While all commend the recent action of the government, and give the
executive full credit for the repression by proclamation of
processions avowedly intended to be protests against authority and
law, it is generally regretted that prosecutions should have been
instituted against some of those who had taken part in these
processions. Had these menacing assemblages been held after the
proclamations were issued, or in defiance of the authorities, the
utmost power should have been exerted to put them down, and the
terrors of the law would properly have been invoked to punish the
guilty. But, bearing in mind the fact that these processions had been
declared by the head of the government--expressing, no doubt, the
opinion entertained at that time by the law officers of the crown,
that these processions were "not illegal"--remembering, too, that
similar processions had been already held without the slightest
intimation of opposition on the part of government; and recollecting,
also, that the proclamation was everywhere implicitly obeyed, and
without the least wish to dispute it, we cannot avoid regretting that
the government should have been advised, at the last hour, to
institute prosecutions of such a nature. Once, however, it was
determined to vindicate the law in this way, the utmost care should
have been taken to maintain the dignity of the proceedings, and to
avoid everything calculated to create annoyance, irritation, or
offence. If we except the moderate and very able speech of Mr.
Murphy, Q.C., there is no one part of the proceedings in the
police-court which merits commendation. Some of the witnesses utterly
broke down; opportunity was given for utterances not calculated to
increase respect for the law; and disloyal sentiments were boldly
expressed and cheered until the court rang again. Great and serious
as was the mistake in not obtaining an accurate legal opinion
respecting the character of these meetings at the first, and then
prohibiting them, a far greater mistake is now, we think, committed
in instituting _these retrospective prosecutions_. For this mistake
the law officers of the crown must, we infer, be held responsible.
Were they men of energy and vigour, with the necessary knowledge of
the world, they would not have suffered the executive to permit
processions first, and then prohibit them, and at the same time try
men for participating in what had been pronounced not to be illegal.
We exonerate the attorney-general from the error of summoning to give
evidence persons who openly gloried in the part they had taken in
these meetings. To command the presence of such witnesses was of the
nature of an offence. There was no ground, for instance, for
supposing that Mr. Sullivan would have played the informer against
the friends who had walked with him in the procession--such is not
his character, his feeling, or his sense of honour. The summoning of
those who had moved with, and as part of, the multitude, to give
evidence against their fellows, was not only a most injudicious, but
a futile expedient, and naturally has caused very great
dissatisfaction and annoyance. The circumstance, however, proves that
the prosecutions was instituted without that exact care and minute
attention to all particulars which are necessary in a case of this
kind.
Even the _Daily Express_, the, all-but subsidised, if not the secretly
subsidised, organ of the ultra-orange section of the Irish
administration, had to own the discomfiture of its patrons:--
Are our police offices to become a kind of national journals court?
Is the "national press of Ireland" then and there to bid for the
support immediately of the gallery, and more remotely of that portion
of the population which is humourously called the Irish Nation? These
speculations are suggested by a curious scene which took place at the
inquiry at the police office yesterday, and which will be found
detailed in another column. Mr. Sullivan, the editor of the _Nation_,
seized the opportunity of being summoned as a witness, to denounce
the government for not including him in the prosecution. He
complained "of endeavouring to place the editor of a national journal
on the list of crown witnesses in this court as a public and
personal indignity," and as an endeavour to destroy the influence of
the national press. It is certainly an open avowal to declare that
the mere placing of the name of the editor of a "national" journal
upon the list of crown witnesses is an unparalleled wrong. But Sir
John Gray was still more instructive. From him we learn that a
witness summoned to assist the crown in the prosecution of sedition
is placed in an "odious position." Odious it may be, but in the eyes
of whom? Surely not of any loyal subject? A paid informer, or
professional spy, may be personally odious in the eyes of those who
make use of his services. But we have yet to learn how a subject who
is summoned to come forward to assist the government fills an odious
position in the opinion of his loyal fellow-subjects. We should
rather have supposed him to be entitled to their gratitude. However
that may be, Sir John Gray came gallantly to the rescue of several
"gentlemen connected with his establishment," whom, he was informed,
the government intended to summon as witnesses. This, he knew, they
would all refuse. "I suggested, if any unpleasant consequences should
follow, that they should fall on the head of the establishment
alone." He called upon the authorities to summon him. We do complain
of our police-courts being made the scenes of open avowals of
determination to thwart, or, at least, not to assist the government
in their endeavours to prosecute treason and sedition. We can imagine
no principle on which a subject could object to assisting the crown
as a witness, which, if followed to its logical consequences, would
not justify open rebellion. It is certainly a dangerous doctrine to
preach that it is allowable, nay, even praiseworthy in a subject to
refuse to give evidence when called upon to do so by the crown. There
is a disposition too prevalent in this country to regard the law as
an enemy, and opposition to it, either by passive obstruction or
active rebellion, as a praiseworthy and patriotic act. Can we wonder
at this when we hear opposition to constituted authority openly
preached by the instructors of "the nation," and witness the
eagerness of the "national press" to free itself from the terrible
suspicion of coming to the assistance, even involuntarily, of the
government in its struggle with sedition and treason?
