or

abstraction of, those very conditions under which thought itself is

realized; consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only

negative--negative of the conceivable itself. For example, on the one

hand we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole, that is, a

whole so great, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative part of a

still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so small,

that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible into

smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent, or

realize, or construe to the mind, (as here understanding and imagination

coincide,) an infinite whole, for this could only be done by the

infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes, which would itself

require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same

reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of

parts.... As the conditionally limited (which we may briefly call the

conditioned) is thus the only possible object of knowledge, and of

positive thought--thought necessarily supposes conditions. _To think_ is

_to condition_; and conditional limitation is the fundamental law of the

possibility of thought." ... "The conditioned is the mean between two

extremes--two inconditionates, exclusive of each other, neither of

which _can be conceived as possible_, but of which, on the principles of

contradiction and excluded middle, one _must be admitted as necessary_."

This theory may be epitomized as follows:--"The Unconditioned denotes

the genus of which the Infinite and Absolute are the species." This

genus is inconceivable, is "negative of the conceivable itself." Hence

both the species must be so also. Although they are thus incognizable,

they may be defined; the one, the Infinite, as "that which is beyond all

limits;" the other, the Absolute, as "a whole beyond all conditions:"

or, concisely, the one is illimitable immensity, the other,

unconditional totality. As defined, these are seen to be "mutually

repugnant:" that is, if there is illimitable immensity, there cannot be

absolute totality; and the reverse. Within these two all possible being

is included; and, because either excludes the other, it can be in only

one. Since both are inconceivable we can never know in which the

conditioned or conceivable being is. Either would give us a

being--God--capable of accounting for the Universe. This fact is assumed

to be a sufficient ground for faith; and man may therefore rationally

satisfy himself with the study of those matters which are

cognizable--the conditioned.

It is not our purpose at this point to enter upon a criticism of the

philosophical theory thus enounced. This will fall, in the natural

course, upon a subsequent page. We have stated it here, for the purpose

of placing in that strong light which it deserves, another topic, which

has received altogether too little attention from the opponents of the

Limitists. Underlying and involved in the above theory, there is a

question of _fact_, of the utmost importance. Sir William Hamilton's

metaphysic rests upon his psychology; and if his psychology is true, his

system is impregnable. It is his diagnosis of the human mind, then,

which demands our attention. He has presented this in the following

passage:--

"While we regard as conclusive Kant's analysis of Time and Space into

conditions of thought, we cannot help viewing his deduction of the

'Categories of Understanding' and the 'Ideas of Speculative Reason' as

the work of a great but perverse ingenuity. The categories of

understanding are merely subordinate forms of the conditioned. Why not,

therefore, generalize the _Conditioned--Existence Conditioned_, as the

supreme category, or categories, of thought?--and if it were necessary

to analyze this form into its subaltern applications, why not develop

these immediately out of the generic principle, instead of

preposterously, and by a forced and partial analogy, deducing the laws

of the understanding from a questionable division of logical

proposition? Why distinguish Reason (Vernunft) from Understanding

(Verstand), simply on the ground that the former is conversant about, or

rather tends toward, the unconditioned; when it is sufficiently

apparent, that the unconditioned is conceived as the negation of the

conditioned, and also that the conception of contradictories is one? In

the Kantian philosophy, both faculties perform the same function, both

seek the one in the many;--the Idea (Idee) is only the Concept (Begriff)

sublimated into the inconceivable; Reason only the Understanding which

has 'overleaped itself.'"

Not stopping now to correct the entirely erroneous statement that "both

faculties," _i. e._, Understanding and Reason, "perform the same

function," we are to notice the two leading points which are made,

viz.:--1. That there is no distinction between the Understanding and the

Reason; or, in other words, there is no such faculty as the Reason is

claimed to be, there is none but the Understanding; and, 2. A

generalization is the highest form of human knowledge; both of which may

be comprised in one affirmation; the Understanding is the highest

faculty of knowledge belonging to the human soul. Upon this, a class of

thinkers, following Plato and Kant, take issue with the logician, and

assert that the distinction between the two faculties named above, has a

substantial basis; that, in fact, they are different in _kind_, and that

the mode of activity in the one is wholly unlike the mode of activity

in the other. Thus, then, is the great issue between the Hamiltonian and

Platonic schools made upon a question of _fact_. He who would attack the

former school successfully, must aim his blow straight at their

fundamental assumption; and he who shall establish the fact of the Pure

Reason as an unquestionable faculty in the human soul, will, in such

establishment, accomplish the destruction of the Hamiltonian system of

philosophy. Believing this system to be thoroughly vicious in its

tendencies; being such indeed, as would, if carried out, undermine the

whole Christian religion; and what is of equal importance, being false

to the facts in man's soul as God's creature, the writer will attempt to

achieve the just named and so desirable result; and by the mode

heretofore indicated.

It is required, then, to _prove_ that there is a faculty belonging to

the human soul, essentially diverse from the Sense or the Understanding;

a faculty peculiar and unique, which possesses such qualities as have

commonly been ascribed by its advocates to the Pure Reason; and thereby

to establish such faculty as a fact, and under that name.

Previous to bringing forward any proofs, it is important to make an

exact statement of what is to be proved. To this end, let the following

points be noted:--

_a._ Its modes of activity are essentially diverse from those of the

Sense or Understanding. The Sense is only capacity. According to the

laws of its construction, it receives impressions from objects, either

material, and so in a different place from that which it occupies, or

imaginary, and so proceeding from the imaging faculty in itself. But it

is only capacity to receive and transmit impressions. The Understanding,

though more than this, even faculty, is faculty shut within the limits

of the Sense. According to its laws, it takes up the presentations of

the Sense, analyzes and classifies them, and deduces conclusions: but it

can attain to nothing more than was already in the objects presented. It

can construct a system; it cannot develop a science. It can observe a

relation it cannot intuit a law. What we seek is capacity, but of

another and higher kind from that of the Sense. Sense can have no object

except such, at least, as is constructed out of impressions received

from without. What we seek does not observe outside phenomena; and can

have no object except as inherent within itself. It is faculty moreover,

but not faculty walled in by the Sense. It is faculty and capacity in

one, which, possessing inherent within itself, as objects, the _a

priori_ conditional laws of the Universe, and the _a priori_ conditional

ideal forms which these laws, standing together according to their

necessary relations, compose, transcends, in its activity and

acquisitions, all limitations of a _Nature_; and attends to objects

which belong to the Supernatural, and hence which absoluteness

qualifies. We observe, therefore,

_b._ The objects of its activity are also essentially diverse in kind

from those of the Sense and the Understanding. All the objects of the

Sense must come primarily or secondarily, from a material Universe; and

the discussions and conclusions of the Understanding must refer to such

a Universe. The faculty which we seek must have for its objects, _laws_,

or, if the term suit better, first principles, which are reasons why

conduct must be one way, and not another; which, in their combinations,

compose the forms conditional for all activity; and which, therefore,

constitute within us an _a priori_ standard by which to determine the

validity of all judgments. To illustrate. Linnaeus constructed a system

of botanical classification, upon the basis of the number of stamens in

a flower. This was satisfactory to the Sense and the Understanding.

Later students have, however, discovered that certain _organic laws_

extend as a framework through the whole vegetable kingdom; which, once

seen, throw back the Linnaean system into company with the Ptolemaic

Astronomy; and upon which laws a _science_ of Botany becomes possible.

That faculty which intuits these laws, is called the Pure Reason.

