of them of the first families, and weightiest properties, in the
kingdom; but infinitely more distinguished for their untainted honor,
public and private, and their zealous, but sober attachment to the
constitution of their country, than they can be by any birth, or any
station. If they are the friends of any one great man rather than
another, it is not that they make his aggrandizement the end of their
union; or because they know him to be the most active in caballing for
his connections the largest and speediest emoluments. It is because they
know him, by personal experience, to have wise and enlarged ideas of the
public good, and an invincible constancy in adhering to it; because they
are convinced, by the whole tenor of his actions, that he will never
negotiate away their honor or his own: and that, in or out of power,
change of situation will make no alteration in his conduct. This will
give to such a person in such a body, an authority and respect that no
minister ever enjoyed among his venal dependents, in the highest
plenitude of his power; such as servility never can give, such as
ambition never can receive or relish.
This body will often be reproached by their adversaries, for want of
ability in their political transactions; they will be ridiculed for
missing many favorable conjunctures, and not profiting of several
brilliant opportunities of fortune; but they must be contented to endure
that reproach; for they cannot acquire the reputation of _that kind_ of
ability without losing all the other reputation they possess.
They will be charged too with a dangerous spirit of exclusion and
proscription, for being unwilling to mix in schemes of administration,
which have no bond of union, or principle of confidence. That charge too
they must suffer with patience. If the reason of the thing had not
spoken loudly enough, the miserable examples of the several
administrations constructed upon the idea of systematic discord would be
enough to frighten them from such, monstrous and ruinous conjunctions.
It is however false, that the idea of an united administration carries
with it that of a proscription of any other party. It does indeed imply
the necessity of having the great strongholds of government in
well-united hands, in order to secure the predominance of right and
uniform principles; of having the capital offices of deliberation and
execution of those who can deliberate with mutual confidence, and who
will execute what is resolved with firmness and fidelity. If this system
cannot be rigorously adhered to in practice, (and what system can be
so?) it ought to be the constant aim of good men to approach as nearly
to it as possible. No system of that kind can be formed, which will not
leave room fully sufficient for healing coalitions: but no coalition,
which, under the specious name of independency, carries in its bosom the
unreconciled principles of the original discord of parties, ever was, or
will be, an healing coalition. Nor will the mind of our sovereign ever
know repose, his kingdom settlement, or his business order, efficiency,
or grace with his people, until things are established upon the basis of
some set of men, who are trusted by the public, and who can trust one
another.
This comes rather nearer to the mark than the author's description of a
proper administration, under the name of _men of ability and virtue_,
which conveys no definite idea at all; nor does it apply specifically
to our grand national distemper. All parties pretend to these qualities.
The present ministry, no favorites of the author, will be ready enough
to declare themselves persons of virtue and ability; and if they choose
a vote for that purpose, perhaps it would not be quite impossible for
them to procure it. But, if the disease be this distrust and
disconnection, it is easy to know who are sound and who are tainted; who
are fit to restore us to health, who to continue, and to spread the
contagion. The present ministry being made up of draughts from all
parties in the kingdom, if they should profess any adherence to the
connections they have left, they must convict themselves of the blackest
treachery. They therefore choose rather to renounce the principle
itself, and to brand it with the name of pride and faction. This test
with certainty discriminates the opinions of men. The other is a
description vague and unsatisfactory.
As to the unfortunate gentlemen who may at any time compose that system,
which, under the plausible title of an administration, subsists but for
the establishment of weakness and confusion; they fall into different
classes, with different merits. I think the situation of some people in
that state may deserve a certain degree of compassion; at the same time
that they furnish an example, which, it is to be hoped, by being a
severe one, will have its effect, at least, on the growing generation;
if an original seduction, on plausible but hollow pretences, into loss
of honor, friendship, consistency, security, and repose, can furnish it.
It is possible to draw, even from the very prosperity of ambition,
examples of terror, and motives to compassion.
I believe the instances are exceedingly rare of men immediately passing
over a clear, marked line of virtue into declared vice and corruption.
There are a sort of middle tints and shades between the two extremes;
there is something uncertain on the confines of the two empires which
they first pass through, and which renders the change easy and
imperceptible. There are even a sort of splendid impositions so well
contrived, that, at the very time the path of rectitude is quitted
forever, men seem to be advancing into some higher and nobler road of
public conduct. Not that such impositions are strong enough in
themselves; but a powerful interest, often concealed from those whom it
affects, works at the bottom, and secures the operation. Men are thus
debauched away from those legitimate connections, which they had formed
on a judgment, early perhaps, but sufficiently mature, and wholly
unbiassed. They do not quit them upon any ground of complaint, for
grounds of just complaint may exist, but upon the flattering and most
dangerous of all principles, that of mending what is well. Gradually
they are habituated to other company; and a change in their habitudes
soon makes a way for a change in their opinions. Certain persons are no
longer so very frightful, when they come to be known and to be
serviceable. As to their old friends, the transition is easy; from
friendship to civility; from civility to enmity: few are the steps from
dereliction to persecution.
People not very well grounded in the principles of public morality find
a set of maxims in office ready made for them, which they assume as
naturally and inevitably, as any of the insignia or instruments of the
situation. A certain tone of the solid and practical is immediately
acquired. Every former profession of public spirit is to be considered
as a debauch of youth, or, at best, as a visionary scheme of
unattainable perfection. The very idea of consistency is exploded. The
convenience of the business of the day is to furnish the principle for
doing it. Then the whole ministerial cant is quickly got by heart. The
prevalence of faction is to be lamented. All opposition is to be
regarded as the effect of envy and disappointed ambition. All
administrations are declared to be alike. The same necessity justifies
all their measures. It is no longer a matter of discussion, who or what
administration is; but that administration is to be supported, is a
general maxim. Flattering themselves that their power is become
necessary to the support of all order and government; everything which
tends to the support of that power is sanctified, and becomes a part of
the public interest.
Growing every day more formed to affairs, and better knit in their
limbs, when the occasion (now the only rule) requires it, they become
capable of sacrificing those very persons to whom they had before
sacrificed their original friends. It is now only in the ordinary course
of business to alter an opinion, or to betray a connection. Frequently
relinquishing one set of men and adopting another, they grow into a
total indifference to human feeling, as they had before to moral
obligation; until at length, no one original impression remains upon
their minds: every principle is obliterated; every sentiment effaced.
In the mean time, that power, which all these changes aimed at securing,
remains still as tottering and as uncertain as ever. They are delivered
up into the hands of those who feel neither respect for their persons,
nor gratitude for their favors; who are put about them in appearance to
serve, in reality to govern them; and, when the signal is given, to
abandon and destroy them in order to set up some new dupe of ambition,
who in his turn is to be abandoned and destroyed. Thus living in a state
of continual uneasiness and ferment, softened only by the miserable
consolation of giving now and then preferments to those for whom they
have no value; they are unhappy in their situation, yet find it
impossible to resign. Until, at length, soured in temper, and
disappointed by the very attainment of their ends, in some angry, in
some haughty, or some negligent moment, they incur the displeasure of
those upon whom they have rendered their very being dependent. Then
_perierunt tempora longi servitii;_ they are cast off with scorn; they
are turned out, emptied of all natural character, of all intrinsic
worth, of all essential dignity, and deprived of every consolation of
friendship. Having rendered all retreat to old principles ridiculous,
and to old regards impracticable, not being able to counterfeit
pleasure, or to discharge discontent, nothing being sincere, or right,
or balanced in their minds, it is more than a chance, that, in the
delirium of the last stage of their distempered power, they make an
insane political testament, by which they throw all their remaining
weight and consequence into the scale of their declared enemies, and the
avowed authors of their destruction. Thus they finish their course. Had
it been possible that the whole, or even a great part of these effects
on their minds, I say nothing of the effect upon their fortunes, could
have appeared to them in their first departure from the right line, it
is certain they would have rejected every temptation with horror. The
principle of these remarks, like every good principle in morality, is
trite; but its frequent application is not the less necessary.
As to others, who are plain practical men, they have been guiltless at
all times of all public pretence. Neither the author nor any one else
has reason to be angry with them. They belonged to his friend for their
interest; for their interest they quitted him; and when it is their
interest, he may depend upon it, they will return to their former
connection. Such people subsist at all times, and, though the nuisance
of all, are at no time a worthy subject of discussion. It is false
virtue and plausible error that do the mischief.
If men come to government with right dispositions, they have not that
unfavorable subject which this author represents to work upon. Our
circumstances are indeed critical; but then they are the critical
circumstances of a strong and mighty nation. If corruption and meanness
are greatly spread, they are not spread universally. Many public men are
hitherto examples of public spirit and integrity. Whole parties, as far
as large bodies can be uniform, have preserved character. However they
may be deceived in some particulars, I know of no set of men amongst us,
which does not contain persons on whom the nation, in a difficult
exigence, may well value itself. Private life, which is the nursery of
the commonwealth, is yet in general pure, and on the whole disposed to
virtue; and the people at large want neither generosity nor spirit. No
small part of that very luxury, which is so much the subject of the
author's declamation, but which, in most parts of life, by being well
balanced and diffused, is only decency and convenience, has perhaps as
many, or more good than evil consequences attending it. It certainly
excites industry, nourishes emulation, and inspires some sense of
personal value into all ranks of people. What we want is to establish
more fully an opinion of uniformity, and consistency of character, in
the leading men of the state; such as will restore some confidence to
profession and appearance, such as will fix subordination upon esteem.
Without this, all schemes are begun at the wrong end. All who join in
them are liable to their consequences. All men who, under whatever
pretext, take a part in the formation or the support of systems
constructed in such a manner as must, in their nature, disable them from
the execution of their duty, have made themselves guilty of all the
present distraction, and of the future ruin, which they may bring upon
their country.
It is a serious affair, this studied disunion in government. In cases
where union is most consulted in the constitution of a ministry, and
where persons are best disposed to promote it, differences, from the
various ideas of men, will arise; and from their passions will often
ferment into violent heats, so as greatly to disorder all public
business. What must be the consequence, when the very distemper is made
the basis of the constitution; and the original weakness of human nature
is still further enfeebled by art and contrivance? It must subvert
government from the very foundation. It turns our public councils into
the most mischievous cabals; where the consideration is, not how the
nation's business shall be carried on, but how those who ought to carry
it on shall circumvent each other. In such a state of things, no order,
uniformity, dignity, or effect, can appear in our proceedings, either at
home or abroad. Nor will it make much difference, whether some of the
constituent parts of such an administration are men of virtue or
ability, or not; supposing it possible that such men, with their eyes
open, should choose to make a part in such a body.