It was amidst such an outburst of vexation and indignation as this, even
from the government journals themselves, that the curtain rose next
morning on Act II. in the Head Police Office. A very unique episode
commenced the proceedings on this day also. At the resumption of the
case, Mr. Murphy, Q.C., on behalf of the crown, said:--
Mr. Sullivan and some other gentlemen complained yesterday of having
been served with summonses to give evidence in those cases. I am
directed by the attorney-general to state that he regrets it, and
that it was done without his authority. He never gave any directions
to have those persons summoned, nor was it done by anyone acting
under his directions. It occurred in this way. General directions
were given to the police to summon parties to give evidence in order
to establish the charge against those four gentlemen who are summoned
for taking an active part in the procession. The police, in the
exercise of their discretion thought it might be necessary to summon
parties who took part in the procession, but there was no intention
on the part of those aiding on behalf of the crown to summon parties
to give evidence who themselves took part in the procession, and I am
sorry it occurred.
Mr. Dix--I may mention that a magistrate when signing a summons knows
nothing of the witnesses. If they were all living in Jamacia he
merely signs it as a matter of form.
Mr. A.M. Sullivan--I thank your worship and Mr. Murphy, and I think
it will be seen that had your worship not allowed me yesterday to
make the protest I did, the attorney-general would not have the
opportunity of making the disclaimer which it became the dignity of
the government to make. The aspect of the case yesterday was very
adverse towards Sir John Gray, myself, and other gentlemen. Although
my brother signed his name to the notice, he was not summoned as
principal but as a witness, but if necessary, he was determined to
stand side by side in the dock with Mr. Martin.
Mr. Allen--I am very glad of the explanation, because I was blamed
for allowing persons making speeches here yesterday. I think if a man
has any ground of complaint the sooner it is set right the better.
Mr. Sullivan--I have to thank the bench.
Mr. Allen--I am glad that a satisfactory arrangement has been come to
by all parties, because there is an objection entertained by some
persons to be brought into court as witnesses for the crown.
Mr. Sullivan--Especially a public journalist.
Mr. Allen--Quite so.
Mr. Heron then proceeded to cross-examine the witness.
It was elicited from the government reporter, that, by a process which
he called "throwing in the vowels," he was able to make Mr. Martin's
speech read sufficiently seditious. Mr. D.C. Heron, Q.C., then addressed
the court on behalf of Mr. J.J. Lalor; and Mr. Michael Crean, barrister,
on behalf of Dr. Waters. Mr. Martin, on his own behalf, then spoke as
follows:--
I admit I attended the procession. I admit also that I spoke words
which I consider very grave and serious words upon that occasion. For
my acts on that occasion, for the sense and intention of the words I
spoke on that occasion, I am perfectly willing to be put upon my
country. Not only for all my acts on that occasion--not only for the
words which I spoke on that occasion; but for all my acts or all the
words I either spoke or wrote, publicly or privately, upon Irish
politics, I am perfectly willing to be put upon my country. In any
free country that has real constitutional institutions to guarantee
the liberty of the subject--to guarantee the free trial of the
subject charged with an offence against either the state or his
neighbour, it would be quite absurd to expect a man could be put upon
his country and convicted of a crime for doing that and using such
words as the vast majority of his fellow-countrymen approve. In this
case I believe that a vast majority of my fellow-countrymen do not
disapprove of the acts I acknowledge on that occasion, and that they
sympathise in the sentiment of the words I then spoke. Therefore the
mere fact that a prosecution is preferred against me for that act,
and for those words, is the expression of an opinion on my part that
this country does not at present enjoy real constitutional
institutions, guaranteeing a free trial--guaranteeing that the man
accused shall be really put upon his country. Therefore it is absurd
to think that any twelve honest men, my neighbours, put upon their
oaths, would declare that to be a crime which it is probable that, at
least, four-fifths of them believe to be right--right both
constitutionally and morally. I am aware--we are all aware--that the
gentlemen who represent the crown in this country, have very powerful
means at their disposal for obtaining convictions in the form of law
and in the form of justice, of any person they think proper to
accuse; and without meaning either to sneer or to joke in this
matter, I acknowledge the moderation of the gentlemen who represent
the government, since they chose to trouble themselves with me at
all. I acknowledge their moderation in proposing to indict me now for
sedition, for the language which they say I used, because it is
possible for them, with the means at their disposal, to have me
convicted for murder, or burglary, or bigamy (laughter). I am sorry
to say what seems like a sneer, but I use the words in deep and
solemn seriousness, and I say no more than I am perfectly ready to be
tried fairly or foully (applause in court).
