enough to have had no lasting result. They were not followed up, and in
the mean time had to some extent passed out of memory, or, if
remembered, the absence of result can hardly have acted as an incentive
to fresh effort. At the same time it must be admitted that the
screw-propeller as a possibility for marine propulsion was known in a
vague way to the engineering practice of the day, and it is at this time
of course quite impossible to say how much may have been known by
Ericsson, Smith, or others concerned in later developments, or to what
extent they may have been dependent for suggestion on what had preceded
them. The question of who invented the screw-propeller in the absolute
sense is entirely futile and without answer. No one could ever have
reasonably advanced any such unique claim. At the best it is simply a
question of the relative influence in the introduction, improvement, and
practical application of what was the common property of the engineering
practice of the day.
In 1833, or at the period now under consideration, however, the
paddle-wheel was the recognized instrument of marine propulsion. Since
the beginning of the century it had been growing in use with the gradual
growth in the application of steam, and at this time it held the field
alone. Some years earlier it appears that some of the objections to the
paddle-wheel had become plainly apparent to Ericsson, although,
occupied with other matters as he was, there was no immediate result. He
apparently recognized that the slow revolutions possible with the
paddle-wheel did not favor the improvement of the steam-engine along the
lines which have since been followed, and he saw clearly that for
warship purposes the engines employed, exposed above the water-line to
destruction from the shell of an enemy, were entirely out of the
question. Finally in 1833 and 1834 we find him employed by a carrying
company in London to conduct numerous trials with submerged propellers
in the London and Birmingham canal. In an affidavit made in March, 1845,
he states that in 1833 his attention was particularly called to the
subject of oblique propulsion, and that under his direction propellers
of various patterns and embodying these principles were fitted on a
canal-boat named the "Francis," and later in 1834 to another called the
"Annatorius." Shortly after this, or in 1835, his ideas took more
definite form, and he refers to his work in a letter to his friend John
Bourne in the following terms:--
"1835. Designed a rotary propeller to be actuated by steam-power
consisting of a series of segments of a screw attached to a thin broad
hoop supported by arms so twisted as also to form part of a screw. The
propeller subsequently applied to the steamship 'Princeton' was
identical with my said design of 1835. Even the mode adopted to
determine, by geometrical construction, the twist of the blades and arms
of the 'Princeton's' and other propellers was identical with my design
of the year last mentioned."
At about this same time, or in 1835, the attention of Mr. F.P. Smith
seems to have been drawn to the subject of the screw-propeller, and we
find him taking out a patent for his form, consisting of an elongated
helix or spiral of several turns, under date of May 31, 1836. Ericsson's
patent followed some six weeks later, or on July 13, 1836. While it thus
appears that Ericsson had been studying the problem since 1833 or
earlier, according to his own statements, there is no evidence that
Smith's attention was drawn to the matter earlier than 1835. Delay on
Ericsson's part in the matter of patent gives the earlier date to Smith.
The mere date of a patent, however, is of small moment for our present
purposes. It must be admitted that the modern form of screw-propeller is
quite unlike either of these original forms, although they all involve
of course the same fundamental principles. Ericsson's propeller may
properly be called an engineering success, built on sound principles,
but improved and largely modified by the results of later experience and
research. Smith's propeller, while capable of propelling a boat, was the
design of an amateur rather than of an engineer, and in comparison with
Ericsson's seemed to show a somewhat less accurate appreciation of the
underlying principles upon which the propeller operates.
In the present case, as we have noted above, the question is not so much
one of invention as of influence in introduction, adaptation, and
improvement. The screw-propeller was already known, but had not been
introduced into and made a part of actual engineering practice. Services
in this direction are all that can be claimed for any of those concerned
with the question during the third decade of the Nineteenth Century.
From this point of view we must give to Ericsson large credit. He had
the courage of his convictions, and did not allow his work in this
direction to lapse for lack of effort on his part to secure its
introduction into the practice of the day.
Thus, in 1837, the "Francis B. Ogden" was built for the special purpose
of testing the power of the screw-propeller, and was operated on the
Thames for the benefit of the British Admiralty and many others. Shortly
after this, and largely through the influence of Capt. Robert F.
Stockton of the American Navy and Francis B. Ogden, the American Consul
at Liverpool, Ericsson began to consider a visit to the United States
for the purpose of building, under Stockton's auspices, a vessel for the
United States Navy. While these negotiations were under way, in 1838, he
built for Captain Stockton a screw-steamer named the "Robert F.
Stockton," the trials of which attracted much attention from the public
at large and from engineers of the time. At about the same period
Ericsson's propeller was fitted to a canal-boat called the "Novelty,"
plying between Manchester and London. This was presumably the first
instance of a screw-propeller employed on a vessel actually used for
commercial purposes.