The effects of all human contrivances are in the hand of Providence. I
do not like to answer, as our author so readily does, for the event of
any speculation. But surely the nature of our disorders, if anything,
must indicate the proper remedy. Men who act steadily on the principles
I have stated may in all events be very serviceable to their country; in
one case, by furnishing (if their sovereign should be so advised) an
administration formed upon ideas very different from those which have
for some time been unfortunately fashionable. But, if this should not be
the case, they may be still serviceable; for the example of a large body
of men, steadily sacrificing ambition to principle, can never be without
use. It will certainly be prolific, and draw others to an imitation.
_Vera gloria radices agit, atque etiam propagatur_.
I do not think myself of consequence enough to imitate my author, in
troubling the world with the prayers or wishes I may form for the
public: full as little am I disposed to imitate his professions; those
professions are long since worn out in the political service. If the
work will not speak for the author, his own declarations deserve but
little credit.
FOOTNOTES:
[38] History of the Minority. History of the Repeal of the Stamp Act.
Considerations on Trade and Finance. Political Register, &c., &c.
[39] Pages 6-10.
[40] Pages 9, 10.
[41] Page 9.
[42] Page 9.
[43] Page 6.
[44] Page 9.
[45]
Total imports from the West Indies in 1764 £2,909,411
Exports to ditto in ditto 896,511
----------
Excess of imports £2,012,900
In this, which is the common way of stating the balance, it will appear
upwards of two millions against us, which is ridiculous.
[46] Page 6.
[47]
1754. £ _s. d._
Total export of British goods value, 8,317,506 15 3
Ditto of foreign goods in time 2,910,836 14 9
Ditto of ditto out of time 559,485 2 10
------------------
Total exports of all kinds 11,787,828 12 10
Total imports 8,093,479 15 0
------------------
Balance in favor of England £3,094,355 17 10
------------------
1761. £ _s. d._
Total export of British goods 10,649,581 12 6
Ditto of foreign goods in time 3,553,692 7 1
Ditto of ditto out of time 355,015 0 2
------------------
Total exports of all kinds 14,558,288 19 9
Total imports 9,294,915 1 6
------------------
Balance in favor of England £5,263,373 18 3
------------------
Here is the state of our trade in 1761, compared with a very good year
of profound peace: both are taken from the authentic entries at the
custom-house. How the author can contrive to make this increase of the
export of English produce agree with his account of the dreadful want of
hands in England, page 9, unless he supposes manufactures to be made
without hands, I really do not see. It is painful to be so frequently
obliged to set this author right in matters of fact. This state will
fully refute all that he has said or insinuated upon the difficulties
and decay of our trade, pages 6, 7, and 9.
[48] Page 7. See also page 13.
[49] Pages 12, 13.
[50] Page 17.
[51] Page 6.
[52] "Our merchants suffered by the detention of the galleons, as their
correspondents in Spain were disabled from paying them for their goods
sent to America."--State of the Nation, p. 7.
[53] Pages 12, 13.
[54] Page 6.
[55] Something however has transpired in the quarrels among those
concerned in that transaction. It seems the _good Genius_ of Britain, so
much vaunted by our author, did his duty nobly. Whilst we were gaining
such advantages, the court of France was astonished at our concessions.
"J'ai apporté à Versailles, il est vrai, les Ratifications du Roi
d'Angleterre, _à vostre grand étonnement, et à celui de bien d'autres_.
Je dois cela au bontés du Roi d'Angleterre, à celles de Milord Bute, à
Mons. le Comte de Viry, à Mons. le Duc de Nivernois, et en fin à mon
scavoir faire."--Lettres, &c., du Chev. D'Eon, p. 51.
[56] "The navy bills are not due till six months after they have been
issued; six months also of the seamen's wages by act of Parliament must
be, and in consequence of the rules prescribed by that act, twelve
months' wages generally, and often much more are retained; and there has
been besides at all times a large arrear of pay, which, though kept in
the account, could never be claimed, the persons to whom it was due
having left neither assignees nor representatives. The precise amount of
such sums cannot be ascertained; but they can hardly be reckoned less
than thirteen or fourteen hundred thousand pounds. On 31st Dec, 1754,
when the navy debt was reduced nearly as low as it could be, it still
amounted to 1,296,567_l._ 18_s._ 11-3/4_d._ consisting chiefly of
articles which could not then be discharged; such articles will be
larger now, in proportion to the increase of the establishment; and an
allowance must always be made for them in judging of the state of the
navy debt, though they are not distinguishable in the account. In
providing for that which is payable, the principal object of the
legislature is always to discharge the bills, for they are the greatest
article; they bear an interest of 4 per cent; and, when the quantity of
them is large, they are a heavy incumbrance upon all money transactions"
[57]
Navy £1,450,900
Army 1,268,500
Ordnance 174,600
The four American governments 19,200
General surveys in America 1,600
Foundling Hospital 38,000
To the African committee 13,000
For the civil establishment on the coast of Africa 5,500
Militia 100,000
Deficiency of land and malt 300,000
Deficiency of funds 202,400
Extraordinaries of the army and navy 35,000
----------
Total £3,609,700
[58] Upon the money borrowed in 1760, the premium of one per cent was
for twenty-one years, not for twenty; this annuity has been paid eight
years instead of seven; the sum paid is therefore 640,000_l._ instead of
560,000_l._; the remaining term is worth, ten years and a quarter
instead of eleven years;[59] its value is 820,000_l._ instead of
880,000_l._; and the whole value of that premium is 1,460,000_l._
instead of 1,440,000_l._ The like errors are observable in his
computation on the additional capital of three per cent on the loan of
that year. In like manner, on the loan of 1762, the author computes on
five years' payment instead of six; and says in express terms, that take
5 from 19, and there remain 13. These are not errors of the pen or the
press; the several computations pursued in this part of the work with
great diligence and earnestness prove them errors upon much
deliberation. Thus the premiums in 1759 are cast up 90,000_l._ too
little, an error in the first rule of arithmetic. "The annuities
borrowed in 1756 and 1758 are," says he, "to continue till redeemed by
Parliament." He does not take notice that the first are irredeemable
till February, 1771, the other till July, 1782. In this the amount of
the premiums is computed on the time which they have run. Weakly and
ignorantly; for he might have added to this, and strengthened his
argument, such as it is, by charging also the value of the additional
one per cent from the day on which he wrote, to at least that day on
which these annuities become redeemable. To make ample amends, however,
he has added to the premiums of 15 per cent in 1759, and three per cent
in 1760, the annuity paid for them since their commencement; the fallacy
of which is manifest; for the premiums in these cases can he neither
more nor less than the additional capital for which the public stands
engaged, and is just the same whether five or five hundred years'
annuity has been paid for it. In private life, no man persuades himself
that he has borrowed 200_l._ because he happens to have paid twenty
years' interest on a loan of 100_l._
[59] See Smart and Demoivre.
[60] Pages 30-32.
[61] In a course of years a few manufacturers have been tempted abroad,
not by cheap living, but by immense premiums, to set up as masters, and
to introduce the manufacture. This must happen in every country eminent
for the skill of its artificers, and has nothing to do with taxes and
the price of provisions.
[62] Although the public brewery has considerably increased in this
latter period, the produce of the malt-tax has been something less than
in the former; this cannot be attributed to the new malt-tax. Had this
been the cause of the lessened consumption, the public brewery, so much
more burdened, must have felt it more. The cause of this diminution of
the malt-tax I take to have been principally owing to the greater
dearness of corn in the second period than in the first, which, in all
its consequences, affected the people in the country much more than
those in the towns. But the revenue from consumption was not, on the
whole, impaired; as we have seen in the foregoing page.
[63]
Total Imports, value, Exports, ditto.
1752 £7,889,369 £11,694,912
1753 8,625,029 12,243,604
1754 8,093,472 11,787,828
--------- ----------
Total £24,607,870 35,726,344
24,607,870
----------
Exports exceed imports 11,118,474
----------
Medium balance £3,706,158
----------
Total Imports, value, Exports, ditto.
1764 £10,818,946 £16,104,532
1765 10,889,742 14,550,507
1766 11,475,825 14,024,964
----------- -----------
Total £32,685,513 44,740,003
----------- 32,683,613
-----------
Exports exceed 12,054,490
-----------
Medium balance for three last years £4,018,163
[64] It is dearer in some places, and rather cheaper in others; but it
must soon all come to a level.
[65] A tax rated by the intendant in each generality, on the presumed
fortune of every person below the degree of a gentleman.
[66] Before the war it was sold to, or rather forced on, the consumer at
11 sous, or about 5_d._ the pound. What it is at present, I am not
informed. Even this will appear no trivial imposition. In London, salt
may be had at a penny farthing per pound from the last retailer.
[67] Page 31.
[68] Page 33.
[69] Page 33.
[70] Page 33.
[71] The figures in the "Considerations" are wrongly cast up; it should
be 3,608,700_l._
[72] "Considerations," p. 43. "State of the Nation," p. 33.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Page 34.
[75] The author of the "State of the Nation," p. 34, informs us, that
the sum of 75,000_l._ allowed by him for the extras of the army and
ordnance, is far less than was allowed for the same service in the years
1767 and 1768. It is so undoubtedly, and by at least 200,000_l._ He sees
that he cannot abide by the plan of the "Considerations" in this point,
nor is he willing wholly to give it up. Such an enormous difference as
that between 35,000_l._ and 300,000_l._ puts him to a stand. Should he
adopt the latter plan of increased expense, he must then confess that he
had, on a former occasion, egregiously trifled with the public; at the
same time all his future promises of reduction must fall to the ground.
