CHAPTER XI

THE END COMES INTO SIGHT: THE SECOND INAUGURATION

When Congress came together in December, 1864, the doom of the

Confederacy was in plain view of all men, at the North and at the South.

If General Grant had sustained frightful losses without having won any

signal victory, yet the losses could be afforded; and the nature of the

man and his methods in warfare were now understood. It was seen that,

with or without victory, and at whatever cost, he had moved relentlessly

forward. His grim, irresistible persistence oppressed, as with a sense

of destiny, those who tried to confront it; every one felt that he was

going to "end the job." He was now beleaguering Petersburg, and few

Southerners doubted that he was sure of taking it and Richmond. In the

middle country Sherman, after taking Atlanta, had soon thereafter

marched cheerily forth on his imposing, theatrical, holiday excursion to

the sea, leaving General Thomas behind him to do the hard fighting with

General Hood. The grave doubt as to whether too severe a task had not

been placed upon Thomas was dispelled by the middle of the month, when

his brilliant victory at Nashville so shattered the Southern army that

it never again attained important proportions. In June preceding, the

notorious destroyer, the Alabama, had been sunk by the Kearsarge. In

November the Shenandoah, the last of the rebel privateers, came into

Liverpool, and was immediately handed over by the British authorities to

Federal officials; for the Englishmen had at last found out who was

going to win in the struggle. In October, the rebel ram Albemarle was

destroyed by the superb gallantry of Lieutenant Cushing. Thus the rebel

flag ceased to fly above any deck. Along the coast very few penetrable

crevices could still be found even by the most enterprising

blockade-runners; and already the arrangements were making which brought

about, a month later, the capture of Fort Fisher and Wilmington.

Under these circumstances the desire to precipitate the pace and to

reach the end with a rush possessed many persons of the nervous and

eager type. They could not spur General Grant, so they gave their

vexatious attention to the President, and endeavored to compel him to

open with the Confederate government negotiations for a settlement,

which they believed, or pretended to believe, might thus be attained.

But Mr. Lincoln was neither to be urged nor wheedled out of his simple

position. In his message to Congress he referred to the number of votes

cast at the recent election as indicating that, in spite of the drain of

war, the population of the North had actually increased during the

preceding four years. This fact shows, he said, "that we are not

exhausted nor in process of exhaustion; that we are _gaining_ strength,

and may, if need be, maintain the contest indefinitely. This as to men.

Material resources are now more complete and abundant than ever. The

natural resources, then, are unexhausted, and, as we believe,

inexhaustible. The public purpose to reëstablish and maintain the

national authority is unchanged, and, as we believe, unchangeable. The

manner of continuing the effort remains to choose. On careful

consideration of all the evidence accessible, it seems to me that no

attempt at negotiation with the insurgent leader could result in any

good. He would accept nothing short of severance of the

Union,--precisely what we will not and cannot give. His declarations to

this effect are explicit and oft-repeated. He does not attempt to

deceive us. He affords us no excuse to deceive ourselves. He cannot

voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it. Between

him and us the issue is distinct, simple, and inflexible. It is an issue

which can only be tried by war, and decided by victory. If we yield, we

are beaten; if the Southern people fail him, he is beaten. Either way,

it would be the victory and defeat following war.

"What is true, however, of him who heads the insurgent cause is not

necessarily true of those who follow. Although he cannot re-accept the

Union, they can; some of them, we know, already desire peace and

reunion. The number of such may increase. They can at any moment have

peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national

authority under the Constitution.

"After so much, the government could not, if it would, maintain war

against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If

questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of

legislation, conference, courts, and votes, operating only in

constitutional and lawful channels. Some certain, and other possible,

questions are, and would be, beyond the executive power to adjust,--as,

for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever might

require the appropriation of money.

"The executive power itself would be greatly diminished by the cessation

of actual war. Pardons and remissions of forfeitures, however, would

still be within executive control. In what spirit and temper this

control would be exercised can be fairly judged of by the past."