Finally, in pursuance of Ericsson's plans with Captain Stockton, he left
England Nov. 1, 1839, and started for New York in the steamer "Great
Western," where he arrived November 23, after a long and stormy passage.
We now reach the final scene of Ericsson's life and professional
activities. His visit was at first intended only as temporary, and he
seems to have anticipated an early return after carrying out his plans
with reference to a ship for the United States Navy. To quote from a
letter to his friend, Mr. John O. Sargent, he says: "I visited this
country at Mr. Ogden's most earnest solicitations to introduce my
propeller on the canals and inland waters of the United States. I had at
the same time strong reasons for supposing that Stockton would be able
to start the 'big frigate' for which I had prepared such laborious plans
in England." The event was otherwise determined, however, and during the
remaining fifty years of his life he lived and wrought in the New World,
and as a citizen of his adopted country.
If the record of his twelve years of work in London was long, that for
the remaining and maturer years of his life may well be imagined as
vastly greater. During the earlier part of this period, or until the
Civil War, when all his energies were concentrated upon his work in
connection with the "Monitor" type of warship, we find the same wealth
of invention and human energy, but for the most part directed along
lines related to marine and naval construction. It was a period of
training for the fuller fruitage of his genius during the Civil War.
Shortly after his arrival, or in 1840, a prize was offered by the
Mechanics' Institute of New York for the best plan of a steam
fire-engine. With his previous experience in London, Ericsson easily
carried off the palm and was awarded the prize. He further occupied
himself with the introduction of propellers on boats engaged in the
inland navigation of the United States, with the design and construction
of the United States steam frigate "Princeton," with the development of
the compound principle in the steam-engine, then in 1851 with his
hot-air ship "Ericsson," or ship propelled by hot-air or caloric
engines, as they were then termed, and later with caloric engines in
smaller sizes for stationary purposes, of which several thousand were
sold during the next succeeding years.
In the work of introducing his propellers good progress was made,
especially in boats built for use on the Great Lakes, so that by 1844,
when the U.S.S. "Princeton" went into commission, there were in use some
twenty-five vessels with the screw-propeller as a means of propulsion.
The project of building a vessel for the American Navy, the purpose
which had most strongly attracted Ericsson to the United States,
suffered long delay in connection with the arrangements between Captain
Stockton and the naval authorities at Washington. At length, in 1841,
Captain Stockton was authorized to proceed with the construction of a
screw steam frigate of about one thousand tons. This was the U.S.S.
"Princeton," which marks an epoch as the first screw vessel-of-war. She
was followed by the French "Pomone" in 1843, and the English "Amphion"
in 1844, for the equipment of which Ericsson's agent in England, Count
Von Rosen, received commissions from the French and English governments
respectively.
The "Princeton" was completed in due time and was equipped with two
12-inch wrought-iron guns, one brought by Ericsson from England and one
designed and built under the direction of Captain Stockton. At the
trials of the ship in 1844 the latter gun exploded, killing the
Secretaries of State and of the Navy, besides other prominent visitors
on board, and wounding several others. This terrible disaster threw an
entirely undeserved stigma upon the ship herself and upon Ericsson's
work, and it was not until many years after that his name was entirely
free from some kind of reproach in connection with the "Princeton" and
the deplorable results of the accident on board.
These are some of the principal lines of work with which Ericsson
occupied himself during the twenty-two years between 1839 and 1861. At
the latter date came the supreme opportunity of his life, and his
services in the art of naval construction during the remainder of the
Civil War, which was then in progress, are a part of the history of that
great struggle. Here, as with the propeller, volumes might be written in
the attempt to give a full account of the inception, growth, and final
vindication of Ericsson's ideas regarding naval offence and defence, as
expressed by the means available in the engineering practice of the day.
The leading points only can be summarized.
The question of armored ships was in the air. The advantages of armor
had been already demonstrated on the French ship "Gloire" and others in
connection with the naval part of the Crimean War, and there was a
feeling that ironclads of some kind were a necessity of the situation.
These facts were perhaps more clearly realized at the South than at the
North; and early in 1861 we find Mr. Stephen R. Mallory, the Confederate
Secretary of the Navy, taking active steps to raise the "Merrimac,"
which had been sunken at the Norfolk Navy Yard, and convert her into an
armor-clad. Information regarding this project naturally became known to
the Federal authorities, and occasioned President Lincoln and the entire
Cabinet the most serious anxiety. At length on August 3, 1861, the
appointment of a Board was authorized, the duty of which it should be to
examine into the question fully, obtain plans, and recommend the
construction of such armor-clads as they should judge best suited to the
demands of the situation.