If he stuck to the 35,000_l._ he was sure that every one must expect
from him some account how this monstrous charge came to continue ever
since the war, when it was clearly unnecessary; how all those
successions of ministers (his own included) came to pay it, and why his
great friend in Parliament, and his partisans without doors, came not to
pursue to ruin, at least to utter shame, the authors of so groundless
and scandalous a profusion. In this strait he took a middle way; and, to
come nearer the real state of the service, he outbid the
"Considerations," at one stroke, 40,000_l._; at the same time he hints
to you, that you may _expect_ some benefit also from the original plan.
But the author of the "Considerations" will not suffer him to escape it.
He has pinned him down to his 35,000_l._; for that is the sum he has
chosen, not as what he thinks will probably be required, but as making
the most ample allowance for every possible contingency. See that
author, p. 42 and 43.
[76] He has done great injustice to the establishment of 1768; but I
have not here time for this discussion; nor is it necessary to this
argument.
[77] Page 34.
[78] In making up this account, he falls into a surprising error of
arithmetic. "The deficiency of the land-tax in the year 1754 and
1755,[80] when it was at 2_s._, amounted to no more, on a medium, than
49,372_l._; to which, if we add _half the sum_, it will give us
79,058_l._ as the peace deficiency at 3_s._"
Total £49,372
Add the half 24,686
-------
£74,058
Which he makes 79,058_l._ This is indeed in disfavor of his argument;
but we shall see that he has ways, by other errors, of reimbursing
himself.
[79] Page 34.
[80] Page 33.
[81] Page 43.
[82] Page 35.
[83] Page 37.
[84] Pages 37, 38.
[85] Pages 39, 40.
[86] Page 39.
[87] It is observable, that the partisans of American taxation, when
they have a mind to represent this tax as wonderfully beneficial to
England, state it as worth 100,000_l._ a year; when they are to
represent it as very light on the Americans, it dwindles to 60,000_l._
Indeed it is very difficult to compute what its produce might have been.
[88] "Considerations," p. 74.
[89] "Considerations," p. 79.
[90] Ibid., p. 74.
[91] I do not here enter into the unsatisfactory disquisition concerning
representation real or presumed. I only say, that a great people who
have their property, without any reserve, in all cases, disposed of by
another people, at an immense distance from them, will not think
themselves in the enjoyment of freedom. It will be hard to show to those
who are in such a state, which of the usual parts of the definition or
description of a free people are applicable to them; and it is neither
pleasant nor wise to attempt to prove that they have no right to be
comprehended in such a description.
[92] Page 21.
[93] Here the author has a note altogether in his usual strain of
reasoning; he finds out that somebody, in the course of this
multifarious evidence, had said, "that a very considerable part of the
orders of 1765 transmitted from America had been afterwards suspended;
but that in case the Stamp Act was repealed, those orders were to be
executed in the present year, 1766"; and that, on the repeal of the
Stamp Act, "the exports to the colonies would be at least double the
value of the exports of the past year." He then triumphs exceedingly on
their having fallen short of it on the state of the custom-house
entries. I do not well know what conclusion he draws applicable to his
purpose from these facts. He does not deny that all the orders which
came from America subsequent to the disturbances of the Stamp Act were
on the condition of that act being repealed; and he does not assert
that, notwithstanding that act should be enforced by a strong hand,
still the orders would be executed. Neither does he quite venture to say
that this decline of the trade in 1766 was owing to the repeal. What
does he therefore infer from it, favorable to the enforcement of that
law? It only comes to this, and no more; those merchants, who thought
our trade would be doubled in the subsequent year, were mistaken in
their speculations. So that the Stamp Act was not to be repealed unless
this speculation of theirs was a probable event. But it was not repealed
in order to double our trade in that year, as everybody knows (whatever
some merchants might have said), but lest in that year we should have no
trade at all. The fact is, that during the greatest part of the year
1755, that is, until about the month of October, when the accounts of
the disturbances came thick upon us, the American trade went on as
usual. Before this time, the Stamp Act could not affect it. Afterwards,
the merchants fell into a great consternation; a general stagnation in
trade ensued. But as soon as it was known that the ministry favored the
repeal of the Stamp Act, several of the bolder merchants ventured to
execute their orders; others more timid hung back; in this manner the
trade continued in a state of dreadful fluctuation between the fears of
those who had ventured, for the event of their boldness, and the anxiety
of those whose trade was suspended, until the royal assent was finally
given to the bill of repeal. That the trade of 1766 was not equal to
that of 1765, could not be owing to the repeal; it arose from quite
different causes, of which the author seems not to be aware: 1st, Our
conquests during the war had laid open the trade of the French and
Spanish West Indies to our colonies much more largely than they had ever
enjoyed it; this continued for some time after the peace; but at length
it was extremely contracted, and in some places reduced to nothing. Such
in particular was the state of Jamaica. On the taking the Havannah all
the stores of that island were emptied into that place, which produced
unusual orders for goods, for supplying their own consumption, as well
as for further speculations of trade. These ceasing, the trade stood on
its own bottom. This is one cause of the diminished export to Jamaica,
and not the childish idea of the author, of an impossible contraband
from the opening of the ports.--2nd, The war had brought a great influx
of cash into America, for the pay and provision of the troops; and this
an unnatural increase of trade, which, as its cause failed, must in some
degree return to its ancient and natural bounds.--3rd, When the
merchants met from all parts, and compared their accounts, they were
alarmed at the immensity of the debt due to them from America. They
found that the Americans had over-traded their abilities. And, as they
found too that several of them were capable of making the state of
political events an excuse for their failure in commercial punctuality,
many of our merchants in some degree contracted their trade from that
moment. However, it is idle, in such an immense mass of trade, so liable
to fluctuation, to infer anything from such a deficiency as one or even
two hundred thousand pounds. In 1767, when the disturbances subsided,
this deficiency was made up again.
[94] The disturbances have been in Boston only; and were not in
consequence of the late duties.
[95] Page 24.
[96] "They are happy in having found, in your zeal for the dignity of
this nation, the means of liquidating their claims, and of concluding
with the court of France a convention for the final satisfaction of
their demands; and have given us commission, in their names, and on
their behalf, most earnestly to entreat your acceptance of their
grateful acknowledgments. Whether they consider themselves as Britons,
or as men more particularly profiting by your generous and spirited
interposition, they see great reasons to be thankful, for having been
supported by a minister, in whose public affections, in whose wisdom and
activity, both the national honor, and the interests of individuals,
have been at once so well supported and secured."--Thanks of the Canada
merchants to General Conway, London, April 28, 1766.
[97] See the Convention itself, printed by Owen and Harrison,
Warwick-lane, 1766; particularly the articles two and thirteen.
[98] Page 23.
[99] Page 46.
[100] Page 46.
APPENDIX.
So much misplaced industry has been used by the author of "The State of
the Nation," as well as by other writers, to infuse discontent into the
people, on account of the late war, and of the effects of our national
debt; that nothing ought to be omitted which may tend to disabuse the
public upon these subjects. When I had gone through the foregoing
sheets, I recollected, that, in pages 58, 59, 60, I only gave the
comparative states of the duties collected by the excise at large;
together with the quantities of strong beer brewed in the two periods
which are there compared. It might be still thought, that some other
articles of popular consumption, of general convenience, and connected
with our manufactures, might possibly have declined. I therefore now
think it right to lay before the reader the state of the produce of
three capital duties on such articles; duties which have frequently been
made the subject of popular complaint. The duty on candles; that on
soap, paper, &c.; and that on hides.
Average of net produce of duty on soap,
&c., for eight years ending 1767 £264,902
Average of ditto for eight years ending 1754 228,114
--------
Average increase £36,788
Average of net produce of duty on candles
for eight years ending 1767 £155,789
Average of ditto for eight years ending 1754 136,716
--------
Average increase £19,073
Average net produce of duty on hides,
eight years, ending 1767 £189,216
Ditto eight years, ending 1754 168,200
--------
Average increase £21,016
This increase has not arisen from any additional duties. None have been
imposed on these articles during the war. Notwithstanding the burdens of
the war, and the late dearness of provisions, the consumption of all
these articles has increased, and the revenue along with it.
There is another point in "The State of the Nation," to which, I fear, I
have not been so full in my answer as I ought to have been, and as I am
well warranted to be. The author has endeavored to throw a suspicion, or
something more, on that salutary, and indeed necessary measure of
opening the ports in Jamaica. "Orders were given," says he, "in
_August_, 1765, for the free admission of Spanish vessels into all the
colonies."[101] He then observes, that the exports to Jamaica fell
40,904_l._ short of those of 1764; and that the exports of the
succeeding year, 1766, fell short of those of 1765, about eighty pounds;
from whence he wisely infers, that this decline of exports being _since_
the relaxation of the laws of trade, there is a just ground of
suspicion, that the colonies have been supplied with foreign commodities
instead of British.
Here, as usual with him, the author builds on a fact which is
absolutely false; and which, being so, renders his whole hypothesis
absurd and impossible. He asserts, that the order for admitting Spanish
vessels was given in _August_, 1765. That order was not _signed at the
treasury board until the 15th day of the November following_; and
therefore so far from affecting the exports of the year 1765, that,
supposing all possible diligence in the commissioners of the customs in
expediting that order, and every advantage of vessels ready to sail, and
the most favorable wind, it would hardly even arrive in Jamaica, within
the limits of that year.
This order could therefore by no possibility be a cause of the decrease
of exports in 1765. If it had any mischievous operation, it could not be
before 1766. In that year, according to our author, the exports fell
short of the preceding, just _eighty_ pounds. He is welcome to that
diminution; and to all the consequences he can draw from it.
But, as an auxiliary to account for this dreadful loss, he brings in the
Free-port Act, which he observes (for his convenience) to have been made
in spring, 1766; but (for his convenience likewise) he forgets, that, by
the express provision of the act, the regulation was not to be in force
in Jamaica until the November following. Miraculous must be the activity
of that contraband whose operation in America could, before the end of
that year, have reacted upon England, and checked the exportation from
hence! Unless he chooses to suppose, that the merchants at whose
solicitation this act had been obtained, were so frightened at the
accomplishment of their own most earnest and anxious desire, that,
before any good or evil effect from it could happen, they immediately
put a stop to all further exportation.
It is obvious that we must look for the true effect of that act at the
time of its first possible operation, that is, in the year 1767. On this
idea how stands the account?