If rebels wished to receive, or any Northerners wished to extend, a

kindlier invitation homeward than this, then such rebels and such

Northerners were unreasonable. Very soon the correctness of Mr.

Lincoln's opinion was made so distinct, and his view of the situation

was so thoroughly corroborated, that all men saw clearly that no

reluctance or unreasonable demands upon his part contributed to delay

peace. Mr. Francis P. Blair, senior, though in pursuit of a quite

different object, did the service of setting the President in the true

and satisfactory light before the people. This restless politician was

anxious for leave to seek a conference with Jefferson Davis, but could

not induce Mr. Lincoln to hear a word as to his project. On December 8,

however, by personal insistence, he extorted a simple permit "to pass

our lines, go South, and return." He immediately set out on his journey,

and on January 12 he had an interview with Mr. Davis at Richmond and

made to him a most extraordinary proposition, temptingly decorated with

abundant flowers of rhetoric. Without the rhetoric, the proposition was:

that the pending war should be dropped by both parties for the purpose

of an expedition to expel Maximilian from Mexico, of which tropical

crusade Mr. Davis should be in charge and reap the glory! So ardent and

so sanguine was Mr. Blair in his absurd project, that he fancied that he

had impressed Mr. Davis favorably. But in this undoubtedly he deceived

himself, for in point of fact he succeeded in bringing back nothing more

than a short letter, addressed to himself, in which Mr. Davis expressed

willingness to appoint and send, or to receive, agents "with a view to

secure peace to the two countries." The last two words lay in this rebel

communication like the twin venom fangs in the mouth of a serpent, and

made of it a proposition which could not safely be touched. It served

only as distinct proof that the President had correctly stated the

fixedness of Mr. Davis.

Of more consequence, however, than this useless letter was the news

which Mr. Blair brought: that other high officials in Richmond--"those

who follow," as Mr. Lincoln had hopefully said--were in a temper far

more despondent and yielding than was that of their chief. These men

might be reached. So on January 18, 1865, Mr. Lincoln wrote a few lines,

also addressed to Mr. Blair, saying that he was ready to receive any

Southern agent who should be informally sent to him, "with the view of

securing peace to the people of our one common country." The two

letters, by their closing words, locked horns. Yet Mr. Davis nominated

Alexander H. Stephens, R.M.T. Hunter, and John A. Campbell, as informal

commissioners, and directed them, "in conformity with the letter of Mr.

Lincoln," to go to Washington and informally confer "for the purpose of

securing peace to the two countries." This was disingenuous, and so

obviously so that it was also foolish; for no conference about "two

countries" was "in conformity" with the letter of Mr. Lincoln. By reason

of the difficulty created by this silly trick the commissioners were

delayed at General Grant's headquarters until they succeeded in

concocting a note, which eliminated the obstacle by the simple process

of omitting the objectionable words. Then, on January 31, the President

sent Mr. Seward to meet them, stating to him in writing "that three

things are indispensable, to wit: 1. The restoration of the national

authority throughout all the States. 2. No receding by the executive of

the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed

thereon in the late annual message to Congress, and in preceding

documents. 3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of the war and

the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government. You will inform

them that all propositions of theirs, not inconsistent with the above,

will be considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality.

You will hear all they may choose to say, and report it to me. You will

not assume to definitely consummate anything."

The following day Mr. Lincoln seemed to become uneasy at being

represented by any other person whomsoever in so important a business;

for he decided to go himself and confer personally with the Southerners.

