THE TRENT AFFAIR
INCLUDING A
REVIEW OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR
BY THOMAS L. HARRIS, A. M.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
JAMES A. WOODBURN, PH. D.
Professor of American History in the Indiana University.
[Illustration]
INDIANAPOLIS AND KANSAS CITY:
THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY
1896.
Copyright 1896
BY
THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY.
CONTENTS.
INTRODUCTION 7
CHAPTER.
I. Relations with England 11
II. English Sympathy for the Confederacy 21
III. The Question of Confederate Independence 31
IV. The Queen’s Neutrality Proclamation 37
V. English Negotiations with the Insurgents 53
VI. Mr. Seward’s Circular to the Governors of the Northern
States 61
VII. The First Efforts of the Confederates for Recognition
Abroad 69
VIII. James Murray Mason and John Slidell. The Nature
and Merits of Their Mission 79
IX. The Departure of the Commissioners for Europe 91
X. The Seizure 97
XI. The Effect in America 117
XII. The Effect in England 137
XIII. The British Demand 163
XIV. Consideration of the British Demand in America 175
XV. Views of Other European Nations Concerning the
Trent Case 195
XVI. The Answer of the Federal Government 211
XVII. The Surrender of Mason and Slidell 225
XVIII. Earl Russell’s View of the American Position 239
XIX. International Law in the Trent Case 247
XX. Reflections on the Course of the British Government 269
INTRODUCTION.
The history of the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the
United States suggests an interesting and valuable field to the student
of Anglo-American history and international law. It is a fertile field,
still largely unworked. No one, so far as I know, has yet ventured upon
an exhaustive and connected discussion of the important subjects which
this theme involves. One of the most interesting and unwritten chapters
in this history is to be found in the relations between Great Britain
and the United States during our civil war, as illustrated in the case
of the Trent and the discussion to which this case gave rise. Much has
been written on this celebrated case. Mr. Harris has set for himself
the task of examining the literature of the subject, of reviewing
the original material, and placing in brief and accessible shape the
important and essential features of the discussion. All who wish a
ready access to a faithful review and complete resume of this notable
chapter in our foreign relations will appreciate his service.
The right of search is historically a very interesting subject. On
two notable occasions it brought us into serious collision with Great
Britain. One of these occasions was in the war of 1812, the other in
the affair of the Trent in 1861. The war of 1812 is to be studied
chiefly as a part of the history of international law. The reader who
turns his attention to this war will, therefore, desire to bring within
his view the history of the affair of the Trent. The merits of the two
discussions, in 1806-1812 and 1861, are inseparable. Mr. Madison and
Mr. Seward, the American contributors to the diplomatic literature of
this discussion, are to be considered together. It will thus be seen
that a competent account of the case of the Trent and the principles of
public law which it involves brings within the view a pretty wide range
of historical discussion.
One of the prominent causes of the war 1812 was the right, then claimed
by Great Britain, of searching the vessels of the United States upon
the high seas for British subjects, with the purpose of impressing
them into the service of the British navy. The way in which Great
Britain exercised this power of search did more than all other causes
combined to arouse irritation and antagonism in America. Mr. Webster,
in his correspondence with Lord Ashburton, in 1842, gave an American
definition of this assumed right. “England asserts the right,” says Mr.
Webster, “of impressing British subjects in time of war out of neutral
ships and of deciding by her visiting officers who among the crew of
such merchant ships are British subjects. She asserts this as a legal
prerogative of the crown, which prerogative is alleged to be founded on
the English law of perpetual and indissoluble allegiance of the subject
and his obligation, under all circumstances, and for his whole life, to
render military service to the crown whenever required.”
Great Britain did not renounce this right at Ghent in 1814, nor has she
at any time since specifically surrendered it. But the right of search,
for such a purpose as England then asserted it, is now obsolete. It
is safe to say that it will never again be attempted in time of war
against any vessel flying a neutral flag. American diplomacy has
contributed not a little to this desirable result.
In 1861 a public armed vessel of the United States forcibly searched an
English mail steamer for the purpose of recovering certain gentlemen
who were claimed as citizen subjects of the United States. The act
was not one of hostility toward England, nor as an act of search was
it nearly so provoking as many which had been previously committed
by Great Britain against us. The case arising out of this seizure
is a subject of the first importance in our national history, and
the result of the case, with the diplomatic discussion between Mr.
Seward and Lord Lyons, may be said to have finally established, as
permanent public law, the principle underlying the preceding historic
American contention on this subject. The history of the case, its
political aspects, the diplomatic discussions to which it gave rise,
the principles of law which it has helped to establish, the opinions
of eminent publicists, the conclusions of international law, and the
relation of the case to preceding discussions,--these themes indicate
the scope of Mr. Harris’s essay.
JAMES A. WOODBURN.
_Indiana University._
CHAPTER I.
RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND.
Undisturbed relations have not always existed between the two great
branches of the Anglo-Saxon race on opposite sides of the Atlantic.