To recapitulate. What we seek is, in its modes and objects of activity,

diverse from the Sense and Understanding. It is at once capacity and

faculty, having as object first principles, possessing these as an

_inherent heritage_, and able to compare with them as standard all

objects of the Sense and judgments of the Understanding; and to decide

thereby their validity. These principles, and combinations of

principles, are known as _Ideas_, and, being innate, are denominated

_innate Ideas_. It is their reality which Sir William Hamilton denies,

declaring them to be only higher generalizations of the Understanding,

and it is the faculty called the Pure Reason, in which they are supposed

to inhere, whose actuality is now to be proved.

The effort to do this will be successful if it can be shown that the

logician's statement of the facts is partial, and essentially defective;

what are the phenomena which cannot be comprehended in his scheme; and,

finally, that they can be accounted for on no other ground than that

stated.

1. The statement of facts by the Limitists is partial and essentially

defective. They start with the assumption that a generalization is the

highest form of human knowledge. To appreciate this fully, let us

examine the process they thus exalt. A generalization is a process of

thought through which one advances from a discursus among facts, to a

conclusion, embodying a seemingly general truth, common to all the facts

of the class. For instance. The inhabitants of the north temperate zone

have long observed it to be a fact, that north winds are cold; and so

have arrived at the general conclusion that such winds will lower the

temperature. A more extensive experience teaches them, however, that in

the south temperate zone, north winds are warm, and their judgment has

to be modified accordingly. A yet larger investigation shows that, at

one period in geologic history, north winds, even in northern climes,

were warm, and that tropical animals flourished in arctic regions; and

the judgment is again modified. Now observe this most important fact

here brought out. _Every judgment may be modified by a larger

experience._ Apply this to another class of facts. An apple is seen to

fall when detached from the parent stem. An arrow, projected into the

air, returns again. An invisible force keeps the moon in its orbit.

Other like phenomena are observed; and, after patient investigation, it

is found to be a fact, that there is a force in the system to which our

planet belongs, which acts in a ratio inverse to the square of the

distance, and which thus binds it together. But if a generalization is

the highest form of knowledge, we can never be sure we are right, for a

subsequent experience may teach us the reverse. We know we have not _all

the facts_. We may again find that the north wind is elsewhere, or was

once here, warm. Should a being come flying to us from another sphere so

distant, that the largest telescope could catch no faintest ray, even,

of its shining, and testify to us that there, the force we called

gravitation, was inversely as the _cube_ of the distance, we could only

accept the testimony, and modify our judgment accordingly. Conclusions

of to-day may be errors to-morrow; and we can never know we are right.

The Limitists permit us only interminable examinations of interminable

changes in phenomena; which afford no higher result than a new basis for

new studies.

From this wearisome, Io-like wandering, the soul returns to itself,

crying its wailing cry, "Is this true? Is this all?" when suddenly, as

if frenzied by the presence of a god, it shouts exultingly "The truth!

the truth! I see the eternal truth."

The assumption of the Limitists is not all the truth. Their diagnosis is

both defective and false. It is defective, in that they have failed to

perceive those qualities of _universality_ and _necessity_, which most

men instinctively accord to certain perceptions of the mind; and false,

in that they deny the reality of those qualities, and of the certain

perceptions as modified by them, and the actuality of that mental

faculty which gives the perceptions, and thus qualified. They state a

part of the truth, and deny a part. The whole truth is, the mind both

generalizes and intuits.

It is the _essential_ tenet of their whole scheme, that the human mind

nowhere, and under no circumstance, makes an affirmation which it

unreservedly qualifies as necessary and universal. Their doctrine is,

that these affirmations _seem_ to be such, but that a searching

examination shows this seeming to be only a bank of fog. For instance.

The mind seems to affirm that two and two _must_ make four. "Not so,"

says the Limitist. "As a fact, we see that two and two do make four, but

it may make five, or any other sum. For don't you see? if two and two

must make four, then the Infinite must see it so; and if he must see it

so, he is thereby conditioned; and what is worse, we know just as much

about it as he does." In reply to all such quibbles, it is to be

said,--there is no seeming about it! If the mind is not utterly

mendacious, it affirms, positively and unreservedly, "Two and two are

four, _must_ be four; and to see it so, _is conditional for_ ALL

_intellect_." Take another illustration. The mind instinctively, often

unconsciously, always compulsorily, affirms that the sentiment, In

society the rights of the individual can never trench upon the rights of

the body politic,--is a necessary, and universally applicable principle;

which, however much it may be violated, can never be changed. The whole

fabric of society is based upon this. Could a mind think this away, it

could not construct a practical system of society upon what would be

left,--its negation. But the Limitists step in here, and say, "All this

seems so, perhaps, but then the mind is so weak, that it can never be

sure. You must modify (correct?) this seeming, by the consideration

that, if it is so, then the Infinite must know it so, and the finite and

Infinite must know it alike, and the Infinite will be limited and

conditioned thereby, which would be impious." Again, the intellect

unreservedly asserts, "There is no seeming in the matter. The utterance

is true, absolutely and universally true, and every intellect _must_ see

it so."

Illustrations like the above might be drawn from every science of which

the human mind is cognizant. But more are not needed. Enough has been

adduced to establish the _fact_ of those qualities, universality and

necessity, as inherent in certain mental affirmations. Having thus

pointed out the essential defect of the logician's scheme, it is

required to state:

2. What the phenomena are which cannot be comprehended therein.

In general, it may be said that all those perceptions and assertions of

the mind, which are instinctive, and which it involuntarily qualifies as

universal and necessary, are not, and cannot be comprehended in Sir

William Hamilton's scheme. To give an exhaustive presentation of all the

_a priori_ laws of the mind, would be beyond the scope of the present

undertaking, and would be unnecessary to its success. This will be

secured by presenting a classification of them, and sufficient examples

under each class. Moreover, to avoid a labor which would not be in place

here, we shall attempt no new classification; but shall accept without

question, as ample for our purpose, that set forth by one of our purest

and every way best thinkers,--Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of

Williams College, Mass.

"The ideas and beliefs which come to us thus, may be divided into,

first, mathematical ideas and axioms. These are at the foundation of the

abstract sciences, having for their subject, quantity. In the second

division are those which pertain to mere being and its relations. Upon

these rest all sciences pertaining to actual being and its relations.

The third division comprises those which pertain to beauty. These are at

the foundation of aesthetical science. In the fourth division are those

which pertain to morals and religion. Of these the pervading element is

the sense of obligation or duty. Of this the idea necessarily arises in

connection with the choice by a rational being of a supreme end, and

with the performance of actions supposed to bear upon that."--_Moral

Science_, p. 161.

First.--Mathematical ideas and axioms.

Take, for instance, the multiplication table. Can any one, except a

Limitist, be induced to believe that it was originally _constructed_;

that a will put it together, and might take it apart? Seven times seven

now make forty-nine. Will any one say that it might have been made to

make forty-seven; or that at some future time such may be the case? Or

again, take the axiom "Things which are equal to the same thing are

equal to one another." Will some one say, that the intellectual beings

in the universe might, with equal propriety, have been so constructed as

to affirm that, in some instances, things which are equal to the same

thing are _unequal_ to one another? Or consider the properties of a

triangle. Will our limitist teachers instruct us that these properties

are a matter of indifference; that for aught we know, the triangle might

have been made to have three right angles? Yet again. Examine the

syllogism. Was its law constructed?

All M is X;

All Z is M;

All Z is X.

Will any one say that _perhaps_, we don't know but it might have been so

made, as to appear to us that the conclusion was Some Z is not X? Or

will the Limitists run into that miserable petty subterfuge of an

assertion, "All this _seems_ to us as it is, and we cannot see how it

could be different; but then, our minds are so feeble, they are confined

in such narrow limits, that it would be the height of presumption to

assert positively with regard to stronger minds, and those of wider

scope? Perhaps they see things differently." _Perhaps_ they do; but if

they do, their minds or ours falsify! The question is one of _veracity_,

nothing more. Throughout all the range of mathematics, the positive and

_unqualified_ affirmation of the mind is that its intuitions are

absolute and universal; that they are _a priori_ laws conditional of

_all_ intellect; that of the Deity just as much as that of man.