Shortly after this, Ericsson forwarded to President Lincoln a
communication in which he offered to construct a vessel "for the
destruction of the Rebel fleet at Norfolk and for scouring the Southern
rivers and inlets of all craft protected by Rebel batteries." For one
reason or another this communication does not seem to have produced any
immediate result. Later, however, when the Board made its report dated
September 16, they registered the opinion that the present demand called
for "vessels invulnerable to shot, of light draft of water, before going
into a more perfect system of large iron-clad seagoing vessels of war."
In pursuance of this idea they recommended the construction of three
vessels,--Ericsson's floating battery, a broadside vessel later known as
the "Ironsides," and the "Galena." Mr. C.S. Bushnell, who was
instrumental in bringing Ericsson's plans actually before the Board,
later associated with himself and Ericsson in the project two gentlemen
of means, and large manufacturers of iron plate, Mr. John A. Griswold
and Mr. John F. Winslow, who advanced most of the money needed, Mr.
Bushnell supplying the remainder. The keel was laid Oct. 25, 1861, and
the "Monitor," as she was named by Ericsson, was launched Jan. 30, 1862,
and was turned over to the Government Feb. 19, 1862. This brief record
of construction leaves untold all history of the ceaseless struggle
against time and of the superb organization and distribution of the work
which made possible the completion of such a piece of work in the period
of one hundred working days.
One important fact which goes far to explain this astonishing speed in
design and construction is found in the fact that Ericsson was not
dealing with an entirely new and freshly developed proposition. He has
stated that the thought of a floating battery, which should be small in
size, but impregnable to the heaviest guns known and yet heavily armed
herself, had long occupied his thoughts in connection with the problem
of the defence of Sweden. Ericsson never forgot his native land, and
gave to her political troubles and to the question of her defence
against her more powerful neighbors much serious thought. As a result of
this study, he had produced as early as 1854 a design embodying all the
essential features of the "Monitor," and this design, shown by a model,
was in that year sent to Napoleon III., who was then at war with Russia.
This was in the hope that he might in this way contribute to the
overthrow of the latter, the hereditary enemy of his native land.
The design, however, was not adopted, and after it was returned was laid
aside to collect the dust of his office, until the experiences of the
Civil War brought it again to the light. The plan in all its main
features had therefore long been matured, and it only remained to
proceed rapidly with the details and with the realization of the idea in
the most suitable materials to be obtained.
The result of the battle between the "Monitor" and the "Merrimac" in
Hampton Roads is a part of history. The relentless devastation which the
latter had begun on the old wooden ships of the American Navy at Hampton
Roads was stayed, and the wild fears at the North concerning the
destruction which she might cause to the shipping and to the seaboard
cities was calmed. The "Merrimac" met her master, and retired from the
conflict crippled and shorn of power for further evil. A short time
later she sank beneath the waters of the Chesapeake, and is now
remembered only as the antagonist of the "Monitor."
If the result of this battle between the "Monitor" and the "Merrimac"
marked a turning-point in the naval aspect of the Civil War, it wrought
a no less marked change in the standing and fortunes of her designer.
Some of his engineering efforts had not met with the success for which
he or his friends had hoped. The engines of the air-ship, while a
success as a piece of mechanism, were so enormous and heavy that she had
to be considered as a commercial failure, and the venture was not
repeated; the deplorable accident on the "Princeton" was by some held to
be in part chargeable to Ericsson, though a later and full knowledge of
the circumstances shows that such was in no wise the case. Again,
Ericsson, as an experimenter and pioneer, was by some considered as a
dreamer, and before the "Monitor" was completed there was no lack of
croakers who prophesied failure or who openly ridiculed the idea. This
condition was of course natural. In many ways Ericsson was ahead of his
age; and, again, it must not be supposed that he avoided mistakes or
that all of his work fully realized the expectations which were based
upon it. Furthermore, Ericsson's spirit was proud, and he was little
disposed to accept criticism from those whom he felt to be unqualified
to pass adequate judgment on his work, while he was especially impatient
under the system by which government work was done. He was therefore but
little disposed to pleasantly submit to the exasperating delays and
interferences with his work which arose from the methods of doing
public business, and it is no more than the simple truth to say that
during the preceding years the relations between Ericsson and the
officials of the Navy Department had often become seriously strained,
and they were seldom in cordial accord regarding the various questions
which arose in connection with his public work.
With the demonstration made by the "Monitor," however, the attitude of
the public changed in a moment, and Ericsson was hailed on every hand as
a public benefactor. He received the thanks of Congress on March 28,
1862, and of the Legislature of the State of New York a little later.