Then ensued, and continued during four hours, on board a steamer in

Hampton Roads, the famous conference between the President and his

secretary of state on the one side and the three Confederate

commissioners on the other. It came to absolutely nothing; nor was there

at any time pending its continuance any chance that it would come to

anything. Mr. Lincoln could neither be led forward nor cajoled sideways,

directly or indirectly, one step from the primal condition of the

restoration of the Union. On the other hand, this was the one

impossible thing for the Confederates. The occasion was historic, and

yet, in fact, it amounted to nothing more than cumulative evidence of a

familiar fact, and really its most interesting feature is that it gave

rise to one of the best of the "Lincoln stories." The President was

persisting that he could not enter into any agreement with "parties in

arms against the government;" Mr. Hunter tried to persuade him to the

contrary, and by way of doing so, cited precedents "of this character

between Charles I. of England and the people in arms against him." Mr.

Lincoln could not lose such an opportunity! "I do not profess," he said,

"to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to

Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is,

_that he lost his head_!" Then silence fell for a time upon Mr. Hunter.

Across the wide chasm of the main question the gentlemen discussed the

smaller topics: reconstruction, concerning which Mr. Lincoln expressed

his well-known, most generous sentiments; confiscation acts, as to which

also he desired to be, and believed that Congress would be, liberal; the

Emancipation Proclamation, and the Thirteenth Amendment, concerning

which he said, that the courts of law must construe the proclamation,

and that he personally should be in favor of appropriating even so much

as four hundred millions of dollars to extinguish slavery, and that he

believed such a measure might be carried through. West Virginia, in his

opinion, must continue to be a separate State. Yet there was little

practical use in discussing, and either agreeing or disagreeing, about

all these dependent parts; they were but limbs which it was useless to

set in shape while the body was lacking. Accordingly the party broke up,

not having found, nor having ever had any prospect of finding, any

common standing-ground. The case was simple; the North was fighting for

Union, the South for disunion, and neither side was yet ready to give up

the struggle. Nevertheless, it is not improbable that Mr. Lincoln, so

far as he personally was concerned, brought back from Hampton Roads all

that he had expected and precisely what he had hoped to bring. For in

the talk of those four hours he had recognized the note of despair, and

had seen that Mr. Davis, though posing still in an imperious and

monumental attitude, was, in fact, standing upon a disintegrated and

crumbling pedestal. It seemed not improbable that the disappointed

supporters of the rebel chief would gladly come back to the old Union if

they could be fairly received, although at this conference they had felt

compelled by the exigencies of an official situation and their

representative character to say that they would not. Accordingly Mr.

Lincoln, having no idea that a road to hearty national re-integration

either should or could be overshadowed by Caudine forks, endeavored to

make as easy as possible the return of discouraged rebels, whether

penitent or impenitent. If they were truly penitent, all was as it

should be. If they were impenitent, he was willing to trust to time to

effect a change of heart. Accordingly he worked out a scheme whereby

Congress should empower him to distribute between the slave States

$400,000,000, in proportion to their respective slave populations, on

condition that "all resistance to the national authority [should] be

abandoned and cease on or before the first day of April next;" one half

the sum to be paid when such resistance should so cease; the other half

whenever, on or before July 1 next, the Thirteenth Amendment should

become valid law. So soon as he should be clothed with authority, he

proposed to issue "a proclamation looking to peace and reunion," in

which he would declare that, upon the conditions stated, he would

exercise this power; that thereupon war should cease and armies be

reduced to a peace basis; that all political offenses should be

pardoned; that all property, except slaves, liable to confiscation or

forfeiture, should be released therefrom (except in cases of intervening

interests of third parties); and that liberality should be recommended

to Congress upon all points not lying within executive control. On the

evening of February 5 he submitted to his cabinet a draft covering these

points. His disappointment may be imagined when he found that not one of

his advisers agreed with him; that his proposition was "unanimously

disapproved." "There may be such a thing," remarked Secretary Welles,

"as so overdoing as to cause a distrust or adverse feeling." It was also

said that the measure probably could not pass Congress; that to attempt

to carry it, without success, would do harm; while if the offer should

really be made, it would be misconstrued by the rebels. In fact scarcely

any Republican was ready to meet the rebels with the free and ample

forgiveness which Lincoln desired to offer; and later opinion seems to

be that his schemes were impracticable.