Feebleness and want of scope have nothing to do with mind in its

affirmation, "Seven times seven _must_ make forty-nine; _and cannot by

any possibility of effort make any other product_;" and every intellect,

_if it sees at all, must see it so_. And so on through the catalogue.

From this, it follows in this instance, that human knowledge is

_exhaustive_, and so is exactly similar, and equal to the Deity's

knowledge.

Second. Those ideas and beliefs which pertain to mere being and its

relations.

Take, for instance, the axiom, A material body cannot exist in the

Universe without standing in some relation to all the other material

bodies in that Universe. Either this is absolutely true, or it is not.

If it is so true, then every intellectual being to whom it presents

itself as object at all, must see it as every other does. One may see

more relations than another; but the axiom in its intrinsic nature must

be seen alike by all. If it is not absolutely true, then the converse,

or any partially contradictory proposition, may be true. For example. A

material body may exist in the Universe, and stand in no relation to

some of the other material bodies in that Universe. But, few men will

hesitate to say, that this is not only utterly unthinkable, but that it

could only become thinkable by a denial and destruction of the laws of

thought; or, in other words, by the stultification of the mind.

Take another instance, arising from the fact of parentage and offspring,

in the sentient beings of the world. A pair, no matter to what class

they belong, by the fact of becoming parents, establish a new relation

for themselves; and, "after their kind," they are under bonds to their

young. And, to a greater or less extent, their young have a claim upon

them. As we ascend in the scale of being, the duty imposed is greater,

and the claim of the offspring stronger. Whether it be the fierce eagle,

or the timid dove, or the chirping sparrow; whether it be the prowling

lion, or the distrustful deer, or the cowering hare; or whether it be

the races of man who are examined, the relations established by

parentage are everywhere recognized. Now, will one say that all this

might be changed for aught we know; that, what we call law, is only a

judgment of mankind; and so that this relation did not exist at first,

but was the product of growth? And will one further say that there is no

necessity or universality in this relation; but that the races might,

for aught we know, have just as well been established with a parentage

which involved no relation at all; that the fabled indifference of the

ostrich, intensified a hundredfold, might have been the law of sentient

being? Yet such results logically flow from the principles of the

Limitists. Precisely the same line of argument might be pursued

respecting the laws of human society. But it is not needed here. It is

evident now, that what gives validity to judgments _is the fact that

they accord with an a priori principle in the mind_.

Third. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to beauty. A science of

beauty has not yet been sufficiently developed to permit of so extensive

an illustration of this class as the others. Yet enough is established

for our purpose. Let us consider beauty as in proportioned form. It is

said that certain Greek mathematicians, subsequently to the Christian

era, studied out a mathematical formula for the human body, and

constructed a statue according to it; and that both were pronounced at

the time _perfect_. Both statue and formula are now lost. Be the story

true, or a legend, there is valid ground for the assertion, that the

mind instinctively assumes, in all its criticisms, the axiom, There is a

perfect ideal by which as standard, all art must be judged. The very

fact that the mind, though acknowledging the imperfection of its own

ideal, unconsciously asserts, that somewhere, in some mind, there is an

ideal, in which a perfect hand joins a perfect arm, and a perfect foot a

perfect leg, and these a perfect trunk; and a perfect neck supports a

perfect head, adorned by perfect features, and thus there is a perfect

ideal, is _decisive_ that such an ideal exists. And this conclusion is

true, because God who made us, and constructed the ground from whence

this instinctive affirmation springs, is true.

Take another instance. Few men, who have studied Gothic spires, have

failed to observe that the height of some, in proportion to their base,

is too great, and that of others, too small. The mind irresistibly

affirms, that between these opposite imperfections, there is a golden

mean, at which the proportion shall be _perfect_. When the formula of

this proportion shall be studied out, any workman, who is skilled with

tools, can construct a perfect spire. The law once discovered and

promulgated, becomes common knowledge. Mechanical skill will be all that

can differentiate one workman from another. The fact that the law has

not been discovered yet, throws no discredit upon the positive

affirmation of the mind, that there must be such a law; any more than

the fact of Newton's ignorance of the law of gravitation, when he saw

the apple fall, discredited his instinctive affirmation, upon seeing

that phenomenon, there is a law in accordance with which it fell.

Now how comes the mind instinctively and positively to make these

assertions. If they were judgments, the mind would only speak of

probabilities; but here, it qualifies the assertion with necessity. Men,

however positive in their temperament, do not say, "I know it will rain

to-morrow," but only, "In all probability it will." Not so here. Here

the mind refuses to express itself doubtfully. Its utterance is the

extreme of positiveness. It says _must_. And if its affirmation is not

true, then there is no _reason_ why those works of art which are held in

highest esteem, should be adjudged better than the efforts of the tyro,

except the whim of the individual, or the arbitrary determination of

their admirers.

Fourth. The ideas and beliefs which pertain to morals and religion.

We now enter a sphere of which no understanding could by any possibility

ever guess, much less investigate. Here no sense could ever penetrate;

there is no object for it to perceive. Here all judgments are

impertinent; for in this sphere are only laws, and duties, and

obligations. An understanding cannot "conceive" of a moral law, because

such a law is inconceivable; and it cannot perceive one, because it has

no eye. If it were competent to explain every phenomenon in the other

classes, it would be utterly impotent to explain a single phenomenon in

this. What is moral obligation? Whence does it arise, or how is it

imposed? and who will enforce it, and how will it be enforced? All

these, and numerous such other questions, cannot be raised even by the

Understanding, much less answered by it. The moral law of the Universe

is one which can be learned from no judgment, or combination of

judgments. It can be learned only by being _seen_. The moral law is no

conclusion, which may be modified by a subsequent experience. It is an

affirmation which is _imperative_. To illustrate. It is an axiom, that

the fact of free moral agency involves the fact of obligation. Man is a

free moral agent; and so, under the obligation imposed. At the first, it

was optional with the Deity whether he would create man or not. But will

any one assert that, having determined to create man such as he is, it

was optional with him, whether man should be under the obligation, or

not? Can man be a free moral agent, and be free from the duties inherent

therein? Does not the mind instinctively and necessarily affirm, that

the fact of free moral agency assures the fact of such a relation to

God's moral government, that obligation _must_ follow? One cannot

hesitate to say, that the formula, A free agent may be released from his

obligation to moral law, is absolutely unthinkable.

Again, no judgment can attain to the moral law of the Universe; and yet

man knows it. Jesus Christ, when he proclaimed that law in the words

"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy mind and strength, and

thy neighbor as thyself," only uttered what no man can, in thought,

deny. A man can no more think selfishness as the moral law of the

Universe, than he can think two and two to be five. Man not only sees

the law, but he feels and acknowledges the obligation, even in his

rebellion. In fact there would be no rebellion, no sense of sin, if

there were no obligation. Whence comes the authority of the law? No

power can give it authority, or enforce obedience. Power can crush a

Universe, it cannot change a heart. The law has, and can have authority;

it imposes, and can impose obligation; only because _it is an a priori

law of the Universe_, alike binding upon _all_ moral beings, upon God as

well as man; and is so seen immediately, and necessarily, by a direct

intuition. Man finds this law fundamental to his self; and as well, a

necessarily fundamental law of _all_ moral beings. _Therefore_ he

acknowledges it. And the very efforts he makes to set up a throne for

Passion, over against the throne of Benevolence, is an involuntary

acknowledgment of the authority of that law he seeks to rival.