1764, Exports to Jamaica £ 456,528
1765 415,624
1766 415,544
1767 (first year of the Free-port Act) 467,681
This author, for the sake of a present momentary credit, will hazard any
future and permanent disgrace. At the time he wrote, the account of 1767
could not be made up. This was the very first year of the trial of the
Free-port Act; and we find that the sale of British commodities is so
far from being lessened by that act, that the export of 1767 amounts to
52,000_l._ more than that of either of the two preceding years, and is
11,000_l._ above that of his standard year 1764. If I could prevail on
myself to argue in favor of a great commercial scheme from the
appearance of things in a single year, I should from this increase of
export infer the beneficial effects of that measure. In truth, it is not
wanting. Nothing but the thickest ignorance of the Jamaica trade could
have made any one entertain a fancy, that the least ill effect on our
commerce could follow from this opening of the ports. But, if the author
argues the effect of regulations in the American trade from the export
of the year in which they are made, or even of the following; why did he
not apply this rule to his own? He had the same paper before him which I
have now before me. He must have seen that in his standard year (the
year 1764), the principal year of his new regulations, the export fell
no less than 128,450_l._ short of that in 1763! Did the export trade
revive by these regulations in 1765, during which year they continued in
their full force? It fell about 40,000_l._ still lower. Here is a fall
of 168,000_l._; to account for which, would have become the author much
better than piddling for an 80_l._ fall in the year 1766 (the only year
in which _the order_ he objects to could operate), or in presuming a
fall of exports from a regulation which took place only in November,
1766; whose effects could not appear until the following year; and
which, when they do appear, utterly overthrow all his flimsy reasons and
affected suspicions upon the effect of opening the ports.
This author, in the same paragraph, says, that "it was asserted by _the
American factors and agents_, that the commanders of our ships of war
and tenders, having custom-house commissions, and the strict orders
given in 1764 for a due execution of the laws of trade in the colonies,
had deterred the Spaniards from trading with us; that the sale of
British manufactures in the West Indies had been greatly lessened, and
the receipt of large sums of specie prevented."
If the _American factors and agents_ asserted this, they had good ground
for their assertion. They knew that the Spanish vessels had been driven
from our ports. The author does not positively deny the fact. If he
should, it will be proved. When the factors connected this measure, and
its natural consequences, with an actual fall in the exports to Jamaica,
to no less an amount than 128,460_l._ in one year, and with a further
fall in the next, is their assertion very wonderful? The author himself
is full as much alarmed by a fall of only 40,000_l._; for giving him
the facts which he chooses to coin, it is no more. The expulsion of the
Spanish vessels must certainly have been one cause, if not of the first
declension of the exports, yet of their continuance in their reduced
state. Other causes had their operation, without doubt. In what degree
each cause produced its effect, it is hard to determine. But the fact of
a fall of exports upon the restraining plan, and of a rise upon the
taking place of the enlarging plan, is established beyond all
contradiction.
This author says, that the facts relative to the Spanish trade were
asserted by _American factors and agents_; insinuating, that the
ministry of 1766 had no better authority for their plan of enlargement
than such assertions. The moment he chooses it, he shall see the very
same thing asserted by governors of provinces, by commanders of
men-of-war, and by officers of the customs; persons the most bound in
duty to prevent contraband, and the most interested in the seizures to
be made in consequence of strict regulation. I suppress them for the
present; wishing that the author may not drive me to a more full
discussion of this matter than it may be altogether prudent to enter
into. I wish he had not made any of these discussions necessary.
FOOTNOTES:
[101] His note, p. 22.
THOUGHTS
ON
THE CAUSE OF THE PRESENT DISCONTENTS.
Hoc vero occultum, intestinum, domesticum malum, non modo non
existit, verum etiam opprimit, antequam perspicere atque explorare
potueris.
CIC.
1770.
It is an undertaking of some degree of delicacy to examine into the
cause of public disorders. If a man happens not to succeed in such an
inquiry, he will be thought weak and visionary; if he touches the true
grievance, there is a danger that he may come near to persons of weight
and consequence, who will rather be exasperated at the discovery of
their errors, than thankful for the occasion of correcting them. If he
should be obliged to blame the favorites of the people, he will be
considered as the tool of power; if he censures those in power, he will
be looked on as an instrument of faction. But in all exertions of duty
something is to be hazarded. In cases of tumult and disorder, our law
has invested every man, in some sort, with the authority of a
magistrate. When the affairs of the nation are distracted, private
people are, by the spirit of that law, justified in stepping a little
out of their ordinary sphere. They enjoy a privilege, of somewhat more
dignity and effect, than that of idle lamentation over the calamities of
their country. They may look into them narrowly; they may reason upon
them liberally; and if they should be so fortunate as to discover the
true source of the mischief, and to suggest any probable method of
removing it, though they may displease the rulers for the day, they are
certainly of service to the cause of government. Government is deeply
interested in everything which, even through the medium of some
temporary uneasiness, may tend finally to compose the minds of the
subject, and to conciliate their affections. I have nothing to do here
with the abstract value of the voice of the people. But as long as
reputation, the most precious possession of every individual, and as
long as opinion, the great support of the state, depend entirely upon
that voice, it can never be considered as a thing of little consequence
either to individuals or to governments. Nations are not primarily ruled
by laws: less by violence. Whatever original energy may be supposed
either in force or regulation, the operation of both is, in truth,
merely instrumental. Nations are governed by the same methods, and on
the same principles, by which an individual without authority is often
able to govern those who are his equals or his superiors; by a knowledge
of their temper, and by a judicious management of it; I mean,--when
public affairs are steadily and quietly conducted; not when government
is nothing but a continued scuffle between the magistrate and the
multitude; in which sometimes the one and sometimes the other is
uppermost; in which they alternately yield and prevail, in a series of
contemptible victories, and scandalous submissions. The temper of the
people amongst whom he presides ought therefore to be the first study of
a statesman. And the knowledge of this temper it is by no means
impossible for him to attain, if he has not an interest in being
ignorant of what it is his duty to learn.
To complain of the age we live in, to murmur at the present possessors
of power, to lament the past, to conceive extravagant hopes of the
future, are the common dispositions of the greatest part of mankind;
indeed the necessary effects of the ignorance and levity of the vulgar.
Such complaints and humors have existed in all times; yet as all times
have _not_ been alike, true political sagacity manifests itself in
distinguishing that complaint which only characterizes the general
infirmity of human nature, from those which are symptoms of the
particular distemperature of our own air and season.
Nobody, I believe, will consider it merely as the language of spleen or
disappointment, if I say, that there is something particularly alarming
in the present conjuncture. There is hardly a man, in or out of power,
who holds any other language. That government is at once dreaded and
contemned; that the laws are despoiled of all their respected and
salutary terrors; that their inaction is a subject of ridicule, and
their exertion of abhorrence; that rank, and office and title, and all
the solemn plausibilities of the world, have lost their reverence and
effect; that our foreign politics are as much deranged as our domestic
economy; that our dependencies are slackened in their affection, and
loosened from their obedience; that we know neither how to yield nor how
to enforce; that hardly anything above or below, abroad or at home, is
sound and entire; but that disconnection and confusion, in offices, in
parties, in families, in Parliament, in the nation, prevail beyond the
disorders of any former time: these are facts universally admitted and
lamented.
This state of things is the more extraordinary, because the great
parties which formerly divided and agitated the kingdom are known to be
in a manner entirely dissolved. No great external calamity has visited
the nation; no pestilence or famine. We do not labor at present under
any scheme of taxation new or oppressive in the quantity or in the mode.
Nor are we engaged in unsuccessful war; in which, our misfortunes might
easily pervert our judgment; and our minds, sore from the loss of
national glory, might feel every blow of fortune as a crime in
government.
It is impossible that the cause of this strange distemper should not
sometimes become a subject of discourse. It is a compliment due, and
which I willingly pay, to those who administer our affairs, to take
notice in the first place of their speculation. Our ministers are of
opinion, that the increase of our trade and manufactures, that our
growth by colonization, and by conquest, have concurred to accumulate
immense wealth in the hands of some individuals; and this again being
dispersed among the people, has rendered them universally proud,
ferocious, and ungovernable; that the insolence of some from their
enormous wealth, and the boldness of others from a guilty poverty, have
rendered them capable of the most atrocious attempts; so that they have
trampled upon all subordination, and violently borne down the unarmed
laws of a free government; barriers too feeble against the fury of a
populace so fierce and licentious as ours. They contend, that no
adequate provocation has been given for so spreading a discontent; our
affairs having been conducted throughout with remarkable temper and
consummate wisdom. The wicked industry of some libellers, joined to the
intrigues of a few disappointed politicians, have, in their opinion,
been able to produce this unnatural ferment in the nation.
Nothing indeed can be more unnatural than the present convulsions of
this country, if the above account be a true one. I confess I shall
assent to it with great reluctance, and only on the compulsion of the
clearest and firmest proofs; because their account resolves itself into
this short, but discouraging proposition, "That we have a very good
ministry, but that we are a very bad people"; that we set ourselves to
bite the hand that feeds us; that with a malignant insanity, we oppose
the measures, and ungratefully vilify the persons, of those whose sole
object is our own peace and prosperity. If a few puny libellers, acting
under a knot of factious politicians, without virtue, parts, or
character, (such they are constantly represented by these gentlemen,)
are sufficient to excite this disturbance, very perverse must be the
disposition of that people, amongst whom such a disturbance can be
excited by such means. It is besides no small aggravation of the public
misfortune, that the disease, on this hypothesis, appears to be without
remedy. If the wealth of the nation be the cause of its turbulence, I
imagine it is not proposed to introduce poverty, as a constable to keep
the peace. If our dominions abroad are the roots which feed all this
rank luxuriance of sedition, it is not intended to cut them off in order
to famish the fruit. If our liberty has enfeebled the executive power,
there is no design, I hope, to call in the aid of despotism, to fill up
the deficiencies of law. Whatever may be intended, these things are not
yet professed. We seem therefore to be driven to absolute despair; for
we have no other materials to work upon, but those out of which God has
been pleased to form the inhabitants of this island. If these be
radically and essentially vicious, all that can be said is, that those
men are very unhappy, to whose fortune or duty it falls to administer
the affairs of this untoward people. I hear it indeed sometimes
asserted, that a steady perseverance in the present measures, and a
rigorous punishment of those who oppose them, will in course of time
infallibly put an end to these disorders. But this, in my opinion, is
said without much observation of our present disposition, and without
any knowledge at all of the general nature of mankind. If the matter of
which this nation is composed be so very fermentable as these gentlemen
describe it, leaven never will be wanting to work it up, as long as
discontent, revenge, and ambition, have existence in the world.