The English colonies in the New World quarreled continually with their
mother country. Finally revolution and war enabled the colonists to
free themselves from English rule, although causes of dispute have
ever continued to exist. A continuous record of the international
difficulties between the United States and England would form no
inconsiderable part of American history.
An almost unbroken succession of disputes has occupied the attention
of statesmen in both countries for more than a century. The Federal
government had scarcely been organized when the first serious cause of
trouble arose. England claimed the right forcibly to visit and search
American merchant vessels on the high seas in time of peace. Thousands
of American citizens having been impressed into the British naval
service, the arbitrament of war was resorted to. This did not decide
the matter. The abstract right of search and seizure was steadily
maintained by England for almost half a century after the close of the
war of 1812. An attempt to put it into practice again off the coast of
Cuba in the spring of 1858 caused an outburst of popular indignation
in every part of the United States, and American war vessels in
Cuban waters were immediately ordered to resent such outrages at all
hazards. This looked like war, and, without further delay, Great
Britain abandoned the claim for which she had so long contended.[1]
Boundary disputes were a cause of much agitation for many years.
Long and tedious negotiation was required to adjust the northwestern
boundary of the United States between Maine and New Brunswick. Although
the American claims in this region were ably presented and fairly
established, British writers have repeatedly asserted that the United
States government, in this instance, accomplished its purposes by means
which were unfair, unjust, and entirely unworthy of modern diplomacy.[2]
Scarcely had a treaty been concluded by which this boundary was settled
when the Oregon question became one of great prominence, and in 1844,
the alliterative campaign cry of “fifty-four forty or fight” testified
to the serious character of the dispute. A settlement was finally
effected by conceding most of the English claims, although ex-President
John Quincy Adams and other equally noted Americans protested against
what seemed to them a disgraceful surrender. The details of the various
controversies caused by English conduct during the American civil
war are fresh in the memory of a generation still living. In our own
time fishery disputes have tested the skill of diplomatists in both
countries.
There has probably never been a time, however brief, in the history
of the United States when absolutely no cause of difference existed
between the two nations. At the present date (1895) one hundred seven
presidential messages reviewing the state of the country have been
submitted to the American congress at the opening of its regular
sessions. It is a significant fact that seventy-eight of these
messages--almost three-fourths of them--have called the attention of
congress to difficulties of more or less importance with Great Britain.
To the seventy-eight messages of the latter class every president has
contributed except Garfield, Taylor, and William Henry Harrison.
Toward the close of the year 1860, however, British and American
international affairs had assumed a much more favorable aspect than
usual. All of the most perplexing and dangerous questions which had so
long disturbed the relations of the two countries had been peaceably
and finally settled. This result gave the greatest satisfaction to
the people and government of the United States. In his message to
congress at the opening of the session in December, 1860, President
Buchanan said: “Our relations with Great Britain are of the most
friendly character. Since the commencement of my administration the
two dangerous questions arising from the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and
from the right of search claimed by the British government have been
amicably and honorably adjusted. The discordant constructions of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which at different periods of the discussion
bore a threatening aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely
satisfactory to this government.
“It must be a source of sincere satisfaction to all classes of our
fellow-citizens and especially to those engaged in foreign commerce
that the claim on the part of Great Britain forcibly to visit and
search American merchant vessels on the high seas in time of peace has
been abandoned. This was by far the most dangerous question to the
peace of the two nations which has existed since the war of 1812. While
it remained open they might at any moment have been precipitated into a
war.
“The only question of any importance which still remains open is the
disputed title between the two governments to the Island of San Juan
in the vicinity of Washington territory.” It was evident that both
countries were expecting this question to be settled without any
trouble.
The president also said in the same message: “The recent visit of the
Prince of Wales in a private character to the people of this country
has proved to be a most auspicious event. In its consequences it can
not fail to increase the kindred and kindly feelings which I trust
may ever actuate the government and people of both countries in their
political and social intercourse with each other.”
Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, truly said of this
message that its language was the most cordial in character of
any which had ever appeared in such a communication. The British
government and people appeared to appreciate the friendship and good
feeling for them which prevailed in the United States at that time.