It was said above, that neither Sense nor Understanding can take any

cognizance of the objects of investigation which fall in this class.

This is because the Sense can gather no material over which the

Understanding can run. Is the moral law matter? No. How then can the

Sense observe it? One answer may possibly be made, viz.: It is deduced

from the conduct of men; and sense observes that. To this it is replied

_a._ The allegation is not true. Most men violate the moral law of the

Universe. Their conduct accords with the law of selfishness. Such

conclusions as that of Hobbes, that war is the natural condition of

Society, are those which would follow from a consideration of man, as he

appears to the Sense.

_b._ If it were true, the question obtrudes itself,--How came it there?

_How came this fundamental law to be?_ and to this the Sense and

Understanding return no shadow of answer.

But from the stand-point of a Pure Reason, all is clear. All the ideas

and beliefs, every process of thought which belongs to this sphere, are

absolute and universal. They must be what they are; and so are

conditional of all moral beings. Here what the human mind sees, is just

what the Deity sees; and it sees just as the Divine mind sees, so that

the truth, as far as so seen, is _common_ to both.

Although the facts which have been adduced above, are inexplicable by

the Limitists, and are decisive of the actuality of the Reason, as it

has been heretofore described, yet another line of argument of great

wight must not be omitted. There are in language certain _positive_

terms, which the Limitists, and the advocates of the Reason agree in

asserting cannot convey any meaning to, or be explained by the Sense and

Understanding. Such are the words infinite and absolute. The mere

presence of such words in language, as positive terms, is a decisive

evidence of the fact, that there is also a faculty which entertains

positive ideas corresponding to them. Sir William Hamilton's position in

this matter, is not only erroneous, but astonishing. He asserts that

these words express only "negative notions." "They," the infinite and

absolute, "can be conceived only by a thinking away from, or abstraction

of, those very conditions under which thought itself is realized;

consequently, the notion of the Unconditioned is only negative--negative

of the conceivable itself." But, if this is true, how came these words

in the language at all? Negative ideas produce negative expressions.

Indeed, the Limitists are confidently challenged to designate another

case in language, in which a positive term can be alleged to have a

_purely_ negative signification. Take an illustration to which we shall

recur further on. The question has been raised, whether a sixth sense

can be. Can the Limitists find in language, or can they construct, a

positive term which will represent the negation of a sixth sense? We

find in language the positive terms, ear and hearing; but can such

positive terms be found, which will correspond to the phrase, no sixth

sense? In this instance, in physics, the absurdity is seen at once. Why

is not as readily seen the equal absurdity of affirming that, in

metaphysics, positive terms have grown up in the language which are

simple negations? Here, for the present, the presentation of facts may

rest. Let us recapitulate those which have been adduced. The axioms in

mathematics, the principles of the relations of being, the laws of

aesthetics, and most of all the whole system of principles pertaining to

morals and religion, standing, as they do, a series of mental

affirmations, which all mankind, except the Limitists, qualify as

necessary and universal, compel assent to the proposition, that

there must be a faculty different in kind from the Sense and

Understanding,--for these have already been found impotent--which can be

ground to account of all these facts satisfactorily. And the presence in

language of such positive terms as absolute and infinite, is a most

valuable auxiliary argument. The faculty which is required,--the faculty

which qualifies all the products of its activity with the

characteristics above named, is the Pure Reason. And its actuality may

therefore be deemed established.

The Pure Reason having thus been proved to be, it is next required to

show the mode of its activity. This can best be done, by first noticing

the _kind_ of results which it produces. The Reason gives us, not

thoughts, but ideas. These are simple, pure, primary, necessary. It is

evident that any such object of mental examination can be known only in,

and by, itself. It cannot be analyzed, for it is simple. It cannot be

compared, for it is pure; and so possesses no element which can be

ground for a comparison. It cannot be deduced, for it is primary and

necessary. _It can only be seen._ Such an object must be known under the

following circumstances. It must be inherent in the seeing faculty, and

must be _immediately and directly seen_ by that faculty; all this in

such a manner, that the abstraction of the object seen, would annihilate

the faculty itself. Now, how is it with the Reason? Above we found it to

be both capacity and faculty: capacity in that it possessed as integral

elements, _a priori_ first principles, as objects of sight; faculty in

that it saw, brought forward, and made available, those principles. The

mode of activity of the Pure Reason is then a _seeing_, direct,

immediate, _sure_; which holds pure truth _fast_, right in the very

centre of the field of vision. This act of the Reason in thus seeing

pure truth is best denominated an intuition of the Reason. And here it

may be said,--If perception and perceive could be strictly confined to

the Sense; concept and conceive to the Understanding; and intuition and

intuit to the Reason, a great gain would be made in accuracy of

expression regarding these departments of the mind.

Having thus, as it is believed, established the fact of the existence of

a Pure Reason, and shown the mode of its activity, it devolves to

declare the function of that faculty.

The function of the Pure Reason is, first:--to intuit, by an immediate

perception, the _a priori_ elemental principles which condition all

being; second,--to intuit, by a like immediate perception, those

principles, combined in _a priori_ systematic processes, which are the

conditional ideal forms for all being; and third,--again to intuit, by

another immediate perception, precisely similar in kind to the others,

the fact, at least, of the perfectly harmonious combination of all _a

priori_ elemental principles, in all possible systematic processes, into

a perfect unity,--an absolute, infinite Person,--God.

To illustrate.

1. The Reason asserts that "Malice is criminal;" and that it is

_necessarily_ criminal; or, in other words, that no act, of any will,

can make it otherwise than it is. The assertion, then, that "Malice is

criminal," is an axiom, and conditions all being, God as well as man.

2. The Reason asserts that every mathematical form must be seen in Space

and Time, and it affirms the same necessity in this as in the former

case.

3. The full illustration of this point would be Anselm's _a priori_

argument for the existence of God. His statement of it should, however,

be so modified as to appear, not as an _a priori_ argument for the

existence of God, but as an amplified declaration of the fact, that the

existence of God is a first principle of Reason; and as such, can no

more be denied than the multiplication table. Objection.--This doctrine

degrades God to the level of the finite; both being alike conditioned.

Answer.--By no means; as will be seen from the two following points.

1. It is universally acknowledged that God must be self-existent, which

means, if it means anything, that the existence of God is _beyond his

own control_; or, in other words, that self-existence is an _a priori_

elemental principle, which conditions God's existing at all.

2. In the two instances under consideration, the word condition has

entirely different significations. God is conditioned only by _Himself_.

Not only is this conditioning not a limitation, properly speaking, but

the very absence of limitation. The fact that He is absolute and

infinite, is a condition of His existence. Man's conditions are the very

opposite of these. He is relative, instead of absolute; finite, instead

of infinite; dependent, instead of self-existent. Hence he differs in

_kind_ from God as do his conditions.

Such being the function of the Pure Reason, it is fully competent to

solve the difficulties raised by Sir William Hamilton and his followers;

and the statement of such solution is the work immediately in hand.

Much of the difficulty and obscurity which have, thus far, attended

every discussion of this subject, will be removed by examining the

definitions given to certain terms;--either by statement, or by

implication in the use made of them;--by exposing the errors involved;

and by clearly expressing the true signification of each term.

By way of criticism the general statement may be made,--that the

Limitists--as was natural from their rejection of the faculty of the

Pure Reason--use only such terms, and in such senses, as are pertinent

to those subjects which come under the purvey of the Understanding and

the Sense; but which are entirely impertinent, in reference to the

sphere of spiritual subjects. The two following phases of this error

are sufficient to illustrate the criticism.

1. The terms Infinite and Absolute are used to express abstractions. For

instance, "_the infinite_, from a human point of view, is merely a name

for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible."