The fourth of March was close at hand, when Mr. Lincoln was a second

time to address the people who had chosen him to be their ruler. That

black and appalling cloud, which four years ago hung oppressively over

the country, had poured forth its fury and was now passing away. His

anxiety then had been lest the South, making itself deaf to reason and

to right, should force upon the North a civil war; his anxiety now was

lest the North, hardening itself in a severe if not vindictive temper,

should deal so harshly with a conquered South as to perpetuate a

sectional antagonism. To those who had lately come, bearing to him the

formal notification of his election, he had remarked: "Having served

four years in the depths of a great and yet unended national peril, I

can view this call to a second term in no wise more flattering to myself

than as an expression of the public judgment that I may better finish a

difficult work, in which I have labored from the first, than could any

one less severely schooled to the task." Now, mere conquest was not, in

his opinion, a finishing of the difficult work of restoring a Union.

The second inaugural was delivered from the eastern portico of the

Capitol, as follows:--

"FELLOW COUNTRYMEN,--At this second appearing to take the oath of the

presidential office, there is less occasion for an extended address than

there was at the first. Then, a statement, somewhat in detail, of a

course to be pursued, seemed fitting and proper. Now, at the expiration

of four years, during which public declarations have been constantly

called forth on every point and phase of the great contest which still

absorbs the attention and engrosses the energies of the nation, little

that is new could be presented. The progress of our arms, upon which all

else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself; and

it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. With

high hope for the future, no prediction in regard to it is ventured.

"On the occasion corresponding to this four years ago, all thoughts were

anxiously directed to an impending civil war. All dreaded it,--all

sought to avert it. While the inaugural address was being delivered from

this place, devoted altogether to saving the Union without war,

insurgent agents were in the city seeking to destroy it without

war--seeking to dissolve the Union, and divide effects, by negotiation.

Both parties deprecated war; but one of them would make war rather than

let the nation survive; and the other would accept war rather than let

it perish. And the war came.

"One eighth of the whole population were colored slaves, not distributed

generally over the Union, but localized in the southern part of it.

These slaves constituted a peculiar and powerful interest. All knew that

this interest was, somehow, the cause of the war. To strengthen,

perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the

insurgents would rend the Union, even by war; while the government

claimed no right to do more than to restrict the territorial enlargement

of it. Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration

which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the

conflict might cease with, or even before, the conflict itself should

cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental

and astounding. Both read the same Bible, and pray to the same God; and

each invokes his aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men

should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from

the sweat of other men's faces; but let us judge not, that we be not

judged. The prayers of both could not be answered,--that of neither has

been answered fully. The Almighty has his own purposes. 'Woe unto the

world because of offenses! for it must needs be that offenses come; but

woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.' If we shall suppose that

American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of

God, must needs come, but which, having continued through his appointed

time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South

this terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offense came,

shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes

which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we

hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily

pass away. Yet, if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled

by the bondman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be

sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by

another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so

still it must be said, 'The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous

altogether.'

"With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the

right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the

work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who

shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan,--to do

all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among

ourselves, and with all nations."

This speech has taken its place among the most famous of all the written

or spoken compositions in the English language. In parts it has often

been compared with the lofty portions of the Old Testament. Mr.

Lincoln's own contemporaneous criticism is interesting. "I expect it,"

he said, "to wear as well as, perhaps better than, anything I have

produced; but I believe it is not immediately popular. Men are not

flattered by being shown that there has been a difference of purpose

between the Almighty and them. To deny it, however, in this case is to

deny that there is a God governing the world. It is a truth which I

thought needed to be told; and as whatever of humiliation there is in it

falls most directly on myself, I thought others might afford for me to

tell it."

Abraham Lincoln, Volume II · 第 11 / 14 章