As an evidence of this fact Queen Victoria sent her son, the Prince
of Wales, on a visit to the United States in the latter part of the
year 1860--the event referred to in President Buchanan’s message. The
Prince was received everywhere with the hearty and enthusiastic welcome
which was due to such a distinguished personage. After the visit had
terminated, the British minister at Washington was directed to express
the thanks of her majesty and to say to the president and citizens
of the United States that one of the main objects which she had in
view in sanctioning the visit of her son to America was to prove “the
sincerity of those sentiments of esteem and regard which her majesty
and all classes of her subjects entertain for the kindred race which
occupies so distinguished a position in the community of nations.” “Her
majesty trusts,” continued the British minister, “that the feeling of
confidence and affection, of which late events have proved beyond all
question the existence, will long continue to prevail between the two
countries to their mutual advantage and to the general interests of
civilization and humanity. I am commanded to state to the president
that the queen would be gratified by his making known generally to
the citizens of the United States her grateful sense of the kindness
with which they received her son, who has returned to England deeply
impressed with all he saw during his progress through the states, and
more especially so with the friendly and cordial good-will manifested
towards him on every occasion and by all classes of the community.”[3]
This message was promptly answered by the American assistant secretary
of state, who said among other things: “I am instructed by the
president to express the gratification with which he has learned
how correctly her majesty has appreciated the spirit in which his
royal highness was received throughout the republic, and the cordial
manifestation of that spirit by the people of the United States which
accompanied him in every step of his progress. Her majesty has justly
recognized that the visit of her son aroused the kind and generous
sympathies of our citizens, and, if I may so speak, has created an
almost personal interest in the fortunes of the royalty which he so
well represents. The president trusts that this sympathy and interest
towards the future representative of the sovereignty of Great Britain
are at once an evidence and a guaranty of that consciousness of common
interest and mutual regard which have bound in the past, and will in
the future bind together more strongly than treaties, the feelings and
the fortunes of the two nations which represent the enterprise, the
civilization, and the constitutional liberty of the same great race.”[4]
While the Prince of Wales was in the United States the London Times
described his visit to the tomb of Washington at Mount Vernon and his
planting a chestnut while there. The closing paragraph read as follows:
“It seemed, when the royal youth closed the earth around the little
germ, that he was burying the last faint trace of discord between us
and our great brethren in the west.” Other English newspapers, in
commenting upon the prince’s welcome in America, gave utterance to
sentiments which were extremely cordial in character. Two extracts from
leading London papers may be noticed. “Thus we believe an alliance has
been consolidated which will endure for the mutual benefit, not only of
the two nations, but of the civilized world.”[5] “At no time could we
desire more earnestly than we do now the close alliance of the great
Anglo-Saxon family.”[6]
Opportunities were soon to be offered for testing the sincerity of
those recently expressed “sentiments of esteem and regard which her
majesty and all classes of her subjects entertain for the kindred
race which occupies so distinguished a position in the community of
nations.” South Carolina seceded December 17, 1860. Other states
followed her example. A hostile government was organized within the
territory of the United States. A war cloud was rapidly gathering upon
the American political horizon. Lord Lyons duly reported all of these
occurrences to his government. On February 4, 1861, in a communication
addressed to Lord John Russell, the British minister for foreign
affairs, Lord Lyons gave a detailed account of Mr. Seward’s views
concerning the state of the country and of his plans for securing the
peaceable return of the seceding states to “the confederation.” In this
dispatch the American union is characterized as a “confederation.”
Since the adoption of the constitution no such use of the word
“confederation” had ever been made in any diplomatic communication. It
was indicative of the English view of the nature of the American union.
Lord John Russell replied to the above communication just two weeks
before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. After saying that the success or
failure of Mr. Seward’s plans were matters of deep interest to her
majesty’s government and that it was not their duty to offer advice,
Lord Russell said: “Supposing, however, that Mr. Lincoln, acting under
bad advice, should endeavor to provide excitement for the public mind
by raising questions with Great Britain, her majesty’s government
feel no hesitation as to the policy they would pursue. They would in
the first place be very forbearing. They would show by their acts how
highly they value the relations of peace and amity with the United
States. But they would take care to let the government which multiplied
provocations and sought quarrels understand that their forbearance
sprung from the consciousness of strength and not from the timidity
of weakness. They would warn a government which was making political
capital out of blustering demonstrations that our patience might be
tried too far.”[7]
It is not easy to understand why Lord Russell should make use of such
language at this time. Only seventy-two days before this dispatch was
written, the most cordial feelings of “confidence and affection” for
the American people had been professed in the communication concerning
the visit of the Prince of Wales, and in the meantime not an unkind
word had been used in the correspondence of either government. His
lordship may have seen in a settlement of the American domestic
difficulties something which was unfavorable to British interests.
The occasion certainly was not one which called for an offensive and
unprovoked threat from the British minister for foreign affairs. He did
not lose the opportunity, however, to utter an official warning to the
American government that British patience “might be tried too far.”
From many similar instances in the official career of that
statesman, it is certain that Lord Russell himself never lost a
favorable opportunity to “make political capital out of blustering
demonstrations.”
AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES.
1. Annual messages of the presidents of the United States, 1789-1894.
2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress.
3. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1860-1861.
4. London newspapers: The Times, News and Post, November, 1860.
5. London Quarterly Review, No. 221.
6. Schuyler, Eugene: American Diplomacy.
7. Westminster Review, Vol. XXI.
8. Winsor: Narrative and Critical History of America.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See Schuyler’s American Diplomacy, pp. 262-3.
[2] London Quarterly Review, No. 221, p. 261; Westminster Review, Vol.
XXI, pp. 222-3. For a discussion of the northwestern boundary question,
see Winsor’s Narrative and Critical History of America, Vol. VII, p.
180.
[3] Lord Lyons to Gen. Cass, U. S. secretary of state, Dec. 8, 1860.
[4] Mr. Trescot to Lord Lyons, Dec. 11, 1860.
[5] London Post, Nov. 16, 1860.
[6] London News, Nov. 16, 1860.
[7] Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Feb. 20, 1861.