"It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally

self-contradictory with that of the Infinite."--_Limits of Religious

Thought_, pp. 94 and 96. If asked "Absolute" what? "Infinite" what? Will

you allow person, or other definite term to be supplied? Mansel would

reply--No! no possible answer can be given by man.

Now, without passing at all upon the question whether these terms can

represent concrete objects of thought or not, it is to be said, that the

use of them to express abstract notions, is utterly unsound. The mere

fact of abstraction is an undoubted limitation. There may be an Infinite

and Absolute Person. By no possibility can there be an abstract

Infinite.

2. But a more glaring and unpardonable error is made by the Limitists in

their use of the words infinite and absolute, as expressing quantity.

Take a few examples from many.

"For example, we can positively conceive, neither an absolute whole,

that is, a whole so great that we cannot also conceive it as a relative

part of a still greater whole; nor an absolute part, that is, a part so

small, that we cannot also conceive it as a relative whole, divisible

into smaller parts. On the other hand, we cannot positively represent,

or realize, or construe to the mind (as here understanding and

imagination coincide), an infinite whole, for this could only be done by

the infinite synthesis in thought of finite wholes which would itself

require an infinite time for its accomplishment; nor, for the same

reason, can we follow out in thought an infinite divisibility of

parts."--_Hamilton's Essays_, p. 20.

"The metaphysical representation of the Deity as absolute and infinite,

must necessarily, as the profoundest metaphysicians have acknowledged,

amount to nothing less than the sum of all reality."--_Limits of

Religious Thought_, p. 76.

"Is the First Cause finite or infinite?... To think of the First Cause

as finite, is to think of it as limited. To think of it as limited,

necessarily implies a conception of something beyond its limits; it is

absolutely impossible to conceive a thing as bounded, without conceiving

a region surrounding its boundaries."--_Spencer's First Principles_, p.

37.

The last extract tempts one to ask Mr. Spencer if he ever stood on the

north side of the affections. Besides the extracts selected, any person

reading the authors above named, will find numerous phrases like these:

"infinite whole," "infinite sum," "infinite number," "infinite series,"

by which they express sometimes a mathematical, and sometimes a material

amount.

Upon this whole topic it is to be said, that the terms infinite and

absolute have, and can have, no relevancy to any object of the Sense or

of the Understanding, judging according to the Sense, or to any number.

There is no whole, no sum, no number, no amount, but is definite and

limited; and to use those words with the word infinite, is as absurd as

to say an infinite finite. And to use words thus, is to "multiply words

without knowledge."

Again, the lines of thought which these writers pursue, do not tend in

any degree to clear up the fogs in which they have lost themselves, but

only make the muddle thicker. Take, for instance, the following

extract:--

"Thus we are landed in an inextricable dilemma. The Absolute cannot be

conceived as conscious, neither can it be conceived as unconscious; it

cannot be conceived as complex, neither can it be conceived as simple;

it cannot be conceived by difference, neither can it be conceived by

the absence of difference; it cannot be identified with the

Universe, neither can it be distinguished from it. The One and the

Many, regarded as the beginning of existence, are thus alike

incomprehensible."--_Limits of Religious Thought_, p. 79.

The soul, while oaring her way with weary wing, over the watery waste of

such a philosophy, can find no rest for the sole of her foot, except on

that floating carcase of a doctrine, Chaos is God. The simple fact that

such confusion logically results from the premises of the Limitists, is

a sufficient warrant for rejecting their whole system of

thought,--principle and process; and for striking for a new base of

operations. But where shall such a base be sought for? On what immutable

Ararat can the soul find her ark, and a sure resting-place? Man seeks a

Rock upon which he can climb and cry, I KNOW that this is truth. Where

is the Everlasting Rock? In our search for the answer to these queries,

we may be aided by setting forth the goal to be reached,--the object to

be obtained.

By observation and reflection man comes to know that he is living in,

and forms part of, a system of things, which he comprehensively terms

the Universe. The problem is,--_To find an Ultimate Ground, a Final

Cause, which shall be adequate to account for the existence and

sustentation of this Universe_. There are but two possible directions

from which the solution of this problem can come. It must be found

either within the Universe, or without the Universe.

Can it be found within the Universe? If it can, one of two positions

must be true. Either a part of the Universe is cause for the existence

of the whole of the Universe; or the Universe is self-existent. Upon the

first position nothing need be said. Its absurdity is manifested in the

very statement of it. A full discussion, or, in fact, anything more than

a notice of the doctrine of Pantheism, set forth in the second point,

would be beyond the intention of the author. The questions at issue lie

not between theists and pantheists, but between those who alike reject

Pantheism as erroneous. The writer confesses himself astonished that a

class of rational men could ever have been found, who should have

attempted to find the Ultimate Ground of the Universe _in itself_. All

that man can know of the facts of the Universe, he learns by

observation; and the sum of the knowledge he thus gains is, that a vast

system of physical objects exists. From the facts observed, he draws

conclusions: but the stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. With

reference to any lesser object, as a watch, the same process goes on. A

watch is. It has parts; and these parts move in definite relations to

each other; and to secure a given object. If now, any person, upon being

asked to account for the existence of the watch, should confine himself

wholly to an examination of the nature of the springs, the wheels, the

hands, face, &c., endeavoring to find the reason of its being within

itself, the world would laugh at him. How much more justly may the world

laugh, yea, shout its ridicule, at the mole-eyed man who rummages among

the springs and wheels of the vast machine of the Universe, to find the

reason of _its_ being. In the former instance, the bystander would

exclaim,--"The watch is an evidence of intelligence. Man is the only

intelligent being on the earth; and is superior to the watch. Man made

the watch." And his assertion would be true. _A fortiori_ would a

bystander of the Universe exclaim, "The Universe is an evidence of

intelligence. An intelligent Being, superior to the Universe, made the

Universe." And his assertion is true. We are driven then to our last

position; but it is the Gibraltar of Philosophy.

THE ULTIMATE GROUND OF THE UNIVERSE MUST BE SOUGHT FOR, AND CAN ONLY BE

FOUND, WITHOUT THE UNIVERSE.

From this starting-point alone can we proceed, with any hope of reaching

the goal. Setting out on our new course we will gain a step by noticing

a fact involved in the illustration just given. The bystander exclaims,

"The watch is an evidence of intelligence." In this very utterance is

necessarily expressed the fact of two diverse spheres of existence: the

one the sphere of matter, the other the sphere of mind. One cannot think

of matter except as inferior, nor of mind except as superior. These

two, matter and mind, comprise all possible existence. The Reason not

only cannot see _how_ any other existence can be, but affirms _that_ no

other can be. Mind, then, is the Ultimate Ground of the Universe. What

mind?

By examination, man perceives what appears to be an order in the

Universe, concludes that there is such an order, assumes the conclusion

to be valid, and names the order Nature. Turning his eye upon himself,

he finds himself not only associated with, but, through a portion of his

faculties, forming a part of that Nature. But a longer, sharper

scrutiny, a profounder examination, reveals to him his soul's most

secret depth; and the fact of his spiritual personality glows refulgent

in the calm light of consciousness. He sees himself, indeed, in Nature;

but he thrills with joy at the quickly acquired knowledge that Nature is

only a nest, in which he, a purely supernatural being, must flutter for

a time, until he shall be grown, and ready to plume his flight for the

Spirit Land. If then, man, though bound in Nature, finds his central

self utterly diverse from, and superior to Nature, so that he

instinctively cries, "My soul is worth more than a Universe of gold and

diamonds;" _a fortiori_ must that Being, who is the Ultimate Ground, not

only of Nature, but of those supernatural intelligences who live in

Nature, be supernatural, spiritual, and supreme?