The magistrates reserved their decision till next day; so that there
might be decent and seemly pause for the purpose of looking up and
pondering the legal precedents, as the legal fiction would have it; and
on next day, they announced that they would send all the accused for
trial to the next Commission at Green-street, to open on the 10th
February, 1868. The several traversers, however, were required to enter
merely into their own recognizances in £500 each to appear for trial.
In this police court proceeding the government, confessedly, were
morally worsted--utterly humiliated, in fact. So far from creating awe
or striking terror, the prosecution had evoked general contempt, scorn,
and indignation. To such an extent was this fact recognised, that the
government journals themselves, as we have seen, were amongst the
loudest in censuring the whole proceeding, and in supporting the general
expectation that there was an end of the prosecution.
Not so however was it to be. The very bitterness of the mortification
inflicted upon them by their "roll in the dust" on their first legal
encounter with the processionists, seemed to render the crown officials
more and more vindictive. It was too galling to lie under the public
challenge hurled at them by Mr. Bracken, Mr. O'Reilly, and Mr. Sullivan.
After twelve days' cogitation, government made up its mind to strike.
On Saturday, 28th December, 1867--just as everyone in Ireland seemed to
have concluded that, as the Conservative journals said, there was "an
end of" the foolish and ill-advised funeral prosecutions--Mr. Sullivan,
Mr. Bracken (one of the funeral stewards), Mr. Jennings, of Kingstown
(one of the best known and most trusted of the nationalists of
"Dunleary" district). Mr. O'Reilly, (one of the mounted marshals at the
procession), and some others, were served with citations to appear on
Monday the 30th, at the Head Police Office, to answer charges identical
with those preferred on the 16th against Mr. Martin, Dr. Waters, and Mr.
Lalor.
Preliminary prosecution No. 2 very much resembled No. 1. Mr. Murphy,
Q.C. stated the crown case with fairness and moderation; and the police,
as before, gave their evidence like men who felt "duty" and "conscience"
in sore disagreement on such an occasion. Mr. Jennings and Mr. O'Reilly
were defended, respectively, by Mr. Molloy and Mr. Crean; two advocates
whose selection from the junior bar for these critical and important
public cases was triumphantly vindicated by their conduct from the
first to the last scene of the drama. Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Bracken, and the
other accused, were not represented by counsel. On the first-named
gentleman (Mr. Sullivan) being formally called on, he addressed the
court at some length. He said:--
Please your worship, had the officials of the crown adopted towards
me, in the first instance, the course which they have taken upon the
present occasion, and had they not adopted the singular course which
they pursued in my regard when I last appeared in this court, I
should trouble you with no observations. For, as one of the 50,000
persons who, on the 8th of December, in this city, publicly,
lawfully, and peacefully demonstrated their protest against what they
believed to have been a denial of law and an outrage on justice, I
should certainly waste no public time in this preliminary
investigation, but rather admit the facts as you perceive I have done
to-day, and hasten the final decision on the issues really knit
between us and the crown. What was the course adopted by the crown in
the first instance against me? They had before them, on the 9th, just
as well as on the 29th--it is in evidence that they had--the fact
that I, openly and publicly, took part in that demonstration--that
sorrowful and sad protest against injustice (applause). They had
before them then as much as they had before them to-day, or as much
as they will ever have affecting me. For, whatever course I take in
public affairs in this country, I conceal nothing, I take it
publicly, openly, and deliberately. If I err, I am satisfied to abide
the consequences; and, whenever it may suit the weathercock judgment
of Lord Mayo, and his vacillating law advisers, to characterise my
acts or my opinion as illegal, seditious, heretical, idolatrous, or
treasonable, I must, like every other subject, be content to take my
chance of their being able to find a jury sufficiently facile or
sufficiently stupid to carry out their behests against me. But they
did not choose that course at first. They did not summon me as a
principal, but they subpoenaed me as a witness--as a crown
witness--against some of my dearest, personal, and public friends.