Particular punishments are the cure for accidental distempers in the
state; they inflame rather than allay those heats which arise from the
settled mismanagement of the government, or from a natural indisposition
in the people. It is of the utmost moment not to make mistakes in the
use of strong measures; and firmness is then only a virtue when it
accompanies the most perfect wisdom. In truth, inconstancy is a sort of
natural corrective of folly and ignorance.
I am not one of those who think that the people are never in the wrong.
They have been so, frequently and outrageously, both in other countries
and in this. But I do say, that in all disputes between them and their
rulers, the presumption is at least upon a par in favor of the people.
Experience may perhaps justify me in going further. When popular
discontents have been very prevalent, it may well be affirmed and
supported, that there has been generally something found amiss in the
constitution, or in the conduct of government. The people have no
interest in disorder. When they do wrong, it is their error, and not
their crime. But with the governing part of the state, it is for
otherwise. They certainly may act ill by design, as well as by mistake.
"_Les révolutions qui arrivent dans les grands états ne sont point un
effect du hazard, ni du caprice des peuples. Rien ne révolte _les
grands_ d'un royaume comme _un gouvernement foible et dérangé_. Pour la
_populace_, ce n'est jamais par envie d'attaquer qu'elle se soulève,
mais par impatience de souffrir._"[102] These are the words of a great
man; of a minister of state; and a zealous assertor of monarchy. They
are applied to the _system of favoritism_ which was adopted by Henry the
Third of France, and to the dreadful consequences it produced. What he
says of revolutions, is equally true of all great disturbances. If this
presumption in favor of the subjects against the trustees of power be
not the more probable, I am sure it is the more comfortable speculation;
because it is more easy to change an administration, than to reform a
people.
Upon a supposition, therefore, that, in the opening of the cause, the
presumptions stand equally balanced between the parties, there seems
sufficient ground to entitle any person to a fair hearing, who attempts
some other scheme beside that easy one which is fashionable in some
fashionable companies, to account for the present discontents. It is not
to be argued that we endure no grievance, because our grievances are not
of the same sort with those under which we labored formerly; not
precisely those which we bore from the Tudors, or vindicated on the
Stuarts. A great change has taken place in the affairs of this country.
For in the silent lapse of events as material alterations have been
insensibly brought about in the policy and character of governments and
nations, as those which have been marked by the tumult of public
revolutions.
It is very rare indeed for men to be wrong in their feelings concerning
public misconduct; as rare to be right in their speculation upon the
cause of it. I have constantly observed, that the generality of people
are fifty years, at least, behindhand in their politics. There are but
very few who are capable of comparing and digesting what passes before
their eyes at different times and occasions, so as to form the whole
into a distinct system. But in books everything is settled for them,
without the exertion of any considerable diligence or sagacity. For
which reason men are wise with but little reflection, and good with
little self-denial, in the business of all times except their own. We
are very uncorrupt and tolerably enlightened judges of the transactions
of past ages; where no passions deceive, and where the whole train of
circumstances, from the trifling cause to the tragical event, is set in
an orderly series before us. Few are the partisans of departed tyranny;
and to be a Whig on the business of an hundred years ago, is very
consistent with every advantage of present servility. This retrospective
wisdom, and historical patriotism, are things of wonderful convenience,
and serve admirably to reconcile the old quarrel between speculation and
practice. Many a stern republican, after gorging himself with a full
feast of admiration of the Grecian commonwealths and of our true Saxon
constitution, and discharging all the splendid bile of his virtuous
indignation on King John and King James, sits down perfectly satisfied
to the coarsest work and homeliest job of the day he lives in. I believe
there was no professed admirer of Henry the Eighth among the instruments
of the last King James; nor in the court of Henry the Eighth was there,
I dare say, to be found a single advocate for the favorites of Richard
the Second.
No complaisance to our court, or to our age, can make me believe nature
to be so changed, but that public liberty will be among us as among our
ancestors, obnoxious to some person or other; and that opportunities
will be furnished for attempting, at least, some alteration to the
prejudice of our constitution. These attempts will naturally vary in
their mode according to times and circumstances. For ambition, though it
has ever the same general views, has not at all times the same means,
nor the same particular objects. A great deal of the furniture of
ancient tyranny is worn to rags; the rest is entirely out of fashion.
Besides, there are few statesmen so very clumsy and awkward in their
business, as to fall into the identical snare which has proved fatal to
their predecessors. When an arbitrary imposition is attempted upon the
subject, undoubtedly it will not bear on its forehead the name of
_Ship-money_. There is no danger that an extension of the _Forest laws_
should be the chosen mode of oppression in this age. And when we hear
any instance of ministerial rapacity, to the prejudice of the rights of
private life, it will certainly not be the exaction of two hundred
pullets, from a woman of fashion, for leave to lie with her own
husband.[103]
Every age has its own manners, and its politics dependent upon them;
and the same attempts will not be made against a constitution fully
formed and matured, that were used to destroy it in the cradle, or to
resist its growth during its infancy.
Against the being of Parliament, I am satisfied, no designs have ever
been entertained since the revolution. Every one must perceive, that it
is strongly the interest of the court, to have some second cause
interposed between the ministers and the people. The gentlemen of the
House of Commons have an interest equally strong in sustaining the part
of that intermediate cause. However they may hire out the _usufruct_ of
their voices, they never will part with the _fee and inheritance_.
Accordingly those who have been of the most known devotion to the will
and pleasure of a court have, at the same time, been most forward in
asserting a high authority in the House of Commons. When they knew who
were to use that authority, and how it was to be employed, they thought
it never could be carried too far. It must be always the wish of an
unconstitutional statesman, that a House of Commons, who are entirely
dependent upon him, should have every right of the people entirely
dependent upon their pleasure. It was soon discovered, that the forms of
a free, and the ends of an arbitrary government, were things not
altogether incompatible.
The power of the crown, almost dead and rotten as Prerogative, has grown
up anew, with much more strength, and far less odium, under the name of
Influence. An influence, which operated without noise and without
violence; an influence, which converted the very antagonist into the
instrument of power; which contained in itself a perpetual principle of
growth and renovation; and which the distresses and the prosperity of
the country equally tended to augment, was an admirable substitute for a
prerogative, that, being only the offspring of antiquated prejudices,
had moulded in its original stamina irresistible principles of decay and
dissolution. The ignorance of the people is a bottom but for a temporary
system; the interest of active men in the state is a foundation
perpetual and infallible. However, some circumstances, arising, it must
be confessed, in a great degree from accident, prevented the effects of
this influence for a long time from breaking out in a manner capable of
exciting any serious apprehensions. Although government was strong and
flourished exceedingly, the _court_ had drawn far less advantage than
one would imagine from this great source of power.
At the revolution, the crown, deprived, for the ends of the revolution
itself, of many prerogatives, was found too weak to struggle against all
the difficulties which pressed so new and unsettled a government. The
court was obliged therefore to delegate a part of its powers to men of
such interest as could support, and of such fidelity as would adhere to,
its establishment. Such men were able to draw in a greater number to a
concurrence in the common defence. This connection, necessary at first,
continued long after convenient; and properly conducted might indeed, in
all situations, be an useful instrument of government. At the same time,
through the intervention of men of popular weight and character, the
people possessed a security for their just proportion of importance in
the state. But as the title to the crown grew stronger by long
possession, and by the constant increase of its influence, these helps
have of late seemed to certain persons no better than incumbrances. The
powerful managers for government were not sufficiently submissive to the
pleasure of the possessors of immediate and personal favor, sometimes
from a confidence in their own strength, natural and acquired; sometimes
from a fear of offending their friends, and weakening that lead in the
country which gave them a consideration independent of the court. Men
acted as if the court could receive, as well as confer, an obligation.
The influence of government, thus divided in appearance between the
court and the leaders of parties, became in many cases an accession
rather to the popular than to the royal scale; and some part of that
influence, which would otherwise have been possessed as in a sort of
mortmain and unalienable domain, returned again to the great ocean from
whence it arose, and circulated among the people. This method,
therefore, of governing by men of great natural interest or great
acquired consideration was viewed in a very invidious light by the true
lovers of absolute monarchy. It is the nature of despotism to abhor
power held by any means but its own momentary pleasure; and to
annihilate all intermediate situations between boundless strength on its
own part, and total debility on the part of the people.
To get rid of all this intermediate and independent importance, and _to
secure to the court the unlimited and uncontrolled use of its own vast
influence, under the sole direction of its own private favor_, has for
some years past been the great object of policy. If this were
compassed, the influence of the crown must of course produce all the
effects which the most sanguine partisans of the court could possibly
desire. Government might then be carried on without any concurrence on
the part of the people; without any attention to the dignity of the
greater, or to the affections of the lower sorts. A new project was
therefore devised by a certain set of intriguing men, totally different
from the system of administration which had prevailed since the
accession of the House of Brunswick. This project, I have heard, was
first conceived by some persons in the court of Frederick Prince of
Wales.
The earliest attempt in the execution of this design was to set up for
minister, a person, in rank indeed respectable, and very ample in
fortune; but who, to the moment of this vast and sudden elevation, was
little known or considered in the kingdom. To him the whole nation was
to yield an immediate and implicit submission. But whether it was from
want of firmness to bear up against the first opposition; or that things
were not yet fully ripened, or that this method was not found the most
eligible; that idea was soon abandoned. The instrumental part of the
project was a little altered, to accommodate it to the time and to bring
things more gradually and more surely to the one great end proposed.