Just above, it was seen that matter and mind comprise all possible

existence. It has now been found that mind, in its highest form, even in

man, is pure spirit; and as such, wholly supernatural. It has further

been determined, that the object of our search must be the Supreme

Spirit.

Just at this point it is suitable to notice, what is, perhaps, the most

egregious and unpardonable blunder the Limitists have made. In order to

do this satisfactorily, the following analysis of the human mind is

presented. The soul is a spiritual person, and an animal nature. To this

animal nature belong the Sense and the Understanding. It is universally

acknowledged,--at least the Limitists will not deny,--that the Sense and

the Understanding are wholly within, and conditioned by Nature. Observe

then their folly. They deny that a part can account for a whole; they

reject Pantheism; _and yet they employ only those faculties which they

confess are wholly within and conditioned by Nature_--for they deny the

existence of the Pure Reason, the perceptive faculty of the spiritual

person--_to search, only in Nature, for the cause of Nature_. A fly

would buzz among the wheels of a clock to as little purpose.

The result arrived at just above, now claims our careful attention.

_The Ultimate Ground of the Universe is_ THE SUPREME SPIRIT.

To appreciate this result, we must return to our analysis of man. In his

spiritual personality we have found him wholly supernatural. We have

further found that, only as a spiritual person is he capable of pursuing

this investigation to a final and valid termination. If, then, we would

complete our undertaking, we must ascend into a sphere whose light no

eagle's eye can ever bear; and whose atmosphere his daring wing can

never beat. There no sense can ever enter; no judgments are needed.

Through Reason--the soul's far-darting eye,--and through Reason alone,

can we gaze on the Immutable.

Turning this searching eye upon ourselves, we find that man, as

spiritual person, is a Pure Reason,--the faculty which gives him _a

priori_ first principles, as the standard for conduct and the forms for

activity,--a Spiritual Sensibility, which answers with emotive music to

the call of the Reason; and lastly, a Will, in which the Person dwells

central, solitary, and supreme, the final arbiter of its own destiny.

Every such being is therefore a miniature final cause.

The goal of our search must be near at hand. In man appears the very

likeness of the Being we seek. His highest powers unmistakably shadow

forth the form of that Being, who is The Final. Man originates; but he

is dependent for his power, and the sphere of that power is confined to

his own soul. We seek a being who can originate, who is utterly

independent; and the sphere of whose activity extends wherever, without

himself, he chooses. Man, after a process of culture, comes to intuit

some first principles, in some combinations. We seek a being who

necessarily sees, at once and forever, all possible first principles, in

all possible relations, as the ideal forms for all possible effort. Man

stumbles along on the road of life, frequently ignorant of the way, but

more frequently perversely violating the eternal law which he finds

written on his heart. We seek a being who never stumbles, but who is

perfectly wise; and whose conduct is in immutable accord with the _a

priori_ standards of his Reason. Man is a spiritual person, dependent

for existence, and limited to himself in his exertions. He whom we seek

will be found to be also a spiritual person who is self-existent, and

who sets his own bounds to his activity.

That the line of thought we are now pursuing is the true one, and that

the result which we approach, and are about to utter, is well founded,

receives decisive confirmation from the following facts. Man perceives

that malice must be criminal. Just so the Eternal Eye must see it. A

similar remark is true of mathematical, and all other _a priori_ laws.

Sometimes, at least, there awakens in man's bosom the unutterable thrill

of benevolence; and thus he tastes of the crystal river which flows,

calmly and forever, through the bosom of the "Everlasting Father." For

his own conduct, man is the final cause. In this is he, must he be, the

likeness of the Ultimate. Spiritual personality is the highest possible

form of being. It is then a form common to God and man. Here, therefore,

Philosophy and Revelation are at one. With startling, and yet grateful

unanimity, they affirm the solemn truth, "GOD MADE MAN IN HIS OWN

IMAGE."

We reach the goal at last. The Final Truth stands full in the field of

our vision. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith

Jehovah, who is, and who was, and who is to come, the Almighty." THAT

SPIRITUAL PERSON WHO IS SELF-EXISTENT, ABSOLUTE, AND INFINITE, IS THE

ULTIMATE GROUND, THE FINAL CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

The problem of the Universe is solved. We stand within the portico of

the sublime temple of truth. Mortal has lifted, at last, the veil of

Isis, and looked upon the eternal mysteries.

It is manifest now, how irrelevant and irreverent those expressions must

be, in which the terms infinite and absolute are employed as signifying

abstractions or amounts. They can have no meaning with reference to the

Universe. But what their true significance is, stands out with

unmistakable clearness and precision.

1. _Absoluteness is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the

necessary Being which establishes Him as unqualified except by Himself,

and as complete_.

2. Absoluteness and Unconditionedness are,--the one the positive, and

the other the negative term expressive of the same idea.

3. _Infinity is that distinctive spiritual_ QUALITY _of the necessary

Being which gives to Him universality_.

Absoluteness and Infinity are, then, spiritual qualities of the

self-existent Person, which, distinguishing Him from all other persons,

constitute Him unique and supreme.

It is a law of Logic, which even the child must acknowledge, that

whenever, by a process of thought, a result has been attained and set

forth, he who propounds the result is directly responsible for all that

is logically involved in it. The authority of that law is here both

acknowledged and invoked. The most rigid and exhaustive logical

development of the premises heretofore obtained, which the human mind is

capable of, is challenged, in the confidence that there can be found

therein no jot of discrepancy, no tittle of contradiction. As germain,

and important to the matter in hand, some steps in this development will

be noted.

In solving the problem placed before us, viz: To account for the being

and continuance of the Universe, we have found that the Universe and its

Cause are two distinct and yet intimately and necessarily connected

beings, the one dependent upon the other, and that other utterly

independent; and so that the one is limited and finite, and the other

absolute and infinite; that the one is partly thing and partly person,

and that to both thing and person limitation and finiteness belong;

while the other is wholly person, and consequently the pure, absolute,

and infinite Person. We have further found that absoluteness and

infinity are spiritual qualities of that one Person, which are

incommunicable, and differentiate Him from all other possible beings;

and which establish Him as the uncaused, self-active ground for all

possible beings besides. It is then a Person with all the limitations

and conditions of personality,--a Person at once limited and unlimited,

conditioned and unconditioned, related and unrelated, whose limitations,

conditions, and relations are entirely consistent with his absoluteness

and infinity, who is the final Cause, the Ultimate Ground of the

Universe.

The finite person is self-conscious, and in a measure

self-comprehending; but he only partially perceives the workings of his

own being. _A fortiori_, must the infinite Person be self-conscious, and

exhaustively self-comprehending. The finite person is an intellect,

sensibility, and will; but these are circumscribed by innumerable

limitations. So must the infinite Person be intellect, sensibility, and

will; but His intellect must be Universal Genius; His sensibility Pure

Delight, and His will, as choice, Universal Benevolence, and as act,

Omnipotence.

1. As intellect, the infinite Person is Universal Genius.

Then, he "must possess the primary copies or patterns of what it is

possible may be, in his own subjective apprehension;" or, in other

words, "The pure ideals of all possible entities, lie as pure reason

conceptions in the light of the divine intelligence, and in these must

be found the rules after which the creative agency must go forth."

These _a priori_ "pure ideals" are _conditional_ of his knowledge. They

are the sum and limit of all possible knowledge. He must know them as

they are. He cannot intuit, or think otherwise than in accordance with

them. However many there may be of these ideals, the number is fixed and

definite, and must be so; and so the infinite Person must see it. In

fine, in the fact of exhaustive self-comprehension is involved the fact,

that the number of his qualities, attributes, faculties, forms of

activity, and acts, are, and must be limited, definite, and so known to

him; and yet he is infinite and absolute, and thoroughly knows himself

to be so.

