THE QUESTION OF CONFEDERATE INDEPENDENCE.
When the southern states began to secede, the attitude of foreign
governments toward them was a matter of much concern to the Federal
government. At that time any acts of foreign powers looking toward
a recognition of the seceding states would have increased the
embarrassment of the United States government and tended to give
encouragement to the rebellion.
A few days prior to the close of President Buchanan’s administration,
his secretary of state, Jeremiah S. Black, sent a circular letter to
all United States ministers at foreign courts, requesting them to do
all that was necessary and proper to prevent the independence of the
seceding states from being recognized by the governments to which
they were respectively accredited. Among other things Mr. Black said:
“This government has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction
within the territory of those states, nor does it desire to do so. It
must be very evident that it is the right of this government to ask
of all foreign powers that the latter should take no steps which may
tend to encourage the revolutionary movements of the seceding states
or increase the danger of disaffection in those which still remain
loyal.”[1]
When this matter was brought to the attention of Lord Russell by Mr.
Dallas, the American minister at London, his lordship said that while
he regretted the secession, he was not in a position to bind the
British government to any particular course of action.
Immediately upon becoming secretary of state, Mr. Seward sent a second
circular to the United States ministers abroad, repeating with renewed
emphasis the instructions of his predecessor, and urging them to “the
exercise of the greatest possible diligence and fidelity on your
part to counteract and prevent the designs of those who would invoke
foreign intervention to embarrass or overthrow the republic.” He also
suggested that it would be greatly to the advantage of foreign nations
for the Union to be preserved, and that the revolt, should it break up
the Union, “might tend by its influence to disturb and unsettle the
existing systems of government in other parts of the world and arrest
that progress of improvement and civilization which marks the era in
which we live.” Mr. Seward also expressed his confidence that these
with other considerations would prevent foreign governments “from
yielding to solicitations to intervene in any unfriendly way in the
domestic concerns of our country.” “You will be prompt,” continued
Mr. Seward, “in transmitting to this department any information you
may receive on the subject of the attempts which have suggested this
communication.”[2]
When this dispatch was communicated to Lord Russell, he replied that
the government was in no hurry to recognize the secession as final,
but that he thought the matter not ripe for decision one way or the
other.[3]
His lordship also declined to discuss the subject further at that time.
No words of sympathy were uttered, no good wishes for the preservation
of the Union were extended, but only an answer which said in substance
that England was ready to acknowledge Confederate independence
whenever it was expedient to do so. Lord Russell’s answer did not even
assure the United States that England meant to observe that absolute
neutrality which international obligation would impose.
Most answers from other countries in response to Mr. Seward’s
circular were quite different from that which England gave. It will
be sufficient to notice three of them. Prussia “from the principle of
unrelenting opposition to all revolutionary movements would be the
last to recognize any _de facto_ government of the disaffected states
of the American Union.”[4] Austria “was not inclined to recognize _de
facto_ governments anywhere.”[5] Spain “would have nothing to do with
the rebel party in the United States, in any sense.”[6] Very favorable
responses were received also from most other countries. Russia, Italy
and Switzerland sent assurances of the warmest sympathy for the cause
of the Union. Individual expressions from great men outside England
were not wanting in the beginning of the struggle. On September 10,
1861, Garibaldi, the Italian patriot, addressed a letter to the United
States consul at Antwerp, in which he expressed an intention to come to
America and enlist in the Federal army, if circumstances would permit
him to do so.
When Charles Francis Adams became the American minister to England,
he was instructed to take a still more decided stand against the
recognition of the independence of the Confederate States. Said Mr.
Seward in his letter of instructions to Mr. Adams: “You will in no
case listen to any suggestions of compromise by this government under
foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens. If, as the president
does not at all apprehend, you shall unhappily find her majesty’s
government tolerating the application of the so-called seceding states,
or wavering about it, you will not leave them to suppose for a moment
that they can grant that application and remain the friends of the
United States. You may even assure them promptly in that case that
if they determine to recognize, they may at the same time prepare to
enter into an alliance with the enemies of this republic. You alone
will represent your country at London, and you will represent the
whole of it there. When you are asked to divide that duty with others,
diplomatic relations between the government of Great Britain and this
government will be suspended, and will remain so until it shall be seen
which of the two is most strongly intrenched in the confidence of their
respective nations and of mankind.”[7]
At another time when referring to the matter of recognizing Confederate
independence, Mr. Seward said: “I have never for a moment believed that
such a recognition could take place without producing immediately a
war between the United States and all of the recognizing powers. I have
not supposed it possible that the British government could fail to
see this, and at the same time I have sincerely believed the British
government must, in its inmost heart, be as averse from such a conflict
as I know this government to be.”[8]
English sympathy for the South was manifested at first not only by
expressions of opinion from the press and public men of that country,
but also by efforts to have the independence of the Confederacy
immediately recognized.
On March 4, 1861, while the ceremonies of Mr. Lincoln’s inauguration
were being conducted at Washington, Mr. Gregory, member of parliament
for Galway, arose in his place in the House of Commons and gave notice
of a motion to recognize the independence of the Confederate States of
America.[9] At that date the organization of the Confederate government
had been perfected only three weeks, and Mr. Gregory’s knowledge of the
matter had been received certainly not more than ten days before the
notice of his motion was given. The notice was renewed on April 16,
1861. The matter was brought before the house several times during the
session, but it was finally postponed indefinitely because the Commons
thought it inexpedient to act upon it at that time.
While the matter was before the house, Mr. Gregory published a letter
in the London Times in which he stated the reasons for immediate
recognition of the Confederacy. He thought it would do much toward
breaking up the slave trade which he asserted was “mainly carried on
by ships sailing from northern ports, and floated by northern capital,
that it would ameliorate the condition of slavery, secure peace and
freedom of trade.” He also regarded it as a just retaliation against
the North for having enacted the Morrill tariff, and as a vindication
of the right of a people to assert their independence. Mr. Gregory
concluded his letter with the strong conviction that the recognition of
the Confederacy by both England and France just then “would cause the
war party in the North to pause before plunging their countrymen deeper
into the sad struggle.”[10]
It is evident from the facts already presented, and the opinions
referred to, that it was neither the righteousness of the northern
cause nor lack of sympathy for the South that prevented an early
recognition of the Confederacy by England. It was thought to be
inexpedient, and perhaps not quite safe to recognize the independence
of the Confederate States, otherwise there would have been no
hesitation in doing it.
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861.
2. Notice Book House of Commons, 1861.
3. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause.
4. Senate Ex. Doc.: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I.
5. Seward’s Works, Vol. V.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Mr. Black to U. S. ministers abroad, February 28, 1861.
[2] Mr. Seward to the U. S. ministers abroad, March 9, 1861.
[3] Mr. Dallas to Mr. Seward, April 9, 1861.
[4] Mr. Wright to Mr. Seward, May 8, 1861.
[5] Mr. Jones to Mr. Seward, April 15, 1861.
[6] Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward, June 13, 1861.
[7] Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, April, 1861.
[8] Seward’s Works, Vol. V, p. 294.
[9] See Notice Book, House of Commons, 1861.
[10] Pollard’s Lost Cause, pp. 126-7.