The first part of the reformed plan was to draw _a line which should
separate the court from the ministry_. Hitherto these names had been
looked upon as synonymous; but for the future, court and administration
were to be considered as things totally distinct. By this operation, two
systems of administration were to be formed; one which should be in the
real secret and confidence; the other merely ostensible to perform the
official and executory duties of government. The latter were alone to be
responsible; whilst the real advisers, who enjoyed all the power, were
effectually removed from all the danger.
Secondly, _A party under these leaders was to be formed in favor of the
court against the ministry_: this party was to have a large share in the
emoluments of government, and to hold it totally separate from, and
independent of, ostensible administration.
The third point, and that on which the success of the whole scheme
ultimately depended, was _to bring Parliament to an acquiescence in this
project_. Parliament was therefore to be taught by degrees a total
indifference to the persons, rank, influence, abilities, connections,
and character of the ministers of the crown. By means of a discipline,
on which I shall say more hereafter, that body was to be habituated to
the most opposite interests, and the most discordant politics. All
connections and dependencies among subjects were to be entirely
dissolved. As, hitherto, business had gone through the hands of leaders
of Whigs or Tories, men of talents to conciliate the people, and to
engage their confidence; now the method was to be altered: and the lead
was to be given to men of no sort of consideration or credit in the
country. This want of natural importance was to be their very title to
delegated power. Members of Parliament were to be hardened into an
insensibility to pride as well as to duty. Those high and haughty
sentiments, which are the great support of independence, were to be let
down gradually. Points of honor and precedence were no more to be
regarded in Parliamentary decorum than in a Turkish army. It was to be
avowed, as a constitutional maxim, that the king might appoint one of
his footmen, or one of your footmen for minister; and that he ought to
be, and that he would be, as well followed as the first name for rank or
wisdom in the nation. Thus Parliament was to look on as if perfectly
unconcerned, while a cabal of the closet and back-stairs was substituted
in the place of a national administration.
With such a degree of acquiescence, any measure of any court might well
be deemed thoroughly secure. The capital objects, and by much the most
flattering characteristics of arbitrary power, would be obtained.
Everything would be drawn from its holdings in the country to the
personal favor and inclination of the prince. This favor would be the
sole introduction to power, and the only tenure by which it was to be
held; so that no person looking towards another, and all looking towards
the court, it was impossible but that the motive which solely influenced
every man's hopes must come in time to govern every man's conduct; till
at last the servility became universal, in spite of the dead letter of
any laws or institutions whatsoever.
How it should happen that any man could be tempted to venture upon such
a project of government, may at first view appear surprising. But the
fact is that opportunities very inviting to such an attempt have
offered; and the scheme itself was not destitute of some arguments, not
wholly unplausible, to recommend it. These opportunities and these
arguments, the use that has been made of both, the plan for carrying
this new scheme of government into execution, and the effects which it
has produced, are, in my opinion, worthy of our serious consideration.
His Majesty came to the throne of these kingdoms with more advantages
than any of his predecessors since the revolution. Fourth in descent,
and third in succession of his royal family, even the zealots of
hereditary right, in him, saw something to flatter their favorite
prejudices; and to justify a transfer of their attachments, without a
change in their principles. The person and cause of the Pretender were
become contemptible; his title disowned throughout Europe; his party
disbanded in England. His Majesty came, indeed, to the inheritance of a
mighty war; but, victorious in every part of the globe, peace was always
in his power, not to negotiate, but to dictate. No foreign habitudes or
attachments withdrew him from the cultivation of his power at home. His
revenue for the civil establishment, fixed (as it was then thought) at a
large, but definite sum, was ample without being invidious. His
influence, by additions from conquest, by an augmentation of debt, by an
increase of military and naval establishment, much strengthened and
extended. And coming to the throne in the prime and full vigor of youth,
as from affection there was a strong dislike, so from dread there seemed
to be a general averseness, from giving anything like offence to a
monarch, against whose resentment opposition could not look for a refuge
in any sort of reversionary hope.
These singular advantages inspired his Majesty only with a more ardent
desire to preserve unimpaired the spirit of that national freedom, to
which he owed a situation so full of glory. But to others it suggested
sentiments of a very different nature. They thought they now beheld an
opportunity (by a certain sort of statesmen never long undiscovered or
unemployed) of drawing to themselves by the aggrandizement of a court
faction, a degree of power which they could never hope to derive from
natural influence or from honorable service; and which it was impossible
they could hold with the least security, whilst the system of
administration rested upon its former bottom. In order to facilitate the
execution of their design, it was necessary to make many alterations in
political arrangement, and a signal change in the opinions, habits, and
connections of the greatest part of those who at that time acted in
public.
In the first place, they proceeded gradually, but not slowly, to destroy
everything of strength which did not derive its principal nourishment
from the immediate pleasure of the court. The greatest weight of popular
opinion and party connection were then with the Duke of Newcastle and
Mr. Pitt. Neither of these held their importance by the _new tenure_ of
the court; they were not therefore thought to be so proper as others for
the services which were required by that tenure. It happened very
favorably for the new system, that under a forced coalition there
rankled an incurable alienation and disgust between the parties which
composed the administration. Mr. Pitt was first attacked. Not satisfied
with removing him from power, they endeavored by various artifices to
ruin his character. The other party seemed rather pleased to get rid of
so oppressive a support; not perceiving, that their own fall was
prepared by his, and involved in it. Many other reasons prevented them
from daring to look their true situation in the face. To the great Whig
families it was extremely disagreeable, and seemed almost unnatural, to
oppose the administration of a prince of the House of Brunswick. Day
after day they hesitated, and doubted, and lingered, expecting that
other counsels would take place; and were slow to be persuaded, that all
which had been done by the cabal was the effect not of humor, but of
system. It was more strongly and evidently the interest of the new court
faction, to get rid of the great Whig connections, than to destroy Mr.
Pitt. The power of that gentleman was vast indeed and merited; but it
was in a great degree personal, and therefore transient. Theirs was
rooted in the country. For, with a good deal less of popularity, they
possessed a far more natural and fixed influence. Long possession of
government; vast property; obligations of favors given and received;
connection of office; ties of blood, of alliance, of friendship (things
at that time supposed of some force); the name of Whig, dear to the
majority of the people; the zeal early begun and steadily continued to
the royal family: all these together formed a body of power in the
nation, which was criminal and devoted. The great ruling principle of
the cabal, and that which animated and harmonized all their proceedings,
how various soever they may have been, was to signify to the world that
the court would proceed upon its own proper forces only; and that the
pretence of bringing any other into its service was an affront to it,
and not a support. Therefore when the chiefs were removed, in order to
go to the root, the whole party was put under a proscription, so general
and severe, as to take their hard-earned bread from the lowest officers,
in a manner which had never been known before, even in general
revolutions. But it was thought necessary effectually to destroy all
dependencies but one; and to show an example of the firmness and rigor
with which the new system was to be supported.
Thus for the time were pulled down, in the persons of the Whig leaders
and of Mr. Pitt (in spite of the services of the one at the accession of
the royal family, and the recent services of the other in the war), the
_two only securities for the importance of the people; power arising
from popularity; and power arising from connection_. Here and there
indeed a few individuals were left standing, who gave security for their
total estrangement from the odious principles of party connection and
personal attachment; and it must be confessed that most of them have
religiously kept their faith. Such a change could not however be made
without a mighty shock to government.
To reconcile the minds of the people to all these movements, principles
correspondent to them had been preached up with great zeal. Every one
must remember that the cabal set out with the most astonishing prudery,
both moral and political. Those, who in a few months after soused over
head and ears into the deepest and dirtiest pits of corruption, cried
out violently against the indirect practices in the electing and
managing of Parliaments, which had formerly prevailed. This marvellous
abhorrence which the court had suddenly taken to all influence, was not
only circulated in conversation through the kingdom, but pompously
announced to the public, with many other extraordinary things, in a
pamphlet[104] which had all the appearance of a manifesto preparatory to
some considerable enterprise. Throughout it was a satire, though in
terms managed and decent enough, on the politics of the former reign.
It was indeed written with no small art and address.
In this piece appeared the first dawning of the new system: there first
appeared the idea (then only in speculation) of _separating the court
from the administration_; of carrying everything from national
connection to personal regards; and of forming a regular party for that
purpose, under the name of _king's men_.
To recommend this system to the people, a perspective view of the court,
gorgeously painted, and finely illuminated from within, was exhibited to
the gaping multitude. Party was to be totally done away, with all its
evil works. Corruption was to be cast down from court, as _Atè_ was from
heaven. Power was thenceforward to be the chosen residence of public
spirit; and no one was to be supposed under any sinister influence,
except those who had the misfortune to be in disgrace at court, which
was to stand in lieu of all vices and all corruptions. A scheme of
perfection to be realized in a monarchy far beyond the visionary
republic of Plato. The whole scenery was exactly disposed to captivate
those good souls, whose credulous morality is so invaluable a treasure
to crafty politicians. Indeed there was wherewithal to charm everybody,
except those few who are not much pleased with professions of
supernatural virtue, who know of what stuff such professions are made,
for what purposes they are designed, and in what they are sure
constantly to end. Many innocent gentlemen, who had been talking prose
all their lives without knowing anything of the matter, began at last to
open their eyes upon their own merits, and to attribute their not having
been lords of the treasury and lords of trade many years before, merely
to the prevalence of party, and to the ministerial power, which had
frustrated the good intentions of the court in favor of their abilities.
Now was the time to unlock the sealed fountain of royal bounty, which
had been infamously monopolized and huckstered, and to let it flow at
large upon the whole people. The time was come, to restore royalty to
its original splendor. _Mettre le Roy hors de page_, became a sort of
watchword. And it was constantly in the mouths of all the runners of the
court, that nothing could preserve the balance of the constitution from
being overturned by the rabble, or by a faction of the nobility, but to
free the sovereign effectually from that ministerial tyranny under which
the royal dignity had been oppressed in the person of his Majesty's
grandfather.
These were some of the many artifices used to reconcile the people to
the great change which was made in the persons who composed the
ministry, and the still greater which was made and avowed in its
constitution. As to individuals, other methods were employed with them;
in order so thoroughly to disunite every party, and even every family,
that _no concert, order, or effect, might appear in any future
opposition_. And in this manner an administration without connection
with the people, or with one another, was first put in possession of
government. What good consequences followed from it, we have all seen;
whether with regard to virtue, public or private; to the ease and
happiness of the sovereign; or to the real strength of government. But
as so much stress was then laid on the necessity of this new project, it
will not be amiss to take a view of the effects of this royal servitude
and vile durance, which was so deplored in the reign of the late
monarch, and was so carefully to be avoided in the reign of his
successor. The effects were these.