Besides these, he was the recipient of numbers of memorials and
mementoes, and of such praise in every form as might well have disturbed
the equilibrium of a mind less well balanced. In all this change of
public opinion, the one thing which must have given him the deepest
satisfaction was the change in the attitude of the naval authorities at
Washington. He was now considered as one whose ideas had demonstrated
their right to serious and respectful attention, and a large fleet of
vessels of the monitor type was ordered, similar to but larger than the
prototype, and containing such minor changes as experience had
suggested. Yet even this was not accomplished without objection. The
officers of the navy were accustomed to the old type of wooden ship,
and were slow to realize that naval war was, after all, an engineering
problem, and that the ideas of the engineer must now be substituted for
those which had been sanctified by long ages of past experience. Still,
the demonstration was too convincing to admit of serious question, and
Ericsson and his associates in business were busily occupied during the
remainder of the war in the design and construction of a numerous fleet
of vessels of the monitor type.
Ericsson's work during this period was enormous. One design followed
another in quick succession, while work of supervision and inspection
and cares of a business nature all combined to make a burden which would
have broken down a nature less determined and self-centred, and a body
less inured to physical endurance and sustained nervous tension.
This prodigious load was not so much but that he found time to devote to
the needs of other nations, and in 1862 he offered to construct for the
Chilian government a monitor similar to those under construction for the
United States, while later a similar offer was made to the Peruvian
Government. With the close of the Civil War Ericsson found still further
time to devote to the introduction of this type of vessel into foreign
navies, and a considerable part of his time seems to have been occupied
with projects of this character, and more particularly with the question
of the naval defence of his native land. As regards the introduction of
warships of the monitor type, the results were not so pronounced as
might have been expected, and while the influence of the idea is seen in
the practice of every maritime nation in regard to the construction of
its warships, still, for the most part, the leading nations preferred to
make application of the idea in their own way rather than order such
vessels direct from their original designer. Yet in not a few cases the
original type was faithfully copied, though it is not always clear to
what extent Ericsson himself may have had direct contact with their
designs. In 1866 the Swedes were able to test the first of a small fleet
of monitors built after Ericsson's plans. This was called the "John
Ericsson," and was armed with two 15-inch guns presented to Sweden by
Ericsson himself. Later, in 1868, he designed for Spain and
superintended the construction of thirty small gunboats for use in
Cuban waters.
For nearly ten years now Ericsson had devoted most of his energies to
the art of war. It was a time of change and unrest. Heavy guns and armor
had brought about a complete break with the past. The torpedo, which had
made its appearance in crude form during the Civil War, was attracting
more and more attention, and questions of naval offence and defence and
of the best governmental policy were attracting the serious attention of
all whose duty led them into relation with such matters. Into this
problem in its broadest aspects Ericsson threw himself in the early
'seventies with all the ardor of his younger days.
It is proper to explain here that there was one feature of the earlier
plans which were submitted to Napoleon III. in 1854, which he did not
embody in the "Monitor," and which, indeed, was omitted from all
published plans and descriptions of the system given out in former
years. This was a system of submarine or subaqueous attack, which, he
states in a letter to John Bourne, had attracted his attention since
1826. The time now seemed ripe for the presentation and development of
this idea, and he accordingly developed his designs for a torpedo, and
for a method of firing it under water from a gun carried in the bow of a
boat, and suitably opening to allow the discharge of the torpedo
projectile. This was Ericsson's so-called "Destroyer" system, and was
embodied finally in a boat called the "Destroyer," which he built in
company with his friend, Mr. C.H. Delamater, and with which he carried
on numerous experiments. In the end, however, the system did not commend
itself to the naval authorities, and the "Destroyer" was left on her
designer's hands, an instance of difference of opinion between Ericsson
and those charged with the duty of naval administration, and with no
supreme test of war to provide opportunity for the determination as to
which were the more correct in their judgment. With the "Destroyer,"
and his work in connection with her, closes the record of Ericsson's
connection with the advance in naval construction.
During these later years of his life it must not be supposed that he was
less busily occupied than in earlier life. His was a nature which knew
no rest, and to the last day of his life he was literally in the
harness. Only brief mention however can be made of some of the more
important lines of work which interested the closing years of
Ericsson's life.
In connection with his naval designs, he devoted much study to the
improvement of heavy ordnance, both as to the gun and its mounting. In
particular, his mounting of the guns in the "Monitor" was quite
original, and the friction arrangement for absorbing the recoil was a
great improvement over methods then in use, and served as a model for
many copies and adaptations of the same principles in later years by
other designers. In 1863 he also designed and built for the acceptance
of the Government a forged 13-inch wrought-iron gun. While his design
was an advance on those of the day, the demands on the makers of iron
forgings were more than could be successfully met, and the gun developed
some slight cracks in the test, which prevented further developments on
this line. Ericsson always maintained that the tests to which this gun
was submitted were unfairly severe, and he showed how the defects could
be remedied by a steel lining. But the Naval Bureau of Ordnance insisted
that this should be done at his own expense, and as he had already lost
some $20,000 on the gun, he was unwilling to proceed farther, and the
matter was allowed to lapse.