2. As sensibility, the infinite Person is Pure Delight.

Then he exists in a state of unalloyed and complete bliss, produced by

the ceaseless consciousness of his perfect worth and worthiness, and his

entire complacency therein. Yet he is pleased with the good conduct, and

displeased with the evil conduct, of the moral beings he has made. And

if two are good, and one better than another, he loves the one more than

the other. Yet all this in no way modifies, or limits, or lessens his

own absolute self-satisfaction and happiness.

3. As will, the infinite Person is, in choice, Universal Benevolence; in

act, Omnipotence.

_a._ In choice, the whole personality,--both the spontaneous and self

activity, are entirely and concordantly active in the one direction.

Some of the objects towards which this state manifests itself may be

very small. The fact that each receives the attention appropriate to his

place in the system of beings in no way modifies the Great Heart, which

spontaneously prompts to all good acts. But

_b._ In act, the infinite Person, though omnipotent, is, always must be,

limited. His ability to act is limited and determined by the "pure

ideals," in which "must be found the rules after which the creative

agency must go forth." In act he is also limited by his choice. The fact

that he is Universal Benevolence estops him from performing any act

which is not in exact accordance therewith. He cannot construct a

rational being, to whom two and two will appear five; and if he should

attempt to, he would cease to be perfect Goodness. Again, the infinite

Person performs an act--of Creation. The act is, must be, limited and

definite; and so must the product--the Universe be. He cannot create an

unlimited Universe, nor perform an infinite act. The very words

unlimited Universe, and as well the notions they express, are

contradictory, and annihilate each other. Further, an infinite act, even

if possible, would not, could not create, or have any relation to the

construction of a Universe. An infinite act must be the realization of

an infinite ideal. The infinite Person has a thorough comprehension of

himself; and consequently a complete idea of himself. That idea, being

the idea of the infinite Person, is infinite; and it is the only

possible infinite idea. He finds this idea realized in himself. But,

should it be in his power to realize it _again_, that exertion of power

would be an infinite act, and its product another infinite Person. No

other infinite act, and no other result, are rationally supposable.

The Universe, then, however large it be, is, must be, limited and

definite. Its magnitude may be inconceivable to us; but in the mind of

its Creator every atom is numbered. No spirit may ever have skirted its

boundary; but that boundary is as clear and distinct to his eye as the

outline of the Alps against a clear sky is to the traveller's. The

questions Where? How far? How long? How much? and the like, are

pertinent only in the Universe; and their answers are always limited and

definite.

The line of thought we have been pursuing is deemed by a large class of

thinkers not only paradoxical, but utterly contradictory and

self-destructive. We speak of a Person, a term which necessarily

involves limitation and condition, as infinite and absolute. We speak of

this infinity and absoluteness as spiritual qualities, which are

conditional and limiting to him. We speak of him as conditioned by an

inability to be finite. In fine, to those good people, the Limitists,

our sense seems utter nonsense. It is required, therefore, for the

completion of this portion of our task, to present a rational ground

upon which these apparent contradictions shall become manifestly

consistent.

In those sentences where the infinite Person is spoken of as limited and

unlimited, &c., it is evident that there is a play upon words, and that

they apply to different qualities in the personality. It is not said, of

course, that the number of his faculties is limited and unlimited; or

that his self-complacency is boundless and constrained; or that his act

is conditioned and unconditioned. Nor are these seeming paradoxes stated

to puzzle and disturb. They are written to express a great, fundamental,

and all-important truth, which seems never once to have shadowed the

minds of the Limitists,--a truth which, when once seen, dispels forever

all the ghostly battalions of difficulties which they have raised. The

truth is this.

That Being whose limitations, conditions, and relations are wholly

subjective, _i. e._ find their whole base and spring in his self; and

who is therefore entirely free from on all possible limitations,

conditions, and relations, from without himself; and who possesses,

therefore, all possible fulness of all possible excellences, and finds

the perennial acme of happiness in self-contemplation, and the

consciousness of his perfect worth; and being such is ground for all

other possible being; is, in the true philosophical sense, unrelated,

unconditioned, unlimited. Or, in other words, the conditions imposed by

Universal Genius upon the absolute and infinite Person are _different in

kind_ from the conditions imposed upon finite persons and physical

things. The former in no way diminish aught from the fulness of their

possessor's endowments; the latter not only do so diminish, but render

it impossible for their possessor to supply the deficiency.

The following dictum will, then, concisely and exactly express the truth

we have attained.

_Those only are conditions, in the philosophical sense, which diminish

the fulness of the possessor's endowments._

An admirable illustration of this truth can be drawn from some

reflections of Laurens P. Hickok, D. D., which we quote. "What we need

is not merely a rule by which to direct _the process_ in the attainment

of any artistic end, but we must find the legislator who may determine

the end itself"...

Whence is the ultimate behest that is to determine the archetype, and

control the pure spontaneity in its action.

* * * * *

"Must the artist work merely because there is an inner want to gratify,

with no higher end than the gratification of the highest constitutional

craving? Can we find nothing beyond a want, which shall from its own

behest demand that this, and not its opposite, shall be? Grant that the

round worlds and all their furniture are _good_--but why good? Certainly

as means to an end. Grant that this end, the happiness of sentient

beings, is _good_--but why good? Because it supplies the want of the

Supreme Architect. And is this the _supreme good_? Surely if it is, we

are altogether within nature's conditions, call our ultimate attainment

by what name we may. We have no origin for our legislation, only as the

highest architect finds such wants within himself, and the archetypal

rule for gratifying his wants in the most effectual manner; and

precisely as the ox goes to his fodder in the shortest way, so he goes

to his work in making and peopling worlds in the most direct manner.

Here is no will; no personality; no pure autonomy. The artist finds

himself so constituted that he must work in this manner, or the craving

of his own nature becomes intolerable to himself, and the gratifying of

this craving is _the highest good_."

We attain hereby a mark by which to distinguish the diminishing from the

undiminishing condition. A sense of want, _a craving_, is the necessary

result of a diminishing condition. Hence the presence of any craving is

the distinguishing mark of the finite; and that plenitude of endowments

which excludes all possible craving or lack, is the distinguishing mark

of the infinite and absolute Person. In this plenitude his infinity and

absoluteness consist; and it is, therefore, conditional of them. Upon

this plenitude, as conditional of this Person's perfection, Dr. Hickok

speaks further, as follows:--

"We must find that which shall itself be the reason and law for

benevolence, and for the sake of which the artist shall be put to his

beneficent agency above all considerations that he finds his nature

craving it. It must be that for whose sake, happiness, even that which,

as kind and benevolent, craves on all sides the boon to bless others,

itself should be. Not sensient nor artistic autonomy, but a pure ethic

autonomy, which knows that within itself there is an excellency which

obliges for the sake of itself. This is never to be found, nor anything

very analogous to it, in sensient nature and a dictate from some

generalized experience. It lies within the rational spirit, and is law

in the heart, as an inward imperative in its own right, and must there

be found.... This inward witnessing capacitates for self-legislating and

self-rewarding. It is inward consciousness of a worth imperative above

want; an end in itself, and not means to another end; a user of things,

but not itself to be used by anything; and, on account of its intrinsic

excellency, an authoritative determiner for its own behoof of the entire

artistic agency with all its products, and thus a conscience excusing or

accusing.

"This inward witnessing of the absolute to his own worthiness, gives the

ultimate estimate to nature, which needs and can attain to nothing

higher, than that it should satisfy this worthiness as end; and thereby

in all his works, he fixes, in his own light, upon the subjective

archetype, and attains to the objective result of that which is

befitting his own dignity. It is, therefore, in no craving want which

must be gratified, but from the interest of an inner behest, which

should be executed for his own worthiness' sake, that 'God has created

all things, and for his pleasure they are and were created.'"