In times full of doubt and danger to his person and family, George II.
maintained the dignity of his crown connected with the liberty of his
people, not only unimpaired, but improved, for the space of thirty-three
years. He overcame a dangerous rebellion, abetted by foreign force, and
raging in the heart of his kingdoms; and thereby destroyed the seeds of
all future rebellion that could arise upon the same principle. He
carried the glory, the power, the commerce of England, to a height
unknown even to this renowned nation in the times of its greatest
prosperity: and he left his succession resting on the true and only true
foundations of all national and all regal greatness; affection at home,
reputation abroad, trust in allies, terror in rival nations. The most
ardent lover of his country cannot wish for Great Britain a happier fate
than to continue as she was then left. A people, emulous as we are in
affection to our present sovereign, know not how to form a prayer to
heaven for a greater blessing upon his virtues, or a higher state of
felicity and glory, than that he should live, and should reign, and when
Providence ordains it, should die, exactly like his illustrious
predecessor.
A great prince may be obliged (though such a thing cannot happen very
often) to sacrifice his private inclination to his public interest. A
wise prince will not think that such a restraint implies a condition of
servility; and truly, if such was the condition of the last reign, and
the effects were also such as we have described, we ought, no less for
the sake of the sovereign whom we love, than for our own, to hear
arguments convincing indeed, before we depart from the maxims of that
reign, or fly in the face of this great body of strong and recent
experience.
One of the principal topics which was then, and has been since, much
employed by that political[105] school, is an affected terror of the
growth of an aristocratic power, prejudicial to the rights of the crown,
and the balance of the constitution. Any new powers exercised in the
House of Lords, or in the House of Commons, or by the crown, ought
certainly to excite the vigilant and anxious jealousy of a free people.
Even a new and unprecedented course of action in the whole legislature,
without great and evident reason, may be a subject of just uneasiness. I
will not affirm, that there may not have lately appeared in the House of
Lords, a disposition to some attempts derogatory to the legal rights of
the subject. If any such have really appeared, they have arisen, not
from a power properly aristocratic, but from the same influence which is
charged with having excited attempts of a similar nature in the House of
Commons; which House, if it should have been betrayed into an
unfortunate quarrel with its constituents, and involved in a charge of
the very same nature, could have neither power nor inclination to repel
such attempts in others. Those attempts in the House of Lords can no
more be called aristocratic proceedings, than the proceedings with
regard to the county of Middlesex in the House of Commons can with any
sense be called democratical.
It is true, that the peers have a great influence in the kingdom, and
in every part of the public concerns. While they are men of property, it
is impossible to prevent it, except by such means as must prevent all
property from its natural operation: an event not easily to be
compassed, while property is power; nor by any means to be wished, while
the least notion exists of the method by which the spirit of liberty
acts, and of the means by which it is preserved. If any particular
peers, by their uniform, upright, constitutional conduct, by their
public and their private virtues, have acquired an influence in the
country; the people, on whose favor that influence depends, and from
whom it arose, will never be duped into an opinion, that such greatness
in a peer is the despotism of an aristocracy, when they know and feel it
to be the effect and pledge of their own importance.
I am no friend to aristocracy, in the sense at least in which that word
is usually understood. If it were not a bad habit to moot cases on the
supposed ruin of the constitution, I should be free to declare, that if
it must perish, I would rather by far see it resolved into any other
form, than lost in that austere and insolent domination. But, whatever
my dislikes may be, my fears are not upon that quarter. The question, on
the influence of a court, and of a peerage, is not, which of the two
dangers is the more eligible, but which is the more imminent. He is but
a poor observer, who has not seen, that the generality of peers, far
from supporting themselves in a state of independent greatness, are but
too apt to fall into an oblivion of their proper dignity, and to run
headlong into an abject servitude. Would to God it were true, that the
fault of our peers were too much spirit. It is worthy of some
observation that these gentlemen, so jealous of aristocracy, make no
complaints of the power of those peers (neither few nor inconsiderable)
who are always in the train of a court, and whose whole weight must be
considered as a portion of the settled influence of the crown. This is
all safe and right; but if some peers (I am very sorry they are not as
many as they ought to be) set themselves, in the great concern of peers
and commons, against a back-stairs influence and clandestine government,
then the alarm begins; then the constitution is in danger of being
forced into an aristocracy.
I rest a little the longer on this court topic, because it was much
insisted upon at the time of the great change, and has been since
frequently revived by many of the agents of that party; for, whilst they
are terrifying the great and opulent with the horrors of mob-government,
they are by other managers attempting (though hitherto with little
success) to alarm the people with a phantom of tyranny in the nobles.
All this is done upon their favorite principle of disunion, of sowing
jealousies amongst the different orders of the state, and of disjointing
the natural strength of the kingdom; that it may be rendered incapable
of resisting the sinister designs of wicked men, who have engrossed the
royal power.
Thus much of the topics chosen by the courtiers to recommend their
system; it will be necessary to open a little more at large the nature
of that party which was formed for its support. Without this, the whole
would have been no better than a visionary amusement, like the scheme of
Harrington's political club, and not a business in which the nation had
a real concern. As a powerful party, and a party constructed on a new
principle, it is a very inviting object of curiosity.
It must be remembered, that since the revolution, until the period we
are speaking of, the influence of the crown had been always employed in
supporting the ministers of state, and in carrying on the public
business according to their opinions. But the party now in question is
formed upon a very different idea. It is to intercept the favor,
protection, and confidence of the crown in the passage to its ministers;
it is to come between them and their importance in Parliament; it is to
separate them from all their natural and acquired dependencies; it is
intended as the control, not the support, of administration. The
machinery of this system is perplexed in its movements, and false in its
principle. It is formed on a supposition that the king is something
external to his government; and that he may be honored and aggrandized,
even by its debility and disgrace. The plan proceeds expressly on the
idea of enfeebling the regular executory power. It proceeds on the idea
of weakening the state in order to strengthen the court. The scheme
depending entirely on distrust, on disconnection, on mutability by
principle, on systematic weakness in every particular member; it is
impossible that the total result should be substantial strength of any
kind.
As a foundation of their scheme, the cabal have established a sort of
_rota_ in the court. All sorts of parties, by this means, have been
brought into administration; from whence few have had the good fortune
to escape without disgrace; none at all without considerable losses. In
the beginning of each arrangement no professions of confidence and
support are wanting, to induce the leading men to engage. But while the
ministers of the day appear in all the pomp and pride of power, while
they have all their canvas spread out to the wind, and every sail filled
with the fair and prosperous gale of royal favor, in a short time they
find, they know not how, a current, which sets directly against them:
which prevents all progress; and even drives them backwards. They grow
ashamed and mortified in a situation, which, by its vicinity to power,
only serves to remind them the more strongly of their insignificance.
They are obliged either to execute the orders of their inferiors, or to
see themselves opposed by the natural instruments of their office. With
the loss of their dignity they lose their temper. In their turn they
grow troublesome to that cabal which, whether it supports or opposes,
equally disgraces and equally betrays them. It is soon found necessary
to get rid of the heads of administration; but it is of the heads only.
As there always are many rotten members belonging to the best
connections, it is not hard to persuade several to continue in office
without their leaders. By this means the party goes out much thinner
than it came in; and is only reduced in strength by its temporary
possession of power. Besides, if by accident, or in course of changes,
that power should be recovered, the junto have thrown up a retrenchment
of these carcasses, which may serve to cover themselves in a day of
danger. They conclude, not unwisely, that such rotten members will
become the first objects of disgust and resentment to their ancient
connections.
They contrive to form in the outward administration two parties at the
least; which, whilst they are tearing one another to pieces, are both
competitors for the favor and protection of the cabal; and, by their
emulation, contribute to throw everything more and more into the hands
of the interior managers.
A minister of state will sometimes keep himself totally estranged from
all his colleagues; will differ from them in their councils, will
privately traverse, and publicly oppose, their measures. He will,
however, continue in his employment. Instead of suffering any mark of
displeasure, he will be distinguished by an unbounded profusion of court
rewards and caresses; because he does what is expected, and all that is
expected, from men in office. He helps to keep some form of
administration in being, and keeps it at the same time as weak and
divided as possible.
However, we must take care not to be mistaken, or to imagine that such
persons have any weight in their opposition. When, by them,
administration is convinced of its insignificancy, they are soon to be
convinced of their own. They never are suffered to succeed in their
opposition. They and the world are to be satisfied, that neither office,
nor authority, nor property, nor ability, eloquence, counsel, skill, or
union, are of the least importance; but that the mere influence of the
court, naked of all support, and destitute of all management, is
abundantly sufficient for all its own purposes.
When any adverse connection is to be destroyed, the cabal seldom appear
in the work themselves. They find out some person of whom the party
entertains a high opinion. Such a person they endeavor to delude with
various pretences. They teach him first to distrust, and then to quarrel
with his friends; among whom, by the same arts, they excite a similar
diffidence of him; so that in this mutual fear and distrust, he may
suffer himself to be employed as the instrument in the change which is
brought about. Afterwards they are sure to destroy him in his turn, by
setting up in his place some person in whom he had himself reposed the
greatest confidence, and who serves to carry off a considerable part of
his adherents.
When such a person has broke in this manner with his connections, he is
soon compelled to commit some flagrant act of iniquitous, personal
hostility against some of them (such as an attempt to strip a particular
friend of his family estate), by which the cabal hope to render the
parties utterly irreconcilable. In truth, they have so contrived
matters, that people have a greater hatred to the subordinate
instruments than to the principal movers.
As in destroying their enemies they make use of instruments not
immediately belonging to their corps, so in advancing their own friends
they pursue exactly the same method. To promote any of them to
considerable rank or emolument, they commonly take care that the
recommendation shall pass through the hands of the ostensible ministry:
such a recommendation might however appear to the world, as some proof
of the credit of ministers, and some means of increasing their strength.