The attorney-general, whose word I most fully and frankly accept in
the matter--for I would not charge him with being wanting in personal
truthfulness--denied having had any complicity in the course of
conduct pursued towards me; but where does he lay the responsibility?
On "the police." What is the meaning of that phrase, "the police?" He
surely does not mean that the members of the force, who parade our
streets, exercise viceregal functions (laughter). Who was this person
thus called the "police?" How many degrees above or below the
attorney-general are we to look for this functionary described as
"the police," who has the authority to have a "seditious" man--that
is the allegation--a seditious man--exempted from prosecution? The
police cannot do that. Who, then? Who was he that could draw the
line between John Martin and his friend A.M. Sullivan--exempt the
one, prosecute the other--summon the former as a defendant and
subpoena the latter as a crown witness? What was the object? It is
plain. There are at this moment, I am convinced--who doubts
it?--throughout Ireland, as yet unfound out, Talbots and Corridons in
the pay of the crown acting as Fenian centres, who, next day, would
receive from their employers directions to spread amongst my
countrymen the intelligence that I had been here to betray my
associate, John Martin (applause). But their plot recoiled--their
device was exposed; public opinion expressed its reprobation of the
unsuccessful trick; and now they come to mend their hand. The men who
were exempted before are prosecuted to-day. Now, your worships, on
this whole case--on this entire procedure--I deliberately charge that
not we, but the government, have violated the law. I charge that the
government are well aware that the law is against them--that they are
irresistibly driven upon this attempt to strain and break the law
against the constitutional right and liberty of the subject by their
mere party exigencies and necessities.
He then reviewed at length the bearing of the Party Processions Act upon
the present case; and next proceeded to deal with the subject of the
Manchester executions; maintaining that the men were hanged, as were
others before them, in like moments of national passion and frenzy, on a
false evidence and a rotten verdict. Mr. Sullivan proceeded:--
It is because the people love justice and abhor injustice--because
the real crime of those three victims is believed to have been
devotion to native land--that the Catholic churches of Ireland
resound with prayers and requiem hymns, and the public highways were
lined with sympathising thousands, until the guilty fears of the
executioners proclaimed it illegal to mourn. Think you, sir, if the
crown view of this matter were the true one, would the Catholic
clergy of Ireland--they who braved fierce and bitter unpopularity in
reprehending the Fenian conspiracy at a time when Lord Mayo's organ
was patting it on the back for its 'fine Sardinian spirit'--would
these ministers of religion drape their churches for three common
murderers? I repel as a calumnious and slanderous accusation against
the Catholic clergy of Ireland this charge, that by their mourning
for those three martyred Irishmen, they expressed sympathy, directly
or indirectly, with murder or life-taking. If an act be seditious, it
is not the less illegal in the church than in the graveyard, or on
the road to the cemetery. Are we, then, to understand that our
churches are to be invaded by bands of soldiery, and our priests
dragged from the altars, for the seditious crime of proclaiming
aloud their belief in the innocence of Allen, Larkin, and O'Brien?
This, sir, is what depends on the decision in this case, here or
elsewhere. All this and more. It is to be decided whether, in their
capacity of Privy Councillors, the judges of the land shall put forth
a proclamation the legality or binding force of which they will
afterwards sit as judges to try. It is whether, there being no
constitution now allowed to exist in the country, there is to be no
law save what a Castle proclamation will construct, permit, or
decree; no mourning save what the police will license; no
demonstration of opinion save whatever accords with the government
views. We hear much of the liberties enjoyed in this country. No
doubt, we have fine constitutional rights and securities, until the
very time they are most required. When we have no need to invoke
them, they are permitted to us; but at the only time when they might
be of substantial value, they are, as the phrase goes, "suspended."
Who, unless in times of governmental panic, need apprehend
unwarranted arrest? When else is the _Habeas Corpus_ Act of such
considerable protection to the subject? When, unless when the crown
seeks to invade public liberty, is the purity and integrity of trial
by jury of such value and importance in political cases? Yet all the
world knows that the British government, whenever such a conflict
arises, juggles and packs the jury--
Mr. Dix--I really cannot allow that language to be used in this
court, Mr. Sullivan, with every disposition to accord you, as an
accused person, the amplest limits in your observations. Such
language goes beyond what I can permit--
Mr. Sullivan--I, at once, in respect for your worship, retract the
word juggle. I will say the crown manipulates the jury.