In the light of the foregoing discussion and illustrations, the division

of conditions into two classes--the one class, conditions proper,

comprising those which diminish the endowments of the being upon whom

they lie, and are ground for a craving or lack; and the other class,

comprising those conditions which do not diminish the endowments of the

being upon whom they lie, and which are, therefore, ground for perfect

plenitude of endowments, and of self-satisfaction on account thereof--is

seen to be thoroughly philosophical. And let it be here noted, that the

very construction, or, if the term suit better, perception of this

distinction, is a decisive evidence of the fact, and a direct product of

the operation of the Pure Reason. If our intellect comprised only what

the Limitists acknowledge it to be, a Sense and an Understanding, not

only could no other but diminishing conditions be thought of, but by no

possibility could a hint that there were any others flit through the

mind. Such a mind, being wholly in nature, and conditioned by nature,

_cannot_ climb up out of nature, and perceive aught there. But those

conditions which lie upon the infinite Person are supernatural and

spiritual; and could not be even vaguely guessed at, much more examined

critically and classified, but by a being possessed of a faculty the

same in kind with the intellect in which such spiritual conditions

inhere.

The actual processes which go on in the mind are as follows. The Sense,

possessing a purely mechanical structure, a structure not differing in

_kind_ from that of the vegetable,--both being alike entirely

conditioned by the law of cause and effect,--perceives phenomena. The

relation of the object to the sensorium, or of the image to the sensory,

and the forms under which the Sense shall receive the impression, are

fixed. Because the Sense acts compulsorily, in fixed mechanical forms,

it is, by this very construction, incapable, not only of receiving

impressions and examining phenomena outside of those forms, but it can

never be startled with the guess that there _is_ anything else than what

is received therein. For instance: A man born blind, though he can have

no possible notion of what light is, knows that light is, from the

testimony of those who can see. But if a race of men born blind should

be found, who had never had any communication with men who could see, it

is notorious that they could have no possible notion even that light

was. A suspicion of its existence could never cross their minds. This

position is strengthened and established beyond controversy, by the

failure of the mind in its efforts to construct an entirely new sense.

Every attempt only intensifies our appreciation of the futility of the

effort. From fragments of the five senses we might, perhaps, construct a

patchwork sixth; but the mind makes no presentation to itself of a new

sense. The reason is, that, to do so, the Sense, as mental faculty, must

transcend the very conditions of its existence. It is precisely with the

Understanding as with the lower faculty. It cannot transcend its limits.

It can add no item to the sum of human knowledge, except as it deduces

it from a presentation by the Sense. Hence its conditions correspond to

those in its associate faculty.

It is manifest, then, that a being with only these faculties may

construct a _system_, but can never develop a _science_. It can arrange,

classify, by such standards as its fancy may select, the phenomena in

nature; but this must be in accordance with some sensuous form. _No law

can be seen_, by which it ought to be so, and not otherwise. Such

classification must always be determined by the number of stamens in the

flower, for instance; and that standard, though arbitrary, will be as

good as any other, _unless there comes a higher faculty_ which,

overlooking all nature, perceives the _a priori_ law working in nature,

which gives the ultimate ground for an exhaustive development of a

science which in its _idea_ cannot be improved. It is manifest, further,

that those conditions, to which we have applied the epithet proper, lie

upon the two faculties we have been considering. In this we agree with

the Limitists.

It now behooves to present the fact that the faculty whose existence was

proved in the earlier part of our work, is competent to overlook, and so

comprehend nature, and all the conditions of nature, and thereby assign

to said conditions their true and inferior place, while it soars out of

nature, and intuits those _a priori_ laws which, though the conditions

of, are wholly unconditioned _by nature_; but which are both the

conditions of and conditioned by the supernatural; and this in an

entirely different sense from the other. This is the province of the

Pure Reason. Standing on some lofty peak, above all clouds of sense,

under the full blaze of eternal truth, the soul sees all nature spread

like a vast map before her searching eye, sharply observes, and

appreciates all the conditions of nature; and then, while holding it

full in the field of her vision, with equal fulness perceives that other

land, the spiritual plains of the supernatural, sees them too in all

their conditionings; and sees, with a clearness of vision never

approximated by the earthly eye, the fact that these supernatural

conditions are no deprivation which awaken a want, but that they inhere

and cohere, as final ground for absolute plenitude of endowments and

fulness of bliss, in the Self-existent Person.

It will be objected to the position now attained, that it involves the

doctrine that the Pure Reason in the finite spiritual person is on a par

with the Universal Genius in the infinite spiritual Person. The

objection is fallacious, because based upon the assumption that likeness

in mode of action involves entire similarity. The mode of action in the

finite Pure Reason is precisely similar to that of the Universal Genius;

the objects perceived by both are the same, they are seen in the same

light, and so are in accord; but the _range_ of the finite is one, and

the _range_ of the infinite is another; and so diverse also are the

circumstances attending the act of seeing. The range of the finite

Reason is, _always must be, partial_: the range of the infinite Reason

is, _always must be, exhaustive_ (not infinite). In circumstances, the

finite Reason is created dependent for existence, must begin in a germ

in which it is inactive, and _must_ be developed by association with

nature, and under forms of nature; and can never, by any possibility of

growth, attain to that perfectness in which it shall be satisfied, or to

a point in development from which it can continue its advance as _pure

spirit_. It always must be spirit in a body; even though that be a

spiritual body. The infinite Reason is self-existent, and therefore

independent; and is, and always must be, in the absolute possession of

all possible knowledge, and so cannot grow. Hence, while the infinite

and finite reasons see the same object in the same light, and therefore

_alike_, the difference in range, and the difference in circumstance,

must forever constitute them dissimilar. The exact likeness of sight

just noticed is the _necessary a priori_ ground upon which a moral

government is _possible_.

In thus declaring the basis upon which the above distinction between the

two classes of conditions rests, we have been led to distinguish more

clearly between the faculties of the mind, and especially to observe how

the Pure Reason enables us thereby to solve the problems she has raised.

In this radical distinction lies the rational ground for the explication

of all the problems which the Limitists raise. It also appears that the

terms must, possible, and the like, being used to express no idea of

restraint, as coming from without upon the infinite Person, or of lack

or craving, as subsisting within him, are properly employed in

expressing the fact that his _Self, as a priori ground for his

activity_, is, though the only, yet a real, positive, and irremovable

limit, condition, and law of his action. Of two possible ends he may

freely choose either. Of all possible modes of action he may choose one;

but the constituting laws of the Self he _cannot_, and the moral laws of

his Self he _will not_, violate.

That point has now been reached at which this branch of the discussion

in hand may be closed. The final base from which to conduct an

examination of the questions respecting absoluteness and infinity has

been attained. In the progress to this consummation it was found that a

radical psychological error lay at the root of the philosophy taught by

the Limitists. Their theory was seen to be partial, and essentially

defective. Qualities which they do not recognise were found to belong to

certain mental affirmations. Four classes of these affirmations or ideas

were named and illustrated; and by them the fact of the Reason was

established. Then its mode of activity and its functions were stated;

and finally the great truth which solves the problem of the ages was, by

this faculty, attained and stated. It became evident that the final

cause of the Universe must be found without the Universe; and it was

then seen that

That spiritual Person who is self-existent, absolute, and

infinite, is the Ultimate Ground, the Final Cause, of the

Universe.

Definitions of the terms absolute and infinite suitable to such a

position were then given, with a few concluding reflections. From the

result thus secured the way is prepared for an examination of the

general principles and their special applications which the Limitists

maintain, and this will occupy our future pages.