To prevent this, the persons so advanced are directed, in all companies,
industriously to declare, that they are under no obligations whatsoever
to administration; that they have received their office from another
quarter; that they are totally free and independent.
When the faction has any job of lucre to obtain, or of vengeance to
perpetrate, their way is, to select, for the execution, those very
persons to whose habits, friendships, principles, and declarations, such
proceedings are publicly known to be the most adverse; at once to
render the instruments the more odious, and therefore the more
dependent, and to prevent the people from ever reposing a confidence in
any appearance of private friendship or public principle.
If the administration seem now and then, from remissness, or from fear
of making themselves disagreeable, to suffer any popular excesses to go
unpunished, the cabal immediately sets up some creature of theirs to
raise a clamor against the ministers, as having shamefully betrayed the
dignity of government. Then they compel the ministry to become active in
conferring rewards and honors on the persons who have been the
instruments of their disgrace; and, after having first vilified them
with the higher orders for suffering the laws to sleep over the
licentiousness of the populace, they drive them (in order to make amends
for their former inactivity) to some act of atrocious violence, which
renders them completely abhorred by the people. They, who remember the
riots which attended the Middlesex election, the opening of the present
Parliament, and the transactions relative to Saint George's Fields, will
not be at a loss for an application of these remarks.
That this body may be enabled to compass all the ends of its
institution, its members are scarcely ever to aim at the high and
responsible offices of the state. They are distributed with art and
judgment through all the secondary, but efficient, departments of
office, and through the households of all the branches of the royal
family: so as on one hand to occupy all the avenues to the throne; and
on the other to forward or frustrate the execution of any measure,
according to their own interests. For with the credit and support which
they are known to have, though for the greater part in places which are
only a genteel excuse for salary, they possess all the influence of the
highest posts; and they dictate publicly in almost everything, even with
a parade of superiority. Whenever they dissent (as it often happens)
from their nominal leaders, the trained part of the senate,
instinctively in the secret, is sure to follow them: provided the
leaders, sensible of their situation, do not of themselves recede in
time from their most declared opinions. This latter is generally the
case. It will not be conceivable to any one who has not seen it, what
pleasure is taken by the cabal in rendering these heads of office
thoroughly contemptible and ridiculous. And when they are become so,
they have then the best chance for being well supported.
The members of the court faction are fully indemnified for not holding
places on the slippery heights of the kingdom, not only by the lead in
all affairs, but also by the perfect security in which they enjoy less
conspicuous, but very advantageous situations. Their places are in
express legal tenure, or, in effect, all of them for life. Whilst the
first and most respectable persons in the kingdom are tossed about like
tennis-balls, the sport of a blind and insolent caprice, no minister
dares even to cast an oblique glance at the lowest of their body. If an
attempt be made upon one of this corps, immediately he flies to
sanctuary, and pretends to the most inviolable of all promises. No
conveniency of public arrangement is available to remove any one of them
from the specific situation he holds; and the slightest attempt upon one
of them, by the most powerful minister, is a certain preliminary to his
own destruction.
Conscious of their independence, they bear themselves with a lofty air
to the exterior ministers. Like janissaries, they derive a kind of
freedom from the very condition of their servitude. They may act just as
they please; provided they are true to the great ruling principle of
their institution. It is, therefore, not at all wonderful, that people
should be so desirous of adding themselves to that body, in which they
may possess and reconcile satisfactions the most alluring, and seemingly
the most contradictory; enjoying at once all the spirited pleasure of
independence, and all the gross lucre and fat emoluments of servitude.
Here is a sketch, though a slight one, of the constitution, laws, and
policy of this new court corporation. The name by which they choose to
distinguish themselves, is that of _king's men_ or the _king's friends_,
by an invidious exclusion of the rest of his Majesty's most loyal and
affectionate subjects. The whole system, comprehending the exterior and
interior administrations, is commonly called, in the technical language
of the court, _double cabinet_; in French or English, as you choose to
pronounce it.
Whether all this be a vision of a distracted brain, or the invention of
a malicious heart, or a real faction in the country, must be judged by
the appearances which things have worn for eight years past. Thus far I
am certain, that there is not a single public man, in or out of office,
who has not, at some time or other, borne testimony to the truth of what
I have now related. In particular, no persons have been more strong in
their assertions, and louder and more indecent in their complaints, than
those who compose all the exterior part of the present administration;
in whose time that faction has arrived at such an height of power, and
of boldness in the use of it, as may, in the end, perhaps bring about
its total destruction.
It is true, that about four years ago, during the administration of the
Marquis of Rockingham, an attempt was made to carry on government
without their concurrence. However, this was only a transient cloud;
they were hid but for a moment; and their constellation blazed out with
greater brightness, and a far more vigorous influence, some time after
it was blown over. An attempt was at that time made (but without any
idea of proscription) to break their corps, to discountenance their
doctrines, to revive connections of a different kind, to restore the
principles and policy of the Whigs, to reanimate the cause of liberty by
ministerial countenance; and then for the first time were men seen
attached in office to every principle they had maintained in opposition.
No one will doubt, that such men were abhorred and violently opposed by
the court faction, and that such a system could have but a short
duration.
It may appear somewhat affected, that in so much discourse upon this
extraordinary party, I should say so little of the Earl of Bute, who is
the supposed head of it. But this was neither owing to affectation nor
inadvertence. I have carefully avoided the introduction of personal
reflections of any kind. Much the greater part of the topics which have
been used to blacken this nobleman are either unjust or frivolous. At
best, they have a tendency to give the resentment of this bitter
calamity a wrong direction, and to turn a public grievance into a mean,
personal, or a dangerous national quarrel. Where there is a regular
scheme of operations carried on, it is the system, and not any
individual person who acts in it, that is truly dangerous. This system
has not arisen solely from the ambition of Lord Bute, but from the
circumstances which favored it, and from an indifference to the
constitution which had been for some time growing among our gentry. We
should have been tried with it, if the Earl of Bute had never existed;
and it will want neither a contriving head nor active members, when the
Earl of Bute exists no longer. It is not, therefore, to rail at Lord
Bute, but firmly to embody against this court party and its practices,
which can afford us any prospect of relief in our present condition.
Another motive induces me to put the personal consideration of Lord Bute
wholly out of the question. He communicates very little in a direct
manner with the greater part of our men of business. This has never been
his custom. It is enough for him that he surrounds them with his
creatures. Several imagine, therefore, that they have a very good excuse
for doing all the work of this faction, when they have no personal
connection with Lord Bute. But whoever becomes a party to an
administration, composed of insulated individuals, without faith
plighted, tie, or common principle; an administration constitutionally
impotent, because supported by no party in the nation; he who
contributes to destroy the connections of men and their trust in one
another, or in any sort to throw the dependence of public counsels upon
private will and favor, possibly may have nothing to do with the Earl of
Bute. It matters little whether he be the friend or the enemy of that
particular person. But let him be who or what he will, he abets a
faction that is driving hard to the ruin of his country. He is sapping
the foundation of its liberty, disturbing the sources of its domestic
tranquillity, weakening its government over its dependencies, degrading
it from all its importance in the system of Europe.
It is this unnatural infusion of a _system of favoritism_ into a
government which in a great part of its constitution is popular, that
has raised the present ferment in the nation. The people, without
entering deeply into its principles, could plainly perceive its effects,
in much violence, in a great spirit of innovation, and a general
disorder in all the functions of government. I keep my eye solely on
this system; if I speak of those measures which have arisen from it, it
will be so far only as they illustrate the general scheme. This is the
fountain of all those bitter waters of which, through an hundred
different conduits, we have drunk until we are ready to burst. The
discretionary power of the crown in the formation of ministry, abused by
bad or weak men, has given rise to a system, which, without directly
violating the letter of any law, operates against the spirit of the
whole constitution.
A plan of favoritism for our executory government is essentially at
variance with the plan of our legislature. One great end undoubtedly of
a mixed government like ours, composed of monarchy, and of controls, on
the part of the higher people and the lower, is that the prince shall
not be able to violate the laws. This is useful indeed and fundamental.
But this, even at first view, is no more than a negative advantage; an
armor merely defensive. It is therefore next in order, and equal in
importance, _that the discretionary powers which are necessarily vested
in the monarch, whether for the execution of the laws, or for the
nomination to magistracy and office, or for conducting the affairs of
peace and war, or for ordering the revenue, should all be exercised upon
public principles and national grounds, and, not on the likings or
prejudices, the intrigues or policies, of a court_. This, I said, is
equal in importance to the securing a government according to law. The
laws reach but a very little way. Constitute government how you please,
infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon the exercise of the
powers which are left at large to the prudence and uprightness of
ministers of state. Even all the use and potency of the laws depends
upon them. Without them, your commonwealth is no better than a scheme
upon paper; and not a living, active, effective constitution. It is
possible that through negligence, or ignorance, or design artfully
conducted, ministers may suffer one part of government to languish,
another to be perverted from its purposes, and every valuable interest
of the country to fall into ruin and decay, without possibility of
fixing any single act on which a criminal prosecution can be justly
grounded. The due arrangement of men in the active part of the state,
far from being foreign to the purposes of a wise government, ought to be
among its very first and dearest objects. When, therefore, the abettors
of the new system tell us, that between them and their opposers there is
nothing but a struggle for power, and that therefore we are no ways
concerned in it; we must tell those who have the impudence to insult us
in this manner, that, of all things, we ought to be the most concerned
who, and what sort of men they are that hold the trust of everything
that is dear to us. Nothing can render this a point of indifference to
the nation, but what must either render us totally desperate, or soothe
us into the security of idiots. We must soften into a credulity below
the milkiness of infancy to think all men virtuous. We must be tainted
with a malignity truly diabolical to believe all the world to be equally
wicked and corrupt. Men are in public life as in private, some good,
some evil. The elevation of the one, and the depression of the other,
are the first objects of all true policy. But that form of government,
which, neither in its direct institutions, nor in their immediate
tendency, has contrived to throw its affairs into the most trustworthy
hands, but has left its whole executory system to be disposed of
agreeably to the uncontrolled pleasure of any one man, however excellent
or virtuous, is a plan of polity defective not only in that member, but
consequentially erroneous in every part of it.